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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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1552576
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April 12, 1973 - NSC Meeting
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1552576
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April 12, 1973 - NSC Meeting
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This file contains mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (4/4/1949 - )
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Soldiers
United States-Soviet relations
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1552576
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12
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1973-04-12
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4
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1973
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12
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1973-04-12
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4
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1973
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Nixon
William P. Rogers, Secretary of State
Elliot Richardson, Secretary of Defense
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of
Central Intelligence
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
James Farley, Deputy Director, ACDA
Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, US Ambassador
to NATO
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Kenneth Rush, Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
3/8/04
President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 12, 1973
10:00 a.m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
SUBJECT:
NSC Meeting on MBFR
The President: We are faced with a situation where any reduction is
probably to our detriment. If we don't show some movement, the
structure of NATO will come apart because of the lack of U.S. support.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY. NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Deview
DATE 3/30/14
We will have a hell of a time maintaining the military budget against
Mansfield and the others.
We are keeping one step ahead of the sheriff. We can't say any agree-
ment is better than none, though.
We have got to show movement; we have got to have something come of it.
FORD
CLASSIFIED EY Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
GERALO
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5 (B) (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 2 -
SALT is somewhat like that. It may be good on its own -- although there
are lots of problems, like cheating, military cutback, etc. But the mood
of the country is such that if we don't move in this context, we will cut
unilaterally.
We still have some hawks; the polls are good. I talk hawkish, but let's
face it.
Let's analyze the realities coldly, then see what it is we can live with.
Jim?
Schlesinger: (Briefs)
The President: Elliott?
Richardson: With Congress, we have devoted a lot of effort to show that
NATO forces are capable.
The President: On the trip wire thing, say that if there is a confrontation,
it will be nuclear. That is the best argument for a conventional capability.
Henry?
Kissinger: This is a superficial analysis. The Germans were inferior in
two wars and nearly won. We should not kid ourselves that we have a
balance.
Richardson: The Soviets have the same sort of interest in stability in
Europe that we do. But we have to show that we don't have to depend
on the trip wire.
Rogers: Henry's analysis, if you believe it, would indicate that our leader-
ship is worse than the Warsaw Pact.
Kissinger: Elliott is correct about the Congressional presentation of the
situation. But as things stand, we do not have a cohesive alliance. We
have the dilemma of MBFR versus force improvements.
Rush: Europe is afraid we are leaving NATO. NATO is making force
improvements and we should push for more, but not tied to MBFR.
Rogers: NATO is afraid we have already made a deal with the Soviet.
Union.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
- 3 -
The President: I don't think the Soviet Union is too keen on MBFR.
Rogers: There is agreement in the government on how we should
proceed.
The President: Henry?
Kissinger: (Begins his briefing at 10:33 a. m.)
The President: Let's have no illusion -- the whole thing fails if we
don't keep our contribution level. We must show that if we keep strong,
we can reduce later; and Europe must do its share.
Richardson: Arends has a study that is favorable to NATO and against
unilateral reductions.
Kissinger: (Resumes his briefing, which is completed at 10:58 a. m. )
Rogers: I think we are generally agreed. We want to get going, show
seriousness, and show that we haven't made a deal.
I like the two proposals, plus implicit linkage and the force improvements.
Richardson: I think we should present both, but express a preference
for reduction of stationed forces at as high a percentage as is negotiable.
We can also introduce the nuclear component, as an illustrative approach.
The President: Tom?
Moorer: We should have in our minds how we want to come out.
On the Soviet side, all the stationed forces are Soviet; on ours they are
British, Canadian, and U.S.
The first step should be a U.S. cut of ten percent and a Soviet cut of
eighteen percent. We shouldn't get into the structure of the forces to
be withdrawn.
Richardson: Collateral constraints could be important, like stationing
of observers.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XCDS
- 4 -
Farley: There will be lots of discussion.
Rumsfeld: We should say we may have a preference, but our final
preference will depend on the final alliance concensus.
The President: Good point.
Kissinger: Agreed.
The President: We must recognize we must take the lead, without
appearing to sell our position.
Rumsfeld: It should include the nuclear potion, and collateral constraints.
Kissinger: With Hungary in, you can't have a common ceiling cut, only
a percentage. A percentage cut is detrimental to NATO.
The President: We have no illusion but that improvement of forces must
go along with MBFR. It is essential for support here at home. We have
a gough selling job here. I have yet to talk to a NATO leader who talks
in terms of selling to his people a strong NATO. There is no guts in
t he European elite.
Heath has problems. He wants to be strong, but has economic problems.
Brandt has problems. Look at their attitude toward our troops. Brandt
is a muddle head anyway.
In Europe we have a bunch of ward heelers, not international leadership.
They would want to be but their public won't allow it.
The old bipartisan leadership has gone. It's lost its guts. Unless we
step up to the problem, no one will.
Rumsfeld: The argument that cuts leave us only with a nuclear option
should be persuasive. Even peaceniks shouldn't want to be on that
side of the argument.
The President: Kennedy had an overwhelming superiority. He didn't
need other options. Now we have parity -- so now we need an option
other than all or nothing.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
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