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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 1/29/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09167
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Meeting of the NSC, 1/29/75
CREATION DATE
01/29/1975
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200009
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/29/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
REDACTED 4127104
09167
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Wednesday, January 29, 1975
4:30 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. (90 minutes)
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger HR
I. PURPOSE
To review the status of SALT preparations prior to the resumption
of talks in Geneva this week.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: The US Delegation will return to Geneva to fesume
the SALT negotiations on January 31. Since your meeting with
General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok, we have analyzed
several issues which must be settled to obtain a SALT agree-
ment based on the Vladivostok Aide Memoire. The four major
issues are:
1. Verification of MIRV limits.
2. Limitations on cruise missiles.
3. The definition of a heavy bomber.
4. A possible ban on air and land-mobile ICBMs.
At this meeting we will discuss these four issues. Although there
is general agreement on how each should be handled, we will dis-
cuss alternative approaches SO that you will then be in a position
to make your decision on the overall negotiating approach.
DECLASSIPTED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH PORTIONS EXEMP TED
E.O. 12908 SEC. 1.5 (d)
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
stets 9/25/98, OSD etc 4/27/04
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
MR98-40#15 NScettr2119/99 NSC
CIA 5 110/05
BY dal MARADATE 7/20/06
OP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
MIRV Verification -- On verification of the MIRV limits, the
Verification Panel now agrees that even the most elaborate rules
for ensuring adequate verification cannot fully guard against the
types of problems which could arise in the 1980s. Thus, the
Verification Panel is in agreement that we should initially take
a flexible approach toward MIRV verification by simply explaining
to the Soviets the various verification problem areas we see. We
would try to draw out the Soviet delegation by presenting a series
of verification problems we might expect to encounter and discuss
in general terms various "MIRV counting rules. 11 Once we know
what the Soviets want from us and we see how flexible they are
on the issue of MIRV verification, we should be in a much better
position to formulate a precise verification package than we are
now.
The Verification Panel has considered several "MIRV counting
rules" and has divided these rules into three categories:
(a) those which are highly desirable, (b) those which are
desirable but of lower priority, and (c) those which probably
would cause us more problems than they are worth. Each of
the counting rules will be discussed in detail at the meeting.
One further issue which will probably come up concerns the
deployment of MIRVed
Our plans call for deployment of
leaving the remaining
unMIRVed
The difficulty is that if we proceed with this plan but decide at
some point in the negotiations to agree to count MIRVs by
"complex" (one of the "desirable but lower priority" rules
mentioned above), we will have to count all
as MIRVed, although only
will actually be MIRVed.
This would seriously impact our
deployment program in
the 1980s.
DOD estimates that it would cost about $3 million to hold up the
deployment for the 4-5 months it will take to complete
the SALT negotiations. I would recommend that we do this;
however, I understand that Secretary Schlesinger may offer a
different opinion at the meeting.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Cruise Missiles -- As you know, we anticipate difficulties on the
issue of limitations on air-launched cruise missiles. The Soviets
will claim that under the provision of the Aide Memoire, air-
launched cruise missiles of range greater than 600 km should
count as delivery vehicles within the aggregate of 2400. It was
the US understanding that the air-to-surface missile limitations
would apply only to ballistic missiles, not to cruise missiles.
The Verification Panel generally agrees that it is important for
the US to retain the option of deploying long-range air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCMs). We may end up having to propose
alternative limits in other areas in return for Soviet agreement
to permit deployment of long-range ALCMs (up to 3000
kilometers).
Definition of a Heavy Bomber -- The Verification Panel agrees
that the US should initially define the Backfire as a heavy
bomber. However, the Soviets will be certain to reject this
approach. The US could fall off designating the Backfire as a
heavy bomber if the Soviets gave us adequate assurances that
the Backfire would not be used for intercontinental roles. Our
military might be reluctant to endorse this approach, since they
are skeptical that effective guarantees which would inhibit
intercontinental operation of the Backfire can be negotiated.
Mobile ICBMs -- Regarding air and land-mobile ICBMs, there
is agreement that we should let the Soviets take the lead on
this issue. If the Soviets repeat their proposal to ban air-
mobile ICBMs we could propose a combined ban on both air and
land mobiles.
Based on the results of this meeting, I will prepare a NSDM for
your approval which gives detailed instructions to the Delegation
on raising these issues with the Soviets.
Mr. Carl Duckett is prepared to give a briefing on the status of
the new Soviet strategic programs. He will also be prepared to
brief on the latest intelligence projections of Soviet force
deployment within the limits agreed upon at Vladivostok.
After your opening remarks, I suggest you ask me to present the
results of the analytical work prepared by the Verification Panel.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
GERALD FORD WERRANT
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be
announced. There will be a White House photographer.
III. TALKING POINTS
A. At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the major SALT
issues requiring resolution and to go over our general approach
to the negotiations prior to their resumption in Geneva. We
made considerable progress at Vladivostok toward concluding a
successful ten-year agreement limiting strategic offensive arms,
but there are still several major issues which need to be resolved.
2. I want to reemphasize the importance which I attach to these
negotiations. Recent developments in our relations with the Soviet
Union make it clear that these negotiations could be an important
test of our efforts to build a stable relationship with the Soviets.
3. I think we all have to remember the context of our relations
with the Soviets as we enter these negotiations. Given our
difficulties in areas such as trade, there are probably fairly
rigid limits to how far we can push them in other areas. We
must protect our basic security interests, but at the same time,
we must demonstrate as much flexibility as possible.
4. We will begin today by having Mr. Duckett give us the latest
intelligence on the new Soviet systems and then Henry will give
us a rundown on where we stand.
B. At the Close of the Meeting
1. The discussion today has been very helpful in giving me a
perspective on the major outstanding issues. I believe the
Verification Panel has come up with an effective negotiating
approach that will get us started toward resolving these issues.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TIENARY GERALD FORD
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
2. I would like to reemphasize the point Henry raised on overall
US-Soviet relations. Our first priority in the negotiations must
of course be the protection of our vital security interests, but
in our approach to these negotiations, we want to be generally
flexible. We don't want to give the impression that we are going
back on our word, and in particular, we don't want to give the
impression of reopening the Vladivostok agreement.
3. Alex (Johnson), we will get instructions to you within a few
days.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
GERALD FORD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09168
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Talking Points, NSC Meeting, 1/29/75
CREATION DATE
01/29/1975
VOLUME
16 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200009
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/29/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
REDACTED 4/27/04
5/10/05
09168
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
TALKING POINTS
NSC Meeting
Wednesday, January 29, 1975 -- 4:30 p.m.
- Mr. President, our objective in this round of the SALT nego-
tiations will be to transform the Vladivostok agreement into a new SALT
agreement which will cover the period until the end of 1985.
-- You and General Secretary Brezhnev resolved the major
issues for this new agreement in Vladivostok. However, there are
still other issues to be resolved. I will review the analysis we have
done in the Verification Panel on these issues.
-- Underlying our basic approach to these negotiations is the
more general issue of overall US-Soviet relations. This argues for a
flexible approach in the negotiation of these remaining issues.
-- In my view, the Soviets will be particularly sensitive to any
US effort to modify what they perceive to be agreed provisions or any
effort on our part to broaden the scope of the new agreement.
MIRV VERIFICATION
-- The first issue which has been under study is MIR V verification.
-- There are good arguments for obtaining some understanding
with the Soviets on how MIR Ved missiles will be counted.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
GERALD FORD
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5 (a)(c)
state
3/31/05,
OSD
4/27/04
MR -40 NSC
CIA its 5/10/05
BY dal NARA DATE 7/20/06
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
2
-- The Verification Panel initially considered a very extensive
list of potential problems and associated rules for counting MIR Ved
missiles. But since even the most elaborate counting rules cannot
fully guard against all types of problems that could arise near the end
of the ten-year period, all agree that we should take a more flexible
approach on MIRV verification in the upcoming talks, emphasizing the
major problem areas.
-- The approach we would propose to take in Geneva on this issue
is to first describe the problems which we believe could arise and solicit
the Soviet views on possible solutions. In some instances they may be
able to give us explicit assurances, eliminating the necessity for
complicated negotiations.
-- In several cases, as I will describe, we will need Soviet agree-
ment on explicit counting rules for the number of deployed MIRVs.
-- We have divided the counting rules into three categories:
highly desirable, desirable but lower priority, and finally, those which
probably cause us more problems than they are worth.
Highly Desirable Rules
-- I will start with the highly desirable rules.
FORD & LIBRARY
1. Definition of a MIR Ved Missile
An ICBM or SLBM booster of a type flight tested as a MIR Ved
missile will be counted as MIR Ved when deployed, even if a
single warhead version of the booster has also been developed.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
-- One fundamental problem is how to define what constitutes a
MIR Ved missile. The basic question is how many MIRV tests should
be permitted before a missile must be counted as MIR Ved.
-- The Verification Panel concluded that a single MIR V test
should be the criterion for defining a MIR Ved missile. Even though
15 to 20 flight tests would be required for a full MIRV development
program, there seems to be no reason to permit a small number of
tests, such as five.
-- If either side plans an unMIR Ved missile, there is no reason
ever to test it with MIRVs. Insisting that even one test qualifies a
missile as MIR.Ved avoids problems which could arise if a small number
of MIRV tests were permitted.
-- For example, even if as few as five MIR V tests were permitted,
one side might be able to fully develop a MIRV system through a test
program where the MIR V bus dispenses only one warhead on most tests,
and a multiple number of warheads on the permitted five MIRV tests.
- To protect against this scenario, it would be necessary to
have a definition of a MIRV test which included tests where the MIRV
bus only dispenses one warhead. To avoid such complicated definitional
problems, the Verification Panel concluded that a single MIRV test
should be the criterion for defining a MIR Ved missile.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
-- One problem which could arise is that the Soviets may want
to deploy both MIR Ved and unMIRVed SS-18s.
-- We do not see how we can distinguish between silos which contain
MIR Ved and unMIR Ved versions of the same missile. But under this
counting rule, since the SS-18 has been tested with MIRVs, all SS-18
silos will be counted as containing MIR Ved missiles.
-- If the Soviets balk at this approach, we feel it is incumbent on
them to come up with some other acceptable solution. Whenever it is
feasible, we will adopt this type of flexible approach; we will encourage
the Soviets to propose alternative solutions when they find our proposals
objectionable.
2. Counting Changed ICBM Silos as MIR Ved
Count under the MIRV limit all ICBM launchers of types modified
for the purpose of permitting the deployment of MIR Ved missiles.
-- Our basic means for verifying the number of MIR Ved Soviet
ICBMs is to observe modifications to existing silos. We believe all
of the new Soviet MIR Ved ICBMs require silo modifications which we
can identify.
-- Thus, we would tell the Soviets that if they change any silos in
the manner they are now doing for deployment of the SS-17, 18, and 19,
we will have to assume that those silos contain these new missiles.
FORD
We will seek an explicit counting rule to cover this situation.
LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
5
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
3.
Counting MIRVed SLBMs by Class
Count under the MIRV limit all SLBM launchers on a submarine
if any SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed.
For MIRVed SLBMs, we anticipate that the Soviets will
develop a MIRVed SLBM which fits in the existing SS-N-8 launch tubes on
the Delta-class submarines. Once the Soviets start to deploy such a
MIRVed SLBM, we will have to assume that all the SS-N-8 launch tubes
on Delta-class submarines could contain MIRVs.
-- For this reason it would be highly desirable to obtain a
counting rule whereby MIRVed SLBMs are counted by class. We would
prefer to count immediately all the launchers in the class once the first
MIRVed SLBM is deployed. However, we could permit some phased counting
rate such as 200 per year after deployment of a MIRVed SLBM begins.
4. Replacement of MIRVed Launchers
ICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIRVed will always
count as MIRVed unless dismantled, destroyed, or converted to
unMIRVed launchers under mutually agreed procedures.
-- A difficult verification problem could arise in the future if
either side wants to deploy an unMIRVed missile in a launcher which
previously contained a MIRVed missile. For example, near the end of
the ten-year period the Soviets may choose to decrease their number of
MIRVed ICBMs in order to deploy MIRVed SLBMs and still stay within
the 1320 limit. Strict procedures for such replacement of MIRVed
FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
6
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
launchers would have to be negotiated in the SCC; however, currently
we see no way that such replacement can be done without destruction
or dismantling of the ICBM silo.
5. Interference with National Technical Means
No interference with national technical means of verification
including means for verifying the limitations of the MIRV provisions.
-- We would also expect to include in the agreement an explicit pro-
vision banning interference with national technical means of verification of
the MIRV limitations. However, we would not bring up the issue of telemetry
encryption in Geneva.
Desirable Rules, but Lower Priority
There are several other problems for which counting rules would
be desirable but of lower priority.
1. Changes to unMIRVed ICBM Silos
Count under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers whose length or
diameter are changed.
-- The Soviets may wish to modify unMIRVed silos to increase their
hardness. Such modification could make these unMIRVed silos compatible
with the new MIRVed missiles. In particular, an increase of only a few
feet in silo depth may make the SS-11 silos compatible with the SS-17. The
general requirement to count silos modified to permit MIRVs would cover
this, but we might wish to tighten up the rule by banning increases in
the depth or diameter of unMIRVed silos.
SECULA FORD LIBRARY
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
7
-- We could go further and seek a ban on all modifications to
unMIRVed silos. However, this would impact on our
for
since we add
- - Given these complications, we believe that the best approach
is to defer a decision on further constraints on unMIRVed silo changes
until we have heard the Soviet proposals.
2.
Changes to SLBM Launchers
Count under the MIRV limit SLBM launchers which are modified to
permit the deployment of MIRVed missiles, including launchers
whose length or diameter are changed.
As I indicated previously, we expect the Soviets to deploy
a MIRVed SLBM. which fits in the launch tubes on the Delta-class
submarines. However, launcher modifications might also permit MIRV
deployment in Yankee-class submarines.
-- To improve verification in such a situation, it would be
desirable, but not necessary, to have a counting rule where all modified
SLBM launchers are counted as MIRVed. This would also insure that
the launch tubes on the Yankee submarines are, not modified to accept
a MIRVed SLBM without being counted.
3.
Count MIRVed ICBMs by Complex
Count under the MIRV limit all launchers at an ICBM complex
if any launchers at that complex are MIRVed.
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORM
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
8
-- There is also the possibility that the Soviets could covertly
deploy MIRVed missiles in unMIRVed silos. This would be of particular
concern at complexes which contain a mixture of MIRVed launchers and
unMIRVed luanchers.
-- For this reason, it would be preferable to count MIRVed
ICBMs by complex.
-- However, we think that from a tactical standpoint, it would
be prudent if we did not initially raise the issue of counting MIRVed ICBMs
by complex since this may be the solution to the problem of
-- - The Soviets are certain to raise this problem in any discussion
of MIRV verification. The
The Soviets can correctly claim that national technical means
are inadequate for insuring that
- If the Soviets push hard on this issue, we could try an
asymmetric approach whereby MIRVed ICBMs are counted by complexes
for the United States and on the basis of silo modification for the Soviet Union.
-- - An additional problem concerns the deployment of
We plan to deploy
in only
of the
silos.
As a consequence an approach where MIRVed ICBMs are counted by
complex would lead to excessive counting of the number of MIRVed ICBMs
on the US side.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
9
TOP SECEET/SENSITIVE
- If all
launchers are counted as MIRVed, we
would exceed the 1320 limit when the
submarine is
deployed. This would take place in 1981 under the current schedule.
- At that point, we could either stop the
program or
dismantle
silos
which are being counted
as MIRVed. Neither of these alternatives is attractive. In particular,
loss of
would put us even farther from the 2400 overall
limit.
- Another approach would be to try and get Soviet agreement to
designating a portion of
as a MIRVed complex. This may
be possible since the squadron where the
are being
deployed is geographically separable from the rest of the
silos
In either case, I believe we should do nothing with regard to
that deployment until we have a better feel for the outcome of the
negotiations on MIRV verification. The cost, as I understand it, would
be only $3 million to put a hold on the deployment.
Count launchers as MIRVed if operating procedures and ground
GERALD R. FORM
4.
support equipment are changed
Count under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers at complexes at which
current operating procedures and ground support equipment have
been changed.
- If the Soviets attempt to covertly deploy MIRVed missiles in
unMIRVed silos, it would probably require changes to existing operating
procedures and ground support equipment.
POPSECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
10
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
-- To inhibit this cheating scenario, it would be desirable to
have a counting rule whereby ICBM launchers at complexes where
procedures and equipment are changed are automatically counted as
MIRVed.
- - The Soviets will probably object to such a rule on the basis
that they should have the freedom to modernize equipment and procedures
for unMIRVed missiles.
Rules Either not Needed or Undesirable
-- The third category of potential problems and counting rules
includes those of least priority. These would generally be more trouble
than they are worth, either from the standpoint of negotiability or
impact on US programs.
-- However, I will briefly describe each of the problems.
1. Changes in Test Ranges
No relocation of ballistic missile flight test ranges except as agreed.
-- However, it is very unlikely that the Soviets would agree to such
a proposal, and it might also hamper our future testing.
FORD is GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
11
2. Count all Launchers Compatible in Size with New MIRVed Missiles as
MIRVed.
If new types of MIRVed missiles are developed and flight tested,
launchers which are compatible in size with such missiles will
be counted under the MIRV limit.
-- We have some concern that the Soviets will develop a new
MIRVed ICBM which fits in unmodified SS-11 silos.
-- A counting rule which included in the MIRV limit all launchers
compatible in size with a new MIRVed missile would cover this possibility.
-- Unfortunately, this would require all US silos to be counted as
MIRVed when we develop the new
which is designed to fit in
these silos. In addition, with such a counting rule, we would be hard
pressed to defend not counting all
silos as MIRVed since
there already exists a MIRVed missile,
compatible
in sizë with these silos.
3.
Modified MRV Systems
Count new or modified MRV systems as MIRVs.
-- An additional concern is that the Soviets may covertly attempt
to improve their multiple RV systems to give them true MIRV capability.
At present the Soviets have three such systems which cannot independently
target their RVs. They are variants of the SS-11, the SS-9, and the
SS-N-6.
FORD & GRAVED LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
12
-- However, the probability of the Soviets pursuing this approach
to improved MIRV capability is SO unlikely that we don't feel that it is
necessary to seek a counting rule to cover this situation.
4.
MIRVed IRBMs Similar to Mobile ICBMs
Count under the MIRV limit, any type of mobile launchers compatible
with existing MIRVed ICBMs.
The last problem that the Verification Panel analyzed was
the possibility of Soviet deployment of a MIRVed mobile intermediate
range missile which would be indistinguishable from a MIRVed mobile
ICBM. This is a problem that could arise if the new MIRVed mobile
IRBM which the Soviets are developing uses the same launchers as the
SS-16 ICBM. However, this problem is unlikely to emerge and we do
not feel it is necessary to bring it up with the Soviets at this time.
- That summarizes the status of our analysis of the MIRV
verification issue. As I indicated, the approach we propose to take
in Geneva is initially to describe and discuss the major problems with
the Soviets, in particular those in the first two categories. We would
then push hard to get Soviet agreement on explicit counting rules to cover
those problems in the first category.
Cruise Missiles
-- We anticipate problems with the Soviets on the air-launched
cruise missile issue.
FORD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
13
-- They are certain to insist that the Aide Memoire applies to
both ballistic and cruise air-to-surface missiles, even though I told Dobrynin
that in our interpretation only air-launched ballistic missiles were
included in the agreement.
-- We have a strong interest in retaining the option to deploy
long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as a hedge against
improvements in Soviet air defenses in the 1980s, in particular, the
possibility of Soviet deployment of a barrier defense which would
engage US bombers several hundred miles outside the Soviet border.
Such a defense would consist of transport aircraft equipped with radars
similar to our AWACS and long-range interceptor aircraft.
-- We are confident that the B-1 could penetrate such improved
Soviet defenses. However, such a defense could have a significant
capability against the B-52.
-- We have some flexibility on this issue since we can accept
some limitations on air-launched cruise missiles and on other cruise
missiles as well.
-- In our initial position in Geneva we can continue to insist that
ALCMs aren't covered in the Aide Memoire, but we could offer to count
all ALCMs of range greater than 3000 km in the aggregate.
LIBRARY GERALD FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
14
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-- We could also offer to count ALCMs and ballistic ASMs
on transport or tanker aircraft, which are not explicitly limited in the
Aide Memoire. The Aide Memoire only cites ASMs on heavy bombers.
- - In addition, we could offer to count or ban all cruise missiles
of range greater than 3000 km, including sea and land-launched.
-- We see no reason to go beyond this position in the early
stages of the negotiation. However, eventually we may wish to
consider other limitations on cruise missiles, such as counting SLCMs
down to 600 km, in order to obtain Soviet agreement to a higher range
limit on ALCMs.
Heavy Bombers
-- The most important aspect of this issue is whether the Back-
fire will be classed as a heavy bomber.
-- We have a strong basis for an initial position that Backfire
should be counted. It's capability is equal to that of the Soviet Bison,
an acknowledged heavy bomber.
The Soviets are certain to contend that the Backfire is for
naval and other peripheral missions rather than for intercontinental
missions. Our intelligence indicates that the initial Backfire deployment
is consistent with this point of view.
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-- Our principal concern would be deployment of a tanker force
to give the Backfire extended range capability. Thus, we will see if the
Soviets are willing to give us assurances that they will not deploy such a
tanker. force or that Backfires with tanker support will be counted.
- The Soviets may respond that FB-111s should also be counted.
A trade of counting the
FB-111s for counting Backfires would be in
our interest, but the Soviets would probably insist that the 450 F-111s
also be counted.
Mobile ICBMs
-- The Verification Panel also looked at the possibility of
proposing a combined ban on air and land-mobile ICBMs.
-- The Soviets have expressed an interest in the past in banning
air-mobile ICBMs. However, they strongly resisted limits on land-
mobile ICBMs in SALT I and appear to have a land-mobile ICBM program
in the advanced development stage.
-- - The Verification Panel felt we should defer on this issue until
we see what the Soviets propose.
Heavy ICBMs
- - Since the Interim Agreement provision limiting heavy ICBMs
is being carried over, we will probably want an explicit definition of a
heavy ICBM.
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-- We could propose that any new ICBM with throw weight greater
than the SS-19 should be classed as a heavy ICBM.
* *
In sum, our basic approach will be:
-- To discuss the MIRV verification problem with the Soviets
and attempt to obtain their agreement to specific counting rules in the
areas of principal concern.
-- To explore the cruise missile issue with the objective of
parlaying additional limitations into a longer range limitation on air
launched cruise missiles.
-- To include the Backfire as a heavy bomber until the Soviets
provide assurances that it will not be used for intercontinental missions.
-- To defer on the mobile ICBM issue unless the Soviets raise
it.
-- - - To propose that the SS-19 be the upper limit for light ICBMs.
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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February 7, 1975
SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis mo
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting on
SALT, January 29, 1975
Herewith, Jan Lodal's minutes of the January 29 NSC meeting
on SALT. A summary memorandum for the Vice President is
being prepared and will be ready today or tomorrow.
Attachment
TOP SECRET / let 2/98
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ATTACHMENT
FORD & LIBRARY CERALD
FORD is LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09169
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 1/29/75
CREATION DATE
01/29/1975
VOLUME
29 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200009
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 1/29/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
at 5/99
742X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TDP SE CRET/SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Wednesday, January 29, 1975
TIME:
4:39 p.m. to 6:19 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Under Secretary of State for Politico Affairs
Joseph Sisco
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson (SALT Delegation)
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
SERA
BRARY
CIA:
Deputy Director of Science and Technology
Carl Duckett
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
NSC:
Lt General Brent Scowcroft
Jan M. Lodal AmL
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
DECLASSIFIED - E.O. 12958 Sec.
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
FORDO ; LIBRARY 336 .
E.O. 12958 Sect.3,4(b) (i) ond()
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President Ford: It's good to see all of you. The meeting today is to
review the major SALT issues and go over our general approach at
Geneva. First, I would like to say that all of you know how strong and
affirmative I think we should be about the Vladivostok Agreement. I
think the negotiations were most successful, and I was pleased at the
reaction we got at the first meeting with the Congressional leadership.
I am thankful for the help I got from all of you.
The problem we face is to get through next June or July. So in this
meeting, we will go over, after Carl has said a few words about the
current situation, the various issues -- verification, cruise missiles,
Malmstron, etc. Carl?
Mr. Duckett: Bill will do the briefing -- I will assist him as needed.
Mr. Colby: Mr. President, the Soviet repudiation of the 1972 trade
agreement and Brezhnev's physical ailments have generated questions
about possible changes in Soviet foreign policy with respect to detente
and the Soviet attitude toward SALT.
Moscow has provided copious assurances -- both private and public
that, despite the difficulties over the trade agreement, other aspects of
the US-Soviet relationship should go forward. Premier Kosygin was
decidedly upbeat on detente, particularly on the importance of arms
limitation agreements with the US, when he talked with Prime Minister
Whitlam earlier this month. The Soviet press continues to say favorable
things both about the arms limitation agreements reached at Vladivostok,
and about you personally.
On the specific issues of Most Favored Nation, export credits, and
emigration, the signs thus far suggest the Soviets hope for another round
of bargaining on these issues -- although we believe they may be even
tougher bargainers.
Just how fast the Kremlin moves ahead on detente-related policies may
well depend upon Brezhnev's political and physical health when he emerges
from the hospital -- where he has been since December 26.
We don't know exactly what put him there, but he has a history of heart
trouble, has become easily subject to fatigue, and suffers from severe
dental problems that may have required surgery.
In the meantime, other Soviet leaders appear to be carrying on normally,
and we detect no atmosphere of political crisis in Moscow.
is
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Should Brezhnev's health force him to step down, the odds are that his
senior colleagues would monopolize the subsequent decisionmaking.
Kirilenko would probably be the nominal leader, but the leadership
would be collective until age began to take its toll among the seniors,
and the juniors began to inherit -- and contend over -- power.
The seniors, all in their late 60s and early 70s, are not likely to want
any substantial changes in established policy directions. But they might
slow down the pace in a few areas. In particular, Brezhnev's departure
might reduce the Soviet incentive to complete SALT II this summer.
In any case, the Soviets are continuing to develop new strategic weapons.
All four of their new ICBMs are at or near the end of their development
programs. Two of them -- the SS-18 and SS-19 are being deployed
and the SS-16 could now be ready for deployment. They are also flight
testing a new intermediate range ballistic missile -- the SS-20 -- which
appears to be an outgrowth of the 16.
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There are three other developments in Soviet weapons related to SALT
that I would like to discuss. First, a new intermediate range missile I
have already mentioned -- the SS-20
Secondly, the new Backfire bomber may now be entering service with
operational medium bomber units. This aircraft can cover the entire US
on a one-way mission from the Soviet Union. Since July, we have photo-
graphed it at both Long Range and Naval Aviation bases.
A total
of about 40 Backfires have now been produced. By the end of 1975 the
Soviets will probably have a regiment of Backfires -- 25 planes -- fully
operational, and another partially up to strength.
Cruise missiles may also impact on SALT, and since the mid-fifties
the Soviets have developed an extensive inventory.
Most of these missiles are tactical, however, and the Soviets do not now
appear to be developing the kind of long-range ones being considered
by the US for strategic use. But they are capable of deploying strategic
cruise missiles in the next decade.
President Ford: With nuclear payloads?
Mr. Colby: Yes.
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Mr. President, the events at Vladivostok and since have reaffirmed our
belief that the USSR will press a vigorous strategic arms competition,
with emphasis on qualitative force improvements. These events provide
no reason for altering the basic judgments of NIE 11-3/8, which was
published just before the Vladivostok meeting.
The agreements reached at Vladivostok did, however, alter our "best
estimate" of Soviet forces as presented in the NIE, and we have formulated
a new one. It assumes that the Soviets take a balanced approach requiring
only minimal changes in ongoing programs to upgrade their forces. We
are also, of course, looking at other Soviet options.
In developing the rationale for this new best estimate, we concluded that
the Soviets would continue to stress MIRVed ICBMs and emphasize
qualitative improvements. They would also strike a balance between
types of systems, and between survivability and counterforce capability.
Finally, they would allow a slight relaxation in the pace of MIRVing from
that projected in the NIE best estimate, to reduce costs and improve
programming efficiency.
The new best estimate concludes that, to stay within the 2, 400 limit the
Soviets would deploy fewer mobile ICBMs than we projected in the NIE,
dismantle silo-based launchers at two SS-11 complexes, and retire
Bison bombers. We do not believe that the Soviets would be willing, in
the current round of negotiations, to discuss further reductions.
Mr. President, I would like to illustrate, with a series of charts, how
our new best estimate differs from the NIE in its projection of Soviet
forces.
In these charts, the US force is based upon the January 75 Five Year
Defense Program, with the FB-111 excluded. It contains no long range
cruise missiles, or other US programs under development but not yet
programmed for deployment.
This chart shows Soviets delivery vehicles. The Interim Agreement limited
fixed ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers, but not land-mobile ICBMs or
bombers. The projection reached around 2, 600 in the 1980s, compared
to the Vladivostok limits of 2,400 delivery vehicles.
If the Backfire were included -- as illustrated on this overlay -- the
Soviets would be required to make significant reductions in their
projected ICBM and SLBM forces, since as many as 250 Backfire
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could be deployed in Long Range Aviation units by 1985. Including
Backfire might also mean counting the 70 US FB-111.
The next chart, of MIRVed delivery vehicles, shows some 500 fewer
MIRVed missile launchers under the Vladivostok limits than in the NIE
projection. You will note that there is little difference between the
"Vladivostok best" projection and the "NIE best" until 1979, when the
next generation of Soviet weapons -- about which we know little -- is
expected to appear.
The intelligence community disagrees on the most likely mix of MIRVed
systems in the 1980s. The majority believes that the Soviets would
MIRV fewer SLBMs than we projected in the NIE, opting instead for
ICBMs with qualitative improvements beginning in 1983. Others believe
the Soviets would place more emphasis on submarine launched ballistic
missiles than in the majority view, projecting some 200 more MIRVed
SLBMs and fewer improved ICBMs. Under this projection the Soviets
would have more total MIRVed missile launchers in the early 1980s, as
shown by the shaded area on the chart.
If, however, the majority of our community is correct, and the Soviets
do plan to slow the pace of MIRVing in the early 1980s -- as indicated by
the flattened portion of the curve there might be an opportunity to
negotiate reductions in MIRVed missile launchers as well as total delivery
vehicles. The US presumably would have to reduce the number of deployed
MIRVed missiles, while the Soviets refrain from further deployments of
MIRVs in SS-11 silos.
Finally, this chart shows the total warheads in the forces. Here we see
that the total number of weapons in the US programmed forces remains
above either estimate of the Soviet force throughout the next 10 years.
This includes bombers, where the US comes higher.
In conclusion, Mr. President, I think we can make, with considerable
confidence, some statements about the strategic situation in the next ten
years.
The Vladivostok agreement, if implemented, will remove one worry: that
the Soviets might achieve a numerical edge -- in launchers and delivery
vehicles -- which, while not changing the basic strategic situation of mutual
deterrence, could have given them a politically useful image of superiority
among those who focus primarily on quantity.
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During the next ten years of numerical balance, Soviet attention will turn
more and more to qualitative competition with the US. Moscow will
achieve substantial improvements in counterforce capability, flexibility,
and, in the near term, survivability. Soviet agreement to the Vladivostok
terms may stem in part from their pessimism about the prospects of
achieving dramatic advantages through numbers alone, and their con-
sequent desire to focus resources on qualitative improvements instead.
This means that each side will continue to have many more than enough
strategic weapons for assured retaliation after a first strike, or for
"limited option" scenarios. At the same time, we expect the Soviets to
be searching for better -- and possibly quite different -- strategic arms
in the decade of SALT II and beyond.
The Soviets will, accordingly, pursue a vigorous R&D program. But we
do not foresee technological advances which would sharply alter the
strategic balance in the USSR's favor during the next ten years.
President Ford: Thank you very much Bill is that the conclusion?
Secretary Schlesinger: Bill, I have one question -- does it look as if the
17 will not be deployed, and that they will concentrate on the 19?
Mr. Colby: No, they will deploy both.
Mr. Duckett:
We expect a mixed force of
17's and 19's.
Mr. Colby: They are testing both missiles.
Mr. Duckett: It looks like we were wrong earlier when we felt they
might stop the 17 program and deploy only the 19. Recently, there have
been more 17 tests.
Secretary Kissinger: They may have a morale problem with the SS-17s
design bureau (laughter).
Mr. Colby: The testing programadoes not indicate any priority given
to either one.
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Mr. Duckett: It seems clear that both will be deployed.
President Ford: The failure rate appears to be higher on the 17 program.
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Schlesinger: Maybe we will see a token deployment of the 17.
Mr. Colby:
President Ford: Henry, would you like to sum up where we stand?
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, the Verification Panel has
concentrated principally on the verification of the limits agreed to in
Vladivostok and limits related to the definition of various types of
cruise missiles.
Given the sensitive state of US and Soviet realtions, we should concentrate
during the present phase of the talks on describing a number of problems
which we believe could arise and attempting to elicit the Soviet position.
We should reveal our own position only gradually, and not nail ourselves
down to hard and fast position at the beginning. The Verification Panel
has grouped the possible county rules into three categories: highly
desirable, desirable but of low priority, and finally, some proposals
made by various agencies which would be either undesirable or
unnecessary.
I will begin with the desirable rules. For these, the Soviets would have
to come up with a very strong alternative before we would abandon our
position. The first rule concerns the definition of a MIRVed missile.
"An ICBM or SLBM booster of a type flight tested as a MIRVed missile
will be counted as MIRVed when deployed, even if a single warhead
version of the booster has also been developed."
This rule applies to the SS-17, 18, and 19. Any missile in the MIRV
mode, we will consider MIRVed once it is deployed. I see no problem
with the 17 and 19, but there will be problems with the 18. They have
developed a single warhead version. As you remember, Mr. President
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at Vladivostok, they resisted restraining MIRV deployment of the 18;
they will now resist any proposal on all 18's deployed counting as
MIRVs.
President Ford: In Vladivostok, we talked about limiting deployments
of 18's --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but unless the Soviets come up with a new
device, any 18 deployed must be counted as MIRVed. Even on-site
inspection would not help as much. We will tell them that if they come
up with something, we will examine it with respect to the 18. For the
17 and the 19, no single warhead version exists; by definition, once the
17 and 19 are deployed, they will be counted.
Later on, the question will arise when to consider a weapon to be MIRVed.
So we adopted the rule that after a single MIRV test,
the missiles count as MIRV.
President Ford: Whether the test is successful or otherwise --
Secretary Kissinger: A single MIRV test would count. There's no reason
ever to test a missile with MIRVs if one has no intention of deploying it
with MIRVs. If the Soviets make a fuss over this, we may have to come
back to you on it. We may have to go up to no more than five tests. But
there's no reason why they should need this. For new MIRV missiles,
there's no excuse -- once tested, we'll count it in the MIRV total.
I came reluctantly to this view. At first I thought we could permit mo re
tests.
President Ford: How many MIRV missiles do they have -- the 17 and the 19?
Secretary Kissinger: The 17, 18, and 19.
Mr. Colby: How about the 16?
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Mr. Duckett:
President Ford:
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: If they have a MIRV program for it, they will
test it more than once. Only if they're trying to cheat, would they
object to counting it after the first test.
Secretary Schlesinger: It's not our current assessment that the 16 is
MIRVed.
Secretary Kissinger: This is a question of fact. If the Soviets present
a counter argument, we will come back first to the VP and then to you.
The second rule concerns counting changed ICBM silos as MIR Ved,-
"Count under the MIRV limit all ICBM launchers of types modified for the
purpose of permitting the deployment of MIR Ved missiles."
In my estimate, we will not have too much trouble with this rule except with
regard to the 18. We know they plan to deploy the 18 with both single war-
heads and with MIRVs. We know they plan a single warhead deployment
from their extensive testing program, and we know that they plan a MIRV
deployment from the Vladivostok arguments they gave. But I don't think
they realize we've established these counting rules. I don't think they have
focused on them, despite the fact that I have explained to Dobrynin on many
occasions how we plan to proceed.
Mr. Duckett: I might point out that the 18's we have seen deployed so far
we believe to be single warhead versions; I can't imagine given their state
of testing, they have deployed the MIR Ved version yet.
Dr. Ikle: Is it possible they will replace the single warhead SS-18s with
MIR Ved versions before they reach the 1320 level, in which case this
problem would go away?
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Secretary Kissinger: They have a long way to go to get to 1320, so I don't
know. But for now, I believe we will have to count the 18 as MIR Ved.
We'll have problems with the 18, unless as Fred has
suggested, they have decided the limit is so high that they can live with it.
Mr. Duckett: Frankly, Mr. President, we guessed wrong on this program.
They seemed to be going quite slow on their MIR Ved 18 testing, and we thought
maybe this might be a signal that they would be willing to limit the MIRVed
version.
Secretary Kissinger: At Vladivostok, their military seemed ready to go
along with limits on the MIR Ved 18, but Gromyko was not. He made it an
issue of principle not to have sublimits. It reminded me of some people
I knew! (laughter) They refused to give up what they weren't going to do
in any event.
To go on to the next counting rule, it deals with counting SLBMs with MIRVs--
"Count under the MIRV limit all SLBM launchers on a submarine if any
SLBM launchers on submarines of the same class are MIRVed."
President Ford: That is, if they only MIRV- one out of ten?
Secretary Kissinger: The problem is that they have two kinds of submarines--
the Y-class, and the D-class. We believe they may be having problems
developing a MIRV for the D-class, but when it's completed, it will be
compatible with all D-class submarines. We will have then to count all
420 D-class launchers as containing MIRVs. We have come up with a form-
ulation to ease the problem somewhat which would permit them to count only
200 per year --
Deputy Secretary Clements: But that helps only with the production problem --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- We don't believe they can deploy 420 in the
first year. Our intelligence and our conversations with Brezhnev have both
indicated that they do not have much confidence in their SLBMs. Personally,
I do not believe they will want to MIRV 420 SLBMs. But it's hard to tell. We
can start out with this rule in Alex's instructions, and he can ask them to tell
us how they plan to reassure us if they don't like the rule. They're developing
a stretched version of the D-class, and maybe we could count only that, but
I don't know how we would tell the difference.
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Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev tells me that in his perception, their SLBMs
are not very good. So they will probably want to deploy less than 420 MIRVs.
President Ford: How much testing have they done on SLBM MIRVs?
Secretary Kissinger: None. Last June, Brezhnev said he doesn't expect
to have an SLBM MIRV until the late seventies. At that time we were
discussing a five-year agreement with Brezhnev, so that implied he would
have no SLBM MIRVs through that period.
Mr. Duckett:
But even this
would mean that it would be well toward 1980 until this system were ready.
President Ford: But they have single warhead SLBMs operational?
Mr. Duckett: They have both a single and a double warhead version,
Secretary Kissinger: They will have a large number of SLBMs to be counted
in their 2400 total, but no MIRVs in their 1320 total until the late seventies --
that's when we will have a problem.
General Brown: If we propose this rule, we will penalize ourself because we
will have to count our Polaris submarines. There are 180 missiles on ships which
are the same as Poseidon and we will have to count them until we phase
them out.
President Ford: How long will that be?
General Brown: They will have to go out in '83 so we can deploy the Trident.
Secretary Schlesinger: I don't believe I agree with you on that. The Polaris
missile is completely different, and it fits into a smaller tube.
Ambassador Johnson: But they can't distinguish --
Secretary Schlesinger: They can distinguish the difference.
Deputy Secretary Clements: If we try to put the shoe on their foot, the
will turn around and put it on our foot.
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Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is with Minuteman, not with Polaris. As
long as the missile tube is different and we have no MIR V to fit in it, we're
okay. It's like the distinction between their D and Y class.
Deputy Secretary Clements: Their D-class is somewhere between our
Trident and Poseidon.
Secretary Kissinger: We intend to deploy Trident missiles on Poseidon, but
they already count as MIRVs. Our problem is only with the 550 Minuteman III.
In our best judgment, they have to change their silos to deploy MIRV. But
there are no external differences between the Minuteman II and Minuteman III
silos. They will want some restrictions on us, due to the fact that our silos
are the same.
Secretary Schlesinger: Ultimately, I think we will have to fall back on this
issue and perhaps count only their stretched D-class, but Alex's instructions
should be to hold fast initially.
Secretary Kissinger: In each case, Alex should argue that this is our position,
but if they have another way, we will listen to it. I agree with Jim I
believe they have no intention of deploying 420 SLBM MIRVs, so we will
probably have to fall back, but not until Alex comes back for further
instructions.
The fourth rule is "ICBM and SLBM launchers once counted as MIR Ved
will always count as MIR Ved unless dismantled, destroyed, or converted
to unMIR Ved launchers under mutually agreed procedures. " There will
have to be a commitment that once a launcher is counted as MIR Ved, you
cannot say you are putting an unMIR Ved missile unless this is done through
agreed-on procedures.
The fifth rule is "no interference with national technical means of verifica-
tion, including means for verifying the limitations of the MIR V provisions. "
There is some question concerning how exactly we would interpret this.
There is one school of thought which believes we should call attention to
the incompatibility of encrypted telemetry with verification. Personally,
I believe we would have to explain too much about our intelligence to do
this we would have to tell them what we know.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We all agree on that.
Secretary Schlesinger: We think we might be able to come with some
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phraseology, such as no changes in flight test procedures, which would
not require us to say much, but might give us some leverage on the
telemetry.
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Secretary Kissinger: The next rules are in a different category of
desirability -- still desirable, but of lower priority.
The first is to "count under the MIRV limit ICBM launchers whose length
or diameter are changed."
The problem is that if the Soviets attempt to modify their SS-11 silos to
increase their hardness, it will be difficult to figure out if the change is
to convert to an SS-17 silo, or is devised strictly to increase the hardness
of an unMIR Ved silo. We could go further and seek a ban on all modifica-
tions to unMIR Ved silos, but this would presentimmeasurable problems to
us, so we will oppose deepening the silos.
President Ford: They' re permitted a 15 percent increase in dimensions,
aren't they?
Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. President, they are under the Interim
Agreement. But if they increase the diameter, we would have to count
the silo as containing a 17 or a 19. We may be able to accept some
hardening, but if they start digging, we'd have to count it.
Ambassador Johnson: This is really just a tougher version of the second
rule in the first category.
Secretary Kissinger: The problem will come up if they want to increase
the hardness of their 11 silos.
Ambassador Johnson: Then we will have to make a judgment whether it
will hold a MIR V or not.
Mr. Duckett: Of course, with the MIRV numbers so high, there is really
no motivation for them to cheat like this under this agreement. But if you
go for reductions, then the problems change.
Secretary Kissinger: Since there is less incentive for them to cheat, it
ought to be relatively easier to get them to agree to hard rules.
The second rule in this category relates to changes in SLBM launchers --
"Count under the MIRV limit SLBM launchers which are modified to permit
the deployment of MIR Ved missiles, including launchers whose length or
diameter are changed. "
The third rule is to "count under the MIR V limit all launchers at an ICBM-
complex if any launchers at that complex are MIR Ved. "
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This makes it easier for us because if we see any silos compatible with
MIRVs, we would count the whole field. I think that none of us had any
expectations that the Soviets will possibly agree with this -- since all the
others apply only to them and none to us, I suspect that's why the Chiefs
went along with it. (laughter)
But it may be something they want, since any missile we have or are thinking
of having, including the MX, will be compatible with existing silos. We have
played around with the idea of designating for the Soviets which fields have
Minuteman III in them and letting them inspect on-site at Minuteman II silos.
President Ford: This is related to the problem at Malmstrom --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. If we deploy the first 50 there, all 200 would
have to be counted. We would be giving up 150 MIRVs. Therefore, after
the sixth Trident is deployed, we would have to get rid of some Poseidon
or Minuteman III's.
President Ford: The plan is to put in 50 Minuteman III now, and more later?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We have 500 at other fields, plus the 50 at
Malmstrom would complete the planned 550 deployment.
General Brown: (passes out chart) I have a chart here which shows the
Malmstrom deployment (see chart attached).
Secretary Kissinger: If the deployment by complexes is not an issue, there
will be no problem. If it is, we can try to separate the 50 missiles into a
different area. If not, we could look for another field. But this is not a
question of unilateral restraint.
Dr. Ikle: If this does not cost too much, it would gain us some flexibility
in sorting out this issue.
Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to lose 150. We may be able to find a
different way of accounting for 550 -- for example, by inspection -- but I
don't believe they will accept on-site inspection -- Do you Alex?
Ambassador Johnson: No, they won't.
Dr. Ikle: But proposing it may make them stop pressing the issue.
Secretary Kissinger: If we could wait 4 to 6 weeks, we would see how this
issue arises.
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Mr. Duckett: We can often tell their MIRV deployments by seeing their
support base. If they deploy by complex, when the support base shows up
this is a helpful tool in verification.
Secretary Schlesinger: I am disinclined to allow our logic to carry us too
far. The Soviets have never been that interested in this -- they have other
means of verification, including our Congressional testimony. At Malmstrom,
we have prepared to open up the balance of the silos to inspection. That leads
to a deeper issue. Third, we would hold up our program, and this would
reduce the pressure on them to agree.
Secretary Kissinger: That would be true if we were trying to get something
from them, but we don't want anything from them. It would be true if we were
talking about numbers.
Dr. Ikle: It is irreversible once we start. If it's not too costly, we can
always go back and put them in later.
President Ford: How far have we gone so far?
Secretary Schlesinger: Three Minuteman II have been removed -- and two
Minuteman III are at the site. An erector is at the site. The ground support
equipment is already in. We are pretty pregnant, but we have terminated
further action as of now as we agreed last week.
President Ford: What was your schedule if you had not stopped?
Secretary Schlesinger: We would have started this week.
General Brown: We would have completed Minuteman III deployments this
June.
President Ford: In about six months. As Fred mentioned, the cost is
important -- What is the cost of the delay?
General Brown: It's nominal -- We did an estimate and went over it this
morning, and for one month, it would be only about $150,000.
President Ford: What would be the monthly cost after that?
General Brown: Up to three months, only about an additional $6,000 a month.
It's so inexpensive I don't believe it.
Deputy Secretary Clements: It's the contractor's expenditures.
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General Brown: But we are doing most of it in-house.
President Ford: How soon will we know where we stand with the Soviets?
Ambassador Johnson: In about 30 days, hopefully.
Secretary Kissinger: My guess is that if Brezhnev wants an agreement by
June, they will put their cards on the table by mid-March at the latest.
Their position will be substantially different than ours on a whole range of
issues. But we will know at the latest by mid-March. If they don't raise
the Minuteman III problem, and we don't accept, we can go ahead.
Secretary Schlesinger: But what if they do accept -- then what do we do?
Secretary Kissinger: We would find a smaller field with only 150 silos.
General Brown: It would cost half a billion dollars to put the missiles in
another field. There's a lot of sunk cost at Malmstrom -- guidance systems,
silo preparations, and so forth -- which would be wasted.
Dr. Ikle: We also have the option of separating the 50 silos.
General Brown: One indicator they might look for is the MIRV support
building, and we could move it over with the silos.
President Ford: At the Shelby complex?
General Brown: It's now at the base. But if we move it to the complex, it
would put the identifier at the complex. This would be something of an
isolated location.
Secretary Schlesinger: That's no good in any event. You have the facility
at Malmstrom anyway. Their judgment would be if they want to be suspicious,
they would have to count 200.
Deputy Secretary Clements: If we start we can always pull them out later.
President Ford: Except one of the other rules is that once you have it
MIR Ved, it has to count --
Deputy Secretary Clements: We could negate that and take them out.
President Ford: But under one of the highly desirable rules, once they're
deployed, you can't pull them out --
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Deputy Secretary Clements: Oh, I see what you are saying --
Secretary Schlesinger: Of course, the building is already there.
Secretary Kissinger: They will start counting a thousand Minutemen.
They will apply every one of these rules to us. If so, we will lose a
thousand. Probably, after some groaning, they will accept only 550,
but it will cost us somewhere else. The SS-18 problem is identical to
this.
Secretary Schlesinger: If I might interrupt, I'm not sure the price will
increase. My feeling is that if we maintain the program until such time
as we get an agreement, we're better off. Otherwise, the negotiations
will just stretch out.
Secretary Kissinger: They won't stretch out. They want an agreement by
the time Brezhnev gets here. If this agreement blows up, he's in trouble,
politically.
Mr. Colby: We would have two options -- count the 50 as a separate area,
or count all of them, if it's irreversible once they've been deployed.
Secretary Kissinger: It's not yet irreversible, but we can't pull them out
once we start.
President Ford: They will probably go by the hard rule.
Dr. Ikle: If we look at the 80's, they may wish to pull out some MIR Vs and
deploy mobiles.
Secretary Schlesinger: For them to push us on this would just be part of
their negotiating strategy.
Secretary Kissinger: So far they haven't used verification at all to push us --
President Ford: Do we have mixed Minuteman II's and Minuteman III's else-
where?
Deputy Secretary Clements: No.
Secretary Kissinger: George, do we have your paper -- You were going to
check whether you want the Russians running around our ICBM fields?
Deputy Secretary Clements: This would be an opportune time to raise
site inspection -- - this could bring us several good effects.
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Secretary Kissinger: But suppose they accept it -- Are we willing to let them
run around?
Deputy Secretary Clements: Sure.
President Ford: That's certainly a change!
General Brown: We wouldn't let them look just anywhere.
Deputy Secretary Clements: They're not going to be running around like
Henry makes it sound.
President Ford: This would give them a lot more freedom of movement
than anything I've heard before.
General Brown: We could set up a program that would let them tell whether
the missiles are MIR Ved are not. But we are concerned about what they
might see on some of our other equipment -- the electronics, and so forth.
Secretary Kissinger: How do you keep them from seeing that?
General Brown: We would have to limit their movements.
President Ford: How do we know this will satisfy them?
Secretary Schlesinger: It should.
Deputy Secretary Clements: It would be the beginning of agreements on on-
site inspections --
Secretary Kissinger: They will not accept it.
Secretary Schlesinger: It will put the burden on them.
Ambassador Johnson: Even proposing unilateral on-site inspection will give
them problems.
Secretary Kissinger: So far, we haven't seen one specific Soviet verification
proposal. They may say that each side should designate what it wants to
MIRV, and verify the other with national technical means.
Ambassador Johnson: They may not even propose designations, but national
technical means only.
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Secretary Schlesinger: I have not been able to learn what we gain by stopping
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Dr. Ikle: We gain the flexibility to respond to the evolving negotiations. If
they are upset with our Minuteman II - Minuteman III problem, we can
respond by moving support equipment, and so forth.
Secretary Schlesinger: Moving the support equipment would not help.
Secretary Kissinger: We could at least move to another missile field -- -
This would give us two more Tridents.
Secretary Schlesinger: You think we could agree to count 650 if we had only
deployed 550? That's not possible --
Secretary Kissinger: I don't know, but we're not at that point. This would
give us some elbow room to delay by 4 to 6 weeks to permit the Delegation
to see what it could come up with. I believe there's a 50-50 chance that they
want an agreement badly, so it may go easier than we think.
Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure that the cost of the delay is not greater
than the cost of going ahead. If we are already pregnant, it's somewhat like
the Spartan missile, where we were already pregnant.
President Ford: I don't see what a six week delay hurts. If we put them in
now, and are obliged to count all of them, we lose. If we hold up, and there
is no problem, we can proceed.
Secretary Schlesinger: If we move, it costs an additional half a billion dollars.
If they respond favorably, we can give only an embarrassed response --
President Ford: What embarrassed response?
Secretary Schlesinger: If they say yes we agree, we will have to say that we
will have inspection at Malmstrom. We are better off going ahead with the
deployment in the first place.
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President Ford: This is a judgment factor, and there's no way we can tell.
But the odds are better if we hold up at least six weeks, or maybe we will
know quicker.
Ambassador Johnson: I can't make any predictions.
President Ford: Let's go on to the next issue.
Secretary Kissinger: There's one other rule in the desirable category -- - -
Secretary Schlesinger: The last rule on the chart? I have some problems
with that. We may wish to change our ground support equipment. This
could be so prohibitive that it might not be desirable.
Secretary Kissinger: I was going to list it in the next category -- it is
desirable if applied to them, but the problem is if it is applied to us.
We have to decide what we want more.
Dr. Ikle: It doesn't even buy as much with them.
Secretary Kissinger: Going on into the next one, there would be no changes
in test ranges except as agreed.
To con-
tinue getting this data, we would prefer to prohibit changes in test
range locations.
President Ford: Do they have fixed test ranges now?
Secretary Kissinger: They have been to date, but we don't want to be
constrained by this ourselves.
Secretary Schlesinger: I don't understand the rule.
Secretary Kissinger: We considered it, but we don't want it.
The next rule is that "if new types of MIR V missiles are developed and
flight tested, launchers which are compatible in size with such missiles
will be counted under the MIRV limit". The problem we have is with
their SS-11 silos -- we don't want them to develop a new MIRV missile
which fits. But any new missiles we would develop would be compatible
with our existing silos. So if Alex can get this applied unilaterally --
(laughter).
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Dr. Ikle: We may want a softer rule -- such as a requirement to discuss
all new missiles in the SCC. This way we might be able to walk the line
between the MX and the follow-on to the 11.
Mr. Duckett: I'd like to add that we agreed that this one should come out.
We just said initially that we should take a look at it, but now believe it
should come out.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't believe there is any need
to cover these other rules. No one here wants you to approve any of them.
President Ford: And they wouldn't want them.
Secretary Kissinger: There's a long list. We could go down these last
four, but we decided --
President Ford: We either did not want them, or they were undesirable --
Secretary Kissinger: They would be OK for them, but not for us.
Dr. Ikle: Except that we might want to require that the discussion of new
missiles take place in the SCC.
Secretary Schlesinger: Could we go back to Category I for just a second?
The emphasis of the fourth rule must be on the agreed procedures in the
SCC. If later on we wish to remove Minuteman III and deploy more MIRVs
at sea, we may not want to destroy the silos. So the emphasis should be
on SCC agreed procedures. We should not put emphasis on destruction of
the silo.
President Ford: If we moved from the silo to sea, we don't want to be
committed to dismantling it --
Secretary Kissinger: I suspect they would not agree to the procedure, but
I agree with Jim --
The next set of issues deal with cruise missiles. The Soviets will
undoubtedly say that the Aide Memoire applies to both ballistic and cruise
missiles, even though we say only ballistic missiles. From the record,
there is some legitimate ground for confusion. In Vladivostok, we're not
sure the interpreter always interpreted the word ballistic. We have a
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strong interest in retaining the option to deploy long-range air launch
cruise missiles -- I might say that I have some proprietary interest in
them! (laughter) Alex could begin by saying that the Aide Memoire
applies only to ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the Aide Memoire
speaks only of heavy bombers -- other vehicles carrying cruise missiles
are free, such as ships and transport aircraft. This is a perfectly
legitimate interpretation of the Aide Memoire -- more legitimate than
their interpretation of including cruise missiles. We could also propose
that cruise missiles be counted above 3,000 kilometers. In return, any
other aircraft carrying cruise missiles would be counted in the bomber
total, and we would count them on any other vehicles. This closes a
loophole in their favor. But Alex can go here from saying initially that
only ballistic missiles are included. If they want to get bloody on the
Vladivostok agreement, we'll just tell them that we'll put ALCMs on
the cargo planes. That has its problems, but it bothers them --
President Ford: Where do we stand on the development of cruise
missiles?
Deputy Secretary Clements: We plan to fly the first one in one year.
President Ford: What range will it have?
Deputy Secretary Clements: 1500 miles.
President Ford: How big a warhead?
Deputy Secretary Clements:
General Brown:
With the accuracies
we can get, it will be a very significant weapon.
President Ford: Could you repeat the progression, Henry -- our position
at the start will be that only ballistic missiles are included?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- starting with ballistic missiles only, we
would first agree to count ALCMs only above 3000 kilometers. Then we
could agree to count any other aircraft with cruise missiles under a
2400 total, or even ban them on other aircraft.
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President Ford: How would we verify them on other aircraft?
Secretary Kissinger: The verification of ALCMs is in any event mind
boggling. If you say they count only if they are hanging on the aircraft,
they can avoid the limit by not hanging them. If you apply the MIRV
ground rules, any type of aircraft seen carrying them would have to
count. We would verify by never flying them on tankers.
President Ford: Can you verify 1500 versus 3000 kilometers?
Mr. Colby:
Mr. Duckett:
General Brown: Of course, we'll tell them through our publications.
President Ford: That would permit us to verify if they were under 3000
kilometers within the limit. Do we have any information as to their
development program?
Mr. Duckett:
President Ford:
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. Colby: They have an extensive program, but not the same kind as
ours.
Mr. Duckett: Right. They have a lot more experience than we have,
but of a different type.
Secretary Kissinger: They had long-range cruise missiles, but abandoned
them when they went to ballistic missiles.
Mr. Duckett: In the early sixties, they had two programs, which they
cancelled when we cancelled ours.
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Deputy Secretary Clements: Our technology is such that they can't build
the same thing for the next ten years. Our cruise missiles will be
interchangeable -- on aircraft, ships, or submarines. It will be made
the same size to fit on all of them.
Secretary Kissinger: We have a trade off we can make over launch
modes -- tankers, ships, and so forth. We can get the Soviet reaction,
but in this case, their reaction is totally predictable. They will insist
that the Aide Memoire counts cruise missiles. But we can offer as a
solution a longer limit -- counting over 3000 kilometers, together with
counting them on other vehicles.
Ambassador Johnson: It's a fine point, but the Aide Memoire doesn't
count ballistic missiles on other aircraft either.
Secretary Kissinger: That's right. We could put ballistic missiles on
the C-5. We have enough loopholes that we could get somewhere.
President Ford: We're not in a totally defensive position.
Secretary Kissinger: It is in our own interest to close all of these loop-
holes; we want cruise missiles on bombers for penetration, but we don't
want an arms race in cruise missiles on ships, submarines, and so forth.
Secretary Schlesinger: We need to be careful not to foreclose our tactical
cruise missile options.
Secretary Kissinger: But those would be within the 600 kilometers.
Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure 600 kilometers does the job. We
are thinking about deploying some of them in Europe.
President Ford: What range would those be?
Secretary Schlesinger: Probably 1200 kilometers.
General Brown: There's the sea case also --
Ambassador Johnson: Jim, are you talking about land based, or airborne?
Secretary Schlesinger: Airborne.
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Ambassador Johnson: ALCMs up to 3000 kilometers wouldn't be covered,
so airborne would be okay --
Secretary Kissinger: In any event, it's clear that now the Aide Memoire
covers cruise missiles only on heavy bombers. There's a big area in
which Alex can negotiate.
Deputy Secretary Clements: We have good leverage on this.
Dr. Ikle: In the long run, the verification of cruise missiles will be
difficult, and we may want to take them out and put them in a separate
agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: A stalemate on this is totally predictable --
Dr. Ikle: The verification problem of cruise missiles is so severe that
it might contaminate an overall agreement.
Secretary Schlesinger: I think that's right. There's no way to distinguish
cruise missiles from drones, for example. We have drones on our C-130
aircraft. You probably want to put cruise missiles in a codicil to the
agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev will be back in 1977! (laughter)
The other problem we have concerns heavy bombers. Bill, could you put
up the chart with the bombers? (Colby shows chart)
The main issue is the Backfire. It's bigger than the F-111, but smaller
than our B-1. It has identical range/payload characteristics with the
Bison, which we have always counted as a heavy bomber. Thus, there's
a good case that it should be counted.
We can expect the Soviets to strenuously resist this position. Most of
their deployments so far have been with naval units, and our intelligence
indicates that it is intended for peripheral missions.
Mr. Colby: There's some difference within the intelligence community,
but our basic intelligence indicates that it is for peripheral missions,
although it can cover all of the US on one-way missions.
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Mr. Duckett: It is also refuelable, and that gives us some leverage, since
it will be hard for them to explain why it's refuelable if they don't intend
to use it except for peripheral missions.
President Ford: I don't understand the peripheral missions --
Mr. Colby: These are theater missions and naval aviation uses.
Mr. Duckett: It's important to remember that they built 1000 Badger
medium aircraft in the 1950s. This is their largest single program
ever undertaken. Thus, they may have a great incentive to get a new
medium bomber, since they obviously see a considerable need for a
medium bomber. But the question is why refueling --
Secretary Schlesinger: We may have to eventually fall back on this one
also. But our initial position should be hard nosed. If we fall back, we
still need ancillary agreements that if they deploy it with tankers or on
Arctic bases that it would have to count.
President Ford: In other words, if they expand the bases and make them
operational --
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.
Secretary Kissinger: Or deploy tankers.
President Ford: Do they have tankers now?
Mr. Duckett: A few that are really cludged up. They have put tanks in
the Bison aircraft. They have limited experience with tankers, and
limited equipment.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, those are the major issues. There
are others, such as mobile missiles, where they have an intermediate
range missile which could cause problems. But we can come back to
that later. This should not arise initially. Also, the Verification Panel
was unanimous that we need to draw a limit on heavy missiles, since
their new light missiles are considerably heavier than their old ones,
so they don't keep creeping up.
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President Ford: Defined in throw weight?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We want them to agree that any ICBM greater
than the SS-19 would be counted as a heavy ICBM.
Secretary Schlesinger: We may also want to get them to agree to define
a category of "medium" ICBMs between 2500 and 7000 pounds throw weight.
We are beginning to lose the concept of a light missile, and this might set
the basis for some eventual limits on throw weight.
President Ford: Well, gentlemen, thank you. My impression is that we
are making some headway in understanding these problems. Alex, when
do you leave?
Ambassador Johnson: Tomorrow.
President Ford: When's your first meeting?
Ambassador Johnson: Friday, but that should be only exploratory. The
first substantive meeting will be on Monday.
President Ford: Can you estimate any rate of progress?
Ambassador Johnson: I see. two alternatives -- first, they may come
back with a full-blown agreement.
President Ford: And want you to sign it! (laughter)
Ambassador Johnson: They won't want me to sign, but they may lay it
on the table. The other possibility is that they will want to feel out our
position. In either event, within a few days, or a few weeks, we will
know their position.
Secretary Kissinger: We should then put our position forward. There
is every indication that they want an agreement before Brezhnev's visit
here in June. I think it may go faster than Alex expects.
Secretary Schlesinger: I would like to make one last point. Subsequent
to SALT I, on every ambiguity, such as the 15% increase in dimensions,
they pushed us to the limits. They will exploit every ambiguity so we
should tie this down as much as possible.
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President Ford: I agree. But your general thrust, Alex, is that we want
to achieve success. We should aim at an understanding that will culminate
when Brezhnev comes.
Secretary Kissinger: We need to get Alex out of town, before he starts
meeting with the Murphy Commission to tell them how to beat the NSC
system. He did it for four years when he was Under Secretary of State !
(laughter)
President Ford: Have you been up there to testify, Alex?
Ambassador Johnson: Not yet, but Bob and I play golf together every
so often.
President Ford: I heard he has not been as staunch as we would like.
Secretary Schlesinger: Relative to the rest of the Commission, he has
been very, very steadfast! We heard the rest of them on the intelligence
business, and they were really off base; but he has been bringing them
around.
President Ford: I had heard otherwise, but I am glad to hear I may have
been wrong.
Secretary Kissinger: I believe he is coming around.
President Ford: Well, thank you all once again.
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