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May 28, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans
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May 28, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
Ed
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Leo Tindemans, Prime Minister of Belgium
Renaat Van Elslande, Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Development Cooperation
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Leonard Firestone, US Ambassador to Belgium
DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, May 28, 1975
9:15 p.m.
PLACE:
Le Petit Salon Blanc
The Royal Palace
Brussels
[There was five minutes small talk standing, before the group sat down. ]
Kissinger: Like most of our Ambassadors, Firestone is already sitting on
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, Stateleview 3/9/04
the Belgian side.
Tindemans: One of your former Ambassadors lives here -- MacArthur.
NARA, DATE 5/17/04
Who was your predecessor?
Firestone: Strauz-Hupe.
President: I am looking forward to the next two days of meetings. I want
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
to tell you I reaffirm the US commitment to NATO. There have been questions
about our commitment and there have been developments which led many to
do that. But I am certain of the credibility of our commitments.
FORD
&
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
BY BY /M
GERALD
TOP SECRET XGDS (3)
DECLARCIFIED
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
BY Can
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state 3/9/04
I NARA, DATE 5/17/04
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-2-
I gave Congress the drill in a speech last night. Last week there was a
House Amendment to withdraw 70, 500 troops -- it was defeated 290-91.
Tip O'Neill has favored cuts for years but he said this was not the time.
There is a changing mood. Mansfield for years has pushed withdrawals from
NATO, Korea and Vietnam -- he said he wouldn't do it now. It is this message
I want to get out.
Tindemans: That is good news because my Foreign Minister was asking if
there was a new foreign policy.
I don't know if there is a specific topic you wanted to discuss, but there is
the question of the F-104 replacement. It is difficult for us. You know we
divided North-South and there were some split ones. There were three planes
certified by NATO. Yours, the Mirage, and the Swedish. If I had taken a
vote, the government would have fallen. I went to Paris and met with my
friend Chirac. There was much lobbying on both sides. There was a price
deadline but the French kept making new proposals. The four countries
recognized the General Dynamics plane was the best and cheapest. But the
French made new proposals, adding economic compensation. We have a small
industry in the area, located in the South. Also an electronics industry located
in the North. This complicated things. Chirac made political proposals.
He said, "Let's do it together, for a European aircraft industry.' The MRCA
is German, a consortium plane. The French proposed a European aircraft
industry. It was an attractive idea. At the last moment the French proposed
a. European Council for Security Affairs to study arms and the implementation
of production of arms. Second, Chirac said he accepted going back to the
Eurogroup of NATO this a Gaullist leader! but Giscard doesn't say this.
It's paradoxical. So there appeared this possibility. So we consulted. I
spoke with Thorn, the Dutch Government and asked the Dutch their reaction.
I also talked to Schmidt, who has never answered. We figured if the French
made such a proposal they had talked to the Germans.
Kissinger: The French told me they wouldn't proceed with European defense
projects.
Tindemans: He told me "Security affairs" of the Nine; he didn't want to usethe
word "defense. "
Denmark answered no, Iceland,no, Great Britain said, "Don't talk of it before
the referendum." So the Germans and the Dutch didn't answer, Denmark and
Iceland said no, so we tried. If it is a European solution, we must have another
solution. So my Minister will talk to you about some of the details.
FORD
?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRAR
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
-3-
President: I am glad to hear it is coming to a head. I followed it without
being personally involved. I was with the Defense Procurement Committee
in the House, so I know all the planes. It is our plan to have 250 of them
in NATO. We had a tough competition and decided the F-1 16 was the best.
I am encouraged about what I heard from the Danes, the Norwegians and the
Dutch.
Tindemans: We didn't like the way they did it. They took a decision without
consulting us, that if the four agreed, they wanted the F-16. They have a
problem, the Socialist party -- his own party -- voted against such a plane.
Den Uyl said that not the country, but now the Socialist leaders are giving him
problems. So he has problems. And we have a problem, so I think we can
make a choice without the government falling.
President: So the French were actually helpful.
Kissinger: Not by design.
Tindemans: My Minister of Defense pressed for the Mirage so he will have
some questions.
President: I would be interested in your views on Portugal. I am worried
about it.
Tindemans: You can say it is a danger for NATO -- for security. But the
other view is that if we take such an attitude now, the forces who would make
a coup would have it because they are already ostracized. Conversely
President: The military said they wouldn't pay attention to the vote. Somehow
we have to support the 87 percent -- but how do we do it without supporting
the few?
Kissinger: There is another problem. There are left-wing parties in Europe
with communist allies. If Portugal goes like Algeria and Yugoslavia and yet
stays in NATO, it will set a pattern. The anomaly of having them there
attending the meetings, reading the documents. Like tomorrow. We might
as well have the Russian Ambassador in.
President: We don't have the answer. We didn't like the previous government.
But we are very disturbed by the way it is going.
FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
is
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-4-
Kissinger: The former government was on no threat -- no one would imitate
it. But this is a new phenomenon. A neutralist, Communist-dominated
government in NATO.
President: I felt compelled to speak frankly. I spoke to some European
journalists on TV and I expressed these views. Most Americans feel this
way.
Tindemans: When Giscard came in, he invited us all to the Elysee. I discovered
that some of the new leaders weren't acquainted with the Treaty of Rome. Some
of the leaders proposed things that were contrary to it. There is no longer
the generation of pioneers for the Treaty of Rome. There are now economic
difficulties, and that always puts pressure on governments. There is no
movement now towards integration. That is not the mood of the moment.
So it was a surprise when Giscard proposed direct election of the European
Parliament and abandonment of unanimity at the Council of Ministers.
DeGaulle would have died. The other governments said that at this difficult
movement their populations wouldn't understand why we weren't talking the
problems of reality, like energy. At the Foreign Ministers' level there was
suspicion about the Paris meeting. But we had to do something so we decided
a study should be made of the future of Europe.
We shouldn't speak of new institutions -- what we need is new policies. There
are no longer any strong decisions. Don't look for harmony among all, because
even the United States doesn't have that kind of harmony. That was what came
from the Dublin meeting [of the Nine].
We are not realizing our monetary union, but we are drifting away from each
other. I gave a press conference and said that the political leaders in 1972 were
too ambitious to propose monetary union by 1980. The difference in regions are
still too great. I said sometime, maybe in ten, 20, 30 years. But I was
attacked by the British for advocating monetary union. But in Luxembourg,
where they were for it, they said they could tell me how to do it soon. So
we have problems.
So now can we now speak of monetary union, common energy policy, different
institutions, and the question of: do we need new institutions? What is the
role of the Committee and the Commission? What is the role of the Council
of Ministers? The Summit meetings are now called the European Council --
it meets five times a year. What is relation of that to the Commision? No
one knows. These are the problems, the solutions for which I must caution
upon in my paper by December.
FORD
?
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
-5-
President: I would say you have a monumental task preparing such a report.
Your problems remind me of Clarence Streit, who was always for Atlantic
Union. His resolution has passed the House a couple of times. But I think it
is healthy to have this kind of discussion. It's better than wanting to destroy
what you have -- at least you are looking for ways to progress.
Tindemans: For us, Europe is not against the Atlantic Alliance. We need
an Atlantic World -- it is life for us. But if we can have a Europe, we want
it, because otherwise borders are closed and the small countries are hurt.
But there is an anti-Europe mood in Europe now. Even in the socialist parties.
FORD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
2
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TINDEMANS OF BELGIUM
Wednesday, May 28, 1975
9:15 p.m. (30 minutes)
Le Petit Salon Blanc, The Royal Palace
Brussels, Belgium
From: Henry A. Kissinger
I.
PURPOSE
This meeting, on the eve of the NATO summit, will permit you and
the Belgian Prime Minister to review trans-Atlantic and East-West
issues as well as current international developments of mutual
interest. Your purpose will be:
-- to state the United States' total commitment to the Atlantic
Alliance and to seek Delgian support for the strengthening of the
Alliance.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS AND PRESS ARRANGEMENTS
A. Background: This will be your first meeting with Prime Minister
Tindemans (TIN-dah-mons), one of the postwar generation of
moderate Flemish political figures who have risen to prominence
in Belgian national politics in recent years. Tindemans will
welcome this meeting to review the current state of Atlantic
relations and the prospects for further steps in East-West
relations, particularly in the CSCE and MBFR talks. He may
also seek your views on developments relating to Cyprus.
Tindemans' center-right government took office in April 1974.
It is a coalition of Social Christians, Liberals, and a small
linguistic party. At present, his most pressing concern is the
depressed state of the Belgian economy: inflation is running at
15 per cent and unemployment at 6 per cent. There are no
significant bilateral problems between the US and Belgium,
although the Tindemans government is currently facing a difficult
issue in its choice of a replacement for its F-104 combat aircraft.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
GDS
NSC MEMO, 11/24/08, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 3/9/04
BY
4
NARA, DATE 5/17/04
SECRET
-2-
The Belgians must weigh the technical and cost advantages
of the US built F-16 against French political pressure to choose
the Mirage F-1.
Belgium is one of the most consistent and resolute supporters
of NATO. Domestic political considerations, however, deeply
influence the Belgian government's attitudes toward possible
Spanish membership in NATO and the effect of recent events in
Portugal on its role in NATO. The Belgians strongly oppose any
steps to improve Spain's relationship with NATO while Franco is
in power, fearing that such steps would lead to the collapse of the
Belgian Government and undermine support in Belgium for con-
tinued participation in the Alliance. At the same time, the Belgians
prefer an optimistic interpretation of the April 25 elections in
Portugal and would probably favor accommodation with the Portuguese
on NATO security issues.
East-West Issues: Belgium is amenable to a CSCE summit in
Helsinki this summer but wants further Soviet concessions on
notification of major military maneuvers and on Basket III issues
(human contacts). Belgium continues to be among the strongest
defenders of the Alliance position in MBFR and is concerned over
growing pressures in some Alliance countries for early cuts in
MBFR. The Belgians believe that following CSCE the Soviets will
make a major push in MBFR and that unless the Europeans are
prepared, public pressure for a conclusion reflecting Eastern goals
will be difficult to resist. They believe NATO should concentrate
on developing common positions on the nuclear option and the
common ceiling.
B. Participants: Prime Minister Tindemans, Foreign Minister
Van Elslande, Henry A. Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.
C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will be announced as part of
your schedule in Brussels, and there will be a press photo session
at the beginning of your conversations with the Prime Minister.
SECRET
GDS
SECRET
- 3 -
III. TALKING POINTS
Atlantic Alliance/NATO Summit
1. In the year since the signing of the Atlantic Declaration, consul-
tations and cooperation among the nations of the Alliance have
improved significantly. We greatly appreciate the important
contributions which Belgium has made to this encouraging
development.
2. It is my firm belief that no cause is of greater importance for
our peoples -- and to the prospects for peace and stability through-
out the world -- than that of maintaining and demonstrating the
strength and solidarity of the West.
3. These are times of immense challenge for our countries. The
very fact that the issues before us are of such gravity and com-
plexity makes this NATO summit especially important as an
opportunity to reaffirm our determination to resolve problems
and to find solutions in the common interest.
4. I will state clearly tomorrow that the United States remains true
to our North Atlantic Treaty commitments.
5. I look forward during the next two days to consulting with the other
leaders of the Alliance on the need to maintain a strong and credible
defense, to improve the process of consultation, and to proceed
together with the agenda for detente.
6. Unless each of us keeps our defense forces strong and unless we
continue modernization, the Alliance will be extremely hard
pressed to meet the challenges we face.
Portugal and NATO
1.
The April 25 election results, while encouraging for the Socialists
and other moderates, will have only slight effect upon the policies
and leadership of the AFM. Continuing unrest and turmoil in
Portugal, such as have taken place recently are a source of con-
tinuing concern.
SECRET
GDS
SECRET
- 4 -
2. We remain deeply concerned about the radical and neutralist
policies of the AFM, its repression of Socialist party organs,
the presence of Communist ministers in the Cabinet, and the
future role of Portugal in the Alliance.
Spain and NATO
1. It is important to look to the future, and to the importance that
the stable, purposeful framework of the North Atlantic Alliance
.
can provide to Spain over the coming years. Our defense facilities
in Spain make a substantial contribution to the Alliance.
2. Spain would be aided in following a stable, moderate course if it
is brought into the NATO framework as early as circumstances
permit.
3. We recognize that a number of Allies, including Belgium, cannot
consider Spanish membership in NATO while Franco is in office.
However, we should be prepared for the transition. We think it
important to begin to indicate to the Spanish, as well as to our
publics. that a future possibility for a Spanish role in the Alliance
exists.
CSCE
1. The Allies have done a good job in developing realistic goals at
The CSCE. We hope that Belgium will continue to join in holding
firm on Western positions, and I know the importance your govern-
ment attaches to the freedom of contact and humanitarian issues
in Basket III.
2. At the same time, we believe the Allies should be realistic in
demands for Soviet concessions on Confidence Building Measures.
3.
We still assume that results of the Geneva talks will be significant
enough to justify a stage III summit this year, but we will continue
to withhold a final commitment to a summit until results are in hand.
MBFR
1. We have just completed a thorough review of MBFR in which we
examined what should be done in the near future to help achieve
our MBFR objectives.
SECRET
GDS
SECRET
- 5 -
2. Our review of course included the question of introducing nuclear
weapons into MBFR.
3. We have concluded that the addition of nuclear elements to the US
first-phase reductions offers the best promise for reducing the
existing asymmetry in armor and manpower in Central Europe
and gaining Eastern Acceptance of manpower parity in that area.
4. A prime objective in our examination of this possible change in
the Alliance position has been to maintain the greatest possible
flexibility for improving NATO forces and military effectiveness.
5. We will be presenting to NATO a comprehensive paper on our
views, explaining our proposal in detail.
Energy/Raw Materials
1. I regret lack of agreement at the producer-consumer preparatory
conference, but believe it better not to move forward with a
conference which would clearly not be productive. The primary
focus of US international energy initiatives will remain the IEA.
2. The Prepcon's failure underscored several points: we cannot
resolve the energy problem simply by talking to the producers;
we must take the necessary steps to achieve the conservation
and development of domestic energy sources which will reduce
our dependence on imports, and create the objective conditions
for lower oil prices. My recently announced energy measures
are designed to achieve these ends.
3. The politicization of raw materials issues stalemated the energy
Prepcon. It is now in the interest of the industrialized countries
to coordinate with one another to ensure a common approach to
the developing countries and demands for abandonment of the
present international economic system.
4. I want to emphasize our very real interest in cooperation with both
consumers and producers. In this spirit, we are willing to parti-
cipate in another preparatory conference. We remain convinced
however that energy resources and other raw materials must
receive separate treatment if progress is to be made in either area.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEGRET
- 6 -
5.
We are prepared to consider realistic proposals for change in
specific areas where change is of substantive benefit and
mutually agreeable. Increases in developing country income
should be achieved primarily through increased production and
trade; it is particularly unrealistic to think that large scale
transfers can take place in a stagnating world economy or on
the basis of unrealistic demands for "reparations. "
6. We must convince developing countries of our genuine interest
in finding solutions to commodity problems and of the necessity
to tailor solutions to the individual commodities. We must also
convince them that they must move from their radical demands
to more realistic bargaining.
Middle East
1.
I am looking forward to my talks with Sadat.
2. The Middle East situation is, of course, dangerous for all of us
since without some significant diplomatic movement there will
almost certainly be an eventual resumption of hostilities and
another oil embargo.
3. Our reassessment has been prolonged because its outcome
naturally depends in good part on the attitude of the parties and
we are hoping for some change. As yet we have made no decisions
on a diplomatic option. The choices are to resume the suspended
negotiations over the Sinai passes and oil fields, try for a broader
interim agreement, or go squarely for a comprehensive settlement,
with the possibility of it resulting in a series of interim agreements.
Nor have we made any firm decisions on Geneva, although this
seems more and more likely as time goes by with no signs of
movement.
4.
We are under heavy pressure from Israel and its supporters in the
U.S., on the one hand, and Sadat and the other Arabs, on the
other, to take a public stand in their favor.
5.
We have been firm in not entering into any new military or economic
commitments with Israel while the reassessment continues, and we
have had no new diplomatic proposals from them. Sadat is
becoming more anxious because political and economic pressures
SEGRET
FORD
GDS
GERALD
SECRET
- 7 -
on him are increasing, partly generated by the USSR. Critical
dates for the Arabs will be the Arab Summi+ on June 28 and the
renewal of UNEF on July 25, so something must begin to move
this month.
6.
I hope my meetings in Salzburg with Sadat and later with Rabin
will provide a clearer idea of what is feasible.
Cyprus
1.
The continuing lack of a negotiated settlement on Cyprus is damaging
to the Alliance and has weakened its strategic southern flank. It is
therefore important to the Alliance -- as well as to the parties --
that a solution be found. The United States will continue to offer its
good offices in assisting the parties to find such an acceptable solution.
2. It is in this spirit that I will meet with the Greek and Turkish prime
ministers tomorrow. I am hopeful that these meetings, together
with recent direct Greek-Turkish and Cypriot intercommunal
contacts, will create momentum for progress toward a settlement
acceptable to all parties - - Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.
F-104 Replacement
1. Our commitment to a strong alliance requires that we give continuing
attention to provision of the most modern, technologically advanced
weapons systems for our defense forces -- the replacement of the
F-104 is, therefore, a significant and very positive step.
2. I am pleased that the four consortium countries, including Belgium,
acknowledge the technical superiority of the F-16. We certainly are
not opposed to a European defense industry, but if it is done as a
means of competing with the U.S. on the basis of French industry, U.S.
support for NATO will wane,
3. Together with our own planned deployment of 250 F-16's to Europe
in the 1980's, a decision for the F-16 would enlarge the area of
standardization among NATO air forces and would increase by a
significant margin the efficiency of the air war capability of the
Alliance.
*
*
The Department of State's memorandum on this meeting, biographic sketches
and additional background materials are in your bilateral briefing book at the
Tab marked Belgium.
SECRET
F-16 / Move insured then talkers
*
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DECLASSIFIED
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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review53/9/14
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NARA. DATE 5/17/04
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