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1553476
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June 18, 1976 - Cabinet Meeting
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1553476
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document
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June 18, 1976 - Cabinet Meeting
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collections
Memoranda of Conversations (Nixon and Ford Administrations)
Ford Administration Memoranda of Conversations
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Lebanon
Syria
Egypt
Ambassadors
Assassination
Cabinet meetings
Terrorism
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1553476
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18
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1976-06-18
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6
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1976
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18
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1976-06-18
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6
year
1976
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File scanned from the National Security Adviser's Memoranda of Conversation Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
DECI ASSIFIED
E.O 12953 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
See.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
MR 00.27, #63; st. dept Ltr 12/18/01
By doe NARA, Date 2/13/02
PARTICIPANTS:
President Ford
The Cabinet
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, June 18, 1976
11:00 a.m.
PLACE:
The Cabinet Room
President: Ron just announced we are evacuating Americans from
Lebanon. We will leave essential people in the Embassy to keep
operations going. We began announcements on VOA and BBC because
communications in Beirut are so poor. There are about 1400 people
in Lebanon but we have no idea how many will want to leave, because
it is voluntary. Henry, why don't you describe the situation in Lebanon?
Kissinger: First, the situation about the Meloy killing. He was on his
way to meet with the new President Sarkis, to discuss the situation and
possible U.S. evacuation.
[He describes the assassination.]
To the best of our information, the killing was done by a splinter
group of the rejectionist front. To our best knowledge, it was done
without PLO involvement. All the Arabs have condemned the act, unlike
the Sudan killings.
We will evacuate tomorrow. We will not announce the route.
We have been given adequate assurances and most of the route is
through Syrian-held territory. We have made adequate contingency
preparations but it is important not to comment on this.
We don't know how many will leave. Many have no other real
home, but there is no security in Beirut. But none of the responsible
groups has any real interest in killing Americans, because if there was,
it could be done quite easily at any time. But there are, of course,
BY
BRENT SCOWCROFT
"X_MPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
GERALD
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
SECRET /NODIS/XGDS
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
2.
totally irresponsible elements. But the overall situation in Lebanon is
developing in a way that is not unhelpful to our interests. Lebanon is a
tragedy. In U.S. equivalents, four million people have been killed.
In March, the Syrians said they were moving in in 48 hours.
The Israelis said they would move in that case. If that happened, we
would have united all the Arabs against it. If Israel didn't act and if
Syria cleaned it up, we would be accused by Egypt of colluding with
the Syrians. But if the Syrians didn't move, the radicals could dominate
Lebanon and Syria would then be squeezed between a radical Lebanon
and Iraq.
We maneuvered our way through this and governmental changes
were made. [He describes the election, etc. But there was no
security so the political changes couldn't take place. So Syria decided
to act. [Describes Syrian-held territory.]
It looks now like no one will gain an overwhelming victory. What
is likely to emerge is an Arab solution with no one in predominance,
with the PLO weakened, but with Egypt relatively content and Syria as
well. The end result should be a strategic situation which is favorable
to us, because Syria and Egypt probably will get back together. We
must remember that we are the only ones who are really in touch with
all the parties and the only useful force working with all of them.
[Compares with the Soviets] It could blow up, of course, but if it goes
on track, that is a likely outcome.
A spectacular Syrian defeat probably would overthrow Assad.
With this probable moderate outcome, we are in a good position for peace.
If we can keep all the radicals from uniting, or all the Arabs, it looks
like a positive aspect to the tragedy of Lebanon.
Secretary Richardson: Why did the Syrians support the Christians and
what kept them from a spectacular victory?
Kissinger: The Christians were about to be wiped out and that would
have given Lebanon to the radicals who would have squeezed the Syrians.
A spectacular Syrian victory in March could have given them a need to
prove their Arab nature and turn on the Christians; this would have
radicalized Jordan and put pressure on the Saudis and isolated Egypt.
They didn't win spectacularly, first because it is an agony for them to
be attacking the PLO, and second they underestimated the strength they
faced.
[The next item was a campaign update.
[The next item was our line on busing.]
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012356
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Note
DESCRIPTION
Notes for memcon
CREATION DATE
06/18/1976
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
036600037
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. MEMORANDA OF
CONVERSATIONS
BOX NUMBER
19
FOLDER TITLE
June 18, 1976 - Cabinet Meeting
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/11/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
WHM