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June 19, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, NATO Ambassadors
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June 19, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns, NATO Ambassadors
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This file contains material related to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).
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Scowcroft, Brent, 1925-
Peck, Edward, Sir, 1915-
Bruce, David Kirkpatrick Este, 1898-1977
Rose, François de, 1910-
Luns, Joseph M. A. H. (Joseph Marie Antoine Hubert), 1911-
Pansa Cedronio, Paolo.
Schlesinger, James R., 1929-2014
Kissinger, Henry, 1923-2023
Clift, Arthur Denis, 1937-
Busch, Rolf
Staercke, André de, 1913-
Menzies, Arthur R.
Ford, Gerald R., 1913-2006
Rumsfeld, Donald, 1932-
Goldwin, Robert A. (Robert Allen), 1922-
Holmes, H. Allen, 1933-
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Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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North Atlantic Treaty Organization. (04/04/1949 - )
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tional Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
E/C FORD LIBRARY
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1b
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns
NATO Deputy Secretary General Pansa Cedronio
Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning
and Policy Colin Humphreys
Ambassador Andre de Staercke, Belgium
Ambassador Arthur Menzies, Canada
Ambassador Ankar Svart, Denmark
Ambassador Francois de Rose, France
Ambassador Franz Krapf, Germany
Ambassador Byron Theodoropoulos, Greece
Ambassador Tomas Tomasson, Iceland
Ambassador Felice Catalano, Italy
Ambassador Marcel Fischback, Luxembourg
Ambassador A. K. F. (Karel) Hartogh, Netherlands
Ambassador Rolf Busch, Norway
DECLASSIFIED SEC. 3.6
Ambassador Joao de Freitas Cruz, Portugal
E.O. 12958
Ambassador Orhan Eralp, Turkey
MR07-50 rev3/04, OSDltr 7/30/07
Ambassador Sir Edward Peck, United Kingdom
Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, United States
del NARA DATE, 7/29/08
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Robert Goldwin, Special Consultant to the President
H. Allan Holmes, Director, Office of NATO and Atlantic
Political-Military Affairs, Department of State
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security
Council RN
DATE AND TIME:
June 19, 1975
4:05 - 5:02 p.m.
GERALDR.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
The White House
SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED TOP BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRET/NODIS
5/20/04
H
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
SUBJECT:
President's Meeting with Permanent Representatives
to the North Atlantic Council
President: (Having gone around the table to greet each participant
individually) Won't you all please sit down. We have to have our traditional
press photograph.
(The press was admitted for photographs and then left.)
President: Let me welcome each and every one of you to the White House.
I am delighted to meet those of you I haven't met before and to get reacquainted
with old friends, Franz Krapf. Franz Krapf and I and our wives got well
acquainted many years ago. How long ago was it Franz?
Krapf: 1958 or 1959, Mr. President.
President: Well, it's good to see you. I had no idea that the invitation for this
meeting that I issued in February would be interferred with by the Brussels
summit, however, I felt that the summit was very successful, that it was very good
to have the representatives of the various countries of the Alliance together. The
reaction to the summit in the United States has been very good, and I hope it
has been the same in each of your countries.
I think that the reaction to the trip here is best reflected by the action ofthe
United States Senate following my return -- the actions they have taken with
regard to Secretary Schlesinger and the Military Authorization Bill. A year
ago, when we had action on this bill, there were numerous cuts, and numerous
amendments that were very harmful to our defense effort. This year, the
atmosphere was entirely different. We won every amendment that would have
reduced our weapons systems or cut back on our defense program, and we
won by a good margin!
On the occasion of this meeting I would like to state my continuing interest in
the six points that I raised during the Brussels meeting. I know you are
familiar with them and so I will go through them quickly. First, we have a
continuing interest in the strength of the Alliance, strength in a military sense.
This is of foremost importance, and the United States will play a full role.
Second, we are interested in the Alliance broadening its interests in areas
relating to the strength of our countries, in areas that we face as industrialized
SECRET/NODIS
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
countries. Third, I believe we have to be realistic about the US-Spanish
defense agreements, and that we have to recognize the contribution that they
make to military arrangements in Europe. I also think that we, that the United
States, should continue detente with the Soviet Union. This can be helpful in
areas of importance to the Alliance. We are extending our negotiations in
SALT II; there is no resolution as yet but we are building on the Vladivostok
meeting of last December. The MBFR negotiations, the negotiations in Geneva
without consideration of Phase III -- have shown progress in Phase I. What
are the numbers, Henry?
Secretary Kissinger: In MBFR or CSCE -- in MBFR there are some 28 to 32
thousand on our side to 68 thousand on their side, together with equipment.
President: The point I am making is that in Phase I we are on dead center. I
know that consultations have gone forward on the nuclear element and that we
are now looking at the question of including Pershings and some of our aircraft.
Is it the F-104s?
Secretary Schlesinger: F-4s, sir.
President: We are also interested in the European security negotiations. I
understand that there is now some movement, and if there is an acceptable
compromise I would assume there will be something in Helsinki in the latter
part of July. These are among the principal issues that we see of interest to
the Alliance, together with standardization, rationalization, and other matters
of present concern.
Turning to the Middle East, following my visit to Europe I had two very full
days with Prime Minister Rabin. These followed my conferences with President
Sadat in Salzburg. I am convinced that if we permit a stalemate to continue
it inevitably will result in military conflict in the Middle East. If that happens,
you can write out the next part of the scenario - - an oil embargo. Third, if we
don't get movement we will have war in the Middle East, an oil embargo and the
development of serious anti-Americanism among the Arab states. Fourth, these
efforts would bring back into the Middle East the Soviet Union in a strong way.
They've been somewhat crowded out, in fact, substantially crowded out in the
negotiations following the Yom Kippur War. But, if these things take place,
the Soviet Union will be back in the Middle East.
We're working along two tracks. The suspended talks could be resumed and an
interim settlement agreed to. Differences have been narrowed, but there is
still insufficient give by the parties. If that give doesn't develop, there will be
no alternative but to pursue a comprehensive settlement with all issues going to
SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS
- 4 -
Geneva. We prefer the former, but the latter would have to be the alternative
if an interim agreement is not possible. I can't at this point forecast an interim
agreement, because we still have not resolved the differences but if we don't
have such an agreement a comprehensive plan will have to be introduced. It will
be inevitable, although not a good choice.
Well, with those comments I would like to turn to you and to have any questions
you may wish to ask.
Secretary General Luns: Mr. President, allow me on behalf of the Council to
warmly thank you for taking time in your very heavy schedule to fit in this visit
by the Council to the White House. We are very grateful. This strong evidence
of your interest in the Alliance and in the affairs of Europe has been crowned by
the summit in Brussels. In Europe, the governments, the parties, the public
and the media have recognized the importance of the summit and see it as a great
success. Far from having this visit inconvenienced by the summit, we feel
that our meeting with you today brings new energy and new importance to the
work of the Alliance.
Mr. President, we have listened with interest to your remarks, to your state-
ments on the six points of your address and your views on the world situation
-- especially the Middle East. You and your Secretary of State are very active
in this area. The Council shares the pre-occupations of you and your government
on what might happen if there is no agreement between Israel and the Arab states.
We do hope your talks with Rabin and your meetings with Sadat in Austria will
lead to a new step.
The Council has had a very useful schedule here in the United States. The
Nuclear Planning Group has had the privilege to be on the other side of the
United States, and now we are attending the SACLANT Symposium in Annapolis.
Our meeting in Monterey was very successful.
President: It is a beautiful place isn't it?
Secretary General Luns: Yes, Mr. President, but it's cold! It was only
45 to 50 degrees. We had heard that the sun shines out there, but we didn't
believe it (laughter). Flying over your country we were again impressed by its
enormity, by the size of the strongest member of the Alliance. It made us very
proud to think that our cousins, our brothers andour sisters have all come here
to contribute to its growth.
SECRET/NODIS
TERRAT GERALDR. Quin.
SECRET/NODIS
- 5 -
President: They are the bulwark of our population.
Secretary General Luns: We also had the opportunity to visit your huge base
at Vandenburg, We were extremely impressed of how dedicated and how well
trained all the men there were, and how very modern your technology. Now,
we appreciate your kind invitation to put questions to you, and I will ask the
Dean to begin this. First, however, I want to stress our very warm thanks.
President: Did you have a good evening last night?
Secretary General Luns: Yes, oh yes. Several of the ambassadors and I
decided that if we had such a marvelous yacht, we would do a lot less than you
if we were President. Mr. Rumsfeld and his wife are very good hosts, and it
was a lovely evening.
Ambassador de Staercke: Thank you Mr. President. As Dean, I would first
like to underline the importance of this meeting. It not only has a symbolic
importance but also an effective importance as it completes the success of your
trip to Brussels and it underlines the solidarity expressed during the meetings
in Brussels. I, too, wish to express our gratitude.
The first question I would like to ask relates to the Middle East question. We
are aware of the importance of an interim settlement. Is there a chance for
step-by-step diplomacy again, for the Secretary of State to become involved
again?
President: There is a possibility of working with Egypt and Israel toward this
end. However, at this point, it would not be wise to send the Secretary of State
on another two-to-three week shuttle operation. There would have to be an
agreement already agreed to, but one which might be consumated during such a
visit. It would not be wise now to plan another three week trip. It would be
impractical. We have narrowed differences, but there are still differences.
We would have to have them further narrowed.
Ambassador de Staercke: Turning to another situation, Mr. President, I would
like to discuss Europe, the situation in the Alliance. I won't talk about recent
elections and recent events with which we are all familiar, but rather about the
whole situation and its precarious effect on the solidarity on the Alliance.
Especially, there is the problem of Turkish-Greek-US relations. Mr. President,
we would like to help you. Realistically, as Dean, I believe there are no great
chances for such assistance, but we would like to put all chances possible on
your side. We have heard of the 30-day move by the Turks. We have heard of
SECRET/NODIS
LERARY GERALD FORD
SECRET/NODIS
- 6 -
the possibility of a settlement with the Greeks in the autumn. But the United
States should not have to work alone. We are grateful, but the Secretary
General, with the considerable powers of his office, could do more. The
Secretary General with our consensus could, for example, write the three
parties to urge the governments of Greece and Turkey to work as friends
and to work with patience -- and to urge the United States to greater speed
in dealing with the delivery of arms to Turkey. If we could help, I think it
would be of enormous assistance. The danger is, that while we have unity,
these problems run the risk of being misinterpreted by outsiders. Our
internal differences are seen as a weakening of our resolve. Thank you
Mr. President. I wanted you to know of this interest on our part.
President: Our concern about Cyprus and the differences between Greece and
Turkey have had the highest priority of this Administration. We are anxious
to help as best we can to resolve these problems. I met -- two fine meetings
-- with Caramanlis and Demirel in Brussels. The Secretary of State has been
meeting with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers. Unfortunately, we
also have the problem in the United States of the Congress which has taken
a very unwise action in the arms cut-off. I have fought that action since I
have been in office. The Senate, as you know, took positive action before we
left for Brussels. I met this morning with members of the House Committee on
International Affairs to see if it is possible to get some action in the House.
However, the problem is more difficult in the House than in the Senate. We will
continue to try to get the Congress to take affirmative action, and to take this
problem out of the Turkish-Greek negotiations. On the other hand, once that
has been done it is essential that the negotiations between Greece and Turkey
bring some resolution of the Cyprus problem. Secondly, in the interim, it is
my hope that there will be
restraint in that part of the Mediterranean.
Resumption of any military activity would be counterproductive.
Secretary Schlesinger: Mr. President, I think Ambassador de Staercke has
raised an interesting point in suggesting that NATO's views might be made
known at some point in the House debate.
Secretary Kissinger might wish to keep this in mind, and we might get in touch
with Secretary General Luns at the appropriate time.
President: There is now the realization in the House that something has to be
done, and I believe that anything from this group would be welcomed.
SECRET/NODIS
LERRARY GERALDR. FORD
SECRET/NODIS
- 7 -
Secretary General Luns: As you know, I have a watching brief inherited
from my predecessor, but special circumstances have prevented me from
acting.
The Greek Government has felt that now that it has a democratic
government and has done away with the colonels it is burdened with a problem
not of its making and does not have enough support of NATO. Turkey, as you
have pointed out, is dismayed by the interference of the House and Senate. I
had a very good meeting with the President and the Prime Minister of Turkey,
after an international meeting in Izmir. I also met with Demirel in Brussels.
If the Secretary General could be of use, I believe it would have to be without
conditions and without publicity. Forces at work, I think we would agree,
would jump at the pretext to condemn such a role. If the U.S. Government
feels it would be useful to have its views brought to one government or to two
governments, I will do it. I touched on this subject at the SACLANT Symposium.
Ambassador Theodoropoulos: Mr. President, speaking for Greece, I wish to'
express our great appreciation for the spirit in which the United States is
trying to help both in the framework of the Alliance and in our bilateral relations
in the restoring of democratic institutions. I would note that today we have a
new President.
President: I saw that, congratulations.
Ambassador Theodoropoulos: He is a very distinguished man. Mr. President,
as my Prime Minister may have told you, our situation is that of a very fragile
flower, and we need all the help we can from our allies if we are to have the
situation stabilized. I believe the meeting of the Prime Ministers in Brussels
was helpful. My Prime Minister spoke to you and to other Prime Ministers,
and these discussions shaped his mind in a constructive way. You will also have
witnessed the first and second stages of our bilateral negotiations in which I
believe we arrived at a happy solution in a positive way which will preserve the
interests of both sides. I am confident that the NATO negotiations will also
be concluded in this spirit. We are aware of our geographic position, and we
belong to the West. As to the suggestion that the watching brief might be
reactivated, there is one essential element and the Secretary General is very
wise in stressing the need for confidentiality. We must avoid a great splash.
Ambassador Eralp: Mr. President, I would like to reiterate the appreciation
of my government for what your Administration is doing to set right the injustice
of the arms cut-off. Considering the pressures of public opinion and the press
in Turkey under the present circumstances, I think the measures that we have
taken are mild. We are in a period of expectation, and we are relying on you
in the meantime to set the record straight.
SECRET/NODIS
FURD
TERRAT
SECRET/NODIS
- 8 -
As to the Secretary General's watching brief, we have enormous confidence
and we do not think he has failed. This brief concerns Greek-Turkish relations
not Cyprus. We in Turkey feel that Cyprus should not be related to the arms
cut-off issue.
Ambassador Svart: Mr. President, returning to the Middle East, do you feel
that Western Europe can play a useful role? Could we play a role, and if so,
at what stage?
President: At this point, I have reservations on the suggestion that any additional
pressure might be useful. There is clear recognition that Europe continues
to have a huge stake. I remember vividly the oil embargo of 1973 running into
1974, and the parties trying to resolve their differences can't be oblivious to
this. My general impression is that we presently have such delicate circumstances
that any additional pressure would be counterproductive. Both are proud
countries. If we can get them together, we will have better protection. If we have,
to go to Geneva, however, I think the point of view of our various countries
would have impact.
Secretary Kissinger: Now the issues are so complex that any deal by a party
not intimately involved would only add a new element of confusion. If we have
failure and if we move in the direction of an overall settlement, it will be highly
desirable that Europe and the United States not try to outbid each other.
Ambassador Svart: In Geneva?
President: Right.
Ambassador Krapf: Mr. President, I would like to discuss Syria's place. in this.
I believe you are expecting a visitor?
President: Yes, we will be meeting tomorrow morning.
Secretary Kissinger: He is here now.
Ambassador Krapf: I wonder if there is a realization on Israel's part of the need
to give somewhat on the Syrian side?
President: In our discussions, the question of Syria and Israel making a
subsequent step has been discussed. We have, however, tried to focus initially
to isolate the Israel-Egypt step. There are those who say if you have a first
step you will have to have a second. There are also those who say the second
SECRET/NODIS
LERATE
SECRET/NODIS
- 9 -
step has even more difficult territorial problems than in the Sinai. I should
know better tomorrow what their views are on the very difficult issue of the
Golan Heights. I think all of you know how very difficult it was for the
Secretary of State to get that initial territorial agreement last year.
Ambassador Menzies: Mr. President, there were many of us who were
surprised and pleased that the mandate of the UN forces was extended for six
years.
Secretary Kissinger: Six months.
Ambassador Menzies: Yes, six months.
President: We wish it had been for six years (laughter).
Ambassador Menzies: Would it be correct to assume that the extension of
this mandate would be one way to get the Israelis off the hook on the matter of
a guarantee of non-belligerency?
President: The duration of any agreement is a matter of importance. The
extension of the UN forces has been helpful. If we hadn't had it, it would have
been a disaster. The fact that the UNforce has continued and the continued
UN presence is an important element in the efforts toward a settlement. I
should say that both parties have emphasized to us the excellent manner in
which the UN force has performed its responsibilities. The UN force has
performed in outstanding fashion and both parties have excellent relations.
Secretary General Luns: On one other matter, Mr. President, until the day
before yesterday my impression was that the Helsinki meeting would not be held
in the near future because of the lack of progress in the Conference and because
the Finns need a month to prepare for the meeting. This morning I heard that
the Soviet Union had been in touch with several governments -- I don't know if
the United States was one -- concerning a July 22 starting date for the meeting.
I was surprised since it was my impression that the feeling is in Geneva that
it wouldn't be held earlier than the end of September. How do you view this?
President: We haven't been pushing this. We have continued to feel that our
Western Alliance partners should be the main parties involved in directing
the pace of the negotiations. I must admit that I have been concentrating so
heavily on other matters -- the Greek-Turkish question with the Congress,
for example -- that I haven't taken a fresh look at this with Henry. Henry?
SECRET/NODIS
LERRAT GERALD FORD
SECRET/NODIS
- 10 -
Secretary Kissinger: The Soviets have proposed a July 22 date. Our position
continues to be that we are prepared to meet whenever the second stage is
completed satisfactorily. We haven't accepted or rejected the Soviet proposal,
and we won't agree to a date before the second stage of the Conference is
finished. You should all know this so that we won't be whipsawed by the Soviet
Government contacting each of our governments and saying that one or the
other of us has agreed to this or that. Our instructions, to be completely
frank to you, to our Ambassador in Geneva are to stay a half a step behind the
Europeans-- and to let you drag us into the Conference. We aren't pressing,
and we aren't holding back. Until the Soviet Union makes a concession on the
question of three hundred kilometers, Basket I will not be completed.
President: If there are no other questions, I want to thank you very much for
being here. I hope that you find your meetings in California, in Washington and
in Annapolis very productive.
Secretary General Luns: We are going back to Annapolis now, and most of us
will return to Europe on Saturday.
President: This has been a most productive meeting. It has been a pleasure
for me and I look forward to seeing you here again or in Brussels in the near
future. (The President then shook hands with several of the participants and
departed.)
Secretary General Luns: (To his NAC colleagues) I have been asked to say a few
words to the press. I'll do that and be back in a jiffy.
SECRET/NODIS
FORD
1817 & FORD
act
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4310X
SEGRET/NODIS
ACTION
June 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Mr. Clift
SUBJECT:
President's Meeting With NATO PermReps:
1) Memcon
2) Reporting Cable For Ambassador Bruce
The memorandum of conversation at Tab A of the President's meeting with
the North Atlantic Council Permanent Representatives on Thursday, June 19,
1975, is forwarded for your review and approval, and onward delivery to
the President's Files.
Prior to the meeting it was agreed among Secretary General Luns, Ambassador
Bruce and yourself that the White House staff would be responsible for the
official note-taking and that we would provide Luns and Bruce with a record
of the meeting. The telegram for your approval at Tab B, with cover
memorandum for Jeanne Davis to State, would do this.
RECOMMENDATION
1.
That you approve the memcon at Tab A for the President's Files.
APPROVE B
DISAPPROVE
2. That you approve the telegram at Tab B for Jeanne Davis' forwarding
to State.
APPROVE B
DISAPPROVE
FORD
R
DECLASSIFIED
SEGRET/NODIS
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
XGDS
NSC MEMO, Wn 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state will 3/4/01
GERALD
5/20/04