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January 22, 1976 - Ford, House International Relations Committee
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January 22, 1976 - Ford, House International Relations Committee
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Greece
Yugoslavia
Cyprus
Israel
Syria
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Iran
Egypt
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Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyah.
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1a
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
House International Relations Committee:
Representative Thomas "Doc" Morgan
Representative Bill Broomfield
Representative Charlie Wilson (Texas)
Representative Paul Findley
Representative Bob Lagomarsino
Representative Larry Winn
Representative L. H. Fountain
Lewis Gulick (Committee Staff)
Steve Ward (Committee Staff)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. Eugene Krizek (State Department)
Mr. Max Friedersdorf, Assistant to the
President
DATE AND TIME:
Thursday, January 22, 1976
12:00 - 12:30 p.m.
PLACE:
Cabinet Room
President: It is very nice to see you and get a report on your trip to a
very vital area. Doc --
Morgan: Thank you, Mr. President. I will have Fountain brief you on
the part of the trip that I missed.
We were met by the heads of state from every country except
NSC MEMO, GUIDELINES
NARA, DATE 6/7/04
Yugoslavia, and Tito was sick. We tried to portray our visit as a
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
friendly one; it was not for arm twisting. We pointed out the problems
DECLASSIFIED
11/24/98, STATE DEPT.
and how we thought they could help.
GERADO
CLASSIFIED BY BRENT SCOWCROFT
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
BY
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1,3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
Broomfield: Sadat seemed pleased with the state of progress in the
Middle East. The most interesting thing was he reported to us that he
needed defensive weapons. He is out in the cold with the Soviet Union.
He wants to concentrate on economic development, but he does need some
weapons.
Fountain: Sadat clearly wants to focus on economic development. I even
detected a changed attitude toward Rabin. I saw it on Rabin's part also.
The chief problem seems to be Syria. We told him there was not much
chance now to get weapons. He said he understood that 1976 was an
election year and he didn't expect much from us.
He was concerned about the PLO. He said Arafat was the most
moderate of them and if there was no movement, the radicals would take
over.
President: Sadat has usually been very impressive. He gave us much help
at the OAU Conference on Angola.
Findley: The major impression I had from everywhere was a yearning to
see American leadership. And if we didn't provide it, there would be none.
All of them but Rabin thought we had to start a dialogue with the PLO. I
feel more strongly now that we must move for a comprehensive settlement
and we must deal the PLO.
President: The situation in Lebanon is very serious. They have had
23 cease-fires and are working on another.
Findley: I think that adds urgency to the move for a comprehensive and
broad settlement.
Despite what other members of the Committee may say, I hope you
will consider seriously the sale of defensive arms to Egypt. Everyone else
is getting them and Egypt is being left out.
President: Is there unanimity about opening an unofficial dialogue with the
PLO?
Morgan: No, there is not. Some of us feel that with the PLO activity in
Lebanon, now is not the time.
Wilson: I'm in favor of it.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
GERALD
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
3.
Lagomarsino: I do not.
Winn: I do.
Findley: I do.
Winn: Sadat said Syria is auctioneering. He is concerned about Syria,
but he wants us to keep working with them.
President: We do have the Syrians in the assistance package both for
'76 and '77.
Winn: Sadat was very complimentary to the United States.
President: He is a very courageous man.
Findley: All the heads of government of the countries we visited urged us
to help him all we can.
Fountain: Rabin indicated they were willing to give up territory under
appropriate circumstances. He thought he could work with Hussein if Syria
didn't push him to the wall.
I got the feeling that Hussein had his feelings hurt at the early stages,
that he had not been called in to help.
Findley: Rabin places far too much hope on being able to work with Hussein
to settle the West Bank. The Shah, though, thinks that if Hussein tried he
would be overthrown.
Winn: I don't think Rabin changed his tune, really. But Peres is now leading
Rabin in the polls by about 8%.
Morgan: Israel wants to negotiate the West Bank with Jordan, not the PLO.
They feel that an independent Palestinian state would be a Marxist sword
pointed at them, and they are prepared to give Syria some ground in a
settlement.
Winn: General Gur said they are willing to give ground in the Golan, but he
is talking in terms of feet and yards.
Morgan: The Shah said he needs arms and if he can't get them from us he'll
get them elsewhere. We should keep friendship with both Greece and Turkey.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DE
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
4.
Findley: He expressed concern that we might be becoming isolationists.
He said we are the leaders. If we didn't exercise leadership, the Soviets
will.
Winn: On the nuclear issue, he mentioned India's increasing lean towards
the Soviet Union.
Morgan: I rejoined the group in Turkey. We visited with all sides. We
tried to impress on them the need for movement on Cyprus in view of the
bills pending in the Congress. I was surprised by their indications of
sincerity about the Cyprus negotiations. I was concerned about Makarios
playing the spoiler role. They said they were non-expansionists and they
wanted to negotiate with Greece. There is an age-old animosity, but I
think they will make steps if they can sit down and discuss the issues.
We are in a time bind. We are trying to work out some compromise
language because we are in mark-up now.
In Greece, I was impressed with the Prime Minister. He is a tough
customer and I didn't see much give. I thought the Turks really wanted to
settle.
President: How about Ecevit? Is he cooperative?
Morgan: He says he is, but he is ready to play it politically.
Lagomarsino: He can have it either way. He is not making an issue now,
but if they move and the coalition collapses, Ecevit will take over.
Wilson: I stayed in Turkey after the group. I told them we had an irre-
sponsible Congress and if they could play ball with us and be patient, we
would be more responsive after November. The intellectuals seemed to
buy it.
President: Clerides withdrew his resignation, but Makarios is the
potential spoiler. I am glad you laid it on the line. I know what you face
when the bill comes up. We got to have some indication of progress.
Findley: That is the line we tried to stress. We tried to be diplomats
but we said we needed their help to get the necessary votes. You have
to make another report on February 5.
SEGREF/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
5.
Morgan: We pointed out to the Turks there was no way we could make a
long term agreement on the bases. I think they got the message it would
have to be on an annual basis.
Lagomarsino: For some reason they didn't want to talk about the troop
withdrawals from Cyprus, but there have been some.
Findley: The differences between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus are
fairly narrow. The problem is the difficulty of either one appearing to
give in. I think the United States needs to be the catalyst. I think if we
used someone like Lemnitzer to propose a settlement which they both
could buy
Wilson: Demirel said they would invade Greece if the embargo was re-
imposed and if they perceived the military balance shifting.
Broomfield: We perceived that Yugoslav-American relations were good.
There were no problems.
We asked why they voted the way they did on the Zionism resolution and
they said it was a bad vote by them.
Winn: They would like the trade spread out. They do three times the trade
with the Soviet Union as with us and they want to balance it.
Findley: All the capitals we visited expressed uneasiness about detente and
SALT and I urge you to put it off until 1977.
President: We are negotiating now. I am concerned that if there is no
agreement, we will have to start some new programs and that will cost
money. No one will be able to sit in this chair without an agreement and
not ask for more money for defense. What concerns me is what the
Congress will do. If Congress turns me down, will we be in a better
position to negotiate in 1977?
Findley: I am worried about Backfire and the cruise missiles. In fact, the
cruise missiles are a greater problem to us than the Soviet Union and
Backfire is an aircraft of tremendous range.
President: It is very complicated. I would reiterate that we are not
necessarily better off in 1977.
[Congressman Findley handed the President a report of his views,
which is attached.]
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
Findly
1b
I returned from my trip to Europe and the Middle East
with a number of impressions regarding past policy failures
and possible policy initiatives.
U.S. Leadership Required - At every stop the same urgent
theme emerged: There is a strong need for continued
leadership by the United States to affect the shape and
nature of international security system.
There is continued trust in our capacity for leadership
and a growing fear of the consequences of a failure to
exercise such leadership.
There is only one other power center capable of
influencing events, the Soviet Union.
Uneasiness Over the Intentions and Power of the Soviet Union -
Linked to the desire for U.S. leadership was, we found, a
concomitant sense of concern over the continued and
substantial growth of the Soviet Union's capacity to project
military power and its willingness to do so. The Soviets
have learned incompletely--to the extent they have learned
at all - - the rule of behavior a state must follow under any
reasonable policy of detente.
GERALD
Resolution of Turkish-Cyprus Problem - Our policy failures
in the southern flank of NATO only increase the possibilities
for irresponsible Soviet behavior.
The smoldering and still tormented situation on Cyprus
affects adversely the interests of both countries involved,
as well as the integrity and resilience of the NATO
alliance.
The leadership of both Greece and Turkey labors under
incredibly tenuous political circumstances. Domestic
support can be found only under the umbrella of policies
which are extremely intransigent in character. Neither
side can afford to be perceived as surrendering to the
demands of the other. The irony of the situation is that
the substantive differences separating the two sides are
really quite small. All of this leads me to suggest a
change in our approach to this problem. We should attempt
to structure the negotiations so as to permit the Greeks
and Turks to make compromises on behalf of European security.
I would suggest, therefore, the option of deputizing a
former prestigious SACEUR such as General Lyman Lemnitzer
to serve as an intermediary in follow-on negotiations on
this problem.
Need for a Comprehensive Middle East Peace Initiative -
We have been successful today in effectively forestalling
any new outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East. We
have done this, though, at a very high price in terms of the
military and economic resources we have provided. My
concern is that such aid may provide the opportunity for
greater delay, that it may dull the impulse for diplomatic
initiative on the part of the state of Israel. This would
be very bad for Israel's long-range security. We learned
that the track record for Israeli-initiated peace ventures
is not very substantial. This suggests that greater
pressure will have to be applied. My impressions in this
regard were strengthened dramatically in my talks with
Prime Minister Rabin. I have suggested previously a
comprehensive formula (see attachment) that would end the
stalemate in the Middle East and thereby allow Israel to
regain some diplomatic advantage. In light of the trend
of events in the United Nations and elsewhere, this is a
consideration of growing importance. No diplomatic initiative
in the Middle East can succeed, however, unless we begin more
actively to incorporate responsible Palestinians into the
peace-making process.
Congressional Record
United States
of America
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
94th
CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION
Vol. 121
WASHINGTON, MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1975
No. 49
HON. PAUL FINDLEY
OF ILLINOIS
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CONGRESS CAN END MIDEAST
LOGJAM
American foreign policy has been riv-
estinians living on the West Bank of the
eted upon the Middle East while the deli-
Jordan River, in Gaza, and those wishing
cate structure of. world peace has begun
to return to these locations, to determine
to crack and tumble down.
their own future, within the framework
It is high time for the
of the principle of Israel's sovereignty
Congress to lay down some fundamental
within defined borders and in accordance
principles which should govern any peace
with U.N. Resolutions 194 and 242;
settlement which might yet be arranged.
Fourth. Establishment and control by
Congress should put all the parties in
the United Nations Security Council of a
the Middle East on notice that the Amer-
zone of proportionate width on each side
dcan people support the peace initiatives
of the borders between the State of Israel
which this administration has under-
and its contiguous neighbors, the secu-
taken. Although that expression of sup-
rity and inviolability of which to be
port may be late in coming, it will none-
maintained by United Nations forces
theless be important in whatever forum
subject only to the authority of the
the peace talks are resumed.
United Nations Security Council and re-
Congress should recognize the funda-
movable only by its affirmative vote; said
mental importance of sustained progress
zone to be free of nationally controlled
on the issues which divide the two sides.
military forces;
For it is progress, more than any other
Fifth. Guarantee to all parties of free-
factor, which weaves the fabric of peace.
dom of navigation through the Suez
Congress should now set forth a set of
Canal and all international waterways of
principles to serve as a guideline for
the area; and
peace, and thus provide impetus to re-
Sixth. Guarantee to persons of all re-
newed negotiations and progress toward
ligious faiths of equal access to the city
of Jerusalem.
peace.
The seventh principle, and the one
The seven principles which I believe
which brings credibility to the preceding
are fundamental to peace in the Middle
six, is that the United States should
East are embodied in a resolution I am
pledge that it will enter into an arrange-
introducing today. Those principles are:
ment or agreement with such other
First. Withdrawal of Israeli armed
powers as wish to join to guarantee a
forces from territories occupied in the
final settlement based upon the prin-
1967 conflict:
ciples just stated.
Second. Termination of all claims of
This resolution is a careful mix of
states of belligerency and respect for and
existing policy previously agreed to by
acknowledgment of the sovereignty, ter-
all parties in the Middle East and some
ritorial integrity, and political independ-
reasonable advances.
ence of every state in the area and their
The most important part of my re-
right to live in peace within secure and
solution is section 2, the glue which binds
recognized boundaries free from threats
the agreement together. This key sec-
of acts of force;
tion states that:
Third. Recognition of the right of Pal-
The United States should pledge that it
will enter into an agreement to guarantee
been a fundamental part of U.S. policy,
the final settlement based on the principles
and the Arab States know it. In addition,
stated above in concert with such other
Secretary Kissinger has recently ex-
powers as wish to join.
panded the U.S. commitment in the
This section states a fundamental
Middle East to include the prevention of
commitment on the part of the people
some undefined "strangulation" of the
of the United States. It is qualified. The
Western World.
commitment will occur only if the set-
It would be far wiser for the United
tlement contains the principles set forth
States to enter into a formal agreement
earlier in the resolution.
to guarantee a peaceful settlement in
That is an important qualification. The
the Middle East based on fair and bal-
implementation of the commitment is
anced principles, rather than the erratic
subject, of course, to regular constitu-
shifting and unpredictable factors now
tional processes. This section would not
in prospect.
in itself authorize the President to send
I put this resolution before the House
U.S. military forces to attempt to en-
because it is clear that today, more than
force a settlement. Such action would re-
ever before, the United States must
quire the separate specific approval of
speak clearly and with one voice on the
the Congress.
Middle East question.
For all practical purposes, a U.S. con-
In addition, this is an opportune time
gressional commitment to defend the in-
for the Congress to recognize its con-
tegrity of the State of Israel already
stitutional responsibility to participate
exists and has been restated and rein-
in the formulation of fundamental U.S.
forced on many occasions.
foreign policy.
Unfortunately this commitment is
Moreover, it is an opportunity for Con-
vague. It is imprecise. It does not state
gress to be positive in the formulation of
the principles which lead to the com-
foreign policy, not always negative as in
mitment. Because of its imprecision, it
the debate over Cyprus. If we fail to ac-
has on occasion placed the United States
cept that responsibility. fail to state
in an awkward position.
clearly our support for a just and reason-
Although some Americans might fear
able peace in the Middle East, the con-
that such an agreement could involve
sequences of our inaction could be disas-
the United States in a war in the Middle
trous. The possibility of renewed war,
East, that possibility already exists. In
another oil boycott, worldwide inflation
fact, I believe the passage of this resolu-
and depression, all hinge upon fair res-
tion would reduce very substantially the
olution of the issues which separate Arabs
risk of war. The United States has never
and Israelis.
been willing to permit Israel's neighbors
No single initiative which this Congress
to invade and destroy that nation. The
might undertake could be more worthy
threat of U.S. intervention has always
of its immediate attention. No other issue
holds SO much promise for the peace and
well-being of mankind.
H. CON. RES. 192
Whereas peace in the Middle East is essen-
tial to world peace and to the peace and well-
and in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 194
being of the people of the United States; Now
and 242.
therefore be it;
4. Establishment and control by the United
Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep-
Nations Security Council of a zone of propor-
resentatives of the United States in Congress
tionate width on each side of the borders be-
assembled, That it is the sense of the Con-
tween the State of Israel and its contiguous
gress that the President should seek agree-
neighbors, the security and inviolability of
ment by all parties to a peace settlement in.
which to be maintained by United Nations
the Middle East based upon the following
forces subject only to the authority of the
principles:
United Nations Security Council and remov-
1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from
able only by its affirmative vote, said zone
territories occupied in the 1967 conflict;
forces; to be free of nationally controlled military
2. Termination of all claims of states of
belligerency and respect for and acknowledg-
5. Guarantee to all parties of freedom of
ment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity
navigation through the Suez Canal and all
and political independence of every State in
international waterways of the area;
the area and their right to live in peace
6. Guarantee to persons of all religious
within secure and recognized boundaries free
faiths of equal access to the city of Jeru-
from threats or acts-of force;
salem.
3. Recognition of the right of Palestinians
SEC. 2. It is the further sense of the Con-
living on the West Bank of the Jordan River,
gress that the United States should pledge
in Gaza, and those wishing to return to these
that it will enter into an agreement to guar-
locations, to determine their own future,
antee the final settlement based on the prin-
within the framework of the principle of
ciples stated above in concert with such other
GERALD
Israel's sovereignty within defined borders
powers as wish to Join.
[rief Points on Salt II
Election years are not appropriate times in which to negotiate
sensitive and complex limitations on our strategic forces. We should
not conclude an agreement withthe Soviet Union on this subject unless
we can have a very high degree of confidence in it. This is important
both for reasons of international security (the perceptions other
countries have of the military balance between the U.S. and S.U.)
and domestic support. Recent revelations about Soviet compliance
and action under existing agreements argue even more forcefully in
favor of greater skepticism and safeguards.
Two issues concern me greatly: our position on the Soviet
Backfire bomber and proposed restrictions on cruise missiles.
My amendment to the House Resolution on the Vladivostok Under-
standing called for careful attention to be given to the Backfire
problem, verification, and the imbalance in missile throw-weight.
I believe the American people are also most concerned about these
questions.
Backfire - We must not compromise our stance on the Backfire
bomber. This is a highly advanced strategic aircraft capable of
performing intercontinental missions. Various realistic flight
profiles enable it to hit all meaningful targets in the United
States. It should be treated as a "heavy" bomber and therefore
counted within the 2400 angregate for strategic delivery vehicles.
Counting only those hombers which are deployed at Arctic staging
bases does not make sense, since bombers can be re-deployed quickly
in time of crisis.
page 2 (SALT)
Cruise Missiles - Restrictions on American cruise missiles would
also not promote a high confidence arms control agreement. These
are not "ballistic" missiles and should not be included within the
comprehensive totals for strategic delivery vehicles. ?ange
constraints on the cruise missile simply cannot be meaningfully
verified. Range depends upon fuel load, which in turn depends
upon the weight of the warhead. The warhead can be easily and
quickly altered. We can only know the range within, roughly,
an order of magnitude, i.e., perhaps one can fly 700 miles,
perhaps 7,000.
Aside from this, cruise missiles enable us to redress to some
extent the large and growing superiority in throw-weight that has
been accorded the Soviet Union. !1i sile size and payload capacity
determine the number of re-entry vehicles that can be fitted on
an individual missile. The Soviet Union could translate their
payload advantage into roughly 10 times the number of warheads
possessed by the United States. While this imbalance is some-
what technical, it is nonetheless coming to be understood by
the American people.
page 3
Cruise missiles have other desirable properties as well.
They are extremely accurate; this means they are a very cost-
effective system. Beyond this, however, it means they can be
used against legitimate militery targets without adverse spill-over
effects on civilian areas.
Finally, placing (unverifiable) constraints on the cruise
missile 's range, say by limiting both sides to a range no greater
than 600 kilometers, is not to the advantage of the United States.
Most lucrative targets in the U.S. are located within coastal areas,
which can be reached by Soviet short-rance cruise missiles. Important
Soviet targets, on the other hand, can only be hit by missiles of much
greater rance.
2
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FORD
DECLASSIFIED
&
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES Stateliview3/11/104
NARA. DATE 6/7/00
GERALD
LIBRARY
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