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December 5, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
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December 5, 1974 - Ford, Kissinger, FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor,
Federal Republic of Germany
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Vice Chancellor
and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Berndt Von Staden, Ambassador to the United States
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Martin J. Hillenbrand, Ambassador
to the Federal Republic of Germany
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft,
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, December 5, 1974
11:00 a. m.
PLACE:
The Oval Office
The White House
State Deview 3/10/04
[The press was admitted briefly for photos and then dismissed.]
Kissinger: This office has just been redecorated.
President: It is surprising how much difference a rug makes.
I am very pleased to meet with you, Mr. Chancellor. I have heard so
much about you. I am looking forward to my discussion with you.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
HARA, DATE 5/7/04
[General Scowcroft left the meeting for a few minutes and missed part
of the conversation.]
President: Henry is just back from the PRC. I hear now you are going.
Kissinger: [to Schmidt] They are waiting for you.
FORD
&
TAILISNTS/S
GERALD
SECRET XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
Schmidt: I am not sure I will go.
I would like to set aside considerable time in our discussions for
economics. I think we are in a recession and on the brink of a
world-wide depression. It is not inevitable but it is possible. Our
two countries are the biggest weight in the world's economy. I
would like to discuss this.
President: That is fine. A discussion of what we can do to avoid a
depression would be useful.
Schmidt: Secretary Kissinger and Minister Genscher can discuss
the other things.
There is an economic meeting this afternoon. If there is a press
statement, I would hope it would include a number of economic
aspects.
Giscard is looking forward to what I can tell him. He as a person
is willing to be helpful. It is his domestic situation which is his
problem. He needs the Gaullist votes. If you need an emissary to
him, you should think of sending Shultz.
President: I have complete confidence in George.
Schmidt: I only mention it because if anything arises which needs a
judgment, he can get one from Giscard.
President: First, let me say a word about my Japan trip. I was under
some pressure here to cancel it. But it was very productive. We
went beyond the traditional security concerns; both of us are deeply
concerned with the energy problem and they are interested in the
stability of food supply. It's a consensus government. That's how
they operate. And we were able to establish a rapport with the
government.
There were few demonstrations.
Kissinger: Kyoto was the worst, and there was a sound track that
said, "Go home as soon as you can. " [Laughter]
President: I had to go to South Korea. Otherwise it would have been
seen as a withdrawal of support. We had to establish support for
such a strong leader. At Vladivostok.
FORD
A
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
Schmidt: interrupting Whose idea was it to go to Vladivostok?
Kissinger: They proposed Europe. But that wasn't a good idea. The
President would have had to meet with Brezhnev either before or
after meeting with allied leaders, and it would have overshadowed
the meetings with the allied leaders. Then they proposed Vladivostok.
We checked with the PRC and they preferred Vladivostok to Europe.
President: Brezhnev was the only one who had been to Vladivostok.
Schmidt: I saw him just before you, and he gave me a lecture about
East Siberia.
Kissinger: It is the prettiest city I have seen. Like San Francisco.
President: We drove around at dusk.
We had done much SALT preparation, culminating in Dr. Kissinger's
October trip. So we didn't have to spend much preliminary time
jockeying.
Schmidt: Brezhnev seemed to me to be certain there would be an
agreement. More so than Kissinger.
Kissinger: He knew the concessions!
Schmidt: You did too.
Kissinger: No. We didn't know that they would change their positions on
FBS and the British and French systems.
President: We spent six hours and then broke up without an agreement.
We solved it the next morning. Then we talked CSCE and Middle East.
Schmidt: How do you have discussions among yourselves ?
Kissinger: We use babblers.
Schmidt: We used the microphones in Lenin Hills to tell them what
we wanted.
President: We reached an agreement on equal ceilings of 2400, covering
ICBMs, SLBMs, and missiles on heavy bombers.
FORD
&
SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
4
Kissinger: We have a dispute about the type of missiles permitted
on bombers. That must be worked out. We are not sure we
should stick on it.
Schmidt: There is no agreement on reentry vehicles.
Kissinger: No, but there is much nonsense being said on this point.
We are far ahead in warheads and will stay so for the foreseeable
future. We can assume they don't deploy any on missiles on which
they have not tested them.
Schmidt: Is there a definition to distinguish between long-range and
short-range bombers?
Kissinger: Not yet, but probably the long-range would include the
Bison, Bear, B-52, B-1, and not the Backfire.
Schmidt: I used to be Defense Secretary. That is why I am interested
in this.
Kissinger: To get to 2400 they have to cut. They are planning new
missiles and will have to cut for that.
Schmidt: They are building submarine missiles.
President: They are counted.
Schmidt: But they may move in that direction.
Kissinger: They should if they are smart.
Schmidt: You don't have to reassure us; we have no doubts.
Kissinger: We can put three times the throwweight in the Minuteman
holes if we wish. If they don't move to sea they will be 85 percent
vulnerable. Their submarine missiles are not very good.
Schmidt: Did you discuss the Middle East?
President: Yes. He wanted to go to Geneva right away. We felt that
it would be fruitless at the present time. We will act vigorously
to get another Israeli-Egyptian agreement. Because that area is a
tinderbox.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
LIBRARY
TALLISNTS/LOTS
5
Kissinger: It would be helpful if you don't mention this to anyone. Egypt
needs this negotiation to go on with no appearance of it until it is almost
completed.
Schmidt: I am worried. The state of Israel's mind is a concern itself.
There is some capability there for taking decisions out of desperation.
Kissinger: They must know that a military victory could be dangerous
if the Soviets intervene and there is an oil cutoff.
Schmidt: They are talking of taking all means within their reach. What
does that mean? The second danger is the Soviets maneuvering behind
the lines to counter your efforts. The last is the French countering your
efforts. We feel soon we may have to split with France on the Middle
East. We are deeply disturbed about the French behavior in the U.N.
We went out of our way to have a unified position, then at the last minute
they switched. Through the Sauvagnargues/Arafat meeting.
Kissinger: We have also heard about the activities of their ambassadors
in the area.
Schmidt: They are back on the Jobert track.
Kissinger: They are fairly impotent, but more persistently hostile than
the Soviet Union.
Schmidt: We are worried about the Soviet role. What is their role?
And how do you, for their face, let them play some role and yet limit their
behind-the-scenes negative maneuvering?
Kissinger: Gromyko has no understanding of the Middle East. He has it
organized as if it were CSCE, and his points are the same as the Arabs.
The Arabs at least know the difference between rhetoric and reality. He
won't split it into parts.
He tells
the Arabs everything we tell
him. Otherwise we would bring them in.
Schmidt: How about Brezhnev? They seem to have divided the world.
Gromyko handles some, Bre zhnev some. We have detected a difference
of views between them on some areas. For example: Gromyko is in
charge on Berlin.
They can't -- despite what your newspapers say -- get a single cent of
credit from us over the next years. But economic relations with us is a
Brezhnev area.
SECRET/SENTISTIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
6
Von Staden: Brezhnev is dominant in SALT.
Kissinger: CSCE and MBFR are handled by Gromyko. Also the Middle
East problem, but Brezhnev may be getting into that.
Don't tell the Europeans, but we are hoping for an Israeli-Egyptian
agreement. That would separate Syria, because Egypt probably wouldn't
go to war for them. That would take it past the UNDOF extension and
then we go back to Geneva.
Schmidt: I think this should be talked over privately between you and
Giscard. Without Sauvagnargues. You should show him how far you're
going and the dangers of their Middle East policy. Kissinger can't talk
with Sauvagnargues. Giscard wants to cooperate and I would ask you to
try.
President: After the SALT discussion, Brezhnev gave more participation
to Gromyko.
Kissinger: In thi S vein, we had to tell Brezhnev implicitly that we didn't
like Gromyko's approach and would be receptive to another approach.
Gromyko wants to settle everything at once. That means an explosion.
Israel can deal with only so many issues at once. If there are too many,
they will go to war.
Schmidt: We are not interested in supporting the Soviet Union in regaining
Soviet positions in the Middle East. But if there is a conflict, we might be
very exposed quickly, though Schlesinger didn't stress this. Therefore,
we hope you will do your best for a tacit understanding.
Kissinger: We think we have 4-6 months. There was no real war danger
in November. It was very irresponsible of Israel.
Schmidt: But they will be more irresponsible in the future because they
are so deeply in despair and the Government is not strong.
Kissinger: In the 6 months we should arrange a settlement and work with
the Soviet Union.
Schmidt: In Israel, there was some concern about a U.N. speech.
Genscher and I didn't clear it and we don't approve it. Israel was told
the same thing.
Now about oil. The explosion of oil prices has added to the downward
LIBRARY
development of the world economy that was al rea dy under way.
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
7
The breakdown of Bretton Woods between 1971 and 1973 had already
indicated the basic problem. The U.S. balance of payments deficit
for 3 years, etc., contributed. Then the oil prices on top of that.
For the first time since World War II, a number of countries may be
unable to produce a real income increase for their workers. Some
have avoided the situation so far by borrowing abroad, but that is only
a temporary solution.
I think the psychology is as important as mechanical moves. The big
companies are reluctant to invest. Labor is not used to not getting
increases. Social strife will increase, in Italy and especially France.
Kissinger: We have seen a report of a systematic attempt to infiltrate
the military and police.
Schmidt: I haven't seen that. If we don't tell the enterprises we will
move upward, we will be in for self-fulfilling bad prophecies. I am
really worried. I told my public that we are prepared to take decisive
measures when I return from here and the EC Summit. I am prepared
to take a number of steps, but I want to consult:
(1) To embark on a path of monetary and credit growth, probably
at 8% per year. I would prefer 10%, but my Central Bank won't.
(2) A tax cut in January '75, for the working and lower middle
class, of 14 billion marks. This is in an economy five times
smaller than yours.
(3) The longest budget deficit since the war.
(4) We would pay a premium to any investment between this
Wednesday and June 1975 of 2.5% of the value of the investment
if it is completed within a certain period, depending on the
types of investment.
(5) We will also launch a small-scale public works investment and
a few other similar measures.
This is to show that we have shifted from inflation-fighting to recession-
fighting and that the increase in investment is our number-one priority.
One slogan will include'lupward movement and stability" (which means
price stability).
FORD
&
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
8
We can do it easier because our inflation is one half of yours(6. 5%),
and because we have taken strong measures already and must end this
phase. It is not a complete turnaround, but a change of emphasis.
Kissinger: What inflation rate will you get?
Schmidt: Not over 8%.
President. Let me review our situation. On August 9, our economy was
badly deteriorating -- inflation was burgeoning, the interest rate was at
an all-time high. Burns was making the only effective effort to do something.
There was no serious deterioration in employment at that point. I tried to
get a consensus with the Congress. I held a series of meetings, and so
on, I recommended a program to Congress saying that we felt inflation
was the number one problem. We put a ceiling on the budget of $300
million -- 5-6 billion below the estimated budget. We needed some relief
for the low-income people so I recommended tax relief for them. To offset
this and help the deficit I asked for a surtax of 5% -- this hit only 28% of the
wage earners -- and a ten-percent investment tax credit to stimulate
industry (up from 7%). I must say my advisors did not foresee, among other
things, the loss of consumer confidence.
Schmidt: Investors confidence?
President: Not like the consumers. Now we have a crisis in the auto
industry.
Schmidt: We also are producing at only two-thirds capacity.
President: I have asked for a new analysis from the Council of Economic
Advisers by next week. I think he will recommend a rigid limitation on
expenditures. We can get only to $306 billion, even with Congressional
cooperation.
Schmidt: How much of a deficit will this be?
President: At $302 billion, it would have been a $9. 4 billion deficit, which
could be okay. At the rates we expect, the deficit will be somewhat stimu-
lative. He will probably recommend a tax cut instead of government
spending.
Schmidt: It depends. If it is on consumption, yes; if on investment it
is not good.
rund
?
SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
9
President: Yes, but the Congress wants to put it on an income supplement.
The new Congress is an unknown quantity. The House is probably more
Liberal (in our sense), with the Senate the more conservative. We will
probably submit a program to deal with the same kind of problem that
you point out.
He thinks we can get inflation down to 7-8% by summer. Unemployment
this month may be up to 6. 5%. That is bad.
Schmidt: It could go to 7% by February.
President: Yes, and that may launch Congress into a stimulative program
of expanding the income supplement. We will make recommendations in
the State of the Union Address, which is around 14 January. One other
point: Burns was tightening the money supply all summer.
Schmidt: Eighteen months too late.
President: I won't judge, but he wouldn't change until we negotiated a
plan and got a hand on spending.
Schmidt: The same with us. If I had seen the steep decline of the economy,
I would have acted differently.
Kissinger: How do you explain it?
Schmidt: It is psychological. The enterprises of the U.S. are one of the
decisive forces of the world; the next is ours. It is in your hands. Whatever
we do, if you don't, we can't do by ourselves. I think you should have a
budget deficit for investment. It would show leadership. Otherwise, a
world depression will be blamed again on the United States. It will destroy
your world foreign policy leadership.
Kissinger: Please tell the President candidly tomorrow what you think,
after talking with our economic people.
Schmidt: Yes. But I think we need a press statement talking about the
economy -- also something on oil, which has not been discussed yet. You
are such a great weight in the world.
President: We recognize that. I must be careful in a statement now
because of the Congress. I have to be careful to avoid specifics at this
time.
FORD
&
TALLISNS/SS
GERALD
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
10
Schmidt: I understand. Countries in surplus should step up demand;
Countries in deficit (except from imports of oil) should get their houses
in order. I would endorse -- don't write this down -- a request for
Germany to step up demand.
President: In defense of the October plan
,
Schmidt: Don't explain. I ma de the same mistake. The downward
development came much quicker than anyone expected.
President: If we hadn't hit inflation, no one knows what the Congress
would do in an election time. We do need to adjust the October program,
but we have to get Congress out of time.
Schmidt: Back to Giscard and oil. As I understand him, as a person
we have talked often over the last weeks -- he is willing with you to
bring about not only what looks like but really serves the purposes of
consolidation. With his consent, I will sketch out a few ideas on which
you and he might publicly agree.
We must avoid, if possible, a consumer-producer confrontation, because
the consumers are weaker -- Europe much more than the United States.
Europe is very dependent on Middle East oil. No one thinks we should
risk confrontation if it can be avoided. So we need government-to-govern-
ment working relations with the producers. We think we can combine the
proposals raised by OECD, the U.S. ideas, and Giscard's carelessly
launched ideas. (He consulted apparently no one).
Why not a sequence of three phases?
(1) Giscard invites a February meeting of senior civil servants
to Paris to set a date and invitations to a consumer-producer
conference, maybe for June, and define what might be
discussed. Then everyone will know a conference will
happen and that consensus of consumers and producers
(separately) must evolve.
(2) A consumer caucus, in which France then must join. And
(3) a consumer-producer meeting.
FORD
&
SECRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
1
HALLISNTS/OSS
11
Giscard will buy this. Before all this, we should do something private --
a small group of private citizens with access to their governments
(12-15 people) to have a meeting of brains. You could send Schultz.
Iran would send someone, and Saudi Arabia, and Algeria. There has
never been a brainstorming conference like this in the economic area
it would be like Pugwash -- with the producers. The Shah is not capable
of knowing what he has done to the world.
This is a personal idea. Someone would have to host, but governments
would be recipients of the ideas.
The governments of the producers don't understand. The French
Government doesn't. Giscard himself may.
President: Let me think about it. We strongly feel there must be a
higher unity among the consumers -- not on the basis of a confrontation,
but to know that we as consumers know our options, and soon. Without
that, if we go even to a preparatory conference, we will get off on the
wrong foot.
Schmidt: I agree. Secretary Kissinger knows I am trying to help.
Kissinger: Indeed, I told the President about your help at the Washington
Energy Conference.
Schmidt: But it may appear, if you attempt to do this first, before
anything, it looks like a consumer cartel. If you wrap it as I suggest,
it avoids this. You must defuse French policy in the Middle East.
In response, the French would have to participate.
Kissinger: Aside from the merits, there are a number of phony
arguments. What confrontation is there? Our relations with the
producers are as good as anybody's. The French are saying we
want a confrontation.
Schmidt: And U.S. citizens traveling abroad.
President: Then they are ill-informed. But if consumers don't have
some unison, we could go down the path to ineffective results.
Schmidt: I agree. But you are viewed as seeking a confrontation.
FORD
7
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/SENSITIVE
12
Kissinger: If bilateral relations with the producers aren't coordinated
among the consumers before the meeting, a meeting will produce the
same uncoordinated babble. We don't want a confrontation. You could
argue that if we aren't coordinated, a conference would fail and then a
confrontation would be inevitable.
Wise producers can't want the destruction of the consumers. I agree
with Giscard. But French diplomats are stimulating these ideas of the
U.S. wanting a confrontation.
Schmidt: How would you do it?
Kissinger: Giscard is committed to a producers conference. We are
not opposed, and we could even agree on a tentative date. But we would
reverse stages A and B. We first need consumer unity. We had a
letter from Sauvagnargues in Tokyo, in which he said a producers
conference only makes sense if preceded by consumer cooperation. If
we start preparation for a consumer/producer conference, maneuvering
would start. We save Giscard's face by getting the President's
commitment to a producers conference. The basic point is whether a
producers conference is one where the West continues its civil war or
whether we can get a unified approach.
French diplomats are using the producers conference in an anti-American
campaign. It actually helps us because it makes us look tough.
We worry about an unstructured conference. We want a long-term
solution which avoids confrontation.
Boumediene said to me, "If you want a slight political price cut we can
talk; if a deep cut, we can't talk. "
Schmidt: A private meeting would help to get an understanding on this
point.
Kissinger: A producers conference could accentuate the sense of
impotence of the West that could offset all policies.
Schmidt: I am convinced.
President: The problem is to save France's face and make it work.
Let's try to find a formula which will work and let me finalize it at
Martinique.
LIBRARY
SEGRET/SENSITVE
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
13
Schmidt: There are two technical problems: (1) Indexing. I am
totally opposed. But there is some validity for producers to want a
guarantee of the real price of oil.
Kissinger: It depends on the price.
Schmidt: The second problem is the $25 billion fund, about which I am
hesitant. It is an invitation for Britain and Italy to continue with inflation.
It takes away from the Arabs the risks of investment and puts it on us.
Third, I can't commit my country to that amount. $4 billion is an
enormous burden on our budget. It would explode my budget.
President: It gives us more freedom to have our own funds, so we are
not then dependent on both the oil produced and the money invested.
Kissinger: It could be used to introduce discipline.
Schmidt: Italy wouldn't fulfill the conditions.
Kissinger: If we borrow from the producers now, we have instituted
a producers/consumers dialogue right away.
Schmidt: The U.S. economy is 5 to 6 times as strong as ours. We
are just a medium-size economy. I couldn't risk being called on to
pay out billions. I would have to borrow from the Arabs.
Kissinger: Better you than the Italians.
Schmidt: Yes. But then I take all the bad risks and the Arabs get the
good risks. I would have to get parliamentary approval.
President: If we had the right kind of consumer unanimity, we could
get Congressional approval.
Schmidt: If it wouldn't be used, I could make it, but
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY. 44
NARA. DATE 5/7/04
GERALD
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K Dort & mentin this, E hu As and np
5
Increased F until about
Eath of and is a
4
Then sons cup. for Twhing during not of
droper atim
K They unst has shil, includes 2mld he tragem
if Soro introduce & oil whole
S They Toby of taking all have or/ in their
each What that was?
Snoul anyer is Snes sharewing himid
lines to conntry you effort hart is
Freenh cometry your efforts. WA feel
snor ml may board to apht w/ From ME
we drophy chetraked about Fr Chumin
propers
in VN. We what ontif an why for
unified from there at lut number they
smith There Savaram mapet mty
K also atistion P their arrlo. in are
S Terry hashion print hak
K Tromy famty ingotest int home persistantly
hishle than SU
S Won't about sov s rele. what is their wh
& her de you 100 let time they form
mks thrust behind scouls Any everyther
ich
negative
K Grangle has we individualing of na E. He
be it cl jonizel 00 if CSSE - his parats
all some as anob. anab at liest know
abj let shitesine & es alits. He won't split
it into parts, tells arols every thing and tell him
Otherwise in and his then in
S Honrebat Buy They Jan to have chrichd
C world. G hundles there, Ruz meand
we have entected dy of this but Uhen on
sone areas Fa ex: 6 in change on
Burt
(Droperte your payer)
They amot get a singh ent f event from
us anc court years - but lcan us/ by
is a Buz over,
V Brey deciment in SALT
K CSCE NIBER ME pros but Bry
(ferm Erms, but in hoging I-E
by le getting in,
applicant. That and regmate Syne cause
E purshy monthint 95th was for this. That
world the port SHIDOF ext & there me go hask
to Anima
S I this this should he (ablet over primation hrt
your Griand - s/o
you should shom bin froms/ore your
young #C dragers & their ME policy. Heart
calk w/ Ground wouth to
emp & devent losh B you to try.
P optn SALT, Bary game should partic to
K # la this usa, we hum GerB we ch but whe
Granghas approvance t recepting to anyther approvals
G writs to with have thing at once Thatsmas
x plasion. I cm dhal w/only sorming issues
at Once If too many, thing will gothurn.
5 use not wheshim injerting SU in
regaring Sow position on ME. But if a english
we hight he very exyment quickly, the
Schles didn't stress this, : and hope you
will dr your list for twit understanding
K an think and home 4-6 was There no longer
in Nov. It very issue. of I.
S And of mill home enresp in future because
they jo dugh in despin F creat not stare
K Inc can and should arronge & hark
6
w/so
S In I, Then who some Common atsta UN
sprich. Gaschrit & in thit han it & me don't
approved. I total Pane this
Umr and
plann fort prices hrs addrd to &
of wold evenomy about but way. Bunkdren
from Wash hit 11-73 already indiante
c hassi fish. US B/P deport w, the
contibuted Them and prices on by of that, that
For 12t trie nice is 3 II, a# of This my
the are enough & perduce a
T for workers.) Same have am & jet to for
by burrain atural, but analy tomporary.
& think pay a important as mechanical
mores. The big can cryanics as
to minst. have - not used getting invided
Servit strip will missid - staty + esp France.
K we form request systemation attroget to infertments
and t pohce
S Honevit accurthol. you dnit till
will ment eyened are will he in for of
fulfulling bel prophaces dually world.
Inter by public and pryand A Taha diasine
when Intern per have + EC,
I pregoned to tahn # of steps, but writty ensent
(1) Enhark on path of monthing & crish't generth
problemy 8 90 fee. I would prefer 1040 but
cant brook unit cintral bank
(x) Tax ant Jan 75, for whing & known
maddle Inco 14 lnl marks (in they
5X sundler)
(3) hongest balget lif feries C hor
7
this Wed
(4) Pay from # any envatment hat
we d June 25 of 2.560f what of
mostment if completed IL in certain
(5) also lumh small sinh public works
print lighting on trpjes mustrent
instruction to measures few orten include
his to them and have shipted from importer
& aprs forghty - method in
hurthert on # r p verity One slrgon
will in hub "eyrond moment, + Habitty
(means price strengly)
We candr it wain hirmal inglation is
1/2 your (6.5 12) 68 h word me have take
story menares alrendy t must bnd this
planes. Wrt crangets hat highrism
K What inflution rate will you get
S hast ever 890
Y Let hrt mixing On any i, economy badly
inplation burgering, int rate
as entire high effective
effort to do someting. no thin determine
m engloyment at that print I thed & yet
a vacenses w/c cang (ntys, Ntc), Insuranced
a proy to was felt in fortin was # r
your We put criting on brudget of 3ro - 5-6 Lil
betore Gt, weel from whif pa lner mime
tax white to good offset
This of help defrect I are A for smith $5%
hit only 28% 10% hurstand tay endit To
stinnlate terestment enclush Cig form 78)
9 must say my advisorschid was presius Ins things
commy other
of ensenver emprishes
8
S Importer emf?
P art who consumer. ams me hour crisis in anto
industry
S We aso purchase at only 2/3 expirate
Y ashed for new atorachysis from CI A by next ank.
& think he will M cornerent: mind huntation
as expendentments. We can get only A 306 even w/
long carp.
S Haw nark dif.
& at 302 it and have from 9.4, which cenld
hn r. at c rates me expect, C clap. will he
forewhat strimbations. He and prob
tax ant vice gost specifing
S Informs. Curroption ys, you investment
K good
them TU cm
P Yes, but en, currente to kent it on merchane suppliment
The wer Pm, is unk quantity Honse known more
when (inom sense) w/c Smotic onne
use will submit - a page to dental
1 some bind f pun you point ant.
He wen get inflution drum a 7-8% by
from this much may
he ez $ 6.5 That had
S Smil go 67 by Fin
P Yes, Y throughough l much cong into strimulares
prog of X anding mine suppliment. we
will mule Ukommed in SOV akoul 14 you.
Oreater first benno an tighting massey
shoply all somer
S 18-mis twente
P want judge, ht he crunklist change til negot
a plan & get a hand on spending
5 A Same w/ nge If & hadsela step & february
9
I world hur a dif.
K are Hms explain
S Pay. The Interprises of c us and one of chairm
forus of werld- - met ams. It is in your
hmb Whatner ml I, if you lint, and can't by
and that you should house boudget
dep per investment. It mild show leadmoling
Otherwise, a and depression well he bluened
again on US. IT will alstroy your world
F leadholing
K Phose the P canchittly through what you think,
after Talking w/ eron people
& years But 2 thin me weld press statement tother
son, also something on onl whith not
get- Your serha
P We that. Smit h carefull in
statement now bacnese 8 Cry. Have to m
to and specifies at this in
S davidestand, Contris in smylem should
sty ry depend. Coys in diffect
ail) shouldret them honges in retu &
orald (dnt writidned Mynest
for her to step y driver's
P r lef. for plan
S Dont explain Imade 10ml instance
abjut came much quicker
& June hadn't hit inflation him know
what cony would do in electric time We
dr need & affert C Oct pring, but ham to
ges (ny
S Bank Cascard 0.1. a undertunal
him or persons we have tontal often amilat
who- he 10 withing w/ryou to big about wt
10
only what looks like but sealth sheese purpose
of insolved w/his consent, I will shetch
ant - for the n which your he bright
problem agen.
Winnest arril if possibing a c-p comporation
become C more creater. we Een sunch more
them US. 65 Em very dependent on M ant.
wome Thinks has should isle componenter if -
for amount Some mee I paint greet
anything whom w/ p. we think ema enwhin
presents smil by SECD, us lilers, & Gricert's
combroly lam-had idea (He creamited of pornthy
no ow). why wt a sequence of 3 phase (1)
Graind invets Feh mty f Himis civil shorts
to forms to net set a dnti, initatris of c-y
cmf, razh for June, dyine what impt
he have Then every ne will know a craf
will happen & Cancuss of conserviro r prod
(sepentry) rest emit (2)
currers, in which Fe then hourst you
(3) a s-y mty.
Coscard will my this, Before all this, me
should dr someting private- small group of primate
entizens of awas to this goosts (rut people) I
from world send tow one - Samh, algerin.
have inty of him. you could send Shulty
Were huna hamistering 1mg whe this in
the a wecon Chetr Reguirch) w/ L producers Shah
wt eag: of being what he done toc world.
This fromal isten. Same would home to harb,
had canato he receptents for ideas.
The Cents of and dnit Fr
Cont drink (Gavard business snow
"
P hut me Think her storyly bell hust he
higher wint away C- not on hasis &
conformation but to here that me as
insurences bear one optimes etc, w/o
That, if me 70 room to prop every and will pet
off m arry faint.
S I agree K has I Trying A help
K & trild / alims your at WEC
S. K at it may appear P you attroge to do this
first before m thing A lowks like enoner
cartel. If you crugo it of dary grot it
armils this. you must defnes Fr policy
in NIE, her For world hum
to participate.
K aseils from ments, there an phony arproved.
What comparation? Our sel atris w/prout and
as good as anyther he Fr are singing che
want
S and US catizes traveling about
P Tram they ill and But in crymers dont
have your union, me could To dum furth
to inflection wants
S & Impress but run are unived os suching compontation
K In gov true If helattral evlations of p aren't
crosl any c hope maty, a mytami
province c snow in bahbh. are
don't ant importation sof Your could engare that
if me aren't crowd, cmf would Pail r am m cmf
he switch
W ise purduces containt distruction of
& ago che But Fr dylandto one structury
idem of vs importanter
$ ft mo and 7m of it?
Gut Samesay hith for Shuridit
12
K Gracient would to producers crup. We not approval
under bren agen a tent date. But we would
muhre stage A&B. we 1st me d consumer
with Hat later from Samramazer in Tabergo,
Said And coup only makes mise m if predent
by ems. comp. of are start prep. for e-p
movementing and stub. Wear same
Grind face by getting Prothwt put mf.
Booli ponit is whicher your up is and cranse
Wrst critines it and was or whither am
sen get or inspirated provide.
Fr and every prod couf in an onth
am company actually helps in bocause mabs
to line through
We many about an instructured mf.
We wont a long term solution which avoids
Banchine crupotation smil if you want shigit pal.
yru cnt, recontark; if a day unt, he can't
carb.
S a printi mtg would help to get me instanching on
this print
K Prod. em/- could accounted ( sinse f my atrance
I/C West that it and loffest all pulices
S & currenced
offset
Y Purk is to same Fr face F mate it work. hits'
by 5 Frida personal which will ank + ht has
finalis at Undertining
S $ 2 leah purh: (1) Indepring. Jann totally
of posed. But volulity for pool to emit guarantee
of pricedunt
K Department price
S Smood is 25 hrt find about which Lan heartant
13
It on montation for Br & stary to entime w/in/sate
It the amy from anube wish of investment
+ ports , m ho. (3) & and cmt my country
B Chat ant, 4 hil is am huring
on am boudyst. It smill spyding my had it
P and undersh unpal It years no me
fronden to have are on funds, and are not
them diplenchent on borth c and A fronds produced
& C money invested.
K smill he esed to introduces chaciptine
S Staty entital wouldn't falfill conditions
K of we harms from and hour we have instantine
p.e drialny
S US economy is 5-6 time or story EMI me. are
just a be him size & coundr't ink
bring called m to pay ant believe I mmH have
to borrow from mak.
K Karter you there c statins
S Yrs. But them & take Mc be d nots te ares
get - good risks. & would have to get particiant
P If approved. me hade eight hilf consumer smoking,
we -and get Crug opjersured.
S of is eventint he used, & could mate it, but