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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 018644 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL Memorandum of Conversation TITLE Kissinger and Schlesinger CREATION DATE 12/26/1973 VOLUME 4 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 031400100 COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations BOX NUMBER 3 FOLDER TITLE December 26, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger DATE WITHDRAWN 08/20/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG reducted 2/15/08 MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.5 WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED THE WHITE HOUSE E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5 state ltr 2/15/08 WASHINGTON MR07-113, #4; OSDer 10/2/07 SECRET/NODIS/XGDS BY dal NARA DATE 11/10/08 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense General John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, December 26, 1973 8:00 - 9:30 a.m. (breakfast) PLACE: The Pentagon Kissinger: There is no evidence of the U.S. being responsible for the anti-American way Europe is developing. There is something basically wrong -- not just a failure on our part. Clements is running around making trouble. Dayan's withdrawal proposal was a one-kilometer move. Schlesinger: We should make sure this remains a tempest in a teapot. The problem is the frustration of the companies. [Tells a story about the 50% shortfall in New England. ] The shortage isn't so severe and the leakage is heavy. Why can't we get enough residual into New England? I want to find out what the problem really is. Kissinger: Faisal's real problem is how he can lift the embargo and HERALD R still retain leadership of the radicals. Schlesinger: I think we must show the Arabs we won't operate under pressure. CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SECRET/NODIS/XGDS SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3) AUTOMATICALLY DEGLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det, SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 2. Kissinger: I think we should hold up on disengagement until the embargo is lifted. Schlesinger: Was the AOPEC decision a surprise? Kissinger: Yes. Faisal said he would work for lifting the embargo and he had never failed in his word. Though Akins said lifting wasn't enough -- production had to be increased. This could be the first step in lifting production. Schlesinger: The 10% increase is good, and we can get our share. Kissinger: That's right. Lifting the embargo without an increase in production wouldn't help. Schlesinger: The international balance of payments problems will be terrible for many countries. Kissinger: European leadership is so weak. Schlesinger: Norway is getting rich. They should spend some on defense. Kissinger: I'll bring you up to date. Egypt will go through the motions until the 8th or 9th of January. Then, Egypt's proposal is to withdraw heavy equipment from the east bank, and Israel is to withdraw to the passes. The heavy equipment goes further east, and put the UN in between. This takes Egypt out of the war. Schlesinger: That is great for Egypt and Israel. Is it good for us? How about the Canal. We only have two carriers which can go through the Canal. These are scheduled to retire. We should probably keep them. Kissinger: I agree. This Egyptian proposal would defuse the situation and lessen the possibilities of blackmail. It would split the Arabs. Asad knows this -- he called Sadat a pimp! If there is anything we want from Egypt on the Canal, we better ask them now. Schlesinger: I want a base in Sinai. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS TERMIT GERALDA FORD SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 3. Kissinger: Very privately -- Sadat wants to abrogate the Soviet treaty and he wants arms from us. He said he would either kick the Soviet Union out or give us equivalent bases. This withdrawal is good. It opens the Canal, but takes off the terrible pressure on us from the unstable military situation. Schlesinger: If we get a base in the Sinai I don't care about the Canal. Kissinger: Asad has pressure from Iraq and has internal challenges. His nightmare is Sadat will take himself out of the war and leave him holding the bag. So we need a disengagement agreement for Syria also. Then we will have defused the situation and can deal with the rest of the problem calmly. The Israelis will change once the pullback starts. Their military is stupid what they need is demilitarized zones which give a warning when crossed. Schlesinger: Do you think we can get a base in Sinai if the Soviet Union stays in Egypt? Kissinger: Not for six months or a year, and maybe not ever. Schlesinger: How do we threaten the producers without men out there? Kissinger: How about Ethiopia? Our task force out there was very effective. Schlesinger: I told our people that in view of the price rise, I want to hit the Shah with a good share of the F-14 and 15 R&D. Also charge the Saudis high for their many needs. How about our European friends? Jackson-Nunn is no problem if we define the offset properly. We will have a DPRC meeting to massage the group from Commerce. The issue is: The Europeans are already offsetting our balance of payments costs. We have to get Commerce to count right. They are counting many things which they shouldn't count. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 4. Kissinger: The danger of your approach is that the Europeans will do nothing. Schlesinger: Yes, we must hit the Europeans that the thing they must do is to raise their defense budgets -- this would defuse Mansfield, et al. Kissinger: I was depressed by the NATO meeting. They will promise anything then not deliver. Scheel is terrible; Home is okay; the French are playing a desperate game -- Jobert may be okay but Pompeidou is bad. Can we have Foster do something with Galley that doesn't hurt? Schlesinger: Let's talk about that. Our NATO friends think we undercut them with the French when they try to stand up for us. The French say they make us eat crow and like it. The Dutch said they would buy U.S. rather than French aircraft because France wasn't in NATO. Carrington said France couldn't enjoy the benefits of membership if they didn't pay their dues. Kissinger: That's true. The opposite argument is that the alternative to their present program is zero; if it leaks, it will destroy their credibility with the other allies, and it gives us some leverage. Schlesinger: Let me see what we can give them. The British are giving up on Poseidon. Shouldn't we have them withdraw their people? Kissinger: Are they? If so, yes. Scowcroft: They haven't yet said anything to us. TREATY GERALD FORD Schlesinger: No. But their budget decision stretches things out at least two years. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 2 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 018645 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL Note DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes of Kissinger and Schlesinger meeting CREATION DATE 12/26/1973 VOLUME 7 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 031400100 COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations BOX NUMBER 3 FOLDER TITLE December 26, 1973 - Kissinger, Schlesinger DATE WITHDRAWN 08/20/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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    "ocrText": "File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 018644\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nMemorandum of Conversation\nTITLE\nKissinger and Schlesinger\nCREATION DATE\n12/26/1973\nVOLUME\n4 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031400100\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. Memoranda of\nConversations\nBOX NUMBER\n3\nFOLDER TITLE\nDecember 26, 1973 - Kissinger,\nSchlesinger\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n08/20/2004\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nGG\nreducted\n2/15/08\nMEMORANDUM\nDECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.5\nWITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nE.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5\nstate ltr 2/15/08\nWASHINGTON\nMR07-113, #4; OSDer 10/2/07\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nBY dal NARA DATE 11/10/08\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and\nAssistant to the President for National\nSecurity Affairs\nDr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense\nGeneral John A. Wickham, Jr., Military Assistant\nto the Secretary of Defense\nMajor General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant\nto the President for National Security Affairs\nDATE AND TIME:\nWednesday, December 26, 1973\n8:00 - 9:30 a.m. (breakfast)\nPLACE:\nThe Pentagon\nKissinger: There is no evidence of the U.S. being responsible for the\nanti-American way Europe is developing. There is something basically\nwrong -- not just a failure on our part.\nClements is running around making trouble.\nDayan's withdrawal proposal was a one-kilometer move.\nSchlesinger: We should make sure this remains a tempest in a teapot.\nThe problem is the frustration of the companies. [Tells a story\nabout the 50% shortfall in New England. ] The shortage isn't so severe\nand the leakage is heavy. Why can't we get enough residual into New\nEngland? I want to find out what the problem really is.\nKissinger: Faisal's real problem is how he can lift the embargo and\nHERALD R\nstill retain leadership of the radicals.\nSchlesinger: I think we must show the Arabs we won't operate under\npressure.\nCLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER\nEXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652\nEXEMPTION CATEGORY\n5 (b) (1, 3)\nAUTOMATICALLY DEGLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det,\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n2.\nKissinger: I think we should hold up on disengagement until the embargo\nis lifted.\nSchlesinger: Was the AOPEC decision a surprise?\nKissinger: Yes. Faisal said he would work for lifting the embargo and\nhe had never failed in his word. Though Akins said lifting wasn't\nenough -- production had to be increased. This could be the first step\nin lifting production.\nSchlesinger: The 10% increase is good, and we can get our share.\nKissinger: That's right. Lifting the embargo without an increase in\nproduction wouldn't help.\nSchlesinger: The international balance of payments problems will be\nterrible for many countries.\nKissinger: European leadership is so weak.\nSchlesinger: Norway is getting rich. They should spend some on defense.\nKissinger: I'll bring you up to date. Egypt will go through the motions\nuntil the 8th or 9th of January. Then, Egypt's proposal is to withdraw\nheavy equipment from the east bank, and Israel is to withdraw to the passes.\nThe heavy equipment goes further east, and put the UN in between. This\ntakes Egypt out of the war.\nSchlesinger: That is great for Egypt and Israel. Is it good for us? How\nabout the Canal. We only have two carriers which can go through the\nCanal. These are scheduled to retire. We should probably keep them.\nKissinger: I agree.\nThis Egyptian proposal would defuse the situation and lessen the\npossibilities of blackmail. It would split the Arabs. Asad knows this --\nhe called Sadat a pimp!\nIf there is anything we want from Egypt on the Canal, we better\nask them now.\nSchlesinger: I want a base in Sinai.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nTERMIT GERALDA FORD\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n3.\nKissinger: Very privately -- Sadat wants to abrogate the Soviet treaty\nand he wants arms from us. He said he would either kick the Soviet\nUnion out or give us equivalent bases. This withdrawal is good. It opens\nthe Canal, but takes off the terrible pressure on us from the unstable\nmilitary situation.\nSchlesinger: If we get a base in the Sinai I don't care about the Canal.\nKissinger: Asad has pressure from Iraq and has internal challenges.\nHis nightmare is Sadat will take himself out of the war and leave him holding\nthe bag. So we need a disengagement agreement for Syria also. Then we\nwill have defused the situation and can deal with the rest of the problem\ncalmly.\nThe Israelis will change once the pullback starts. Their military\nis stupid what they need is demilitarized zones which give a warning\nwhen crossed.\nSchlesinger: Do you think we can get a base in Sinai if the Soviet Union\nstays in Egypt?\nKissinger: Not for six months or a year, and maybe not ever.\nSchlesinger: How do we threaten the producers without men out there?\nKissinger: How about Ethiopia? Our task force out there was very\neffective.\nSchlesinger:\nI told our people that in view of the price rise, I want to hit the\nShah with a good share of the F-14 and 15 R&D. Also charge the\nSaudis high for their many needs.\nHow about our European friends? Jackson-Nunn is no problem\nif we define the offset properly. We will have a DPRC meeting to\nmassage the group from Commerce. The issue is: The Europeans are\nalready offsetting our balance of payments costs. We have to get\nCommerce to count right. They are counting many things which they\nshouldn't count.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n4.\nKissinger: The danger of your approach is that the Europeans will do\nnothing.\nSchlesinger: Yes, we must hit the Europeans that the thing they must\ndo is to raise their defense budgets -- this would defuse Mansfield, et al.\nKissinger: I was depressed by the NATO meeting. They will promise\nanything then not deliver. Scheel is terrible; Home is okay; the French\nare playing a desperate game -- Jobert may be okay but Pompeidou is\nbad.\nCan we have Foster do something with Galley that doesn't hurt?\nSchlesinger: Let's talk about that. Our NATO friends think we undercut\nthem with the French when they try to stand up for us. The French say\nthey make us eat crow and like it. The Dutch said they would buy U.S.\nrather than French aircraft because France wasn't in NATO. Carrington\nsaid France couldn't enjoy the benefits of membership if they didn't pay\ntheir dues.\nKissinger: That's true. The opposite argument is that the alternative to\ntheir present program is zero; if it leaks, it will destroy their credibility\nwith the other allies, and it gives us some leverage.\nSchlesinger: Let me see what we can give them.\nThe British are giving up on Poseidon. Shouldn't we have them\nwithdraw their people?\nKissinger: Are they? If so, yes.\nScowcroft: They haven't yet said anything to us.\nTREATY GERALD FORD\nSchlesinger: No. But their budget decision stretches things out at\nleast two years.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n2\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 018645\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nNote\nDESCRIPTION\nBrent Scowcroft's handwritten notes of\nKissinger and Schlesinger meeting\nCREATION DATE\n12/26/1973\nVOLUME\n7 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031400100\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. Memoranda of\nConversations\nBOX NUMBER\n3\nFOLDER TITLE\nDecember 26, 1973 - Kissinger,\nSchlesinger\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n08/20/2004\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nGG"
}