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China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (1)
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China, Republic of - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (1)
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "China, Republic of - State
Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (1)" of the Presidential Country Files
for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
COPY 8 OF 15 COPIES
S N
OF STATE
-
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
PEODET
SECURITY
R 190709Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2693
CONTROL: 4836Q
BT
SECRE T TAIPEI 5195
Recd
: 19, Aug
STADIS
N
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MARR, TW
SUBJECT: FUTURE USE OF TAINAN AIR BASE
REF: A) STATE 128586; B) TAIPEI 3726
1. WE HAVE DROPPED THE IDEA CF MESSAGE TO KEY MILITARY
ADDRESSEES REGARDING FUTURE USE OF TAINAN BECAUSE OUR LOCAL
EFFORTS HAVE PROMPTED 13AF AND PACAF TO COME UP WITH PLAN WHICH
WE FIND QUITE SATISFACTORY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH CONCEPT
OF "CARE TAKER" STATUS. ALONG WITH CHIAYI AND CCK AIRBASES,
$
13/AFX wILL CONTINUE TO USE TAINAN FOR STORAGE OF CONVENTIONAL
WAR RESERVE MUNITIONS. MAINTENANCE WILL BE CON-
TRACTED TO CHINESE AND TOTAL NUMBER OF PERSONNEL AT TAINAN
WILL BE AOUT TWO HANDFULLS WITHOUT DEPENDENTS.
2. ALTHOUGH PLAN NCT YET FINAL, WE WILL NOT PURSUE ISSUE
FURTHER UNLESS TROLLEY GETS CFF THE TRACK AGAIN.
UNGER
ZO
N
ST
#5195
NNNNOTE BY CC/T: NODIS CAPTION ADDED BY MR TWOHIE, S/S-O.
PASS TAPE AND COPY TO OFF-LINE FOR PROCESSING.
S
FORD
LIBRARY & UERALD
CHART STATES GG 4/23/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT TITL RUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
2
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
OF STATE
.
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SEGRET
R 230829Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2749
CONTROL: 6204Q
BT
s E G-R-E-T TAIPEI 5338
R±cd : 23, Aug
5:06 A.M.
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, TW
SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR DEATH OFNBRESIDENT CHIANG
KAI-SHEK
REQUEST DEPT AIR-POUCH SOONEST CONTINGENCY STUDY FOR USG
ACTIONS IN EVENT DEATH OF ROC PRESIDENT CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
OUR RECOLLECTION IS 1971 CONTINGENCY PLAN WAS REVISED IN
DEPT LAST YEAR. WE EMPHASIZE THERE ARE NO RECENT OR NEW
DEVELOPMENTS THAT PROMPT THIS REQUEST.
UNGER
FORD
GERALD ?
LIBRARY
PEODUCT GG 4/23/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT The AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
3
COPY 15 Or 15 COPIES
DEPARTMENT of STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SEPDET
05/16/
R 2402182 SEP 74
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3020
BT
SECRET
- TAIPEI 5933
NODIS
CONTROL: 5347Q
E.O. 11652:
RECD: 24 SEPTEMBER 74 -
TAGS PFOR TW CH
SUBJECT: US CHINA POLICY AND THE GROC'S OPTIONS
12 01 AM
REGARDING ITS INTERNATIONAL STATUS
1. BEGIN SUMMARY: AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG TRACK OF
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH PRC. IT BECOMES IN-
CREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO FORECAST KINDS OF ACTIONS WHICH
GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF
RECOGNIZING PEKING AND REDUCING ITS RELATIONS IN
TAIPEI BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL. PREDICTABLY, GROC
WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL
STATUS. WE BELIEVE AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEITHER OPEN
NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING, NOR WILL IT SERIOUSLY PURSUE A
SOVIET CONNECTION. INSTEAD, IT WILL HAVE TWO BASIC
COURSES OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT ABANDONING CLAIMS
TO BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA,
CONTINUE PRAGMATIC EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC
AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY
SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E. CONTINUE PRESENT POLICIES):
OR (B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A
STRATEGY SUSCEPTIBLE OF MANY GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM
MINIMAL ASSERTION OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY UP TO OUTRIGHT
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.
MR 02-22 #6; state in 3/6 102
By dal NARA, 4/16/02
2. NEGOTIATIONS WITH PEKING (UNLESS TO OBTAIN PRC
AGREEMENT TO TAIWAN'S SEPARATION) WOULD BRING EXTREME
DOMESTIC CRISIS WITH CIVIL DISRUPTIONS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE.
THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS
BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. APPROACH TO
SOVIETS (WHO IN ANY CASE ARE UNLIKELY TO BOARD SHIP
WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN IMMINENT DANGER OF
SINKING) WOULD OFFEND RIGHT-WING FRIENDS IN us AND JAPAN,
WOULD CONFUSE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDICTRINATED POPULATION, AND
WOULD BE MOST GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING.
3. MAINTAINING UNCHARGED PRESENT COURSE PROBABLY WOULD
BE INSUFFICIENTLY REASSURING TO POPULACE SHAKEN BY LOSS
emenuy
CLUIMS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
-2- TAIPEI 5933
OF LAST VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION ANDUN-
CERTAIN AS TO NEW RELATIONSHIP WITH US, DESPITE POPULARITY
OF THIS STRATEGY WITH SOME DIE-HARD KMT ELEMENTS. IT
WILL BE NECESSARY FOR GOVT TO DEMONSTRATE IT HAS THOUGHT
THROUGH WAYS OF MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR
TRADE AND TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT NON-COMMUNIST CONTROLLED
FUTURE IS STILL VIABLE. STANDING PAT. OR STANDING PAT
WITH SLIGHT VARIATIONS WOULD NOT
PROVIDE SUCH REASSURANCE.
4. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE CCK WILL FEEL
PRESSURED TO MAKE STATEMENT FORMALIZING ROC'S SEPARATION
FROM MAINLAND, YET THERE WILL BE FACTORS INHIBITING HIM
FROM TAKING RADICAL ACTION-THE MOST RADICAL BEING A
DECLARATION THAT TAIWAN IS FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA.
SUCH A RADICAL ACTION, DESPITE UNSDOUBTED POPULARITY WITH
TAIWANESE MAJORITY ON ISLAND, WOULD OFFEND IMPORTANT CON-
STITUENCIES IN MILITARY AND SECURITY APPARATUS AND WOULD
UNDERCUT PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER CONTROL. IT
THUS WOULD INDUCE UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION PRECISELY
AT TIME WHEN PUBLIC CALM AND STABILITY WOULD BE MOST
NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD HAVE TO FEAR ADVERSE US
REACTION, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE POSITION, AND
WOULD UNDERSTAND INDEPENDENCE DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE
PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT WHEN THERE COULD BE
MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE COMMITMENT.
5. CCK THEREFORE IS LIKELY TO REDEFINE ROC STATUS IN
MORE MINIMAL WAYS. FROM VARIETY OF SHADINGS AVAILABLE,
HE PROBABLY WILL GO ONLY SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD TOWARD
TOTAL SEPARATION AS HE THINKS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN
PUBLIC CVONFIDENCE IN FUTURE AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES
FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING WITH TAIWAN, RETAINING OPTIONS
TO MOVE FURTHER ALONG IN FUTURE AT TIMES AND IN WAYS
WHICH LEAST UPSET CONSTITUENCIES ON ISLAND AND INTER-
NATIONALLY. ONE POSSIBLE INITIAL FORMULA, FOR EXAMPLE,
COULD BE SIMPLE STATEMENT THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS
MAY BE AND HOWEVER WIDELY RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONALLY,
PRC EXERCISES NEITHER SOVEREIGNTY NOR JURISDICTION OVER
TAIWAN AND GROC DOES.
6. EVEN AT POINT OF RECOGNIZING PEKING, US WILL RETAIN
ENORMOUS LEVERAGE HERE AND CAN USE IT IN WAYS WHICH
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
GEODEY
VPLRAT
OLORED
()
-3 - TAIPIE 5933
REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS MAKING FOR CATION ON CCK'S
PART. SPECIFICALLY, US SHOULD: (A) EASE RADICAL
TENDENCIES HERE BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE NOT
ONLY TO LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC DIPLOMATIC RECOG-
NITION BUT ALSO TO IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END
OF THEIR WORLD, A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR
TAIWAN CAN NEVERTHELESS BE ACHIEVED: (B) ATTEMPT TO
PUT ACROSS IDEA THAT SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS UPON
MUTUAL DEFENE TREATY THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANEMENTS
IN REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF STABILITY
SUFFICIENT TO DETER PEKING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE
TAIWAN'S STATUS: (C) DISCREETLY BUT POINTEDLY WARN OF R
RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROC ACTION TO UNDERMINE BASIS OF
US-PRC RELATIONSHIP, AS WELL AS ADVERSE US REACTION TO
UNILATERAL ALTERATION OF TAIWN'S JURIDICAL STATUS: (D)
IN USG ITSELF, HAVING DETERMINED HOW WE WISH HANDLE
ISSUES AFTER RECOGNITION OF
(on
PEKING! OFFER GROC BEST ASSURANCES WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT
OFFICIAL USG PRESENCE ON ISLAND, MILITARY SECURITY AND
ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER ACCESS TO US.
7. THRUGHOUT PROCESS. WE SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT
OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JAPAN AND REST OF ASIA, AS ELL AS
WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE
AND ON BAISIS OF RESPONSIBLE, CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS.
END SUMMARY.
A. GROC OPTIONS
8. AS US MOVES FURTHER ALONG RACK OF NORMALIZATION OF
RELATIONS WITH PRC, IT BECOMES INCRESIGLY IMPORTAT TO
FORE CAST XINDS OF ACTIONS WICH GROC IS LIKELY TO TAKE
IF AND WHEN US REACHES POINT OF RECOGNIZING PRC AND
ESTABLISHING FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, AND AT SAME TIME
REDUCES ITS RELATINS WITH ROC BELOW THE DIPLOMATIC LEVEL.
WE MUST CAVEAT OUR ANALYSIS BY NOTING THAT THE POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC VARIABLES ARE MANY AND THAT MUCH WILL DEPEND
UPON SPECIFIC SITUATIONS AT THAT POINT IN IME. NEVERTHELESS,
WE CAN IN GENERAL TERMS FORESEE THE COURSES OF
ACTION GROC WILL HAVE OPEN 10 IT.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE Dr
Department of State
UNITED
SECRET
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
OLUIILI
-4- TAIPEI 5933
9. PREDICTABLY, GROC WILL FEEL COMPELLED TO COPE WITH
ITS DAMAGED INTERNATIONAL STATUS. ASSUMING AS WE DO THAT
AT THAT POINT GROC WILL NEIGHTER OPEN NEGOTIATIONS WITH PRC
FOR INCORPORATION INTO A COMUNNIST-RULLED STATE, NOR HAVE
A TRUE "SOVIET OPTION," GROC WILL HAVE TWO BASIC COURSES
OPEN TO IT: (A) WHILE NOT FORMALLY ABANDONING CLAIMS TO
BE ONLY LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA, CONTINUE PRAGMATIC
EFFORTS TO KEEP ROC AND TAIWAN VIABLY AND INDEFINITELY
SEPARATE FROM MAINLAND (I.E., CNTINUE PRESENT POLICIES); OR
(B) FORMALIZE TAIWAN' SSEPARATION FROM MAINLAND, A STRATEGY
SUSCEPTIBLE OF SEVERAL GRADATIONS RUNNING FROM A MINIMAL
ASSERTIN OF SEPARATE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH JURIDICAL
FORMULAS SUCH AS "TWO STATES WITHIN ONE NATION" TO AN
OUTRIGHT DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE FROM CHINA.
B. NEGOTIONAS WITH PRC
10. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT GROUP ON TAIWAN WHICH FAVORS
BECOMING PART OF A COMMUNIST MAINLAND. INDEED, CRITICAL
FACTOR IN TAIWAN'S DOMESTIC STABILITY IS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
THAT PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO INTENDS KEEP TAIWAN SEPARATE
FROM PRC RULE, COUPLED WITH BELIEF (SHARED BY TAIWANESE
AS WELL AS MAINLANDERS) THAT HE IS LEADER MOST CAPABLE
OF DOING so. THUS REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH PEKING IS
CCK'S FIRMEST POLICY COMMITMENT. ABANDONMENT OF THAT
COMMITMENT AND OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON ANY BASIS OTHER
THAN SEEKING PRC ACQUIESCENCE IN TAIWAN'S CONTINUED SEPARATION
WOULD GRAELY DESTABILIZE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION
AND THRATEN CCK'S ABILITY TO MAINTAIN CONTROL.
C. SOVIENT CONNECTION
11. WE DOUBT CCK HAS TRUE SOVIET OPTION. DIFFICULT TO
IMAGINE USSR REACHING APPRAISAL THAT ROC COULD BE SERIOUS
CONTENDER FOR POWER ON MAINLAND AT SOME FUTURE TIME, AND
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE SOVIETS WOULD CONSIDER INCURRING ANY
DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR TAIWAN. SHOULD CCK, IN
EXTREMIS, PURSUE SOVIET OPTION, IT IS DOUBTFUL USSR
WOULD JUMP ABOARD SHIP WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO THEM IN
IMMINENT DANGER OF FOUNDERING.
12. FOR HIS PART, CCK IS UNLIKELY TO SERIOUSLY PURSUE
SOVIET CONNECTION, BUT WILL CONTINUE OCCASIONAL COVERT,
SECRET
PRODUCT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED DEPARTMENT STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
ONLY
-5- TAIPEI 5933
S
DISOWNABLE CONTACTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ELEMENTS HERE--
IN MILITARY, AMONG INTELLECTURALS, PERHAPS ELSEWHERE--WH WHO
BELIEVE ROC MIGHT BE ABLE TO DEVELOP A SOVIET OPTION,
PERMIER MUST BE EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS: WOOING SOVIETS WOULD
BE GRAVEST POSSIBLE PROVOCATION TO PEKING, MOST LIKELY
WOULD EVOKE OPPOSITION WITHIN KMT AND CONFUSION IN
POPULATION LONG EXPOSED TO MASSIVE ANTI-COMMUNIST INDIC-
TRINATION, AND COULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT RIGHT-WING
FRIENDS IN JAPAN AND us.
D. MAINTAINING STATUS QUO
13. SOME THIRTY-OOD COUNTIRES OW RECOGNIZE ROC, A
NUMBER BOUND TO DECLINE FURTHER IN DAYS AHEAD. US
RECOGNITION OF PRC UNDOUBTEDLY WILL ACCELERATE OE-
RECOGNITION PROCESS, PROBABLY LEAVING ONLY SUCH STALWARTS
AS PARAGUAY, SOUTH AFRICA OR SOUTH VIETNAM FORMALLY
RECOGNIZING GROC AS GOVT OF CHINA. GREAT UNCERTAINTY
AS TO FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH US WHICH us RECOGNITION
S
OF PEKING WOULD ENGENDER, PLUS RAPID LOSS OF LAST
VESTIGES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF ROC AS MEMBER
OF FAMILY OF NATIONS, WILL BE EXTREMELY UNXSETTLING TO
PUBLIC, INDEED COULD CAUSE SOMETHING OF PANIC REACTION
UNLESS GOVT INTERVENES SWIFTLY AND IN WAYS OTHER THAN
SIMPLE SECURITY CRACKDOWN.
14. SIMPLY CONTINUING TO ASSERT CLAIMS TO BE ONLY
LEGITIMATE GOVT OF CHINA UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES
WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE TO SHAKEN POPULATION.
PREMIER MIGHT TRY TO DEALHHXLUSBM DOMESTIC SITUATION BY
REMAINING ESSENTIALLY WITHIN THE PRESENT POLICY FRAME-
WORK, BUT STATING MORE EXPLICITYLY WHAT IS ALREADY IN-
FERENTIALLY HIS GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. THAT IS, WHILE NOT
FORMALLY ABANDONING PRO FORMA CLAIMS TO BE CHINA'S ONLY
LEGITIMATE GOVT, PREMIER COULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT EFFECTIVE
SOVEREIGNTY IS LIMITED TO TAIWAN AND ASSOCIATED ISLAND,
NOTING THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO DEAL WITH TAIWAN ECONOMICALLY
OR IN OTHER WAYS MUST 00 SO ON BASIS OF CONTINUING TO
S
TEAT GROC AS EFFECTIVELY SOVERIEGN WITHIN AT LEAST THAT
AREA. OUR JUDGMENT IS THAT TAKING SUCH A POSITION,
HOWEVER, STILL WOULD NOT RE SEEN DOMESTICALLY AS DEALING
EFFECTIVELY WITH ROC'S SITUATION, NOW WOULD IT BE
SUFFICIENT REASURANCE THAT GOVT HAS THOUGHT THROUGH
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
PEPORT
CLURE
-6- TAIPEI 5933
S
WAYS OF MAINTAINING INERNATIONAL ACCESS FOR TRADE AND
TRAVEL PURPOSES, AND THAT A NON-COMMUNIST FUTURE, THERE-
FORE, IS STILL VIABLE.
E. INDEPENDENCE?
15. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTO THAT FACED WITH THIS SITUATION,
CCK WOULD BE STRNGLY TEMPTED TO DECLARE AN INDEPENDENT
"REPUBLIC OF TAIWAN", PERHAPS TO SABOTAGE US-PRC NORMALIZATION,
PERHAPS TO CAPBITALIZE ON CONTINUING SYMPATHY
FOR NATIONALIST CHINA AND ON SENTIMENT IN THE US AND
ELSEWHERE IN FAVOR OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES, AND
IN ANY CASE TO SOLIDLY UNITE TAIWANESE MAJORITY BEHIND
HIS RULE. CERTAINLY ESTABLISHMENT OF "REPUBLIC OF
TAIWAN" IS ULTIMATE IDEAL OF ALMOST ALL POLITICALLY CN-
SCIOUS TAIWANESE ON THIS ISLAND, YET THERE ARE A GRET
NUMBER OF FACTORS WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO INHIBIT CCK FROM TAKING
SO RADICAL AND DRAMATIC A STEP.
S
16. UNLESS CAREFULLY AND LENGTHILY PREPARED IN ADVANCE,
DECLARING TAIWAN FORMALLY INDEPENDENT OF CHINA WOULD
IMMEDIATELY UPSET PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF STATE
(WITH "NATIONAL"GOVT SUPERIMPOSED ATOP "PROVINCIALGOVTD
AND WOULD UNDERMINE PRESENT RATIONALE FOR MAINLANDER
CONTROL. КИТ "OLD GUARD"--MANY OF WHOM WOULD STAND
TO LOSE THEIR SINECURE JOBS--AND DIE-HARD MAINLANDERS
WOULD BE BOUND TO OPPOSE. MILITARY LEADERSHIP, STILL
HEAVILY INDOCTRINATED WITH MAINLAND RECOVERY MISSION,
WOULD FEAR THEY TOO WOULD LOSE THEIR PRESENT FAVORED
POSITION IN SOCIETY. SECURITY APPARATUS, WHICH HAS S0
LONG AND so VIGOROUSLY TRACED DOWN ALL TAIWAN INDENPENDENCE
ACTIVISTS WOULD BE IDSORIENTED AND MIGHT FEAR REPRISALS.
IN SHORT DESPITE POPULARITY WITH TAIWANESE, INDEPENDENCE
WOULD BRING CONFUSION, WOULD ALIENATE IMPORTANT CON-
STITUENCIES ON WHICH CCK OPENDS, AND WOULD CREATE GREAT
UNCERTAINTY AT PRECISELY THE TIME STABILITY AND PUBLIC
CALM WOULD BE MOST NECESSARY. EXTERNALLY, CCK WOULD
HAVE TO FEAR AN ADVERSE US REACTIO, GIVEN OUR SHANGHAI
COMMUNIQUE POSTION, AND HOULD UNDERSTAND THAT INDEPENDENCE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
-7- TAIPEI 5933
DECLARATION WOULD BE GRAVE PROVOCATION TO PEKING AT MOMENT
WHEN THERE MIGHT BE MAXIMUM UNCERTAINTY AS TO US DEFENSE
COMMITMENT.
F. LESS RADICAL SEPARATION
17. EMBASSY'S JUDGMENT IS THAT ABOVE FACTORS WILL DISSUADE
PREMIER FROM DECLARING TAIWAN INDEPENDENT OF CHINA BUT
THAT HE PROBABLY WOULD DECIDE ON SOME LESS EXTREME FORMALI-
ZATION OF TAIWAN'S SEPARATION FROM MAINLAND. THERE ARE
A NUMBER OF GRADATIONS POSIBLE. FORMING A KIND OF
SPECTRUN BEGINNING WITH FAIRLY SIMPLE AND AMBIGUOUS FOR-
MULATIONS NOTING THAT WHATEVER PEKING'S CLAIMS MAY BE,
AND HOWEVER WIDESPREAD INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF
THOSE CLAIMS, GOVT INPEKING EXERCISES NEITHER JURISDIC-
TION NOR SOVEREIGNTY OVER TAINAN AND GOVT IN TAIPEI DOES.
FORMAL, JURIDICALLS
YXBLEASED STATEMENTS SUCH AS "ONE
CHINA, TWO GOVERNMENTS" OR "TWO STATES IN ONE NATION" FORM
PART OF THAT SPECTURM. TOTAL, FORMALLY DECLARED INDE-
PENDENCE OF CHINA--WHICH WE HAVE ANALYZED AS UNLIKELY--
is THE TERMINAL POINT OF THE SPECTURM.
18. IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT CURRENT THINKING HERE
ON THESE QUESTIONS (WHICH, AFTER ALL, IS PROSCRIBED UNDER
PRESENT CONDITIONS) IS HAZY AND CONFUSED. EVEN SENIOR
AND KNOWLEOGEABLE GOVT OFFICIALS WHO, OCCASIONALLY, HAVE
INFORMALLY DISCUSSED "THREORETICAL OPTIONS" WITH US TEND
TO SLIDEAMONG THESE POSSIBILITIES WITHOUT PRECISION.
TAIWANESE INTELLECTURALS TEND TO CALL ALL OF THESE
POSSIBILITIES "INDEPENDENCE."
19. BUT CCK, IN HIS TWO YEARS AS PREMIER, HAS SHOWN HIM-
SELF A VERY CAUTIOUS MAN WHOSE CHARACTERISTIC APPROACH TO
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IS GRADUALIST. WE BELIEVE THAT
WHEN IT APPEARS UNMISTAKEABLY CLEAR US INTENDS RECOGNIZE
PEKING IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE, PREMIER WILL SEE IT
NECESSARY TO REDEFINTE ROC'S STATUS TO EMPHASIZE SEPARATION
FROM MAINLANO. IN so 001NG, HE WILL TRV TO REASSURE
HIS PEOPLE THAT PATRAN. as A SEPARATE ENTITY,
HAS VIABLE FUTURE IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SECURITY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
-8- TAIPEI 5933
TERMS. HE WILL ACT PRIMARILY TO MAINTAIN PUBLIC CONFI-
DENCE CAVOINDING CAPITAL FLIGHT AND DOMESTIC INSTABILITY)
S
AND TO ESTABLISH GROUND RULES FOR OTHER NATIONS DEALING
WITH TAIWAN. HE WILL GO ONLY SO FAR AS HE THINGS
NECESSARY TO ACCOMPLISH THOSE PURPOSES, RETAINING OPTION
OF FURTHER, GRADUAL MOVEMENT IN FUTURE, IN WAYS AND AT
TIMES WHICH LEAST UPSET CONTTITUENCIES AND BALANCES ON
THE ISLAND AND INTERNATIKONALLY.
G. US ROLE
20. WE BELIEVE THAT IN CRISIS CAUSED BY US RECOGNITION
OF PEKING, CCK ACTUALLY WILL BE MORE RATHER THAN LESS
DEPENDENT UPON US. HE WILL BE MOST CONCERNED AS TO HOW
NEW DEVELOPMENT WILL AFFECT MULTIPLE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS
(LOANS, TRADE, INVESTMENT, ETC.), SUPPLY OF
ARMS AND SPARES FOR HIS MILITARY AND, ABOVE ALL, SECURITY
GUARANTEES. HIS OWN AND TAIWAN'S FUTURE WILL STILL
DEPEND TO EXTRAORDINARY DEGREE ON IS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN
EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH USG--INDEED THAT ABILITY
(in)
WILL CONTINUE TO BE A MAJOR CRITERION IN PUBLIC'S
JUDGMENT OF HIM AS A LEADER.
21. THESE FACTORS SHOULD BE UZED BY US AS LEVERAGE TO
STEER GROC AWAY FROM ANY DECLARATION OR OTHER PROVO-
CATIVE ACTION WE WOULD CONSIDER EMBARRASSING OR ADVERSE
TO OUR INTERSTS. WE SHOULD EMPLOY THIS LEVRRAGE TO
REINFORCE TOSE FACTORS ALREADY MENTIONED WHICH MAKE
FOR CAUTION ON CCK'S PART. ASSUMING THAT FULL
NORMALIZATION LIES AHEAD, WE SHOULD:
A. IN OUR USE OF THE CONDITIONING PROCESS, EASE RADICAL
TENDENCIES BY ACCUSTOMING GOVT AND PEOPLE HERE NOT ONLY
TO THE LIKELY INEVITABILITY OF US/PRC RECOGNITION BUT ALSO TO
THE IDEA THAT RATHER THAN BEING THE END OF THEIR WORLD,
A CONTINUING, ACCEPTABLE FUTURE FOR TAIWAN CAN BE
ACHIEVED.
B. SUBTLY BUT PURPOSIVELY ITERATE AND REITERATE POINT
THAT TODAY SECURITY MUST DEPEND LESS ON MUTUAL DEFENSE
TREATY PER SE THAN ON POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN
REGION, AND THESE SHOW REASONABLE PROSPECT OF
STABILITY SUFFICIENT TO DETER PERING FROM USING FORCE TO CHANGE
TAIWAN'S STATUS.
proper
VELICY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
DAMAR
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
-9- TAIPET 5933
C. DISCREETLY BUT POINTEOLY WARN VARIOUS ELEMENTS IN
S
SOCIETY-- UP TO AND INCLUDING CCK, IF WE CONCLUDE IT
IS NE CESSARY--OF RISKS INHERENT IN ANY GROC ACTION TO
UNDERMINE BASIS OF US-PRC RELATIONSHIP: WARN AS WELL THAT
US WOULD REACT ADVERSELY TO UNILATERAL GROC ATTEMPTS TO
ALTER TAIWAN'S JURIDICAL STATUS
N
D. IN US GOVT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE DETERMINE HOW WE
INTEND TO HANDLE ISSUE OF SECURITY ASSURANCE FOR GROC,
FOLLOWING RECOGNITION OF PEKING, AND HOW TO ACHIEVE PRC
ACQUIESCENCE IN OUR INTENDED ARRANGEMENTS. THEREAFTER,
WHEN RECOGNITION is IMMINENT, OFFER GROC BEST ASSURANCES
WE CAN RE INFORMAL BUT OFFICIAL AND EFFECTIVE USG PRESENCE,
MILITARY SECURITY AND ARMS SUPPLY, ECONOMIC AND OTHER
ACCESS TO US.
H. CONCLUSIONS
22. IF AND WHEN US RECOGNIZES PRC, WE BELIEVE DOMES-
TIC CONSIDERATIONS WILL LEAD CCK TO MAKE STATEMENT
FORMALIZING AT LEAST SOMEWHAT ROC'S SEPARATION FROM
MAINLAND. LOCAL AND INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, AS WELL AS
HIS OWN CHARACTERISTIC CAUTION, PROBABLY WILL LIMIT THE
STATEMENT TO LOWER END OF SPECTURM, KEEPING IT WELL
AWAY FROM ANYTHING SO RADICAL AS A DECLARATION OF
TAIWAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF CHINA. US CAN AND HOULD
OPERATE IN WAYS WHICH WILL REINFORCE THOSE FACTORS TO
MAKE SURE THAT US-PRC NOMALIZATION PROCESS IS NOT
(U) (c) z
ADVERSELY AFFECTED.
23. EVEN IF FACTORS NOT NOW FORESEEN INTRUDE AND MOVE
GROC TO MAKE DECLATION WHICH IS EMBARRASING TO US-PRC
RELATIONS, WE WILL HAVE NUMBER OF APPROPRIATE RESPONSES
AAILABLE. IN ANY CASE, WE SHOULD STILL RTAIN ABILITY
TO PROCEED WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING, ATTENUATING
RELATIONS HERE TO DEGREE THAT SEEMS DICTATED BY CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THE TIME, UP TO IN THE EXTREME CASE, EXPLICIT
DISASSOCIATION FROM AND NONRECOGNITION OF ANY NEW STATUS.
PERMET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
72, (c) [CD] ())
DEPARTMENT 144 OF STATE
*
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET
-10- - TAIPET 5933
24. AS WE MOVE UP TO AND BEYOND POINT OF RECOGNITION, WE
SHOULD REMAIN MINDFUL THAT OUR INTERESTS VIS-A-VIS JPAAN
AND REST OF ASIA, AS WELL AS WITH ROC, REQUIRE THAT WE
BE SEEN TO ACT WITHOUT HASTE, AND ON BASIS OF RESPONSIBLE,
CAREFULLY THOUGHT-OUT PLANS.
UNGER
266 72 (co) Rr.
GEODET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR)
LDK 4 ;
Copy 15 of 15 copies
709
OF STATE DF
Department of State
UNITED OF AMERICA
SECORT
TELEGRAM
STATES
R 0808357 NOV 74 ZFF-4
Control: 2284Q
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
Recd: Nov 8, 1974
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3402
3:49 AM
S
BT
SECRE + TAIPEI 6773
NODIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, TW
SUBJECT: US-ROC DIALOGUE
ZOP
REF: STATE 244329
1. APPRECIATE MESSAGE CONTAINED REFDEPTEL WHICH ARRIVED
JUST IN TIME FOR USE WITH PREMIER CHIANG.
2. RECORD OF MY PRESENTATION, WHICH IN ESSENCE FOLLOWED
TALING POINTS AS AMENDED, TOGETHER WITH PREMIER'S COMMENTS
WILL BE POUCHED FOR DEPARTMENT'S INFORMATION. IT WAS
PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO BE ABLE TO USE LANGUAGE IN LAST
PARAGRAPH DEPTEL AE AUTHORIZED EXPRESSION OF VIEWS.
S
UNGER
N
S
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
&
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY GG
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
#
SHORT
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012707
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE
Conversation with Premier Chiang
Ching-Kuo
CREATION DATE
11/22/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400129
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
China, Republic of - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - NODIS (1)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
DECLASSIFIED, with portions exemptal
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES state visit 8/2/00
BY, GG , NARA, DATE 4/27/01
SANITIZED 7/02
M
wft
/
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
dx
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
70P SECRET
NOD483
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07812 2210537
00
ACTION NOOS-00
S
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
072467
R 221000Z NOV 74
Control: 6607Q
PM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
Recd: Nov 22, 1974
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3514
6:00 AM
TOPSECRET TAIPEI 7012 CORRECTED COPY
NODIS
E.O. 11552: XG0S-2
TAGS: PFOR, MILI, PINR, TH. CH
SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO
FOR EA/HUMMEL
1. I CALLED ON PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KII AGAIN TODAY, NOV. 22.
S
I TOLD HIM THAT, AS HAD HAPPENED ON SIMILAR PAST OCCASIONS,
WE HAD BEEN ASKED BY WASHINGTON TO DISCUSS WITH HIM SITUATION
IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENT FORDIS AND DR. KISSINGERIS
CURRENT TRAVELS IN AREA, INCLUDING PEKING. ON OUR PART, I
ASSURED HIM, WE WERE TAKING ALL NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS TO
AVOIO ANY ACTIVITIES IN AREA WHICH PEKING COULD CONSIDER
PROVOCATIVE, AND WE HOPED THAT GROC COULD ALSO AVOID
ANYTHING WHICH COULD PRECIPITATE ANY REACTION AT THIS TIME.
DURING PREVIOUS VISIT WE AGAIN SOLICITED GROC COOPERATION
IN MAKING CERTAIN NO UNUSUAL MOVEMENTS OR ACTIONS
OCCURRED IN THE STRAIT AREA. I ANDED THAT WE BELIEVED
CHICOMS WOULD MAINTAIN SIMILAR NON-PROVOCATIVE POSTURE
DURING THE VISIT PERIOD, AS THEY HAD DONE ON PAST
FORD
OCCASIONS.
LIBRARY
2. PREMIER CHIANG UNHESITATINGLY RESPONDED THAT "YOU
NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT US". HE RECALLED THE EMBASSY'S
APPROACH ON THE EVE OF THE NIXON VISIT, AND SAID HE
COULD GIVE US THE SAME ASSURANCES THAT THE GROC WOULD
S
DO NOTHING TO DISTURB THE CURRENT VISIT. .T.
EXPRESSED
DEC ASSIFIED E.O. 12358 Sec. 3.6
With PORTIONS EXEMPTED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 1.5 (c)
MR 02- 23 # CIA ltr 7/12/02
for SECRET
By doe NARA, Date 8/1/02
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED OF
TELEGRAM
STATES
TOP SECRET
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 07012 2210532
OUR APPRECIATION AND SAID I WOULD RELAY HIS ASSURANCES
TO WASHINGTON.
S
3. COMMENT: I THINK WE HAVE NOW DONE EVERYTHING POSSIBLE
TO DETER POSSIBLY PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS BY GROC,
ALSO
HAO OPPORTUNITY IN DISCUSSION WITH CAFCINC CHIEN I-FAN
EARLIER TODAY TO WARN AGAINST UNDERTAKING UNUSUAL ACTIVITY
AT THIS SENSITIVE TIME.
UNGER
TOP BECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COPY 14 OF 15 COPIES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
NOD167
CONTROL: 88570
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 07108 3003522
00
ACTION NOOS-00
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
036698
0 3003252 NOV 74 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 3564
$ & e R-E R F TAIPEI 7108
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: US-PRC COMMUNIQUE
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE
REF: SECTO 265
1. I CONVEYED TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE AND ASSURANCE RE NORMALIZA-
TION AS AUTHORIZED REFTEL TO PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO AT
5:00 PM LOCAL NOVEMBER 29.
2, PREMIER THANKED ME AND THEN NOTED THAT JUST ADJOURNED
KMT CONCLAVE HAD GIVEN ITS BLESSING TO HIS POLITICAL REPORT
WHICH CALLED FOR CONTINUATION GROC FOREIGN POLICY BASED UPON
"PRINCIPLE AND MORALITY" NOT UPON EXPEDIENCY NOR SHORT-
TERM BENEFITS OR NARROW SELF-INTEREST.
PRESUMABLY HAVING IN MIND "ASSURANCE" MENTIONED REFTEL, HE
ASSERTED THE GROC WOULD WORK TO EXPAND ITS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CUL-
TURAL RELATIONS WITH ALL "FREE" NATIONS, INCLUDING THOSE
WITH WHICH IT HAD NO FORMAL DIPLOMATIC TIES. PREMIER
MADE NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO SECRETARY'S TRIP, THE COMMUNIQUE
OR "ASSURANCE".
3. IT WAS VERY HELPFUL TO DUR RELATIONS WITH GROC TO BE
ABLE TO GIVE THIS ADVANCE WORD ON COMMUNIQUE AND IMMEDIATE ALBEIT
BRIEF READOUT ON SECRETARY'S PEKING VISIT. I BELIEVE IT ALSO
HELPFUL TO PREMIER TO BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE TO GOVERNMENT
FORD
&
SECRET
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
STATES Of
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 07108 300352Z
LEADERS HIS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH USG AND THUS RETAIN
THEIR COOPERATION IN HIS EFFORT TO DEVELOP RATIONAL
S
AND PRACTICAL RESPONSE TO CREEPING INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC
ISOLATION DESPITE PRESSURES OF DIE-HARD KMT ELEMENTS AND
OTHERS WHO MIGHT ADVOCATE EXTREME COURSES OF ACTION. UNGER
14.
S
NOTE: Not passed Tokyo by OC/T.
N
S
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
7
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CONFIDENTIAL
NOD11
ACTION COMY
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00079 0710426
CONTROL: 906Q
RECD: 7 JAN 75
()
00
5:19AM
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
078118
0 0709452 JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMDIAT NIACT 3874
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Retain Class'n
C 0 N F I E N-T I TAIPEL 0079
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
NODIS
Declassify
After
With concurrence
FOR EA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HABIB
(not)(obtained)
PS by PV
Date 8/3/00
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, TW
JSUBJECT: RUC REQUEST FOR AGREMENT TO NEW AMBASSAUOR
REF: STATE 2685
1. WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST FOR TWO REASONS RECONSIDERATION OF
DECISION TO DENY AGREMENT TO CHOW SHU-KAI. (A) FACT THAT
PROPOSED CHANGE IS ALREADY KNOWN IN TOP CIRCLES HERE, AND
THEREFORE RESPONSE WILL BE MAITER OF SOME EMBARRASSEMENT AND
PUZZLEMNT. (8) THOUGH CHOK QUITE NATURALLY WOULD UO EVERYTHING
ME CAN TO PROTCT ROC INTERESTS, HIS GRASP OF ESSENTIALS,
GENERAL SUPHISTICATION AND HIS ENTREE To CCK ARE ASSETS WHICH
COULD BE DISTINCTLY TO OUR ADVANTAGE IN CERTAIN FUTURE CON-
TINGENCIES.
2. IN EVENT IT NEVERTHELESS IS DETERMINED INADVISABLE TO GRANT
AGREMENT TO NEW RCC AMBASSADOR, I URGE THAT WE PRESENT A
DIFFERENT RATIONALE, ALTHOUGH THE ASSURANCES REGARDING PRESI-
DENTIS VISIT AND US-PRC NORMALIZATION PROCESS CERTAINLY HILL
BE WELCOME AND SHOULD BE GIVEN, NEVERTHELESS OUR MAJOR REASON
("PUBLIC SPECULATION ABOUT A *COOLING IN US-PRC RELATIONS")
PUTS THE MATTER MUCH T00 SQUAKELY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING. AT THIS TIME AT LEAST, OUR LINE
SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE THAT WE CAN MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THE ROC EVEN WHILE WORKING FOR A BETTER RELATIONSHIP
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
&
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
07VU39
LIBRARY
state Vist
BY GG
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION , OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
8/3/00
TERMATMENT OF STATE
Department of State
GREATH STATES OF A AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONT IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 00079 0710424
WITH THE PRC. CERTAINLY WE DUGHT NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT
OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH PEKING UPERATES TO PREVENT UCK FROM
HAVING THE ANBASSADOR OF HIS CHOICE IN WASHINGTON S0 LONG
AS ROC MAINTAINS AN EMBASSY THERE. THAT ALMOST SURELY WOULD
BE SSEEN AS SERIOUSLY INSULTING.
3, THEREFORE IF WE MUST TURN DOWN THE REQUEST, I BELIEVE
IT WOULD BE MORE PALATABLE TO SAY THAT WE FEAR CHANGING
AMBASSADORS A.T THIS JUNCTURE WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS INDICAT-
TING SOME CRISIS OR UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENT IN US-ROC (KPEAT,
US-RNC) RELATIONS, AND THAT TMIS IS AN IMPRESSION BEST
AVOIDED. EVEN THOUGH THIS IS HARDLY LESS TRANSPARENT AS
AN EXCUSE, NEVERTHELESS IT WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE HERE.
4. AS FAR AS HANDLING IS CONCERNED, I BELIEVE IT WOULD
BE BEST TU. GRANT SHEN THE APPUINTMENT HE HAS REQUESTED WITH
THE DEPUTY SECRTARY AND HAVE THE MATTER SURFACE IN THAT
VENUE. ONC THAT DISCUSSION HAS TAKEN PLACE, I CAN THEN
(VD)
SEEK AN APPUINTMENT WITH CCK 10 GO OVER THE GROUND WITH HIM,
OR TAKE IT UP WITH HIM THE NEXT TIME HE MEET.
UNGER
1
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
8
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED of
TELEGRAM
STATES
CONFIDENT
N00309
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00113 0815414
ACTION COPY
00
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 1001 W
092881
0 081513Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 3892
C
0
N
F
E
TAIPEL 0113
NODIS
EA FOR ASST SEC HABIB
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TW
SUBJECT: ROC REQUEST FOR AGREMENT: CALL ON PREMIER
REF: A, STATE 3603
B. TAIPEI 0079
1. I CALLED ON PREMIER CHUIANG SIX PM JANUARY 8
AND MADE PRESENTATION PER REF A. TAKING CUE FROM
PREMIER'S QUESTIONS, 1. STRESSED THAT PERSONALITIES
WERE NOT A FACTOR (THAT WE, IN FACT, ESTEEMED BOTH
MEN VERY HIGHLY), BUT THAT IN REQUESTING THAT NOTI-
FICATION OF RESIGNATION BE WITHDRAWN OUR PRINCIPAL
CONCERN MAS NOT TO FUEL SPECULATION OF UNFORTUNATE
DEVELOPMENTS IN US-ROC RELATIONS, OR IN CHINA SITU-
ATION GENERALLY.
2. PREMIER NOTED HE HAD RECEIVED REPORT FROM AMBAS-
SADOR SHEN WHICH LAID GREAT SIRESS ON "SHOCK" WITH
WHICH DEPUTY SECRETARY HAD REACTED TO SHEN'S PRE-
SENTATION. ACCORDING TO PREMIER, SHEN'S REPORT HAU
ALSO EMPHASIZED INOPPORTUNITY OF REQUEST "AT THIS
PARTICULAR POINT IN TIME." IN REPLY, I SAID THAT
FORD
&
WHILE INOMPORTUNITY OF THE MOMENT CERTAINLY WAS TURUE,
IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DGUESS DURATION OF "THE
GERALD
LIBRARY
MOMENT" OR PREDICT WHEN CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE
CONF IDEH
GG 4/23/01
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF state
Department of State
UNITED OF
TELEGRAM
STATES
CONF FUENTIAL
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 00113 0815414
$
ALTERED.
3. PREMIER'S DEMEANOR THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION WAS
CALM, THOUGH SOMEWHAT PUZZLEU AY DEVELOPMENTS. HE
ASKED FOR TIME FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. MY JUDGE-
MENT IS THAT THE PILL, THOUGH BITTER, HAS BEEN
SWALLOWED.
UNGER
N
CHILD
FORD
&
CONF IDENTIAL
GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
9
COPY /
OF 15 COPIES
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
002351
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
NOD067
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00210 1404274
20
ACTION NOUS-00
INFO OCT-01 /001 W
017715
R 143414Z JAN 75
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3948
E N I TAIPE1 0210
NODIS
E.O. 11652: XG0S-3
TAGS: PFOR, T14
SUBJECT: KOC REQUEST FOR AGREMENT TO NEW AMBASSADUR
REF: STATE 007826
1. LAST NIGHT PREMIER CHIANG CHING-KUO TOLD ME THAT HE
HAS DECIDED TO "POSTPONE" ANY CHANGE IN ROC AMBASSADOR
IN WASHINGTON AND HAS WRITTEN JAMES SHEN TO THIS EFFECT,
PREMIER EMPHASIZED THIS MATTER BEING CLOSELY HELD BUT
GUIDELINES State visit 8/3/00
DID ASK ME TO EXPLAIN TO CHOU SHU-K'AI WASHINGTON'S
THINKING LYING BEHIND REQUEST NOT TO MAKE CHANGE.
2. PREMIER AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NU POLI-
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NARA, DATE 4/23/00
TICAL INTENT IN PROPOSING THIS CHANGE, RATHER THAT JAMES
SHEN HAS SPOKEN OF BEING VERY TIRED AND GIVEN EVIDENCE
STATE DEPT,
OF BEING SOMEWHAT LESS VIGOROUS.
3. PREMIER IN SAME CONTEXT MENTIONED TO ME UP-COMING
BY
CHANGES IN OTHER ROC POSTS ABHOAD INCLUDING PANAMA,
SAUDI ARABIA AND POSSIBLY KOREA. AGREMENT HAS BEEN
RECEIVED FROM JIDDA FOR HSUEH YU-CHII, PRESENTLY
VICE MINISTER FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
UNGER
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
FORD
LIBRARY
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
&
Declassify
After
CONFIDENTIAL
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
GERALD
IPS by 3V
Date 8/3/00
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
10
OF STATE
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
TOP S SECRET
NOD220
DECLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 TAIPEI 00513 291037Z
E.O. 12968 Sec. 3.6
s
12
me 02.22 #8: state lts 3/6/02
ACTION CCO-00
due 4/16/02
INFO OCT-01 NODS-00 /001 W
077237
0 2900497 JAN 75
N
CONTROL: 6189Q
FM AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
RECD
: JAN 29, 1975
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 4092
5:45 A.M.
I OPSECRET TAIPEI 0513
EO 11652 XGOS-3
TAGS PFOR, PINR, TW
SUBJECT: ROC COVERT EFFORT TO ACQUIRE TURPEDOES IN U.S.
REFS: STATE 19383, STATE 19449, STATE 19450, STATE 19451
S
NOOIS
1. WE AGREE REFTELS PROVIDE COMPELLING EVIDENCE ELEMENTS
GROC ENGAGED IN ILLICIT EFFORT PURCHASE MARK-37 TOPEDOES.
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION HERE WHICH WOULD REFUTE THIS EVIDENCE.
FURTHERMORE, THERE HAS BEEN EVIDENCE FOR SOME TIME THAT ROC
MILITARY STRONGLY FEEL NEED TO SECURE TOPEDOES FOR THEI
74
I
SUBMARINES. WHILEIE DOUBT PREMIER PERSONALLY
INVOLVED UR AWARE THE FULL NATURE THIS BIZARRE AFFAIR,
CO
ITS POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US/ROC
RELATIONS OF SUCH A SERIOUS NATURE THAT I BELIEVE IT WARRANTS
MY REQUESTING AN IMMEDIATE PRIVATE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM.
SUBJECT TO DEPARTMENT'S -- AND I ASSUME FBI'S --CONCURRENCE,
MY REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PREMIER WOULD BE ALONG FOLLOWING
LINES:
--THAT MY REDUEST TO SEE HIM WAS MADE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS
IN UPDER TO INFORM HIM THAT WE HAD RELIABLE INFORMATION
THAT CERTAIN GROC OFFICIALS WERE ENGAGED IN AN EFFORT TO
S
PURCHASE ILLICITLY. AND CLANDESTINELY, STOKEN MARK-37
TORPEDOES IN THE UNITED STATES. TRANSACTION CALLS FOR
PURCHASE UF 30 TOHPEDOES AT UP TO $75,000 EACH FOR THE
I
TWO ROC SUBMARINES PURCHASED FROM THE U.S.
TUP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTS STATE
LENT OF
UNITED
AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
TOP SECRET
S
PAGE 02 TAIPEI 90513 2910372
THESE OFFICIALS INCLUDED: ADMIRAL CHIU HUA-KU,
ROC NAVAL ATTACHE, WASHINGTON; HSU YA-MING, ASSIGNED TO
ROC CONSULATE, LOS ANGELES: MAN MIN, A JUNIOR OFFICER IN
ROC NAVYI
N
--AT AT LEAST ONE OF THE ABOVE IS KNOWN TO BE AWARE THAT
TORPEDUES IN QUESTION WERE TO BE STOLEN FROM BROOKLYN NAVY
YARD:
THESE ROC OFFICIALS WERE NEGOTIATING
PRINCIPALLY THROUGH RONALD COLITTI, A LOS ANGELES
MUNITIONS DEALER, IRVING I. REFKIN, VICE PRESIDENT,
PACIFIC ORDNANCE AND ELECTRONICS CORPORTATION.
IN TAIPEI, ALFRED C TAI, (DESCRIBED AS A RETIRED
Rdc ADMIRAL) IS INVOLVED IN JTRANSACTION AND HAS BEEN IN CONTACT
on
WITH COLITTI AND OTHERS.
MR. TAI ARRANGED TO SEND THE NAVAL OFFICER TO U.S.
IN LATE JANUARY TU NEET WITH REFKIN AND COLITTI FOR PURPOSE
OF INSPECTING TORPEDOA SPECIFICATIONS AND TO VERIFY POSSIBILITY
REPAIRING SUBMARINES' FIRE -CONTROL SYSTEMS so THAT TORPEDOES
COULD BE INSTALLED AND FIRED. THE NAVAL OFFICER SUBSEQUENTLY
INFORMED ADMIRAL CHIU AND A CONTACT IN TAIPEI THAT HE WAS
SATISFIED FIRE-CONTROL SYSTEM COULD BE REAPAIRED.
THE NAVAL OFFICER ENTERED THE UNITED STATES UNDER
FALSE PRETENSES ON JANUARY 20.
*-COLITTI AND REFKIN HAVE INFORMED ADMIRAL CHIU THAT
SELLER OF TORPEDOES WANTS TO SEE PURCHASE MONEY BEFORE
PROCEEDING FURTHER WWITH ARRANGEMENTS TO TURN TORPEDOES OVER
TO THEM ADMIRAL CHIU so INFORMED TAIPEI.
--WI WOULD ADD THAT FOREGOING FACTS PRESENTED TO PREMIER
PRIMARILY TO IMPRESS UPON HIM THE SPECIFICITY AND RELIABILITY
OF OUR INFORMATION.
--I SHALL STATE MY BELIEF THAT HE WOULD AGREE THAT SUCH
FOOLISH AND FUTILE SCHEME CAN DO INESTIMABLE HARM TO OUR
RELATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, SUCH BEHAVIOR IS BOUND TO HAVE AN
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE St.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
D
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
S
PAGE 03 TAIPEI 00513 2910372
ADVERSE IMPACT ON OUR MILITARY SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP. I
WOULD ALSO REMIND HIM THAT WO SURMARINES WERE RELEASED TO
ROC NAVY SOLELY TO EXERCISE ITS ASW CAPABILITYIES AND WE HAVE
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED ANY TRANSFERS OF TORPEDOES. I SHALL EXPRESS MY
CONFIDENCE THAT HE WILL IMMEDIATELY TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO
PUT AN END TO THIS INEXCUSABLE ACTIVITY AND TO ANY OTHERS OF
A. SIMILAR NATURE WHICH MAY BE UNDERWAY OR CONTEMPLATED.
--I I SHALL ALSO URGE UPON PREMIER THAT IN ORDER TO SAVE
BOTH OF US EMBARRASSMENT THAT HE ENSURE NO PUBLIC
DISCLOSURES OF MATTER ARE MADE, WE WILL 00 THE SAME HERE AND IN THE
.s.
2. REQUEST DEPARTMENT AOVISE ME ASAP AND NO LATER THAN
$
ORENING OF BUSINESS TAIPEI TIME, THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, ITS
CONCURRENCE ABOVE APPROACH. I SHALL BE REQUESTING APPOINT-
MENT WITH PREMIER FOR AFTERNOON JANIJARY 30. ALSO REQUEST ANY
INFORMATION IN ADDITION THAT CONTAINED REFTELS, INCLUDING
ANY LAST MINUTE DEVELUPMENTS, WHICH MIGHT BEAR ON
CASE AND MY PRESENTATION TO PREMIER. BELIEVE IT ESENTIAL
I ACCOMPLISH THIS BUSINESS ON JANUARY 30 SINCE I AM
SCHEDULED TO DEPART TAIPEI EARLY JANUARY 31 ON TRIP AS
GUEST OF MINISTER OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WHIFCH WOULD BE VERY EMBARRASS
ING TO TURN OFF.
3. ASSUME DEPARTMENT TOGETHER WITH FAI WILL EXAMINE CAREFULLY
OUR STATEMENTS OF FACT WHICH I PROPOSE TO PUT BEFORE
PREMIER IN ORDER TO VERIFY THEIR PRECISE ACCJURACY. ATTENTION
CALLED INPARTICUL TO REFERENCE TO OUR EXCLUDING TRANSFER OF
TORPEDUES.
UNGER
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