Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "1552409",
    "label": "NSC Meeting, 12/2/76",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552409"
}

{
    "id": "1552409",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552409",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "NSC Meeting, 12/2/76",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552409",
    "collections": [
        "National Security Council Meetings Files (Ford Administration)",
        "National Security Council Meetings Files from the Ford Administration"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)",
        "Federal budget",
        "National security",
        "Warships"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/5524/1552409/content/library/document/0312/1552409.pdf",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/5524/1552409/content/library/document/0312/1552409.pdf",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/5524/1552409/content/library/document/0312/1552409.pdf",
    "imageCount": 1,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1552409",
    "naId": 1552409,
    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-12-31",
        "month": 12,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "coverageStartDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1976-12-01",
        "month": 12,
        "year": 1976
    },
    "levelOfDescription": "fileUnit",
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/opastorage/live/9/5524/1552409/content/library/document/0312/1552409.pdf",
    "mediaId": "cabd84d7df93a710",
    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 2, folder: \"NSC Meeting, 12/2/1976\" of the\nNational Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Frank Zarb donated to the United States\nof America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 2 of the National Security Adviser's NSC Meeting File at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 09242\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nAgenda\nCREATOR'S NAME\nBrent Scowcroft\nCREATOR'S TITLE\nNational Security Adviser\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nPresident\nTITLE\nNSC meeting on the NSSM 246 Report on\nUS Defense Policy and Military Posture\nand the NSC study on Naval Force\nRequirements\nCREATION DATE\n12/02/1976\nVOLUME\n7 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031200040\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. National\nSecurity Council Meetings File\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/31/1998\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nLET\nsantized 4/27/04\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nON THE NSSM 246 REPORT ON\nU.S. DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY POSTURE\nAND THE NSC STUDY ON\nNAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS\nThursday, December 2, 1976\nThe Cabinet Room\nFrom: Brent Scowcroft\nB\nI. PURPOSE\nTo be briefed on and discuss NSC studies on U.S. Defense Policy and\nMilitary Posture (NSSM 246) and Naval Force Requirements.\nII. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS, AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS\nA.\nBackground\n1. NSSM 246. In September, you directed through NSSM 246\nthat the NSC conduct a broad review of U.S. defense policy\nand military posture. The study, which was conducted by\nthe NSC Defense Review Panel, has been completed. It\nprovides a range of illustrative strategies for both our\nstrategic and general purpose forces, taking into account\nDECLASSIFIED F.O. 12958 Sec. 3.0\nWith PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (a)\n2/19/99, oso 4127104\n# 2t etr 9/25/98\nDate 2/8/05\ntheir military, arms control, and budgetary implications.\nIn the area of strategic forces, the study highlights the\nfollowing issues as central to U.S. strategy:\n-- Deterrence Criteria: What criteria for selecting and\nsizing U.S. strategic offensive and defensive forces\nwill assure achievement of our fundamental objective\nof deterring nuclear attack?\n-- Force Diversity: How much force diversity and redundancy\nis necessary to provide adequate confidence in performance,\nto hedge against unexpected technological breakthroughs\nor catastrophic failures, and to complicate any Soviet\nfirst strike designs? The study examines the triad of\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B) (3)\nClassified by Brent Scowcroft\nGERALD LIBRARY A. FORD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n2\nof bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs and possible\nalternatives such as a dyad of bombers and SLBMs only.\nForce modernization programs such as the\nare\nrelated to this analysis.\nCountersilo Capability: Do we need to increase our\ncapability to attack the hardened Soviet ICBM force?\nThis issue deals with weapons effectiveness and crisis\nstability. It relates directly to the future of the\nand\nprograms.\nDefensive Damage Limitation: What level of emphasis\nshould be placed on U.S. civil defense programs, air\ndefense, and ABM R&D?\nThe study points up the growth in the capability of Soviet\ngeneral purpose forces and examines alternate U.S. responses.\nAmong the key general purpose force issues raised in the\nreport are:\nAdequacy of Forward Deployment: What arethe\nappropriate levels of forward deployed forces in Europe\nand elsewhere?\nAssumptions on Warning Time: Should U.S. planning\nfor initial NATO defense, mobilization, and short-term\nreinforcement continue to assume approximately three\nweeks of warning time?\nSustainability: How long should U.S. NATO forces be\ncapable of sustaining conflict, and what is the relative\nlikelihood of a very short (days or weeks) versus a\nlonger (months or years) war? Central to the sustainability\nfactor are the issues of Soviet capabilities, U.S. equipment\nstocks, and mobilization and preparedness programs.\nConflict Outside the NATO Central Region: How much\ncombat capability should the U.S. maintain for conflict on\nthe NATO flanks and outside the European theater? We\ncurrently maintain land, air, and naval forces for a range\nof possible contingencies outside Central Europe. Decisions\non the future nature and size of these forces have major\nimplications for the Navy and Marines, and are tied to\nspecial considerations such as Mid-East oil supply\ncontinuity and Korean defense.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERAID FORD LIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n3\nAlternative approaches derived from different responses\nto these fundamental issues have been combined to form a\nnumber of illustrative notional strategies -- five for strategic\nforces and six for general purpose forces. These in turn\nare combined into a number of overall strategy alternatives.\nThese combinations provide a useful framework for examining\neach issue in the context of overall defense policy. Two of\nthe notional strategies approximate current policy, with\nalternatives ranging on either side of these base points.\nTentative and extremely rough cost estimates have been\nprovides for each strategy.\nThe study lends itself to a number of possible uses. Each\nof the Defense Review Panel principals has an independent\nview on the utility of the study and on the individual issues\nand alternative strategies presented in the report. There\nare differing opinions as to the extent to which the study in\nits present form provides an appropriate basis for decisions\naffecting our national strategies. As Secretary Rumsfeld\npoints out in his transmittal memorandum to you, there is a\nneed for additional analysis to reduce uncertainties associated\nwith the strategy alternatives, the force requirements and the\ncost implications of each.\n2. NSC Study on Naval Force Requirements. The NSC study\non U.S. Strategy and Naval Force Requirements was initiated\nearly in 1976 and conducted by the NSC Defense Review Panel.\nIts early development provided the basis for the May supple-\nmental budget request to the Congress for additional shipbuilding\nfunds. Your FY 1977 budget requested $6.3B for 16 ships.\nThe supplemental added $1.2B for five more ships and long-\nlead funding for an additional carrier (CVN-71). Congress\napproved $6.2B for 15 ships and the long-lead funds for the\ncarrier.\nAs a basis for U.S. force projections, the study has examined\ntrends in the growth of the Soviet Navy, its capabilities for\nconducting naval warfare in areas more distant from the\nSoviet Union, and the increasing willingness of the Soviet\nleadership to employ naval forces in support of foreign\npolicy objectives. The basic questions governing U.S. naval\nforce requirements as set forth in the Navy study are:\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nGERALD\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\n4\nShould we accelerate current shipbuilding plans? The\nnumerical size of the Soviet Navy has stabilized but\nnewly constructed ships possess increased capabilities.\nShould the force mix of ship types stress expensive,\nhighly capable ships, or should we concentrate on\nnumbers, building less expensive ships of lower unit\ncapability? Within this broad question, the study\naddresses such issues as carrier vulnerability and\nforce levels; a program to modernize the existing\ncarrier force; the nuclear/conventional power mix;\nthe qualitative mix of other surface combatants;\nalternative methods of providing air power to the\nfleet; and the impact of future systems such as V/STOL\naircraft and cruise missiles.\nShould the program stress new construction or should\nit emphasize the readiness of existing units while adding\nmore slowly to the size and strength of the fleet?\nBased on the projected threat and alternative responses\nto these basic questions, the study outlines major naval force\nalternatives. The current FY 78 Defense Plan builds an\naverage of 22 ships per year for a force of 535 ships by 1990\nat an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977 dollars.\nThree other major program options are offered:\nOption 1 would build no more large-deck carrier\nand would use the funds formerly devoted to carrier\nconstruction to build more surface combatants (an\naverage of 28 ships per year for a force of 586 ships\nby 1990 at an average annual cost of $6. 9B in FY 1977\ndollars).\nOption 2 would build one more large-deck carrier,\ndevelop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard a few\nsmaller aviation ships, and build additional surface\ncombatants -- stressing numbers over unit capability\n(an average of 32 ships per year for a force of 608\nships by 1990 at an average annual cost of $8. 0B in\nFY 1977 dollars).\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nLIDRARY\nOption 3 would build one more large-deck carrier,\ndevelop V/STOL aircraft and deploy them aboard\nmore aviation ships, and build a mix of surface\ncombatants -- stressing unit capability and numbers\nof ships (an average of 32 ships per year for a\nforce of 609 ships by 1990 at an average annual cost\nof $8. 4 B in FY 1977 dollars).\nSubsequent to the completion of the study, Defense added\na Low-Mix Option. This option falls between Options 1\nand 2 in overall Navy size and costs. It does not build\none more large-deck carrier or any strike cruisers. It\ndevelops V/STOL aircraft and deploys them aboard one\naviation ship, and includes additional surface combatants\nof lower unit capability and additional support ships. It\nemphasizes numbers of ships (an average of 32 ships\nper year for a force of 604 ships by 1990 at an average\ncost of $7.5 B in FY 1977 dollars).\nThe study concludes that there is a need to improve our\nnaval capability and that the current Defense Plan\nalready includes an ambitious program to raise both the\nquality of our ships and overall force levels. The\noptions presented provide a means to accelerate and\nexpand the current plan. A choice among the options\ncenters on the question of whether we should build one\nmore large-deck carrier and the qualitative mix of\nsurface combatants necessary to improve the fleet's\nanti-air and anti-missile capability.\n3.\nRelationship between NSSM 246 Strategies and Navy\nStudy Options.\nThe NSSM 246 study outlines\nalternative defense strategies, and provides notional\nforce structures, including naval forces, for each. The\nNavy study postulates three alternative force structures\ndesigned to implement current U.S. strategy. The\noptions in the two studies therefore are not strictly\ncomparable. However, some general correlation is\npossible, and a chart illustrating the general\nrelationship is at Tab D.\nB.\nParticipants:\n(List at Tab A)\nC.\nPress Arrangements:\nThe meeting, but not the subject,\nwill be announced. White House photographer only.\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nFORD ADHARY\nTOP SECRET/S' SITIVE XGDS\n6\nIII. TALKING POINTS\n(At the opening of the meeting)\n1.\nThe basic purpose of this meeting is to become acquainted\nwith the results of two major NSC studies, both of which\ncould provide important contributions to future U.S. defense\npolicy and military posture. Don, would you brief us first\non the response to NSSM 246?\n(Following briefing and discussion of NSSM 246)\n2.\nWe also now have the final version of the Navy study which\nwe discussed in a preliminary version last spring. Don,\ncould we have the briefing on that study?\n(Upon conclusion of discussion of the Navy study)\n3.\nThese studies clearly represent a major effort to grapple\nwith the future direction of our military strategy and force\nposture. I want to consider them both in greater detail and\nwill probably want further NSC discussion of NSSM 246.\nAttachments\nTab A\n-\nList of Participants\nTab B\n-\nU.S. Defense Policy and Military Posture,\nResponse to NSSM 246, November 30, 1976\nTab C\n-\nNSC Study on U.S. Strategy and Naval Force\nRequirements, November 16, 1976\nTab D\n-\nImplications of Navy Study Alternatives and\nOptions for NSSM 246 Strategies\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS\nATTENDANCE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING\nDecember 2, 1976\nCabinet Room - 9:00 a.m.\nPrincipals\nThe Vice President\nActing Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson\nSecretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George S. Brown\nThe Director of Central Intelligence George Bush\nThe Director, Office of Management and Budget, James T. Lynn\nThe Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Fred C. Ikle\nOther Attendees\nDefense:\nDr. James P. Wade\nE.C. Aldridge\nWH:\nRichard Cheney\nBrent Scowcroft\nWilliam G. Hyland\nNSC\nStaff:\nGeneral Richard Boverie\nFORD\n?\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\n09244\nIMPLICATIONS OF NAVY STUDY ALTERNATIVES AND\nOPTIONS FOR NSSM 246 STRATEGIES\nNavy Study \"Options\" 1, 2, 3 and the Low-Mix Option, * each provide\na specific force structure for the execution of current strategy. These\n\"Options\" are variants of Navy Study \"Alternatives\" B and C, and\nroughly describe an increasing force scale from NSSM 246 Strategy\nG-2 through G-3. Other NSSM 246 Strategies entail Navy forces\nlesser or greater than the three Navy Study \"Options. 11 These\nrelationships are depicted in the following chart:\nNavy \"Alternative\"\nNavy \"Option\"\nNSSM 246 Strategy\nA\nLess than all \"options\" Europe - 30 days (G-1)\nB\nCurrent plan\nCurrent strategy (G-2)\nOption 1\nLow-Mix Option*\nOption 2\nC\nOption 3\nCurrent NATO/increased\nworldwide (G-3)\nD\nExceeds all \"options\" Increased NATO/increased\nworldwide (G-6)\nE\nGreatly exceeds all\nExceeds all NSSM 246\n\"options\"\nstrategies\n*\nNot addressed in the Navy Study; added by DOD after the\nstudy was completed.\nGERALD ? LIBRARY FORD\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE XGDS (B)(3)\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\nNSCJAr2119199, ospetr 4/27/04\n(Classified by Brent Scowcroft)\nmr 98-40,#63; st.lts 9/25/98\ndal NARA, Date 2/8/05\nTOP SECRET\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nWASHINGTON. D.C. 20301\nNovember 30, 1976\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DEFENSE REVIEW PANEL\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Response to NSSM 246 - US Defense Policy and Military Posture (c)\nAttached hereto is the National Security Council Defense Review Panel's\nresponse to NSSM 246. It addresses the current and projected threat, arms\ncontrol, and resource considerations associated with our military posture.\nIt also highlights a number of critical unresolved issues which impact on\npresent and projected strategies and require further studies and analysis.\nChanging military and political considerations identified during the study\nmake it questionable that our current policies and programs will be fully\nconsistent with our national security requirements during the 1980s.\nWe have therefore developed a range of options in the form of notional\nalternative strategies for our strategic and general purpose forces, some\nof which merit further refinement and detailed analysis. Additional analysis\nis particularly needed to reduce the current uncertainty in the elements of\neach major strategy alternative, along with the force structure requirements\nand cost implications of each. These cost estimates are extremely rough\nand the figures are not agreed among your advisers.\n2\nAttachment\na/s\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nFORD i LIBRARY BERALD\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOPSECRET\nWhen Enclesure is Baterbal\nE.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4.\nThis doesment IS despanded\nMR98-40,#62; DOD 6ther 8/24/98\nto Confidential\nBy\nlet\nNARA, Date 10/21/98\nSECRET\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSTUDY ON\nU.S. STRATEGY\nAND\nNAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS\n16 November 1976\nClassified by ASD(ISA).\nExempt from General Declassification\nSchedule of E.O. 11652. Exemption\nCategory 2. Declassify on 31 December 2006\nFORD & LIBRARY SERALD\nORIGINAL RETIRED FOR PRESERVATION\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nAuthority detumined to be unclassified whensemed\nfrom classifed attachments\nBy lit\nNLF Date 6/98\ni\nU.S. STRATEGY AND NAVAL FORCE REQUIREMENTS\n1. The Political-Military Environment of the 1980s and 1990s\n- I\nA. Assumptions About the Global Military Balance\n- 1\nB. Political, Economic and Technological Assumptions\n- 1\n11. Bases of U.S. Defense Policies\n- 3\nA. U.S. National Aims\n- 3\nB. U.S. National Security Objectives\n- 3\nC. National Defense Policy Guidance\n- 4\n1. Sources of Policy\n- 4\n2. Strategic Nuclear Forces\n- 4\n3. General Purpose Forces\n- 5\n111. The Soviet Military Challenge and Its Maritime Implications\n- 5\nA. The Soviet Military Challenge\n- 5\nB. Soviet Military Trends\n- 6\nC. Soviet Maritime Challenge\n- 6\nD. The Challenge of Soviet Naval Forces (Sea and Air)\n- 7\nIV. Factors in Developing a Maritime Program\n- 9\nA. Strategic Considerations\n- 9\nB. Future Technological Developments\n-11\nC. Vulnerability of Surface Ships\n-13\nD. Role of the Naval Reserves\n-14\nE. Maritime Forces for Freedom of the Seas\n-15\nF. Key Points in a Strategy for Serving U.S. Maritime Interests\n-16\nG. Controllable and Non-controllable Elements\n-18\nH. DoD Program Implications of the Maritime Strategy\n-18\nI. From Strategy to Force Structure\n-19\nV. Navy Force Requirements\n-19\nA. The Navy's Mission\n-19\nFORG i LIBRARY GERALD\nii\nB. Conduct of Naval Operations\n-20\n1. Routine Forward Deployed Posture\n-20\n2. Transition from Routine Forward Deployment Posture to\nWorldwide Conflict\n-25\n3. Worldwide Conventional War with The Soviet Union\n-26\na. Soviet Strategy\n-26\nb. U.S. and Allied Strategy and Force Employment\n-27\n(1) Sea Control\n-27\n(a) Threat Characteristics that Influence the\nCampaign\n-29\n(b) Area Sea Control Operations\n-29\n(c) Local Sea Control operations\n-32\n1. The Atlantic\n-34\n2. The Mediterranean Sea\n-34\n3. The Pacific\n-35\n4. The Indian Ocean\n-35\n(2) Power Projection\n-35\nC. Operational Employment of Supporting Forces\n-36\n(1) Naval Reserve and Coast Guard Forces\n-36\n(2) Allied Contribution\n-38\n(3) Land-Based Aircraft\n-38\nC. Nuclear War at Sea\n-43\nD. Current Net Assessment of Capabilities -- U.S. vs. USSR\n-44\n1. Force Trends\n-44\n2. Sea Control\n-44\na. USSR\n-44\nb. U.S.\n-45\nE. Major Force Alternatives\nLIBRARY\n-46\niii\n;\n1. The Five Year Defense Program - Alternative B\n-50\n)\n2. The Reduced Force - Alternative A\n-50\n5\n3. The Intermediate Force - Alternative C\n-50\n6\n4. The Navy's Recommended Force - Alternative D\n-52\n6\n5. The JCS Strategic Objective Plan (JSOP) Objective Force -\nAlternative E\n-52\n7\n6. The JSOP Prudent Risk Force\n-52\n7\n: Specific Program Options\n-52\nA. Decision Required\n9\n-52\n1. Issues Related to Force Levels\n:9\n-54\n12\n2. Issues Related to the Composition of the Navy\n-55\n34\na. Qualitative Considerations\n-55\nb. Carriers and Cost\n34\n-56\n35\nC. Nuclear/Conventional Power Mix\n-59\n(1) Large Deck Carriers\n35\n-61\n(2) AEGIS Cruiser\n35\n-61\n36\nd. Qualitative Mix of Other Surface Combatants\n-61\n36\ne. The Future of Sea-Based Air\n-63\n38\nf. New Technology\n-64\n.38\n3. Issues Related to Rate of Growth\n-64\n-43\nB. Program Options for a Decision\n-64\nOption 1\n-44\n-65\nOption 2\n-44\n-65\nOption 3\n-44\n-65\n-44\nCriteria for Decision\n-66\n-AS\nPace of Modernization\n-70\n-46\nProgram Details\nLIMBURA GERALD P. FORD\n-70\niv\nVII. Areas for Further Study\n-77\nAnnex A\nA-1\nSummary of Allied Capabilities\nA-1\nAreas for Allied Force Improvement Emphasis\nA-3\nSpecific Naval Forces Recommendations\nA-4\nFORD is LIBRARY BERALD"
}