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August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
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August 13, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Greece
Cyprus
Israel
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Turkey
Egypt
President (1974-1977 : Ford). National Security Council. (1974 - 1977)
Arms transfers
Middle East conflicts
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1974-08-13
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1974
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13
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1974-08-13
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8
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, August 13, 1974
9:00 a. m.
PLACE:
Oval Office
[General Scowcroft came in late.
]
Kissinger: The problem in Geneva is that the Turks see that the more
the negotiations are protracted the more difficult the unilateral military
move becomes. The Greeks are procrastinating -- they want to go home
for 36 hours and then resume discussions. The Turks so far have
refused to grant a 36-hour extension because it would make it that much
harder to take unilateral action.
DECLARGIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES 3/9/04
President: What would we do if the Turks moved?
Kissinger: We would have to vote against them in the Security Council.
We would have our hands full to keep the Greeks from going to war. The
NARA, ATE 3/25/04
Turks right now are extremely nationalistic. For a few years ago, the
Turkish tactics are right -- grab what they want and then negotiate on
the basis of possession. But if the Turks run loose on Cyprus, the Greeks
could come unglued. We certainly do not want a war between the two, but
if it came to that, Turkey is more important to us and they have a political
structure which could produce a Qadhafi.
[Scowcroft left to call Macomber and returned after about 10 minutes.
FOHD
GERALD
LIBRARY
CLASSIFIED BY HENR A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
BY
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SEORET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Kissinger: We have been trying to bail the Cyprus situation out after
it got out of control. The British have made a mess of it. If the Turks
move to take what they want, they will be condemned in the Security
Council and the Soviet Union will beat them over the head with it.
Some of my colleagues want to cut off assistance to Turkey that would
be a disaster. There is no American reason why the Turks should not
have one-third of Cyprus. We will make a statement today that will
get the New York Times off our back, but we should not twist their arm.
I would like to mention the Turkish poppy issue. President
Nixon signed a letter to Ecevit which, because of Cyprus, we have not
yet delivered. We could redo the letter for your signature, or I could
send it. I think the whole poppy situation is a loser. Do you want to
have a brawl with the Turks, or should I? Maybe I should do it.
President: The other side of the coin is that you already have very good
relations with Ecevit and there would be less damage coming from me.
Kissinger: Let's wait a bit. If we come out of the Cyprus thing all
right, we will have more leverage. The Turks can't focus on it now
anyway.
President: Yes. Let's wait a bit.
Kissinger: Here is the Egyptian military request list. The top items we
do not want to give them.
President: You mean giving them things through Saudi Arabia?
Kissinger: Yes. President Nixon in Cairo told them that there was
some chance that the list that Defense suggested could be approved.
President: Would they be satisfied with that?
Kissinger: I could tell Fahmy that you are willing to proceed but that
we would have to start with very low-visibility items.
President: Is there some rationale that Saude Arabia needs this equipment?
Kissinger: Yes. Saudi Arabia has a big military purchase program and
this would just be added. Isn't that right, Brent?
FORD
a
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Scowcroft: Yes. They have a major program under way now.
President: Are these weapons offensive or defensive?
Kissinger: It's hard to say. We should probably start out heavy on
ammunition -- that they need.
President: You think we should go ahead then? When would it start?
Kissinger: Not until after the first of the year. We can't really do it
without letting Congress know.
President: Okay, if you think it is needed.
Kissinger: I think we should. Egypt is in a difficult situation. If we
can't encourage the switch away from the Soviet Union and they turn
back, there will probably not be another opportunity in our generation.
President: Ithink we should do it, but not these items Defense recom-
mends against.
Kissinger: No. Those have not even been mentioned as possible.
The Syrian is coming next week. You should probably see him,
but I think not give a lunch for him in order to show some preference.
The Soviets are telling the Syrians that we are neglecting them. The
Saudis are worried about you because they think you are pro-Israeli.
Saqqaf is coming week after next. It would be very useful if you could
pay special attention to him.
President: Fine.
Kissinger: You wanted to review the NSC system. The names of the
principal subgroups change, mostly because the advisers change, but
the core membership is the same for all the groups. The Under Secre-
taries' Committee is an implementing group. The IGs - Interdepartmental
Groups -- are chaired by the Assistant Secretaries. The process is that
we issue NSSMs, the IGs analyze the problem, prepare the paper, the
Senior Review Group reviews the paper and then it goes to the NSC where
you make the decision. Each President does things a little differently,
but I think you should hear out each participant in the meeting but not
make decisions in the meeting, with the implication of a vote by the
members.
FORD
a
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
President: I agree.
Kissinger: Because otherwise the members will work out deals before-
hand, like under Eisenhower who could only say yes or no to proposals,
and to say no the way they were structured would be ridiculous. I think
we should continue to give you memos containing sharply defined options.
Under President Nixon every paper from a Cabinet officer went into him
but through me, with a cover sheet. I must tell you that at the end
President Nixon did not read the tabs. I would propose continuing this
system.
President: Did it work down until the end?
Kissinger: It worked even at the end. I just wanted to point out that
he only read my memo, not those from the Cabinet members.
President: I do not like agreed positions.
Kissinger: People will try to end run and get papers to you, especially
at the beginning while the lines of communication are losse. I think it
would be good if they knew that every paper had to come through me.
President: Does that include the JCS also?
Kissinger: The JCS is not the problem. The JCS problem is getting
their views through the Secretary. Laird used to operate the system to
play it both ways and change his positions. But Laird never played
games in crises. The Major thing is to make clear to Defense that
papers should come through me.
President: If I know they will get to me, that is fine.
Kissinger: You might want to tell the JCS today that you will expect to
hear their views, that they have direct access to you but that you would
expect normally that they would submit their views through the Secretary
and through me to you.
President: My position -- shouldn't it be -- that they have the right to
see me but I would recommend that their views should normally come
through the Secretary and the NSC to me? This would not preclude a
Chief from coming to me on important matters.
Kissinger: Sir, I would recommend that if papers come in through other
channels, that you send them to Brent. We will get them to you within
24 hours.
&
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5.
President: There haven't been any end runs so far. I would like to
point out that Jack Marsh will not interfere with your operation. He
has been with me a long time and has done a lot of work in liaison
with Defense and on the Hill. He has very good antenna for the Hill
and I need him but I can assure you he will not get in the way.
Kissinger: I was not thinking about Marsh. But it is natural at this
time for everyone to try to make runs. I just wanted to point out that
the NSC system is designed to illuminate options, not to suppress them.
When you get a paper, you need to have all viewpoints.
President: Nothing irritates me more than having people I trust argue
with other people I trust. This merely upsets me. I have to sit down
with Haig, Hartmann and Rumsfeld and sort this thing out. I just do
not want petty bickering. If people do this sort of thing behind my back,
they will be the losers.
Kissinger: Do you like to read cables?
President: Like what?
Kissinger: [Showed him some cables. ]
President: No, not now.
Kissinger: Okay. We will just summarize the main things for you.
Tomorrow I propose we do the Soviet Union and Egypt.
[Turns to map. ] On the West Bank, the Jordanian proposal was a
ten-kilometer withdrawal along the river. Israel opposes such a scheme
because they want to maintain strong points and if they move, they want
to give up people. Israel wants to give back a sausage which would
return most of the Arab people but keep most of the river.
There is now some confusion between the Jordanian and Egyptian
views. Jordan says Egypt agreed that Jordan could go first, but Fahmy
says Egypt has to go next. While I love the King, Egypt is more
important. Also, Egypt is not willing to turn over sovereignty of the
returned areas to Jordan but administration only, with UN troops.
FORD
&
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
6.
These are the present Sinai disengagement lines. What Israel
wants is a line here -- somewhat east of El Arish and down through
Sharm el-Sheikh. One logical solution would be a line from El Arish
to Sharm el-Sheikh. My scheme is to let Egypt move to the present
Israeli line, demilitarize the territory to El Arish, and the Israelis
would retain the territory east of that line.
The problem with the next step is the quid pro quo. One quid pro
quo might be freedom of Israeli cargoes through the Suez Canal -- that
is already agreed. There is not much reason for Israeli ships to go
through the Canal. Freedom of passage through Bab el-Mandeb Strait
is another possibility. Also UN forces as a more permanent feature
rather than their six-month terms at present. Our arms supply to the
Israelis constitutes our big clout.
If Egypt should shift back to the Soviet Union and take all the
Arabs with them, we will have a massive problem. The Europeans
and the Japanese would be against us also.
I think you should indicate to Fahmy that an oil embargo again
would not be a free shot. But we have at the same time to tell Israel
that we cannot stand another oil embargo. This sounds devious but
it's really necessary. This settlement would take Egypt out of the war.
Then we could deal with Jordan and then only Syria would be left.
President: When should we start?
Kissinger: Right away, but it depends on how much pressure you are
willing to use on the Israelis. You would have to let the Jewish
Community know that you want movement.
President: I have good relations with Jewish groups but I have already
cautioned them, both about the settlement and about the Trade Bill.
Kissinger: No, you have excellent relations with the Jewish Community.
If there is another war, you might have to use American troops. If
Israel was winning, the Soviets would almost undoubtedly come in. If
Israel were to lose, we would have a massive problem. My experience
with the Israelis is that at the beginning of a negotiation Israeli news-
papers all say we are selling them out. At the end of a negotiation, they
are grateful for what we have done for them. They need to be brought to
see there is no alternative.
FORD
a
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
7.
President: You set up a meeting with the Jewish groups whenever you
want.
Kissinger: I would wait a bit. First, you should have a meeting with
Rabin.
Could you see the Ambassadors of India, Iran and Pakistan for
five minutes? They are a little upset because you didn't meet with
them.
President: How about Saturday?
Kissinger: Reston would like to meet with me to do a piece about your
foreign policy perspectives.
President: That's fine. He did a good story about me when the going
was tough.
Kissinger: I could discuss what is achievable in your Administration.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
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DECLASSIFIED
FORD
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
&
BY,
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 3/9/04
NARA, DATE 3/25/04
GERALD
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