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March 17, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, American Jewish Leadership Group
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March 17, 1976 - Ford, Kissinger, American Jewish Leadership Group
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Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
March 17, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT'S FILE
FROM:
Robert B. Oakley RW
NSC Staff
SUBJECT:
Meeting with American Jewish
Leadership Group, on Wednesday,
March 17, 1976, 3:15 p.m. - 4:45 p.m.
in Cabinet Room
PARTICIPANTS:
Mr. Max M. Fisher
Rabbi Alexander M. Schindler, Chairman,
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations and
President, Union of American Hebrew
Congregations
Mr. David M. Blumberg, President,
B'nai B'rith
Mr. Yehuda Hellman, Executive Director,
Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg, President,
American Jewish Congress
Mr. Jerold C. Hoffberger, President,
Council of Jewish Federations and
Welfare Funds
Mr. Harold Jacobs, President, Union of
Orthodox Jewish Congregations
Mrs. Charlotte Jacobson, Chairman,
World Zionist Organization--American
Section
Mr. Frank R. Lautenberg, General Chairman,
DECLASCIFIED
United Jewish Appeal
E.O. 12658, SEC. 3.5
Mr. Arthur Levine, President, United
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state leview
Synagogue of America
BY we
# MARA, DATE 6/17/04
3/12/04
Mrs. Rose Matzkin, President, Hadassah
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
Automatically Declassified on
December 31, 1982.
TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HERRY A, KINSINGER
CONFID ENTIAL (GDS)
- 2 -
Rabbi Israel Miller, Immediate Past
Chairman, Conference of Presidents of
Major American Jewish Organizations
Mr. Edward Sanders, President, American
Israel Public Affairs Committee
Mr. Jacob Sheinkman, President, Jewish
Labor Committee
Dr. Joseph P. Sternstein, President,
Zionist Organization of America
Mr. Elmer L. Winter, President,
American Jewish Committee
The Honorable Gerald R. Ford, President
of the United States
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State
The Honorable Brent Scowcroft, Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. David H. Lissy, Associate Director,
Domestic Council
Mr. Robert Goldwin, Special Consultant to
the President
Mr. Robert B. Oakley, By Area Director for
Middle East and South Asian Affairs,
National Security Council Staff
Max Fisher:
Mr. President, I would like you to meet Rabbi
Schindler, the new Chairman of the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.
We all welcome this opportunity for an exchange on
the concerns we have.
President:
Let me make a few general observations first, then
Henry Kissinger and I will deal with specific questions.
Let's review the developments in the Middle East
since I became President. After the Yom Kippur
War the U.S. was helping rebuild Israel, providing
large amounts of economic and military assistance.
Then in March 1975 the negotiations fell apart and
we had a period of uncertainty before they were
concluded in September 1975, with the historic
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 3 -
President:
Sinai Agreement. Now the U.S. and U.N.
(Continuing)
observers are in place-- I just saw a report on
that today--and both sides are carrying out their
part of the bargain. It took great courage by
both sides to reach this agreement. More
recently we have had the visit of my friend,
Prime Minister Rabin. We had three meetings
and a dinner together and came to an understanding
on some ideas of how to proceed in trying to get
negotiations started again. This is not easy but
the Prime Minister recognized the danger of
doing nothing.
It is of great importance to us to secure Israel's
survival and security. In the current fiscal year
we have requested $1.5 billion in military assistance--
50% of it in grants--and $800 million in economic
aid for Israel. We have asked about $700 million
for Egypt and smaller amounts for other Arabs.
In fiscal year 1977 we have requested one billion
dollars in military aid for Israel and $780 million
in economic aid. There is about $650 million for
Egypt. We are working in a constructive way to
see that Israel has a military capability adequate
to meet any contingencies. That and the favorable
developments in Egypt give brighter prospects for
the future than in the past.
Sadat has taken a strong position toward the USSR.
In his speech he cut off all relations with them.
It took a lot of courage and I applaud it. It turns
Egypt more our way. We should welcome and
support this evolution.
That provides a rough estimate of where we are.
Now, I understand that you have some questions
about the C-130 propeller aircraft we intend to
sell to Egypt. This is fully justified. It provides
no offensive military capability. You must look
at the total picture of aid to Israel, both military
and economic, compared to our aid for Egypt. No
one should object to the division of support. The
planes should go to Egypt. If you disagree, I want
to know why. If you have questions, please ask.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 4 -
President:
I am firmly convinced this is the right move for
(Continuing)
Israel as well as the U.S.
Now I will ask Henry to give you his ideas.
Kissinger:
We must take the strategic view, look at what
has been created and where the greatest danger
to Israel lies. The greatest danger is a unified
Arab front backed by the Europeans and the Soviets,
isolating the U.S. and Israel. So we want to
disentangle the situation and eliminate this threat.
The security of Israel is strategic and not tactical.
At the end of the October War everyone was united
in opposition to Israel and they were all pressing
the U.S. to pressure Israel for an immediate
return to the 1967 boundaries. Our desire to
maintain a special relationship with Sadat is not
naive, but to buy time so we can bring about a
better situation. This is why we propose C-130s.
Sadat is having a tough time with his army who
could throw him out and open the way for a massive
influx of Soviet arms. We must remain in control
of the diplomatic situation. There is no danger of
large-scale U.S. arms sales to Egypt. You must
keep in mind the overall strategic considerations.
President:
The breach in Egypt's relationship with the USSR
followed Soviet pressures. They cut off spare
parts and maintenance for Egyptian weapons and
equipment.
Kissinger:
Egypt's MIGs fly only six hours a month. We want
to keep Egypt neutralized but no army can be
expected to accept the prospect of no weapons at all.
President:
If we cut off Israel's spare parts, their military
capability would go down. But selling six C-130s
will not affect Egypt's military capability.
Someone mentioned to me your interest in the
Sheehan article. Our position is firm and clearly
understood by both Sadat and Rabin. We stand by
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, period.
GONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 5 -
President:
They provide for negotiations and secure and
(Continuing)
recognized boundaries. We stand for that.
Kissinger:
We have a problem. We cannot comment on
every book or article that appears. There are
so many, and full of distortions. Look at Matty
Golan and Admiral Zumwalt. We cannot contradict
or correct all the errors but the U.S. position
is as the President has stated and we have never
deviated from it. The Arabs complain that they
are never able to get a commitment from us on
the 1967 boundaries. Had we wished to pursue
the 1967 boundaries, we could have done it much
more easily without any need for ambiguity. We
could have joined the EEC in October 1973 and
done it directly. Instead we decided upon the
step-by-step approach to avoid just this and ease
the pressure on Israel. We have always said that
the location of secure and recognized boundaries
is to be negotiated by the parties. We stand on
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Fisher:
Some would say this meeting has a teutonic aspect
with Kissinger and Schindler.
Kissinger:
I would say it is a Harvard aspect.
Schindler:
Mr. President, I want to thank you for receiving
us and for your past affection for the Jewish
Community. Because we are Americans we also
thank you for the way you have conducted yourself
in office. And we thank you for the overall thrust
of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East--to
separate the moderates and the radicals and to
drive out the Soviets. There has been more progress
in containing confrontation in the past two years
than during the preceding twenty years. So we
support your overall policy. We also agree that
six C-130 aircraft will not affect the military
balance of power. Still we are afraid and we are
apprehensive. We fear it is the beginning of a
process. The symbolic aspect scares us. We buy
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 6 -
Schindler:
the overall approach of supporting moderates so
(Continuing)
we support economic aid to Egypt and we do not
oppose the nuclear agreement. But we are
worried about the six C-130s as being the start
of a much larger process. Why does Egypt need
arms? Its only enemy is Israel. Israel must
fear not only Egypt but all the Arabs. Arms can
be transferred from one to another. Last year
Israel got $1.3 billion in arms but the Arabs got
between $14 and $15 billion worth of arms. There
is also a qualitative imbalance, the superiority
of American equipment. That is why we do not
want American equipment going to Egypt. Israel
needs to maintain qualitative superiority with
planes like the F-15.
President:
Let me comment. If we look back at the four wars
Israel has fought and the tragic loss of life, perhaps
we can agree that the best way to alleviate the fear
of another is to have Egypt dependent upon the U.S.
rather than the Soviets or even Western Europe.
It is better for us to be able to turn them on and
off than for others to be in that position. Also,
you cannot dismiss the problem between Libya
and Egypt. Egypt is a much better friend of the
U.S. than Libya which is getting huge amounts of
military assistance from the USSR. That is
creating a serious problem for us.
Kissinger:
Egypt will not allow itself to be totally disarmed.
Either Sadat gets some arms from the U.S. or he
will go elsewhere or he will be thrown out. Do not
drive him to despair. The problem of more arms
for Egypt may come back in a year or two but by
then we will have gained time for more peace moves.
The President is speaking theoretically when he
talks of the U.S. having the ability to control
Egypt's supply of arms. There is no plan for a
significant supply of U.S. arms. You spoke of the
F-15 but we have no intention of supplying sophis-
ticated arms to Egypt. The transfer of equipment
is a very difficult question. We have no fixed
program except the C-130s and the training of ten
to fifteen Egyptian officers at our military schools.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 7 -
Kissinger:
If we felt the need to move past this to another
(Continuing)
phase of arms supply we would be obliged to
consult Congress but we do not wish to reach
this point. On the other hand, we do not wish
to go back to the point we were at in 1969 when
we had to talk to the Egyptians through the
Soviets. Last year there was an influx of Soviet
arms to Egypt prior to the expected visit of
Brezhnev but we stopped it by Sinai II.
Rabbi Hertzberg:
We are sympathetic to your policy. But you
are going from a little bit pregnant to more
pregnant. How can you stop the process? Egypt
is very hungry for arms. If the military is that
strong within Egypt, it will have to come back
again for more arms. If we agree to six C-130s
as a symbolic act, then it is the symbol of more,
but how much more and when? There is a theory
that Israel is so dependent upon the U.S. that it
means parameters are set for Israeli policy.
But what about U.S. influence on Sadat's policy?
What will bring Egypt and the Arab moderates
closer to the U.S. and Israel? What will Egypt
do in return for the C-130s? What do we get in
exchange?
President:
One thing has already occurred, the breaking of
Egyptian military relations with the Soviets.
Closing the port of Alexandria to Soviet naval
vessels deprives the Soviet fleet of valuable repair
and maintenance facilities. They can go to Libya,
maybe, but it is not as good. You cannot develop
installations overnight to meet the Soviet needs.
There are also two ports in Syria but they are not
as good as Egypt. That is already a big dividend.
Kissinger:
Another dividend is the peace process. So long
as Egypt adheres to its present policy we can
withstand Arab/Soviet pressures to move too fast
toward peace. With Sadat we can move at a pace
Israel can accept. We told Rabin to think about
what Israel could do next. He sent us some ideas
on non-belligerency. We took them to Sadat but
to no other Arab.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 8 -
Mrs. Matzkin:
Mr. President, you want to know what the
people think. Well, the question I get all the
time is if the U.S. supplies both Israel and
Egypt, how do you cut off supplies if there is
a war? Does the U.S. take sides? U.S. arms
will be tested on the battlefield where we do not
want them tested. You asked if Egypt did not
deserve a reward. I reply that they have a reward.
They have most of the Sinai back, they have the
oil fields and they are getting large amounts of
economic aid. Egypt has internal problems yet
it is spending its money on arms and is not
committed to peace.
President:
It is our hope that military and economic aid
will allow the U.S. to avoid another war. Having
both dependent upon the U.S. gives us leverage
to preclude it. Although Sadat is an outstanding
leader, he does have to contend with military
leaders who see the Soviets cut off supplies and
look to see what the U.S. will do. There is a
theoretical potential of military leaders who might
want to take charge in Egypt. We must deal with
reality and keep Sadat in office. He has done more
than anyone since I have been President to try and
find a non-military understanding with Israel.
Kissinger:
You talk as if Egypt were to be fully rearmed.
If the President made such a decision and Congress
approved it, there would still be five years or
more needed to replace Egypt's present weapons
due to production and training problems. But let's
be realistic. We are not interested in replacing
Soviet equipment with U.S. equipment. That is not
our problem. Our problem is to keep the peace
process alive. The situation you describe would
probably take ten years to achieve even at top speed.
But that is not what we are talking about.
Hoffberger:
The President and the Secretary of State mentioned
Egyptian military influence and the threat to Sadat.
Are you telling us Sadat is in a precarious position?
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
GONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 9 -
President:
My impression--and Henry can supplement it--
is that Sadat is in a strong position. He has
given the kind of inspirational leadership Egyptians
like. Yet there is a history of military rule in
Egypt and the army taking power. This was true
of both Nasser and Sadat. We must be alert to
contingencies. Egypt has an enormous debt and
a huge military supply problem. There are great
pressures to do more economically and militarily.
We see no immediate threat but we must be realistic
as to what could happen if the economy were to
collapse or military supplies totally cut off. Then
there is the threat of Libya and Qadhafi.
Winter:
I have just come from a meeting of the Business
Council. I am troubled by what you say. Secretary
Kissinger says we will not be the chief suppliers
of both sides, so where does Egypt turn for the bulk
of its arms? To Europe? So how are we going to
get them wholly into our camp without a full military
relationship which we do not want?
President:
The same delay Henry spoke of about U.S.
deliveries applies to Europe. It would take five
years or more as Henry stated and this applies to
the Europeans. Personally, I agree with you and
would prefer to have Egypt dependent upon the U.S.
rather than Europe. But we have not made that
commitment. Practically, I would prefer this but
we have not done it.
Kissinger:
I understand the dilemma you pose. There is no
good answer. We cannot accept either to supply
nothing or to be the chief supplier. If we are either
one or the other, it would be too much. So we will
find a path in between and try to gain time. I do
not think we are in a position to make an absolute
decision. We do not want to be the main supplier
nor to decide to do nothing more, even than the C-130s.
But there is no great speed in doing more. We want
to be able to move the peace process along.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 10 -
Rabbi Miller:
Mr. President, we all know of your friendship
with the American Jewish Community. So we will
speak with candor based on respect and show you
the deep worries of that community. We are
profoundly worried, not about six lousy planes but
about what you and the Secretary here have said.
We are concerned about tomorrow. We recognize
what you are saying is that the U.S. must gamble,
that there is no guarantee. We recognize this since
the situation cannot remain static. Our concern
is that the U.S. will become a supplier to Egypt
which will have a mixed source of supply--from
France and others--and Saudi Arabia will have a
substantial amount of arms, which it can supply
to Egypt. Realistically, in another conflict, Egypt
will not stand away and it will have many sources of
supply. As to negotiations, your gamble on supplying
arms to generate movement will necessarily become
a fixed commitment. As negotiations progress,
another allocation of more advanced and sophisticated
weapons will be requested by Egypt as a price for
continuing. You will say, we have gone so far so
we must go a bit further to keep negotiations going.
The American Jewish Community worries about
this scenario. We worry also about the Sheehan
article. We worry about the billions and billions
of dollars in arms for the Arabs. Where are we
going? We worry about what is going to happen
tomorrow.
President:
You expressed the same concerns a year ago prior
to the negotiations in March and then after the March
negotiations failed. Yet by developing the trust of
both Israel and Egypt we were able to obtain the
Sinai II Agreement. It is an achievement of great
significance. You were concerned throughout the
past year but the movement has been a success so
your legitimate fears have been eliminated by the
results. I believe in Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338. There must be progress within the
confines of these resolutions. We cannot eliminate
your concerns and apprehensions. They will always
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 11 -
President:
be present. But you must have faith and trust.
(Continuing)
This is not the ideal world but the real world.
We are making headway on getting trust between
the U.S. and Egypt and the U.S. and Israel and
Egypt and Israel. Lots of progress. It should
not be underestimated.
Miller:
We are expressing the fears of our people. You
all must deal with this and get it across to our
people. Mr. Jacobs will talk to you about aid,
about the fifth quarter. There are certain ways
to explain trust. It is not enough to say "trust us. 11
Mrs. Jacobson:
We appreciate your comments on the Sheehan
article. I would like to set the record straight
on leaving here by saying that you have told us
the U.S. position does not go beyond supporting
Resolutions 242 and 338. It seems to me that we
need an additional step by Egypt toward peace.
Sadat dismissed the Soviets because they were not
giving what Egypt wants. It is a golden opportunity
to move towards peace. Let us make a new effort
with Egypt. A major breakthrough on the Sinai.
The word peace is still missing.
President:
We are always ready to begin negotiations if Israel
and Egypt are ready. It is not up to us. But you
cannot make overall headway by concentrating
exclusively on Israel and Egypt. We are working
with Prime Minister Rabin to find ways of further
progress. It is up to Israel and the Arabs but we
will continue our mediating role.
Kissinger:
The Israeli Government is telling us constantly
not to go too fast, not to try for overall peace now.
We have an agreed strategy with Israel to try for
an end to the state of war. But the gamble of
turning back on C-130s for Egypt would be extremely
dangerous. We asked Israel to do a bit on the
West Bank before Rabat to preclude the PLO, but
it did not work. The Israelis are nostalgic for
Jordan today. I am not sure your idea would be
greeted with joy in Jerusalem since Israel would
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
12 I I
Kissinger:
need to spell out its position on final boundaries
(Continuing)
if it were to negotiate for peace.
Jacobs:
I saw your wife in California, campaigning for
you, Mr. President. She makes an excellent
impression.
President:
I am trying hard to get my votes up to her polls.
Jacobs:
What about the fifth quarter funding for Israel,
are you going to support it or not?
President:
We did not recommend any funds for the 5th quarter.
We recommended $2.3 billion for FY 76 and $1.8
billion for FY 77, with $1.0 billion in military aid.
Based upon the analyses of all the reports in the
U.S. Government, this is plenty to keep up with
Israel's modernization needs. It is not as much
as their MATMON-B plan, but it is enough. The
technicians actually recommended $.5 billion, but
I upped it to $1.0 billion. In all honesty, during
my talks with Rabin there was no sign they were
disappointed. Maybe he tells you something he
does not tell me but he said he was content. They
had a much longer shopping list but a lot of it
was filled.
Now the Senate Approp riations Subcommittee has
increased the aid bill by one billion dollars, $500
million of it for Israel for the fifth quarter. I am
trying hard to get the budget under control. I am
squeezing every Department except Defense. So
now you want me to approve another one billion.
How can I justify that when people complain about
how heartless and cruel I am for cutting food stamps,
HEW and other programs. This is a very signifi-
cant increase for the Middle East, especially when
I am told by the technicians in CIA and DOD that
$500 million would be enough for Israel. I recom-
mended $1.0 billion. I must relate domestic
programs to foreign programs. We must stop the
growing deficit and inflationary pressures. I think
it is wrong to ask for this and I feel strongly about it.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)
- 13 -
Fisher:
To sum up, the six planes to help Sadat is not
really a concern. The concern is over the U.S.
eventually becoming a major supplier. This year,
you have to gamble with six planes. Next year,
you may have to gamble again, but if so, you will
go before Congress. You do not want the U.S. to
be a major supplier. You are playing for time.
We understand this.
On aid, I know your problem but what will happen
if Congress passes the bill. That is a real problem.
There is a lot of sentiment in Congress for an
increase across the board for Israel. I would not
be frank if I did not tell you of our concern that
this be approved.
President:
I get bill after bill from Congress, they add $1.2
billion to HEW, $1.0 billion to HUD, more to
Interior. Look at the totals and see where this
would take us. So I veto. We must get a handle
on the rate of growth. If we did not change a law,
there would be a $50 billion increase in FY 77
expenditures. This country simply cannot afford
it. Look at the projections. Already the
Congressional Committees have sent increases to
the Budget Committee totalling over $20 billion
without the increase for foreign aid. How do I
answer those who say I am hard-hearted on
domestic programs if I go along with greater
foreign aid and military assistance. You need to
look at all this in context. My job is a tough one,
but I can face it.
My fundamental view is the same today as for
twenty years in Congress and it will not change.
We will deal with day-to-day problems in a frank
and candid way. You need to trust me. My view
will be the same in the future as in the past on
Israel.
Fisher:
Thank you for this meeting, Mr. President.
CONFIDENTIAL (GDS)