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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEMORANDUM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DECLASSIFIED SECRET/NODIS/XGDS E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6 dal 7/20/04 MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: President Ford Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs DATE AND TIME: Monday, January 26, 1976 9:25 - 10:30 a. m. PLACE: The Oval Office SUBJECT: Secretary Kissinger's SALT Discussions with Brezhnev Kissinger: Wade did very well. FORD a GERALO LIBRARY Rumsfeld: He was very pleased. It worked well. The President: Henry, why don't you bring us up to date ? Kissinger: They totally rejected Option IV. I then went to Modified Option III because I thought it was better for them. They rejected that on grounds that Backfire couldn't be counted. They will give us in writing the range of the Backfire and a commitment that it wouldn't be upgraded or used in an intercontinental role. It is not a lie based on design mission profile. I think if we wrote down some specifications and some constraints, they would at least look at them. They accepted the ALCM proposal. We can say we are giving something up, but since they wanted to count each missile, they gave up -- especially their agreeing to 2500 kilometers. CLASSIFIED BY Brent Scowcroft SECREF/NODIS/XGDS EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(b)(3) AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 2 They accepted SLCM from subs, but not surface ships. They want 600 kilometers for land-based. We made the mistake of going from 5500 to 2500. It called their attention to it. Then they gave us the heavy missile definition. Rumsfeld: This will defuse the violation argument on SALT I. Kissinger: The soft areas are surface-ship SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles. I get wildly different interpretations of the utility of surface-ship SLCMs. We could maybe count them as MIRV with an upper limit. Maybe if we counted land-based in the 2400. Scowcroft/Rumsfeld: That won't solve the European problem. Kissinger: They will hang tough, I think, on 2500 kilometers on land-based. We can probably solve the surface-ship SLCMs. Rumsfeld: But in Europe they are just like FBS. Kissinger: But from Europe and Japan we can cover four-fifths of the USSR and they can just cover Europe. We have insisted on 2500, but I think they won't buy it. Rumsfeld: There is also the nuclear versus the conventional warhead. Another issue is third country acquisition. If you bar conventional, you are barring the possibility of replacing some present systems. I have never seen so much leaking as came out of your party. Kissinger: It was done because it would have leaked after I briefed NATO. Rumsfeld: Don't blame it on NATO. Kissinger: Cruise missile verification is really their problem through '85. That can be our excuse for the nuclear versus conventional. SECRET/NODIS/XGDS GERALD LEBRARY F FORD SECRET/NODIS/XGDS 3 Rumsfeld: Cruise missile verification is a horror. Scowcroft: You have the same problem with range if you allow 5500. The President: I think we should look at all the issues and reach a judgment. What is the time schedule ? Kissinger: I think we should get something back to them before their Party Conference. Rumsfeld: I was thinking we could get the VP Working Group going and try to get back to Dobrynin by 8 or 10 February. Kissinger: One way would be to count all land-based over 600. That way we could have a few. SEGRET/NODIS/XGDS FORD R. GERALD LIBRARY 2 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 018354 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL Note DESCRIPTION Brent Scowcroft's notes from meeting with Ford, Kissinger, and Rumsfeld CREATION DATE 01/26/1975 VOLUME 2 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 031400783 COLLECTION TITLE National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Conversations BOX NUMBER 17 FOLDER TITLE January 26, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, Rumsfeld DATE WITHDRAWN 06/16/2004 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

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    "ocrText": "File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nE.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6\ndal\n7/20/04\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nPresident Ford\nDr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nDonald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense\nBrent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President\nfor National Security Affairs\nDATE AND TIME:\nMonday, January 26, 1976\n9:25 - 10:30 a. m.\nPLACE:\nThe Oval Office\nSUBJECT:\nSecretary Kissinger's SALT Discussions\nwith Brezhnev\nKissinger: Wade did very well.\nFORD a GERALO LIBRARY\nRumsfeld: He was very pleased. It worked well.\nThe President: Henry, why don't you bring us up to date ?\nKissinger: They totally rejected Option IV. I then went to Modified\nOption III because I thought it was better for them. They rejected that\non grounds that Backfire couldn't be counted. They will give us in\nwriting the range of the Backfire and a commitment that it wouldn't be\nupgraded or used in an intercontinental role. It is not a lie based on\ndesign mission profile.\nI think if we wrote down some specifications and some constraints,\nthey would at least look at them.\nThey accepted the ALCM proposal. We can say we are giving\nsomething up, but since they wanted to count each missile, they gave\nup -- especially their agreeing to 2500 kilometers.\nCLASSIFIED BY\nBrent Scowcroft\nSECREF/NODIS/XGDS\nEXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION\nSCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652\nEXEMPTION CATEGORY\n5(b)(3)\nAUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n2\nThey accepted SLCM from subs, but not surface ships.\nThey want 600 kilometers for land-based. We made the mistake\nof going from 5500 to 2500. It called their attention to it.\nThen they gave us the heavy missile definition.\nRumsfeld: This will defuse the violation argument on SALT I.\nKissinger: The soft areas are surface-ship SLCMs and land-based cruise\nmissiles.\nI get wildly different interpretations of the utility of surface-ship\nSLCMs. We could maybe count them as MIRV with an upper limit.\nMaybe if we counted land-based in the 2400.\nScowcroft/Rumsfeld: That won't solve the European problem.\nKissinger: They will hang tough, I think, on 2500 kilometers on land-based.\nWe can probably solve the surface-ship SLCMs.\nRumsfeld: But in Europe they are just like FBS.\nKissinger: But from Europe and Japan we can cover four-fifths of the\nUSSR and they can just cover Europe.\nWe have insisted on 2500, but I think they won't buy it.\nRumsfeld: There is also the nuclear versus the conventional warhead.\nAnother issue is third country acquisition. If you bar conventional, you\nare barring the possibility of replacing some present systems.\nI have never seen so much leaking as came out of your party.\nKissinger: It was done because it would have leaked after I briefed NATO.\nRumsfeld: Don't blame it on NATO.\nKissinger: Cruise missile verification is really their problem through\n'85. That can be our excuse for the nuclear versus conventional.\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\nGERALD LEBRARY F FORD\nSECRET/NODIS/XGDS\n3\nRumsfeld: Cruise missile verification is a horror.\nScowcroft: You have the same problem with range if you allow 5500.\nThe President: I think we should look at all the issues and reach a\njudgment. What is the time schedule ?\nKissinger: I think we should get something back to them before their\nParty Conference.\nRumsfeld: I was thinking we could get the VP Working Group going and\ntry to get back to Dobrynin by 8 or 10 February.\nKissinger: One way would be to count all land-based over 600. That way\nwe could have a few.\nSEGRET/NODIS/XGDS\nFORD R. GERALD LIBRARY\n2\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 018354\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nNote\nDESCRIPTION\nBrent Scowcroft's notes from meeting\nwith Ford, Kissinger, and Rumsfeld\nCREATION DATE\n01/26/1975\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n031400783\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNational Security Adviser. Memoranda of\nConversations\nBOX NUMBER\n17\nFOLDER TITLE\nJanuary 26, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger,\nScowcroft, Rumsfeld\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n06/16/2004\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nGG"
}