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This file contains materials concerning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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1553594
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Southeast Asia (7)
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document
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1553594
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document
title
Southeast Asia (7)
description
This file contains materials concerning the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Soviet Union
Cambodia
China
Japan
Laos
Korea (North)
South Dakota
Indonesia
Vietnam
Strategy
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
International relations
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1553594
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1976-09-30
month
9
year
1976
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1976-01-01
month
1
year
1976
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1
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cc03000b5ef04b4a
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 1, folder "Southeast Asia (7)" of the
National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at
the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
/
1a
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
January 27, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR
John A. Wickham, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Military Assistant to the Secretary
Department of Defense
SUBJECT:
Pacific Force Structure
The NSC has no objection to DOD's removal of the temporary
moratorium imposed May 7, 1975 on U.S. Army reductions and
internal realignments in Japan. We approve the planned reduc-
tion of 2000 U.S. Army military support personnel and 6000
local national employees.
William G. Hyland
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
GERALD LIBRARY R FORD
GONFIDENTIAL GDS
KBH 1/14/00
if MH
MEMORANDUM
177
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
walt
ACTION
GONFIDENTIAL GDS
MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND
WASH January 19, Signed
on
FROM:
JAY TAYLOR
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
SUBJECT:
U.S. Army Reductions on Japan
Last May, following the Southeast Asian events, DOD imposed a temporary
moratorium on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments in Japan.
This moratorium affected reductions scheduled to take place by FY 1977
involving some 2000 military personnel and 6000 local national employees,
all of whom performed support functions.
DOD has informed us that it would like to remove the moratorium and pro-
ceed with the scheduled reductions (Tab B). The DOD's proposed imple-
menting memorandum (Tab C) directs that in implementing the reduction
program, logistics and facilities in Japan should not be diminished to the
point they can no longer support a Korean contingency. Support functions
that are still required will be transferred for the most part to other services.
The memorandum also directs that, in implementing the reduction, efforts
be made to minimize the impact on civilian employees by transferring as
many as possible to the service assuming the function previously performed
by the Army.
DOD points out that the political considerations behind the moratorium have
diminished in importance and that further deferment would result in in-
creased budgetary problems for the Army.
M
Secretary Kissinger has been informed of this proposed move. The Depart-
ment of State has no objection.
I also concur in the proposed move.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum at Tab A to General Wickham approving
the planned reductions.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
CONFIDENTIAL
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines DOD Directive
By
KBH
, NARA, Date 1/17/00
CONFIDENTIAL
staff 177
OF DEFENSE
IC
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
UNITED STATES UF AMERICA
8 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Pacific Force Structure
Last May, following the Southeast Asia events, a temporary moratorium
was imposed by DOD on U.S. Army reductions and internal realignments
in Japan. These reductions, to take place by FY 1977, would involve
some 2,000 military personnel and 6,000 local national employees, all
of whom perform support functions. The support functions that are
still required will be transferred, for the most part, to other Services.
(Some portion of the local national work force will be transferred along
with the residual functions.) The intent of the moratorium was to pre-
clude any immediate adverse political reaction to further military with-
drawals from Asia, even though the programmed reductions involve only
support elements.
The political considerations behind the moratorium now have diminished
in importance. Continued U.S. military presence in Asia has allayed
political fears of U.S. withdrawal. Therefore, we believe reduction
actions should be resumed. Further deferment would serve no good
political purpose, and only result in increased budgetary problems for
the Army.
Accordingly, the attached draft memorandum lifts the moratorium. I am
informed that the State Department at staff level has no objection to
the memorandum. Unless the NSC staff has objections, the Department
intends to issue the attached memorandum no later than 16 January.
Attachment
JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.
As stated
Major General, USA
Military Assistant
FORD & LIBRARY QERALD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
DOD Directive
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
By KBH 9 NARA, Date 1/14/00
AMERICAN REVOLUTION
0071
1776-1976
Sec Def Cont Nr. X-
CONFIDENTIAL
1d
CONFIDENTIAL
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
MEMORANDUM FOR THE Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and
Logistics
SUBJECT: Pacific Force Posture (U)
(c) The political considerations that led to the 7 May 1975 moratorium
on PBD 280CR actions in Japan have diminished in importance. Accordingly,
the program of reductions and transfers deferred in May may be implemented,
under ASD/I&L administration. Internal U.S. Army realignments deferred by
the moratorium also may be implemented.
(c) Two considerations must be kept in mind while implementing the re-
duction program. First, the logistics organization and facilities in
Japan should not be diminished to the point that they can no longer sup-
port a Korean contingency.
(c) A second consideration is the potential adverse political impact of
the sizeable RIF associated with the U.S. Army drawdown in Japan. Careful
timing of RIF announcements can limit that impact. Transfer of civilian
employees to the Service assuming a function previously performed by the
Army also can limit RIF impact. Finally, any adverse impact can be par-
tially offset by an accompanying release of any facilities and areas no
longer required.
GERALD R FORD LIBRARY
Classified by
ASD/ISA
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. AUTOMITICALLY DOWNGRADED
AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31 Dec 81
CONFIDENTIAL
3789
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DUE DATE: 1/14
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SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
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MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
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BY
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SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
M/F'D JAN
CRT ID:
291976
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MEMORANDUM
1029
2a
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
URGENT ACTION
February 20, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Message to the
ASEAN Summit
Following up on a telegraphic recommendation (Tab C) from Ambas-
sador Newsom in Jakarta, the Department of State has forwarded to
you a proposal (Tab B) for a Presidential message (Tab A) to the
ASEAN Summit. The Summit is scheduled to convene February 23.
In informal consultations with State, we have discovered that there are
mixed feelings about the proposal, and no universal enthusiasm for it.
State does not want to take the onus for quashing an Ambassadorial
recommendation out of hand, and I agree that we should make the
decision on the issue here.
My View
I recommend against the sending of this message for the following
reasons:
-- The President endorsed ASEAN in his December 7 Honolulu
speech. In the opinion of some, the manner of the endorsement, which
the President's personal speech writers arranged, was too effusive.
-- We should thus avoid a further Presidential embrace of
ASEAN at this juncture.
-- ASEAN leaders recently turned off Japanese and Australian
requests to participate in the ASEAN Summit. They would have been
even less enthusiastic about such a request from us had we exhibited
the lack of wisdom to proffer it.
-- We broached the subject of economic consultations with
ASEAN over a year ago, and have yet to receive a meaningful ASEAN
response.
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
& LIBRARY QERALD
Kendwing advised
KBH 1/14/00
8:37pm
CONFIDENTIAL
2
-- Our most successful dealings with ASEAN countries have
been on a bilateral basis and should continue that way.
Moreover, a Japanese foreign office official, whom I have known
since 1958 and have a great deal of respect for, paid a call on our
Embassy in Tokyo February 20. He offered a suggestion that the
U.S. refrain from sending a congratulatory message to the ASEAN
Summit (Tab D). He based his stance on his conversation with the
local Thai Ambassador. The Ambassador said that a message
from the United States or other superpower would be embarrassing
in view of ASEAN sensitivities toward involvement with superpowers
during its delicate formative state.
RECOMMENDATION:
That the President not send the message at Tab A to the ASEAN
Summit meeting.
Approve
Disapprove
Should you disapprove my recommendation, I have prepared a memo
at Tab I from you to the President recommending that he approve
sending the message at Tab A.
GERALD LIBRARY R FORD
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
26
MEMORANDUM
1029
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
GONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Proposed Presidential Message to the
ASEAN Summit
Ambassador Newsom in Jakarta has suggested that you may wish
to send a congratulatory message to the ASEAN Summit meeting
scheduled to convene in Bali February 23. There is a precedent
for such messages in that both you and former President Nixon sent
messages to the summit meetings of the Organization of African
Unity. A message would be particularly appropriate because this
is the first summit meeting since ASEAN establ ishment some nine
years ago. We wish to encourage regional cooperation among
ASEAN's five countries -- Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indo-
nesia, and the Philippines -- since we enjoy friendly relations with
all.
The message at issue is addressed to President Suharto, who is
hosting the conference. We propose to keep the message private
in consonance with our objective of maintaining low-key relations
with ASEAN. We would have no objection if the ASEAN leaders
themselves wish to release the text.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you send the congratulatory message at Tab A to the ASEAN
leaders.
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
CONFIDENTIAL - GDS
KBH 1/14/00
2c
Proposed Presidential Message to ASEAN Leaders
Dear President Suharto:
The first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs of Government in
Bali is an event of historic importance. On this occasion I
would like to convey through you, as host for the Conference,
my best wishes to each of the assembled leaders and my sincere
hope that their deliberations will yield many positive benefits to
the peoples of the ASEAN nations.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
GERALD A. FORD LIBRARY
7601029
2d
S/S 7603524
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
February 19, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Proposed Presidential Message for
the Summit of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Ambassador Newsom has proposed that the
President send a letter of greeting for the ASEAN
leaders to President Suharto who will be host
to the ASEAN Summit Meeting, which convenes
February 23. The U.S. has sought to avoid any
over-identification with ASEAN which might prove
embarrassing to this group which seeks to convey
an image of independence and moderate non-align-
ment. At the same time we do not wish to appear
aloof or unfriendly, particularly if other coun-
tries were to send similar greetings. Moreover
there are precedents for such messages. For
example, both Presidents Ford and Nixon have sent
greetings to the Summit Meetings of the Organi-
zation of African Unity.
On balance, the Department of State believes
that a Presidential message along the following
lines would be useful as a demonstration of good
will towards ASEAN's five member countries.
Dear President Suharto:
The first meeting of the ASEAN Chiefs
of Government in Bali is an event of
historic importance. On this occasion
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
I would like to convey through you,
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS KBH 1/14/00
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
as host for the Conference, my best
wishes to each of the assembled leaders
and my sincere hope that their delibera-
tions will yield many positive benefits
to the peoples of the ASEAN nations.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
We would propose to keep the message private,
in line with our desire, and particularly that
of the ASEAN nations, to keep our relations with
ASEAN low key. We would have no objection, of
course, if the ASEAN leaders wish to release
the text although that is unlikely.
It is accordingly recommended that the
attached telegram to Embassy Jakarta agreeing to
the text of a letter from the President be approved.
is
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Attachments:
1. Incoming telegram Jakarta
2160
2. Draft telegram
FORD & LIBRARY QERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
2e
ARTMENT
:
23
STATE
Department of State
of STATE AMERICA ORING
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 9605
PAGE 61 JAKART 02160 180453Z
22-12
ACTION EA-09
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CPR-01 TO-11 OIC-02 NSC-05 NSCE-00 SS-15
SSO-00 1044 W
127145
n 180441Z FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 2752
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MANILA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE
C-A-N F I D E N TAL JAKARTA 2160
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDIP, ASEAN, ID
SUBJ: PROPOSED PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEAM SUMMIT
:. IT OCCURS TO us THAT FIRST ASEAN SUMMIT MFETING
REING HELD FEBRUARY 23-25 WOULD RE APPROPRIATE
OCCASION FOR PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE OF GREETING. SINCE
NO INDIVIDUAL IS DESIGNATED AS CHIEF OF ASEAN ORGANI-
ZATION, WE SUGGEST THAT PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE BE
DIRECTED TO PRESIDENT SOEHARTO AS HOST OF
CONFERENCE. WE RECOMMEND THAT MESSAGE BE TREATED AS
PRIVATE AND THAT LEAVE TO GOI QUESTION OF RELEASE.
2. FOLLOWING IS SUGGESTED TEXT: DEAR PRESIDENT
SOEHARTO: THE FIRST MEETING OF ASEAN CHIEFS OF
GOVERNMENT IN BALI IS AN EVENT OF HISTORIC IMPORTANCE.
ON THIS OCCASION I WOULD LIKE TO CONVEY THROUGH YOU,
AS HOST FOR THE CONFERENCE, MY BFST WISHES TO EACH
OF THE ASSEMBLED LEADERS AND MY SINCERE HOPE THAT
FORD
&
THEIR DELIBERATIONS WILL YTELO MANY POSITIVE
RENEFITS TO THE PEOPLES OF THE ASEAN NATIONS.
SINCERELY, GERALD R. FORD. END TEXT.
GERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT 00 STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
CONF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 JAKART *216* 1804532
3. IF MESSAGE APPROVED, RECOMMEND WE RECEIVED TEXT
RY NO LATER THAN FEBRUARY 21 IN ORDER TO INSURE
DEI IVERY BY OPENING OF CONFERENCE.
4. WE HAVE NO CLEAR INFORMATION YET AS 10 INTENTION OTHER
GOVERNMENTS. THERE IS SOME EXPECTATION THAT AUSTRALIANS
AND PERHAPS EASTERN EUROPEANS MAY SEND MESSAGES.
NEWSOM
CONFIDENTIAL
If
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 009881
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Cable
CREATOR'S NAME
Hodgson
CREATOR'S TITLE
U.S. Ambassador to Japan
RECEIVER'S NAME
Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Secretary of State
TITLE
Congratulatory Messages to ASEAN
CREATION DATE
02/02/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400022
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
1
FOLDER TITLE
Southeast Asia (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN
01/10/2000
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
KBH
the
DBCLASSIFIED with portions exempted
E.O. 12958, See. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines State visit 8/00
By KBH . NARA, Date 5/18/01
2f
0
L*******E COPY
OP IMMED
TKI895
DE RUEHKO #2574 0511020
0 200950Z FEB 76
:
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7063
TXB
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4998
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1935
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 2479
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1508
AMEMBASSY MANILA 6837
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1649
e
0
N
D
E
N
TOKYO 2574
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, ASEAN, US
SUBJEC: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES TO ASEAN
1.
CALLED FEBRUARY 20 TO OFFER "PERSONAL SUGGESTION" THAT US
REFRAIN FROM SENDING CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO OPENING
OF ASEAN SUMMIT FEB 23. HE BASED SUGGESTION IN PART ON
CONVERSATION BETWEEN
AND THAI AMBASSADOR
DURING LAST FEW DAYS. LATTER, RESPONDING TO CASUAL
QUESTION
ON SUBJECT OF CONGRATULATORY MESSAGES,
SAID ASEAN WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEMS WITH MESSAGES FROM JAPAN
AND AUSTRALIA, COUNTRIES IN THE REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND
MESSAGE FROM US OR OTHER SUPERPOWER WOULD BE EMBARRASSING
IN VIEW OF ASEAN SENSITIVITIES TOWARD INVOLVEMENT WITH
SUPERPOWER AT DELICATE FORMATIVE STATE.
2.
SAID HIS "SUGGESTION" ALSO BASED ON REPORT
FROM EMBASSY WASHINGTON THAT US SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SENDING
MESSAGE. HE ADDED PERSONAL ADVICE THAT ANY MESSAGE US MIGHT
SEND WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE AS COMMENT ON RESULTS OF
CONFERENCE AFTER CLOSE. A SIMILAR LOW KEY SUGGESTION WILL
BE PASSED IN WASHINGTON, HE CONCLUDED.
3. COMMENT: PERSONAL SUGGESTIONS OF THIS SORT BY GOJ
OFFICIALS ARE HARDLY EVER PERSONAL, BUT RATHER REPRESENT THE
LOWEST LEVEL FORM OF OFFICIAL DEMARCHE.
FORD
?
GERALD
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PAGE 01
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1
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COPY
DECLASSIFIED with portions exempted
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines State Visit 8/00
By KBH NARA, Date 5/18/01
*******CDNFIDENTI [*******E COPY
HODGSON
BT
GERALD
FORD LIBRARY &
RECALLED
PSN 002976
PAGE 02
OF 02
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2g
CONFIDENTIAL
EA/RA:RJMARTENS: AP
2/19/76 22912
EA:RHMILLER
S/S -
NSC
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
IMMEDIATE
JAKARTA
IMMEDIATE
KUALA LUMPUR, MANILA, SINGAPORE, TOKYO, CANBERRA
RHM
E.O. 11652: GDS
RJM
of
TAGS:
PDIP, ASEAN, ID
S/S
NSC
SUBJECT:
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE FOR ASEAN SUMMIT
REF:
JAKARTA 2160
EMBASSY IS AUTHORIZED TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT
SUHARTO IN CONNECTION WITH ASEAN SUMMIT MEETING PER
TEXT IN REFTEL.
WE WISH TO AVOID OVER-IDENTIFICA-
TION WITH ASEAN ORGANIZATION THAT COULD EMBARRASS ASEAN
MEMBERS OR BE CONSIDERED BY THEM TO BE INJURIOUS TO IMAGE
THEY SEEK TO CONVEY. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT
WANT ASEAN COUNTRIES TO FEEL WE ARE EXCESSIVELY ALOOF.
YOU SHOULD INDICATE TO INDONESIANS THAT MESSAGE IS PRIVATE
ONE TO OUR ASEAN FRIENDS AND NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION.
WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION IF ASEAN
LEADERS WISH TO PUBLISH IT. YY
CONF IDENTIAL
KBH 1/14/00
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LOG NBR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
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7601029
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3
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4101-add on
July 23, 1976
Bud:
As you requested, we have prepared an
expanded paper on international develop-
ments in Southeast Asia since the fall
of Vietnam and Cambodia.
Thomas J. Barnes
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Foreign Policy Ramifications of the Fall of Indochina
Summary
GERALD A. LISAARY FORD
While the internal political, social, and economic consequences of the
Communist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past year,
the international ramifications and the effects upon U.S. foreign policy
are just beginning to come to the surface. The disengagement of U.S.
forces from mainland Southeast Asia has left a partial vacuum requiring
all countries to readjust their positions. There is no doubt that the fall
of Vietnam has caused some of our friends to reappraise their relationship
with us, move closer to other powers in the region, and question the
credibility of U.S. commitments. Others are moving quickly to fill the
void which our military departure created. Our adversaries, Vietnam
and the Soviets, are on the offensive seeking to expand their influence
and further reduce U.S. power and prestige. Our allies, Thailand and
the Philippines, partially in response to these pressures, are seeking
accommodation with Communist powers and are moving away from their
previously tight relations with the U.S. Other friends, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Indonesia, alarmed at the prospects of Communist gains,
are hoping the U.S. will remain involved in the region to counter the
presence of the Communist powers.
Our Adversaries
The Soviets
The Soviets have made advances in Southeast Asia since the fall of Saigon.
A prime inidication of this progress is the fact that the People's Republic
of China (PRC) now privately cautions Southeast Asian leaders to be care-
ful not to "let the bear sneak in the back door after driving the tiger out
the front. "
Soviet foreign policy goals in the area appear to be to:
-- end the U.S. military presence and diminish U.S. influence in the
region;
-- increase its own diplomatic, economic, and intelligence presence;
-- enjoy good state to state relations with all nations;
-- create an image of the Soviet Union as a benign super power seeking
to preserve peace and stability through peaceful coexistence, while labeling
China as the cause of instability because of its support of local revolutionary
movements.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidellnes State visit 7/00
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To achieve these ends, Moscow is seeking to strengthen its relationship
with Vietnam and Laos, and use them as the cornerstone of its policy in
the area. Other Soviet activities in support of these goals have run the
gamut from heightened diplomatic, political, and economic initiatives to
covert intelligence operations.
There is no doubt that the Soviets see Vietnam as the firm base of their
foreign policy in Southeast Asia, especially since Vietnam's deteriorating
relationship with the People's Republic of China over territorial disputes
has caused Hanoi to definitely tilt toward the Russians. Vietnamese
Communist Party First Secretary Le Duan's trip to Moscow and Peking in
October 1975 offered clear evidence of this Soviet advantage. During
his stop in Russia, the Soviets promised Duan lavish support for Vietnam's
economic truction. In contrast, during an earlier stop in Peking,
discussions were apparently so sterile that the two Communist states did
not even issue a final communique, a most unusual omission indicating
the depths to which Sino-Vietnamese relations had plunged.
The Soviets and the Vietnamese are cooperating to try to further reduce
the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia and thereby diminish our
power and prestige. Some Asian officials believe that the Soviets are
behind harsh Vietnamese verbal attacks against Thailand and the Philippines
on this subject. While it would be wrong to consider the Vietnamese as
Soviet frontmen or puppets, they at least see a common goal with the USSR
on this subject.
Moscow is also seeking to manipulate Thai domestic politics, apparently
to help ensure that anti-U.S. elements remain strong. While it would be
wrong to consider Soviet influence in Thailand to be extensive, or that
Soviet diplomacy has entranced Southeast Asians outside Vietnam and
Laos, Soviet agents reportedly have been active in covertly infiltrating
student and labor movements in Thailand, while at the same time conducting
overtcultural programs at Thai universities. Thailand saw as its own
self-interest its recent decision to end U.S. military presence in that
country, and Soviet and North Vietnamese efforts helped to make up the
Thai mind.
The Soviets have also been busy making inroads in other countries. In
Malaysia, on a government to government basis, they are seeking to
finance the large Tembeling hydroelectric project. They have also under-
taken an ambitious cultural program which encompasses the press, trade
unions, students, and literary circles. The Malaysians are extremely
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reluctant to get further involved with the Soviets, but top officials are
reportedly finding it difficult to rebuff all Soviet proposals. At the same
time, the Soviets are taking steps to indirectly increase their influence
in internal Malaysian politics. Since 1974, apparently as part of an effort
to penetrate Malaysian unions, they have invited over 40 trade union
representatives to visit the USSR. Most of their attention is directed at
ethnic Malays, raising the spectre that the Soviets wish to take advantage
of the strong racial antagonism which exists between Malays and Chinese
in Malaysia. Apparently conceding that ethnic Chinese will look to Peking,
the Soviets are attempting to make themselves known as friends of the
poorer Malay farmer. There apparently is a program of covert activity
as well. After some members of the class became involved in unusual
political activity, the Malaysian government recently closed a Russian
language course which a Soviet national taught.
Soviet activities are more limited in Indonesia and Singapore which are
both well known for their tough anti-Communist regimes. Nonetheless,
Russia does carry on a brisk commerce in Singapore through its Narodny
Bank, and from having its ships repaired in Singapore port facilities.
While Singapore had been reluctant to admit Soviet vessels to its government-
owned Sembawang shipyard (where U.S. Navy ships are serviced), the recent
worldwide downturn in shipping made the Soviet business too attractive
to resist.
Perhaps the Soviets' most significant inroad since the fall of Indochina
has come in the Philippines, one of the U.S. 's oldest friends. Philippine-
Soviet relations began improving after the war, and in May 1976 President
Marcos and Foreign Secretary Romulo went to Moscow on a state visit.
While there, they formally agreed to establish diplomatic relations and
also signed a joint trade agreement. Displays of Soviet military power
and scientific capability in Moscow greatly impressed both Marcos and
Romulo. During the visit, the Soviet leaders told Marcos that the presence
of U.S. bases on sovereign Philippine soil made him look like a U.S.
puppet, and urged him to terminate the U.S. use of these bases, and no
longer permit U.S. forces on Philippine soil. Marcos replied that while
he could not end the American presence now, he might do so in about five
years. While Marcos is still probably formulating his ultimate intentions
toward a U.S. military presence in the Philippines, the fact that he would
suggest the possibility of terminating our use of Philippine bases indicates
a breach in our close relationship.
Since the PRC has the inside track with all insurgent movements in
Southeast Asia, Moscow is not involved in directly supporting any armed
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insurgents in Southeast Asia, and appears rather to be concentrating its
activities on state to state relations and covert activities aimed at urban
interest groups.
Vietnam
After a year of concentrating on consolidating power in the South, Hanoi
has once again turned its attention to foreign affairs. Its major goals would
seem to be:
-- maintaining its position of influence, verging on control, over
Laos;
-- further eroding U.S. influence in Southeast Asia, and ending or
rendering ineffective the U.S. military presence in Thailand and the
Philippines;
-- supporting, to the extent possible, revolutionary activities in
Northeast Thailand, while vying with the PRC for influence with the Thai
insurgents;
-- establishing diplomatic relations with all states in the region and
obtaining the maximum amount of economic assistance from them;
-- seeking foreign technology to exploit its unproven oil reserves.
One of Vietnam's main concerns during the past year was Thailand's
toleration of U.S. bases on its soil. Hanoi made it clear that as long as
these bases remained, relations between the two countries could not
improve. Hanoi added to its pronouncements explicit expressions of
support for groups in Southeast Asia seeking "genuine independence. "
The message to the Thai was perfectly clear: If you continue to allow
U.S. bases on your soil, we will support the growing insurgency in your
country. The Thai, under major influence from this pressure, ordered
all U.S. forces out of the country by July 20, 1976. As a result of
Thailand's ending its special relations with the U.S., Hanoi now appears
ready to normalize relations with Bangkok and exchange ambassadors.
A Thai delegation will travel to Hanoi in August 1976 to discuss this
possibility.
Hanoi's willingness to open relations with Thailand comes at a time when
Vietnam is seeking to sweeten its diplomacy throughout the region. In
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July, Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien went on a goodwill mission to
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines -- all of the ASEAN
countries except Thailand. Later he made stops in Burma and Laos.
While the Vietnamese clearly designed this trip to improve Hanoi's state
to state relations with these countries, Hanoi is apparently not ready to
renounce supporting revolutionary groups. When Singapore Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew asked Hien directly whether Vietnam would continue to aid
insurgents, he evaded the question by saying he was authorized to discuss
only formal state to state matters. From his refusal to answer, Lee
concluded that Vietnam is really trying to "lull its non-Communist neighbors
to sleep" and have them drop their guard. He believes that Hanoi, like
the PRC, will follow a two pronged policy of supporting insurgent groups
through its party apparatus, while maintaining good government to govern-
ment relations.
One of the major successes of Hien's trip was obtaining agreement in
Manila for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Philippines.
In this process, Hanoi did not miss another opportunity to attack U.S.
military capabilities. In the communique announcing the agreement, the
Vietnamese inserted language stating that neither country will allow its
territory to be used as a base for foreign aggression, or for direct or
indirect intervention against the other or any other country in the region.
The Philippines agreed to this provision. Since the Vietnamese and the
Soviets consider practically any U.S. military operation to be either an
aggression or an intervention, the Vietnamese have thus laid the groundwork
for future complaints should we use our Philippine bases to conduct opera-
tions such as: rescuing another Mayaguez; transporting military equipment
to Israel; or projecting U.S. power into East Africa as we did in support
of Kenya after the Entebbe raid. That the Philippines would agree to such
language is another indication of the changing situation in Southeast Asia.
Hanoi continues to exhibit an interest in the insurgency in Northeast
Thailand, but is competing with the predominant PRC influence on the
Thai Communists, and combating an almost visceral Thai dislike for the
Vietnamese. The Vietnamese have political cadre among the approximately
90, 000 Vietnamese who reside permanently in Northeast Thailand, and
train some Thai insurgents in Vietnam. There is no evidence, however,
to suggest any significant increase in these activities since the end of the
Indochina war.
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People's Republic of China
Peking set the example for Vietnam of striving for good state to state
relations while maintaining support for Southeast Asian Communist parties,
almost all of which are Maoist in orientation. While it has achieved
successes in establishing diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian
countries except Singapore (and has yet to revive them in the case of
Indonesia), the PRC has a difficult balancing act since it is ideologically
or logistically involved with insurgents in Burma, Thailand, the Philippines,
Malaysia, and perhaps Indonesia, not to mention its substantial troop
presence in Laos. Thailand's diplomatic embrace of the PRC carried the
hope of Chinese willingness to lessen support for insurgents, and to help
stave off the Vietnamese.
If the case of Malaysia is any example, at least PRC moral support for
the rebels will continue. Malaysia in May 1974 became the first ASEAN
state to enter into diplomatic relations with Peking. Kuala Lumpur has
been severely disappointed that its actions has not brought about a reduction
in propaganda broadcasts from the "Voice of the Malaysian Revolution"
located in southwest China. In addition, the Malaysians are upset that
the PRC Embassy has been "cultivating" the ethnic Chinese population
and that their trade balance with the PRC remains unfavorable. Thailand
is already learning this lesson as the China based Voice of the People of
Thailand radio continues its vitriolic railing against the government in
Bangkok.
Cambodia
Cambodia represents China's great triumph in Southeast Asia. Pro-
Peking Khmer cadre gained control of the Communist Party, and severed
all command relationshipswith the Vietnamese Lao Dong Party which had
originally founded it. With the end of a Vietnamese role, Soviet influence
in the country ended as well. China is the primary external influence
in Cambodia today. While they refuse to label themselves as Communists,
the Khmer leaders espouse a Maoist line and are carrying out a radical
economic and social revolution which has parallels only in left wing Chinese
Communist programs. The unceremonious way in which the Cambodian
Communists literally booted the Soviets out of the country, and the exclusive
use of Chinese military supplies during the last three years of the war
are further evidence of Peking's unique hold on that country.
While its international role will be limited, Cambodia has indicated
through its public statements that it will follow a harsh anti-American
line in the third world and non-aligned movements.
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Laos
The new Lao government is beset with difficult international problems,
most of which are located within its own borders. Approximately 20, 000
Chinese engineering troops are in northwest Laos with no apparent in-
tention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a sizable
presence with some 32, 000 military spread throughout the eastern and
southern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present in considerable
numbers, and a Cuban advisory team is on hand. The Lao Communists
seem to have balanced off these contending parties so far, and have main-
tained better relations with the PRC than have their Vietnamese mentors.
The Lao, with Vietnamese support and backing, provide support to the
Thai insurgency. Thai Communists have safe havens and logistical
storehouses in Laos. Supplies from the PRC and perhaps Vietnam are
transshipped through Laos. Lao and Vietnamese are continuing to train
some insurgents.
Our Friends
There is no doubt that our withdrawal from Indochina and the subsequent
Communist victories caused our allies and friends in Southeast Asia to
reconsider their relationship with us, and reevaluate the credibility of
our commitments and our pledges to remain involved in the region. These
reactions have taken various forms and have caused them to act in varying
ways.
Thailand
The U.S. disengagement in Indochina had a special effect on the Thai,
causing them to seriously question U.S. commitments to their security
under the Manila Pact. This perception, combined with North Vietnamese
veiled threats that a continued U.S. presence would result in Vietnamese
support for Thai insurgents, caused Thai leaders to see accommodation
with Vietnam as their safest course. Hence their mid-1976 deadline on
U.S. troop withdrawals, despite PRC endorsement for a continued U.S.
presence. Thai Foreign Minister Phichai, in a recent major foreign
policy speech, indicated that friendly relations with the Communist states
of Indochina will be one of the cornerstones of Thai policy. In actual
terms, Thailand still remains closer to the U.S. than to either the PRC
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or Russia. We still give $16 million a year in security assistance and
continue certain limited security cooperation by sharing intelligence,
but the Thai move toward the Communists has clearly lessened U.S.
ability to collect regional intelligence, support Indian Ocean operations,
and project power into Asia.
While the Philippines has not gone so far as to terminate our military
presence there, nor sought to abrogate our mutual defense treaty, it too
is moving away from us. The Philippines took the lead in dismantling the
formal SEATO organization, and is seeking to restrict how we use our
military bases. While there is no question but that the GOP still considers
the U.S. its closest ally, President Marcos has taken a number of major
steps to improve his country's standing in the third world, and to achieve
more balance in its relationship with the super powers. In the past year,
he has traveled to both the PRC and the Soviet Union, and opened diplomatic
relations and signed trade agreements with them. In addition, he moved
to achieve a leadership position among Third World and non-aligned
countries through chairmanship of the Group of 77 meeting in Manila,
and acting as its spokesman at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi.
Others
Singapore and Indonesia, while equally concerned about a possible U.S.
retreat from Southeast Asia, have reacted in a different fashion. While
trying not to give the outward impression of doing so, they have endeavored
to move closer to the United States and to enhance their security relation-
ship with us. President Suharto, in talks in both Washington and Jakarta,
expressed reservations about Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese intentions
toward his country. He made a strong request for a continued U.S. military
role inthe area and for significantly increased military assistance. Cuts
in our assistance to Indonesia have undermined efforts to assure the GOI
that we are genuinely concerned with helping it to remain strong. In the
first joint U.S. -Indonesian consultations, held June 25-29 in Washington,
Indonesian representatives made it clear that our actions so far had not
matched our words and that, as a result, they were beginning to wonder
whether we are really interested in playing a positive role in Southeast
Asia.
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has a pessimistic view of both
Malaysia and Thailand's chances of dealing with their Communist insurgencies.
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He believes there is a strong chance that Communist forces will threaten
Singapore from Malaysian territory in the next five to ten years. To
counter this threat, Lee has sought to purchase significant quantities of
U.S. military equipment and to obtain U.S. help in training his forces.
Lee has also urged that the U.S. retain a military presence in the area
and the Indian Ocean to counter increasing Soviet pressure. Singapore
Foreign Minister Rajaratnam recently publicly called for the U.S. to
stay involved in the region as long as the other super powers are present,
and chided certain ASEAN colleagues who have haively' called for a
precipitous U.S. withdrawal. To facilitate our remaining, Singapore has
allowed the servicing of U.S. naval ships in its ports, and permits the
transiting of a limited number of Diego Garcia support flights.
Malaysia has an ambivalent approach to the new situation in Asia and has
attempted to hedge all its bets. Publicly it has continued to support late
Prime Minister Razak's call for a zone of peace and neutrality in Southeast
Asia. The current Prime Minister Hussein Onn, however, troubled by
the increasing level of the insurgency, privately has told top U.S. officials
that he supports a continued U.S. presence in the area. He has asked us
for credits to purchase U.S. military equipment.
Conclusions
The fall of the non-Communist governments in Indochina has set off a
process of readjustment which may have profound implications for U.S.
foreign policy. A unified Vietnam in close concert with the Soviet Union
is slowly moving to expand its influence as a regional power. Moscow
is gradually increasing the role it plays in the region despite PRC efforts
to keep it out. Thailand and the Philippines clearly have rethought their
previous extremely close relationship with the U.S., and are seeking to
move some distance away from us. Thailand ended our military presence
on its soil and the Philippines is at least thinking about following suit in
the mid term. Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia all look to a continued
U.S. military involvement in the area as the key to continued stability.
The final conclusion therefore must be that a continued U.S. security role
is the key to political developments in Southeast Asia.
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MEMORANDUM
4101
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
July 15, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES M
SUBJECT:
Assessment of Developments in Indochina Since the
End of the War
Bud indicated that you wish to have a detailed assessment of developments
in Indochina since the communists came to power. The paper at Tab A
summarizes events there and points out general trends which have emerged
both internally and in the foreign relations of each country. The paper
deals first with regional comments, then in depth with Vietnam, and
finally Cambodia and Laos.
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the study is that it points up the
considerable political and economic changes Hanoi instituted in South
Vietnam. Most journalistic accounts have tended to portray life there
as relatively unchanged from the Thieu period.
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One Year After the Fall of Indochina
The internal political, social, and economic consequences of the
communist victories in Indochina have clearly emerged in the past
year. The international ramifications and the effects upon U.S. foreign
policy are just beginning to come to the surface.
Life in Cambodia has been radically altered amidst what can only be
called a brutal bloodletting. In Vietnam and Laos, changes have come
more gradually, but in South Vietnam the patterns for the future seem
unmistakably clear. Laos, as it always did in the war, is following
slowly in the footsteps of its Vietnamese brethren.
International Aspects
The international impact of the communist victories and the U.S. pull-
back from Asia is becoming clearer. Vietnam and the Soviets are on
the offensive; Thailand and the Philippines are seeking accommodation
with communist powers; and Singapore and Indonesia are hoping the
U.S. will stay around. The Thai, anxious to appease the North Vietnamese
whom they consider their greatest threat, have ended their special
relationship with the United States. Certain limited cooperation will
continue, but the Thai have deliberately moved toward a more "balanced"
foreign policy which includes good relations with the new communist
governments of Indochina, and acquiescence in Hanoi's demand that all
U.S. bases be removed. Thailand has been communicating with Cambodia
for some time, and a Thai delegation will visit Hanoi in August to consider
normalizing relations.
Singapore and Indonesia are more pessimistic about being able to deal
with communist regimes. Singapore in particular has been outspoken
about the need for a continued American presence in Southeast Asia
as long as the "other super powers" are present. Malaysia is disappointed
that its establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC has not
dampened the ardor of its communist insurgents.
The Soviets have continued to take steps to gradually increase their
influence in Southeast Asia, and have established diplomatic relations
with the Philippines. Numerous Soviet and Cuban advisors are in Laos
helping "socialize" that country.
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After a year of limited activity, newly united Vietnam has embarked
on a diplomatic campaign aimed at improving state-to-state relations
in Southeast Asia. Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien is currently
on a good-will mission to all of the ASEAN countries except Thailand,
and announced July 12 the opening of diplomatic relations with the
Philippines. One feature of the joint communique was agreement to not
allow their territories to be used as bases for foreign aggression or
intervention against each other or other countries in the region.
Vietnam has serious problems closer to home with both China and
Cambodia, and has had border skirmishes with both. Hanoi has
departed from its previous balancing act between the USSR and the
PRC, by clearly tilting toward the Soviets. Laos feels compelled to
be more even in its approach to these two powers, particularly since
the PRC has some 20, 000 troops on its soil, but Laos remains under
the principal tutelage of Hanoi, which still has about 32, 000 troops
on hand.
Life in South Vietnam Under Communist Rule
Many recent accounts have portrayed life under the communists in
South Vietnam as relatively unchanged from that under the Thieu
Government. Careful reading of communist media, statements from
refugees fleeing there, and available intelligence, however, show
that life in South Vietnam has changed considerably, since the North
Vietnamese have:
-- Moved to eradicate the vestiges of "capitalism, 11 eliminate
political opposition, and construct a socialist state.
-- Incarcerated a large number of former GVN officials.
-- Instituted more stringent political restrictions and harsh
punishments, including the death sentence.
-- Undertaken a campaign to lessen the influence of religion.
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-- Begun a significant cultural transformation.
- Started to restructure the economy along collectivist lines and
relocated portions of the urban population to remote areas to begin
agricultural production.
Specific details about each of these subjects are listed below.
Administrative and Political Control: Who is really in charge
Senior NVN General Van Tien Dung's recent article detailing how the
North Vietnamese Politburo planned the final attacks on Saigon and
how the North Vietnamese Army executed it, should have ended any
question about who really ran the war for the communists. All
sources of information indicate that the South is really in the hands
of the North Vietnamese, and that southerners are just beginning to
realize that the basic fact of the war is that the North conquered the
South. Southern Viet Cong cadre are reportedly so few in number,
and so inept that northerners give them office only as front men.
Everyone who has left Saigon recently indicates they have dealt with
northerners in all of the ministries of the former government in
Saigon.
Communist media have revealed that in some provinces the North
Vietnamese Army has had to put soldiers into all villages and hamlets
to administer the government.
Refugees report that in the Saigon area North Vietnamese soldiers
are quartered in people's homes, and that there they perform a
function of political control and watching over the population.
Executions and Death Sentences
The Communist Government in SVN established on March 23, 1976 a
new set of punishments for both ordinary and political crimes which in
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effect makes activity against the new government punishable by death.
In contrast, under the Thieu Government, no one had ever been executed
for any crime. The premiership of Nguyen Cao Ky was the last time
when the government executed anyone, a Chinese rice merchant who had
allegedly been hoarding during a period of extreme shortages. The new
communist decree provides the death penalty for a large number of crimes
including "plotting to overthrow the government, spying, stealing public
property, murder, and rape. " The new code, however, also provides
the death penalty for such "crimes" as producing faked goods, illegal
business transactions, forgery, speculation, hoarding, raising and
lowering prices, corruption, burglary, and for actions aimed at "sabotaging
national unity, unification and national defense. " While there is no
evidence to suggest that there has been a "bloodbath, " communist media
have reported the sentencing of at least 17 men to death in the last year.
Vietnamese communist media have also announced that the Can Tho military
tribunal tried a number of ARVN officers, including the former Province
Chief of Chuong Thien, and sentenced them to death. A refugee who
escaped from Can Tho stated that he witnessed a number of these executions,
and said that there may have been 30 over the past year. Many of the
executions were by strangulation, including some in which men were choked
to death with barbed wire. Others died by having their throats cut. The
Chuong Thien Province Chief had his trachea torn out by hand. Most
other executions that we know of occurred by the firing squad. Giai Phong,
the South Vietnamese communist newspaper, carried a picture May 27, 1975
of one man being killed by a firing squad in Saigon. Both the Washington
Post and the New York Times also carried photos last May of "peoples'
trials" which ended in executions. The Times article showed one man about
to be shot. While Giai Phong states that all of those executed were men
who committed crimes such as murder or rape, some refugees have
stated that at least some are men accused of "political crimes" while
serving in the old government. Giai Phong on September 6, 1975, for
example, reported a death sentence for a former GVN village chief,
a police sergeant, a CIA agent, and the commander of a reconnaissance
unit.
Political Restrictions
While prior to the fall of Saigon the communists had promised political
freedom and voiced support for "third force" and neutral elements
within Vietnamese politics, following their takeover of South Vietnam,
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Issued a decree May 20, 1975 ordering all political parties in
South Vietnam to cease activities. Included in this order were a number
of "reactionary parties" such as the VNQDD, the Dai Viet, and the
Cong Nong, all of which had been independent of or in opposition to
President Thieu. Shortly thereafter, on May 23, the Saigon Military
Management Committee ordered that "all organizations, associations,
and parties (except the Communist National Liberation Front) must
register with the government and may function only after government
approval has been granted. " To date there has been nothing to indicate
that any organization or association or party has received such approval.
Along with this order to halt activities was a strict prohibition against
erecting signs, holding meetings, or raising funds.
Compelled the leaders of these "reactionary political parties"
to undergo "collective reform" and sign statements acknowledging anti-
revolutionary activities and pledging to end all opposition to the new
administration. These political party leaders along with other party
officials have also lost all rights of citizenship, although the government
may restore them after a period of "good behavior. 11
Most notable in this group is Vu Hong Khanh, the head of the VNQDD,
who had been an anti-French revolutionary since 1925. The communists
had previously thought so much of Khanh that in August 1945 they made
him a Deputy Minister in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's first
government in Hanoi. He later broke with the communists and joined
the Bao Dai government, thus probably accounting for his being branded
a dangerous reactionary.
Suppression of Religion
While publicly acknowledging freedom of religion, the communists have
also publicly stated that they will not allow those, elements within any
religion who might cause them any trouble to continue their activities.
To achieve this end they have conducted a coordinated and systematic
campaign to gain a degree of control over organized religion.
Their attack on the Catholic church began shortly after the takeover of
Saigon with a "popular campaign" to drive the apostolic delegate, a
Frenchman, from that city. Following demonstrations against him, the
PRG ordered him to leave June 5, 1975. Bishop Nguyen van Thuan, the
auxiliary bishop of Saigon and incidentally a nephew of Ngo dinh Diem,
also known for his staunch anti-communism, was exiled to Nha Trang
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shortly thereafter. At that time, communist spokesman Mai Chi Tho
justified the government's actions by saying that the appointment of all
bishops within the country is a matter which the state must approve.
In the fall of 1975, the French bishop of Kontum, along with a number
of French priests and nuns, was told to leave the country without being
given any reason. This attack on foreign clergy continued until July 1976,
when the last group of non-Vietnamese priests and nuns arrived in
Bangkok after the PRG evicted them. A purge of the Vietnamese clergy
reportedly began in the latter part of 1975. Communist media indicated
that priests who were known for their anti-communist activities were
branded as criminals and accused of "abusing religion. 11 Communist
cadres organized meetings of their parishoners at which they denounced
these priests. Some refugees have reported that some priests were then
arrested and sent to prison. In at least two cases, the refugees said they
knew the men were executed. Other priests have reportedly undergone
torture such as being staked out in a tiger cage. The communists have
used force against some Catholic parishes and may be resorting to false
charges to arrest their most obstinate opponents. There is evidence
that the regime based the Vinh Son incident, in which troops stormed a
church and arrested the rector and several other persons on charges
of resistance activities, on pre-fabricated information. The intention was
to discourage outspoken clerics.
Another part of the anti-church campaign has been the physical takeover
of church buildings. The state has confiscated all private schools and,
in some cases, closed seminaries. In other cases, North Vietnamese
soldiers have moved into church properties. North Vietnamese soldiers
regularly camp and conduct exercises on Catholic church grounds in
Saigon. Refugees say that churchgoers believe that anyone attending the
church thus comes under NVA scrutiny. Moreover, the North Vietnamese
sit in the church during the services and listen carefully to every word
spoken. The result is that attendance at mass and church is down,
and the authority of the clergy is breaking down.
The regime recently permitted the Archbishop of Hanoi to travel to the
Vatican so that the Pope could elevate him to the rank of Cardinal. A
seemingly liberal act, the real purpose of it was probably to further
eclipse the power of the Archbishop of Saigon, who in the newly unified
Vietnam will now have less prestige than the Hanoi Cardinal, who over the
years has proven no impediment to government policies.
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7
Attacks on the Buddhists are not so well reported as those on the
Catholic church. There is nevertheless evidence of a similar campaign
against the Buddhists. Communist radio broadcasts state that a number
of Buddhist monks were denounced as being false religious leaders. In
addition, some refugees indicate that pagodas in Can Tho and other
parts of the Mekong Delta have been closed and that some monks were
sent away for re-education. Other refugees say pagodas are open but
only the most elderly monks remain. Particularly significant is the
apparent disappearance of Thich Tri Quang, the leader of the anti-Thieu
An Quang Buddhist faction in Saigon who has not been heard of since the
"liberation" of Saigon. The government may be sending these religious
and other opinion leaders to forced labor camps. Recent newspaper and
radio articles indicate that priests and monks, along with artists and
intellectuals, are being sent to do "voluntary" manual labor in the new
economic areas.
The communists have also disbanded the governing boards of the Hoa Hao
Buddhist sect, no doubt because the Hoa Hao has always been anti-communist
and continues toresist to this day.
The Anti-Decadent Culture Campaign
One of the first programs which the North Vietnamese instituted was
the campaign to "eradicate the decadent U.S. puppet culture in the
South. " This effort, which began in May 1975, initially took the form
of "students" being sent into the streets to collect books, songs, tapes,
cassettes, and any other type of printed or written material which
exemplified the "decadent culture" which the United States "had brought"
to South Vietnam. American and French journalists reported that while
communist soldiers kept the press from getting too close, they observed
that the students entered book stores and emptied them of every type of
publication except for mathematical and technical books. The students
next reportedly removed "objectionable items" from private homes.
According to a French journalist's report, while some of the items they
rounded up were "pornographic" publications such as Playboy and Oui,
they also picked up every type of political writing and Vietnamese history
along with translations of all foreign works. Since then the authorities
have extended the campaign to include a prohibition against singing songs
which the new regime has not approved, as well as a total proscription
against foreign music unless specific prior approval is obtained. This
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8
mass roundup of literature seems to have taken on striking proportions.
At the end of the campaign's first month, Radio Saigon reported that
several "tons" of books had been collected. In one village alone in the
Saigon area, almost 50, 000 books and close to 20, 000 tapes and cassettes
had been collected in that month. The campaign has continued for a
year and continues to receive considerable press attention. An official
list of blacklisted authors and books was published, and the roundup of
forbidden material continues. An amusing sidelight to this campaign
is that communist cadres are apparently not destroying all of these
objectionable materials. Recently, Vietnamese media have complained
about the proliferation in Hanoi of wild American rock music and nude
pictures that North Vietnamese cadre and troops returning from the
south have brought home.
Destructions of Symbols of the Old Government
Many remember that the communists tore down the large monument
featuring ARVN soldiers charging toward the National Assembly building
in downtown Siagon. Few have regretted its loss from an aesthetic point
of view. A more disconcerting report we have heard from several
refugees is that communist forces descrecrated the large ARVN cemetery,
just outside Saigon, where hundreds of soldiers are buried. Included in
this action was the destruction of the large monument which had been
erected in memory of these men.
Corruption and Other Social Problems
One thing that has seemingly not changed from the old regime is the
extent of the corruption which permeates the new communist government.
Refugees tell stories of demands or bribes from officials at all levels,
and comment that in this respect there is absolutely no difference between
the new government and the old. Many Vietnamese who have left Saigon
on French flights report paying bribes of several thousand dollars for
exit permits. Communist media have indirectly acknowledged this problem
and prescribed penalities for those caught. The refugees describe North
Vietnamese soldiers as the only ones now regularly having any amounts
of money and as dealing wildly on the Black Market. They can buy hard
to get items now such as rice and meat from state commissaries, and
are reselling their purchases on the Black Market with large profits.
Prostitution is proving as persistant as financial corruption, and may
have even increased because so many people are out of work. Reportedly,
only the North Vietnamese have enough money to pay the going rate.
FORD
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9
Collectivization of the Economy
While private individuals still own land, major changes in agriculture
have taken place:
Labor exchange teams now operate throughout the country. These
teams, made up of all farmers in an area, pool all-manual labor, farm
machinery and animal resources to collectively plow, plant and harvest
the rice crop. While most individual ownership of land plots has not
ended, the establishment of these labor exchange teams is apparently
the first step on the way to total collectivization.
Collectivized state farms in which all land is worked in common are
in existence in a few areas. These entities, which cover 4000 to 5000
acres, are so far found only in the new economic zones, areas which the
government only recently reclaimed and to which it is relocating urban
dwellers.
While the state has not collectivized the harvest on individual farms
officially, the state is in fact taking a large part of the rice crop. A new
rice tax has resulted in farmers being forced to give up anywhere from
50 to 75 percent of their rice crop to the government. While an individual
has his own plot of land and theoretically gets to keep what is grown on
it, the communist tax is so high that the state is achieving just about the
same results as it would through a collectivized system.
In urban commerce, the communists have taken more direct and drastic
steps to gain control of the economy. In the fall of 1975 the government
began a campaign to arrest the "comprador bourgeoise," leading ethnic
Chinese businessmen who exercised a cartel over many important
commodities such as rice, metals, and textiles. In a nationwide roundup
the police arrested these men and summarily confiscated all of their
goods and property. For a time their fate was uncertain but in late May
1975 the government issued a news circular indicating that they would be
tried and that minimum sentences for those guilty of speculating or
hoarding would be five years while in the most serious cases the death
penalty would be exacted.
In addition, the North Vietnamese have stripped Saigon of certain
technical equipment such as medical x-ray machines and shipped them
North. Perplexingly, in view of the current food shortage and the U.N.
desire to provide food aid, they also disposed of the valuable huge rice
supply which the U.S. left in Saigon by selling at least part of it to
foreign countries.
&
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10
Reeducation
The communists themselves have admitted that over one million former
GVN officials have registered with the new government, and that at
least 500, 000 have undergone reeducation. Some reeducation was done
in place while other higher ranking persons have gone to reform camps.
Of those sent away, some lower ranking officers have returned home,
many reportedly suffering from a number of diseases and extremely
emaciated. Refugees confirm, however, that most of those who have
gone off to reeducation have never returned, and their ultimate fate is
uncertain. At first the new government stressed the leniency of its
policy. But in late May 1976 it issued a new statement which revealed
that those who had been stubborn or unreformed, presumably this category
applies to all of those who have not yet returned, may have to undergo
reeducation for at least three years. Furthermore, the new statement
indicated that those guilty of crimes with "blood debts" to society will
stand trial. We do not know the exact nature of reeducation, but the few
reports available indicate that it includes much hard labor, little to eat
aside from rice, and large doses of communist propaganda about how bad
the Americans were. Other unconfirmed reports indicate that some
reeducatees are being forced to clear mine fields, and that some have
been killed while doing so.
New Economic Areas
One of the most vigorous communist campaigns has been a year-long
concerted effort to have people leave Saigon and other cities, and resettle
at locations -- referred to as new economic areas which had lain fallow
or had never been farmed. In many cases the land is almost untillable,
and is located in a remote area where farming is difficult under the best
of circumstances. The new government has told people moving there
that there will be a house ready for them, as well as free tools and a
monetary stipend. Many people, lured by government promises, apparently
at first went voluntarily. Later as the word seeped back to the cities
that the government's promises were hollow, the refugees said the
authorities introduced a degree of coercion. Local security forces
physically rounded up some people, particularly young men not having
any means of employment, and sent them to these areas. At the end of
1975, Radio Saigon reported the existence of a campaign to round up such
"bad elements. 11 In other places the authorities used a quota system in
which they required large families to send a certain number of family
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
11
members to the new areas. They also C hose persons who signed up for
free rice at government stores, thus indicating that they h a d no job
or income in the city. In at least one case they used religion to draw
people there. First, they required a Catholic priest to relocate to one
of the new areas. After a short time, they brought him back to make a
speech to his parishoners describing the new zone in laudatory terms and
urging that they return there with him. The relationship between priest
and parishoners being what it is, most people reportedly did go with
him en masse.
Elections
An election for a new unified national assembly was held in both North
and South Vietnam on May 25, 1976. There were four noteworthy aspects
about the election: First, no politicians from the previous GVN period
ran or were elected with the exception of several "third force" figures
who most official Americans believed to be at least communist fellow
travellers. Secondly, 605 candidates ran for the 492 seats available,
practically a one-to-one ratio. Thirdly, the ranking members of the
North Vietnamese Politburo who ran all received 99. 5 percent of the
votes cast in their district or higher. These totals are an interesting
contrast with President Thieu who, running alone in 1971, received only
slightly over 93 percent. Finally, in the new government formed under
the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam, no NLF/PRG personality is
in a position of any real power. Unconfirmed intelligence reports
indicate that the southern communists are resentful over their diminished
role.
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
Cambodia's New Regime
12
Since their April 17, 1975 capture of Phnom Penh, the communists have
moved ruthlessly to establish their domination over the people, and have
tried to reduce or eliminate all vestiges of such basic institutions as
family, religion, and education. Millions of people, including the sick
and aged, have been uprooted and forced to work in the countryside,
under extremely austere conditions, on agricultural and reconstruction
projects. Disease pervades everyday life, malaria and dysentary are
common, and there is little or no medicine available.
Numerous interviews with Cambodian refugees who have fled to Thailand
and information available from other sources indicate that the Cambodian
communists are radically reconstructing that country using extremely
harsh and brutal methods including large scale executions to implement
their policies. Some of the more notable aspects of their rule are:
-- The regime is extremely anti-intellectual. One former school
teacher described book burnings in Phnom Penh following the communist
takeover including one instance in which the entire contents of the National
Library were destroyed.
-- Education has virtually ceased to exist save for some ideological
training for children between the ages of 7 and 12.
Organized religion is apparently being eradicated. Monks are
forced to do work in the fields. Most pagodas have been either dismantled
or are being used for other purposes such as to store grain.
Standards of health have apparently declined seriously, and disease
is rampant. There are reports of widespread epidemics of malaria,
dysentary, and cholera in various parts of the country. Remaining
medical facilities are open only to communist cadre. Most doctors are
no longer allowed to practice but are either forced into manual labor or
executed.
In several areas the family unit is being destroyed with children
permanently separated from their parents, and husbands and wives
placed in separate work groups.
New Government
Phnom Penh formalized its new governmental structure under the
constitution announced in early January. On March 20 communist
authorities staged nationwide elections to elect representatives of the
13
250-member National Legislative Assembly. The Khmer Communist
Party (KCP) maintains overall control of the governing apparatus.
Khieu Samphan will chair the State Presidium, but we do not believe
he is the top man. Prince Sihanouk has been relegated to the role of
elder statesman and will play no consequential part in Cambodia's
future. The new Prime Minister, who may be Saloth Sar under the
pseudonym of Pol Pot, is probably the overall leader of the Party and
the country.
Executions
Refugee reports and other information indicate that arbitrary executions
are commonplace, and there is a widespread fear of arrest and sub-
sequent elimination. Members of the former government's political
elite, bureaucracy, and military -- including doctors, educators, and
engineers -- apparently have no immunity and are prime targets for
execution along with their families.
Reports say that since January 1, 1976 the communists have even executed
former teachers, students, and even low ranking enlisted men of the Lon
Nol military forces. These killings are reportedly widespread and in
many cases members of the entire family of former government officials
or soldiers are executed along with the head of the family. According to
one report, the communists executed approximately 700 Lon Nol officers
from Battambang Province in late April 1975. Another report indicates
that they machine-gunned to death over 350 soldiers who returned from
Thailand where they had been in training.
Journalistic Accounts of Atrocities in Cambodia
Journalists have also documented communist brutality following the
conquest of Phnom Penh. Henry Kamm in the New York Times July 15, 1975
reported refugee accounts of brutal executions, old people and children
dying in the forced exodus from Phnom Penh, and the mass resettlement
of the Cambodian population. The April 26 Asian edition of Time
magazine estimates that, "Since the Communist victory, 500, 000 to
600, 000 people -- roughtly one-twelfth of Cambodia's population --
have died from political reprisals, disease or starvation. " It also
reports that a Khmer Rouge order went out to kill all Army officers
and civilian officials in the Lon Nol government. It describes one such
execution as follows:
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"At Mongkol Borei, the local Khmer Rouge commander
ordered
a squad of young Communist soldiers to punish
a group of civilian officials of the fallen government
The
15 Khmer Rouge rounded up ten former senior civil servants and
their wives and children about 60 people tied their hands
behind their backs
and drove them
to a banana plantation
11
Scattered about the place were the bodies of people killed
one or two days earlier
The Khmer Rouge thrust each
official forward one at a time and forced him to kneel between
two soldiers armed with bayonet-tipped AK-47 assault rifles.
The soldiers then stabbed the victim simultaneously through the
chest and back
"
As each man lay dying, his anguished, horror-struck wife
and children were herded up to the body. The women, forced to
kneel, also received the simultaneous bayonet thrusts. The
children, last to die, were stabbed where they stood.
"Of the 60 or so executed, only about six were spared the bayonet.
These were very small children, too young to fully appreciate
what was happening. In a killing frenzy now, the two executioners
each grabbed a limb one an arm, the other a leg and tore the
infants apart. "
According to the Time story, other larger scale executions took place
as well. In Battambang, hundreds of former officers were found,
loaded onto trucks, and machine-gunned outside the city. In other
places, execution by shooting was considered a waste of bullets.
Some victims were clubbed with wooden hoes or tied together and
buried alive by bulldozers; others suffocated when plastic bags were
tied over their heads; still others died by bayoneting and dismemberment.
While their brutal methods have received most attention following the
fall of Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975, the Khmer Communists actually
instituted the use of terror and execution prior to that date. An
American Embassy Saigon study on Communist rule in Southern Cambodia
dated February 19, 1974 noted that, "Harsh punishment is widespread
with reports of it emanating from every province. " It added that "death
sentences are fairly common
" Journalistic accounts from this
same period tended to confirm this conclusion. The Washington Post
on November 24 quoted refugees who fled to South Vietnam as saying
that the communists punished infringements of even minor rules by
death.
15
Donald Kirk in the Chicago Tribune of July 14, 1974 reported a refugee
as seeing the Khmer Rouge "saw off the neck of a civilian with the sharp
edge of a sugar palm leaf. 11 Kirk added that this episode was not an
isolated case but "one of many I heard during visits to refugee camps. "
Tammy Arbuckle in the April 10, 1974 Washington Star News wrote
that refugees told him that "people who protested against the Communist
policy of food distribution were taken into the forest and beheaded and
mutilated with ax and hammer. 11
According to U.S. Embassy reports, the communists executed approximately
700 civilians and surrendered soldiers in Battambang Province on July 1,
1974. Five minutes after the surrender, the communists began firing
indiscriminately into the group killing 200 people.
Following that, they systematically executed all the men remaining alive
by stabbing them with bayonets while the men were sitting on the ground
with their hands tied behind their backs. They marched off the women
and children, and put them to work in the fields.
Radical Social-Economic Changes
Practically everyone in the country is now engaged in collectivized
rice farming. Private land holdings have ended and people live and
work in commune arrangements, often segregated by sex. Although
Cambodia has managed an ample rice harvest, grain is carefully rationed,
and little else is available to augment the basic diet.
Despite this lack of nourishment, the population is being forced to work
long, arduous hours on a variety of agricultural and reconstruction
projects. Working conditions are described as severe, with little
mechanized equipment available. As a result, most people who escape
to Thailand are emaciated and describe the populationas badly underfed.
Resistance
Indications of armed resistance to the communist regime have periodically
surfaced, but the dissidents lack the strength and organization to pose
a serious threat. Resistance forces with bases in Thailand have proven
ineffectual, and their forays amount only to harassment. Although
increasing popular dissatisfaction has been reported, communist brutality
and stringent population control have prevented a viable opposition from
organizing.
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16
Diplomatic Relations
Countries with resident diplomats in Cambodia include the PRC, North
Korea, Vietnam, Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Laos. Resident
envoys live an austere existence, and their activities are closely
controlled with the exception of the Chinese.
Cambodia recently expanded its international contacts, and has now
established ties with all ASEAN nations except Indonesia. Outside
ASEAN, relations with Burma and Denmark are normalized. Japan
has also been investigating the possibility of establishing a diplomatic
dialogue and has apparently broached the subject to Cambodian officials.
Moscow is still anathema to the KC. While Phnom Penh may be softening
its position, any significant warming between the two would irritate Peking.
Cambodia would probably not do anything that might endanger its close
relationship with China and will probably not renew ties with the Soviets.
Because of continuing border incidents and disputed claims to offshore
islands, relations with Vietnam are correct but strained.
Ties with China
The KC rely heavily on the PRC for external support and assistance.
Up to 2000 Chinese advisors may now be in Cambodia working on agricultural,
mechanical, and industrial projects. Peking also provides aircraft to
fly KC diplomatic missions around the world. Despite the KC refusal to
acknowledge that it has any ties with communism, there is obviously
a close ideological relationship between the two parties.
Prospects
The Khmer leadership will most likely maintain its xenophobic orientation,
and will concentrate on internal matters for some time. Selective
executions and disregard for human rights will continue. In foreign
affairs, Phnom Penh will probably continue to expand its international
affiliations and seek to play an expanding role in the non-aligned movement,
the U. N., and other international fora. Resistance poses no threat to
communist control, although some dissident activity is likely. Periodic
border clashes with Thailand and Vietnam will persist but remain
limited in magnitude.
FORD & LIBRARY QERALD
17
Laos
The communist takeover in Laos was accomplished in more gradual
fashion employing traditional political tactics during the 19 months
that a coalition government existed. The communists, in response to
"popular" demonstrations, formally dissolved both this government and
the monarchy on December 2, 1975 and replaced them with the People's
Democratic Republic of Laos. Prince Souphanouvong is the nominal
Chief -of-State but Communist Party Secretary-General Kaysone
Phomvihan holds the real power in his position of Prime Minister.
Kaysone has a long history of close ties with Hanoi and may be a member
of the Lao Dong Party politburo. Because of this relationship, we still
believe Hanoi is providing a good deal of guidance to the Lao Party on
both internal and international affairs.
Since their takeover, the communists have begun a number of programs
similar to those in Vietnam aimed at imparting significant political,
social and economic change: civilian and military leaders of the non-
communist element of the coalition government have been sent off for
reeducation and most have not returned; a small number of executions
have been reported; the old currency has been replaced with new liberation
Kip;" political dissidents have been rounded up; the State has taken over
some business operations; and some people have been sent to new economic
zones.
Resistance to the communists has been more virulent in Laos than in
Vietnam or Cambodia. Meo tribesmen in the north and former FAR
personnel in the south have both engaged Pathet Lao forces in significant
military actions, at least one of which necessitated the sending of NVA
troops to halt insurgent advances. While the resistance will continue as
a prickly problem, it poses no real threat to the communist government's
survival.
The new Lao government is beset with a difficult set of international
problems most of which are located within its own borders. Approximately
20, 000 Chinese engineering troops are in northeast Laos with no apparent
intention to leave anytime soon. The North Vietnamese also have a
sizeable presence with some 32, 000 military spread throughout the
eastern and southern parts of the country. Soviet advisors are present
in considerable numbers, as well as a Cuban advisory team. The Lao
Communists seem to have balanced off these contending parties SO far,
and have maintained better relations with the PRC than have their
Vietnamese mentors.
18
Thailand is a problem as well. The Lao have engaged in several
military confrontations with Thai forces along their extensive common
border. These incidents have soured Thai-Lao relations and resulted
in Bangkok temporarily closing its border to Laos' economic detriment.
Recent Thai public overtures for better relations may signal a mend
in this rupture, but mutual suspicions will remain, and any improvement
will be gradual.
Available evidence suggests that the leaders of the Thai insurgency
still haven in Laos, which serves as a logistics highway for weapons,
ammunition, and other supplies emanating mainly from China and
destined for Thailand. So far there has been no indication of significant
escalation of Lao, Vietnamese, or Chinese assistance to the Thai
insurgents.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
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4498
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4
August 6
4a
TO BUD MCFARLANE
I question the necessity of
sending this to the President. If
it does go forward, it should be
drastically shortened.
JWD
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
4b D
AH
MEMORANDUM
760 4498
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
ACTION
August 6, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
THOMAS J. BARNES
SUBJECT:
Ambassador Underhill's Assessment of the U.S.
Position in Southeast Asia: "For the time being,
we're ahead in Southeast Asia. 11
Ambassador Underhill cabled July 29 his analysis of the balance of
power in Southeast Asia one year after the fall of Saigon. He also
included U.S. policy recommendations. His analysis is unusually
thoughtful, and contains novel observations. Because it is intellectually
provocative and illustrates the positive aspects of the American versus
the Soviet and Chinese presence, I have prepared a summary (Tab I)
for you to send to the President.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
This is an interesting
8/7/75
price, int & think time just
forthe artis B
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
KBH 1/14/00
4c
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL GDS
ANALYSIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Ambassador Underhill's Assessment of the U.S.
Position in Southeast Asia: "For the time being,
we're ahead in Southeast Asia. 11
Francis Underhill, our Ambassador to Malaysia, recently cabled to
the State Department his assessment of where the U.S. stands in
Southeast Asia. From the title of his analysis, Underhill clearly
believes we are one up on the Soviets and Chinese there. Because his
commentary looks at the problem from an unusual perspective, I
thought it worthy of providing you the following summary of his assess-
ment.
Underhill begins by rejecting what he says is the usual framework we
use in looking at the area. That framework sees the U.S., USSR, and
PRC in competition for power and influence with each trying to limit
the others' presence while seeking a dominant role for itself. Instead,
Underhill begins at the other end by assessing those basic strengths
which the non-communist nations of Southeast Asia have demonstrated.
He posits that these states have reached a level of political organization,
economic development, and regional cohesion that keeps them from being
easily susceptible to outside interference or manipulation. They are
governed by authoritarian, relatively sophisticated, nationalist regimes
which are alert and sensitive to any such attempts.
While intra-regional differences exist, Underhill sees ASEAN as providing
a framework of conciliation and copperation, thus further reinforcing each
country's fundamental strength. Dissident movements, where they do
exist, are too weak, and their prospects for power too slim, to justify
any of the major outside powers taking the risk of providing direct support.
Moreover, with the end of the Vietnam War, a de facto zone of peace,
freedom, and neutrality is evolving which will not attract or encourage
foreign intervention.
GONFIDENTIAL GDS
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
KBH 1/14/00
CONFIDENTIAL
2
While admitting that China and the Soviet Union have made gains in
the past year, Underhill sees them as still without significant influence.
Southeast Asian nations regard both with deep suspicion, particularly
since they suffer from the ideological handicap which obliges them to
assert a difference between party-to-party and government-to-govern-
ment relations, a distinction completely unacceptable to the ASEAN
countries.
Using Malaysia as an example, Underhill points out that neither Moscow
nor Peking is making any extraordinary effort to win influence there.
There have been no high-level visits of senior officials of either country
in the past 12 months, nor has either sent a major cultural or sports
attraction. Their low-level trade further accentuates their impotence.
The USSR provides .1 percent of Malaysia's imports and takes 4.1 percent
of its exports. The PRC furnishes 2 percent of Malaysia's imports,
and receives 9 percent of its exports. In contrast, the U.S. accounts
for 9.5 percent of Malaysia's imports and 14 percent of its exports.
Underhill further notes that this limited Soviet and Chinese economic
involvement pertains to ASEAN as a whole, The USSR exports 2 percent
and imports 1.5 percent of ASEAN's goods, while the PRC handles 2.2
percent of its exports and imports 2.1 percent from ASEAN.
Underhill then takes note of the Soviet attempt to hasten the closing of
American bases in Southeast Asia in the belief that the removal of an
American military presence will reduce our influence. Such an expecta-
tion is wishful thinking, he contends. Our experience in Southeast Asia
clearly shows that a military presence, while it may bring other benefits,
is a net consumer rather than a producer of influence. Underhill, there-
fore, clearly expects that with the departure of our military units from
Thailand, influence will rease. This is an interesting thesis which
probably has a number of adherents in the U.S., but also elements of
naivete.
Underhill comments that "It is evident we are not now making a major
effort in Southeast Asia. " He sees us devoting less attention to the area
and allocating it fewer resources. Our acceptance of Thailand's decision
to end our military presence is a clear demonstration to him that we see
no overriding U.S. interest at stake in the region. The Ambassador adds,
however, that it would be wrong to describe this change as a withdrawal
or a retreat. It is rather a correction of past gross imbalances in the
allocation of our resources, and a re-establishment of a proper relation-
ship between involvement and national interests.
FORD
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CONFIDENTIAL
3
Underhill concludes that the current popular assertion that American
influence in Southeast Asia is on the wane is "pure bunk. " Our influence
is so pervasive and widespread that we do not notice it. The non-communist
countries, he argues, have adopted our mixed public-private approach
to national development, our social values, our business methods and
management techniques, and our definition of the good life. He notes
that, while they do not practice our political ideals, they at least play
tribute to them by holding elections. The elites of these countries are
in fact closer philosophically to the U.S. than they are to their own masses.
The PRC and the USSR models have no current appeal. He proves this
thesis by asking rheotorically "Who would buy a Russian computer or
consult an economist from Peking?"
Underhill turns finally to the question of what is the proper role for the
U.S. and what should be the direction of U.S. policy. His answer
incorporates the following guiding principles:
-- We should give up the search for regional equilibrium since South -
east Asia is under no significant danger from either Moscow or Peking.
-- We should not devote U.S. resources to resisting aggression and
maintaining territorial integrity in Southeast Asia. So many of the
countries are already involved in minor squabbles with each other over
territorial questions -- Timor, Sabah, the Spratly Islands, Northeast
Thailand -- that we do not need to get involved. We should permit Asian
solutions to emerge to Asian problems.
-- The ASEAN nations are most threatened from weaknesses within
their own societies and not from outside aggression or insurgencies.
We can help only indirectly by assisting the governing elites to aqquire
the resources and knowledge needed to cope with these problems. Such
assistance would come in commodity price stabilization, trade concessions,
private investment, training programs, and educational exchange.
-- For military relationships, we should move to make these contacts
as "politically sterile" as possible while at the same time allowing our
friends to acquire the military equipment and technology they need. We
should end forever the "patron-client relationship" which our military
assistance groups have fostered.
-- Finally, we should endorse the ASEAN concept of Southeast Asia
as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. Even though we would not
fully adhere to it because we would maintain our military presence in
FORD
&
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
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CONFIDENTIAL
4
the Philippines, our public endorsement would nonetheless be welcomed
and would generate positive support for us.
While a ready embrace of all of Ambassador Underhill's premises
would be imprudent, his approach to analyzing Southeast Asia allows
us to see the area in a better and more balanced light. Too often we
tend to focus on shortcomings and inadequacies of our allies. In examining
their strengths, we become more cognizant of their self reliance, and
more confident that they will be able to maintain their integrity and their
non-communist systems.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
4d
DOC
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LOG NUMBER
MO
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INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORKESPONDENCE PROFILE
FROM: SECSTATE 8 Barnes
6
7604498
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REFER TO
FOR:
,
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(
NSC PLANNING
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1
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DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS!
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1976
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NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
4996
ACTION
September 8, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
F
FROM:
WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN by
SUBJECT:
Recommended Meetings with Ambassadors Holdridge,
Whitehouse and Sullivan
Ambassadors John Holdridge, Charles Whitehouse and Bill Sullivan
will be in Washington the week of September 13-17 on consultation, and
all three have asked to call on you. I believe your meeting with each
of them would be useful in providing you an update on where we stand in
Southeast Asia and also to give them the benefit of White House thinking
on their countries. If you approve receiving them, I will work out the
timing of their calls with Lora and with State.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you meet with Ambassador Holdridge.
APPROVE
B
DISAPPROVE
That you meet with Ambassador Whitehouse.
APPROVE B
DISAPPROVE
That you meet with Ambassador Sullivan.
APPROVE B
DISAPPROVE
FORD & LIBRARY QERALD
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LOG NUM
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INITIAL ACTION o
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
9
8
9
8
17
7604996
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSIATE
SCOWCROFT +
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RECOMMENDATIONS
INTELLIGENCE
JOINT MEMO
LATIN AMERICA
REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
NSC PLANNING
CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
DATE
FROM
Shoft
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DUE
9/8
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9/13
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
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DISPATCH
NOTIFY
MICROFILM a FILE ROMTS
NSC/S DISP INSTR
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
SE 1976
BY
IF
CRT ID:
SPECIAL INDEXING:
MAKE WH SA FP
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NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022