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June 26, 1974 - Nixon, Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor
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1552730
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June 26, 1974 - Nixon, Italian Prime Minister Mariano Rumor
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Nixon Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Scarent
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Mariano Rumor, Prime Minister of Italy
President Richard M. Nixon
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, June 26, 1974
PLACE:
American Ambassador's Residence
Brussels
Rumor: There are misconceptions, as reported in the press, about
what is going on in my country. Undoubtedly Italy is going through an
economic crisis and it would be a mistake to hide it from ourselves and
the United States. We have big balance of payment difficulties. In the
past three months there has been a descending curve in the trade balance
and an increase in inflation which had started to level off.
The President: What is it now?
Rumor: It was 2.6 percent in March; at the May rate, it would be 16 to
18 percent. The rate has, diminished somewhat. The budget influences
are in balance. There are positive aspects. Production is good, despite
the fact that we are not at full employment. We still have good reserves
which we haven't yet touched. In the last few months, we have had the
advantage, thanks to you, of the revaluation against the dollar.
We are using three major levers: First, in the next few days the Government
will draw, through taxes, three hundred billion lira through 1974-75 to
slow inflation. Second, we will reduce the State budget; this will not be
easy because most parts of it are fixed. Thirdly, we will reduce credit
without slowing the economy but so as to reduce speculation. The fourth
lever is to discourage imports like beef and crude oil, which take a big
slice out of the balance of payments.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
SECRET/XGDS
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines (Sulser)
By KBH NARA, Date 6/29/99
SECRET/XGDS
2
We will impose heavy sacrifices on the Italian people. It will
not be possible without the understanding and help of our Allies, and
the United States especially.
The President: What do you want from us?
Rumor: Loans which can be handled by the technical end of the Government.
If you were willing I know you could find the proper forum. We would like
to do without it but we can't.
Now, as for our internal politics. We had a "non-crisis." This is
a difficult condition but there is no alternative. Despite the fact that the
Socialists are a difficult ally, I think they are willing to accept the
coalition and keep the Communists in opposition. This is an opposition
which is very powerful and has the trade unions and we must take it into
account. We have not had what France had a running together of the
Socialists and Communists. But I believe it will be good for the country.
It is difficult but there is no other way.
Even the Communists have been willing to make some sacrifices
for the good of the country. I am convinced the democratic forces will
continue to control the country. We must remember we are a country of
55 million people perched on a cliff with a very difficult economic situation.
On the other hand, some of our friends are also in a difficult position.
We are not happy to see our friends thus, but we take some satisfaction
in that.
I agree completely with your remarks this morning. Together we
will save ourselves even the Italians.
The President: I realize Italy has always been one of the staunchest
supporters of the Alliance. I am glad you appreciate, as I go to Moscow,
some of the problems we have. We will not negotiate anything at the
expense of the Alliance.
There is one major problem on which I want the Prime Minister's
advice, and that is CSCE. Many European governments oppose having a
summit unless there is more substance, for example, on confidence-
building measures and freedom of movement. Should we hang tough for
more substance before agreeing to a summit? Or should we agree
without their making all the concessions some of our countries want?
SECRET/XGDS
SECRET/XGDS
3
Rumor: I agree with Belgium. I don't wish a summit for its own
sake; it would give the impression we are settling just for the status quo.
On the other hand, if there are Soviet concessions, then we can only
judge when we know what the concessions are. We can't get everything,
but we should get most of what we started out for.
The President: I agree. There should be no agreement for its own sake
or at the expense of our allies.
Rumor: This is our prescription. I tell you frankly: We believe our
effort to build the European Community must not be jeopardized by any
agreement with the Soviets. We think that European unity is to your
benefit also. The European Community serves as a magnet to draw in
forces which might otherwise be drawn to the Soviet Union -- the
Socialists, for example.
The President: The danger of detente is that it makes Communism
respectable and therefore adds to the drawing power of the Communist
groups.
Rumor: You are correct. Detente by itself would create those conditions.
However, with the Alliance and the European Community, it will not --
on the one condition that agreement with the Soviet Union is not at the
expense of European unity. Otherwise a movement of Socialists toward
the Soviet Union is inevitable. Also, for Italy, it is important that the
United States understand that the Alliance is not made up only of Britain,
Germany and France, but also of Italy. Italy can help your brilliant
Middle East policy.
The President: I insist that the Big Four be treated equally, and Italy
is one of the Big Four. And with the United States there are Five.
Rumor: I assure you in your new policy toward the Middle East that
Italy can help you, and were it desired we could work in collaboration
with you.
The President: The main thing is to give everyone a stake in a Middle
East peace. That is why we encourage our European friends to cultivate
the Arabs. We appreciate Italy's representing us in Syria. We are now
exchanging Ambassadors, but we give credit to Italy for arranging the
marriage.
SECRET/XGDS
SECRET/XGDS
4
Rumor: I don't want to hold you. Just one last thing. I want to concur
with what Schmidt said. The heaviest burden today is the economic
collapse of the world. The Communists believe it is more possible than
military collapse. In 1948 you guaranteed Europe with the atomic
umbrella; now we need your aid with an economic umbrella.
The President: We have an answer on the military question. But we
should move now toward economic agreements, realizing our French
friends weren't keen on it earlier.
Rumor: What we first need, before help, is guidance. There has been
resistance, but some things have changed.
The President: We will do our best. We must remember that NATO
began and for years rested on fear. Detente has changed that and we
need a new motivation -- hope -- to solve the economic, energy and
other problems plaguing international society. We must bring to the solution
of the problems of peace the same courage and dedication which we did
to the problem of war. No one has to die for peace, but we need the
same dedication and sacrifices that were given to meeting the problem
of war.
SEGRET/XGDS
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES (Sulser)
BY
NARA. DATE 8/20/04
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.
NATO SANS CLASSIFICATION
- 15 - -
UNITED STATES
Honorable Richard M. NIXON
President of the United States
Honorable Henry A. KISSINGER
Secretary of State
Ambassador Donald RUMSFELD
U.S. Permanent Representative on the
North Atlantic Council
Ambassador Leonard K. FIRESTONE
U.S. Ambassador to Belgium
General Alexander M. HAIG, Jr. USA(Ret)
Assistant to the President
Mr. Ronald L. ZIEGLER
Assistant to the President and
Press Secretary
Major General Brent SCOWCROFT, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Honorable Helmut SONNENFELDT
Counselor of the Department of State
Honorable Arthur A. HARTMAN
Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs
Mr. A. Denis CLIFT
Senior Staff Member,
National Security Council
Mr. William G. HYLAND
Director, Bureau Intelligence and
Research Department of State
Mr. Peter RODMAN
Staff Assistant,
National Security Council
Mr. L. Paul BREMER, III
Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State
Mr. Aram BAKSKIAN, Jr.
Deputy Special Assistant to the
President
NATO SANS CLASSIFICATION
GERA:
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.
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ALO ENGIT & FORD
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.
-2-
Today, the very success of NATO provides the security
for the pursuit of constructive national, regional and
global interests. But the need for security and unity in
pursuing our common objectives has not lessened. Indeed,
it is more important than ever to keep before us the
recognition of our common objectives and to reconcile our
interests as individual nations with our interests as allies.
The Western world needs nothing more than a reaffirmation
of the possibility of great ideals and great conceptions.
As the Declaration recognizes, one of the most important
means of reconciling diverse interests is close consultation.
Consultation should not be viewed as a legally binding
obligation, but as a manifestation of the spirit of coopera-
tion. Consultation to be of value must be a common and
natural practice rather than mere formula.
President Eisenhower called NATO "a way of grouping
ability
" Each nation in this alliance has benefited
from, as well as contributed to, the economic and defensive
capacities of the members, and all have been able to
maximize these benefits in an era of peace.`
The document we sign here today demonstrates a recogni-
tion by all members that if we are to successfully pursue
our individual interests, then we must do so in essential
harmony and above all remain united in the common defense
of every member of the alliance.
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.
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GERALD A. FORD
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.
NSC/DG
FOURTH DRAFT
June 24, 1974
DRAFT STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED AT SIGNING OF NATO
DECLARATION
Twenty-five years ago, when the NATO Treaty was
signed in Washington, the meaning of the alliance was
crystalized by one of the fathers of modern Europe,
Paul-Henri Spaak. "The North Atlantic pact, he said,
"is an act of faith in the destiny of Western civilization."
The Declaration on Atlantic Relations we are signing
today is a reaffirmation of that faith. It recognizes
the important role that the alliance has played for a
quarter of a century in protecting Western freedom and
diversity and in building a strong, prosperous Europe.
Even more importantly, it lays the groundwork for another
quarter century of Atlantic cooperation, solidarity and
security. It signifies that as NATO enters its second
quarter century, the alliance stands strong and more
united.
The world we face in 1974 is very different from the
world of 1949. At that time, peace was in serious
jeopardy and the sovereignty of many of the nations of
Europe was imperiled. The prime need was for unity in
the common defense, SO, that a period of rebuilding could
go forward.
Brent Scowcroft took these notes on the back side of a document that is not directly related to the discussion with Prime Minister Rumor.
Pages 6, 8 and 10 are unrelated to this conversation.