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The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: "NSC Meeting, 2/11/1976" of the
National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States
of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09217
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Agenda
CREATOR'S NAME
Brent Scowcroft
RECEIVER'S NAME
President Ford
TITLE
NSC Meeting, 2/11/76
CREATION DATE
02/11/1976
VOLUME
6 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200030
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 2/11/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
REDACTED 5/10/05
09217
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Wednesday, February 11, 1976
ECLASS FIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED
2:30 p.m.
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5 (a)
The Cabinet Room
state the 9/25/98, osoer 4/27/04
MR98-40, #50; NSC 2/19/99
From: Brent Scowcroft
CIA ets 5/10/05
BY dal NARA DATE 7/20 106
I. PURPOSE
To review the options that might constitute a reply to the last Soviet
offer made by Brezhnev in Moscow.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN
A. Background: The following are the common elements in our
position as they stand now, following Secretary Kissinger's
discussion with Brezhnev:
1. Ai r Launched Cruise Missiles Above 600 km in Range:
The Soviets agree that:
-- ALCMs can only be deployed on heavy bombers that are included
in the aggregate of 2400 and, therefore, banned on other aircraft;
-- are completely banned over 2500 km in range; and
-- that each heavy bomber equipped with air launched cruise missiles
of a range between 600 and 2500 km will count as the same as a
MIRVed missile, and therefore counted in the 1320 ceiling agreed
at Vladivostok.
Additionally, the Soviets proposed, and we rejected, that the
would count as three MIRVed vehicles.
2. Submarine Launched Cruise Missiles:
-- Our positions coincide on banning any cruise missile over 600 km
in range from deployment on submarines.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SEX RET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
2
3.
Cruise Missiles Over 600 km on Surface Ship's:
The Soviets propose that cruise missiles with a range over
600 km be banned from deployment on surface ships.
-- We made two proposals: (1) that each surface ship equipped with
any cruise missiles over 600 kra in range count as a MIRVed
vehicle; and (2) that the US be permitted to deploy 25 surface
ships, in a separate limit that also includes 275 Backfire
bombers.
4.
Land Based Cruise Missiles
At Helsinki we had agreed that cruise missiles of intercontinental
range would be banned:
-- In our last proposal, however, we proposed that the range be
reduced to 2500 km (to coincide with other range limits), and
all land based cruise missiles above that range would be banned
from deployment.
This led the Soviets to claim that all along they had meant that
all land based cruise missiles with a range over 600 km would be
banned; and they confirmed this in a formal proposal.
5. Backfire:
The Soviets, of course, have opposed including Backfire in SALT:
In this last round Brezhnev presented official performance data
to support his claim that it was a heavy bomber; he claimed that
the maximum operational range of the Backfire with a minimal
payload, flying both subsonically and supersonically, was 2200 km in
radius -- as opposed to our current estimate of about
km in
radius.
- - He also proposed that as part of the SALT record he would
include a formal pledge not to give the Backfire an intercontinental
capability.
We made two proposals concerning Backfire in Moscow:
(1) that all Backfire produced after the effective date of the
agreement (October, 1977) would be counted in the 2400
aggregate; and
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
3
(2) that Backfire would be subject to a separate limit (of no
more than 275) for five years through 1982.
Both proposals were rejected by Brezhnev.
6. Reductions:
As part of the modified Option III proposal presented to Brezhnev,
in which there would be a 275 upper ceiling for five years on
Backfire, we also proposed a reduction from 2400 to 2300 by 1980.
-- Brezhnev countered that he would agree to reductions to 2300 or
"even larger, " if we accepted his position on cruise missiles
(i.e., ban them over 600 km on surface ships and on land).
Options for a Counterproposal
The Verification Panel has gone through several sets of Options to
define the basic approaches, which you might adopt as the framework
for a reply to Brezhnev. The three approaches are:
I. To set numerical limits on Backfire;
II. To exclude Backfire, in return for reductions of heavy ICBMs;
III. To defer both Backfire and sea and land based cruise missiles for
an interim period.
Option I:
The rationale for this option is that Backfire must be counted either in
the 2400 aggregate or in a separate limit.
Option I. A. -- is essentially the old modified IV, which was our
opening position in Moscow.
Option I. B.
This is a rough approximation of old Option III:
Backfire would be in a separate category, and limited to 250; the
US would be free to build up to 250 surface ships and/or submarines
with SLCMs over 600 km.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
1
Other cruise missiles, land based, would be limited to 2500 km.
A reduction to 2150 by 1980.
Option II: Backfire Excluded from Reductions
The basic idea is to allow the Backfire to go free outside of SALT,
but to propose a significant Soviet concession in the form of reductions
of heavy ICBMs.
In other respects the proposal would be the same as Option I.A, that
is ALCMs and surface ship SLCMs between 600-2500 km, as MIRVs,
submarine launched cruise missiles over 600 km banned, and
land based permitted up to 2500 km.
-- The Soviets would agree to reduce to 2150 by 1980, and in the process
would reduce 100-200 of their older heavy missiles, the SS-9.
Option III: A Modified Deferral
The basic idea of this option is to defer the remaining issueson cruise
missiles and Backfire for a defined period, say through 1980, but to ex-
change commitments about constraining each side during the interim.
The US, for its part, would pledge that land and sea based cruise
missiles would be tested only up to 2500 in range, and our develop-
ment program would not be accelerated, which would mean these
cruise missiles would not be deployed in this period.
-- The Soviets would pledge not to accelerate Backfire deployments
beyond an agreed schedule.
-- The Vladivostok agreement would be signed, including counting
ALCMs as MIRVed vehicles, in order to clinch the other unsettled
points -- MIRV verification.
The No SALT Environment
You asked for a contingency budget that might be considered if SALT
failed. The paper being prepared by the Defense Department is
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
still not quite finished with interagency clearance, but the main
ourlines are emerging:
In the near term we would have three general courses of action,
depending in par: on the Soviet posture:
1.
Maintain our present budget for FY 77 on the ground~ that it
already includes a 20 percent growth in strategic force spending
for modernization, under the option that the Soviets will show some
restraint even without an agreement.
2. Gradually increase strategic spending starting with an amendment
in the budget request of about $800 million, to provide a basis for
force expansion aiming at equivalence over a period of 5 years;
continuation of such a program over 5 years would require up to
$7. 6 billion for Defense and $400 million for ERDA; (Alternative 1
in paper at Tab B).
3.
Accelerate strategic force modernization starting with a supple- -
mental to the FY 76/77 budget of about $320 million and a $2.1
billion increase in the FY 1977 budget; continuation of such a program
would over the next five years if necessary require $19. 6 billion for
Defense and $3. 3 (Alternate 2 in the draft study at Tab B) billion
for ERDA.
In the gradual build up, the bulk of the spending would be for a
full
production, including the
acceleration of the new
ICBM operational capability to 1983,
instead of 1985, and acceleration of the ALCM and SLCM program
to earlier operational capabilities.
Under the rapid build up, the same programs would be adopted, plus
increased
acceleration of B-1, acceleration of
missile operational capability to 1983.
If the US chose under either build up to add improvement of con-
ventional forces, it is estimated that a program might cost an
additional $10. 3 billion over five years.
(Note: : None of the options include major spending for air defense. )
B. Participants: List at Tab C.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
6
III. TALKING POINTS
In your opening remarks you may wish to make the following points:
1.
It is in our interest to reply to Brezhnev before the Party Congress
on February 24 -- at least to give him the { eneral direction of
our thinking.
2. Brezhnev has made some concessions, especially in his willing-
ness to consider a reduction.
3. We have tentative agreement on some other points, if we wish to
consolidate common elements, but we still have the problem of
Backfire and the land- and sea-based cruise missiles.
4. The first issue is whether we still want to insist on numerical
limits on Backfire.
5. Call on CIA (Carl Duckett) to give an evaluation of the Soviet
performance data on Backfire that they presented in Moscow.
6. After the CIA briefing, call on Secretary Kissinger to review
the main options.
7. At the end of the meeting, you might refer to the advantages of a
SALT agreement compared to the non-SALT case, and especially
point out that most of the programs proposed under an accelerated
build-up would not necessarily be denied under the Vladivostok
accord, but that the problems -- Backfire for example -- will
still remain without an agreement.
Attachments:
Tab A - Charts of SALT Options
Tab B - No-SALT Contingency Budget
Tab C - List of Participants
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09218
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Memorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
William Hyland
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
TITLE
Talking Points for NSC
CREATION DATE
02/11/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200030
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 2/11/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
saniticed 7/99 ut.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 10, 1976
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
WILLIAM HYLAND
SUBJECT:
TALKING POINTS FOR NSC
-- Mr. President, the Verification Panel has examined the
TION
alternative approaches which we might adopt as the basis for a reply
to the Soviets.
-- Before we discuss these approaches, I would first like to
review the deliberations which took place in Moscow.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Carl, could you put up the chart showing the status in Moscow.
-- Consistent with your instructions, we started with Modified
Option IV under which all Backfire produced after October of 1977
would be counted in the aggregate.
As expected, the Soviets flatly rejected this because of the
ORIGINAL
stringent limit on Backfire.
-- Consistent with your instructions, we then moved toward a
tougher version of Option III.
[As shown on the chart]: We proposed a separate limit of
275 Backfire by 1982 along with a limit of 25 surface ship SLCM
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
platforms and reductions to 2300 by 1980.
-- After a long Politburo meeting, the Soviet response was (a)
to accept our proposed throw weight definition for heavy ICBMs, (b)
accept ACLMs as MIRVs, (c) accept a ban on submarine launched
cruise missiles over 600 km, and to offer further assurances that
Backfire would not be given an intercontinental capability. More-
over, Brezhnev made a conditional offer to consider reductions to
2300 and possibly lower if we would accept a 600 km limit on surface
ship SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles.
DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
GERALD
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (4)
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
298-40, #51; State letter 9/25/98
confirmed NSL 2/19/99
By let NARA, Date 10/21/98,7/26/19
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- That was the present situation and I think it is important to
note that our last position was to ban submarine SLCMs above 600 km
and to count heavy bombers with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV
limit in the contest of a 5-year limit of 275 Backfire.
-- Let's now take a look at the options.
-- Mr. President, as you can see from the charts, we have come
up with three basic concepts which might be considered in formulating
a reply to the Soviets; as you might expect, these concepts differ
principally in their treatment of Backfire.
-- In considering these approaches we have to keep in mind that
there is a negotiating record, and the Soviets will judge our counter-
proposal in light of our previous offers.
First, we could continue to seek numerical limits on Backfire --
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
in effect stand on our opening position in Moscow.
Alternatively, we could decide to exclude Backfire from
numerical limits on this basis, and seek compensation in some other
area such as the composition of reductions.
And finally, we could still defer a solution on Backfire and most
ORIGINAL
cruise missile limits in SALT II while continuing the negotiation on these
systems for an interim period of say 4-5 years, but make the deferral
more attractive.
Option I
-- The first of the approaches shown under the first concept would
be to return to the initial position we took in Moscow which was the
modified version of Option IV.
Under this approach, all Backfire produced after October 1977
(or alternatively all those above a low level such as 100) would be
counted in the 2400 aggregate.
-- There are serious political implications if we take this approach.
-- We would back away from the last position we took in Moscow
which would have permitted 275 Backfires through 1982.
FORO
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE
3
-- The second approach under this concept, Option IB on the
chart, would permit 250 Backfire through 1985 and, in addition,
back away from our proposal of 600 km limit on submarine SLCMs
by permitting up to 250 surface ships and submarines with SLCMs up
to 2500 km.
-- This, too, is a toughening of our last position in Moscow
of 275 Backfire and 25 surface ship SLCM platforms through 1982.
-- There are serious doubts that either of these Options will
produce any movement in the talks.
TION
-- Brezhnev could only conclude that we were stonewalling
and we have to take into account now the Soviets would assess this
kind of reply.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Concept II: Exclude Backfire from Strict SALT Limitations
-- The basis of the second concept is that we would decide once
and for all to stop seeking numerical limitations on Backfire in SALT.
-- However, we would continue to seek Backfire assurances and
strict collateral constraints on upgrading, tankers, etc.
ORIGINAL
-- The idea of this option is that we should try to obtain a signi-
ficant concession from the Soviets in return for excluding Backfire
from numerical limits.
-- An interesting possibility would be to ask the Soviets to freeze
SS-18 deployment and reduce part of their older heavy missile force,
i.e., the SS-9s, in a reduction to 2150.
-- At this stage of the talks, it will be a new idea. The Soviet
reaction is not likely to be enthusiastic.
But since they are permitted heavy missiles and we are not,
we have some basis for arguing for a preferential reduction of heavy
missiles.
-- The question is what would be a reasonable figure:
LIDRARY
TOP/SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
4
It is probably not realistic to expect them to reduce all of
them in this agreement.
Even a reduction of 100 would set a valuable precedent for
further heavy missile reductions in SALT THREE. This would be
over 1 million pounds of throw weight and 1200 RVs.
-- As shown in the chart, we would propose such a trade off
while basically sticking to the cruise missile position we had in
Moscow.
Concept III: Defer a Permanent Solution on Backfire and Cruise Missiles
-- The third approach is a modification of the pure deferral option
which Gromyko rejected. In this new version we codify in a SALT TWO
agreement those limits agreed at Vladivostok and subsequently.
Declassified Photocopy from
-- For example, we would probably have to agree to count heavy
Gerald R. Ford Library
bombers with long-range ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV limit in order to
insure Soviet agreement to the MIRV counting rule, and the missile
throw weight limits.
The new features are:
-- During the deferral period, the Soviets would agree not to
ORIGINAL
upgrade the Backfire and not to increase the deployment rate.
-- In return, we would agree not to test SLCMs or land-based
cruise missiles above 2500 km and not to deploy these cruise missiles
above 600 km which we don't plan to do anyway before 1980.
-- Therefore the deferral period would have to be through 1980,
so the Soviets can see it is long enough to have some impact on our
programs.
-- Nevertheless, if you choose this option, we could start by
proposing the end of 1979 and fall back to 1980.
-- Our previous deferral proposals would have deferred all
cruise missile limits, whereas in this case we are offering to
include ALCMs on heavy bombers in the 1320 MIRV limit and
ban ALCMs above 600 km on aircraft other than heavy bombers.
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE-XGDS
CERALD
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
LIBRARY
TQP SECRET/SENSITIVE
5
-- We would also want to get a Soviet commitment to reductions,
although we could probably accept making the reductions contingent
on resolution of the cruise missile and Backfire issues.
-- We might agree on a reduction to 2150 by 1980, but contingent
on a satisfactory outcome to the Backfire/cruise missile negotiations.
*
#
*
*
-- Mr. President, those are the three concepts which could
serve as a basis for our reply to the Soviets.
-- In my view, if we put forth either of the two approaches under
the first concept, it would signal a sharpening of our position. If we
want to stonewall then, this is the option.
-- If we want to maintain some momentum and force the Soviets
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
to give serious consideration to their position, then Option II is a
possibility.
-- The deferral approach às presently modified would also force
a serious Soviet reply, but it is still more of a fallback.
ORIGINAL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
LIGRARY BERALD R. FORD
1057X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
MINUTES
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
DATE:
Wednesday, February 11, 1976
TIME:
2:30 p.m. to 4:15 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room, The White House
SUBJECT:
SALT
Principals
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Dr. Fred Ikle
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft
ORIGINAL
Other Attendees
White House:
Mr. Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
State:
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
FORD i LIBRARY GERALD
Defense:
Deputy Secretary William Clements
CIA:
Mr. Carl Duckett (who departed after presenting
the intelligence briefing at the opening of the
meeting)
FORD
NSC Staff:
Colonel Richard T. Boverie
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950 Sec. 3.6
GERALD
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - XGDS (B) (3)
Classified by Brent Scowcroft
MR98-39, # 52; NSCletu 2/10/99
let NARA, Date 5/25/99
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
TOPASECRET/SENSITTVE/XGDS
2
President: I think it is important that we give some reply to Brezhnev
before their Party Congress. If we have no specific counter proposal,
I think we ought to give him a total negative or the general direction in
which we will proceed.
Henry has made some headway in his last several meetings with Brezhnev.
There are still some areas of difference. There have been one or more
Verification Panel meetings which have explored the options and looked
over the options paper.
I want to reiterate that I think it is in the best interest of this country to
achieve a SALT II agreement. I intend to push to the extent possible to
get a good one. But if a deadlock occurs, we will have to make a 180 degree
change in our course. By 180 degrees I mean we can stand still; or go to
Option 2, which would be the least of my efforts; or go to Option 3, which
would be my preference.
The options I am referring to now are Don's options for a SALT contingency
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
budget.
Rumsfeld: You must have got a copy of the SALT Contingency Plan out of
channels. It is still being worked on at the working level and is not yet
agreed on. He is the latest ropy of the working S paper
being deculated to the principals.
President: Option 1 says we would stand still. I would not do that. Option 2
ORIGINAL
says we would have a moderate program. This is the least I would do.
Option 3 is the one I think would be necessary.
I will wait for the final version of the paper.
I want to reassert that a SALT agreement is in the best interests of this
country! It is possible to do this. I reassert this with emphasis!
George [Bush], do you have something for us?
Director Bush: We have analyzed the Backfire bomber. The Soviet data
do not alter the CIA's present estimate that it has the capability of inter-
continental operations.
Mr. Duckett: [Note: Copies of the charts used by Mr. Duckett are at Tab A.]
At the top of the chart you will see three sets of flight conditions per Soviet
claims. The question is do they match our estimates for the Backfire? For
the first case, they volunteered that most of the flight is subsonic, and
that some is supersonic. It was said the operational radius is 2200 kilometers.
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
GERALD
LIBRARY
3
However, they did not say how much of the flight was supersonic, or how
much payload was carried in this profile.
President: How does its payload compare with the B-52?
General Brown: The B-52 payload is around 50 ,000 lbs.
Mr. Duckett: The Backfire carries 20, 000 pounds in bombs. Its payload
is 25, 000 pounds when it carries external weapons.
The US estimate for the Backfire ranges from 1, 000 kilometers to 3, 500
kilometers at the extremes, depending on the length of supersonic dash.
We could reduce the uncertainties in our estimate if we had more data.
If we want more data, we could ask the Soviets for it. However, we do
not think this will solve the problem about Backfire's ability to strike US
targets.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
The operational range includes a 10 percent fuel reserve.
The Soviets also say that the maximum technical range is 5, 000 kilometers.
Our estimates are that the maximum range is between 2, 100 kilometers and
7,300 kilometers.
Therefore, we cannot tell what the Soviet figures represent.
ORIGINAL
The third case is ridiculous -- it represents a profile no one would fly.
We asked the Soviets how far it could fly at 15, 000 meters altitude but this
is the wrong altitude for the Backfire. It was the wrong question to ask.
We believe it has no capability of sustained flight at 15,000 meters.
Kissinger: The major problem was that I raised the question while
General Kozlov was with Brezhnev. They had made no serious study of
the question. The problem was that Kozlov didn't want to deviate from
what Brezhnev said. Therefore, it was not a carefully considered statement.
It was not a thoughtful reply. I agree with Secretary Kissinger that
Mr. Duckett: On the other board you see our study of Backfire flight
profiles. It shows that our estimate of the Backfire radius is greater
than 5000 kilometers. Also it shows that we have seen the aircraft
actually fly to a radius of 2775 kilometers. I agree with Secretary
10.20
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
GERALD
TOP/SECRET/SEKSITINE/XGDS
4
Kissinger that the Soviet estimate was off the top of their head.
With some additional data, we could generate some high confidence
estimate. We would like to know from the Soviets the maximum gross
take- off weight, maximum fuel load, internal bomb payload, and cruise
lift-to-drag ratio. Butsthis does not change. our judgment that the Backfire
has an intercontinental capability.
President: Your estimate is that the maximum radius is 5, 125 kilometers ?
Mr. Duckett: Yes, with an 8, 125 pound payload.
President: With no supersonic dash ?
RESERVATION
Mr. Duckett: No supersonic dash.
President: Therefore your figures would indicate the Backfire has a
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
range of 5, 400 to 5, 500 nautical miles.
Clements: You have actually tracked the Backfire?
Mr. Duckett: Their radar has, and we have some telemetry. We have
some late data which may make the numbers slightly smaller,
100 kilometers, but this doesn't solve the problem.
ORIGINAL
General Brown: Do you have an assessment of the new photos ? Do
you have greater confidence in your estimate for the engine?
Mr. Duckett: Yes. We now believe they are using the older engine.
Also, Bill Hyland saw the nomenclature in Moscow. Therefore they
are not using the best engine at this time.
President: If they fly that profile, is it militarily desirable ?
General Brown: The typical flight profile is the one in the center, where as
the aircraft climbs it burns off fuel.
President: Would they fly 5100 kilometers in that pattern one way, without
a dash, to attack a military objective ?
General Brown: Yes, against the US, since we have minimum air defenses.
Kissinger: What would they hit?
FORD
FORD & GERALD LIBRARY
GERALD
LIURARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
5
General Brown: Airfields, industrial areas of a city, and targets such
as that.
Director Bush: We have a chart on possible bases. Carl (Duckett) can
explain it.
Mr. Duckett: They have two airfields being equipped with Backfire. With
a 5000 nautical mile capability, they could cover all of the US on a one way
mission.
Director Bush: Cuba would not be a suitable recovery location for the
aircraft.
Mr. Duckett: I believe it would be more likely that they would go back to
northern Canada, or even ditch at sea near ships.
If the Soviets go to Arctic basing, then even 4, 000 nautical miles covers
most of the US. They have some poor facilities there, some good. One
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
thing we would would want is an assurance that the Soviets would not use
Arctic basing.
President: Are those bases not usable in normal course for use against
China ?
RET
General Brown: There would be no reason for them to use those bases.
ORIGINAL
Mr. Duckett: I doubt they plan to refurbish these two bases.
General Scowcroft: For your payload calculations, did you load the
Backfire the same way you loaded it for the megatonnage chart?
Mr. Duckett: Yes. The maximum loading was 20, 000 pounds, which
depends upon the amount of space in the aircraft. The 8100 pounds is a
conventional load.
President: Henry?
Kissinger: We have had a number of Verification Panel meetings in the
spirit of harmony. (Laughter)
We have gone through a number of options on some conceptual basis.
The first option is that we would count Backfire. The second option
would exclude Backfire from strict limits. The third would defer a
permanent solution of the Backfire and cruise missile issues for various
periods of time.
SERVICE
GERALD
TOPSECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
6
In assessing these options, we have to consider several things. We have
to know what its intrinsic merit is. We have to consider the negotiating
history -- if we introduce an option which has already been rejected, this
has significance. We also have to consider the consequences of where we
would be without an agreement.
In Option 1 we would count the Backfire. Option I A is the old modified
Option 4. That is, we would go back to the Soviets with exactly the same
proposal as we started in Moscow.
I have a note which says the Chiefs even want to add reductions to Option 1 A.
General Brown: I know nothing about that.
ATION
Kissinger: I have a note here which says that's what the Chiefs want.
Where did this come from?
Mr. Hyland: General Rowney called the NSC staff.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
General Brown: What we have said is that we agree with principle
of reductions.
Kissinger: Option I A is the old Option IV. Option 1 B is in effect the old
Option III. You have to assess whether, in terms of negotiating history,
this is right. If you assess that they will make an agreement under any
conditions, that is one matter. But we will have gone from IV to III and then
back to IV.
ORIGINAL
I agree with Option 4 on its merits, but this would certainly cause us
negotiating problems.
Now Option IB. My recollection is that what happened in Moscow, Mr.
President, is that I did not use all of the authority you gave me. Our
position was the Soviets would have 275 Backfire and we would have 25
surface-ship SLCM platforms by 1982. This would give us the high
breakout potential withour cruise missiles.
SLCM's on submarines would be banned above 600 km.
Option IB is a toughening of our last position in Moscow. It reduces the
Backfire limit, removes the submarine SLCM limit, and reduces the
aggregate to 2150. From a negotiating standpoint, this is Option III,
minus certain features. Our counterproposal would be worse than what
they have already rejected. This doesn't mean they would not cave.
FORD
FORD & BERALD LIBRARY
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Therefore, Option IA and IB put limits on the Backfire. In IA, Backfire
is counted in the 2400 aggregate. IB is a toughened version of the old
Option III, which the Soviets have already rejected.
There is a second category of options which excludes Backfire from
strict SALT limitations. It includes assurances against Backfire up-
grading and includes additional collateral constraints. This would reduce
the aggregate to 2150 by 1980. We would count heavy bombers and surface
ship platforms under the aggregate and the MIRV sub-ceiling. It would
ban submarine SLCMs above 600 km.
In return, the aggregate woul dbe reduced from 2400 to 2150. The Soviets
PRESERVATION
would have to dismantle a significant percentage of their heavy throw
weight missiles. In the working group, 200 heavy missiles were discussed,
but this is an empty possibility; the Soviets would never do this. Some
figure might be possible.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
In terms of negotiability, I doubt that the Soviets would accept this, but
they would have to study it seriously. It would nd be interpreted as an
attempt to drive them to the wall.
President Ford: Does this mean they would reduce their SS-9's?
Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and the overall totals.
ORIGINAL
If we say we count land-base cruise missiles above 600 km, we can have
them, although something else would have to come out. And this is an
American decision. [to Vice President Rockefeller ]: This takes care of
Edward (presumably Edward Teller).
The end result is that we could have land-based cruise missiles up to
2500 km, but counted in one form or another. A 2150 aggregate brings
pressure on the total number.
George's concern is that Option IIA would have some upper ceiling on
the Backfire -- so that they could not have, for example, 1000. I don't
think we can get the Soviets to write this into an agreement. But maybe
there could be a letter from Brezhnev to you, Mr. President, saying
that they plan on having X number of bombers. They can then have
some force -- not specified in the treaty -- and we can have our
assurances.
LIBRARY GERALD P. FORD
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There was another option within Option II, but it has been dropped. It
was a State Department option and was highly negotiable. But we should
not have it if it is not supported by the military and supported only by
the State Department.
The third major option is deferral. I have tried this three times and it
has always been rejected. But it was never linked with a cruise missile
settlement.
We could defer SLCM and land-base cruise missile deployment. How
we would do this depends on your decision.
SERVATION
We could ask the Soviets not to increase the rate of Backfire production.
We would not deploy cruise missiles--except on bombers- beyond 600 km
through an agreed date. From the standpoint of the Soviets, the later
the date the better. For the US, the sooner the better.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
We would be free to test cruise missiles through a certain range. The
Soviets could continue Backfire production.
There is basic agreement on what this option does. It would codify what
has been done. For an interim period, it defers the Backfire and some
cruise missile limits.
ORIGINAL
President Ford: Would it ban cruise missiles over 600 km on heavy
bombers?
Secretary Kissinger: No. It would permit cruise missiles with ranges
from 600 to 2500 km on heavy bombers, but these bombers would count
in the 1320 sub-ceiling.
This is the basic deferral option.
To sum up--considering the impact on the Soviets:
I believe that Option I would result in aprolonged deadlock at a minimum.
A last minute yield is possible, but I don't believe this will happen.
Option II would get us into the negotiation. Option III is a good fallback
position. But we could also do Option III immediately--it is your
choice, Mr. President.
GENALD FORD
BERALD FORD LIBRARY
9
President Ford: How much different is Option II from that which was
done in Moscow?
Secretary Kissinger: It is significantly different. We never described
to them where they should take their reductions. If we specify their
heavy throw weight missiles, it is an unprecedented new step. Also, the
Soviets would have to back off from the 600 km cruise missile limitation.
But Backfire would be free for the Soviets, except for an unclassified
letter from Brezhnev on assurances, which we would ask them for since
there would be restrictions on cruise missile ranges.
My judgment is that they would turn down Option II, but that they must
study it carefully, and then would come back with something.
Vice President Rockefeller: I am concerned about cruise missiles at
longer distances. The Soviets are developing three different SLBMs.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Why should we interrupt cruise missile applications for land or submarines.
This is such a new thing; we really do not know what its potential is, and
we should keep our options open in cruise missiles.
Brent Scowcroft: In Option II, 2500 kilometers is the upper limit.
Vice President Rockefeller: This is why I am concerned. The Soviets
ORIGINAL
have three new missiles on submarines and five new missiles on land.
The only thing going for us is our cruise missile with excellent guidance
accuracy.
Secretary Kissinger: We have the Trident and the MX.
Bill Hyland: And the B-1.
Brent Scowcroft: And two new Trident missiles.
General Brown: Both sides have sea-based ballistic missiles. There is
no reason to replace them with cruise missiles. They can't defend against
the ballistic missile, but they can defend against the cruise missile.
The cruise missile can be used to protect the sea lines of communication
and perhaps have an ASW role. However there is no reason for them
simply to lie off the beach for attacks against the Soviets. We are not
warhead limited.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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GERALD 8. FORD
TOP/SECRE/T/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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Vice President Rockefeller: You say that we would have no objection
to limiting them for submarines. But that means they would get something
for nothing. Five to ten years from now our present plans could be
obsolete and we may want to do this -- but there would be a 600 km
limit on cruise missiles.
The Soviets have leapfrogged us in naval force structure. We must be
in a position to leapfrog them with cruise missiles.
General Brown: The only way they could guard against the ballistic missile
is if the ABM Treaty fell apart.
Dr. Ikle: Theatre uses are more important for cruise missiles.
RESERVATION
Vice President Rockefeller: If you are not going to use them, they
shouldn't worry.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
President Ford: This is like our argument with them on the Backfire.
Secretary Kissinger: If we counted every cruise missile, we would have
over a thousand missiles. Then we would bust the 2150 total strategic
level, considering naval and regional uses.
If we count ships with 600 to 2500 km missiles as MIRVs, we could use
them against the Soviet Union, but the in-theatre forces would be free.
ORIGINAL
Fifty ships still doesn't hurt the MIRV total very much.
There have been lots of press arguments about this, but the fact as we
know it from the SIOP is that we don't need all those MIRV warheads
except if the ABM Treaty is abrogated. We would be better off in many
cases with single warhead missiles.
If we count these on a one for one basis, we would very rapidly be in bad
trouble with the 2150 or the 2400 level.
Secretary Clements: Mr. Vice President, during the ten-year period
while we are developing our technology, we can move forward in the state
of the art. For periods greater than ten years, we don't know where we
will be going. Within the timeframe, with a 2500 km range, and with
the platforms, we can develop the needed technology.
Vice President Rockefeller: But we would be limited at long ranges.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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Secretary Clements: Not at the end of the treaty time.
Secretary Kissinger: This would be no problem with the deferral option
since we are talking about roughly 1982.
President Ford: And we would have a clearer picture of the situation at
that time.
Secretary Kissinger: If we want to go to deferral, we are better off
getting at it by one more substantive proposal, then using deferral as a
fallback. I do not believe the Soviets would accept Option II, but they
would give it a serious response. The Soviets would not go along with
Option I in my view.
Vice President Rockefeller: We should get a clearer idea about the use
of non-nuclear missiles for any range.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: There are two problems.
The reason many want to surface the nuclear/non nuclear problem is that
they are convinced they will be given away in the last period of the negotiations.
If we have a disciplined government, you would establish the range principle
now. You would then table the conventional definition in Geneva and handle
it on the technical level. If the Soviets balk, we could always say that SALT
ORIGINAL
never has handled conventional weapons.
If we permit an enormous disparity between what is permitted in con-
ventional and nuclear missiles, it will be a tremendous domestic problem.
If we say that it applies only to nuclear armed missiles, the verification
problem would be totally unmanageable.
Vice President Rockefeller: This would be only for ten years. It could
be covered in a new agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: The way to handle it -- I would prefer a four or five-
year interim agreement on deferral, with less strict standards. If we
have an eight to ten-year agreement, then we must think carefully about
the definitional problem because the Soviets can have them then.
President Ford: Henry, what you are saying is that rather than surface
the distinction at the outset, let's settle the range matter first, and then
we can move at the technical level on the other?
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Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We could simply act stupid. We could say
that SALT never addressed conventional weapons at any time. We could
do this in Geneva, rather than spring it on Brezhnev and made him
answer to the Politburo. If we do it my way, he then would have a commit-
ment to something he has agreed to.
Secretary Clements: Was this raised at the Vladivostok?
Secretary Kissinger: No, and neither were cruise missiles.
Dr. Ikle: Option III helps with verification issues versus Option II.
Cruise missiles of 600 km are hard to verify. Option III gives us the
time to understand the verification problem.
President Ford: Is a five-year period better than a two-year period
to defend?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Dr. Ikle: We could use four years, that is 1980, since that is the
approximate time for IOC of the cruise missile.
Secretary Kissinger: The problem Brezhnev has is that he must say he
got something of his proposal. That's why 600 km is significant.
ORIGINAL RETI.
Secretary Rumsfeld: I would like to walk through some of these things.
First, I think we should clear up the outstanding issues of both sides in
the SCC. We will be criticized if we don't try to do this before having a
new agreement.
Second, there are a number of smaller questions around that can get big
later on. The reason the armed/nuclear armed definition is important
is not that we might be "raped" by Henry as Henry stated, but because it
makes a difference. As long as we can understand what we want to do
here about the nuclear definition, that is fine. I won't argue the tactics,
but the substance is important.
President Ford (to Secretary Kissinger): In your approach we would
freeze the range, then solve the technical differences on the definition
at Geneva.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The reason I raised it is because it makes a
difference.
i
FORD
TORSECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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LIBRARY
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My third point has to do with the range of cruise missiles. Range is
complicated. If one changes the warhead and increases the range, we
have a problem.
Fourth, you have to consider non-circumvention and non-transfer. These
are important.
Our goal should be long-term arms limitation -- not confrontation.
Therefore I believe it is important to have simplicity, symmetry, and
higher verification, not less.
The problem with Option II on Backfire, if not counted in the aggregate,
is that we would have no definition of a heavy bomber. It would be like
the heavy missile problem. We would have problems in SALT III. You
should take the long view -- don't do something in SALT II that makes
SALT III difficult.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
I also want to point out that if we reduce the aggregate further and Backfire
goes free, Backfire's importance grows.
Vice President Rockefeller: What are your specific points' What are
your specific proposals ?
Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been here one hour and ten minutes and have
ORIGINAL
not spoken a word. I am coming to my specific points.
In weighing the three options, we have to consider the balance for SALT
and detente.
First, we could do something which would leave the U.S. weak. Second,
we could accept an agreement which we could not easily verify and we
could expect reaction. Third, we could be stiff and unyielding. Fourth,
we could be doing something now, for example, letting the Backfire go
free, which would cause us problems in going for SALT III.
On Option IA, we are including 150 variants which were not offered earlier.
This gives us a way to get back into negotiation.
For Option IB, we would be rolling back from a smaller number of SLCM
platforms to a larger number, so that we would have symmetry. This
would be an advantage of the option.
TOR SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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TOPSECBET/SENSIATVE/XGDS
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Option II is appealing if we can get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.
Secretary Kissinger: We can't get them to reduce 200 heavy missiles.
Secretary Rumsfeld: I have been patient so far. But it is a marginal
option even if they reduce by 200 heavy missiles because of SALT III --
that is, there would be no heavy bomber definition. And we could expect
them to reduce a smaller number than 200 missiles.
Therefore, deferral is in my view the best option. It is the most
honest. We would say that there are gray area systems which we
cannot solve now, and that it shouldn't surprise us that we can't get
them in.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Deferral would permit us to codify Vladivostok. Space and sea-bed
weapons would be banned. Mobile missiles would not be banned but
would be counted. Intercontinental cruise missiles would be banned
at 5500 kilometers.
It may also be possible to get the MIRV verification rule by throwing
in the ALCM limit at 2500 kilometers and counting the platforms in the
ORIGINAL
1320 sub-ceiling.
Secretary Kissinger: The only way deferral can work is by using
number the Soviets have already seen. There is a chance deferral
would work as a fallback position -- if there were a 600 km limit, and
no deployment.
TOP SECRET/SENSTTHVE/XGDS
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TORSECRET/SENSITVE/XGDS
15
There is a chance of deferral working as a fallback position -- if there
is a 600 kilometer limit, no deployment for 3-4-5-X years. And we could
continue R&D. There is a chance of its working.
There is no chance of permitting 5500 kilometer land-based missiles, but
we will have none by 1981 anyway.
Secretary Rumsfeld: What about the cruise missile limit?
Secretary Kissinger: ALCMs would be permitted at 2500 kilometers; all
others would be 600 kilometers until 1980 or 81.
President Ford: And what about research and development?
Secretary Kissinger: R&D and testing could continue.
Mr. Hyland: The working group had proposed that in the interim period,
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
there would be restraint on testing of SLCMs and land-based cruise
missiles beyond, for example 2500 kilometers, and on dévelopment.
This would possibly include not deploying SLCMs and land-based cruise
missiles above 600 kilometers.
RETURN
Secretary Kissinger: The comeon is the deployment limit. But this is
phoney, since there will be no deployment anyway.
ORIGINAL
Secretary Rumsfeld: Therefore there is a question on timing. Under this
option, would it be a 10 year treaty?
Secretary Kissinger: No. It would be 8 years, since it would start in
1977, on Vladivostok, MIRV counting, ALCMs on bombers, and throw-
weight. All others -- cruise missiles and Backfire -- would be for an
interim period through around 1980 or 1981.
We would not deploy SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles above 600
kilometers. With the Soviets we would have assurance that the Backfire
production rate would not be greater than the present rate. T his interim
period would expire at the precise moment of our maximum break-out
capability for cruise missiles.
For the Soviets, 2 years is not realistic. My view is that it is better to go
to 1980 or 81.
:
FORD
TOPSECRET/SENSTVE/XGDS
LIBRARY SERALD A. FORD
GENALD
LIBRARY
16
Secretary Rumsfeld: I believe we should use a target date shorter rather
than longer so that we can get along on resolving the issues. For example
we could use October 1977, when SALT I expires.
President Ford: But SALT II is a follow-on from SALT I. And if we have
deferral, it could go for two to four years.
Secretary Kissinger: I've raised deferral with the Soviets three times and
they have rejected it every time.
President Ford: But this is a version they have not seen.
SERVATION
Secretary Kissinger: This will be a comedown for them, but it won't
present a political crisis if we propose it.
Director Bush: Is there any way to get additional data on the Backfire?
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: We can't go to the Soviets for data to formulate our
position. We could say we will let Backfire go free if they give us data to
confirm its role. Therefore we could have Option II.
Dr. Ikle: In Option III, if we don't accelerate, they don't accelerate.
Secretary Rumsfeld: The ALCM is part of the central systems, and we
ORIGINAL
would be dealing with central systems. We could set aside the grey areas
right?
Secretary Kissinger: For Option III, a one to two year interim period won't
work.
President Ford: It is better for us to have a three to four year period
for cruise missile testing. We won't know much more in one to two years.
Secretary Clements: We are starting to fly them now.
President Ford: And we will know more in three to four years. And we
will be better off at four years for break-out.
Dr. Ikle: We want to avoid legitimizing Backfire deployment while making
cruise missiles illegitimate.
QERALD R. FORD
beared
LIBRARY
TOPSECREP/SENSITIVE/XGDS
17
President Ford: If we agree on a Backfire production rate and we proceed
with research and development on cruise missiles then in three years if
there are no negotiations we are in a better position to go ahead with
cruise missiles than they are with the Backfire.
Secretary Kissinger: That is why the damn thing may not work. They
will buy a 600 kilometer limit on cruise missiles but they would not go
for an eight year period without the limit. Toolittle is known.
Dr. Ikle: Does this mean we should settle the limits?
Secretary Kissinger: Only on deployments for X number of years. But
we have to accept the 600 kilometer limit. We would be able to deploy
up to the 600 kilometer limit. Brezhnev can tell the Politburo it got
something.
The advantage for us would be our break-out position. There would be
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
no verification problem.
Vice President Rockefeller: Would test ranges be unlimited?
Secretary Kissinger: Test ranges would be unlimited or at 2500 kilometers.
President Ford: Would Option II or III be okay from a military standpoint?
ORIGINAL
General Brown: No. The Chiefs view is that we should give up as little
cruise missile capability as we can. It is one point of our leverage on the
Soviets. We propose that the Backfire be counted, but recognize that
this may not be possible. We could slide to deferral. But deferral should
be stated positively like Don (Rumsfeld) stated it, not negatively as is
shown on the chart.
Deferral would be a good position for us in this country. It formalizes
Vladivostok, which we applauded. Vladivostok was simple, gave us sym-
metry, and provided equivalent balance for the U.S. But after a year and
a half it is still not codified.
President Ford: I would be concerned if there were no agreement and no
codification of Vladivostok. There is a 50/50 chance there will be no deal.
General Brown: Before you left for Vladivostok, you were told you couldn't
get certain things. But you came home with what you were told you couldn't
get.
Fo
FORD is BERALD LIBRARY
GERALD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
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Secretary Kissinger: That is not true.
General Brown: I remember it explicitly.
President Ford: From the military view if you freeze the SS-18 and
reduce the SS-9s, is this a significant gain?
General Brown: Yes. But if the Backfire runs free they can make up the
difference easily with the Backfire. If they reduce their heavy missiles
by 200, this would be significant. But in my judgment, they won't buy it.
SERVATION
Secretary Kissinger: Before Vladivostok, we said equal aggregates and
equal MIRVs, or unequal aggregates and unequal MIRVs.
President Ford: (To Secretary Kissinger) How do you recommend
proceeding with one or the other option or should one option be followed
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
by the other.
Secretary Kissinger: We should treat the options separately, or have one
as a fallback. If we go with Option II we can probably get a letter from
Brezhnev saying they would have no more than 450 Backfires. And they would
go down by 250 systems from Vladivostok.
Or we can go with Option III. This might work but it would be better if we
ORIGIN
first went with Option II and then go to OptionIIIf the other fails. But we
could do OptionIIfirst and then Option II.
There are a lot of advantages in Option III. It is simpler. But if we go
from to II, it would be difficult. We may not be able to get II if IIIfails.
But we might be able to get III if fails.
President Ford: Could we give them the option of one or the other ?
Secretary Kissinger: No. We did that once in the ABM negotiations;
we gave them three options, but they picked the wrong one and we
rejected it. (Laugher)
LIBRARY
Secretary Rumsfeld: We could have a statement that if they go beyond
certain limits they will have circumvented the treaty. They could give
us a Backfire production rate, or some limit, and we could say that we
would make some overt act if they exceeded these limits, such as
deploying cruise missiles in Europe. However, this causes a problem
because we might want to deploy missiles like that anyway and not depend
upon what they do on the Backfire.
GERALD FORD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/XGDS
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I like the deferral option. It is honest and in the interest of long-
term arms limitation. I believe it is negotiable. We don't mix the
threat on grey area systems. However we may need to discuss this
with our allies since they have an interest in the Backfire and cruise
missiles.
President Ford: We don't want to bring in problems of allies.
Secretary Rumsfeld: They will bring in the problems.
Dr. Ikle: The simplicity of Option III is a significant advantage over
Option II. And it gives us time to resolve the verification problem.
President Ford: I would like to see the refined material on the assumptions
PRESERVATION
of what we would do if there were a deadlock. (Note: This presumably
refers to the SALT contingency plan.)
General Scowcroft: It is being reviewed now by the principals. This is
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
still a working group paper.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Here is a later draft. It is going to the principals.
It shows that we would need from one to twenty billion dollars over a five-
year period. It uses a building block approach and has a variety of
levels of activity. In the event of a Soviet breakout, it calls for another
$10 billion in non-strategic forces. Therefore, the plan ranges from one
ORIGINAL
to thirty billion dollars.
President Ford: My own visceral reaction is that if there is no SALT,
their plans are not such that they would have to do more. For us, I
will not stand still.
General Scowcroft: The air defense system is not in the earlier package.
General Brown: It is part of this package.
Secretary Kissinger: Nothing prohibits us from building an air defense.
If we are so worried by Backfire, we should do this regardless. It is
independent of an agreement.
FORD
General Brown: I agree.
CENALE
Secretary Clements: We will take care of it.
General Brown: The air defense today would not be the same as in earlier
years.
LISEARY BERALD ? FORD
TOP SECRET SENSUTIVE XGDS
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President Ford: I was going to say I want no more BOMARC.
General Brown: We would have AWACS plus interceptors currently
in the program. In times of tension we would bring in the interceptors.
It would be far more effective than the old system.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Before we close, Mr. President -- you asked George
if there are military-objectionsptot Option 2.
The real objections are not military, but objections from an arms control
standpoint. We have to try to deal with the effect on SALT III, and this
makes the definition of bombers important.
ESERVATION
The throw weight buffs, such as Nitze, would applaud it if we reduced
their heavy missiles.
General Brown: If we get enough of their heavy missiles.
Declassified Photocopy from
Gerald R. Ford Library
Secretary Kissinger: Option II was the DOD option.
Secretary Rumsfeld: I am not ashamed of it. We have attempted to get as
many different options as we can which are realistic. But that doesn't
mean I can't analyze them. Even if we got all 200 missiles, there would
be no throw weight definition for heavy bombers. The problem gets worse
ORIGINAL
downstream.
Secretary Kissinger: The dividing line would be that any upgrading of
Backfire equals a heavy bomber.
I have no preference between Option 11 versus HI.
General Scowcroft: But Option II permits us to bring the 2400 level down.
Secretary Rumsfeld: Option Idoes that also.
Secretary Kissinger: But you won't get it in Option III. Deferral will keep
us still at the 2400 figure.
General Brown: Some would argue that if Backfire runs free, we have,
FORD
broken Vladivostok.
President Ford: Thanks.
Secretary Kissinger: If we choose Option 3, we don't want to define the
systems as grey area systems, since that would then bring in FBS. We
should put it as unsettled issues, for later negotiation, before we
Europe.
BERALD R.FURD LIBRARY
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
21
President Ford: If nothing out of this NSC meeting shows up in the
newspaper, it will be an all time record for my time in office. It will
be of major significance if nothing is leaked out. If it does, I'll throw
up my hands and say that's it. The first god-damned newspaper story
on this, I will say it ends the prospects for a SALT agreement.
GERALD
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
2/24
Eddy:
A
This is one of five charts that are supposed
to be at Tab A to the NSC Minutes of Feb. 11.
If the other four charts ever turn up, I
will send them to you.
SL
Sheila
ORIGINAL RETIRED is PRESERVATION
LIBRARY GERALD ? THE
FORD is LIBRARY GERALD
VIRIGNNAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
2/17/75
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
"Shela
To: BILL HYLAND you
add
From: DICK BOVERIE
nurt D
ORIGINAL RETIRED SERVATION
BILL: ATTACHED 15
THE LAST OF THE CHARTS
FOR THE NSC MEETING
MINUTES. You SHOULD
NOW HAVE 5 CHARTS
To BE ATTACHED AS TAB A
OF THE MINUTES.
GERALD R. LIBRARY FORD
Drik
BENORD LIBRAPA
ORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 09220
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Chart
TITLE
SALT-related charts
CREATION DATE
02/1976
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
031200030
COLLECTION TITLE
National Security Adviser. National
Security Council Meetings File
BOX NUMBER
2
FOLDER TITLE
NSC Meeting, 2/11/76
DATE WITHDRAWN
02/26/1998
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
LET
exempt; C/A lts 6/5/00
2/23/01 due
DOC
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION O
CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
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COLBY, W
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SCOWCROFT X
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
CODEWORD
TS
SENSITIVE
SUBJECT:
Moration Minutes of NSC mts of Feb
11 1976 ne SAlt & USSR -LA
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JOINT MEMO
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UNITED NATIONS
REFER TO
FOR:
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
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COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
DATE
FROM
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Saoft
ox
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C
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)