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1552842
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November 6, 1974 - Ford, Israeli Minister and Charge Mordechai Shalev
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1552842
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document
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November 6, 1974 - Ford, Israeli Minister and Charge Mordechai Shalev
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Israel
Jordan
Egypt
Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah.
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1552842
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6
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1974-11-06
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11
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1974
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6
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1974-11-06
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11
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1974
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
SECRET/EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Gerald R. Ford
Minister Mordechai Shalev,
Minister and Charge' of Israel
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIM E:
Wednesday, November 6, 1974
3:00 p.m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
President: As you know, Secretary Kissinger is in the Middle East
and will visit with the Prime Minister tomorrow. The whole situation
is different from what we had expected and hoped. I am concerned that
we could be faced with a united position of the Arabs, the Soviet Union
and the Europeans against us. As you know from our talks, we had
hoped we could resume negotiations with Sadat, Hussein and eventually
with Syria. It is our judgment that if we had moved, that contingency
[the Rabat outcome] could have been avoided. We fear that unless
movement begins right away we will be in trouble.
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES Stateleview 3/10/04
As I look to October-November 1973, we had the embargo, a conflict
which was very tough for Israel and costly for us, and a fairly close
confrontation with the Soviet Union. It is not in your and our interest
to have that recur. From the viewpoint of the American people, there
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NARA, DATE 5/6/04
were grave reservations at getting too close to the brink -- it was just
after Vietnam and the American people were fed up. I hope you can
communicate with the Prime Minister [to ensure] that there will be a
real exploration with Secretary Kissinger to move quickly and have some
DECLASSIFIED
substance. The potential danger of a united front is dangerous for both
of us.
My past record of support for Israel is well known. I think we could
have avoided Rabat, and I think we can avoid its consequences if the
Prime Minister and Secretary Kissinger will sit down and explore
all the options.
SEGRET/EYES_ONLY
FORD
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
GERALD
CLASSIFIED BY
NGER
SECRET/EYES ONLY
2
Shalev: The Prime Minister has said that Israel is ready to negotiate
with Egypt and with Jordan, but not with the PLO. I believe it is in
accordance with what you would want -- to negotiate with Egypt and
Jordan. Prime Minister Rabin has said this in his speech to the
Knesset. [He reads a page from it. He made it clear that Israel is
not prepared to negotiate with the PLO because they want to destroy
Israel.
President: We understand you view of the PLO and we wish it were
not so, but we need to move.
Shalev: I am not aware of any difference with the United States on
steps toward a disengagement agreement. Rabat would have happened
anyway.
President: My understanding is that we urged movement early, then
Rabin came in and urged some delay. If there had been a negotiation
underway, the Rabat outcome would have been different.
Shalev: We are on the receiving end. Our confidence in Sadat's wishes
for peace are shaken. We think he is keeping his options open.
Egypt is taking some steps building bunkers on the eastern side of the
Canal for anti-aircraft, which is prohibited. We will submit this to
the UN.
On the Secretary's last visit with Sadat, he knew we would negotiate.
I don't think a couple of weeks would have made a difference.
President: I think we now must move, and I want you to communicate
this to the Prime Minister. A repeat -- or so mething even worse --
of 1973 we must avoid.
Shalev: Nothing is further from our minds than a delay of the negotiation.
But we must have our security.
President: I agree. We will maintain our guarantee for Israel's security
and existence.
SECRET/EYES ONLY
GERALO
P/Skuleo
6 we 74
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