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April 16, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
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1553029
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April 16, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Cambodia
Vietnam (Republic)
Cabinet meetings
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1975-04-16
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1975
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1975-04-16
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET MEETING
DATE & TIME:
Wednesday - April 16, 1975
2:30 p.m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
President: There are several items to discuss. The one that is of
overriding importance is Southeast Asia. Henry?
Kissinger: Let me summarize where we are, the thoughts behind
your speech to the Congress last Thursday, and where we go.
You know what is happening in South Vietnam now. We believe that the cuts
in supplies being provided to the South Vietnamese and the upheavals in
the United States, and so on, led to a North Vietnamese decision to go all
out, in flagrant violation of the Paris Accords. Until January, our
intelligence did not indicate this was to be an all-out push. This is a
case where American domestic actions influenced a foreign government.
In the face of his situation, Thieu ordered a retreat into more defensible
enclaves. The retreat was carried out badly and led to these tragic
consequences.
The one question now being asked is how the United States will conduct
itself now after 15 years of support -- after even [in 1963] overthrowing
a government that was suspected of wanting to deal with the North. If
the President had opted just for humanitarian assistance, he would have
had to do it in the knowledge that it would have created panic and negated
our real commitment to the people who relied on us. The President
opted for both economic and military aid, because it was the best course
to take regardless of the outcome -- whether it is an evacuation,
stabilization of the military situation, or a negotiation which gives
them at least a modicum of opportunity to have a say about their own
fate. The only figure of any viability was Weyand's figure. The $300
million figure, if we had simply made the same request, would have
been met with the argument that it was the same as before the tragedy
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
CONFIDENTAL
NOC Memo. 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
LIBRARY & BRARY RALE 33
By
1 NARA, Date 1/20/00
TYINNICLINOD
- 2 -
and thus was clearly inadequate. The issue in the Senate appropriation
was not the amount but the concept. It is a matter of consequence to us
and the world how we manage our exit.
What is the impact on the world situation? It is often said that those
who say this affects us are producing the effect; they don't read the
cables. It has a profound impact on others' perceptions of our judgment,
our constancy, and the wisdom of the United States. Leaders who hardly
know Indochina are asking what it means.
There is nothing we can do about the past, but it is important how we
react to this. Will we withdraw? Will we give up our commitments
and our leadership? The worst mistake we could make now is to say we
are undertaking a global reassessment. What we are seeing in Vietnam
are special circumstances of a commitment that was perhaps unwisely
entered into, circumstances of executive weakness here, and so on,
none of which could be predicted. To generalize from this would be
disastrous in all areas. There can be a domino effect not related to
Vietnam but to our competence in foreign policy. We must conduct
our foreign policy with confidence and assurance, reiterating our commit-
ments.
are
The basic foreign policy of this country is sound. Our alliances good,
our relations with the Soviet Union are okay. In energy, food, raw
materials, we still have the decisive voice. Our problem is getting
the authority to do what is needed. If we can get the moral authority
that is required, we can have a year and a half of foreign policy achieve-
ments. So long as faith in the United States -- that means faith in
ourselves -- remains, we can overcome. We have had a setback but
we can overcome it and have a productive period of foreign policy.
President: Jim, would you update us on the military situation?
Schlesinger: Last Friday night we executed Eagle Pull in Cambodia. It
went smoothly. It was delayed chiefly because of the surprising decision
of most of the GKR -- even those on the death list not to leave. Eagle
Pull has been planned since 1970. Had there been an attack, we would
have returned the fire. The President has that legal authority under the
Constitution. The behavior of the Cambodians has been very brave.
In Vietnam, the North Vietnamese keep charging this is a civil war -- that
they have no forces in the South, and so on. For these reasons
decide not to assault Saigon directly, but they probably will try to they matroyD
the GVN army. It is fighting well but it is in a weaker position.
GE
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
President: Thanks, Jim. Most of you know what I said last Thursday.
We have been trying to get the military and economic aid and authority
to evacuate South Vietnamese. Congress thus far has shown no meaning-
ful cooperation. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has proposed
a $200 million emergency fund for a not very flexible interpretation,
with other provisions that are not very helpful. My judgment is that
amount is as bad as nothing. I intend to stick to my request in dollars
and authority. If the Congress sticks to its indicated attitude, it could
lead to dire circumstances. We must be consistent. We asked for the
right program. I hope the Congress comes through.
But I want no one here to talk about evacuation. That is a codeword in
Saigon for a bug-out. It is my hope that we can get the dollars and the
authority, to stabilize the situation and hopefully get negotiations started.
I want to thank Henry and Jim for their efforts. It hasn't been easy but
they are carrying out the right policy and I think history will demonstrate
the wisdom of our course.
Kissinger: I want to read to you the letter we received from Sirik Matak,
one of the Cambodian leaders, to our Ambassador when our Ambassador
invited him to leave with the evacuation: "Dear Excellency and Friend,
I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport
me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion.
As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed
for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people
which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we
can do nothing about it.
"You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under
this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my
country that I love, it is too bad, because we all are born and must die
one day I have only committed this mistake of believing in you, the
Americans
Butz: What will we do about Cambodian aid after the government falls?
President: I think it is wrong for the United States to give to the Communists
humanitarian aid which makes it easier for them to overcome our friends.
That is especially true in Vietnam. It eases their problems as they over-
whelm our friends. So for now, I would limit our aid to our friends.
FORD
GONEIDENTIAL
& LIBRARY RALD 30
CONFIDENTIAL
- 4 -
Kissinger: In South Vietnam there is no question. The Soviets and
Chinese, having supplied the ammunition, can also supply the rice.
In Cambodia, if Sihanouk comes in, aid may help him, but we should
wait and see. The war for the past three months was against not the
GKR but Sihanouk.
Schlesinger: I think there are higher priority areas for the funds.
President: Turning to domestic affairs, let's turn to consumer protection
legislation. A Consumer Protection Agency would be on the back of the
Departments constantly.
[Jim Cannon, Virginia Knauer, and A1 an Greenspan spoke. ]
RALD w P. FORD ABRART
CONFIDENTIAL
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