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NSC Meeting, 7/25/75
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National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)
National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration
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Soviet Union
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Arms control
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 7/25/1975" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
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Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09191
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
NSC Meeting on SALT Issues, 7/25/75
CREATION DATE
07/25/1975
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200022
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 7/25/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
REDACTED 4/27/04
09191
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH FORTIONS EXEMPTED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5(a)
MEETING ON SALT ISSUES
state ets 9/25/98. osoets 4/27/04
Friday, July 25, 1975
MR 98-40,#30 NSC Itr 2/19/99
CIA etr 5/10/05
4:00 p.m. (one hour)
The Cabinet Room
BY dal NARA DATE 7/20/06
From: Henry A. Kissinger B
I. PURPOSE
To review the latest Soviet positions on SALT; to consider
possible US responses; and to solicit the solidarity and support
of NSC members for moving in a constructive fashion to complete
the agreement.
II.
BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: Following is the status of the major SALT
issues:
MIRV Verification. The Soviets have made a major move
in agreeing to count missiles tested with both MIRVs and
single RVs as MIRVed when deployed. However, a problem
still remains with respect to counting MIRVs on SLBMs. If
MIRVs are deployed only on part of a submarine class we
may not be able to verify that the remaining missiles on that
class are not also MIRVed. With confirmation from Brezhnev
that the Soviets are willing to count missiles tested with
MIRVs as MIRVed when deployed, we will be in a position to
move the MIRV verification issue to the formal negotiations
in Geneva. The problem of counting SLBM MIRVs involves
technical issues which are best dealt with at the Delegation
level. There are no significant interagency disagreements on
how to proceed on this issue.
Cruise Missiles. The Soviets have not changed their position on
cruise missiles. Since our only strategically important interest
in long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), we may
TOP SEGREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS (B) (3)
By Authority of Henry A. Kissinger
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
2
be able to trade off what we want in this area in return for
agreeing to the Soviet position on cruise missiles launched
from sea or land.
The DOD position on cruise missiles differs from that put
forward by the Soviets primarily on the issue of ALCMs.
Defense argues strongly for not counting ALCMs up to 2500-
3000 km, in contrast to the 600 km limit proposed by the
Soviets. On land-based cruise missiles, Defense is eager
to accept the Soviet proposal for a 5500 km limit,
DOD's principle concern is
however, this can almost certainly be done in the context
of a 2500-3000 km limit on ALCMs, since,
The Verification Panel yesterday concluded that we should
concentrate our efforts on achieving our principal objective
of maintaining the option to deploy long-range ALCMs. To
this end, a possible initial approach discussed was to
propose to Brezhnev a 3000 km limit on ALCMs and a 1500
km limit on SLCMs.
Mobile ICBMs. The Soviet position favoring a ban on the
deployment of land-mobile and essentially all air-mobile ICBMs
has caused some interagency problems; however, a consensus
is emerging that, on balance, a combined ban on mobile
deployment (with development and testing permitted) would
be in the US interest. There is general agreement that the US
could not deploy a mobile system prior to 1983 and that 1985
is a more practical date for initial deployment. However, OSD
is apprehensive about the ability to obtain mobile development
funds if deployment is banned. An even greater impediment to
funding is the lack of a viable deployment concept for either
air- or land-mobile ICBMs; all concepts put forward to date
are either too expensive, require too much land, or only offer
marginal improvement in survivability over silo-based ICBMs.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
3
Since mobile deployment would also generate significant
verification uncertainties, the weight of argument seems to
favor agreement to a mobile deployment ban. There is also
the problem of the negative political impact, as well as the
impact on mobile development funding, which would result if
we rejected the Soviet proposal and the Soviet proposal were
leaked to Congress. As you know from your meeting with
the ACDA General Advisory Council, there is widespread
support for a closing off this area of strategic competition.
Thus, the issue comes down to the impact which a mobile
deployment ban would have on the ability to obtain mobile
R&D funds.
Soviet refusal to consider the Backfire a strategic bomber
could be a major problem, unless Gromyko's failure to explicitly
reject a tanker prohibition indicates some flexibility on this
point. OSD recognizes that the Soviets are not going to count
all Backfires in the 2400 aggregate; however, the Chiefs still
hold some hope for such an outcome. OSD has suggested a
fallback position under which all Backfires above a certain
sublimit, e. .g., 100, would be counted. In return, we could
agree not to deploy more than 100 FB-111 medium bombers.
Although we might put forth such a proposal, it is unlikely
to lead to agreement on this issue.
This is a particularly difficult issue since on substantive
grounds Backfire has capability which could warrant its being
classed as a heavy bomber.
Since we cannot hope to obtain rigid constraints on Backfire
deployment, the real question is tactical. We could try to
wrap up the issue now by obtaining' some limits on tankers
and Soviet commitment to deploy Backfire only for peripheral
missions, or we could hold to our current position and try
and obtain further Soviet concessions in the final negotiations.
However, it is unlikely that we could ever get the Soviets to
go beyond a commitment on tankers and a peripheral mission
for Backfire. Thus, there are strong arguments for trying to
settle this issue now.
Heavy Missile Definition. There has been a breakthrough on
this issue in that the Soviets have agreed to define a heavy
TOP SECREF/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
4
missile and have proposed a reasonable parameter--missile
gross weight, for the definition. Although OSD continues to
prefer a definition based on throw weight, missile gross
weight appears to be nearly as restrictive and offers the
additional advantage of being much easier to define. Thus,
we could probably accept the Soviet proposal; however,
pending completion of further analyses on this issue, we
should probably maintain our current throw weight position
if this issue comes up on Helsinki.
The two sides are not far apart on the issues of limitations
on increases in silo size and the timing for follow-on negotia-
tions. These issues can- be turned over to the Delegations for
final resolution.
One final issue concerns your tactical approach with Brezhnev
at Helsinki. There are probably two main approaches you
could take on the remaining SALT issues:
-- Accept as much of the most recent Soviet proposal as
possible and try to compromise on the remaining issues.
-- Pocket what the Soviets have already given us and hold
fast on the remaining issues.
If we hold fast to our basic position, Brezhnev may concede on
some remaining issues, particularly if he is anxious to come
to an agreement and have a Summit. On the other hand, any
concessions Brezhnev is likely to make will not change the basic
character of the agreement which is taking shape. There is
also the danger that a lack of movement on our part could
jeopardize our chances of obtaining an agreement.
On the other hand, this will be your last opportunity to meet
Brezhnev before the summit, and if the two sides are to com-
promise on the remaining issues, it will probably require a
Soviet decision at the highest level. By demonstrating some
movement and a willingness to compromise, you stand a good
chance of wrapping up the agreement at this meeting. This
will then permit the two sides to work out the technical details
well ahead of the signing of the agreement at the summit.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
5
Mr. Colby will be prepared to brief on the latest intelligence
regarding Soviet strategic forces and the Soviet attitude
toward the SALT negotiations.
After your opening remarks, I suggest you ask me to go over
the issues reviewed by the Verification Panel.
B. Participants: (List at Tab A)
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting but not the subject will
be announced. There will be a White House photographer.
III. TALKING POINTS
At the Opening of the Meeting
1. The purpose of this meeting is to review the major SALT issues
requiring resolution in light of the most recent Soviet proposals.
2. I want to reemphasize the importance I attach to the upcoming
talks with the General Secretary. This will probably be the
last chance I have to see him before the summit, and these
talks could be crucial in setting the stage for an eventual
agreement.
3. Bill (Colby) is there anything new in the intelligence area we
should know?
4. Henry, will you outline the latest Soviet proposals and the
results of the Verification Panel's review of the issues?
At the Close of the Meeting
1. The discussion today has been very helpful in giving me a
perspective on the major issues. I believe the alternatives for
dealing with each of the issues are clear.
2. I will consider the issues we discussed today very carefully.
It is clear that the Soviets have put forth a very serious proposal
and I want to respond in a constructive fashion.
3. I want to emphasize my determination to do everything possible
to obtain a good SALT agreement. When I have made my
decisions on the issues, I expect the fullest cooperation from
each one of you in making a thorough success of our efforts.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
MEMORANDUM
5272X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOPLSECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
August 2, 1975
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER
NUH
FROM:
for
Jeanne W. Davis
SUBJECT:
Minutes of NSC Meeting
on SALT, 7/25/75
Attached for your information are the minutes of the National Security
Council Meeting, held July 25, 1975, to discuss SALT and the Soviet
Union.
Attachment
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Attachment
lit 2/98
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09193
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Minute
CREATOR'S NAME
Jan Lodal
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Minutes, NSC Meeting, 7/25/75
CREATION DATE
07/25/1975
VOLUME
23 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200022
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 7/25/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
declassified w/excisms w/ 6/99
let
5272x
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Friday, July 25, 1975
TIME:
4:15 p.m. to 5:37 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
The Soviet Union And SALT
Principals
The President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger
Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Fred Ikle
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
George S. Brown
Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby
Other Attendees
State:
Deputy Secretary Robert Ingersoll
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA:
Mr. Carl Duckett
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
White House:
Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the
President
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.84
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (b)(i)(i) (b
3.4
NSC:
Jan M. Lodal
01648-39,*32,NSC Wer 2199
SALT
By let # NARA, Date 5/25/99
President Ford: I am sorry we were delayed. The suggestion was made that
I go on national television to explain what the Turks have done and the impact
on us, and to urge the House to make a different decision. I might do it TOORD
night, or I might do it from Helsinki.
GERALD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS
CLASSIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
2
President Ford: Bill, why don't you give us a rundown on where we
stand
Director Colby: Mr. President, let me discuss Brezhnev's concerns
and his position, on the eve of his meeting with you in Helsinki.
Last winter, when Brezhnev took a seven-week medical leave, his
retirement was very much in the air. More recently he himself referred
vaguely to it when he met with Senators Humphrey, Scott, and others.
We think it certain, however, that he means to stay on at least through
the Party Congress next February. He knows it is his last Congress -- they
occur every five years -- and he doubtless sees it as the occasion for
securing his place in Soviet history.
A health accident cannot be ruled out, but he is pacing himself carefully.
The odds are good that he will make it through the Congress.
On the foreign policy front, Brezhnev wants to go before the Congress
proclaiming the success of detente. The calendar is arranged to provide
a crescendo for this theme, with next week's European security conference
and his visit here next fall as high points along the way.
Brezhnev's chief claim as a statesman rests on the successful management
of the Soviet-American relationship.
And SALT, of course, lies at the center of that relationship.
This leads straight to the question of, how much room for maneuver
he has in defining Soviet terms for an agreement.
He has had some recent political troubles. The trade bill was an
important setback. The USSR has slipped further in the Middle East.
Most important of all, Brezhnev's age and health are bound to make him
seem a bit of a lame duck. To the extent that his colleagues believe
that his days are numbered, they will turn their minds to their own fortunes
and futures.
Against this, however, Brezhnev still enjoys imposing political strengths.
Detente, despite the disappointments of the past year, remains un-
challenged as the Soviet general line. It is serving a host of Soviet interests,
and serving them well. There are doubtless recurrent differences over
specific issues, but the whole Politburo would be dismayed at the thought
of a summit failure or cancellation that would bring detente into
SERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
3
There have been notable successes under Brezhnev's leadership in
the past year.
-- There are no obvious challengers since the purge of Shelepin last
spring.
A key figure in SALT decisionmaking is Marshal Grechko, the 71-year-old
Minister of Defense whom Brezhnev elevated to the Politburo in 1973
If Grechko vouches in the Politburo for the acceptability of Brezhnev's SALT
proposals, attesting that they would not impair Soviet security, other members
would find it difficult to object effectively.
Also, I should note that the Soviets are keenly aware of the growing tendency
in the US to look critically at detente, and the fact that 1976 is an election
year. They are realistic enough to reckon that SALT TWO should best be
settled fairly quickly.
All this is not to say that Brezhnev is ready to meet our demands on the whole
range of issues under dispute in SALT TWO. But the political factors I have
discussed do suggest that, in the face of a firm yet even-handed US position,
he will make some concessions to assure the success of the negotiations. This
conclusion seems to be confirmed by Gromyko's latest presentation in Geneva.
Assuming that there will be a SALT TWO agreement, one of the problems will
be monitoring Soviet compliance. My remarks today on monitoring a SALT
TWO agreement have to be preliminary. A definitive assessment will depend
on the provisions of the agreement, including measures to aid verification.
To put the monitoring problem into perspective, I believe the Soviets will have
strong incentives not to violate a SALT TWO agreement.
With the ceilings set at Vladivostok, only a large scale cheating effort
could be militarily significant as measured by, for example, the potential
numbers of Soviet first-strike warheads and the numbers of US warheads
which could survive such a strike. Such an effort would carry high risk of
detection and serious political risks.
Nevertheless, I feel sure we will still have to contend with monitoring ambiguities
and suspicious activities in the SALT TWO era.
This board summarizes our evaluation of our capability to monitor the 2, 400
aggregate ceiling. As it shows,
BERA
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
4
As you know, the Soviets have adamantly opposed including their new
Backfire bomber in the aggregate. We believe that Backfire is being
deployed initially for use in peripheral operations; its use against the
US is an open question.
The bomber has a range capability comparable to the Bison heavy bomber
which the Soviets have agreed to count in the aggregate.
This board shows our current estimate of our ability to monitor the 1,320
MIRV limit, in the light of Secretary Kissinger's talks with Mr. Gromyko.
If the Soviets agree that all missiles of types tested with both MIRVed and non-
MIRVed payloads -- like the SS-18 -- will be counted as MIRVed when deployed,
a major ambiguity would be removed.
PO
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TQP SECRE R / SENSITIVE XGDS
5
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
There is some potential for covert deployment of MIRVed ICBMs. As I
pointed out earlier, I think such cheating would be unlikely. Nevertheless,
we have evaluated our ability to detect it.
This potential would be limited if the Soviet strategic force evolves as the
Intelligence Community has projected.
Our capabilities to
monitor future deployment will depend on the characteristics of the missile
and on any treaty measures which might be adopted to aid monitoring.
Our ability to monitor precise numerical limits -- both the aggregate and the
MIRV sublimit -- depends on measures to aid verification and other treaty
provisions such as whether mobile ICBMs and long-range cruise missiles
are allowed or banned.
The uncertainties which will probably exist should raise no questions about
Soviet compliance with the 1, 320 ceiling until at least 1980, because the
Soviet MIRV force will be well below the limit until then.
By the time the Soviets approach the ceiling, our knowledge of first-generation
MIRVed systems probably will have improved significantly. But the follow-on
MIRVed systems we expect the Soviets to deploy before 1985 will introduce
new ambiguities and uncertainties.
In summary, my judgment is that we will continue to face uncertainties and
ambiguities in monitoring a SALT TWO agreement -- especially the MIRV
limit. We can recognize some of the problems likely to arise in this decade
and attempt to introduce treaty measures to make them more manageable.
Such measures are desirable because they can reduce our present monitoring
problems, can make cheating more difficult, lessen the chances of controversy,
and set useful precedents for handling systems of later generations and for
follow-on negotiations involving reductions.
In the 1980s, as new Soviet weapon systems are introduced, new problems
will arise which we cannot yet fully anticipate. Our ability to resolve the issues
of the eighties will depend on the adequacy of treaty measures to aid monitoring,
the effectiveness of the Standing Consultative Commission and -- in a very
important sense -- on our future intelligence collection systems and analytical
capabilities.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
6
President Ford: Could I have a copy of that?
Director Colby: You may have this one (Hands briefing script to the
President).
President Ford: Does anyone have any questions for Bill?
Secretary Schlesinger:
BERALD R,FORD LIBRAR,
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
7
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: The problem is the same on the other side if
you permit land mobiles - you still don't solve this problem.
Secretary Schlesinger: You solve it only if you ban all land mobiles,
including the IRBMs.
President Ford: Henry, perhaps you could go over the options, re-
view the alternatives, and tell us where we are.
Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, I don't think I will go over the
Soviet proposals since everyone here is familiar with them. As you know,
we have had some earlier discussions with Jim and a meeting with the
Verification Panel yesterday. I will try to synthesize the range of issues
and add some thinking done overnight which hasn't yet been considered
on an interagency basis.
On MIRV verifcation, we believe we can't go much further on your level
and should now shift that to Geneva. There needs to be a technical dis-
cussion of how the counting rules are implemented - how to count SLBMs,
how to deal with silo changes, and so forth. These are not very suitable
for your discussion with Brezhnev. They have accepted our principles,
and until we see if we differ on the application of these principles, we're
not ready for a further political decision.
The same is true on silo dimensions. We can carry over the Interim Agree-
ment language prohibiting increases more than 15% in any dimension and
add that volume increases must be less than 32%. This doesn't lend
itself to discussion with Brezhnev either.
Secretary Schlesinger: Would this include a 32% increase in length?
Secretary Kissinger: No - the Interim Agreement provisions would be
retained and in addition a 32% limit on volume. If they went 15% down,
this would give them a few percent in width. If they went 15% in diameter,
that would be all they could do. They could not go more than 15% deeper.
It also avoids the situation where if they narrow the diameter, they could
even go further down than 32%.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, this has eventually no significance
militarily, but it is a political problem.
President Ford: Ok.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
AgR SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
8
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have also proposed to ban ballistic
missiles greater than 600 km on surface ships and on the sea beds; this
is already in another agreement. They have also proposed to ban
weapons in earth orbit, which is also in another agreement, although
I don't remember which one.
Mr. Colby: The outer space agreement.
Secretary Schlesinger: There is still the question of the FOBS.
Fred C. Ikle: The FOBS is being discussed in Geneva now.
Secretary Kissinger: They want the 2400 to be reached within one
the year after the agreement begins. You could accept this in principle
and shift it to Geneva, with instructions to Alex Johnson to reduce the time
aby as much as he can get.
This brings us to more controversial issues. On the definition of a heavy
ICBM, we could accept their principle that the overall launching weight
be no greater than the SS- 19 and add to it a limit on throw weight.
Secretary Clements: There is a vulnerability there not covered when
you limit them to the 19 throw weight. As of today, that is a certain
technology. But they could change that technology and improve their yields.
President Ford: Just like we can.
Secretary Clements: This is a fuzzy area, and I am not suggesting
anything, I just wanted you to understand.
Secretary Kissinger: We can't ask them to limit their yield -
This leaves three issues - first, the definition of a heavy missile.
Dr. Ikle: There is also the question of the 18. We should insisti on no
further increases.
Secretary Kissinger: That is better left in Geneva. That leaves the
two biggest issues -
Secretary Schlesinger: Why should we leave the throw weight of the
18 to Geneva? It lends itself naturally to a general discussion of throw
weight by the President. If you get into it with regard to the 19, you
could have a paragraph and say that in addition, we have raised at
Geneva that there should be a limit on the 18 as well.
FORD & LIBRARY
President Ford: Let's get to the tough ones -
TOP SECRET \SENSITIVE - XGDS
for SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
9
Secretary Kissinger: That's cruise missiles and the Backfire. On cruise
missiles, the Soviet position was that cruise missiles on transport planes
are banned. Cruise missiles on bombers greater than 600 km range would
be counted. Cruise missiles on surface ships and submarines greater than
600 km would be banned. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned,
while other land-based cruise missiles short of 5500 km range would be
permitted.
I just noted from my notes that the Soviets would permit on transport air-
craft cruise missiles less than 600 km, but ban them above 600 km. I
don't know what the significance of this is.
President Ford: They are permitted on both bombers and transport air-
craft?
Secretary Kissinger: On bombers, above 600 km, they are permitted but
counted. On ships, they are permitted to 600 km, but banned above, and
on land, they are permitted to 5500 km, but banned above.
I should add that we have massive verification problems with every cruise
missile issue. The range could be extended - we have a 50% uncertainty
about ranges. At higher range its confidence becomes very uncertain.
There is an additional problem in that the cruise missile we are developing
is the same for ships and aircraft. If we accept a limit on cruise missiles
on ships less than aircraft cruise missiles, they will have to take our
word for it - but that is their problem.
There is a sense of consensus that we could accept their proposition
on intercontinental cruise missiles - to ban those of intercontinental
range.
President Ford: That's the 5500 km -
Secretary Kissinger: Below 5500 km, they would be permitted. Frankly,
I am somewhat puzzled about this proposition. If we put land-base cruise
missiles of 2000 miles range in Europe, we can cover most of the Soviet
territory. But they cannot cover our territory. I don't understand quite
why they made this proposal.
Mr. Duckett: The lack of air defenses in China may have figured in here.
President Ford: They can get China with this kind of weapon?
SERALU
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS
10
Secretary Clements: It works to our advantage in Europe.
President Ford: Is there any disagreement on this?
Secretary Kissinger: There is no disparity that I am aware of.
The air launch cruise missile is needed for penetration purposes
out to a range of about 3000 km, although George Brown and Jim
indicated they could go somewhat below that. But this would be
premature in your first talk with Brezhnev - we could put forward
3,000 km.
President Ford: We would count anything over 3000 km?
Secretary Schlesinger: We could ban them over 3000 km.
Secretary Kissinger: We would be better off if we banned them.
Dr. Ikle: It would be much better for verification reasons.
President Ford: There is agreement on this - not to count but to ban?
Secretary Kissinger: Counting above 3000 km gets you essentially nothing.
Secretary Schlesinger: Except a lot of legal problems in the Standing
Consultative Commission.
Secretary Clements: Verification if you count is impossible.
President Ford: I would think as a layman that verification would be
nil. Suppose you went to 2500 km - would you want to ban above that
range also?
Mr. Duckett: As a general rule, regardless of the number put on range,
you should ban above that range.
Secretary Kissinger: I can't see how we could handle the verification hearings
if we counted above the cut off.
FORD
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Secretary Kissinger (cont'd): The next question concerns submarine
launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). We have difficulties with the 600 km
Soviet proposal. With their forces, it is optimal for their needs, but it
is not enough range for us. They can reach our population along our coast
from 350 km, but we need more range for symmetrical coverage of their
cities.
President Ford: Their proposal is 600 km?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes -- to ban all SLCMs above 600 km.
Director Colby: They see these weapons in part as an anti-ship and anti-
carrier force.
Secretary Kissinger: Yesterday in the Verification Panel we reviewed one
alternative. If the range were set at 1500 km for SLCMs and 3000 km for
ALCMs, everyone thought we could live with it -- but this was not staffed
out and I don't know if it survived overnight.
President Ford: The air-launched limit would be 3000 km?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. One advantage is that the Vladivostok Agreement
contained no limits at all on SLCMs, so this would be a move. The longer
range would give us good coverage of Europe and additional coverage of
China, but not much more coverage of the Soviet Union. If we want to go
into the Soviet Union, we would have ALCMs and could put our land-based
cruise missiles in Europe. This may not be our final position, but it seems
our best beginning negotiating position.
President Ford: So we would go from 600 to 1500 km on submarine-launched
and stay with 3000 km on air-launched.
Secretary Schlesinger: We have never yet gone to 3000 km on air-launched.
Secretary Kissinger: Up to now we have not given them 3000 --
President Ford: But we said that they counted --
Secretary Kissinger: No, until now we have had a preposterous position
that they are not covered by the Vladivostok Agreement.
Secretary Schlesinger: Our positions have been bilaterally preposterous.
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Deputy Secretary Clements: Mr. President, we should look at the 3000 km
proposal for air-launched as an important concession -- as a fall --
President Ford: As a what?
Deputy Secretary Clements: As a fall -- a limit where before we agreed to no
limit at all.
Secretary Kissinger: While it is something of a concession, they would
figure it out in a minute.
Secretary Schlesinger: It's a bigger concession than any they have made
to date.
Mr. Duckett: Mr. President, I should point out that on surface ships
and submarines, the Soviets have 400 launch tubes
in their
fleet today.
Secretary Schlesinger:
M
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: The 1500 km range was planned to meet our Navy's
needs.
President Ford:
Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Schlesinger:
:
Director Ikle:
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Mr. Duckett:
Secretary Kissinger: Therefore, any ban on certain types must include
a ban on testing of those types.
President Ford:
Testing
and deployment --
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. This means we could not try out ours to
longer ranges in the same way.
Director Ikle: We would not test our sea-based ones beyond the permitted
range anyway.
Secretary Kissinger: This brings us to the Backfire aircraft. To date,
we have excluded the Backfire but included the Bison. The problem is
that the dimensions are about the same and the capability is probably
superior for the Bison. Bill, do you have the chart? (Colby shows chart
comparing Soviet bombers.)
Mr. Duckett: As this shows, the range of the Backfire and the Bison are
exactly the same, but the Backfire has a refueling capability, whereas the
Bison does not.
Secretary Kissinger: In the Verification Panel we discussed a proposal
whereby 75 to 100 Backfires would not be counted in the aggregate if they
were kept in naval aviation and if they retire some of their Bears in
naval aviation when they deploy them.
President Ford: Retire their Bears and Bison?
Mr. Duckett: They have a slightly different version of their Bear bomber
in naval aviation for reconnaissance.
Secretary Kissinger: We then had the added thought that we would agree
to keep our FB-111s below 100 to have the agreement written in a symmetrical
fashion. This is a negotiating ploy since we have no plans for a similar
aircraft as the Backfire.
President Ford: In other words, all our FB-111s would be free and they
would get 100 Backfires on the assumption that they replace their Bears
with Backfires.
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Secretary Kissinger: We had thought they would probably get rid of
their Bears anyway because of the agreement.
President Ford: To get down to the 2400 level.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We assumed they would reduce their older
bombers to get down to the level.
Mr. Duckett: Mr. President, it is not my area of expertise, but I might
mention that under this approach you might receive some criticism that it
is now possible to get the aggregate raised by 100 over the 2400 level.
Director Ikle: You might consider putting Backfire and cruise missiles
in a separate agreement. They are both borderlinevcases.
Secretary Kissinger: We would have to explain what we did on Backfire
in any event.
Director Ikle: Putting them separately would simplify the main agreement.
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President Ford: Carl raises the point, if it's true we look like we're
adding 100 to the aggregate --
Secretary Kissinger: In theory we can make an overwhelming case that
these 100 are not strategic bombers. We have a very good case that
they are not strategic bombers, but that we were giving them 100 only if
the proper collateral evidence was available.
Secretary Schlesinger: And in addition we required a reduction in their
existing Bears.
Director Colby: Some of the Backfires are assigned to long-range aviation,
so you have to deal with those, also.
Secretary Kissinger: We have not sorted that out. Perhaps they would be
counted.
President Ford: The FB-111 are not counted now?
Director Colby: No, they don't have the range.
Secretary Kissinger: We have them free anyhow. We would throw them
in only for negotiating symmetry.
Secretary Schlesinger: We have to be careful how we offset the FB-111
versus the Backfire.
Secretary Kissinger: How should we do it?
Secretary Schlesinger: We should not do it symmetrically since they
have different capabilities. If after we have received agreement to not
put Backfires outside of naval aviation, we might say that the US would
then agree to hold to 72 FB-111s.
Secretary Kissinger: This brings us to the mobile missiles. The Soviets
have agreed to ban them, not to deploy them. I am sure the Soviets thought
they were meeting our concerns on this, given, the negotiating history.
There are really only two alternatives -- we can accept their position, or
insist that they be permitted, but counted.
Secretary Schlesinger: Our preference is that this not be discussed with
the Soviets now.
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Secretary Kissinger: They would agree not to deploy them, but permit
development.
President Ford: Is your feeling concerned with research and development
on mobile ICBMs?
Secretary Schlesinger: The US should look carefully into that. We have
a limited number of ICBM holes, and given what we're seeing in the
Philippine Sea with regard to improved ASW, as their counterforce
capabilities increase, we should explore additional basing modes. If we
ban deployment, we increase Congressional problems with regard to
R&D funding. Preferably, this could be bypassed in Helsinki, while we
here in the US could do a careful study before consenting to a ban on mobiles.
Secretary Kissinger: We could not deploy a mobile before 1983 in any event.
Therefore, the issue is whether a ban harms R&D. This depends in part
on what happens when once it becomes known the Soviets have offered a ban
which we rejected. The question is which way we can better get R&D funds
with a ban, or having rejected a ban.
Secretary Schlesinger: An initial option might be to ban deployment until
1980, at which time both sides would agree to review the situation. Until
we see the Soviet counterforce threat developing, we should keep our options
open. If we want the option to pursue development, we should be careful
to keep it open. They have completed 25 tests of the SS-X16, many of which
were perhaps mobile launchers. Their development program is essentially
complete, so they don't need a development option in order to deploy a system.
Secretary Kissinger: They specifically propose that development would be
permitted -- only deployment would be banned.
President Ford: If we went with a ban on deployment plus a ban on R&D,
we would not be in good shape, since they are so far down the road.
Secretary Kissinger: Jim's point is that it would be hard to get money for
development.
President Ford: I'm not so pessimistic provided Congress is told the
Soviets have done so. How much would it cost and how much would it take
to go through a development program for a land-based mobile system?
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, we can throw around some
unsatisfactory figures -- about $2-$3 billion.
GERALD FORD LIBRAR
Deputy Secretary Clements: One reason it is so expensive is because we
don't know what system concept we would come down on. We would have
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to do several different prototypes to determine.
President Ford: In the 50's, the Air Force had developed some models
of mobile ICBMs on trains.
General Brown: We went further than models -- we actually put them in
the fields.
Secretary Kissinger: On trains?
General Brown: Yes, but as the Secretary says, problems relating to
the public became evident.
President Ford: I was talking to Mel Laird about that -- the tests were
not encouraging because of public opinion.
Secretary Schlesinger: Those were random trains moving throughout the
country. Now, we are talking about using public lands in the West.
President Ford: That made some of my colleagues on the Hill wince. It
didn't make me wince, but I didn't think they would be taking them to
Michigan! (Laughter) If you have had trouble with Sanguine, you will have
similar trouble with the environmentalists on this.
Secretary Schlesinger: We are planning to use desert lands, the salt
flats west of Salt Lake City. There are some public lands that are unattractive
even to the environmentalists. But we need to study this further.
President Ford: My quick reaction is that we should go for an R&D program.
I am not as pessimistic about getting it from Congress. I think we could
get it and would be in a better position when we bring in their testing of the
SS-16.
Mr. Duckett: It is at least a basis for argument.
Secretary Kissinger: Those are the major issues.
President Ford: Thank you, Henry, Jim, do you have any comments?
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, it is clear Brezhnev is anxious
for this agreement. We would be inclined to give only a little ground, showing
a considerable degree of firmness, responding to their tactics in kind.
Brezhnev reiterated their Geneva position. The package Henry outlined is
as forthcoming as they have been.
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We would strongly urge that 1500 km be the minimum range on SLCMs,
and that we stick with 3000 km on the ALCM. On Backfire, equal
aggregates were obtained at Vladivostok and everyone recognized that.
We must be careful to not appear that they can now escape from that.
If it becomes open-ended, we will lose the advantage of equal aggregates.
The light versus heavy missile question is very important. With improved
propellants in the SS- 19, they could have 12000 pounds throw weight under
their definition. This would leave us in a ludicrous position with regard
to the modern large ballistic missile constraint negotiated in SALT I. If
we hold at 7, 000 pounds, that would be the best definition achievable at
this point.
On mobiles, we prefer to wait.
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President Ford: Mobile ICBMs?
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes - we should study the options for the US first.
If they develop a major counterforce capability which is a threat to our
systems, we should not exclude additional basing modes.
President Ford: If we ban mobiles and continue with an R&D program,
that will cut out part of the problem.
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes. It really becomes a concern in the early or
mid 80s. We see no possibility of a mobile deployment for 5-7 years.
President Ford: Under any considerations, we need the research and
development. It is a matter of how to best get the research and development
money.
Secretary Schlesinger: Yes.
President Ford: What are your observations, George?
General Brown: Mr. President, I believe that item is a terribly important
issue. As a fallback position, provided it is understood as that, we sub-
scribe to the formula the Secretary put forward. At Vladivostok, you agreed
to equality: But to give up on equality, that would be very difficult to explain.
On cruise missiles, we can accept a proposal to ban intercontinental cruise
missiles. We can accept 3,000 km on air launch cruise missiles, and would
prefere 3,000 km on SLCMs, but came up with 1500 km if we have to go
lower on SLCMs.
We do have a problem concerning the commonality of SLCMs and ALCMs. In
our program, they are basically the same missile. We put the SLCM in a
can which falls off when it is launched. Once it flies out, it is very similiar
to the ALCM. This is their verification problem, but there is a chance we
are going to be accused we were cheating.
President Ford:They can't distinguish the one launched from the air from the
one launched from sea?
General Brown: They have Aviation Week which tells them -
TOR SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS
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Secretary Kissinger: There is also our testing -
General Brown: That's true, but we can trade warhead weight
for range.
President Ford: Like they can.
General Brown: If we can fly 1500 km, we can fly further. I'
just don't want you to get in a position where you are accused of
bad faith.
President Ford: All of this has been in Aviation Week?
Secretary Clements: There's been pretty much in Aviation Week - the
engines are the same, the airframes are the same, the guidance is
the same, and so forth.
Secretary Kissinger: I've never understood how Aviation Week gets all
that -
You should have seen Clements three years ago; he wanted to scrap the
whole program!
Secretary Clements: That's not true ! (laughter)
Secretary Kissinger: This should go to Geneva where it is their problem
to raise the verification problem. After all, Minuteman II and Minuteman
III silos are the same, and they haven't raised that. So we'll let them
raise this.
Secretary Schlesinger: We have a parallel problem. We will not be in
a position to say we have any precision in verification in the cruise
missile area. We will be relying pretty much on good faith.
Dr. Ikle: Mr. President, for this reason I think you should consider
putting the cruise missiles in a separate protocol which could be
keptked apart from the main agreement
President Ford: If we don't include cruise missiles, there will be a
hell of a big reaction.
Secretary Kissinger: In either event, they will have to be presented
simultaneously. In any event, we can't present a SALT agreement that
let's cruise missiles run free.
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President Ford: We would be laughed out of town.
Secretary Clements: Absolutely.
Secretary Kissinger: One thing - George thought he could live with
a limit on the number of cruise missiles on each aircraft. Did you
say you could live with that, George?
General Brown: I could live with it,
President Ford: How many will we have on each aircraft?
Secretary Clements: The bB-52 - IN will have six on either side, or
12 altogether.
President Ford: Both on the B- 1 and the B- 52?
General Brown: More on the B- 1 -
Secretary Kissinger: You can see why this is a problem for the Soviets
since each one has a
weapon on it.
Secretary Clements:
The commonality of the missiles is
the big thing. It's the same missile on the aireraft as is in the torpedo
tubes.
Secretary Kissinger: Would you carry them on bombers in lieu of bombs?
General Brown: I don't think so.
President Ford: What is the problem if we get no SALT II agreement?
What dollars in hardware are we going to have to take to Congress then?
Secretary Schlesinger: Probably two to three billion dollars increase
to the budget over a period of years. Until 1977, we are constrained
anyway.
President Ford: Until fiscal 77?
Secretary Schlesinger: Calendar 77 - until the 5 year interim agreement
runs out.
President Ford: Across the board, or only on launchers?
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Secretary Kissinger: We are constrained on the deployment of land-based
and submarine based missiles. We are not limited on bombers or cruise
missiles.
Dr. Ikle: We couldn't deploy more in any event.
Secretary Schlesinger: If there were no agreement, we would have to
increase our capability.
President Ford: I've asked Henry to get from DOD the figures on the options
we would have to face, to get projections of your needs for the next five years
in terms of money and hardware - what you would send to Congress.
Secretary Schlesinger: Not by tomorrow morning before you go on the air-
craft -
President Ford: No.
Director: Colby: I don't want to sound like I'm against cruise missiles, but
I should point out that they have an air defense and we don't. If they were
tempted, they might push very hard in the cruise missile area.
Secretary Schlesinger: That's the reverse of the fact that we have to have
cruise missiles because of the air defense.
Mr. Duckett: In the last ten years, they have spent about the same amount
on defenses as they have on offensive forces.
Director Colby: They have
surface to air missiles deployed.
President Ford: Are those effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?
Director Colby: No, but it shows their philosophy.
Secretary Clements: Our cruise missile projects drive them up the wall
because their defense will not protect them from our cruise missiles, and
they know it. Cruise missiles cause them plenty of pain and agony. They
give us real leverage.
President Ford: How soon will they be operational?
Secretary Schlesinger: By 1980.
President Ford: I have a technical question - why aren't their present
FORD
air defenses effective vs ALCMs and SLCMs?
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Director Colby: Because of low altitude penetration.
Secretary Kissinger: What speed do they go?
General Brown: Subsonic- not too fast, but they go very low.
Mr. Duckett: I don't want to debate their vulnerability, but
their radar network in the entire western USSR is now down to
I would not be willing to depend on the invulnerability
of air breathing vehicles in the 1980s.
Secretary Kissinger: In any event, the cruise missile: would force
them to spend a lot of money on air defense which otherwise they
would spend elsewhere.
General Brown: There is another point, Mr. President. This is not
like a football game, where it is one play at a time.
Director Colby: They were very shook up by the Hanoi attack - that
was a very heavily defended area.
President Ford: With what?
General Brown: The B-52 attack.
Secretary Kissinger: Their entire defense was exhausted at the
end.
Dr. Ikle: In the end, several years from now, the Russians will catch
up on cruise missile technology. In the end they may build cMIRVs
even larger. So we should also look at what we get from limits on
their cruise missiles. In addition, there is the verification problem.
General Brown:
You not only
penetrate the defenses, but you destroy the defenses. It's not like
Hanoi. It's a very different situation.
President Ford: Well, if there are no other comments, thank you all
very much.
GERALD
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ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09192
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Talking Paper
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
Talking Points (re: Soviet position on
major SALT issues)
CREATION DATE
07/1975
VOLUME
13 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200022
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 7/25/75
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/25/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
sanitized 6/19/03
SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS
09192
TALKING POINTS
-- Mr. President, as you know, Gromyko discussed with
me a range of issues and previewed where he thinks Brezhnev might
compromise with you when you meet in Helsinki.
-- By way of summary, the present Soviet position on the major
issues is as follows:
On MIRV Verification, they have agreed to count missiles
tested with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed.
However, there has been no indication of movement on our other
rules regarding silo changes and counting SLBMs by class.
Regarding cruise missiles, the Soviets did not indicate
any movement from their Geneva position. Their current pro-
posal would count all air-launched cruise missiles above 600 km
range if installed on bombers and ban all cruise missiles above
600 km range if sea-launched or deployed from transport-type
aircraft. The Soviets also proposed to ban all land-based
DECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
cruise missiles of range in excess of 5500 km.
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)
MR98-40 #31; DoDea 11/6/02
By dal NARA, Date 6/19/03
Gromyko proposed a ban on the deployment of land-
mobile ICBMs. In conjunction with the current Soviet Geneva
position which effectively bans air-mobile ICBMs, the Soviets have
in essence proposed a combined ban on air- and land-mobile ICBMs.
GERALDER FORD
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ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
AECRNY/SENSITIVE - XGDS
On Backfire, there was no Soviet movement. The Soviets
have steadfastly refused to count Backfire in the 2400 aggregate.
Regarding the issue of silo dimension changes, Gromyko
indicated that the Soviets would be willing to replace the current
10-15% limitation on silo dimension increases with a single,
unambiguous limit of 32% on silo volume increases.
On the definition of a heavy ICBM, Gromyko agreed to an
explicit definition for heavy ICBMs but he suggested tying the
definition to what he called "launching weight; I believe we call
this "missile gross weight" rather than "launching weight. "
The Soviets proposed a 12 month period after the new agree-
ment enters into force for reducing to the 2400 limit, and also in-
dicated that they would be prepared to convene the follow-on
negotiations in the same year the agreement enters into force.
-- That summarizes where we stand on the major issues. The
Verification Panel has met to consider the Soviet proposal and to discuss
alternative responses we might give.
-- Let me run through the possible alternatives on each of the
major issues.
MIRV Verification
-- The Soviet acceptance of our rule counting all missiles tested
with both MIRVs and single RVs as MIRVed when deployed is a significant
step forward.
FORD
LIBRARY
LIBRARY GERALD R. FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
3
-- However, this still leaves unresolved the issue of how to
handle our other counting rules on silo changes and SLBMs.
-- There are probably two general approaches we can take on
this issue:
We can refer the MIRV verification issue .to the Delegation
in Geneva and try to wrap up the technical language there; in
addition to addressing our counting rule which the Soviets have
accepted, the Delegation could put forth modifications to our
remaining counting rules which might lessen the immediate im-
pact of our rules on the Soviets yet still resolve the obvious
ambiguities.
We can pocket what the Soviets have given us on our MIRV
counting rules and take a hard line on our remaining counting
rules.
-- Moving the verification issue to Geneva would allow the Delega-
tion to thrash out the technical problems associated with such issues
as tying the SLBM MIRV count to a submarine overhaul or conversion
cycle. Because of the complexity of the remaining verification issues,
this may be a more suitable approach than discussing the issues directly
with Brezhnev.
H.FORD
FORD
)
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE - XGDS
-- On the other hand, there is the possibility that, in the absence
of a Soviet decision at the highest level to move on the remaining MIRV
counting rules, the Soviet Delegation will have little flexibility in handling
the remaining verification issues.
-- There was a consenses in the Verification Panel that, if
Brezhnev will agree with this approach, we should shift the remaining
verification issues to Geneva and have Alex try to thrash out the technical
details.
Cruise Missiles
-- Based on the Verification Panel meeting, there appear to be
three general approaches we could take on this issue at this time:
Count all cruise missiles above 3000 km range.
Accept the current Soviet position with the exception that
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) on bombers would count
only above 2500-3000 km range and sea-launched cruise
missiles would be limited to 1500 km range.
Accept the Soviet position on all cruise missile limits,
but in addition insist that land-based cruise missiles above
600 km range be banned.
-- The first approach would essentially encompass all US
cruise missile programs of interest, and would simplify verification.
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
GERALD
-- On the other hand, there arc strategic differences among
the various types of cruise missiles. Furthermore, there might be
some tactical negotiating advantage in accepting as much of the Soviet
proposal as we can in order to focus our pressure in the areas which matter
most to us.
-- The second approach focuses on the cruise missile option
where our main interests probably lie -- the long-range ALCM.
-- A drawback of the second approach is that it would limit some
of our programs, such as the strategic SLCM programs currently under
consideration. However, the strategic argument for SLCMs are less
clear than the arguments for ALCMs. It is hard to see when a sea-
based cruise missile would be better than a sea-based ballistic missile.
-- Our main concern on sea-based cruise missiles is probably
to avoid interfering with our tactical ship-to-ship programs and to keep
open our technical development programs.
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-- The third approach would close a "loophole" which currently
exists in the Soviet cruise missiles position by subjecting land-based
cruise missiles to the same limits that the Soviets have proposed on
SLCMs and ALCMs.
-- Going even further than the Soviet position and rigidly
controlling all cruise missiles could improve the arms control impact
of the new agreement.
-- However, the present Soviet proposal on land-based cruise
missiles is probably more advantageous to us than to them; we could
deploy 5500 km missiles in Europe, but they have no place to deploy
them against us.
-- The Verification Panel also looked at the possibility of a
separate limit on SLCMs which would cover 400 obsolescent Soviet
systems. However, everyone agreed that this was a negotiating ploy
which would not solve the basis cruise missile problem which we currently
face.
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Mobile ICBMs
-- In light of the latest Soviet proposal on mobiles, there are
really only two alternatives:
Leave open the option to deploy mobile ICBMs.
Accept the Soviet proposal and ban the deployment of
mobile ICBMs for duration of the agreement.
-- There are several considerations which would argue for leaving
open the option to deploy mobiles:
Our silo based ICBMs will become increasingly vulnerable.
Soviet deployment of SS-16 mobiles rather than SS-19s would
actually reduce Soviet throw weight.
If we eliminate the deployment option it may be harder to
obtain development funds from Congress.
-- On the other hand, there are considerations favoring acceptance
of the Soviet proposal:
Given the negotiating history, they probably made this
proposal in an attempt to be forthcoming.
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It may be hard to develop a viable US land mobile system,
given land use and environmental constraints.
We probably cannot
deploy a mobile before 1985.
Once the Russians leak to the Congress that they proposed
a land mobile ban which we rejected, we will not only have a major
political problem, but may also lose our land mobile development
funds more readily than we would have under a deployment ban.
-- A related issue concerns surface ship - based mobile ICBMs.
There seems to be no disagreement in the Verification Panel on this
issue: we can go ahead and accept the Soviet proposal to ban deployment
of these systems at a tactically advantageous time.
Backfire
-- The lack of any Soviet movement on Backfire was hardly sur-
prising. In light of these developments, the Verification Panel con-
sidered three alternatives for dealing with the Backfire issue:
Continue with our current position that Backfire is a heavy
bomber and should be included in the 2400 aggregate.
Propose a sublimit on the permitted number of Backfire
bombers (e. g., 100), together with certain collateral constraints
which would limit Backfire's intercontinental capability.
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0 Propose collateral constraints on Backfire operations
and at the same time obtain explicit Soviet agreement to deploy
Backfire only for peripheral missions.
-- Our current position on Backfire has been argued effectively
by the Delegation; the Backfire is certainly as good a bomber as the
Bison.
-- However, it seems very unlikely that the Soviets will agree to
count all Backfires in the aggregate.
-- Another possibility would be to propose a sublimit on the permitted
number of Backfire bombers, e. g., 100. Under this approach, all
Backfires above a specified number would count in the aggregate. At
the same time we would try to limit Backfire deployment to certain
geographical areas, e.g., Soviet naval aviation bases in the southern
USSR; we would also specify that Backfire would count only if deployed
with a companion tanker force.
-- This could still achieve significant limits on the Soviet Backfire
program. However, unless the sublimit included a substantial fraction
of the programmed Soviet Backfire force, this approach would probably be
no more acceptable to the Soviets than our current proposal.
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-- The third alternative would drop the sublimit on the permitted
number of Backfires but retain the collateral constraints on basing
and tanker support.
-- While this approach would be the least restrictive on the Soviets,
and hence probably the most negotiable, it offers no iron-clad
guarantees against the intercontinental use of Backfires.
-- On the other hand, without a companion tanker force, Backfire
capability against the US would be very limited. If at the same time
we obtained explicit Soviet agreement use Backfire only for perpheral
roles, we would have a very strong case for raising the Backfire issue
in the SCC if indicators of intercontinental use appeared.
Silo Dimensions
-- The Verification Panel agreed that the Soviet proposal in
its current form is unacceptable. A simple limit of 32% on silo
volume increases would permit a depth increase of greater than 15%.
-- It is important to retain the 15 percent limit on depth, in
particular since the Soviets have already increased their silo depth
almost this :much on both the SS-18 and SS-19 silos.
-- A compromise which the Verification Panel considered would be
to supplement the current 10-15 percent limitation on silo dimension in-
creases with the 32 percent volume limit. If such an approach were
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acceptable to the Soviets, we could turn the issue over to Alex for
resolution of the detailed language.
Heavy ICBMs
-- The Soviet proposal in this regard may have some possibilities.
Their willingness to agree to an explicit definition of a heavy ICBM at
the very least is a step forward.
-- However, the Verification Panel agreed that there were some
technical problems with the "missile gross weight" approach, and that
we should probably do some additional analysis before making a definitive
response.
-- On a preliminary basis, it appears that we could probably
accept "gross weight" as one criterion for defining a heavy ICBM, but
we should probably stick with our throw weight criterion for the time
being pending the results of the Verification Panel's analysis.
Other Issues
-- Two final issues concern the Soviet proposal for a 12 month
grace period before reducing to the 2400 limit and their proposal to
convene the follow-on negotiations in the same year the agreement enters
into force.
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-- The Verification Panel felt that both of these issues can probably
be handled by Alex. The proposal to reconvene follow-on negotiations in
1977 substantially meets our proposal. While the 12-month period to
reach the 2400 limit is probably excessive, our current instructions give
Alex enough room to negotiate an effective compromise.
-- Mr. President, that concludes my review of the major issues.
However, there is one final point concerning the overall issue of
how to proceed with the Soviets over the next few weeks. There
are probably two principal approaches:
We can accept as much of the most recent Soviet proposal
as we can and try to reach an effective compromise on the remaining
issues in an attempt to wrap up the major part of the agreement
before the summit.
We could pocket the concessions the Soviets have already
made and hold fast on the remaining issues.
-- The first approach has a reasonably good chance of success.
This would also permit the two sides to work out the technical details
well ahead of the eventual signing of the agreement.
-- The second approach may also be successful, particularly if,
as some think, Brezhnev is anxious to come to an agreement and have
a summit. We might obtain a few additional Soviet concessions,
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although these concessions are not likely to change the basic character
of the agreement which is now taking shape.
-- An additional consideration regarding the second approach
is that Brezhnev may react adversely and seriously undermine the prospects
for an agreement this year.
GERATO
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