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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 1/8/1976\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\n/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nON SALT OPTIONS\nThursday, January 8, 1976\n4:00 p.m. (90 minutes)\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Brent Scowcroft\nI. PURPOSE\nTo review the SALT Verification Panel analysis of possible options\nfor resolving the cruise missile and Backfire issues.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA. Background: The Verification Panel has been continuing its\nassessment of alternative approaches for resolving the major\nremaining issues in SALT TWO -- cruise missiles and Backfire.\nWe now have four options for consideration. Two of these, de-\nferral and the option that counts Backfire in the 2400 aggregate,\nwere discussed at the last NS Chmeeting. The other two are new\noptions which are variants of/other three options from the last\nmeeting. Each of these options (described below) will be\npresented to you and discussed at the meeting with the objective\nof assisting you in arriving at a decision on a package for pres-\nentation to the Soviet Union.\n1. Option I (Deferral): This approach would defer the cruise\nmissile and Backfire issues to a later negotiation (either\nSALT III or a separate negotiation on these two issues\nalone). This would set aside the most controversial of\nthe unresolved SALT issues and codify the terms agreed\nat Vladivostok (equal aggregates, MIRVed launcher limits,\nno forward-based system limits, etc.). To insure that the\nBackfire and cruise missile programs are not accelerated,\nwe might include interim constraints on these systems.\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nDECLASSIFIED\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\nE.O. 12356,Sequir 2/19/99\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nMR98-40, 42; State letter 9/25/98\nBy let NARA, Date 10/21/98, 7/21/99\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nDENDITIVE\nXGDS\n2\nOne problem with this approach is that the Soviets may not\nbe willing to include concessions on MIRV verification and\nICBM throw weight ceilings in such an agreement. There\nis alsc some question whether Congress would support the\ncruise missile program while cruise missile limits are\nbeing negotiated. This option could also be considered as\nan ultimate fallback position in the negotiations.\n2.\nOption IV (Count Backfire in the Aggregate): This approach\nwould count Backfire in the 2400 ceiling, but in return for\nextensive cruise missile limits. In effect, the only strategic\ncruise missiles permitted (over 600 km in range) would be\non heavy bombers and surface ships. In addition, the\nnumber of heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles\nup to 2500 km would count against the MIRV ceiling of 1320.\nThis imposes severe restraint on the Soviets, causing them\nto dismantle over 300 ICBMs and SLBMs to deploy the Back-\nfire. On the other hand, we give up submarine launched\ncruise missiles and would have to replace about 250-300\nMIRVed missiles to deploy air launched cruise missiles\n(ALCM) on our heavy bombers.\n3.\nOption III (Ceiling on Backfire Plus Collateral Constraints):\nThis approach would not count Backfire in the aggregate but\nwould impose a separate limit of 300 to 400 Backfire along\nwith comprehensive collateral constraints to inhibit Backfire's\ncapability for two-way missions against the U.S. These\nconstraints could include a ban on Backfire tankers, a ban\non long-range ASMs on Backfire, limits on training and\nbasing, and a requirement that the Soviets phase out older\nmedium bombers as Backfire is deployed. In return, we\nwould include heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs in the\nMIRV limit, ban long-range SLCMs on submarines, and\nlimit surface ships with long-range SLCMs to 50 or 75\nplatforms.\nThe surface-ship SLCMs would provide a balance to the\nBackfire force since both of these are theater systems\nwith marginal strategic capability.\nAPPOECAST SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRART\nTOASEGRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\n4. Option II (Collateral Constraints on Backfire; Relaxed\nCruise Missile Limits): If the Soviets are unwilling to\naccept any numerical constraints on Backfire, an inter-\nmediate option short of deferral would be to have collateral\nconstraints on Backfire along with less restrictive cruise\nmissile limits compared to Options III and IV. For example,\nOption II would maintain the collateral constraints which\ninhibit the two-way capability of Backfire, but would not\ninclude heavy bombers with ALCMs in the MIRV total or\nlimit the number of surface ships carrying SLCMs.\nHowever, this option would limit the number of heavy\nbombers with ALCMs to 300, a substantial program.\n5. Option to Ban Heavy ICBMs: The Defense Department has\nadvanced a suggestion (called Option G) that would propose\na quid pro quo for allowing Backfire to go free; it applies\nthe same limits on cruise missiles as Option IV, but calls\nfor agreement to freeze Soviet deployment of new heavy\nICBMs (SS-18s) at the current level 30-75 and a commitment\nto ban them in the next SALT negotiations. The idea behind\nthis option is that the Soviets could have 300-400 Backfire, or\nabout 3 million pounds of bomber payload if they give up\nroughly the same amount in new ICBM throw weight, and\nagree to the kind of reductions in heavy missiles that would\nmake our missile forces much more equal in throw weight\nat the end of SALT III.\nB. Participants: (List at Tab A)\nC. Press Arrangements: The meeting, but not the subject, will be\nannounced. There will be a White House photographer.\nIII. TALKING POINTS\n1.\nI understand that the Verification Panel has been continuing their\nanalysis of possible options for resolving the cruise missile and\nBackfire issues.\n2.\nBefore we start, I want to emphasize that I consider a good SALT\nagreement to be strongly in the U.S. interest, and that we have to\nconsider not only the Backfire and cruise missiles, but the overall\nvalue of the agreement, and the consequences of no agreement.\nOF SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\n/SENSITIVE XGDS\n1\n3.\nWe have no deadline, but in this period before the Soviet Party\nCongress we may have some bargaining leverage.\n4,\nLet's start with a rundown by Bill Colby of any new developments\nwe should be aware of. Bill, go ahead.\n(Following Colby Presentation)\n5, Henry, as Chairman of the Verification Panel, why don't you\ndescribe to us the options the Panel has developed.\n(Following Kissinger presentation)\n6. (To Secretary Rumsfeld) Don, would you start the discussion\nby giving us DOD's view on the options?\n(Following the discussion)\n7. This meeting has been very useful. I want to spend a few days\nconsidering the various possibilities. We may want to give\nBrezhnev something before Henry goes.\n8.\nI reiterate that I want everyone to continue to devote their\nenergies and to give their full support to the effort to produce\n2 SALT treaty.\nAttachment\nTab A -- List of Participants\nTOP SECRET /SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD & GERALD LIBRARY\nTOASACHTY\nTALKING POINTS\nNSC Meeting\nJanuary 8, 1976\n-- As agreed at the last NSC meeting, the Verification Panel has\nreexamined possible options for resolving the cruise missile and\nBackfire issues.\n-- We have developed two new variants, along with the option that\nwould defer Backfire and cruise missiles, and the option that counts all\nBackfire in the 2400 aggregate.\nOption IV - Count Backfire\n-- As we discussed at the last meeting, Option IV would clearly be an\nacceptable outcome for the US since it would count Backfire in the 2400\naggregate, forcing significant Soviet reductions.\n-- In my judgment, this option will be unacceptable to the Soviets,\nprimarily because the Backfire has become a matter of principle at the\nPolitburo level, and they will never accept counting it as a heavy bomber\nin the 2400 aggregate.\n-- We might still propose this option as an opener in order to\nstimulate a counterproposal, but then it is likely we will provoke a\nrejection, rather than something we might work with.\n-- If there is to be any compromise on the Backfire issue, it will\nhave to be initiated by us and then sold to the Politburo by Brezhnev.\nDECLASSIFIED\nShort SECRET XGDS\nE.O. 12356, Sec. N81 3.A.Her 2/19/99\nMR 298-40,*43; 40, State letter 9/25/98\nFORD & LIBRAR BERALD\nBy\nLet\nNARA, Date 10/21/98,7/21/99\nSALAR\n2\nOption I\n-- At the last meeting we also discussed setting aside the Backfire\nand cruise missile issues to a lat er negotiation and attempting to codify\nthe provisions agreed at Vladivostok, plus the MIRV verification counting\nrule and the throw weight ceiling on light (SS-19) and heavy (SS-18)\nmissiles. There are several problems with this approach:\n- First, the Soviets linked their concession on MIRV verification\nto resolution of the cruise missile problems.\nThus, they may withdraw this concession if cruise missiles\nare not limited at all.\nThe same may be true for our proposal to put a ceiling on\nlight and heavy missiles.\n- Second, this Option is a difficult opening position; if it is\nrejected there is no alternative; if accepted in principle, it could lead\nto a negotiation on cruise missile restraints.\n- Thirdly, it is debatable whether the Congress would support\nthe cruise missile programs while cruise missile limits are being\nnegotiated; we might provoke an attack on cruise missiles as an obstacle\nto negotiation -- or generate Congressional resolutions to ban flight\ntesting and deployment in the interim.\nHowever, it may be an ultimate fall-back if all else fails.\nWNWNS\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nSECRAT\n3\nOption III\n-- Options II and III are mixed packages which contain substantive\ncruise missile limits and some limits on Backfire but short of counting\nit in the aggregate.\n-- Option III would place an upper limit on the number of Backfire --\n300 or maybe 400 -- with the objective of putting some ceiling on the\nBackfire deployment level.\n-- In addition, we could try for some collateral constraints to\ninhibit Backfire's capability for two way missions against the US.\nThese could include a ban on Backfire tankers, a ban on\nlong-range ASMs on Backfire, limits on training and basing, and perhaps\na requirement that the Soviets phase out older medium bombers as\nBackfire is deployed.\n-- In return we would make some concessions: first we would\nforego long-range SLCMs on submarines over 600 km but retain the\nright to deploy SLCMs on surface ships.\nOne approach we might take would be to balance the surface\nship SLCMs for Backfire, where we would be permitted 50 or 75 surface\nships with say 10 SLCMs, and they would be permitted 300-400 Backfire.\n-- Since both Backfire and SLCMs on surface ships are in the grey\narea of theater systems with some marginal strategic capability, we\nmight put these systems in a separate protocol to the main agreement\nwith provision for review in 1981 or 1982.\nMAXIM\nFORD i GERMLD LIBRARY\n-- The second concession would be to count heavy bombers equipped\nwith long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit.\nThis is a significant move from our September proposal, and\nwe will pay a real price in MIRVed missiles in the early 1980s, and the\nSoviets would forego a maximum deployment of Backfire through 1985.\n(Intelligence projects 550 total produced by then.)\nOn the other hand, our cruise missile programs would be\nsanctioned in an agreement, and should command Congressional support.\nThis is an advantage compared to a pure deferral.\nOption II\n-- The next option is really a mid-point between deferral and\nOption III. If the Soviets resist numerical limits on Backfire we could\nfall back to something like Option II, before we went to the extreme case\nof deferral.\n-- In Option II we would withdraw the concession of including\nheavy bombers with long-range ALCMs in the MIRV limit, and withdraw\nfrom limiting the number of surface ship SLCM platforms.\n-- However, it would include a limit of 300 on heavy bombers with\nlong-range ALCMs as we proposed in September, which would have little\nor no impact on our ALCM program.\n-- There was general agreement in the Verification Panel that\nOption III would be preferable to Option II as an opening position.\nSTATE\n1 GERALD LIBRARY FORD\nReductions\nMr. President, you might also note that under any of these\noptions we could seek a reduction of the aggregate to 2300, for example,\nby 1980.\nWe all agree that this would be desirable for political purposes,\nparticularly if Backfire is not counted; there's some question whether\nthe Soviets will accept this.\nOption \"G\"\nA new approach suggested by the Defense Department has not been\ndiscussed in detail and is not on the charts.\n-- This new approach is a variation of Options III and IV in which,\nin effect, we would agree to let Backfire go with only an upper limit.\nWe would make the same offer on cruise missiles as on Option IV.\n-- But we would propose a further Soviet price -- namely, that the\nSoviets would freeze their deployment of new heavy missiles (the SS-18) at\nthe present level of about 30.\n-- In addition we would both agree on a pledge to reduce heavy throw\nweight missiles in SALT III.\n-- The idea of this Option is that if the Soviets have 300-400 Backfire\noutside the numerical limit, they should compensate the US by holding\noff on vast increases in missile throw weight and the MIRVing of their\nheaviest missiles. Halting SS-18 deployments has been rejected on\nseveral occasions, and it is difficult to see what the Soviet incentive\nSAGINT\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nSECRET\nwould be; in order to deploy Backfire, which they claim is entirely\nlegitimate, they would give up a major missile modernization program.\nPolitical Considerations\n-- We have also done some work to look at how the possible outcomes\nwould be argued politically.\n-- Option IV would be easy to support as an outcome.\n-- We could defend Option III on the grounds that Backfire is\nrestrained by an upper limit, and that we have the capability to counter\nit with cruise missiles on bombers and surface ships, even FBS.\n0\nFurthermore, with the collateral constraints, in particular, the\nban on tankers and the ban on ASMs on Backfire, the Backfire would\nbe restricted to one-way missions against the US.\n-- We could also argue that the Soviet rights to Backfire have been\nbalanced by our rights to deploy surface-ship SLCMs -- another gray area\nsystem.\n-- These arguments would also be presented in the context of the\nlimits agreed at Vladivostok which will require the Soviets to dismantle\nnearly 200 systems as well as the Soviet agreement on MIRVs which\nwill probably require their counting 120 more MIRVed missiles than\nthey actually have.\nSUCRINT\nBERRLO 100 8060\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09205\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMinute\nCREATOR'S NAME\nRichard Boverie\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nPresident Ford\nTITLE\nMinutes, NSC Meeting, 01/08/76\nCREATION DATE\n01/08/1976\nVOLUME\n32 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200026\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nBOX NUMBER\n2\nFOLDER TITLE\nNSC Meeting, 1/8/76\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n02/26/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nexcised NSC with 2/10/99\nut 5/99\n693X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SECRET SENSITNE - XGDS\nMINUTES\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDATE:\nThursday, January 8, 1976\nTIME:\n4:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.\nPLACE:\nCabinet Room, The White House\nSUBJECT:\nSALT\nPrincipals\nThe President\nThe Vice President\nSecretary of State Henry A. Kissinger\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld\nChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown\nDirector of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle\nDirector of Central Intelligence William Colby\nAssistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft\nOther Attendees\nWhite House:\nMr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President\nMr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the\nPresident for National Security Affairs\nState:\nMr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor\nAmbassador U. Alexis Johnson\nDefense:\nDeputy Secretary William Clements\nDeputy Assistant Secretary (ISA) James P. Wade, Jr.\nNSC Staff:\nColonel Richard T. Boverie\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)\nE.O. 12958 Sec. b5(b)(i)and(2)\nGERALD FORD LIBRARY\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\n3.4\nMR 98-39, # 44; 2/10/99\nBy let NARA, Date 5/25/99\nTOP SECRET/SENSTTIVE -XGDS\n2\nPresident Ford: We are back at a subject (SALT) we have gone over\nbefore. This is probably the most important decision I will have to\nmake this term. With respect to both the long-term and short-term\ninterests of this country, a good SALT agreement is extremely important.\nWe should try to seek as much unanimity as possible. I have read and\nre-read the options and studied the variety of alternatives. For the\nmeeting today, I would like you to give me the best possible condensation\nand listing of alternatives so that I can make a decision. Bill (Colby),\nwill you start with a summary of intelligence.\nDirector Colby: (Note: The charts used by Director Colby are attached\nat Tab A. ) Mr. President, at your last NSC meeting on SALT, in\nDecember, I reviewed some of our key conclusions about trends in\nSoviet forces for intercontinental conflict, particularly as they might be\naffected by a SALT II agreement. As we again approach the problem of\nnegotiating with the Soviets, I would like to remind you of the way they\nare likely to view the quantitative relationship of strategic forces.\nWe have been unable to deduce this view with precision, for the Soviets\nconsider many factors in assessing the strategic balance, but we do\nknow from their writings, deployments, and some of their SALT positions\nthat they view strategic forces as comprising both systems designed for\nperipheral attack and those for intercontinental attack.\nIn that context, these charts illustrate how they might expect the quantita-\ntive balance to appear now and in 1980 if the SALT II understanding is\ncodified. If there is no SALT II agreement, we would expect Soviet\nforce levels to be somewhat higher than shown here in 1980 and 1985.\nPresident Ford: Somewhat higher?\nDirector Colby: Somewhat higher, if they are not limited, if there is\nno SALT II.\nPresident Ford: How do you estimate what we would do?\nDirector Colby: We use our programmed forces.\nWe have not shown 1985 figures for the Soviets since there are too many\nuncertainties in trying to estimate that far out.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORDO is LIBRARK\nTOP SECRET (SENSITIVE - XGDS\n3\nThe Western forces shown include the intercontinental strike forces of\nthe U.S. and, in dashed lines, the nuclear bombers and missiles of our\nEuropean allies as well as our forward based nuclear systems -- all of\nwhich the Soviets have insisted contribute to the strategic balance. They\nalso include a numerically small threat from China (which we have\nnot shown here).\nThe charts also show Soviet medium bombers, MRBMs, and IRBMs\nin dashed lines. We know that the Soviets include these systems in\ntheir own evaluation of the overall balance, although they have resisted\ntheir inclusion in SALT.\nThe 1980 chart illustrates that in our best SALT-limited estimate, the\npresent modernization and MIRV programs will considerably expand the\nnumber of Soviet weapons -- warheads and bombs -- in spite of a relatively\nstable number of delivery vehicles -- ICBMs, SLCMs, and bombers.\nThe Backfire is shown separately on this chart. We believe that at\nVladivostok the Soviets agreed to limit intercontinental systems to equal\naggregate levels without including either Backfire or FBS in those\nlevels.\nPresident Ford: By 1980 they will add around 200 Backfires?\nDirector Colby: The Backfire production by 1980 will be around 140\nfor their long-range aviation forces, and 140 for naval aviation.\nThe comparative number of weapons is evidently an important strategic\nmeasure to the Soviets. As you see, they now have fewer weapons\nthan the U.S. and could, therefore, view their current conversion and\ndeployment programs in part as rectifying this imbalance.\nOther quantitative measures are also important to the Soviets:\n-- The Soviets currently lead the U.S. in equivalent megatonnage\n(and in missile throw weight, not shown here), which the character of\ntheir chosen weapon systems indicates they value higher. We project\nthat, with their current programs, their advantages in these respects\nwill continue to grow.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET \\SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\n-- The Soviets also consider the capability of their forces to survive\nand to attack various target sets under various scenarios. Thus, these\nboards provide only an indication of how they might view the balance,\nrather than a definitive treatment of the outcome of a strategic exchange.\nAs I indicated at the last NSC meeting, SALT II limitations would hold\ndown the gross numbers of Soviet delivery vehicles to some extent\nand would limit the more extreme possibilities for growth in numbers\nof Soviet weapons. They would not change other asymmetries in the\nforces of the two sides, such as megatons and missile throw weight,\nor reduce the qualitative improvements in Soviet forces which we\nexpect.\nFinally, Mr. President, I would note that the Soviets view these issues\nagainst the overall Soviet-U. S. relationship. We believe that the following\nfactors are prominent in Brezhnev's current negotiating perspective:\n-- His view that the Soviets have already moved further than the\nU.S. in SALT negotiations by agreeing at Vladivostok to equal aggregates\nwithout forward-based systems and by subsequently promising to meet\nU.S. requirements on MIR V counting rules;\n-- Second, his probable feeling that the U.S. is displaying a degree\nof ambivalence about its role in the world that makes it unnecessary for\nthe USSR to concede more than the U.S. on remaining SALT II issues;\nand\n-- Last, the likelihood that the USSR's own foreign policy and\neconomic setbacks, an imminent Party Congress, and Brezhnev's\ndiminished vigor all combine to make it seem unwise for him to try\nto accommodate maximum U.S. demands on Backfire and cruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: Thank you, Bill. Are there any questions?\nDr. Ikle: Do-your force charts include cruise missiles?\nDirector Colby: No.\nGeneral Brown: I would be interested in the details of how you computed\nmegatonnage. We computed megatonnage for 1985, and at a hasty glance,\nI believe it is quite different from Bill's. I won't discuss it further,\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n5\nbut my silence does not imply agreement. Colby's numbers show an\ninsignificant contribution from the Backfire. Ours show that in 1985,\nwith about 500 Backfire, the Backfire contributes about 30-40 percent\nof the total force megatonnage.\nPresident Ford: What percent?\nGeneral Brown: 30-40 percent of the megatonnage.\nSecretary Kissinger: That assumes it is all for use against the U.S.\nIt does not take into account the cruise missiles or FBS factors.\nGeneral Brown: I'm speaking of it only in terms of percentage of the\nSoviet force.\nDirector Colby: In 1980 they will have produced around 270 Backfires.\nBy 1985 they will have 550 Backfire. Therefore, if you double the number\nof Backfire, you double the megatonnage shown here.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: But that would not be near 30 to 40 percent.\nGeneral Brown: Our people should get together and look at this.\nBrent Scowcroft: If you loaded the Soviet forces with Badgers, you would\ncome out about the same, but there is no worry about the Badger.\nGeneral Brown: This relates to Secretary Kissinger's concern (expressed\nat the recent SIOP briefing) about holding forces in reserve.\nSecretary Kissinger:\nGeneral Brown:\nSecretary Kissinger:\nGeneral Brown:\nFORD\nSERALO\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRE / SENSITIVE - XGDS\n6\nPresident Ford: Is there a question about the Badgers?\nGeneral Brown: Not with me.\nPresident Ford: Are they comparable with the Backfire?\nGeneral Brown: They are not the same percentage of the force as Backfire.\nPresident Ford: This is a startling chart; I am surprised I have not\nseen it before.\nGeneral Brown: There are two factors. First, we have drawn up a\nrevised Backfire production estimate -- from 300 to 500. Second, the\nfirst time the information was shown in this form was this week. The\nBackfire megatonnage is now up to 40 percent for 1985. Bill Colby's\nchart shows the percentage only for 1980.\nPresident Ford: The chart shows that the U.S. has only slightly better\nthan 50 percent of the Soviet megatonnage. Even that bar in 1980 is\nsignificant.\nDirector Colby: We will get together with the JCS and DIA and come up\nwith 1985 figures for Backfire.\nPresident Ford: I would like to see what you come up with.\nDr. Ikle: There are so many ways to cover megatonnage.\nDirector Colby: This chart for 1976 includes approximately 580 medium\nbombers in the European threat. It leaves out about 2000 fighter/bomber\ntypes not currently configured for nuclear weapons.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: What about U.S. FBS?\nDirector Colby: U.S. FBS include 770 odd systems approximately,\nincluding those in the Pacific. There are about 1000 additional U.S.\nand NA TO weapons not configured for nuclear weapons.\nPresident Ford: Henry, would you proceed with your briefing.\nis\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP/SECR SENSITIVE - XGDS\n7\nSecretary Kissinger: I would like to sum up the options prepared by\nthe VP. These are summarized on the chart, and are self-explanatory.\nThe chart shows four options categories. You can put together different\nvariations once the basic principle is decided -- the principle you want\nto follow.\nFor each of the options, one must ask three questions.\nFirst, is the option compatible with the national interest, in the national\ninterest? This depends on its strategic impact, not just its negotiability.\nWe have done detailed analyses on each of the options, far more detailed\nthan simply counting megatonnage.\nSecond, one must ask what the situation would be in the absence of an\nagreement. How do you count Backfire megatonnage if there is no\nagreement? What are the specific countermeasures?\nThird, you must ask if the option is negotiable. This goes back to\nBill Colby's point -- what is the negotiating position as the Soviets\nsee our relative forces?\nI agree with Bill (Colby) that the Soviets have made all the concessions\nin this round. There have been no U.S. concessions except to play with\nthe numbers. The Soviets took FBS out at Vladivostok. They are using\nour counting rules, which give us some 120 SS-18s or 2000 warheads for\nnothing. Every SS-18 is counted as a MIRV, and every one deployed to\ndate has not been MIRVed.\nThe Soviet position is that Backfire should not be counted; that all\nmissiles with greater than 600 kilometer range on heavy bombers should\nbe counted; and that all missiles with greater than 600 kilometer range\non other platforms should be banned. Therefore, every one of our options\nrequests a Soviet change. Thus, it is not correct to put forth an option\nsimply to see how they will respond.\nAmbassador Johnson: The Soviets want to permit land-based cruise\nmissiles up to 5500 kilometer range.\nSecretary Kissinger: Right, but the change we ask is in our favor.\nWe must ask whether an option is salable. Given the discussions the\npast two years in this country, we may have a hell of a time selling it.\nMr. President, you must take this into account.\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n8\nIn addition, you (President Ford) will have to decide by what method\nwe should negotiate. We can take one leap to our final position, or\nwe can have a series of fallbacks leading to our final position.\nMy instinct is that in Geneva you take small steps. But in Moscow\nwith Brezhnev you give him something he can put to the Politburo.\nTherefore, our position should be as close to our final position as\nwe can make it.\nI would now like to discuss the options. Some of these we can use as\nfallbacks but some we cannot.\nFor Option I, the basic proposal is to codify Vladivostok. We would\ndefer the Backfire and cruise missile negotiations until an agreed\nlater date. In the future, they could run free, or if they would agree\nto build no more than a certain numb er of Backfire, we would build\nno more than a certain number of cruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: How far along are we in codification of Vladivostok\nas Henry defines it.\nAmbassador Johnson: We are quite far down the road.\nSecretary Kissinger: In my judgment, deferral is almost certain\nnot to be accepted by the Soviets, at least not initially. It implies\nBackfire will be counted. Since the counting rules are linked to\nresolution of the cruise missile issue, there would be no throw\nweight limit until the cruise missile issue is settled.\nIt is conveivable that if we go through other options and fail, then we\nmight arrive at a version of deferral when we are at the end of the line.\nBut we would end up without the counting rule; we would then have to\nrely on national technical means for MIR V verification.\nWe might have a chance of Option I at the last stage of negotiations,\nbut without a throw weight limit and without the counting rule.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: This depends on agreement by a date certain.\nSecretary Kissinger: But both Backfire and cruise missiles could run\nfree until 1985. It depends on how the negotiations go. Until November\nFORD\n1979 we could say we would not deploy beyond a certain number of\nTOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/SENSUNIVE - XGDS\n9\ncruise missiles if they do not go beyond a certain number of Backfires.\nWe could say July 1, 1979. The problem is what do we do on July 1, 1979\nif there is no agreement. Either the basic agreement lapses or we go\ninto cruise missile deployment.\nPresident Ford: There would be no constraints on their cruise missile\nprogram either. They couldn't deploy them but they could do R&D.\nSecretary Kissinger: This would make a tough decision in 1977. The\nagreement would lapse in 1979, or continue to 1985 with cruise missiles\nrunning free.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: If they say they have given up on FBS as being out\nof SALT II, the Backfire can be given up too.\nSecretary Kissinger: We can take the same position with the Backfire\nas they do with FBS. We can treat it in SALT III, not SALT II.\nAmbassador Johnson: I agree with Don's point -- that they may not\ncome back without also saying that we need to include FBS in the\nfollow-on negotiations.\nSecretary Kissinger: This option is unlikely to be accepted; as an opening\nposition it would probably be rejected. It should be viewed as an absolutely\ndesperate last attempt at the end of the line. My instinct is that it would\nbring in FBS but would not result in the counting rule or throw weight limit.\n(There was a brief interruption of the meeting at this time as a note was\nbrought to the President informing him of the death of Chou En Lai.)\nSecretary Kissinger: My recommendation is that we try any of the other\noptions as a first step and then surface Option I. If we first try Option I\nand it is turned down we have no place to go. We would have to go from\nsimplicity to complexity.\nMy recommendation is that even if we want Option I we should take one\nof the others first for negotiating purposes.\nLet's now look at Option IV. From the standpoint of salability here and\nour national interest this is probably the best.\nTORSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n10\nOption IV would count Backfire in the aggregate. It would ban ALCMs\non heavy bombers above 2500 kilometers. It would count heavy bombers\nwith ALCMs above 600 kilometers in the MIRV limit. It would ban ALCMs\nabove 600 kilometers on other aircraft. It would ban SLCMs on submarines\nabove 600 kilometers. It would ban SLCMs on surface ships above 2500\nkilometers. It would ban land-based cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers.\nFrom the point of view of our strategic interests, and the throw weight\nconsiderations of General Brown, Option IV is the most manageable.\nThe only significant concession that it makes is that it counts heavy\nbombers with ALCMs as MIRVs.\nPresident Ford: ALCMs up to 2500 kilometers?\nGeneral Brown: Correct. But we would like long-range SLCMs on sub-\nmarines, but this is not a hard point.\nSecretary Kissinger: We would be giving up some Minuteman III or\nPoseidons for ALCMs. For the Soviets, they must count 500 Backfire\nin the 2400 aggregate. Already they must destroy 200 systems. Therefore,\nunder this option they would have to destroy 700 of their existing missiles,\nor about 25 to 30% of their force.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Or modify some of their force.\nSecretary Kissinger: How?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: If they agree to Option IV they could get around\ndestroying some of their force by modifying the Backfire so it is no\nlonger a gray area system.\nSecretary Kissinger: Once it is a bomber, they would have to redesign\nit completely.\nSecretary Clements: No. General Rowny and I say the Russians could\nmodify it -- clip its wings so to speak.\nSecretary Kissinger: This means they would have to count the Backfire\nor redesign it. I don't know how you (General Brown) react to modifying\nyour force. But nobody who has talked to the Soviets says there is any\nchance of counting the Backfire in the aggregate. I spoke to Gromyko\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nSERATA FORD LISENSE\nTOP SECR ETYSENSITIVE - XGDS\n11\nwhen we were considering hybrid systems. I asked him how many in the\nPolitboro understand SALT. He said four. I knew he was exaggerating\nsince he doesn't understand it himself. But they do understand the Backfire\nand it is clear they are not going to count the Backfire.\nIf we want to get Option I, a good way would be to start with Option IV.\nAmbassador Johnson: I heartily agree.\nSecretary Kissinger: The next option we will look at is Option II. I\nbelieve we are unanimous in saying that the Soviets probably will not\naccept it and that it is not salable in this country. It has no constraints\non Backfire, and the only limit on cruise missiles is one which has already\nbeen rejected. It would be better to the Soviets than our last proposal\nwith respect to Backfire, but worse with respect to cruise missiles.\nThe Soviets won't accept it, and in the U.S. it would not sell.\nPresident Ford: It is not salable here because of no constraints on\nBackfire?\nSecretary Kissinger: Yes. You would be vulnerable to the right because\nit has no constraints on Backfire; and vulnerable to the left because\nthere are no constraints on cruise missiles. People will say this is a\nphony agreement and that it jeopardizes our national interest.\nLet's look at Option III. It explicitly puts Backfire and surface ship\nSLCMs in a hybrid systems category -- weapons not designed for a\nprimary strategic mission but capable of performing such missions.\nIt includes a numerical limit on Backfire.\nPresident Ford: Above the 2400 level?\nSecretary Kissinger: Above 2400. It also has a comfortable limit on\nsurface ships SLCMs; for example we might have 50 ships with 15\nmissiles each or about 750 cruise missiles. This would be a two to one\nratio relative to the Backfire. Option III would involve a separate\nprotocol to be reviewed at some date together with the whole hybrid\nsystems problem. The rest of Option III's features are the same as\nOption IV.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITÍVE - XGDS\nTOR SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n12\nIn terms of negotiations, a more elegant way to approach it would be to\ngive the Soviets a separate limit of 400 for Backfire, not 300, but reduce\nthe aggregate from 2400 to 2300 thereby effectively counting an additional\n100 Backfires.\nGeneral Brown: We talked about a separate limit of 300 Backfires, not\n400.\nSecretary Kissinger: This other approach would have a 400 limit, but by\nreducing the aggregate from 2400 to 2300 this gives a net separate limit\nof 300. Option III is probably negotiable. In terms of salability there is\nstill the problem with the Backfire numbers. One argument against this\noption is the FBS argument.\nLong-range ALCMs would be banned from Backfire because they could\nonly be deployed on heavy bombers. Surface ships SLCMs with greater\nthan 600 kilometer range would be prohibited for the Soviets but permitted\nfor us. On hybrid systems, each side makes its selection at the beginning.\nPresident Ford: If they have Backfire, then they would have no surface\nship SLCMs?\nSecretary Kissinger: Right. We did this with the ABM. Each side had\nthe right to defend either a city or a missile site.\nThis option (Option III) is the most nearly negotiable.\nEveryone is most comfortable with Option IV from the U.S. view. Some\nthink that we should try Option IV, and when it is rejected, we should try\na variation of Option III, if the Soviets would agree to limiting SS-18\ndeployment to a level of 100. At that point we can make a final decision\nwhether to go to Option III. This approach lends itself to Geneva -- we\ncould start hard with Option IV and let out a little at a time. But the\nSoviets may conclude that we want no agreement this year.\nPresident Ford: Why does this include a ban on land-based cruise\nmissiles over 2500 kilometers range? Was this called for by Vladivostok?\nSecretary Kissinger: This would be the easiest feature to get. However,\nthere is no agreement on limiting land-based cruise missiles to 2500 kilo-\nmeters.\nTQP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n13\nDr. Ikle: We would want this if we could limit ALCMs at the same time.\nSecretary Kissinger: But then we are into cruise missile negotiations.\nGeneral Brown: The key point is that the only lever on the Backfire is\nthe cruise missile. If we give on cruise missiles, then we have no\nlever on Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: We should also get a presentation on what the\nDOD/JCS plan is to counter the Backfire in the absence of an agreement.\nEach option permits us to carry out almost all of our plans in the cruise\nmissile field anyway -- only we would have to give up 200 Poseidon or\nMinuteman III missiles.\nPresident Ford (to General Brown): If there is no agreement and Backfire\nruns free, and they have an estimated 400-500 Backfire, do we go into\nan air defense program?\nGeneral Brown: We would have to recommend that. This is why it is\nimperative to cap the Backfire.\nPresident Ford: None of the SALT contingency proposals I have seen\ninclude initiation of an air defense program.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You haven't seen our proposal.\nPresident Ford: I saw two from your predecessor. (Laughter)\nGeneral Brown: We disown those. (Laughter)\nSecretary Kissinger: SALT does not obviate the need for air defenses.\nIf Backfire constitutes 20% of the numbers and 40% of the throw weight and\n\"is certainly a strategic weapon\" and \"is certainly going to be upgraded\"\nthen we will \"certainly need air defense\".\nDr. Ikle: We will have savings because of curtailment of the Soviet missile\nforce.\nGeneral Brown: This points out one major imbalance: the Soviets have\nair defenses, but we do not. The bombers will do the job but they will\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRART\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS\n14\npay the price. If bombers are in a situation like Vietnam where con-\nventional weapons are used, they will take a beating; but in a nuclear\nconflict the bombers will go in only once.\nPresident Ford: My memory of the 1950s is that we wasted many hundreds\nof millions of dollars on BOMARC. Those of us who were for it were\nwrong.\nGeneral Brown: All of us were wrong on the basis of the threat.\nPresident Ford: All our NIKES are gone; we would have to start from\nscratch -- not in terms of technology but in terms of hardware.\nSecretary Kissinger: My basic point is that if we need air defense, we\nwill need it in any case. My question is how do you offset Backfire\nmegatonnage in a no-SALT environment.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: You mean no Option I?\nPresident Ford: No, nothing.\nSecretary Kissinger: The Interim Agreement runs out in 1977. We\nmust decide to extend it or let all run free.\nVice President Rockefeller (to Secretary Kissinger): Option III addresses\nthe hybrid systems. Does this mean that the Russians could not have\nboth the aircraft and the cruise missiles?\nSecretary Kissinger: They could not have both Backfire and long-range\ncruise missiles on surface ships. Both sides can have ALCMs on heavy\nbombers but they would count. They could not have ALCMs on Backfire\nunless they would count them.\nWe would have cruise missiles on heavy bombers, crui se missiles on\nother aircraft provided the range is less than 600 kilometers, and cruise\nmissiles on surface ships.\nThey would have no long-range cruise missiles on surface ships or\nBackfire.\nVice President Rockefeller: Is the 600 kilometer range longer than they\nhave a capability for now?\nTOP \\SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTQP/SECR SENSITIVE - XGDS\n15\nSecretary Clements: It is about what they have now. The platforms\nwould be counted in the MIR total. Each B-52 bomber would count --\nnot each missile -- in the MIR V total.\nAmbassador Johnson: Ship platforms would not be counted in the MIR V\ntotal.\nSecretary Kissinger: One B-52 would count as one MIR V launcher no\nmatter how many ALCMs each bomber carried. What would a B-52\ncarry - 12 on each?\nGeneral Brown: 12 -- maybe up to 20.\nThis brings us back to air defenses. There is merit in addressing 2400\nvehicles the Soviets can use to hit the U.S. We cannot by treaty defend\nagainst their missiles, but we would like to constrain the Backfire.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: George, why is it important to constrain the Backfire?\nGeneral Brown: It will be useful in support of ratification. It would be\njustification for having the Backfire outside the game.\nSecretary Kissinger: Option III and Option II contain certain collateral\nconstraints on the Backfire. There are additional benefits, but not\ndecisive.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We have fallen into the habit of addressing selling\nit at home. It is worth elaborating all the points. The first question is\nthe strategic implications. Also, we must know how to communicate\nthe meaning to others. This is broader than Congressional ratification.\nWe need to debate the effect on our country, our allies, and neutrals in\nthe world. Developing arguments against Options I, II, III, and IV, and\npreparing answers to these arguments, is a useful process. Option IV\nhas been explained. Option I has been explained. All of us have set\naside Option II.\nWith respect to Option III, its positive elements are it has separate\nlimits, some constraints on Backfire, and may be negotiable.\nFORD & LIBRARY BERALD\nThe problems with Option III are, first, that you have broken the 2400\nlevel and gone up to 2700 vehicles, instead of reducing the level. There\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET \\SENSITYVE XGDS\n16\nis another problem. We are counting the Bison in the total, but here\nwe have a new aircraft (the Backfire) with about the same range but\nwe are not counting it -- yet it is comparable.\nPresident Ford: How many Bisons are being counted in the 2400 ceiling\nagreed at Vladivostok?\nAmbassador Johnson: We have no idea. We are counting 120 Bisons and\nBears. But we have no indication from them what they are counting.\nSecretary Kissinger: They will probably get rid of 180 Bisons just to get\ndown to the 2400 ceiling, and the tanker force.\nPresident Ford: Are the tankers interchangeable?\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Yes.\nGeneral Brown: The same tanker can service either the Bison or the\nBackfire.\nAmbassador Johnson: They have only 50 tankers.\nPresident Ford: How many tankers do they need to get the Backfire to the\nU.S.?\nGeneral Brown: 50 tankers are adequate to get them here, and out of\nthe country, although not necessarily back to the Soviet Union. Since\nthey have no air defenses to penetrate, they have a tremendous plus.\nSecretary Kissinger: What can offset the Backfire is our FBS. Also,\nthey can have no ALCMs on Backfire and we can have a force of surface\nSLCMs in some ratio to Backfire.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: I agree that we must use this as an offset, but\ncarefully.\nPresident Ford: What kind of surface ships? Navy men-of-way?\nMerchant ships?\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\nGeneral Brown: Not merchant ships.\nTOP SECRET /SENSITLVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n17\nPresident Ford: Do we have to build different kinds of ships?\nGeneral Brown: Existing ships will do. We can replace existing guns\nand missiles.\nPresident Ford: Can you go down as far as destroyers?\nSecretary Clements: Destroyers and even frigates can carry cruise\nmissiles.\nAmbassador Johnson: Would these have a strategic or tactical capability?\nSecretary Clements: A tactical role, a regional mission like in the\nMediterranean.\nSecretary Kissinger: You could reach K iev easily from the Mediterranean\nwith the ranges you are talking about.\nDr. Ikle: You can have some assurances on the modes of operations.\nPresident Ford: Would you be able to identify the ships carrying cruise\nmissiles?\nDirector Colby: You could identify the ships with national technical\nmeans.\nPresident Ford: And we could verify surface ships with SLCMs.\nDirector Colby: We can and with their means they can also.\nAmbassador Johnson: You can see the launchers on the deck.\nGeneral Brown: This is the only aspect of cruise missiles that is\nverifiable.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There are two other thoughts that need to be discussed.\nFirst, there is the marketing or public discussion of any agreement. Here\nwe must consider a complex versus a simple agreement. There is a general\nfeeling among all I have talked to that the extent to which we can make it\nsimple, the better. It is better in terms of verification, the SCC, explaining\nit to the Congress, and explaining it to the public and our allies. Simplicity\nis one of the advantages of Vladivostok.\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n18\nInevitably, with Options II, III, or IV, Jackson will come down hard on\nus just like he did with me at my confirmation hearings. He will want\nto know about verification of cruise missiles, about distinguishing between\nnuclear and conventional-armed cruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: That is a Soviet problem.\nBrent Scowcroft: The problem is theirs, not ours.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: That is an answer to it. That is one answer.\nSecretary Clements: There is one major problem which makes all\nother problems insignificant. That would be raising the ceiling above\nthe 2400 level. The public applauded the 2400 ceiling agreed to at\nVladivostok. If we break the ceiling, I am afraid all other matters\nwill get lost in the charge that \"you have raised the ceiling\".\nSecretary Kissinger: Option I raises the ceiling too. Backfire runs\nfree.\nSecretary Clements: Backfire runs free for now, but it is a matter\nthat would continue to be negotiated.\nSecretary Kissinger: The day the agreement goes into effect, the ceiling\nwould be 2400 plus Backfire, which would be 175 by 1979.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: But in 1976, the public would understand that we\nwere proceeding with the negotiation on Backfire.\nBrent Scowcroft: We could avoid the perception of breaking the\n2400 ceiling by having a separate protocol -- not \"SALT II\" but\nwe would say \"separately the Soviets have agreed to continue to\nnegotiate the Backfire. 11\nSecretary Kissinger: SALT III starts in 1977 on negotiations on reduc-\ntions. The only option which avoids breaking the 2400 ceiling is Option IV.\nOptions I, II, and III increase the ceiling, if you count Backfire as a\nheavy bomber.\nAs Don said, Backfire is a hybrid system not designed for strategic\nstrike. It does have additional capability which they could use in the\nevent that they wanted to against the United States.\nFORD i GERALD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n19\nThe same thing is true of cruise missiles. They would not be very\ngood for use as strategic system since the Soviets can see them coming\nfor five hours.\nOne must analyze these issues very carefully.\nPresident Ford: If we equate publicly the surface ship SLCM with the\nBackfire would this be a problem? Should we treat them separately?\nMilitarily, George, can you equate the SLCM with the Backfire?\nGeneral Brown: I have not thought about it.\nPresident Ford: Can you give me a reasonable guess.\nGeneral Brown: Yes, I think you can equate them as a reasonable\nguess.\nPresident Ford: Seems to make sense.\nDr. Ikle: Equating the cruise missile with the Backfire.\nBrent Scowcroft: But not equating the ship with the Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: Is there some ratio of Backfires to ships that makes\nsense? For example two?\nGeneral Brown: I worry about the defense of ships. The Soviets have\na large number of submarines which make our ships very vulnerable.\nTherefore, I hesitate to equate these two forces.\nVice President Rockefeller: The American people think about freedom\nof the seas. They think we have freedom of the seas. I ask the CNO\nwhat would happen if there were a war in Europe. He said we would have\nto abandon Japan to keep the sea lines open to Europe, and that we would\nhave to abandon Israel. The public would spend money to put cruise\nmissiles on ships. They have a major potential in defense of freedom of\nthe seas. Cruise missiles are our chance to balance our position on\nthe seas.\nPresident Ford: The Soviets have 400 Backfires. How many surface\nplatforms will we need to balance them?\nTQP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTOR SECRE SENSITIVE - XGDS\n20\nDr. Ikle: There is an 80 to 1 difference in payload. If you multiply\nthe number of cruise missiles on each ship by the number of ships\nyou could look at this. If you have 80 cruise missiles on a ship\n(including reloadings), it would equal a Backfire.\nSecretary Kissinger: We talk about Option III as though it is a con-\ncession to the Soviets, but for the Soviets it is a tremendous political\ndecision. They would have to give us long-range surface ship SLCMs.\nWe must remember that they have tied the counting rule to cruise\nmissiles and the counting rule gives us 120 missiles free.\nIf we agree on Option III we can expect a 10 percent slip at the margin\nOption III is at the margin of what the Soviets can agree to.\nIf we say we can have 80 cruise missiles per ship and 80 ships the\nSoviets will say no. If we say we are going to have 15 cruise missiles\nper ship and 50 ships that might work.\nThe significant part is that they would not have any cruise missiles\non their ships.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: There is a big difference between Options III and\nIV. If we end up with Option III, we must be able to say that we tried\ninitially to get the Backfire included.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have made that attempt for two years.\nPresident Ford: At Helsinki we made the attempt and they made a\nflat categorical turn down.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Assuming this is a religious matter with the\nSoviets, then there will be gray area systems. If one says it is a\nmatter of theology and cannot include it, it will be a future problem\nalso. What if, for example, we decided to call the B-1 a medium bomber.\nBrent Scowcroft: We did this on FBS. We took a theological position.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: The future gets cloudy if things do not fit nearly\ninto theater or strategic category. We need some way to address gray\nareas as we go down the road. This sets a precedent.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD i LIBRARY BERALD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n21\nDr. Ikle: Option III helps move in that direction.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We need to look for something to hold up. They\ncan say to their people that they have 2700 systems. What is there for\nus to hold up? We need a technique of handling these matters. We\nneed to look at options on the side like Option G.\nDr. Ikle: The position we can take on Option III is to say that we have\ncovered more systems than Vladivostok covered -- that we have avoided\nunlimited arms expansion.\nPresident Ford (to General Brown): For Option III, can you militarily\ndefend the ALCM ranges?\nGeneral Brown: We could.\nPresident Ford: I'm talking about the Committee giving us a hard time.\nGeneral Brown: The ALCM ranges are adequate for penetration aids\nagainst the Soviets. With the ground missiles, we could cover all NATO\ntargets from Germany and Turkey. We have looked at that.\nPresident Ford: You can defend the limitations on ALCM and SLCM ranges?\nGeneral Brown: Yes, and the 600 km bottom range.\nPresident Ford: For SLCMs?\nGeneral Brown: Yes. The only thing that would give the U.S. a problem --\nand the Vice President identified this -- would be how it would affect our\nanti-ship role. But in the anti-ship role there is no need for nuclear\nwarheads. This is one reason for the arguments on the definitional problem.\nSecretary Kissinger: This would be an enormous disadvantage to us because\nwe have a large surface fleet.\nGeneral Brown: They do too.\nPresident Ford (to General Brown): Would your colleagues also be able\nto defend these limits?\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBERALD FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n22\nGeneral Brown: Yes sir.\nSecretary Kissinger: It will make a difference if you say it does not apply\nto conventional cruise missiles.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Since SALT is nuclear.\nSecretary Kissinger: Therefore no test ban makes any sense since they\ncan test to any range and call them \"conventional\". Everybody agrees\nyou can screw on another warhead in ten minutes. It would be the edge\nof absurdity if we go to the Hill and say \"This does not apply to conventional\ncruise missiles. 11 Therefore my argument on Backfire would no longer be\ngood since they can put on conventional missiles. I can just imagine what\nJackson will do to us.\nGeneral Brown: This is not a new point. If this were the only problem\nwith verification of cruise missiles, I would remain quiet. But no element\nof cruise missiles can be verified.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Even on Option IV, we must be able to defend our\nposition on cruise missiles.\nSecretary Kissinger: If we try to sell this to the Soviets and say \"con-\nventional okay\" --\nGeneral Brown: \"As do you. \"\nSecretary Kissinger: This let's cruise missiles run free.\nGeneral Brown: The same thing applies to range limits, if range limits\ncan be violated.\nSecretary Kissinger: We have some hope on range verification; we can see\nthem test. I would not want to present this to the high levels of the Soviet\ngovernment. If we want to do this we should let Alex do it in Geneva. We\nhave no conventional ICBMs yet.\nGeneral Brown: But we have conventional bombers. We usedbombers in a\nconventional role in Vietnam.\nBrent Scowcroft: But the B-52s count regardless.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD & LIBRARY GERALD\nTAP SECR ET SENSITIVE - XGDS\n23\nGeneral Brown: We may want to use the B-52 in some other role, but I\ncan't conveive of using the ICBM as a conventional weapon.\nAlex Johnson: We could say we can do anything we want to on the basis of\nthe conventional definition. We don't want to get in that position.\nDr. Ikle: We could put conventional cruise missiles on ships.\nPresident Ford (to General Brown): Militarily, if we ban conventional\nmissiles above the limit, what harm would that do?\nGeneral Brown: It would hurt us primarily in the anti-shipping role. We\ncan get cruise missiles with tens of feet accuracy. Therefore we can use\nhigh explosive warheads.\nSecretary Clements: There is no question about that.\nSecretary Kissinger: We could have a 2500 km limit on surface ship SLCMs.\nDr. Ikle: This would simply be diverting strategic weapons to conventional\nweapons -- as we have done with the B-52.\nPresident Ford: On surface ships, we can have nuclear missiles to 2500 km,\nplus conventional to 2500 km?\nGeneral Response: Yes\nSecretary Kissinger: I am not sure how we would handle this.\nPresident Ford: George, your concern is with the ban on conventional\ncruise missiles at any range. What is the military handicap?\nGeneral Brown: It forecloses tactical non-nuclear use, which is possible\ngiven our accuracy predictions.\nSecretary Clements: We can use cruise missiles from carriers or the 963.\nWe can replace some aircraft missiles with cruise missiles. Therefore\nwe can use them in a tactical, attack, or regional mission on the 963 or\nthe strike cruiser, or even the frigate.\nBrent Scowcroft: What about target acquisition? You could not acquire\ntargets.\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD LIBRARY FORD\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n24\nSecretary Clements: In some instances this would be difficult; in other\ninstances it could be handled.\nSecretary Kissinger: Now carrier air must go over the target.\nSecretary Clements: Would these limits all apply to nuclear-armed missiles?\nSecretary Kissinger: There are two ways we can handle this. We can\naccept the range restriction, then try to make the distinction -- but just\ntry to sell this to Congressional Committees. Then Option III is ridiculous.\nYou can call missiles conventional and this lets them run free.\nGeneral Brown: The missiles are all the same. You can test them, then\nput them in a submarine or on an aircraft. This makes a mockery of SALT.\nYou can't verify them.\nDr. Ikle: The Soviets have other means of verification.\nVice President Rockefeller: How far behind us are the Soviets in cruise\nmissiles -- a couple of years?\nDirector Colby: More than that.\nSecretary Clements: Five years or more behind us.\nVice President Rockefeller: Our freedom of use in cruise missiles to defend\nthe Navy is a powerful ar gument. But 2500 km is quite a distance. However,\nin general we should go to 5000 km.\nGeneral Brown: Ultimately, but that is conceptual only.\nPresident Ford: If you had a 5000 km missile, why would you even need\nto have them on a ship then?\nSecretary Kissinger: If you accept 5500 km for land-missiles, you can\ncover the whole ocean.\nDirector Colby: The Soviet basic strategy is retaliation. This is the basic\nstrategy, whether the Backfire is included or not. In negotiations this is a\nhard point. The Soviets feel that they have yielded to us so far.\nTQP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORM FORD LIBRARI BERALD\nLICHARD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n25\nSecretary Kissinger: They think our Congress will not raise the budget.\nWe have to think in terms of salability to the left and the right. We may\nnot get cruise missiles.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: How do we respond to Congress on verification of cruise\nmissiles?\nDirector Colby: They are difficult to verify. There is almost no distinction\nbetween conventional and nuclear missiles.\nPresident Ford: Then how do we know about those they have in development?\nDirector Colby:\nDr. Ikle: There's a difference between missiles with 600 to 2500 km range,\nand those with 5500 km range. We will know if they have massive deployment\nof ships with SLCMs.\nDirector Colby: If they employ missiles in the thousands, we can begin to\npick it up. However, if they deploy only a small number, it really does not\nmake any difference.\nVice President Rockefeller: On balance, I believe Option III looks pretty\ngood. I am for developing land-based cruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: What about counting the 300-400 Backfires above the limit.\nVice President Rockefeller: That doesn't bother me. I want to protect the\nNavy.\nPresident Ford: What did I do on the Navy appeals in the Budget?\nSecretary Clements: You approved them.\nPresident Ford: That takes the Navy pretty far out.\nVice President Rockefeller: We need cruise missiles for the Navy.\nPresident Ford: If we accept this premise, then carriers are not worth\na thing.\nTOP SECRET / SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORO i LIBRARY GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n26\nSecretary Rumsfeld: We need to consider the number of Navy ships.\nPresident Ford: In terms of ship-to-ship capability, the Harpoon is\noperational.\nSecretary Kissinger: There can be a large number of attack submarines\nwith cruise missiles -- not a negligible weapon. It is a potent weapon.\nThere is no law of nature that says you have to attack ships from a distance.\nAt a distance it would take 5 hours for the cruise missile to get to its target.\nThe submarines gain in invisibility.\nGeneral Brown: There are two points. We should not confuse current cap-\nability with future capability. Much is still far off in the future. Target\nacquisition is missing, although maybe eventually we can use satellites.\nMy second point: stuffing missiles in submarines has its limits too. We\ndon't know how to communicate with submarines unless they come up\nlike surface ships.\nPresident Ford: Then why can't we sell the Seafarer in Michigan? (Laughter)\nGeneral Brown: The communications problem is difficult.\nPresident Ford: Nelson, what is your reaction to Option III?\nVice President Rockefeller: I believe it is a good compromise. It is\nimpressive.\nPresident Ford: Is there anything more to add?\nSecretary Clements: One last thing. This would raise the limit to more\nthan 2400 systems. This is a political aspect which only you can judge.\nMy feeling is that this is important. The other aspects will simply get\nlost.\nPresident Ford: What if there is no SALT agreement?\nSecretary Kissinger: The only way to stay within the 2400 is to ask for\nOption IV.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Option I would do it.\nFORD is LIBRARY SERALD\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSINVE XGDS\n27\nSecretary Clements: I'd go to Option I.\nBrent Scowcroft: Option I goes above the 2400 level.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: If we go to Option I, it won't say we are above 2400.\nDirector Colby: This is true of Option II also.\nSecretary Clements: Option I is perfectly honest and straightforward. We\ncan say we can't get agreement and we are continuing to look at it.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: With Option I we can anticipate agreement during this\nyear or early next.\nVice President Rockefeller: I think the country is drifting to the left (?) at\nthe moment.\nPresident Ford: That is an understatement.\nVice President Rockefeller: If we have no agreement, we will have to ask\nfor more money. There is little chance to get it. I like Option III.\nSecretary Kissinger: I want the record to show that I agree with the Vice\nPresident. I did not talk to the Vice President about this.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Come on, Henry, you passed him a note. (Laughter)\nVice President Rockefeller: Congress won't allow us the money for\ncruise missiles.\nPresident Ford: I think we would be in a better position to defend it if we\nhad Option III.\nSecretary Clements: I defer to you at this point.\nBrent Scowcroft: Bill, what would change that would make this more\nnegotiable in one or two years?\nSecretary Clements: The Soviets are more concerned with our cruise missiles\nthan we are with their Backfire. -- We want to get the President through the\nelection.\nTOP SECR ET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nGERALD FORD \"o\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS\n28\nPresident Ford: If we are not in in '76, those that would follow would get\na less benefical settlement than what we would get.\nGeneral Brown: We should make a good college try for Option IV first,\nthen Option III -- rather than start on the assumption that we can't get\nBackfire counted.\nPresident Ford (to General Brown): Militarily, can you defend Option III?\nGeneral Brown: It is very difficult from the standpoint of the Backfire and\nthe fact that it would increase the totals. But if we tried Option IV at\nfirst and failed -- and the best we can get is Option III -- I have a reasonable\nstory to tell.\nPresident Ford: If we can say we have surface SLCMs with 2500 km range,\nis this a fair trade-off for the military to defend.\nGeneral Brown: No, sir. But a sweetener would be to reduce their heavy\nmissiles -- to bring the 309 missiles down to some lesser number.\nSecretary Kissinger: It is conceivable that Brezhnev would write you a\nletter, Mr. President. He could say that even though 1320 MIR Ved missiles\nis okay, he is planning only 180 SS-18s, thereby giving us 120 MIRVs. This\nis conceivable, but hard to get.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Henry, what would you say in trying to defend Option III?\nWhat would you say is offsetting the 300 Backfires?\nSecretary Kissinger: If there is no agreement, all Backfires run free.\nYou have to begin by saying what do you do without an agreement. How do\nyou offset Backfire under a no-SALT condition? That is the first question.\nThen, you say that Backfire is for the peripheral role as are our FBS.\nSo FBS offset the Backfire. We would also say they can have no long-range\nALCMs on their Backfire. We had not featured Backfire before Vladivostok\nbut if the Soviets had known this in Vladivostok, they would have wanted us\nto trade FBS for Backfire.\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Don't their FBS offset our FBS?\nAmbassador Johnson: No. Their FBS can't reach the United States.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nLIBRAST\nyor SENSITIVE - XGDS\n29\nUnknown Speaker: But they can reach NATO.\nSecretary Kissinger: I will not go to Moscow as the guy who refused to\naccept Option IV, and then testify before the committees on my \"pre-\nemptive concessions.\"\nSecretary Rumsfeld: Henry, the deal is that the guy highest in the popularity\npolls has to take the heat. (Laughter)\nPresident Ford: That's not me. (Laughter)\nSecretary Kissinger: I have tried for six months to get Option IV. I have\ntried every conceivable variation to try to get Backfire counted. You,\nMr. President, personally heard them reject this position. Option III is\neven worse than the one Schlesinger and I had which they have seen. We\nhave tried Option IV. Therefore, if we want Option IV, send it to them\nthrough Alex or Dobrynin. It is a total waste of time to take up Option IV\nwith Brezhnev. If we would rather delay SALT, then we should go with\nOption IV.\nPresident Ford (to Ambassador Johnson): When do you go back to Geneva?\nAmbassador Johnson: The 28th -- it is geared to Henry's trip. We had\nearlier said the 12th, but the Soviets have agreed to change it to the 28th\nto tie it to Henry's trip.\nPresident Ford: Can I have photostats of the charts on the options?\nDirector Colby: Yes. We will get them to you right away.\nBrent Scowcroft: If we first try Option IV, then this adds to the liability\nof Option III. Jackson will say that this (Option IV) is what we wanted,\nand we gave to the Soviets.\nSecretary Kissinger: I want to make it clear that I am not sure the Soviets\nwill even buy Option III. We have some things going for us: their Party\nCongress, and Angola -- Brezhnev can't afford a major failure and Angola\nsimultaneously. Option III is going to be dicey.\nPresident Ford: We have hashed and rehashed all the options. Let me\nthink it over. (To Secretary Kissinger) When do you plan to leave, the\n18th or the 17th?\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS\nFORD i LIBRAR. GERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n30\nSecretary Kissinger: I appealed to the Soviets yesterday. I wanted to\nbe here for the State of the Union address. The Soviets accepted my\nappeal -- - - I will leave the night of the 19th.\nPresident Ford: Is there anything to add? Thank you very much.\nTOR SECRET SENSITUVE - XGDS\nFORD\nFORD i LISEARY GERALD"
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