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April 18, 1974 - Nixon, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi
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1552696
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April 18, 1974 - Nixon, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Nixon
Ismail Fahmi, Foreign Minister of Egypt
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Maj. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
April 18, 1974
11:35 a.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
President: This is a busy time for you.
Fahmi: Yes, I must leave tomorrow. Willy Brandt is coming to Egypt.
President: Yes. He told me. He will be very sympathetic.
Kissinger: He became Foreign Minister in this room the last time he
was here. He was only Minister of Tourism before.
President: I appreciate the statesmanlike role that you and President
Sadat have played. We now have the Syrian problem. It is very
troublesome at the moment. It will depend in part on our influence with
Israel, which we will use. You know what the arguments are about. It's
difficult with the fighting now.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECLASSIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY HENR A. KISSINGER
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
NSC MEMO, look 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES Stab Review 3/8/04
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)
St.
NARA DATE 4/5/04
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
Fahmi: Don't worry about the fighting. It's not serious. It may be a
prelude to real disengagement. I told Henry yesterday about the Security
Council. There is a discussion going on now. You vetoed a previous
resolution because it was not balanced. My fear is if you veto now, there
will be a critical reaction. Henry's mission will become almost impossible,
and the extremists and the Soviet Union will use it in a devastating way.
They will try to prove that Sadat is wrong and there is no change in
U.S. policy. I would advise changing the reso lution first so you can
support it and pull the rug from the Soviet Union. If you can't change
it that much, at least abstain or don't participate in the vote. If you
speak to Lebanon, nobody can force the Lebanese Foreign Minister to
move to a stronger position.
Kissinger: We have a draft which we could live with.
President: Will the Lebanese buy it? Overriding all this is our ability
to deliver the Israelis. To do this we have to maintain some "stroke"
with them. If there can be some reference to the attacks and that
Lebanon didn't approve
If it is a straight condemnation of Israel, we
would be in trouble. I think they did overreact, but we would jeopardize
our ability to move them on disengagement.
Kissi nger: Next week we are asking the Jewish leaders to put pressure
on Israel to move behind Kuneitra. But if we get in a brawl over this
incident -- and Israel is not wholly wrong -- my mission will be jeopardized.
Fahmi: I agree. But Israel is only one part of it. But if all the Arabs
and the Soviet Union are against you, you will embarrass Sadat. All you
have done until now will be erased. I am very worried. Even consider
some Machiavellian ways -- even to postpone it.
Kissinger: The French and the Soviet Union are impossible.
Fahmi: Jobert is unbelievable. He attacked us for dealing with the U.S.
Kissinger: He said you could have dealt directly with Israel.
Fahmi: The best thing is to postpone it.
Kissinger: That would be fine with us.
Fahmi: Or if you don't succeed, maybe a message to Frangie on what you
could do. He could get a bal anced resolution.
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-3-
Kissinger: Do you agree?
President: Postponement would be the best. But a compromise you
would try that we could sell to Lebanon would be helpful. A resolution
solely condemning Israel would be tough for us.
Fahmi: That is only one side. Sadat may even revoke the Soviet
treaty today.
President: We don't want him embarrassed. You two work it out.
Fahmi: Don't say I am involved in the compromise. You know that leak.
Kissinger: Some SOB in State leaked that the reason for hope was a more
reasonable Egyptian position compared to Syria.
President: We are with you. We can't embarrass Sadat. It cannot appear
he is compromising his principles.
Fahmi: We want a change, but on our basic principles. We want a
relationship. One we are not ashamed of, I speak each time with you
about future strategy. I hope your visit, Mr. President, will be the end
of May. The Soviet Union is acting in a positive way around us.
Kissinger: They have even approached the Jordanians.
President: This has to be handled carefully. Gromyko is sensitive. We
must not leave the impression the Soviet Union is being left out. The
problem is tactics.
It gets back to Israel. We are the only ones who can move them. We
understand you need to pay attention to the Soviet Union.
Fahmi: We are not worried about the Soviet Union. They know our
relations are deteriorating. I spent three hours here with Gromyko,
20 in Moscow, four with Brezhnev. I am trying to blame them but it
is tough. I am not worried about what they can do in Egypt, but they
can move quickly to support Asad and stop everything sent to us. I am
sure Sadat will abrogate the treaty. Gromyko begged Sadat for hours not
to do it. I know Sadat will blow it up. When they see part of the American
fleet in Port Said and they are not involved, when they have a port in Alexandria,
a super power can't forget this. If Sadat moves, it will cause a reper-
cussion against them in the Arab world. We expect that at the proper
time you will help Sadat.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-4-
President: In bilateral relations, outside the USSR, we are subject to
the whim of Congress. I think we will be successful, but not as much
as we want. Clearing the Canal, hopefully PL-480, some economic
assistance. You have talked with Henry about arms. All this has my
total support.
If you push them out too fast, you become worried about their
reaction.
Fahmi: I am worried about the political support from you when the time
comes.
President: I promise. That is what it is all about. We must do this
subtly -- - the Soviet Union is very worried. You do have our diplomatic
support and whatever aid we can give.
Kissinger: And we are trying to work out military equipment through
Kuwait.
Fahmi: We are Russian-equipped. Our Army must know they won't be out
of equipment. The nuclear thing is a symbol now.
President: I want to move out on this right away.
Kissinger: I will bring something with me.
President: We will help. We want a strong and prosperous Egypt. On
the Army thing, we will do our best so your Army can have something
to point to.
Kissinger: I will be going next weekend. I will see Gromyko in Geneva.
Fahmi: Don't bring him with you! I told him "You couldn't get disengage-
ment; the U.S. could, so you should meet with Kissinger in Geneva and
get the appearance." What I wanted today was your political support and
a red light to the Soviet Union.
President: You have it. It's your hole card; don't turnitup now, but it
is yours.
Fahmi: That is all I wanted.
President: Let's see. We will try to work out a balanced resolution.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-5-
Kissinger: This whole terrorism was planned to sabotage the peace. It
was a moderate response by Israeli standards.
Fahmi: Sorry, but you know I had to support Lebanon.
President: We understood.
Kissinger: We have agreed with Egypt on the Syrian line. The Israeli
position is impossible. We are not delivering things but we're not saying
anything. The problem is if we get in a fight on the resolution, it will
remove pressure on the disengagement.
The British are trying to line up support, but the French are sabo-
taging us.
Fahmi: Why? They all ran after you.
President: They don't have a government. When are their elections?
Kissinger: May 5 and 19. Unless Mitterand wins by a majority.
[There was further discussion of the French election]
Fahmi: Rumors are the U.S. is supporting Mitterand.
President: Total nonsense.
Kissinger: The French are putting that out to the Arabs.
President: Tell President Sadat I admire him greatly and I won't let
down someone who has been a great leader against great odds. Rely on
me and let me work it out my own way.
We understand why you must use Lebanese and the Soviet Union.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Ismail Fahmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, April 18, 1974
12:20 p.m.
PLACE:
Secretary Kissinger's Office
The White House
Kissinger: This we could support.
Fahmi: There was a previous one which went through.
Kissinger: We are having a massive problem with Israel because
Golda and Dayan are on their way out. If we get into a fight on the
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 3/8/04
resolution, I am lost with the Jewish community.
We are asking the Saudis to postpone the detente. We are
getting the Lebanese down here.
NARA DATE 8/5/04
Fahmi: On arms, only Sadat and I know, and Marwan who we use as
a messenger. The Minister of War doesn't know. The Soviet Union is
now offering more arms than we are asking. I said: "Why don't you
DECLARSIFIED
give us the replacements you already promised?"
E.O. 12958, SEC.
Kissinger: You could get arms from India and we could make it up in
economic aid.
Fahmi: When will you deal with us openly?
CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY
5(b)(3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.
SEGREF/SENSITIVE/XGDS
2
Kissinger: The end of the year. First there has to be a Syrian
disengagement. Then a next step with you. You can't afford a separate
peace -- or can you? I will talk to Sadat. Then we will start a
military program.
If you get F-4's into Saudi Arabia, you can train your pilots
there.
If Israel had a Sadat, it would be a joy to work on this issue.
The Israelis aren't so bright; they are minor league politicians. If
I were Israel I would give Syria most of what they ask, and get Syria
out of the war.
Fahmi: You would have a revolution in Iraq in a minute.
Kissinger: Can you get Syria to agree to Quneitra?
Fahmi: Yes. Asad hates the Russians.
Kissinger: Shihabi said they would try to overthrow the Iraqis.
Fahmi: If we can get a disengagement, then Sadat will move a little
against the Soviet Union. But a disengagement must come first.
Don't even circulate your draft informally.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/XGDS
3
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleview 3/8/04
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LAGGIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 3/8/04
RY In
NARA DATE 8/5/04
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