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1553050
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April 29, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
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1553050
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document
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April 29, 1975 - Cabinet Meeting
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Vietnam (Republic)
Cabinet meetings
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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29
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1975-04-29
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4
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1975
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29
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1975-04-29
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4
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1975
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT:
The President's Meeting with the Cabinet on Indochina
DATE:
Tuesday, April 29, 1975
9:45 a. m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
President: We had a difficult time in Indochina recently, beginning
with the situation in Phnom Penh. We have managed in Vietnam to
prevent a panic and to stabilize the military and diplomatic situation
temporarily. This has enabled us to get virtually all the Americans
out and many Vietnamese out. The fact that we have not panicked and
have kept together has enabled us to come out of a tragic situation as
well as possible.
Kissinger: When the President made his April 10th speech to the
Congress, he set the goal of stabilization of the situation. That
optimized our chances for whatever the outcome would be. It prevented
a panic and the jeopardizing of 6,000 Americans; it kept stability in
government, and it gave some chance to the high-risk Vietnamese.
The supplemental kept troops in the field and let us start the evacuation.
Defacto there was a ceasefire for a few days.
If there is a change in government in Saigon, it is foreseeable
it would move from pro-American to neutral to pro-Communist and
from helping us to opposing us.
Between the speech and yesterday, the number of Americans
was reduced from 6,000 to 950. Yesterday, Tan Son Nhut came under
day of fixed-wing operations if possible to get out 8,000 Vietnamese and
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 1/24/00
attack. The President called an NSC meeting and decided on one more
thin out the Americans. We located them in two areas: the Tan Son Nhut
compound with about 400 Americans, and the Embassy with 400 Americans
FORD
&
CHASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
By let
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
33
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
2.
and 200 hangers-on. The airport was closed by incoming fire so the
President ordered a helicopter evacuation. The airlift was ordered
at 1050 and began in the early hours. Our orders were to evacuate the
Americans, and we thought that could be done in a couple of hours, but
the Americans became mixed with Vietnamese and the decision was
they couldn't be evacuated without danger, so we have evacuated many
Vietnamese. The operation is continuing and probably will continue for
two or three more hours. If we are lucky and get them out, we will
have accomplished our objective to get the high-risk Vietnamese out,
and we have eased the transition to the new government. It is still
tragic but at least it is controlled.
President: The two Marines who were killed yesterday were killed by
happenstance rocket fire. We planned a fixed-wing evacuation, but
they were warned off when the runway was blocked. We then went to
a helicopter evacuation. On the ground they decided to evacuate
Vietnamese with Americans and we have to let them be the judge on
the ground.
Schlesinger: There are about 200 men in a security force at Tan Son
Nhut because the priority now is at the Embassy. There are an unknown
number of Americans and Vietnamese still left. The only attacks were
on aircraft on which fire was returned and on the boat from Can Tho.
Now we have the problem of sniper fire. We hope to complete the
operation by noon.
President: Are we actually in the process of getting the security force
out of Tan Son Nhut?
Schlesinger: Yes.
Kissinger: They can protect themselves better than others.
Morton: How about other nationals?
Kissinger: All have left but the French.
President: One of the problems has been that the number of Americans
has been growing as we evacuate -- they are coming out of the woodwork.
The rifle fire is worrisome. The fire is South Vietnamese, which
illustrates the problem we would have faced had we panicked the situation.
COMEIDENTIAL/XGDS
FORD & LIBRARY RALE 30
CONFIDENTIAL/XGDS
3.
Kissinger: And pushing for aid helped keep the situation stable.
Schlesinger: [Describes the loss of control at Tan Son Nhut] which
led to your decision to evacuate at about 11:00 p.m.
President: We have ordered Martin to get the Americans out but he
is the judge of how to get them out best.
Kissinger: You never ordered any but Americans out in the helicopter
lift. Including Vietnamese was a local decision, probably to insure the
evacuation of American citizens.
Morton: Where will the refugees go?
President: We have set up three U.S. refugee centers - Camp Pendleton,
Camp Chaffee and Eglin Air Force Base. There were some objections to
this, but we must spread them out to the extent possible.
Kissinger: We have approached a number of countries to take some.
President: After the leadership meeting, Henry and Ron Nessen will
brief the press. Tell them. Let's say nothing so we can speak with
one voice.
Morton: Maybe the TTPI can take 4-5, 000 skilled people. There is a
real shortage and we can explore it.
Coleman: Are you giving any thought now to outlining what our foreign
policy will be in this part of the world from here out? Your April 10th
speech was great for the time but obviously, the situation has changed
now.
CONF IDENT AL/XGDS
FORD 2 CERALOR BRARY RACO 30
Comist hity
29 apr 75
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