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April 11, 1973 - Kissinger, Elliot Richardson
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1552574
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April 11, 1973 - Kissinger, Elliot Richardson
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Soviet Union
Arms control
United States-Soviet relations
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1973-04-11
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1973
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1973-04-11
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY MR appeal 04-67:12 NARA 7/8/10
BY dal NARA, DATE 8/31/10
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Military Assistant
to Secretary Richardson
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, April 11, 1973
8:00 a.m. (Breakfast)
PLACE:
The Pentagon
SUBJECT:
SALT
Richardson: Dealing with the asymmetries over time could lead
to a relative advantage for the USSR.
The asymmetries we face are in MLBM's and numbers; the
asymmetries they face are our bombers, MIRV's, and accuracy.
There are three ways to strike a balance: (1) have them
offset, (2) an actual balance (numerical equality) or (3) permit a
catchup over time.
My conclusion is that a combination of the three is best.
The offset would be for the SS-9. The offset of disparite elements
could be the SS-9 and heavy bombers, plus a MIRV ban on the SS-9.
With freedom to mix.
Then apply equality to all the other systems, separately,
like 850 for SLBMs. The same for ICBMs.
CLASSIFIED BY
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
M MPT FROM GENERAL DEC ASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
MPTION CATEGORY
5(b)(3)
OMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
To catch up -- let them MIRV their ICBM's and SLBM's.
Then you have to deal with the instabilities introduced by
increasing accuracy, MIRV, etc.
These are the problems in a MIRV.
Kissinger: I am now opposed to a MIRV test ban. I have come to
similar conclusions.
Richardson: There is a good paper by Archie Wood. Things we
could give up. The best thing to give up is the air-launched
strategic missile. It scares the hell out of me.
Kissinger: Why give up something which scares them?
Richardson: You could put four Minutemann on a 747. I have asked
Foster for a project to develop this and lot it leak. I have looked
over all the things we are doing in case we want to renounce them.
SCAD/SRAM we shouldn't give up. They are important to
the bomber systems.
Kissinger: On SALT I am moving in the same direction.
Yours is an ingenious way of dealing with Jackson.
There are two points on which I may differ: Why not lump
ICBM and SLBM together rather than have a separate ceiling?
And shouldn't we try to get our 550 ceiling on the ICBM?
Richardson: How do we verify?
Kissinger: Let's ask CIA.
GERALD FORD
Richardson: I don't see how we can verify.
Kissinger: Shouldn't we start by agreeing to unequal numbers if
they won't MIRV their land-based missiles? They won't agree,
but then we could move into your idea.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
Their SALT decision-making apparatus is screwed up.
They can only react to an outside input. I have found it best to
give them a theory rather than a plan.
My position differs from yours only in limiting MIRVs on
ICBM.
Let's hold this close. Wait until Alex Johnson gets back,
have a small Verification Panel meeting, and then an NSC meeting.
Richardson: Forward based systems: Try to talk in terms of long
range, medium range, etc., and we could agree to limit our medium
range if they will limit their IRBMs, etc.
Make to the Soviets a distinction between long range and
medium range, not where the weapon is based.
This ought to be dealt with by MBFR.
Just raise this with the Soviet Union, don't try to deal with
it now.
Kissinger: Try to keep this tight. I will discuss it with the President.
We need CIA to tell us whether there is a verification problem on at
partial MIRV ban.
We could have a Verification Panel meeting confined to the
principals next week. Or just an NSC meeting. Within three days
of Johnson's return on the 19th.
FORD
GERALD R
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2
HAK THE WHITE Rechardson HOUSE 110pml
Wod, 11apr' 13
WASHINGTON
8:00 AM
SALT
Break foot mts
at Pentagon
R- Dewting w/c
and trie smed lead to
a relate advantage for USSR.
MLBM
SU
#7
Boushes
MIRV
US
acc,
3 anays a balance
(1) offert
12) actual (emensied equality)
(3) Permit time catching over
DECLASSIFIED
GERALD FORD
AUTHORITY MR appeal 04-67 NARA 7/8/10
BY dal NARA, DATE 8/31/10
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
R conclusion is 64 that a
unitinate of C 3 is bigh
offret cremit he for 55.9,
Oppertal disposits themests and
be 65-9 & badry Combus, plns
a MIRU brown 55-9. Freendor
t mix.
Then agrly equality k are
onther segations, separatily
(hhis 850 for S(Bris)
Same for ILBAN'S
Catchry hit Them MIRV ICBNI
+
Then Jenn have to chal w/ -
instatritity introduced by
LEBRARY GERALD FORD
are in
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
The and purlims in a MIRK
K- - Done non apposed to a
MIRUTAL form
8 home come to simitor contribute
R- Then is a good p apr. Artic
werd, Things the canld give up,
Best thing Litter to gin up is an-
Cam bridemism Scanoc hell
K- - were give up south which
and the
Leaves the
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have aslend Faster pa project
* ching this + but it llak.
I Game all c things us
are dring in coal the wint
a re wound them.
FORDY
BERALD R
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
R- Scal/Suan cm shmidrist
give up. Thing an important
K C bronter siptims.
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in home
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R- Home
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
of empart # ipthing must
MIRE land based.
Thing writ again, but then
and can't more nito your etc.
K- Thin S AXT cleaning not
is sereived up. May
inport- comony react h on artsill
& Home from it last t give
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my position dyfers form yours only
in hunting MIRVI orr
I CBM,
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Johnson gets back, have small
up unty, there OWNSC only.
GERATO FORD LIBRAIN
62 survice (calling) 1950 unitiles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
R- FBS, Try & Calk in times
JLR, Med Rarage, etc, mager
a init orm mel. large if
they will limit AA IRBM's, etc.
K-
SHIT 149-FBS
R- Water to tos.v. distriction hit
to Rt Wed Range, art when
C wpenis based.
This arought to be dealt w/
by MBFR.
just rise this ur/su, don't
try as dial w/it now.
Ra Try of hey this trght, 7 will
GERALD R."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
disinss or/PMD.
mul C.A to tell Ms whether
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K-we would heart Prity
profined to puning also wrpt muk.
On first an NSC mtg.
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the
(w/cim 5 day an 19th of 20thm)
FORD & LERALD LIBRARY