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The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/13/1975 (evening)"
of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
3716-X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
May 29, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER 8
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting of May 13, 1975
Attached are the minutes of the National Security Council meeting held
on May 13, 1975.
Attachment.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRESTION PRESERVATION
cc: General Scowcroft
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
GERALD LIBRARY FORD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Date:
Tuesday, May 13, 1975
Time:
10:40 p.m. to 12:25 a.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, the White House
Subject:
Seizure of American Ship by Cambodian
Authorities
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
ORIGINAL RETIRE
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. David C. Jones
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
DOD:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
John Marsh
Robert Hartmann
Philip Buchen
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
NSC:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
W. Richard Smyser
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 See. 3.0
MR 91-20, #3 NSC ltr 3/19/96
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
By KBH NARA, Date 3/20/96
BERALD FORD VISABLE
TOP SECREF/SENSITIVE
2
President:
Brent, can you tell us what the situation is ?
Scowcroft:
With regard to the boat that I told you about, we do not
have much time. Our aircraft has used riot control agents twice
That has delayed the boat but it has not stopped it. It is now
about six miles from Kompong Som, according to the pilot.
The pilot is not at all sure that he can disable the boat without
sinking it.
President:
I thought the first boat had reached the shore.
Schlesinger:
It got to the island.
Jones:
It was in range.
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRED PROSERVATION
President:
I understand we sank the second one. And the third one is the
one we are now talking about.
Declassified Photocopy from
Scowcroft:
That is correct. That boat is now six miles from Kompong
Som.
President:
Did the pilot try riot control agents?
Scowcroft:
They were tried and they did not work. Now the pilot is not
sure what to do next.
ORIGINAL
Schlesinger:
He is not certain that there are Caucasians on board.
President:
Let's look at it. If they got to shore, and we have done the
other things we are contemplating, there will not be much
opportunity for them anyway.
Kissinger:
They will hold them for bargaining.
Hartmann:
How can the pilot tell whether the men are Caucasians?
Schlesinger:
By a number of signs, such as their size and the color of
their skin.
Scowcroft:
It is not an easy identification. It is very tough.
Schlesinger:
I would think that avoiding bargaining chips is less of an
objective than not being in a position where the Cambodians
can say that the F-4's killed our own men.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
SERAL
GERALD FORD Limited
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
3
President:
What do we do? Should we let them go into port?
Schlesinger:
Let's continue to try to stop them with riot control agents.
We understand there are 8 to 9 men on board who seem to
be Americans. There are others below who may be
Americans. The pilot thinks there may be more Americans.
President:
What do you recommend?
Schlesinger:
I recommend we sink the speedboats. I do not think we should
sink the other boat but should rather continue to use the riot
control agents.
NOU
Scowcroft:
The pilot is reluctant to attack if he is under instructions not
to sink the boat.
Schlesinger:
That is true. He originally thought that he could disable the
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
boat without sinking it. Then he became reluctant.
President:
What do you think?
Kissinger:
I have just come back into this problem, having been out of
town all day. My instinct would have been as follows:
We have two problems:
ORIGINAL
-- First, the problem of the crew and the ship and of how we
win their release.
-- Second, our general posture which goes beyond the crew
and the ship.
But that sort of thing comes later.
In the immediate situation, I think I agree with Jim. We will
take a beating if we kill the Americans. At the same time,
we must understand that we cannot negotiate for them once
they are on the mainland. If you are willing to take that
position, then I think we can let them go. We should not let
them become bargaining chips.
Scowcroft:
We have already done it on one.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD is LIBRARY CERALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
4
Schlesinger:
There were no Caucasians on it.
Kissinger:
We have a pilot who thinks there may be Caucasians. It would
have been a much better position for us to take that we will
simply hit anything that leaves the island.
President:
Right.
Kissinger:
Now we are debating with the pilot.
President:
I gave the order at the meeting to stop all boats. I cannot
understand what happened on that order, because I heard
that it did not go out until 3:30
NOU
Schlesinger:
It went out by telephone within half an hour after you gave it.
Jones:
We talked to Burns, the Commander out there, immediately.
The confirming order went out later. But our communications
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
are so good that we can get all the information back here im-
mediately to Washington in order to make the decisions from
here.
ORIGINAL RECRED
President:
Was the order given, and at what time, not to permit any
boats to leave the island or come into it? I was told it was
not given until 3:30. That is inexcusable.
Jones:
That was the written order, not the verbal order.
President:
Let's find out when it was given.
Clements:
To assist General Jones, I was with him in the Situation
Room when he gave the order even before he left the White
House.
President:
Let's find out what happened. It is inexcusable to have such a
delay.
Now let us talk about the problem of the moment. It is a
different situation, and I reluctantly agree with Jim and Henry.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TURO
-
FORD is LIBRARY DEBALL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
Schlesinger:
I think we should destroy the boats that still remain at the
island.
President:
That is your recommendation. What do you think, Henry?
Kissinger:
I'm afraid that if we do a few little steps every few hours, we
are in trouble. I think we should go ahead withthe island,
Kompong Som, and the ship all at once. I think people should
have the impression that we are potentially trigger-happy. I
think that once we have our destroyer on station, that is ideal.
Schlesinger:
I agree. It will go in at noon.
Kissinger:
In the meantime, I think we should sink the boats that are at
the island.
Rumsfeld:
I thought the HOLT would get in at 8:00 a. m.
Schlesinger:
We understand it is doing 21 knots, not 25.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Scowcroft:
I have got to get the word out. What should I tell them?
President:
Tell them to sink the boats near the island. On the other
boat, use riot control agents or other methods, but do not
attack it.
ORIGINAL RETH
Marsh:
Supposing the boats near the island have Americans on it.
Should we send some order to use only riot control agents
there?
Kissinger:
I think the pilot should sink them. He should destroy the boats
and not send situation reports.
President:
On one boat, there is a possibility of Caucasians. On the
others, we can't be sure.
Jones:
Suppose we say in our order that they should hit all the boats
in the cove, not just two.
Kissinger:
We don't need to decide on the cove right now. We have some
time.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE-XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD is LIBRARY CENALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
6
President:
Is it 11:00 o' clock there now?
Schlesinger:
It is 10:00 o'clock.
President:
How many hours away is the HOLT?
Kissinger:
Fourteen hours.
Jones:
(Raising a chart) I have tried to put all this in a chart,
indicating when the key actions would take place. The HOLT,
we expect, will arrive at 12:30 Washington time tomorrow.
The CORAL SEA and the HANCOCK will arrive later. We
are not sure of the latter's arrival time because it is having
trouble with one propeller shaft.
The Marines are all airborne. They are on the way to Utapao.
That is the 1,000 Marines. The 150, with their helicopters,
are already there and on the alert. The 1,000 Marines will
Declassified Photocopy from
arrive around 0300 tomorrow morning. That is the time for
Gerald R. Ford Library
the first one. After that the others arrive every few hours.
President:
Then the HOLT arrives at 11:30 Eastern Daylight time
tomorrow. That is 2330 Cambodia time.
And the CORAL SEA about 28 hours from now.
ORIGINAL REF
Jones:
It is making 25 knots. The plots are pretty good. It is moving
towards the spot.
President:
That is not flank speed.
Jones:
That is the best time that they can do.
President:
Flank speed is 33 knots.
Jones:
The Navy says that that is the best time that they can make.
Rumsfeld:
The information this afternoon was that the HANCOCK would
arrive on Friday.
Jones:
This is very tenuous. They are working on one of the shafts.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERAL
CERALA FORD LIBRERY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
7
Rumsfeld:
That is 2200, Friday, the 16th?
Jones:
No, the 15th.
Schlesinger:
We are in serious trouble on the mechanical side. One
shaft is out on the HANCOCK. The OKINAWA has an oiler
out. It is making only 10 knots. There has been a series of
mishaps.
President:
What can be done before daylight ends over there today?
Schlesinger:
We have 11 choppers at Utapao. We can run operations against
the vessel. In addition, we can land on the island with 120
Marines. We can support that with the force from Okinawa.
to land with 1, 000.
Gerald R. Ford Library
RETIRED PRESERVATION/
All together, we would have 270 Marines. In all probability,
we could take the island. The Marines estimate that there
might be about 100 Cambodians on the island. We would prefer
Declassified Photocopy from
President:
If you do not do it during this daylight, you have a delay. How
long would it be?
Schlesinger:
24 hours. We do not have the HOLT there yet. The HOLT will
arrive at noon tomorrow our time. If it is to do anything, I
would prefer to wait until the first light on the 15th. Until the
ORIGINAL
CORAL SEA arrives, all we can use are the helicopters at
Utapao.
Kissinger:
How would the Marines get down?
Jones:
On ladders.
Schlesinger:
The helicopters would hover.
Kissinger:
But if there are 100 troops on the island, why do we not attack
it?
President:
In this daylight cycle, you could put 120 on the ships, and
270 on the island?
Jones:
The total lift is 270. Our plan was to seize the ship with 120,
and then to use the Marines from Okinawa to try to go on the
island.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
of GERALD LIBRARY FORD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
8
It is hazardous to go onto the island with this first group
because you do not have time to recycle. We would have to
let them remain there overnight, against a force that we do
not know.
Kissinger:
Does the CORAL SEA have helicopters?
Jones:
No. It has only two or so that it uses itself. But we could take
the Marines on to the CORAL SEA, and thus get them close
to the island.
Kissinger:
I understand we only have 11 choppers.
TION
Colby:
Couldn't the 270 protect themselves against the force on the
island?
Jones:
We have nothing to confirm the exact force on that island.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Kissinger:
I do not see what we gain by going on with that force tonight.
If you sink the boats in the area, and all'who approach, it does
not matter if we have anybody else on the island. At that
point, nothing will be moving.
My instinct would be to wait for the HOLT and the CORAL
SEA. You can then work with the Marines from the CORAL
ORIGINAL
SEA. Nothing can happen in the meantime. Then I would
assemble a force and really move vigorously.
President:
In other words, the time you gain in this cycle is not worth
the gamble.
Kissinger:
Later you can do more. It might work with the 270. But it
is a risk. It should be decisive and it should look powerful.
Jones:
But it cannot be in 24 hours, only in 48. Once you start
cycling, it takes time.
Schlesinger:
I think that Henry (Kissinger) is thinking of going tomorrow
night.
Rumsfeld:
But you have only a few hours left of daylight.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD i LIBRARY CENALO
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
9
Jones:
That would not be enough.
Schlesinger:
We need the morning of the 16th for a coordinated assault.
Kissinger:
We are talking about 48 hours.
President:
In other words, you are talking about Thursday night our time.
Jones:
On Wednesday night, the CORAL SEA will help a little with
its fighters. But not with Marines. Maybe the HANCOCK
will do it.
Kissinger:
You also have the HOLT.
INVATION
Jones:
With the CORAL SEA, you have other vessels as well. You
will have a total of five ships. You would have a good force,
but it is very late at night to begin to cycle the Marines.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Colby:
Our estimate was that there were 2,000 in Kompong Som.
There is not a large force on the island.'
President:
Do you think we can figure with 100?
RETTE
Colby:
Yes. The KC have just arrived in power. They have probably
not had time to man the island more fully.
ORIGINAL
Clements:
In the time frame that you are talking about, there will not
be an island worth taking. All the Americans will be gone.
President:
Not if we knock out the boats. Unless, of course, they leave
at night.
Clements:
Right. I think they will get out. The HOLT will protect the
ship. But that is not what matters. I doubt that there will be
anything on the island.
Rumsfeld:
Can we not use flares for this?
Jones:
The main thing we use at night is infra-red. We can read it
at night. The P-3's also have searchlights and flares.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORDO & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD & LIBRARY GREATE
TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
10
Rumsfeld:
The P-3's should be good at keeping the boat under control.
Jones:
Yes, unless the weather is bad.
Clements:
The small boats can get through. You cannot get control.
Colby:
The KC may say something soon.
President:
It seems that at a minimum we should wait for the next daylight
cycle, with the HOLT getting there.
Kissinger:
The HOLT will be there then.
CRVA NON
President:
Right. Is it the unanimous view that we should withhold action
until after the CORAL SEA has a full day there?
Schlesinger:
I think you should wait.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Colby:
This is not my business. I do not think you should go tonight.
But I worry about what might happen later. If they get locked
in, if they take reprisals, it would be very difficult for us.
Clements:
I would like to take a middle position. Once the HOLT gets
there, we will have some control. We can do a great deal.
ORIGINAL
Colby:
I think that with the Marines, you have to go soon.
Kissinger:
I am very leery about that operation using ladders.
Schlesinger:
If there is token resistance on the island, the Marines can
handle it. If there is more, they can try to lock in and get
more Marines to land the next day, with the HOLT for additional
support. It is a close call. There are the pressures of time.
It is also possible that the Cambodians will decide to execute
our men.
Colby:
Once we take that ship, the clock is ticking.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD is LIBRARN DERALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
11
Clements:
The HOLT can get them, by speaking to them with loud-
speakers. It can let them know our position.
Kissinger:
But that is not the issue. We should not look as though people
can localize an issue. We have to use the opportunity to
prove that others will be worse off if they tackle us, and not
that they can return to the status quo.
It is not just enough to get the ship's release. Using one
aircraft carrier, one destroyer, and 1, 000 Marines to get
the ship out is not much. I think we should seize the island,
seize the ship, and hit the mainland. I am thinking not of
Cambodia, but of Korea and of the Soviet Union and of others.
It will not help you with the Congress if they get the wrong
impression of the way we will act under such circumstances.
As for the 270 Marines, it had several components. There is
an advantage in speed. The problem is if anything goes wrong,
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
as often does, I think against 100 KC you would lose more
Americans because you do not have erwhelming power. I
am assuming we will not negotiate. We must have an uncon-
ditional release. On balance, I would like to get a more
reliable force.
ORIGINAL RETIR
Clements:
If you want the ship and the Americans, why not let the HOLT
do it? Let the HOLT broadcast that if the Americans are not
released, all hell will break loose.
Kissinger:
What would hell mean in a case like that?
President:
Let's do an add-on to Colby's suggestion. The HOLT is there.
You land 270 Marines. You bomb the airport at Sihanoukville.
Colby:
My schedule is to land the Marines today.
Schlesinger:
Until the CORAL SEA gets there, we have only the aircraft
from Thailand. The inhibitions on the use of the aircraft from
Thailand are greater.
President:
No, you have the B-52's on Guam. They can be used.
Colby:
If you knock out every boat, you have effectiveness.
is
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD i LIBRARY EERALD
CERALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
12
Kissinger:
That is still localizing it. We will not get that many chances.
As Jim says, it would exacerbate the Thai problem.
President:
If we order the Marines to go from Utapao, we could get
270 in there.
Jones:
That was before we lost two helicopters on SAR. I would urge
against going this daylight. The Marines would.just be landing
at Utapao. The helicopter pilots would be tired. Nobody
would be mated up yet. It would be a difficult operation to be
launching at that time, especially since we could not follow up
the same day.
Kissinger:
If you were to give the orders now, Mr. President, there would
still be some hours of delay before the messages were received
and before the preparations were made. By then we would
really only have three more hours of daylight left in order
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
to conduct the operation.
President:
So we rule out any action on this daylight cycle. Then, on the
next day, the HOLT gets there. We then have some more
ORIGINAL RETURN
options. The CORAL SEA, however, doesn't get there until the
next cycle.
Kissinger:
If you wait 24 more hours, you have the HOLT and you also
have the fact that you can use 270 Marines.
Jones:
And, in fact, you have 250 more than you can put in. You also
have the CORAL SEA.
Kissinger:
I am not sure that I would let the HOLT go up against the
vessel. It may be best to keep the HOLT where it can
blockade the island. Then we can seize the island.
Schlesinger:
I agree with Kissinger. But we have to keep in mind that
there are forces on the island. That gives them time to
prepare. It also gives them time to scuttle the ship.
Kissinger:
But they can still scuttle the ship, even with the HOLT alongside
If we could seize the ship quickly, I would agree. I did not
know that the HOLT could board.
President:
Unless sailors are different now, they are not good boarders.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CERALD ? Great
TOP-SECRET/SENSITIVE
13
Schlesinger:
Could any Marines do it?
Jones:
We could get the Marines on the ship, but then we could
not use them for other things.
The suggestion is to go with the first light on the 15th, to
get the HOLT and to hold the island.
Kissinger:
My suggestion is to seize the island. We cannot do anything
tonight. By tomorrow morning, we can put the Marines on
the HOLT. They can operate. I would go for the island at
daybreak of the 15th.
Schlesinger:
The problem with that is that the CORAL SEA will not be
there. If you want an overwhelming force on the island, you
should wait until the 16th.
Kissinger:
The ideal time for what I have in mind is the 16th. That
Declassified Photocopy from
would not just include the island but Kompong Som, the
Gerald R. Ford Library
airport and boats.
President:
If you wait until the 16th, you have maximum capability.
But the people in Utapao should be prepared to operate as
soon as the HOLT gets there, at 11:30 tomorrow night. The
Marines should be alerted.
ORIGINAL
Kissinger:
The HOLT gets there at noon tomorrow. So we can go
from first light. We could seize the island and the ship.
That, however, would not give us the CORAL SEA for such
operations as we would wish to run against Kompong Som.
Schlesinger:
You can get 250 Marines in helicopters.
Colby:
That would mean 500 in two cycles.
President:
The operational orders should be set up so that the HOLT and
the Marines can go. We do not know what will happen in
24 hours. They have options also. We can make a decision
tomorrow if we want to. But we should have orders ready
to go so that they can move within 24 hours. That would
be for the HOLT, the Marines, and the B-52's.
Rumsfeld:
When would it start, then?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE- XGDS
GERALE FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
14
Kissinger:
At 2200 hours tomorrow. I think that when we move, we should
hit the mainland as well as the island. We should hit targets
at Kompong Som and the airfield and say that we are doing it
to suppress any supporting action against our operations to
regain the ship and seize the island.
If the B-52's can do it, I would like to do it tomorrow night.
Forty-eight hours are better militarily. But so much can
happen, domestically and internationally. We have to be ready
to take the island and the ship and to hit Kompong Som.
President:
I think we should be ready to go in 24 hours. We may, however,
want to wait.
Schlesinger:
We will be prepared to go on the morning of the 15th. We will
see if we can get the Marines on the HOLT. At first light, we
will have plans to go to the island. Simultaneously, we will go
for the ship.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
We will have the B-52's at Guam ready to go for Kompong Som
But I think there are political advantages to using the aircraft
from the CORAL SEA. You will have more problems on the
Hill with the B-52's from Guam.
Vice President: Why?
ORIGINAL
Schlesinger:
The B-52's are a red flag on the Hill. Moreover, they bomb
a very large box and they are not so accurate. They might
generate a lot of casualties outside the exact areas that we
would want to hit.
President:
Let's see what the chiefs say is better, the aircraft from the
carrier or the B-52's. It should be their judgment.
Kissinger:
But the CORAL SEA would delay us 24 hours.
Rumsfeld:
But do we have to wait for the CORAL SEA actually to arrive?
Scowcroft:
No. Their planes can operate at considerable distance.
President:
On the 15th, we can use the B-52's from Guam. On the 16th,
we also have the aircraft from the CORAL SEA.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD 7. TORD
FORD LIBRARY LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
15
Jones:
Except, if you use the CORAL SEA, it limits some assets.
Everybody is now on alert. We can do it when you say. We
are ready to go.
Rumsfeld:
Is it not possible that the CORAL SEA aircraft could strike
Cambodia even when the CORAL SEA is still hours away?
Schlesinger:
I'm not sure it would be close enough. Let me check.
Rumsfeld:
The CORAL SEA could be there near that time.
Schlesinger:
Let me check.
President:
You may have an operational problem. If you have to turn the
carrier into the wind in order to dispatch and recover air-
craft, you may lose time.
Declassified Photocopy from
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Schlesinger:
Yes, but if you go for the 15th, you do not need its presence
so soon if you can use the aircraft from'a distance.
Kissinger:
What do we have on the CORAL SEA?
Jones:
We have fighter aircraft, including F-4's and A-7's.
Kissinger:
Would they be more accurate than the B-52's?
ORIGINAL
Jones:
Not necessarily. It depends on the type of target.
Buchen:
I see two problems:
-- The first is Cooper-Church Amendment.
-- The second is international law.
President:
On international law, I do not think we have a problem. They
have clearly violated it.
Buchen:
We have the right of self-defense, but only self-defense. The
Cooper-Church Amendment says no actions in Indochina.
Kissinger:
I think you can legitimately say that our aircraft are suppressing
hostile action against our operation.
:
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President:
We cannot be that concerned in this instance.
Marsh:
This afternoon, we had the NSC prepare a paper saying what
we would do. It showed that you would use force in general
terms. The reaction from the people we talked to was very
favorable.
Clements:
I hate to have us lose sight of our objectives in this case.
Those objectives are to get the Americans and the ship. If
we want to punish people, that's another thing. I think that
dropping a lot of bombs on the mainland will not help us with
the release of the Americans.
RVATION
President:
I think we have to assume that the Americans were taken from
the island and that some were killed. This is tragic, but I
think that we have to assume that it happened. Does anybody
disagree?
Declassified Photocopy from
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(General expressions of agreement.)
Vice President: At a briefing yesterday, Congressman Zablocki, one of the
proponents of the War Powers Act, said that he would tell the
press that the U.S. could bomb the hell out of them.
ORIGINAL RETI:
Schlesinger:
We are not inhibited by the War Powers Act, only by
Cooper-Church.
Colby:
We think there are about three T-28's at Kompong Som airfield.
They could use them. So there is a potential threat at
Kompong Som against our forces.
President:
Can we verify this?
Colby:
This is from a photograph taken on the 12th.
Rumsfeld:
How are those aircrafts equipped?
Colby:
With bombs and guns.
Kissinger:
I think the worst stance is to follow Phil's concern.
If we only respond at the same place at which we are challenged,
nobody can lose by challenging us. They can only win.
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This means, I think, that we have to do more. The Koreans
and others would like to look us over and to see how we react.
Under certain circumstances, in fact, some domestic cost
is to our advantage in demonstrating the seriousness with
which we view this kind of challenge.
President:
Phil and I have argued for years.
Buchen:
I have to state the problems that we face.
President:
In this daylight cycle, unless something unusual comes up, we
will try to prevent boats going to and from the island.
Kissinger:
The latest intelligence shows that there are several small
patrol boats near the island in the cove. I think we should
sink them.
President:
I agree.
Declassified Photocopy from
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Schlesinger:
There are four boats.
President:
I think we should sink any boats that can be used to try to move
the Americans.
Rumsfeld:
But not the ones that carry Americans.
ORIGINAL
Schlesinger:
I disagree with Henry in one case. The legal situation in
Indochina is unique. We should emphasize that. The restraints
of our actions are different from the restraints anywhere
else.
Kissinger:
I would hit, and then deal with the legal implications.
President:
Bill (Colby) should verify that the T-28's are there.
At the second daylight cycle, we are prepared to do more.
The HOLT will be there and the Marines will be ready to go
on it and to be put on the island, with the B-52's and perhaps
the aircraft from the CORAL SEA prepared to strike Kompong
Som. But, unless there is some unusual development, the
actual action will take place 24 hours later.
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Schlesinger:
On the 16th.
Kissinger:
You can decide it then.
President:
The preferable time is 24 hours later.
Kissinger:
That is when the best forces will be available. But that has
to be weighed against other considerations for the extra 24 hours
that you lose. I remember 1969, when the EC-121 was shot
down off Korea. We assembled forces like crazy. But in the
end, we did not do anything. Maybe we shouldn't have. We
will never know.
NOIL
Colby:
There is one other justifiable target in the Kompong Som
area. The old Cambodian Government had 25 patrol boats in
the Ream Naval Base.
Declassified Photocopy from
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(The President, Kissinger, and Schlesinger almost simul-
taneously remark along the lines that that might be a worth-
while target.)
Schlesinger:
But this sort of thing would require the gunships out of
Thailand.
Kissinger:
I think we should do something that will impress the Koreans
ORIGINAL
and the Chinese. I saw Teng Hsiao-Ping's comments in Paris.
President:
Are there an airfield and a naval base there at Kompong Som?
Colby:
Yes.
President:
Why not hit both of them? There would be as many objections
to hitting one as two of them.
Schlesinger:
The question is whether you use the B-52's or the carrier
aircraft. The B-52's may represent the best image for what
Henry is trying to accomplish. But, for Congress and others,
other aircraft would be better.
President:
Bill has to verify what there is at the airport.
Schlesinger:
We'll put some T-28's on the base.
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President:
Tomorrow, we will still have the options as to what we should
do.
Jones:
On Guam, if we are to do anything, we have to start pretty
soon. But there are lots of press there.
Rumsfeld:
You would be launching at about 4:00 p.m. tomorrow.
Kissinger:
How long does it take to load?
Jones:
There are many planes to load and to get ready.
Kissinger:
Is the first thing tomorrow still time enough?
Jones:
I'm not sure.
President:
Are there any others in the Far East?
Declassified Photocopy from
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Jones:
Only at Utapao.
President:
We do not want that.
Rumsfeld:
It should not take long to calculate the answer on the question
ORIGINAL RETRES
of using the CORAL SEA.
Vice President: Everybody wants to know when you are moving. In New York,
where I just was, people expect you to be doing things. So
any steps you take in preparation will be understood.
President:
How many B-52's would you use?
Jones:
Perhaps 6 or 9.
President:
Let's say 9. How many do you have on Guam?
Jones:
I am not sure. About 20 or more.
President:
Every time I have looked at a B-52 base, they are always doing
something. It should not be that unusual. I think you should
load them, and get them ready.
Jones:
There are about 50 reporters on Guam right now, because of
the refugees.
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Kissinger:
Can you tell the commander to shut up?
Schlesinger:
It will get out, no matter how hard you try.
Vice President: Perhaps it would be good to have it get out. I don't think we
should cavil.
President:
Let's have them get ready to carry out the mission if we
decide to do it.
Hartmann:
I am not an expert on military affairs. I am just an old retired
captain in the Reserve. I have been listening in terms of what
the American public wants. I think the American public wants
to know what you are going to do.
This crisis, like the Cuban missile crisis, is the first real
test of your leadership. What you decide is not as important
as what the public perceives.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Nothing, so far as I know, has gone out to the public so far,
except that we are taking steps. It may be that we should let
the public know something of the steps that you are taking.
The public will judge you in accordance with what you do. We
should not just think of what is the right thing to do, but of what
ORIGINAL RETIE
the public perceives.
Kissinger:
I would say nothing until afterwards. That will speak for
itself. Then you can explain what you have been doing.
If you say something now, everybody will be kibitzing.
President:
But the press should know of the NSC meeting.
Hartmann:
I think we should consider what the people think we are doing.
Rumsfeld:
The delay worries me.
Hartmann:
Yes.
Kissinger:
If we are going to do an integrated attack, I think we have to
go in 22 hours. We should not wait for a later cycle.
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I cannot judge if there would be a problem in taking the island.
We're saying that it will be one annihilating blow. I cannot
judge if 270 Marines can do it.
Rumsfeld:
There would 500.
Kissinger:
But there will be 270 for four hours. They will have the HOLT
support. Perhaps they will also have some support from the
CORAL SEA.
President:
Do we have Marines on the CORAL SEA?
Jones:
I'm not sure.
Kissinger:
If the CORAL SEA can launch against Kompong Som, it can
launch against the island. We have to be sure that the landing
has a chance of success.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Jones:
The probability that the Americans are gone causes the
problem. I think we have a high probability.
Kissinger:
Then my instinct is with Rummy. We should go tomorrow
night or earlier.
ORIGINAL RET.
President:
Everything will be ready. But, if you do it in the next cycle,
you have the problem of Thailand.
Kissinger:
The ideal time would be Thursday night. But I am worried
that in the next 48 hours some diplomatic pressure will occur,
or something else. So we have to weigh the optimum military
time against the optimum political time. For foreign policy
and domestic reasons, tomorrow is better.
President:
The Thai will be upset.
Kissinger:
That is correct, but they will also be reassured.
Rumsfeld:
Can we be sure there is anybody on the island? We might
just take a walk.
Kissinger:
If the Americans are on the mainland, then we have to rethink.
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Rumsfeld:
If we look at this tonight, we will know tomorrow.
President:
If Jones goes back to the Pentagon tonight with the orders
to prepare, we will have details tomorrow.
Jones:
Everything is now moving, except the B-52's.
Ingersoll:
What is the flying time of the B-52's?
Kissinger:
About 6 hours.
Jones:
Maybe longer.
SERVATION
Schlesinger:
Can we tanker them out of Guam?
Jones:
Yes.
Declassified Photocopy from
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Kissinger:
What will we say about the boats that have been sunk?
Buchen:
We have to make a report to the Hill.
Schlesinger:
It may not get out that quickly.
President:
My answer would be, that we have ordered that no enemy
boats should leave the island or go out to it, but that if they
ORIGINAL
did, they would be sunk.
Kissinger:
I think a low-key press statement can be issued, saying what
has happened. We should tell the truth. We should say it in
a very matter-of-fact way, at a DOD briefing.
Schlesinger:
It will not stay low-key.
President:
The order was issued that no boats should leave.
Kissinger:
We should say nothing about the riot control agents. We should
say that there were Americans possibly being moved, and that
lives were at stake. Some Americans are still on the island.
In pursuit of these objectives, the following boats were sunk.
One other reason is that it is not inconceivable that the Khmers
will cave, and they should come in response to something that
we had done.
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Schlesinger:
Should we say that they were sunk from aircraft from
Thailand? That is your problem.
Kissinger:
I am worried about it getting out of hand. We will look sneaky
and furtive about something we should be proud of.
But the Thai thing does give me trouble. Ithink the Thai
military will love it. But the Thai Government will say that it
does not like it.
The Liberals on the Hill will put forward a recommendation to
withdraw our forces from Thailand. They will match this with
some requests from the Thai Government.
Rumsfeld:
I think that is a good issue.
Declassified Photocopy from
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Hartmann:
Bob Byrd, whom I regard as a good antenna of sentiment, says
that we should act.
Marsh:
Case says we should go in.
ORIGINAL RETIRED
Vice President: In our statement, should we not call them launches?
Schlesinger:
The boats are of different sizes.
Kissinger:
I would urge that the spokesman make a short announcement at
noon tomorrow. He should explain why we are doing it. He
should say that it was ordered by you, executed by the National
Security Council, and then answer no other questions. This
would be noon. By 8 o'clock, we will have decided the other.
That will add to your strength.
(General concurrence.)
END OF MEETING
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