Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1552390
label
NSC Meeting, 5/15/75
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1552390
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting, 5/15/75
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
subjects
Israel
Panama
Organization of American States
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Foreign aid
Governmental investigations
Mayagüez Incident, 1975
Middle East conflicts
Military bases
Panama Canal Treaties (1977)
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1552390
coverageEndDate
day
15
logicalDate
1975-05-15
month
5
year
1975
coverageStartDate
day
15
logicalDate
1975-05-15
month
5
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
06139354388f9471
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 1, folder: "NSC Meeting, 5/15/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 1 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09241
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
President
TITLE
Meeting of the NSC
CREATION DATE
04/24/1975
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200019
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 5/15/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/31/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
3717X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
June 2, 1975
ATTACHMENTS
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis mo
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting, May 15, 1975
/ATION
Attached are the minutes of the three sections of the NSC meeting on
May 15 on:
Tab A
Declassified Photocopy from
Cambodian Seizure of American Ship
Gerald R. Ford Library
Panama Canal Negotiations
Tab B
Middle East
Tab C
ORIGINAL
Attachments
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
ATTACHMENTS
FORD is LIBRARY CERALD
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETURNATIONS OPESERVATION
GERALD
P.
F030 LIBRARY
GERALD LIBRARY R. FORD
A
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
PART I OF III
Date:
Thursday, May 15, 1975
Time:
4:02 p.m. - 4:20 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRNCTION PRESERVATION
Subject;
Seizure of American Ship by Cambodian
Authorities
Declassified Photocopy from
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David C. Jones
The Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
Robert Hartmann
NSC:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
W. Richard Smyser
FORD is LIBRARY CERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.
MR 92-10 # 26 NSC etc. 10/7/94 FORD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
KBH NARA, Date 2/6/95
BERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
2
President:
Will you tell me where we stand at this time?
Colby:
I can give you a report on foreign reaction. I think it would
be better if George could give you a wrap-up on our operation.
President:
Please go ahead.
Colby:
Mr. President, we have no reactions from Communist
authorities in Phnom Penh to the U.S. military operation
beyond what we had last night. In his statement on Phnom
Penh radio at that time, Information Minister Hu Nimm was
noticeably defensive in rationalizing the seizure of the vessel.
ESERVATION
Although he did claim that the MAYAGUEZ was on an intelligence
mission, he stated several times that his government had no
desire to stage "provocations" and that the MAYAGUEZ had
only been halted for "questioning."
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
In the aftermath of the U.S. military operation, the Thai
cabinet today apparently decided to expel a "senior member
of the U.S. mission," and to recall the Thai ambassador in
Washington for consultations.
Thai newspapers today are also urging that the government:
ORIGINAL
-- publicize all agreements between the U.S. and Thailand, and
-- immediately close down all U.S. bases in Thailand.
Leftist politicians are now holding a rally in Bangkok. They
reportedly intend to demand that all U.S. troops leave
Thailand within 10 days.
The political left apparently believes that the time is right to
create a political crisis for the Khukrit government.
Organizers of the demonstration plan to move crowds to both
the prime minister's office and the U.S. embassy.
The Thai military leaders, on the other hand, have privately
continued to support the U.S. actions.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD & CERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
3
In Peking's first reaction to the U.S. military action,
Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien has accused the U.S. of an
"outright act of piracy. "
Speaking at a banquet in Peking today, Li said that "when an
American ship invaded Cambodia's territorial waters,
Cambodia took legitimate measures against the ship to safe-
guard her state sovereignty. 11 Li added that "the U.S. went
so far as to make an issue of the matter" and bombed Cambodiar
territory and ships.
Li said the American action "should be condemned by world
public opinion. "
PRESERVATION
Hanoi radio has characterized the operation as a "flagrant
act of piracy" which shows that the U.S. still has not "learned
from its defeats in Vietnam and Cambodia."
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
The new government in Saigon has not commented, but it
can be expected to parrot Hanoi's line.
Soviet media continue to report the events surrounding the
MAYAGUEZ incident from foreign wire services without
editorial comment.
ORIGINAL
East European commentary remains muted. The Yugoslav
press has even referred to the MAYAGUEZ as a "kidnapped"
U.S. vessel.
The Cuban press has so far treated U.S. actions in a factual
manner, but we have no comment since the U.S. operation
was completed.
A Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated that "a
container ship on open waters must not be subject to seizure"
and that his government viewed the U.S. military action as
"limited."
In most major Western countries there has been little
official reaction.
British and West German press comment has been generally
supportive.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
91.0 is LIBRARY CERALD
TOP SECRET
4
Press reaction from South Korea, Taiwan, and Australia
has been favorable.
Ingersoll:
Bill Rogers spoke to the OAS Ministers while they were here,
including the one from Panama. He said they were very pleased
President:
Jim, I would like to congratulate you and your whole Depart-
ment for a job well done.
Have we had any report on the damage so far?
Jones:
Not yet. We can summarize the claims, but we are not sure
PRESERVATION
that they are accurate. Here is a photograph. It is the first
one that has yet been received here. It shows the buildings
around the airport before and after they were damaged. We
understand that the damage reported on the aircraft was
Declassified Photocopy from
extensive.
Gerald R. Ford Library
President:
Which airport was this?
Jones:
The airport near Kompong Som, called Ream.
Kissinger:
Were any boats sunk?
ORIGINAL
Jones:
Yes, but we don't yet know how many.
We have no Navy reports yet, just the Air Force. We
need to survey all the aircraft involved in the operation.
Kissinger:
Were the aircraft used land aircraft?
Jones:
No, only the CORAL SEA aircraft were used against Kompong
Som. There were four waves. The first was armed
reconnaissance. They did not expend ordnance. They found
the shipping of other countries and did not want to take the
risk. The three subsequent waves went against the airport,
against the POL facilities, and against support facilities.
We put 240 Marines on the island, in total. We put 40 aboard
the ship.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
BEEALS FREE LIGHTED
FORD i LIBRARY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
5
We lost three helicopters in the operation. The equipment
took a lot of battle damage.
Our casualties were 1 killed in action, 1 missing, and 30
wounded. That is considerably lighter than we thought last night
President:
Are all the Marines now on the CORAL SEA or on the
HANCOCK?
Jones:
They are on the CORAL SEA. We had a reserve of 1, 000 on
Thailand. But when the ship's crew was returned, we stopped
any more Marines going to the island. Then we put in another
80 in order to help the Marines that were there to extricate
themselves.
President:
I heard that the Marines on the HOLT had gone to the island.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL Actual RESERVATION
Jones:
No, they did not have their full equipment.
Clements:
How many helicopters were inoperative?
Jones:
We got down to four Air Force helicopters and three from the
CORAL SEA. So there were only a few for the Marines who
were left there. We thought we might have to keep people
overnight on the island. But that was only the impression in
Washington. They continued the flow of helicopters and they
also used several boats from the destroyer, so that they were
able to extricate all the Marines.
Kissinger:
How many Cambodians were on the island?
Jones:
We do not know, but they were obviously well armed with
supplies. They put up a lot of fire against the helicopters.
President:
That is probably why they moved the ship to that island from
that other one where they had it.
Kissinger:
Where did the boat carrying the crew come from?
Jones:
From Kompong Som.
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET
6
Kissinger:
This indicates that the operation was really centrally
controlled.
Jones:
They brought a message that they had been sent out on a
Thai fishing vessel in order to be returned, and they asked us
to stop the bombing. We had one or two more runs, but we
stopped shortly thereafter.
Kissinger:
How many aircraft were used altogether?
Jones:
About 32 to 40.
Schlesinger:
Not the 81 that had been on the carrier.
President:
Henry, would you step out for a moment?
(At this point, the President and the Secretary of State
stepped out for about 3 minutes. They then returned.)
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL PRESERVATION
President:
Jim, I would like a full factual report giving a summary and
chronology of what happened. It should include orders, summary
results, photographs, etc., and indications of what we did
when.
Where is the ship now?
Jones:
She is on her way to Singapore. We towed her for some
distance but then she was able to get up steam and she wanted
to go to Singapore.
President:
It was a job well done. Let us now go on to the next item on
our agenda.
GENALD is FORD ELENTED
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED
RESERVATION
GERALD
P.
FORD LIBRARY
LIBRARY GERALD FORD ?
7
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
PART II OF III
Date:
Thursday, May 15, 1975
Time:
4: 30 to 5:30 p.m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
ESERVATION
Subject:
Panama Canal Negotiations
Principals
The President
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
ORIGINAL
State:
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll
Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
Robert Hartmann
NSC:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
Stephen Low
XGDS - 3 B
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine
BY AUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
TOP SECRET x SENSITIVE (XGDS)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12$58 Sec. 3.6
FORD is LIBRARY CERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION MR98-39, 20; NSC letter 2/10/99
let NARA, Date 5/25/99
TOP SECRET 7 SENSITIVE (XGDS)
8
President:
Bill, can you give us a briefing on the Panama
Canal?
Colby:
( Intelligence briefing attached at Tab D)
President:
Thank you. Can you give us any indication of
the land that is involved?
Colby:
One of the major issues involved is the fact that
you can only land in Panama at points which are
subject to U.S. control. This is a matter of great
concern to the Panamanians. The rest is a matter
of degree. But the fact that they do not have
direct access to Panama bothers them.
/ATION
President:
Henry, can you lay out the options as you see them?
Kissinger:
Mr. President, one of my problems with this issue
is that Ellsworth won't tell me what he's doing. So
Declassified Photocopy from
I think it would be better to ask him first. And
Gerald R. Ford Library
then I will add my comments.
President:
Mr. Ambassador, would you please discuss this?
Bunker:
Mr. President, we think that a treaty is within
reach. But to get it we need flexibility on two
issues: duration and lands and waters. I have
no doubt that failure in these negotiations would
ORIGINAL
entail unacceptable risks including negative
effects beyond Panama which would disrupt our
relations with Latin America, lead to world
condemnation, and hamper the operation of the
waterway. If we get into a situation involving
confrontation, we would turn what is now a
basically free country radically to the Left. While
we could undoubtedly maintain our control, we
would deprive ourselves of what we have gained so
far and undermine any future possibility of a
reasonable agreement. We are trying to get a treaty
which is acceptable both to Panama and to the
Congress, and at the same time protect our basic
security and interests. I believe we can achieve a
balance of the various interests and if we do so,
CERALD FORD LIBRAST
the treaty would be acceptable to both Panama and
Congress. We look at this as involving a balance
of many components: - the long-term protection of
our security interests including the right to act
TOP SECRET 1 SENSITIVE (XGDS)
/ FORD LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
9
unilaterally in defense of the Canal; the consent of
the host country; maintenance of our bases;
satisfactory conditions for Canal personnel; duration
and post-treaty security arrangements. Panama has
already agreed to give us all the defense rights we
want including a good Status of Forces Agreement.
We want a balance between adequate control over
the operation of the Canal, sufficient military
presence, long but not too long duration, and a
reasonable assurance of post-treaty defense
arrangements. With this balance we can obtain a
treaty which is acceptable to all parties, and more
real security than we have today. However, we
need negotiating flexibility, relaxation on treaty
duration to between 20 and 50 years.
President:
Assume a treaty of 25 to 50 years -- what happens
after that expires?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Bunker:
Panama will have control of the Canal. We will
jointly guarantee its neutrality and access for ships
of all nations. What we would like to have is
flexibility, particularly as between duration for
operation and defense. Defense has agreed with us
on a period of duration for operation purposes but
feels we should have 50 years on defense. Torrijos
has made it clear 50 years is unacceptable. We
ORIGINAL
want flexibility so we can bargain as between duration
for operation and duration for defense: 25 years for
operation, 50 for defense, if we can get it, though I
am certain we cannot. Something in-between is what
is necessary. And then a lands and waters proposal
which is sufficient to permit agreement. The present
one is not saleable to Panama.
President:
I am not sure I understand what you mean by
'operation.'
Bunker:
The administration of the Canal.
President:
Once a treaty is signed and approved, how would
operation go?
Kissinger:
For X number of years we would run it. After
the treaty expires, it would go to Panama.
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
President:
And our defense rights would go along with it?
TQP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
10
Kissinger:
The original concept was of duration for both
operation and defense for a 50-year period. Now we
are proposing to split the two. We would be willing
to settle for a shorter period for operational control
if we could get a longer one for defense. I have to
add that in 1967 we offered them 33 years.
President:
For both operation and defense?
Kissinger:
Yes. Now, if we could get 25 years for operation,
we would be still better off than we would have
been in 1967. We would probably have no great
difficulty in getting them to accept 25 years for
operation duration. For defense they will not
ERVATION
accept 50 years. We have not yet explored this with
them as we have not been authorized to. So we don't
know how much more than 25 but less than 50 they
would accept. How much longer for defense than
operation has not been explored. It would be less
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
than 50 but more than 25. This is the area in which
the negotiations would have to take place, if you
decide to permit greater flexibility. The land uses
matter can't be explored here. We don't have any
proposal to make, but something is possible. It
seems to me the basic issues are the following:
first, whether you are willing to go along with the
ORIGINAL
concept of separating operation from defense. The
agencies all agree on this approach. Though not
on the numbers--what is going to happen in 40 years
is so hard to predict. Two, if you are willing to go
that route, then, what is the minimum we can accept?
Three, if you don't want a treaty now, you have to
decide whether there are some unilateral steps we
can take which ease the situation for Panama--steps
which give up some of the lands but do not change
the relationship. It is my strong impression from
the OAS sessions which have just been taking place,
in which I talked to most of the Latin ministers,
that we will get no help from them, but, on the
contrary, they will not hesitate to contribute to our
problems. On the other hand, I have been
GERALD 18",
LIBRARY CERALD P. FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
11
hammered by Thurmond and Buckley on this and am
fully aware of the problems raised from that side. If
you decide to go for a treaty, then you have the
problem of Congress. It is possible, however, that
if a treaty were negotiated and signed, you could
hold up ratification until 1977. Torrijos would go
along with that. Of course, the Congress will
scream when a treaty is signed, even before
ratification. Internationally, failure to conclude a
treaty is going to get us into a cause celebre, with
harassment, demonstrations, bombing of embassies.
The next Administration will face the issue again
with less receptivity and poorer chances to get a
reasonable agreement. On the other hand, if we do
it now, we will face a major domestic uproar.
SERVATION
President:
Going so far as bombs here?
Kissinger:
No, not literally--just political. No one here is for
Declassified Photocopy from
it. Those who are against it are extremely vocal.
Gerald R. Ford Library
Frankly, I can't convince myself that the difference
between 40 and 50 years is that important. If you
decide not to go ahead with the negotiations, we
have to decide how to do it with a minimum of
damage. There will be an uproar in Panama, with
riots and harassment. It will become an armed camp
and will spread rapidly to the Western Hemisphere.
IVNISIBO
It will become an OAS issue around which they will
all unite. Then it will spread into the international
organizations. It is just a question of how long
you want to take. From the foreign policy point of
view, I favor going ahead. However, domestically
I've already encountered enough opponents to know
what a barrier exists.
President:
I've been told that 37 Senators have signed some
document that they would disapprove of a treaty.
Secretary:
From the foreign policy point of view, we're better
off signing a treaty and not submitting it to the
Senate. That would give us two years.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALE
FORD & CERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
12
President:
I have a question. I am told that, inasmuch as we
would be giving up U.S. territory, both the Senate
and the House would need to act on this; the Senate
on the treaty and the House on the land. Of course,
in the House a simple majority is sufficient but
two-thirds are needed in the Senate.
Bunker:
Thirty-seven Senators signed the Thurmond
resolution. Our analysis in the State Department
indicates that perhaps 20 are soft opponents and
might be persuadable; 17 are intransigent and not
susceptible of being won over. As of now, the Canal
has a constituency while the treaty has none. That
is because we have done nothing yet. We have made
no broad effort on the Hill or with the public.
Consultation with the Congress and public education
would be essential in getting a treaty passed.
President:
What do you think about this, Jim?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Schlesinger:
The details of the Defense position. have been
discussed in the earlier meetings. I would like to
give you my personal observations. I guess I may be
classified as an opponent of the treaty. It seems to
me one of the biggest mistakes the United States has
made since 1945 was not to acquire sovereign base
rights in a number of places around the world, like
ORIGINAL
the Philippines and elsewhere in the Far East. The
Panama Canal Zone represents one of these sovereign
base areas. Defense agreed to the Eight Principles
signed last year which sacrificed sovereign land
areas. It was a generous offer on the part of the
U.S., giving them land and sovereignty. What
Ambassador Bunker refers to as flexibility is no less
than a further reduction in what we're asking for,
an erosion in our position of substantial magnitude.
It seems to me we're engaged in reducing our
requirements to what we think Torrijos will accept.
When I was DCI, the analysis was different. We
recognize that there will be harassment and attacks.
The question is whether the price is worth defending
a set of principles on our part. Worldwide reactions
are likely to be mixed. When the U.S. shows
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FURD is GERALD LIBRARY
FORD is LIBRARY CERRID
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
13
strength and determination, it receives respect.
When it recedes from its position, it whets appetites.
I was reluctant to see the position your predecessor,
President Johnson, took in 1967. That eroded your
position.
President:
Were those the negotiations Bob Anderson conducted?
Schlesinger:
Yes; we have had eight years since then; one
solution would be to try to protect our position for
another eight years. That might give us the greatest
period of time advantage. Henry put the problem in
terms of a conflict between domestic and international
RVATION
interests. I think it's more complex than that. The
international effect will be varied--the Brazilians and
some of the others respect us when we take a strong
stand--there will be different attitudes. While the
international implications are mixed, the domestic are
unmixed; in my mind the question is whether or not
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
the U.S. is capable of standing up to the harassment
which Torrijos is quite capable of 'mounting.
President:
In your judgment would the harassment be of such
degree that it could render the Canal inoperable?
Schlesinger:
I think not. The SNIE I produced some years ago
ORIGINAL
concluded that their reaction would depend on their
assessment of the American position. If they were
persuaded the U.S. was flexible, then they would be
tough; if they thought the American position was
tough, they would be more reasonable. They will
take advantage of the situation depending on how
firm the U.S. is prepared to be. If we are tough
in the Canal they will yield. In recent years the
U.S. has not shown a great deal of this quality.
Kissinger:
What do we want to stand up for the Eight
Principles for? They give no time limit and no
guidance in this issue.
Schlesinger:
I understood it was 50 years.
LIBRAMA GERALD = FORD
Kissinger:
That is in the presidential instructions, but not in
the principles. The principles just speak of an
adequate period of time. We have all agreed on
proposing 25 years for operation; the issue is
whether or not to insist on 50 for defense, with an
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
LIBRANY GERALD R. FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
14
extension into the post-treaty period. My
recommendation would be to shave our demands on
matters like operation if it could add to defense. I
do not share the view that some of the Latins will
support us. I have just finished talking to all of
them and am convinced that none will support us.
The question is, is this a good issue on which to
try to face-down the Latins? It might be if it were
only Torrijos we have to face-down, but this is the
whole Hemisphere.
Colby:
I am convinced that we are facing in the next 15
years increasing tension between the North and
South which will take on racial characteristics. They
would be unified against us.
Clements:
I don't think there is any problem about Defense and
State coming to some reasonable solution; working
out the details is easy.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Kissinger:
I agree.
Clements:
This is no problem. The post-treaty conditions are
a little more difficult. We could set them out further
in some reasonable and understandable form. So far
as harassment in the Canal Zone goes, this can be
contained without severe action. In order to do that
we will have to make some minor concessions. We
can move forward with the lesser issues and keep the
negotiations going, make some of the accommodations
they want, but keep the treaty out of the political
arena. Joe Doaks in Paducah is excited about the
Panama Canal. He considers this part of his
business and will become very emotional about it. I
know I'm supposed to be a non-partisan career
official, but I can tell you this will be one hell of an
issue domestically in 1976. I think we can avoid it by
making some accommodations, working out the details,
and holding everything as it is for 18 months, and
still save to a reasonable degree the international
conditions.
President:
Would these adjustments fit under a subsequent
treaty?
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET 1 SENSITIVE (XGDS)
GERALO
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
15
Kissinger:
I agree with Bill that we could come to an agreement
with Defense on all points in a treaty, and we would
gain internationally. From the foreign policy point
of view this is just not a good issue to face people
down with. With regard to his recommendation that
we protract the negotiations so as not to sign for 18
months, we'll have to take a look to see if it's
possible.
Clements:
Bo Callaway and the Army assure me this can be
done. We'll have to do some selling, but there are
a lot of things that we can do, and we feel very
positive about it.
President:
I've had some experience with the Panama Canal,
going back as early as 1951 when I was a member of
the House Appropriations Subcommittee that had
jurisdiction over the Panama Canal. At that time I
had the temerity to look at the sinecures that some
Declassified Photocopy from
of the civilian employees of the Canal had acquired,
Gerald R. Ford Library
such as rents, which I think were $15 a month, and
a raft of other gratuities that few other people
working for the Federal Government received. I
objected and sought to decrease these benefits. I
was met with an onslaught from a highly organized
group which I hadn't anticipated. Previous to that,
the Carrier on which I served went through the
Canal. A Navy Canal pilot whom I met took me back
to the other side and we stayed out late having what
I remember were called "blue moons." The ship was
going to San Diego the next morning. At about
2:00 a.m., I asked whether we shouldn't start back.
He said, "Never mind, I'll fly you in the morning."
And so we went to sleep at about 2:00 and at 5:00,
took off in a single engine plane; we went through
the worst rainstorm I ever saw. I got on the
gangplank of the ship just as it was beginning to go
up. If I had missed it I would have been AWOL.
But that is the most highly organized group of
American employees I know. They have a vested
interest in the status quo. This is a group that
is
FORD
gives the public the impression of what we should be
GERALD
LIBRARY
doing down there. We are not going to decide this
issue on those grounds. They ought to know it. The
Army gets its information from them and they infect
it with their views. But they 're not going to decide
this.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD : GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET I SENSITIVE (XGDS)
16
Clements:
Bo Callaway and the Army have been handling this
very effectively. They have been attempting to bring
about a reduction in these benefits.
President:
Do they still get a 20 to 25 % wage differential?
Clements:
I think they get some. The Army and Bo want to do
things right. They want to bring the Panamanians
into the operation and do some other things that
should have happened long ago.
President:
This group of Americans go from one generation to
another. Some of them have been there for three
generations.
Kissinger:
These concessions could take two forms--first, they
could help save our lives on the treaty; second, if
the Panamanians perceive them as a substitute for a
treaty, we will have difficulty. We will have to
look into the possibility of whether we can drag the
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
negotiations out until after the elections. For that
kind of thing we can probably get'some Latin American
support from people like the Brazilians.
Schlesinger:
What Bo Callaway is talking about is a number of
ORIGINAL RETIRED
atmospherics. He is the most ardent advocate of the
Eight Principles and the existing presidential
guidance.
Kissinger:
The Eight Principles are just platitudes, deliberately
designed to be satisfactory to both sides. They give
no guidance on this.
Schlesinger:
The Army is prepared to accept them. Bo and the
others firmly adhere to this position. It's our
position that the little flexibility they're asking would
reduce the period to 30 or 25 years and soon it gets
down to the point which we just can't tolerate--20
years, for instance.
Kissinger:
No, that's not the case; we're trying to separate
operational rights from defense rights. For operational
rights we're willing to accept down to 20 years; for
defense rights not 50 but more than 25, something like
30 or 40--my own estimate is we should get 40 or even
45--that means defense by Americans. We haven't
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
FORD is LIBRARY CENALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
17
tried shaving the other treaty rights to get more on
defense rights.
Clements:
And some post-treaty rights.
Kissinger:
In any circumstances the defense control will extend
well beyond the year 2000.
President:
Are you saying that if the treaty is signed, our
sovereign rights will extend through the year 2000?
Kissinger:
Until 2000 we operate the Canal and until, say, 40
years, that is, until the year 2015, we have the
unilateral right to defend the Canal. Then there is
the problem of the post-treaty rights which we've
not been prepared to discuss. My understanding is
that sovereignty would lapse with the signing of
the agreement and be phased out over a three-year
period. The operational part is less important than
Declassified Photocopy from
defense.
Gerald R. Ford Library
President:
Then there are really three points. Sovereignty is
phased out in 3 years, operation would be 25, and
defense rights 40 to 45.
ORIGINAL RETIRET
(The Vice President enters)
Rumsfeld:
I've been doing some talking up on the Hill and I
I find there is a great deal of distrust and concern
and leaking of documents to the Hill by the people
in the Zone. I would caution against any new
treaty concession being made to the Panamanians.
The conservatives would join with the liberals on
this.
Kissinger:
This is a totally separate issue. There is a story on
the Hill that we are negotiating some unilateral
accommodations This is sheer nonsense. We have
told them that. We should save these unilateral
concessions for the treaty where we get something in
return.
Rumsfeld:
FORD
There is a strong constituency in Panama and there
LIBRARY
is not at home. We don't think this is a matter of
deep concern among the American people, but there
is a violent concern among some Congressmen that
have active supporters opposing this treaty.
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE (XGDS)
18
Schlesinger:
Is it a matter of physical harassment?
Rumsfeld:
No--political. Some of our good friends in the
Congress feel very strongly about this issue. If we
antagonize them on this, then the ability of the
President to deal with other matters of high priority,
like Turkey, will be diminished. The point is that this
so angers people on the Hill that we lose their support.
This will affect the attitude of these people with regard
to other issues. It would be just like sending up a
nomination for Abe Fortas. There is a strong feeling,
not among many, but a significant group. Bunker and
the others should work with these people.
Kissinger:
There is no way we can persuade some of these
people.
Vice President:
I am a politician and I know a little about pursuing
our national interests and the treatment of people. I
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
understand these people that Don talks about--they
have to understand the world in which we live. This
is a big issue in Latin America like the expropriation
of oil in Mexico was in 1939. It's symbolic of freedom
from the United States and the restoration of dignity.
This is terribly important for our relations in the
Western Hemisphere. I would like to talk to some of
these people. I may be able to help.
Colby:
The pressure will grow from Latin America. There is
a tendency to compare it with the base at Guantanamo.
The situation is going to get more and more tense.
President:
What is the time schedule as you see it?
Bunker:
If we can get the flexibility we need, and without it
we can't get a treaty, then we can move along and
probably get something by August or September.
There has been no treaty drafting as yet.
Ingersoll:
We have done no selling on the Hill because we didn't
know our position, and couldn't explain it. This
problem is not going to go away. It's going to get
worse.
TOP/SECRET/SENSHIVE (XGDS)
FORD is CERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET + SENSITIVE (XGDS)
19
President:
We ought to get further information on the proposal
of the specific things which Bo Callaway is talking
about. When we see those specifics we can look at
how much can be done unilaterally and how soon.
They should be put together soon; let me look to
see what impact they would have and after that we'll
take a look at what we can do.
Kissinger:
The fundamental problem is to assure that we
maintain the negotiating position. If Torrijos
perceives that we've abandoned it in some way, he
wouldn't want to play that game and we would be in for
a confrontation. If we used these unilateral steps to
protect our negotiations for 18 months, we might be all
right and some of the more sophisticated Latins like
the Brazilians might help. But if we say there will be
no new treaty, then there will be an uproar. (I've
never discussed this with the Vice President so I can
assure you there's been no collusion.) We would have
a real uproar; volunteers, demonstrations, violence,
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
and we would be dragged into every international
forum. This is no issue to face the world on. It
looks like pure colonialism.
Schlesinger:
The palliatives will help us only as far as postponement
is concerned. Sooner or later we're going to run into
these problems. You must face the prospect of
ORIGINAL
harassment.
Clements:
Bo Callaway and the Joint Chiefs and all of us are
together on this. There is no problem. We want to
move forward. We're not advocating the status quo.
We understand that a treaty is inevitable; the
problem is timing.
Kissinger:
We'll have to draw up a list and then make our best
assessment of the situation if we are to protect the
negotiations.
President:
Let's find out what the alleged goodies are and the
impact of this kind of thing.
Vice President:
Do you know Torrijos? He's a very interesting guy.
I think at some point if you had him up here and had
an hour with him, you could give him your personal
attention. It would have a big impact.
TOR SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD i CERRID LIBRARY
TQP SECRET L SENSITIVE (XGDS)
20
Rumsfeld:
Get him with
Kissinger:
Right now he's working on Ellsworth on this island
of theirs.
President:
We ought to expose him to my old friend Dan Flood.
Kissinger:
We'd complete the negotiations the next day.
Vice President:
You know his mother's a communist and his father's
a communist and his sisters and brothers are
communists, but he's a real tough guy. He's crazy
about the U.S. military. He's got a real concept of
dignity.
President:
Let's get the materials and facts and then we can
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRED PRESERVATION
make an assessment of where we stand.
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE (XGDS)
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
ORIGINAL RETIRET
IRVATION
is FORD GERALD LIBRARY
FORD & LIBRARY BERALD
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09183
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Robert Oakley?
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, Part III of III,
5/15/75
CREATION DATE
05/15/1975
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200019
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 5/15/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
excised NSC uter 2/10/99
ut FE 5/99
TQPSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS XGDS
21
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
PART III of III
Date:
Thursday, May 15, 1975
Time:
5:30 p. m.
Place:
Cabinet Room, The White House
Subject: Middle East
Principals
The President
Declassified Photocopy from
ORIGINAL Gerald R. Ford Library INVATION
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large
Defense: Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements
WH:
Donald Rumsfeld
NSC:
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
Robert B. Oakley
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3,64.
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
FORD is LIBRARY OFRALD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE NODIS
E.O. 12958 Sec. 15 (b) (i)
3.4
MR 98-39, #22; Nseceiter 2/10/99
By let NARA, Date 5/24/09
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITTVE/NODIS
22
President:
This group is familiar with the reasons that I
ordered the reassessment of the Middle East
on March 28, following the suspension of
negotiations and the decision to treat Israel as
a friend, correctly but like our other friends
and no more. I have no apprehension about the
vigor of our commitment to their security but
there must be a suspension of certain deliveries
and contacts in the interim. I trust my orders
on this subject are being carried out.
In the meantime, I have met with a number of
people and Henry has met with a number of others.
We have told all of them, whether they were
Israeli or pro-Israeli or Arab or pro-Arab or
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
independent, the same thing, that we will not
tolerate stagration or stalemate in the, Middle East.
Momentum is the key word. I plan to meet Sadat
and Rabin and at some time subsequent to that we
will make a decision on United States policy in the
Middle East.
ORIGINAL RETIRES
Henry, would you please give us a rundown on the
diplomatic options open to us.
But before Henry begins, let us recognize the fact
that the professional members of the American
Jewish Community have undertaken a certain nation-
wide campaign to paint the picture that the
reassessment is a change of heart toward Israel.
First, they are wrong. I reiterate my dedication
to the survival of Israel, period. That is the word
we use, survival. Second, anyone who knows me,
and those who do not shall soon know that inequitable,
unfair pressures are exactly the wrong way of trying
to change my views. Inequitable, unfair public
pressure tactics are the wrong way to convince me.
I will tell certain people directly if this continues.
Now, Henry, tell us where we stand diplomatically.
FORD
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
LIBRARY
TOR SECRET/SENSTTVE/NODIS
23
Kissinger:
We have made no attempt to move our policy
examination to a conclusion. However, all concerned
are convinced that within a year of what the Arabs
perceive as a stalemate, there will be a war. We
are also all convinced that the economic and military
consequences would be unacceptable for the U.S.
That is why we are trying SO hard to get negotiations
started again. The fact of our reassessment has
bought us some time with the Arabs since they are
less frustrated than they would have been had nothing
beenhappening at all. But when it comes time for
SERVATION
the next renewal of the UN forces in late July if
nothing is going, or at least the clear prospect of
progress seen, the situation will be out of control.
After that events will move rapidly.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
In our reassessment we have identified the several
options. First, would be to restart the interim
negotiations between Egypt and Israel. In some ways
this is the easiest approach but there are two
ORIGINAL RETIRED
problems. One is that each side is now so dug in
publicly as to their positions on the details of this
negotiation that it will be extremely difficult for them
to make concessions that might have been possible
for them before. The other is that there is a different
atmosphere now in the Arab world. Feisal had been
convinced on the step-by-step approach, a separate
negotiation for Egypt, and Asad had no choice but
to go along. But now Fahd has taken over and he
does not think exactly the same way, he is less liable
to support a separate Egyptian negotiation. Moreover,
the Egyptians and Syrians are now much closer to
each other, with Saudi support. So if we decide to
go for another interim agreement for Egypt we
will also have to go for another one with Syria or we
will create a situation where Syria could easily go
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
to war and ruin everything we have accomplished.
The second option is for Israel to give up a bigger
piece of territory for a bigger political concession
from Egypt. But this would raise the Syrian question
TQPSECRET/SENSIPIVE/NODIS
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITVE/NODIS
24
Kissinger:
in an even more acute way, even more dangerous.
(Continuing)
Also, it could never work because Israel would
demand non-belligerency and this is impossible
for Egypt except in the context of total or almost
total withdrawal.
The third option is a comprehensive proposal at
Geneva, either by the U.S. or put forward by
someone else. This will happen at Geneva whether
we like it or not and/will be forced to take a position
on the key elements, anyway. We can go for a
comprehensive settlement alone or with the Soviets
or start alone and then bring in the Soviets, or try
to work it out together with the Israelis. There are
many possible variations of the comprehensive
Declassified Photocopy from:
Gerald R. Ford Library
approach. But they will all be very difficult for
Israel.
The fourth option is to go to Geneva and let a
stalemate develop and then try to move back to a
ORIGINAL RETIRED
U.S. interim agreement. The Soviets may fear this is
what we have in mind and that we already have worked
at an agreement with Sadat. But a stalemate at
Geneva without prior progress outside of Geneva is
very dangerous and could lead to war as easily as to
an interim agreement. This would be especially
true if we were seen to be the obstacle causing the
stalemate at Geneva.
Given these options, what we will recommend to
the President will depend upon the degree of flexi-
bility the President discovers in his meetings with Sadat
and Rabin and what I find about the Soviet position
when I see Gromyko. When I meet Gromyko the
guidance is not to be specific. This is really an
exploration to get their views before meeting Sadat
and Rabin. We can probably keep this round of
consultations going into the first part of July but not
beyond that or the Arabs will conclude we will do
nothing. It is also possible that the Israeli strategy
is just to sit tight, wait until elections come next year
FORD
and do nothing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
GERALD
Jynuary
TOP SECRETVSENSITIVE/NODIS
25
Schlesinger:
It is clear to me that is precisely their strategy,
don't you agree?
Kissinger:
Yes, I think this is their strategy. Since I left
Israel in March there has not been a single
substantive message from the Israeli Government
capable of enabling progress to be made. Either
they repeat their earlier positions and call them
new when they are the same, or they are so vague
as to be worthless. That is why we must be firm
with them and impress upon them the need to come
SERVATION
up with some new substantive proposals.
Clements:
I want to assure you, Henry, and the President that
the Saudis have great confidence in you and the
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
President wanting a just peace in the Middle East.
When I was there with George (General Brown), they
made this very clear. And they said it is also true
of Egypt. They are optimistic that you and the
President will pull something out of the hat to keep
ORIGINAL RETIRE
it going.
Kissinger:
They are optimistic because they think we will do it
but at this point we have nothing at all to work with.
Schlesinger:
Could I say something about using the word survival
instead of security? It is a codeword of significance.
After October 1973 we took a position on maintaining
the security of Israel and working for a just and
equitable solution to the Middle East situation. That
formula is reassuring to Israel. It means their
undiminished survival. This is a sensitive period
and it is not advisable to get drawn into semantic
disputes.
President:
I have used survival and security interchangeably,
synonymously. But they have now chosen to make a
distinction, not I. I will therefore use survival and
I do not want anyone else to paraphrase or explain
away what I say. The record of my commitment to
Israel is clear. I have before me the major items
furnished to Israel by the U.S. since October 1973
FORD it LIBRARY DERALD
TOP SECRET
BERALD FORD VIBRARIA
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
26
President:
and since I became President, up until April of
(Continuing)
this year. The facts are that Israel is far better
off today militarily than prior to October 1973.
I am delighted they are in that position since it
makes our position very strong in holding off on
certain items. If this criticism continues, we
may release this information.
Now, we are dedicated to Israel's survival and
to the avoidance of stagnation and stalemate.
All Departments and Agencies should maintain a
correct attitude toward the Israelis. All the parties
In the meantime, we will make a bona fide reassess-
Declassified Photocopy from
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
should be treated with the same correctness. Our
position is right and has to be maintained that way.
Gerald R. Ford Library
ment of our policy and announce a final decision after
the meeting with Rabin in June. We made a maximum
effort in March. We are disappointed it did not
succeed. But that is not the reason for our reassess-
ment. We have some critical issues to solve. In
the meantime our attitude is one of correct behavior.
Vice President:
What about using "survival of Israel as a free and
independent state? If That is what I have always used.
President:
We want to stick to survival.
Kissinger:
They have said they need the word security because
it means expanded frontiers. They want us to endorse
that position so they have made it an issue.
Schlesinger:
Have they said so?
Kissinger:
They have said it in the press and have accused us
publicly of trying to get away from supporting their
territorial claims.
Schlesinger:
In the past we have used the word security.
President:
But they have made it an issue and we will not back down.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
GERALD FORD
FORD is LIBRARY OFFICE
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
27
Vice President:
I have used "survival as a free and independent
state" for 26 years. I have attended the kick-off
dinner of the United Jewish Appeal every year and
have a lot of experience in finding just the right
words. I have had to be careful. This will avoid
the territorial issue which is linked to security.
President:
That is okay. Survival or survival as a free and
independent state.
Schlesinger:
Could I raise another issue? Senator Church's
SERVATION
committee has asked to interrogate three of our
people without a monitor present, two of them in
connection with the Huston report and one for some
other report. We need guidance on how to handle
Declassified Photocopy from
this problem, since it will set a precedent.
Gerald R. Ford Library
President:
Have the employees asked to have a monitor present?
Schlesinger:
The employees have not yet been notified directly.
The notification came to the Department of Defense.
Colby:
I talked to Church today. Hills and I showed them
ORIGINAL
some very delicate stuff and they have begun to
realize how important it is to compartmentalize
their operation. The problem of organization is as
important as anything else, since they are now
operating with everyone having access to everything.
There was some sympathy for the idea of interviewing
the employee with a monitor present with a brief
period at the end where there would be unrestricted
access to the employee. Our Counsel would be there
most of the time.
I also testified before the entire Committee today.
It was like being a prisoner in the dock, there was a
real interrogation. All the questions were on assassina-
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
tion and it was like "when did you stop beating your wife? "!"
FORD i LIBRARY CERALD
That was all they wanted to talk about but I insisted on
covering the whole range of covert action in a larger
way, otherwise it would have been a disaster. I
explained to them how covert operations are conducted,
what are the procedures followed, what orders are
given, who does what. Then I gave them some specific
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
28
Colby:
cases that have already been blown for the most
(Continuing)
part, such as Guatemala. This left them groping
for a way to tackle the whole problem. Then I
went on to propaganda and agents of influence, telling
them, for example
Kissinger:
I am not sure that example will impress Kennedy.
Colby:
SERVATION
Then I talked
about Radio Free Europe. And then at the end I got
to assassination. I described the delicacy of the
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
problem and how little of this sort of thing the U.S.
has really done. There were attempts against Castro
in the early 1960s but our information is very scarce.
Then they wanted to know whether we had
ORIGINAL RETU
ever had any of our own agents assassinated, you
know, the Green Beret stuff. I told them we never
do that. I also told them that our policy and our
orders are very clear: we will have nothing to do
with assassination: Church ended by saying that is
not enough. That to be certain we need more than
orders. We need to have a law which prohibits
assassination in time of peace.
President:
Who was in the meeting?
Colby:
All of the Senators.
Kissinger:
It is an act of insanity and national humiliation to
have a law prohibiting the President from ordering
assassination.
President:
Was there staff present?
is
FORD
Colby:
Four staff members.
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
FORD & LIBRART 076839
CERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
29
President:
And court reporters?
Colby:
Yes.
President:
Jim [Schlesinger], at what echelon are the employees
they want to question and when are they to testify?
Schlesinger:
It will be soon. They are of a lower level and the
implication is that it is a question of wrong-doing
that the Committee is after on the part of the
individual rather than the Department.
ERVATION
Colby:
There is a big difference between individual action
and responsibility and the way in which the institution
conducts its operations.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
President:
I have asked my Counsel, Rod Hills,' to draw up some
guidelines for testifying.
Schlesinger:
Can we say to the Church Committee that we are
developing an Administration-wide policy and we will
ORIGINAL RETRI
be back to them as soon as it has been developed?
President:
Yes. You should get together with Rod Hills who is
already working on this.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
FORD is LIBRARY OERALD
BERALD FORD LIBHAR
SECRET
2833
09240
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEETING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PANAMA CANAL NEGOTIATIONS
Thursday, May 15, 1975
DECLASSIFIED
4:30 p.m.
E.O. 12858
SEC.
3.6
state etra 125/98
The Cabinet Room
MR #23, osDers 4/27/04
CIACU515110105
From: Henry A. Kissinger
HC
BY dol NARA DATE 7/20/06
I. PURPOSE
To consider options relating to the Panama Canal question and the
possible need to modify existing Presidential instructions on
negotiation of a new treaty.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: The Panama Canal negotiations have progressed
to the point where a basic decision is necessary as to which of the
available policy alternatives we wish to follow. An agreement in
principle has been reached on three major issues. The differences
between us and the Panamanians are well defined on the remaining
issues. The outline of a possible treaty and our progress to date
is attached at Tab B.
Ambassador Bunker estimates that if he is given further flexibility
in negotiating instructions, he may be able to wrap up an agreement
in another month of negotiations. He is convinced, however, that
agreement with the Panamanians on a treaty is not possible under
the negotiating instructions currently in effect, particularly in regard
to the requirement for a fifty-year minimum duration of the treaty and
the specific areas of lands and waters which we are willing to turn
back to the Panamanians. He and State feel that because the
Panamanian Government is a strong one and fully committed to
resolving the Canal question through negotiation of a new treaty, we
have an opportunity to engage Panama constructively in the Canal
enterprise, giving it a stake in its continued operation. This, he
believes, is the best way to assure the Canal's continued operation
and our access to it over the long term. It is the Ambassador's view
that we are now in a position to get more from Panama and achieve
more satisfactory agreement than at any time in the future.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
SECRET
SECRET
2
It is the unanimous judgment of the Intelligence community that failure
of our treaty effort would result in confrontation, demonstrations and
violence which could lead to our being denied use of the Canal and
seriously affect our interests in and relations with the rest of the
Hemisphere. The recently completed Special National Intelligence
Estimate which contains these conclusions is attached at Tab C.
Negotiations have been carried on with the cooperation of the Defense
Department, which has participated fully in determining our position.
DOD, however, has become seriously concerned at the opposition to a
Canal treaty in the Congress. It questions whether we should present
a treaty which turns over the Canal to Panama at the end of its lifetime
so soon after the reverses suffered to our position in Southeast Asia.
It wonders whether we should expend credit with the Congress on this
issue when there are other, higher priority matters for which we will
have to appeal for support. Defense is of the view, therefore, that we
should continue to insist on a lengthy treaty duration and on the lands
and waters proposals we have already made, on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.
If negotiation of a treaty is not possible, then Defense suggests that we
consider abandoning the treaty route altogether and respond to some of
the Panamanians' most insistent demands through a series of unilateral
accommodations, maintaining the 1903 treaty and our position in the
Zone. Ambassador Bunker does not believe this alternative would be
acceptable to the Congress or prevent a strong Panamanian reaction to
abandonment of treaty negotiations.
Negotiating Instructions Issues
The question of how to proceed with the general Canal problem is of
course related to the two specific matters at issue which both
Ambassador Bunker and the Defense Department agree are crucial to
completing the negotiations with the Panamanians:
1. Duration -- Presently existing negotiating instructions require
Ambassador Bunker to insist on a minimum of fifty years' treaty
duration. President Torrijos has stated publicly that Panama will not
accept a treaty of this length. Ambassador Bunker notes that the
duration provision of the treaty which we offered to Panama in 1967
extended the agreement's life only to the turn of the century.
Bunker believes Panama will accept no more this time. Defense has
agreed with Bunker to seek your approval for a reduced period of
SECRET
LISRARY
SECRET
3
duration of control of the Canal's operation to twenty years. However,
DOD continues to hold that we need a lengthy period of duration for
defense purposes, based on the strategic need for the Canal to insure
inter-ocean passage of men and supplies, Panama's potential for
political instability, and Soviet and Cuban interests in the Hemisphere.
It notes that we have not yet tried separating operational and defense
control and believes that our willingness to be forthcoming on
operational duration might lead the Panamanians to be more agreeable
on defense. In our discussions during the preliminary meeting, DOD
and General Brown agreed that they could accept reduction of the
minimum period for defense to forty years, though with considerable
difficulty.
2. Lands and Waters -- The U.S. position, concurred in by
Defense, offered to turn over to the Panamanians about 60 percent of
the Zone. This area does not, however, include high-visibility
enclaves around Panama City or military base and training land which
is not in use and which forms an important part of the U.S. presence
in Panama. The Panamanians are insisting on at least token return of
some of these areas, and Bunker believes they must, for domestic
political purposes, have some immediate territorial benefit from the
treaty and a promise of the gradual turnover of other high-visibility
areas. He is not convinced we really need all the land we are
insisting on retaining, like abandoned and unused bases, and believes
we could permit the Panamanians some further participation in
administration of high-visibility housing areas around Panama City.
Defense, on the other hand, insists that all areas that we have not
offered the Panamanians are necessary to carry out its responsibilities
for defense and operation of the Canal.
Alternatives Available
There are three alternatives available to us for the future handling of
the Canal issue:
1. Continue the negotiations maintaining our insistence on fifty years'
duration for defense and the present lands and waters proposal.
It would still be necessary to modify negotiating instructions to
permit a shorter period for duration of operational control and a
U.S. right of first refusal in case of Canal expansion. Defense
and State agree on the necessity of these changes.
FORD
SECRET
LISBARY
4
SECRET
2. Pursue the negotiations, giving greater flexibility to the negotiators
on duration and lands and waters.
Under this option we would modify instructions to reduce the minimum
acceptable duration period for defense below fifty years (to perhaps forty
years); reduce the period for operation; and ask State and Defense to
get together to produce a new offer to the Panamanians on lands and
waters which retains for us the areas that are absolutely necessary for
carrying out our responsibilities for operation and defense of the Canal,
but recognizes Panama's need to demonstrate territorial gains from the
treaty and reduces American military presence in urban centers.
There are two sub-options under this alternative regarding how to
proceed once a treaty is negotiated:
A. Seek an early Senate vote.
B. Avoid Senate action until receptivity in Congress improves.
We could submit the treaty to Congress but seek to delay a
vote or not submit it at all until receptivity improves, perhaps in
1977. (Within the last week we received a message from Torrijos
saying it would be preferable to agree on a treaty, even though
ratification were delayed "for much time," than for the
negotiations to fail.)
3. Institute a program of unilateral steps to accommodate the
Panamanians' most insistent demands.
A. As an alternative to concluding the negotiations; or
B. In the event of a breakdown of treaty negotiations or Senate
rejection of a treaty.
B. Participants
List at Tab A.
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will be
announced.
SECRET
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
SECRET
5
TALKING POINTS
Opening the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to consider the Panama Canal
negotiations: whether and how hard to press to complete the
treaty now being negotiated; whether to modify the instructions
now in effect; and finally, whether there may be a separate
non-treaty path we could take.
2. I understand, Bill (Colby), that the Intelligence community has
made a study of the situation and has drawn some conclusions. I
would appreciate your reviewing these briefly since everyone here
today was not present at the earlier Senior Review Group meeting.
Options
3. As I understand it, we have three alternatives available to us.
Henry, would you outline these for us.
The Non-Treaty Route
4. Perhaps the best way to start would be to consider if we want to
continue our efforts to negotiate a treaty or whether there is an
alternative to this by making some unilateral accommodations.
Does the Defense Department believe this is a viable alternative
to a treaty?
5. I understand, Ambassador Bunker, that you believe that this
course would run into difficulties in Congress and be unacceptable
to the Panamanians. Is this correct?
6. Does CIA have any view on whether or not these measures would
be acceptable to the Panamanians?
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
6
(Since there is good possibility that Defense will not press for
abandoning the treaty negotiations in favor of unilateral accommodations,
you may want to move the discussion to the treaty alternatives. To
clarify the point fully, you could ask:)
7. If unilateral accommodations are not a desirable alternative to a
treaty, then we want to consider how hard to press for a treaty.
That is, of course, based on the assumption that no one is
proposing simply breaking off or abandoning the negotiations. Is
that correct?
Treaty Route
8 Continuing the negotiations requires a decision on whether and how
much to modify the negotiating instructions now in effect. Ambassador
Bunker, I gather that you are convinced that the Panamanians will
not accept a treaty that lasted fifty years, even if only for defense
purposes. How much less would we have to offer them in order to
get a treaty? Do you think they will accept forty years?
9. On the lands and waters question, I take it Defense feels there is
no room for give in our position at all. Does this reflect its general
attitude towards the treaty or does it really need all these lands and
waters to carry out its functions under a treaty?
Timing of Submission of a Treaty to Congress
10. Suppose we get an agreement. The Panamanians have apparently
indicated they would be prepared to wait some time for ratification.
Do you think that, if we negotiated a treaty but delayed submission
to Congress, the Panamanians would accept the situation? For how
long? Ambassador Bunker? Bill Colby?
Attachments:
Tab A:
List of Participants
Tab B: Outline and Status of the Treaty
Tab
C: Special National Intelligence Estimate
BERALO R. FORD LIBRARY
SECRET
TALKING POINTS
Options
1. Continue the negotiations on the basis of the instructions as they now
stand with regard to defense duration and lands and waters, while making
the few modifications we all agree on relating to operation, Canal expansion,
etc.
This would:
-- improve the chances for Congressional approval.
-- test the Panamanians' desire. for a treaty on the basis of the
important concessions we have already offered them.
-- permit us to get a reaction from them to our proposal to separate
operation duration from our defense requirements.
On the other hand:
-- we know fifty years is unacceptable to the Panamanians, and they
know we know it.
-- we offered better terms to the Panamanians in 1967 (duration to
turn of Century, 33 years). To be unwilling to match these terms now
would be taken as an indication that we are not negotiating seriously.
-- it is quite possible that making such a proposal would result in a
hardening of their position.
-- if the negotiations break down, no matter who is at fault, we
will be blamed internationally.
R.
FORD
GERALD
LIBRARY
2
2. Continue the negotiations, giving greater flexibility to the negotiators
on duration and lands and waters.
This would:
-- permit us to conclude the negotiations.
-- give us a better treaty than we will probably be able to get in
the future. The present Panamanian leadership is probably more disposed
to make compromises in the interests of a treaty now than it would be if we
get into a confrontation situation; and better disposed than any successor
government is likely to be.
On the other hand,
-- there is little doubt that further concessions will stimulate already
strong Congressional opposition.
If we get a treaty, then we will have to decide whether to:
A. Hold back either by seeking to delay a vote or not submitting a
treaty at all.
-- We have had a number of messages from the Panamanians
indicating that they want a treaty and would understand if the ratification
process were delayed for some time. We could probably hold them to
this for a little while.
-- The Panamanians would have an interest in continuing to show
restraint knowing that violence or demonstrations would damage the
possibility of Senate approval of a treaty.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
3
-- Until we submit the treaty, the matter remains in the Executive
court where we can control it and avoid its becoming an issue until the
atmosphere improves.
B. Push ahead for Congressional approval.
-- failure to submit a treaty would draw growing criticism from
Panama. We should have no illusions that the Panamanians will not soon
accuse us of bad faith and increase international pressure on us to submit
the treaty.
-- There is some possibility that domestic pressure from both sides
in the U.S. would increase until we submitted the treaty.
3. Institute a program of unilateral steps to accommodate the Panamanians'
most insistent demands.
A. We could do this instead of a treaty.
-- This would give us the advantages of avoiding criticism over
the negotiations with Congress and public, and time to encourage a more
sympathetic attitude.
However,
-- Congress would be critical of any unilateral actions the Executive
took and might refuse to pass those actions which required its approval.
(We have already tried out a number of steps with them like the lottery,
license plates and flags, with negative results.)
-- Furthermore, it seems likely that these steps would not satisfy
the Panamanians, who want a treaty with some fundamental change in the
structure.
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
4
-- And of course we would be making concessions without getting
anything in return from the Panamanians, making eventual negotiation of
a treaty more difficult.
B. In the event of a breakdown of treaty negotiations or Senate
rejection:
-- this may be the only means we have to help avoid a violent
reaction and confrontation with the Panamanians. It would also indicate
internationally our desire to recognize legitimate demands and might win
us some support.
R. FORD LIBRARY
SECRET
09182
Sensitive
12 May 1975
DCI BRIEFING FOR
14 MAY NSC MEETING
PANAMA
I. Mr. President, two intelligence assessments are
appropriate to today's deliberations:
-- The consequences of several possible results
of the current canal negotiations, and
--- The present mood and tactics of the Panaman-
ian Government regarding the negotiations.
A. On the possible results of negotiations, our
estimate focusses on three major possible
courses of events.
First Scenario
II. The first scenario assumes that a treaty is signed,
and both Panama and the US begin the ratification
process.
A. The Panamanian Government will be able to ob-
tain prompt ratification of any treaty that
General Torrijos endorses and energetically
supports.
1. Torrijos fully dominates the political
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
MR08-116, #4 CIAltr 10/24/08
FORD i LIBRARY 038870
BY dal NARA DATE 3/6/09
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
scene -- a unique position for a Pana-
manian leader dealing with the US.
B. The principal uncertainty is the timing.
1. Torrijos probably would act fairly
quickly, before the US Senate. He would
hope, among other motives, to influence
the Senate and place the onus for any
failure squarely on the US.
C. Under this scenario, we do not believe that
a future Panamanian Government would denounce
such a treaty, although it is always possible.
The advantages accruing to Panama would be
substantial, and, perhaps more important,
would increase as time passes.
Second Scenario
III. Under the second scenario, a treaty is signed but
the US Senate fails to act for an extended period,
or rejects it entirely.
A. In the case of extended delay, Panama's re-
action would depend on Torrijos' perception
of the reasons for the delay and of the chances
for eventual ratification -- and on how much
- 2 -
FORDO R. GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
confidence he retained in the US executive
branch's intentions.
1. We believe that Torrijos would have dif-
ficulty living with an extended delay.
2. Within a year, he would bow to national-
ist pressure and openly criticize the de-
lay. We could expect some demonstrations
and some harassment of US personnel.
3. But as long as Torrijos believed the door
still open for US ratification, he would
control the level of the Panamanian re-
sponse.
B. The consequences would be much more serious
if the Senate rejected a treaty. Nationalistic
feelings would be ignited, and give rise to
violence and rioting against US installations.
1. After initial disorders, we believe that
Panama would begin more calculated hostile
acts designed to impede operation of the
canal, such as closure of Canal Zone borders.
-- Terrorists would move against US in-
stallations, and US personnel would be
in some physical danger.
- 3 -
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
-- Torrijos would probably break relations
with the US and denounce the 1903 treaty.
2. International support for Panama would be
extensive, especially elsewhere in Latin
America. This would deal a severe blow to
prospects for a multilateral dialogue and
damage the climate for bilateral relations.
Regional organizations would be more in-
clined to exclude the US.
Third Scenario
IV. In the third scenario, the negotiators cannot agree
and talks break down. What happens would depend on
Torrijos' perceptions.
A. If he believed talks might be resumed on his
terms, he would maintain a responsible image
for a while.
B. If in fact talks were not resumed fairly soon,
however, we could expect Panama to follow tac-
tics like those described in the case of
Senate rejection -- harassment and a break
in relations.
C. Torrijos would adopt such tactics quickly
if he concluded at the outset of a break-
FORD
LIBRA
- 4 -
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
down that there was no hope for resuming
the talks. He might well feel a sense of
betrayal, and react emotionally and aggres-
sively.
1. If so, his government would then play
a greater role in directing the popular
response, and there would be a greater
chance that members of the National Guard
would join in the harassment.
2. There would be less prospect for any
meaningful communication between the
US and Panama.
Present Thinking in Panama
V. The mood of the Panamanian Government seems to
be changing. We have recently noted signs of
growing apprehension about the prospects for a
new canal treaty.
A. The change has sprung from fear that op-
position in the Congress, and the domestic
problems that you would face in getting a
treaty ratified, will undermine the will to
conclude one.
B. There is also concern about the argument
- 5 -
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
being made by some in the US that a treaty
meeting Panama's aspirations would be viewed
as a foreign policy weakness, and that the US
should stand firm.
VI. These concerns about what they take to be the
situation in the US have caused the Panamanians
to adjust their tactics.
A. First, they are trying to get across the mes-
sage that they want and must have a treaty,
and are willing to worry later about the
acknowledged difficulties of ratification.
1. They are now suggesting that they could
tolerate a delay in ratification if a
satisfactory treaty is negotiated and
signed -- and that the prospects for
ratification should not be allowed to
influence the content of the treaty.
B. Secondly, sensing that negotiations are reach-
ing a critical point, Panamanian leaders are
conducting a vigorous campaign to get world
opinion on their side.
1. Within the hemisphere, this effort has
become particularly intense. Between
- 6 -
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
them, Foreign Minister Tack and Torrijos
himself have visited some nine Latin
American countries within the last sev-
eral weeks.
2. Panamanian representatives will eventually
go to all the remaining Latin American
countries, as well as to any international
meetings where support might be obtained.
VII. Finally, on the two main unresolved substantive
issues:
A. On the question of the duration of a treaty,
Panama has twice announced publicly 4 most
recently in the March 1973 UN Security Coun
cil meeting in Panama that it can never ac-
cept a 50-year period.
1. To most Panamanians this sounds like per-
petuity, a key factor of the 1903 treaty
they insist must be changed.
B. As for the issue of land and water, the Panaman-
ians are insisting that the US retain for use
only the land and water essential for the op-
eration, maintenance and defense of the canal.
- 7 -
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
SECRET
SECRET
Sensitive
1. We believe that Torrijos must obtain some
visible benefit to Panama on this issue
at the treaty's outset, especially adjacent
to Panama City and Colon.
- 8 -
LIBRARY GERALD ? FORD
SECRET