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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 3/5/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
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Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09170
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Meeting of the NSC, 3/5/75
CREATION DATE
03/05/1975
VOLUME
8 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200010
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
0 pened with portions exempted
5/10/01
3/10/09
6/2/14
B
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SEGRET/CODEWORD
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Wednesday, March 5, 1975
The Cabinet Room
From: Henry A. Kissinger HK
I. PURPOSE
To review issues relating to Soviet compliance with the SALT I
agreement and verification of a SALT II agreement.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: The US recently raised four issues relating to
Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements at a special
session of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) in
Geneva. There has been speculation in the press about some
of the compliance issues including charges that the Soviets
are "violating" provisions of the SALT agreement. In addition,
Senator Jackson has been holding hearings in which compliance
issues have been discussed. Director Colby testified last
month, and Senator Jackson pressed him hard on several
compliance issues. Jackson was obviously seeking evidence
to substantiate a claim that the Soviets are in violation of the
SALT agreement. He will later use this to argue against the
Vladivostok agreement. Secretary Schlesinger is scheduled
to testify this week, and he can probably expect rough treat-
GERALD LIBRATY P. FORD
ment from Jackson.
Although we strongly believe that the Soviets are not in violation
of any of the SALT agreements, several of the issues could be
politically explosive. At this meeting, we will review each of
the issues and update you on where we stand following the end
of the special SCC session last month
TOP SEGRET/CODEWORD - XGDS
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority NLF E.O. 07-81, 13526 Appeac, d,
NARA PmH Date 6/02/2014
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
2
Compliance Issues: The US raised four compliance issues at
the January special session of the SCC. The Issues related to:
1. The volume of the SS-19.
2.
Possible testing of a surface-to-air missile (SAM)
radar for use on part of an ABM system.
3.
Silo-type launch control facilities.
4. Concealment measures.
The negotiating record and relevant details on each of these
issues are as follows:
1. Volume of the SS-19: Throughout SALTI, a major US
goal was to limit Soviet deployment of "heavy" ICBMs. The US
succeeded in freezing the number of modern "heavy" ICBMs
like the SS-9 at 308. We also obtained Soviet agreement not
to convert launchers for light ICBMs like the SS-11 into launchers
for "heavy" ICBMs.
However, the two sides never reached agreement on a definition
of a "heavy" ICBM. The two sides did agree that the dimensions
of ICBM launchers would not be increased by more than 10-15%,
but we never agreed on a criterion for defining a "heavy" missile
itself. Consequently, the US issued a unilateral statement on
May 26, 1972 which said that we "would consider any ICBM having
a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM
now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. 11 However,
the US never clarified to the Soviets what we me ant by
"significantly, " and in any event, the Soviets flatly rejected
our unilateral statement.
The current CIA estimate is that the volume of the SS-19 is more
than
3.3(b)(1)
that of the SS-11. However, since we never
defined what we meant by "significantly" in our unilateral state-
ment and since the Soviets rejected our statement immediately,
we have little legal basis for claiming a violation based upon the
volume of the SS-19.
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
GREATO A. FORD LIBRANDIA
ToΓ SEGRET/CODEWORD
3
Nevertheless, the US pressed the Soviets on this issue in the
SCC to reemphasize the importance we attach to controlling
"heavy" ICBMs and to lay the groundwork for a more precise
distinction between "light" and "heavy" ICBMs in the next
agreement. The Soviet response during the session has been
that the agreed 10-15% limits on increases in the dimensions
of light ICBM launchers is an adequate criterion for ensuring
that light ICBMs are not converted to heavy ICBMs.
2. SA-5 Testing in an ABM Mode: In SALT I, one of our
major concerns was to insure that air defenses were not given
an ABM capability. One of the ABM Treaty provisions which
protects against this possibility is the ban on testing non-ABM
components, such as air defense radars and interceptors, "in
an ABM mode. " To insure that there was no misunderstanding
on the meaning of the term testing in an ABM mode, we included
a unilateral statement which precisely defined the type of testing
which would be prohibited.
Among the activities we cited was the testing of a radar against
an incoming strategic ballistic missile. However, we exempted
range safety and range instrumentation radars from this criteria
since they are necessary components at a test range.
The problem which has developed is that since April of 1974, the
Soviets have been routinely operating what is apparently an air
defense SA-5 radar during ballistic missile tests at the Sary
Shagan ABM test range.
3.3(b)(1)
We raised this issue at the end of the recent SCC session, but
the Soviets have not as yet had a chance to respond.
3. III-X Command and Control Silos: At the time of the
signing of the SALT agreements in 1972, the Soviets had a number
of new large silos under construction which we assumed would all
be for the deployment of new missiles. However, as construction
TOP-SECRET/CODEWORD- XGDS
&
FORD
GERALD
LIBRATY
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
4
of these silos proceeded, it became apparent that some, which
we designated the III-X silos, were probably going to be used as
launch control centers. Nevertheless, we could not preclude the
possibility that these silos could also be used as missile launchers.
We exchanged a number of notes with the Soviets on these silos
pointing out our concerns about the possible employment of these
silos as missile launchers. Their response was that the silos
in question are intended for launch control facilities, and that
we could confirm this from satellite photography.
The communication lines to these silos and other characteristics
do tend to indicate that they will be used for the command and
control of missile launchers; however, we still cannot preclude
their use as missile launchers since they have quick opening
doors and since the old launch control centers have not been
destroyed.
When we raised this issue in the SCC, we indicated that we
would be satisfied if, in the future, they destroyed the old
launch control centers and redesigned the door so it would not
be opened quickly. The Soviet response in the SCC has been
entirely consistent with their earlier replies on this issue
that our national technical means can confirm that the III-X
silos are not intended to launch missiles.
4. Concealment and Deception: As you know, our principal
means of verification is satellite photography. In recognition of
this, the SALT I agreements explicitly banned the use of deliberate
concealment measures which impede verification. However, to
avoid requiring changes in normal maintenance and construction
procedures which had been in effect before the SALT agreements,
the agreement also stipulated that the provisions banning deliberate
concealment would not require changes in existing construction
and overhaul practices. For example, we have for years over-
hauled submarines in covered facilities, a practice we are not
required to change.
The concern which has arisen is an apparently expanding pattern
of Soviet concealment and deception activities over the last year,
These activities include:
Use of canvas and netting over equipment, launch pads,
and revetments at the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar test sites.
FORD
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
R.
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET / CODEWORD
5
-- The erection of shed-like coverings over rail spurs at
a missile production facility, clearly intended to deny photo-
graphic coverage.
-- Concealment of submarine hull sections at a facility
where missile-carrying submarines are constructed.
-- Construction of dummy submarines.
-- Coverings over a missile storage area at an ABM
test range.
At the recent SCC meeting, we asked the Soviets to cease their
concealment activities at the Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar missile
test ranges, the Sary Shagan ABM range, and the Sevordvensk
naval shipyards, and expressed our concern about the expanding
concealment and deception activities. The Soviet response so
far has been mixed. In at least one instance, they claim to be
unable to find the activity we objected to. With respect to the
conçealment activity at test ranges, they claim that such activities
are outside the scope of the Interim Agreement and, thus, not a
valid topic for discussion. Finally, recent intelligence indicates
that they may have already cut back their concealment activities.
At the SCC session the Soviets, as expected, again raised an
analogous concealment issue the issue of US shelters over
ICBM and ABM launchers at Warren and Grand Forks. We had
previously exchanged several notes on this subject. We responded,
as we had in the earlier notes, that the use of shelters over
Minuteman silos is strictly for environmental control as part of
our silo hardening program, and is not intended to provide con-
P.
FORD
cealment. However, we indicated that we would be prepared to
modify our use of these shelters in the context of arrangements
GERALD
LIBRATY
to eliminate other compliance ambiguities.
General Approach to Verification: It is evident from the nature
of the compliance issues described above that there is no evidence
of any violations, or even potential violations, of the basic pro-
visions of the existing agreements. The ambiguities which have
arisen relate principally to the issues of treaty language and the
acknowledged inability to write language that will unambiguously
deal with all activities which could take place during the period
ToΓ SECRET GODEWORD - XGDS
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
6
of the agreement. At the same time, the recent SCC session
is a testimony to the good faith of both parties in recognizing
that ambiguities will arise and that they can be discussed in a
constructive manner.
We must provide the Congress this type of balanced perspective
on the issue of verification of compliance with SALT agreements.
In particular, we must dispel any idea that the existing agree-
ments are crumbling under Soviet violations. Rather, we must
convey that the basic objectives of these agreements -- keeping
both sides to a minimum level of ABM capability and freezing
offensive weapon deployment -- have been met.
Of equal importance, with respect to the SALT agreement
currently being negotiated, we must convey an understanding of
the extent to which a detailed set of MIRV counting rules are
required or advisable. Although we should have clear and
unambiguous provisions convering MIRV verification, we cannot
hope to achieve any extensive set of rules to cover all possible
contingencies. Nor would such a detailed set of rules be
advisable, since too much detail would only induce each side
to work around the rules.
Our basic objective should be to reach an understanding with the
Soviets on the types of MIRV verification problems which could
arise and to insure that there continues to exist a viable
mechanism, such as the SCC, which can handle the ambiguities
that will undoubtedly arise.
After your opening remarks, I suggest that you ask me to review
the compliance issues we raised with the Soviets. Bill Colby and
Carl Duckett are prepared to discuss the latest intelligence on
each issue as we go through them. Finally, we should discuss
our basic approach to verification and the way to handle attacks
such as Jackson's.
B.
Participants: (List at Tab A)
C.
Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will be
announced. There will be a White House photographer.
&
FORD
TOP SECRET GODEWORD XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET /CODEWORD
7
III.
TALKING POINTS
A. At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review those issues.
related to verification with the SALT I agreement and to
discuss the general problem of verification as it relates to
the agreement currently being negotiated.
2. I want to insure that we are doing everything possible to
insure the successful completion of the current negotiations.
3. I know Jackson is holding hearings on compliance. It is
essential that we do not give him any kind of lever to use in
undermining the Vladivostok accords.
4. In addition, I want to emphasize that raising issues which
had been resolved at Vladivostok will only reopen long-standing
disagreements. By tabling provisions which go beyond the
Vladivostok accord, even to counter a similar Soviet move,
would quickly deprive Vladivostok of any significance. If we
are to include a new agreement this summer, we must
continue to be guided by the Vladivostok Aide Memoire.
5. Henry, could you give us a rundown on the compliance issues.
B. At the Close of the Meeting
1. It is clear from this discussion that we have a job on our
hands to provide the proper perspective on compliance, both
to the Congress and to the public.
2. It is apparent that we have no evidence of any Soviet viola-
tions of the SALT agreement. However, Jackson seems
determined to press us hard on every ambiguity. As I said at
the outset, we must not allow Jackson to claim violations of
GERALD R. FORD LIBRAND
SALT I and use that as a vehicle to destroy the chances for
an agreement this summer. There are ambiguities, because
it is impossible to write an agreement which can cover in
advance every detail which may arise. That is precisely
the reason the SCC was set up and that is the way we are
dealing with the current ambiguities.
ToΓ SEGRET /GODEWORD XGDS
TOP SEGRET/CODEWORD
8.
3. We must insure that verification issues, which are
problematical, do not serve as a vehicle to undercut our
whole approach to SALT II. I want each one of you to be
very conscious of this problem and form your discussions
with the Congress in such a way as to permit no chance
for success of any such maneuver.
GERALD z. FORD THE
TOP SECRET /CODEWORD XGDS
MEMORANDUM
1380X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD
March 17, 1975
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davi PMD
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting on
SALT Compliance, March 5, 1975
Attached is a copy of Jan Lodal's minutes of the March 5 NSC
meeting on SALT compliance.
Attachment
TOPSECRETYCODEWORD
Attachment
let 5/25/99
FORDO & 9ERALD LIBRARY
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09171
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal?
RECEIVER'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
TITLE
Minutes of NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
CREATION DATE
03/05/1975
VOLUME
23 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200010
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC letter 2/10/99
let 5/99
1380X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRE LCODEWORD
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Wednesday, March 5, 1975
TIME:
7:34 a.m. to 8:30 a. m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT Compliance
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen George S. Brown
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA:
Mr. Carl Duckett
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to
the President
NSC:
Brent Scowcroft
Jan M. Lodal
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12956 Sec. 3.84
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. I.O (b) (i)
TOR SECRET CODEWORD - XGDS
3.4
MR 98-39,*19, NSC letter 2/10/94
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
By let NARA, Date 5/24/99
TO P\SECRET CODEWORD
2
President Ford: Good Morning. There are four or five issues on
compliance with the SALT I Agreements, questions we have
raised with the Soviets -- Henry, do you want to sum up where the
problem is -- maybe Carl and Bill could add to it also --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, Mr. President -- I would like to begin
by bringing you up-to-date on the status of the Geneva Talks, and
then we can turn to compliance. The Soviets tabled a draft treaty at
the first SALT meeting in Geneva. On:a number of issues, they
differed with our views.
On MIRV Verification, they have said that our existing national
technical means of verification are adequate. We have put forth
several counting rules for distinguishing MIRV launchers -- the
ones we went through at the last NSC meeting. We have now put
these in a protocol to our own draft treaty, but we have left it open
for them to tell us what characteristics of their systems our national
technical means can use to distinguish MIRVs. If they can tell us,
we will bring the proposal here to you.
There is the expected disagreement over cruise versus ballistic
missiles. We have not yet had an opportunity to explore our com-
promise of banning cruise missiles on everything except bombers.
The Soviets' draft also contained two provisions that went beyond the
Vladivostok Agreement. One of these is a limit of 240 on new types
of SLBMs, including our Trident. At your instruction, I pointed out
to Gromyko that we would not negotiate on items inconsistent with
Vladivostok. They have not yet dropped it, but he said they would
consider this point carefully.
We will table a draft treaty very shortly, if we have not already done
so.
Mr. Graybeal: We plan to table it today.
Secretary Kissinger: Well, we will table a draft treaty today?
In summary, the differences that exist are manageable if the Soviets
really want an agreement, or they can be used to stall if they don't
want an agreement. Unless they can satisfy us that our national
technical means can distinguish their MIRVs, we will not
TQP SECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
TAP SECRET CODEWORD
3
accept their approach. Of course, their position has one advantage, in that
it indicates they will not press us on the distinctions between
Minuteman II and Minuteman III.
In short, it is too early to tell how it will come out.
On compliance, Senator Jackson has been holding hearings on the
issues of compliance. Bill testified last week, and I think Jim is
scheduled sometime this week.
Secretary Schlesinger: George and I plan to go up sometime
tomorrow.
Secretary Kissinger: At least if Jackson pulls out JCS documents,
George will know what he is talking about! (Laughter)
Secretary Schlesinger: That is not certain!
Secretary Kissinger: The last time I went up there, Jackson pulled
out some JCS documents which I had never seen, and wouldn't
show them to me, but he wanted me to confirm them. (Laughter)
Jackson is clearly trying to build a case against the Vladivostok
Agreement by pointing to loopholes and ambiguities in the first
agreement, so these can be used as an issue on Vladivostok.
There are four issues which we should discuss --
-- The volume of the SS-19.
-- Possible testing of an SA-5 air defense radar in an ABM mode.
-- The III-X command and control silos.
-- Concealment and deception at missile test and production
facilities.
Secretary Schlesinger: Isn't this a political loser for Jackson?
Isn't he just losing ground by attacking Vladivostok?
President Ford: I think he is.
Secretary Kissinger: I would have thought SO.
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TORSECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
4
President Ford: He has quieted down some from his first blast,
but with these hearings, perhaps he is trying to build a new case
so that he can be ready when the agreement is finished.
Secretary Schlesinger: He has been very inconsistent. He is
trying to run with both the hounds and the hares.
President Ford: Other politicians have tried that also -- ask
Rumsfeld about it -- he is a master! (Laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: On the substance, I agree with Jim -- he
is inconsistent. He said the SALT I numbers were too low, and
the SALT II numbers too high. Perhaps that's why he is now focusing
on verification problems, so he can call the whole thing no good.
Secretary Schlesinger: Our position has to be clear on this --
there are verification problems, but we can handle them. We are
not in some Utopia
Secretary Kissinger: Our ultimate position should be consistent with
the position you outlined. But first, I think we should go through the
specific issues.
The first issue is the SS-19. Throughout SALT I, a major goal of the
US was to limit Soviet deployment of heavy ICBMs. The interim
agreement froze the number of launchers for heavy ICBMs at 308.
However, the two sides never reached agreement on what constituted
a heavy ICBM.
There was some interesting side-play on this. At one point during
the negotiations in Moscow, Brezhnev agreed to no increase in silo
dimensions. The next day, Smirnov pulled back on this.
Therefore, we agreed on the 15% limit on the increases.
But we never fully defined even that, whether it was in all directions,
or just in one.
Consequently, the US issued a unilateral statement which said that
the US would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater
than that of the light ICBM operational to be heavy ICBM. But we
never explained exactly what we meant by "significantly". The Soviets
flatly rejected the unilateral statement.
TOR SECRET/CODEWORD XGDS
TOPSEGRET/CODEWORÍ
5
Later, at one point Laird answered in writing a question from Jackson
by saying that the Soviets would be permitted to increase the volume
of their light missiles only up to about 30%, but again, this is not part
of the formal record, except as a unilateral statement on our part.
Whatever the state of play is now with respect to the 19, one of our
objectives in SALT II is to draw a limit on the size of the missile at
the 18, so there won't be questions like this in the future.
Bill, you might wish to explain what we know about the 18.
Mr. Colby: (Referring to chart.) The point is that it is significantly
larger than the 11. The permitted increase in the size of the silos
is fixed at less than 15%, but we didn't define missile size. Throw
weight was not mentioned either, so this is only a question of volume.
The SS-11, their older missile, is
We think
the SS-19 is
President Ford: And they are putting it in a bigger silo?
Mr. Colby: The silo is the same.
Mr. Duckett: In some cases they have increased the depth by 15%,
but it has a smaller diameter, so the volume is less.
President Ford: It's the volume, not the dimensions --
Mr. Colby: The volume has increased
Of course, there
has been a big increase in throw weight.
Secretary Kissinger: Brezhnev indignantly denied they were increasing
the size of their silos in several meetings. He denied all methods
of increasing the size, except the one they have used, namely digging
down deeper.
Mr. Duckett: One point of interest is that Jackson predicted that the
Soviets would do exactly what they are doing increase their missile
size ase their Inissile
Mr. Colby: We do have Laird's statement that if they increase by 30%,
it would be a violation
Secretary Kissinger: The point is there has been some increase in
the missile, although they have not increased the silo there has
TOP SECRET/CODEWORD - XGDS
BERALD A.FORD LIBRARY
TOPSECRET CODEWORD
6
just been better utilization of the existing space. We can do the same
thing with the MX.
President Ford: That's right -- we can do it in the same way --
Secretary Kissinger: We can do it even better. We have more unused
space in our silos that they do in theirs.
President Ford: We argue that 15% is not applicable?
Secretary Kissinger: The 15% has standing only with respect to the
silo. If we increased our silos by 15%, we could increase our throw
weight tremendously. Even without increasing the silo, the MX will
be in the same class as the SS-19.
The Soviets never accepted our definition of "significantly"
except
with respect to the size of the silo. Any statements made on volume
have been unilateral, and rejected by the Soviets. Laird made statements
to Jackson, but they have no standing with the Soviet Union. In my
view, what they are doing is legal. We have the capacity of putting
in missiles the size of the 19 in our silos also and we would be within
the letter of the agreement.
US
this.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is irony here -- we would be in violation
of our unilateral statement since we accepted it, but the Soviets
would not, since they did not accept it.
President Ford: (To Secretary Schlesinger) Some of these arguments,
l'agree with you, are not very viable politically!
Mr. Clements: Mr. President, when you start talking about the "cube",
which is what you are talking about when you talk about volume, you
should realize that the whole trend of technology is toward miniaturization --
putting more and more into small volume. So volume is not a good
measure of capability in the long run.
Mr. Ikle: That's why we are trying to get the definition in terms of
throw weight.
Secretary Kissinger: That they will never accept.
TOP SECRET / CODEWORD XGDS
LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/CODEWORD
7
Secretary Schlesinger: What position do we want to take on this?
We cannot say that we can do something that they can't. The
position we have to take is that the Soviets are not in violation of
the treaty. We must state that they are in violation of the unilateral
statement, but not the treaty. All this points to is the ineffectiveness
of unilateral statements. They make you feel good, but not much
else.
Mr. Duckett: Jackson makes this point very strongly. He says that
unilateral statements are completely worthless. I'm sure he will
make this point strongly when Jim goes up.
Secretary Kissinger: The next issue concerns the SA-5. The problem
is that we do not want them to turn their air defense systems into
anti-ballistic missile systems. One of the ABM treaty provisions
which protects against this is a ban on testing non-ABM components,
such as air defense radars and SAMs, in an ABM mode.
We described our understand of those activities which constitute testing
in an ABM mode in a unilateral statement. Unlike our statement on the
19, the Soviets did not reject this. Among the activities we describe
as testing in an ABM mode was the testing of a radar against an incoming
missile with the trajectory of a strategic ballistic missile. However,
we exempted range safety and range instrumentation radars since these
are necessary components at a test range.
With this background, the problem is that the Soviets have been operating
what is apparently an SA-5 air defense radar during some ballistic
missile tests at one of their test ranges. We now believe they have been
testing this as a range instrumentation radar. In this case, we're in
the unique situation that this might be a violation of the treaty, although
it does not violate our unilateral statement. Bill, perhaps you can go
through the details --
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: This would be a matter of the greatest concern.
Mr. Colby: The agreement says that neither side will test non-ABM
radars in an ABM mode.
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President Ford:
Mr. Colby:
Nevertheless, this is the closest thing to a technical
violation we have. But our own unilateral statement says if they are using it onl
for range instrumentation, it would not be a violation.
Secretary Schlesinger: It is more ambiguous than that. The average radar
operator is told to look at every target of opportunity, so he probably turns
it on any time he sees something.
President Ford: Even if he knows it as one of their own?
Mr. Colby: It's more regular than that.
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Schlesinger: This is a true ambiguity.
Secretary Kissinger: Particularly since we ourselves pointed out the ambiguity.
Mr. Clements: We could easily have done something like this ourselves.
President Ford: We have the equipment on hand?
Mr. Colby:
Secretary Kissinger: The next ambiguity concerns the III-X command and
control silos. At the time of signing of the SALT agreements in 1972, the
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Soviets had a number of new large silos under construction which we assumed
would all be for the deployment of new missiles. However, as construction
proceeded, it became apparent that some were probably going to be used
as launch control centers. Nevertheless, we could not preclude the possibility
that these silos could also be used as missile launchers. We had many signs
that they intend them to be launch control facilities
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: We have exchanged several notes with them on this.
The number of these related to the size of their total force is small. We
have not said it is a violation, but asked them for clarification.
President Ford: Are all of them in proximity to the old facilities?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes.
Mr. Colby: Yes, except the ones built before the agreement. These did not
have old ones nearby. They knew when we counted 11 of these in the agree-
ment. We believe they may have made changes after this by moving them
much closer to the old one, perhaps attempting to accommodate us.
If one said they could tear the guts out and put a missile in, a process which
would take them 6 months, and you project the numbers to assume they put
one with each silo group, you could come up with about 150--a number
which would not be trivial.
President Ford: If the process takes 6 months, wouldn't we be successful
in detecting them doing so?
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. Colby:
Mr. Duckett: Jackson wants demonstrable proof that they haven't put a
missile in, something we can't get.
General Brown: If this is an effort on the part of the Soviet Union to disguise
cheating, they are spending a whole lot of money to do it. They have put in
tunnels, underground buildings, and extensive electronic equipment, all of
which is very costly.
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Secretary Schlesinger: I think this will clarify itself as they complete con-
struction. Theoretically, it could be a worry, but I do not believe it
will turn out to be a problem.
Mr. Colby: That's possible.
Secretary Schlesinger: We could pursue this with them, but not get hung
up on it.
Secretary Kissinger: But not in a harrassing manner. They have to have
launch control facilities, so if this is not it, it will be something else. We
have proposed to them that they destroy the old one or put on a new door.
So far the Soviets have not been too responsive.
Mr. Duckett: I should point out that we have always believed these are
launch control facilities.
Mr. Colby: Jackson doesn't contest that. But he wants to know how
we can prove at some point in the future they will not be used as launchers.
We can't prove this.
Secretary Kissinger: The next issue concerns concealment and deception.
This can be illustrated by the photos.
Mr. Colby:
Mr. Duckett:
Mr. Colby:
President Ford: Is the cover itself a violation?
Mr. Colby: No, it is an ambiguity - they did not agree not to develop
mobile missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: There are two ambiguities here, Mr. President. First,
they did not agree to put their test range under controls. Second, mobile
missiles were not part of the SALT I agreements, although they are part of
SALT II.
President Ford: This is a testing facility?
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Mr. Colby: Yes, it is a test center.
Mr. Duckett: In addition, nets like this were in place before SALT I was
signed, so they could also argue that they are not changing their practices.
Mr. Colby: (referring to photograph) Here is another example. They have
put a net over this revetment. It has since been taken away.
President Ford: What did it show when they removed it?
Mr. Duckett: Just a revetment. Whatever was under it was movable.
Mr. Colby: At the same test site, there is a problem,
Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that if they deploy it under netting,
it would be a violation of the agreement.
Mr. Duckett:
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Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems. First, how to count
the 20. Second, what happens if they deploy them under nets.
Mr. Graybeal : There is no evidence they have deployed anything
under nets to date
this has all been at test ranges.
Secretary Kissinger: If they deploy the 20, we will have an argument
on counting it.
Director Colby: (Referring to photograph) This is not an example of
concealment, but rather deception. This is a dummy rubber submarine.
Here we caught one with a bend in it it's designed to go around curves --
(laughter)
President Ford: They have some great naval architects!
Director Colby: It is hard to figure out what these are for. It's
probably a pure deception target for bombers.
President Ford: Would it deceive our Air Force?
General Brown: Is there anything on it that gives a radar return?
Mr. Duckett:
We think it
may be a test activity.
Director Colby: Earlier, they built some wooden submarines. We later
saw them broken up on the shore.
Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what this violates --
Director Colby: No, it just reflects theirppenchart for secrecy. The
Soviet military once complained that our military were letting our
civilians in on too many military secrets.
(Referring to next picture)
Mr. Duckett:
President Ford:
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Mr. Duckett: Yes. It is not very effective concealment.
Secretary Schlesinger: I'm not sure. They are playing a shell game,
and we don't know what they're up to.
Secretary Kissinger: We build our submarines in sheds, also.
Director Colby: (Referring to picture) Here is the construction shed
down here.
President Ford:
Director Colby: Yes.
Mr. Duckett: This is where the dummy may come in. We think they
may put the real submarine inside and the dummy outside.
President Ford: (To Schlesinger) It seems to me that when you and
George testify, you'll have no problems. You can say that these are
ambiguities, and that they can be handled.
Secretary Schlesinger: That's true with respect to our testimony.
This last issue, concealment and deception, is a violation of the spirit
of the agreement. We will say we are discussing all of these with them,
and we will have to keep exploring them.
Secretary Kissinger: We would count the dummies (laughter). Seriously,
then that's their problem.
The other problem is that if there is systematic concealment, and if
we have difficulty verifying, we will have to watch them.
We can do exactly what Jim said -- these are all ambiguities that are
the natural results of operating a large complicated strategic force.
President Ford: The one thing this requires us to do is to maximize
our capability to observe and detect their activities.
Director Colby: That leads me to one problem.
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Secretary Schlesinger: They' re going to anyway.
Secretary Kissinger: It's inevitable.
President Ford:
Vice President Rockefeller: If we get agreement on letting fishing fleets
out to 200 miles, maybe that would keep them from coming so close.
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General Brown: But innocent passageispermitted. We fought hard for
innocent passage.
Vice President Rockefeller: You call that innocent?
General Brown: They would.
President Ford: Will this be a problem with Jackson?
Secretary Schlesinger: He could stir up something on it -
President Ford: These are not open hearings, are they?
Schlesinger: No, but --
President Ford: There could be leaks.
Mr. Colby: It might help to know their order of interest. First, the SA -5.
One of Jackson's staffers has apparently said that we testified that they were
violating the agreement on this, but that's not true. Second, the SS-19. On
the 19, they showed us Laird's testimony.
President Ford: Is there anything else, Henry?
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have made some complaints about our
activities. Some are frivolous, like complaints about our old Atlas and
Titan launchers. Others are not. They complained about our covers on
our Minuteman silos. I am uneasy about the covers. If we saw them
doing it, all hell would break loose. You heard Brezhnev complain about
them at Vladivostok. While we said they're for environmental purposes,
they're a problem.
The third complaint concerned the confidentiality of the SCC.
Dr. Ikle : Isn't it our understanding that we will remove the covers?
Secretary Kissinger: If I know General Brown, he will have finished his
program by then -- (laughter)
)
General Brown: I can't speed it up that much it will go on until 1982!
Secretary Kissinger: It's good to offer to remove them.
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Dr. Ikle: We could do without them.
General Brown: I brought a picture of them for you.
President Ford: The netting?
General Brown: No, it's a building in which the contractors work.
(Referring topicture). This gives you an idea of what it's like. We
can modify this to remove the roofs during daylight and good weather.
This would give a 12 hour open period each day. The expense would be
nominal -- 3/4's of a million dollars.
President Ford: We use these only during construction?
General Brown: Yes. We have used them forever. They do get bigger as we
go along --
Mr. Clements: Henry, didn't you also offer on-site inspection to them?
Secretary Kissinger: No. We talked about it here, but we never decided to
offer it to them.
Mr. Clements: We should do it.
Secretary Kissinger: I think we should save on-site inspection for something
more important.
Dr. Ikle: Such as the Minuteman II/Minuteman III problem.
Secretary Kissinger: We don't want to throw it away.
President Ford: Well, thank you --
Secretary Schlesinger: There are two final points. I think we have learned
that in the future, we have to pin down precisely what we mean with them.
We need a greater degree of precision. Second, on the SS-19, which has a
throw weight of 7, 000 lbs versus 1, 800 for the 11. I think we need a
decision to define heavy, medium, and light missiles in the current negotiations.
President Ford: Do we have that now?
Dr. Ikle: Yes --
President Ford: Well, thank you gentlemen.
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Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09313
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
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TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
CREATOR'S NAME
CIA
RECEIVER'S NAME
NSC
TITLE
Graphics used during 3/5/75 NSC Meeting
DESCRIPTION
Analysis of Soviet capability
CREATION DATE
03/1975?
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200010
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETINGS FILE
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 3/5/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
06/21/1999
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET