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April 11, 1974 - Nixon, Algerian President Boumediene
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April 11, 1974 - Nixon, Algerian President Boumediene
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Houari Boumediene, President of Revolutionary
Council, Algiers
Adbelaziz Bouteflika, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Idriss Djazani, Economic Counselor
President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Maj/Gen Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Camille Nowfel, OPL/LS, interpreter
TIME AND DATE:
Thursday, April 11, 1974
11:00 a.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
President: I saw Giscard in Paris.
Boumediene: Why him ?
President: He was at the reception. The only meeting I had was with
Poher.
Boumediene: All are here in this country.
President: I want to wish you a warm welcome. As you know, we
don't have diplomatic relations, but as I look around the world, we
have better relations with you than with some countries with whom
we have official relations.
Boumediene: They have improved since 1967.
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES statelivicw3/8/04
RY
bets
NARA DATE 8/5/04
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
President: I have tried since 1967 to improve relations with those
countries who felt it necessary to sever relations in 1967, whether
formal as in the case of Egypt or informal as Algeria. We welcome
the chance to improve our relations because the destinies of our
people are tied in many ways.
Boumediene: We agree that our relations are good although we don't
have diplomatic relations. We distinguish between that which is
permanent and that which is formal and subject to temporary circum-
stances. We didn't sever relations because of Algerian-US relations,
but we found ourselves in different circumstances. I discussed this
with Dr. Kissinger frankly and told him that many Arabs hold him
responsible for what happened in that part of the world. But there is
no Algerian-US problem, and there won't be in the future. This is
as far as diplomatic relations are concerned. We trust there will
come a time when this situation can be positively resolved. If
Secretary Kissinger was capable of bringing contradictions together
around the table, it may be that the initiation of negotiations between
the sides could be the occasion for resumption of relations between us.
As far as my situation is concerned, so far as I am concerned and the
Algerian people, I could do it tomorrow. But we want to stay with our
Syrian brothers for the moment.
President: The timing is up to you; the important thing is that we can
talk to each other.
Boumediene: We are in favor of a dialogue.
President: We think Algeria has a big role to play in a just peace, and
a particular role in the Syrian-Israeli disengagement. You may
possibly be able to do more there if you don't have relations.
Boumediene: As regards the problem of Israeli prisoners, I don't
talk to Asad.
Kissinger: Without Boumediene, it would not have happened. I know
that from Asad.
President: That makes my point. In your neutral role, you have a
greater role with the Syrians than we or perhaps than you would have
if you had relations with us. The important thing to realize is that in
terms of a permanent peace we have a long way to go. We have to
have talks with the Israelis and with Israelis neighbors. I don't ask
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
you to take any position contrary to your principles. But we have
only a just peace in mind, and where our actions are consistent
with your principles, we would appreciate your help.
Boumediene: Our policy can be summed up in one sentence. We
support whatever Egypt, Syria and Palestine can accept. We don't
want to be more Egyptian than Egypt, more Syrian than Syria, or
more Palestinian than the Palestinians. We have followed this course
since 1967 since we thought that a solution was not possible. We
thought the United States was aligned with Israel.
President: It was. Speaking in this vein, Ame rican policy was
tied closely to Israel. Our failure was not in talking and working
with Israel's neighbors. I told Israel that because we are a friend
of Egypt, it doesn't mean we are not a friend of Israel. It is
better that we be their friend than only the Soviets.
Boumediene: I want the President to be very frank and I will be
frank also. What is a just and fair solution in your view?
President: It has many parts and it must be one that both sides
can accept. It is impossible to return to the status quo ante,
because Israel's neghbors won't accept that. It is unrealistic for
Israel's neighbors to insist on any settlement which would jeopardize
Israel's continued security. As far as we are concerned, we are
not here as lawyers for Israel; we want to mediate between Israel
and its neighbors--not exclusively, but we have a major role,
because we are the only ones who can influence Israel. Being honest
and frank, I cannot draw the line as to how we solve border problems
or Jerusalem, but we are totally committed, as I told Sadat, to a
permanent peace. I am not dodging the question, but I don't want
to commit myself to anything I cannot deliver. But with the Kissinger
diplomacy, we are committed to a solution. As you know, in diplomatic
language, we say we will work out a solution in accordance with
Resolutions 242 and 338. They don't bite the bullet on the question
of who will have what piece of sand, but we will work in the spirit
of those resolutions.
The reason I am confident we can reach a settlement is that after
1967 both sides dug in and had no communication. The American
position was that we cannot move Israel, so we would just provide
arms and hope the war doesn't resume. That failed last October.
SECRET/NODIS
SEGRET/NODIS
- 4 -
I know it would please some if I said we would push Israel into the
sea--as Nasser said when I saw him--or that we would force
Israel to accede to any demand, but I couldn't deliver that. I
think we must be honest with each other in the interest of peace.
We are committed to a just peace which both sides can accept, and
to rectify the injustices built into it that are unacceptable to that part
of the world.
Boumediene Nasser didn't really believe in that. Of course we
can't hope to have a total solution, but what one refers to in Arabic
political language as "a minimum solution. 11 Accor ding to my
information, that includes Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory
and recognition of the rights of the Palestinians, and a third very
sensitive issue--the question of the city of Jerusalem. If this
minimum can't be implemented, perhaps there might be a truce--
long or short--but not a true peace, because the question of Palestine
would not be resolved.
As I told Dr. Kissinger, why don't you get directly in touch with
the Palestinians? It would close the door on demagogic trickiness
and be helpful.
Kissinger: We have been in touch, two times.
Boumediene: At a modest level.
Kissinger: As you instructed the President, we thought we should
get Syrian disengagement done first. With all the Palestinian groups,
we are not confident that secrecy could be ensured. If this became
known, Israel would be upset, which would only delay disengagement.
Following that, however, we are prepared to move to a higher level.
President: We will have Dr. Kissinger move step by step. I realize
this does not give an instant solution. Our people want instant
solutions--the differences are so great that they must be removed
slowly. Each step creates momentum which makes the next step
more attainable. But such a step is more difficult--the Palestinians--
with Jerusalem the hardest of all. But we would like your views on
this problem.
Boumediene: There is a question, Mr. President, and this may relate
precisely to Syria. In my conversation with President Asad, what
was in his mind was not so much a line of demarcation but the commit-
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 5 -
ment of the US that the Golan Heights would be returned to Syria.
President: I have been there- I don't know why anyone wants it.
Now if it were Algerian territory
that would be worth having.
I value this talk very much. It is important not only with respect to
the world views, but from the perspective of raw materials, con-
sumers and producers. My point is the goal and process. The goal
is a peace which both sides wish to keep, so it must be fair to
both. Having studied that, I note, in relation to the PRC, Soviet
Union, and our friends--whenever there are differences, they can
be papered over. We will push where we could be helpful. I am
encouraged by developments on the Egyptian front, on the Syrian
front, and with your help when you feel you can give it, we think
we can succeed.
Kissinger: And we publicly dissociated ourselves from the positions
stated by Israeli leaders on the Golan.
Boumediene: Now that I am in Washington to meet you, I have a
question, and you raised it before I could--whether it is possible
to consider whether there is a serious US policy as to the funda-
mentals of the problem. We have followed your China, Soviet
and Middle East initiatives. I would like some more light on these,
and I would like your ideas on a question having to do with my
country, a non-aligned state endeavoring to consolidate its indepen-
dence. I refer to the European initiative towards the Arabs. What is
your guideline on this question?
President: Our concern at the European initiative was that we thought
all the consumers should consult with each other about a problem
which had come up over oil. Our European allies had a different
approach, and we disagreed. But our policy on the nonaligned
nations is this: whether rich (like Algeria) or poor (like Egypt),
we think each should go its way. We don't object to nonalignment,
and we will try to be as cooperative as possible, not only in pro-
viding a market but also in reciprocation by providing our abundant
technical assistance and other assistance when appropriate to do SO.
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 6 -
I know the President has frankly expressed his views about national-
ization of resources. I respect that view. All we expect is fair
treatment for American companies. While the eyes of the world
have been on our relations with superpowers, I have enormous interest
in the situation of the two billion people in the Third World. I know
that each must seek its own destiny. The United States seeks no
special privilege, only fairness and reciprocity. We want you to
do well.
I know as you look down the path of history 50 to 100 years, peace
will be seriously jeopardized if two-thirds of the world lives below
the poverty line. It can't be changed overnight, but the United States
has been generous in the past and will be so in the future. Unlike
others, we have no designs on you. I know we make a popular
whipping boy, and we don't object to rhetoric. What is important
is to know that we stand by our allies, we seek negotiations with
our adversaries, and we cooperate with those nations which are
on their way up. We are not interested only in China and the Soviet
Union because they are big, or Latin America because it is close. I
have been to Africa and Asia. Those people are destined to play a
big role in the world. We need to establish close and cooperative
relations with these people.
Boumediene: We don't have any problems outstanding with American
companies. People are afraid of the power of the United States, I,
of course, am not talking about the Algerian people.
President: We will meet you again informally this evening and we
will have a chance to talk even more.
Boumediene: We should always be rational.
President: Speaking of being afraid of the United States, when I
have been in small Communist countries, none of them had fear of us.
Boumediene: They also fear the Soviet Union. They fear you are
about to divide up the world. This is not Chinese influence on my
speech.
Kissinger: Yes, he has just been in China.
President: We can talk about China tonight.
Boumediene: I would welcome that.
SEGRET/NODIS
SCOWCROFT FYI
1584
Action - - SAUNDERS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 18, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
CHARLES W.B. WARDELL,
SUBJECT:
Memorandum for the President's File
Please prepare a Memorandum for the President's File on his
meeting with His Excellency, Houari Boumediene, President,
Revolutionary Council, Algeria on Thursday, April 11, 1974 at
11:00 a. m.
DATE DUE: Forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of this memorandum.
Thank you.
Howler
Handrini
Pres/Bournedine
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