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Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
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1553671
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Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
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Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific (Ford Administration)
East Asia and Pacific Country Files
subjects
China
Cambodia
Taiwan
Vietnam
India
Southeast Asia
South Dakota
Vietnam (Republic)
Hong Kong (China)
Commerce
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1553671
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1975-09-30
month
9
year
1975
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1974-08-01
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8
year
1974
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Hong Kong - State Department
Telegrams" of the Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. The Council donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
STATE
EXPIR
Department of State
of i MARKS ORLINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
SECRET 2123
Retain Class'n
Change to
PAGE 01 HONG K 09271 01 OF 02 2008082
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
Declassify
After
11
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
ACTION $3=30
PS by JL
Date 8/3/00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1031 W
123831
R 2003492 AUG 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
DECLASSIFIED
visit
8/3/09
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1930
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
INFO USLO PEKING
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
state
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
BY GG
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 HONG KONG 9271
'748 AUG 20 AM 40
SITUATION ROOM
WHITE HOUSE
EXDIS
F.O. 116521 XGDS-2
TAGS: PINT PFOR CH TW
SUBJI GRC DISCUSSION RE FUTURE OF TAIWAN
SUMMARY. ACCORDING TO A CHINESE -AMERICAN PROFESSOR WITH PRESUM-
ABLY GOOD CONNECTIONS IN TAIWAN, SOME GRC OFFICIALS IN PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS ARE INDICATING HEIGHTENED CONCERN OVER POLITICAL
FUTURE OF TAIWAN AS A RESULT OF U.S. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.
THESE OFFICIALS SEE THE COURSE OF U.S.-RRC RELATIONS AS
TRREVERSIBLE AND THUS BELIEVE THAT IT IS URGENT, BEFORE GRC
POSITION ERODES FURTHER, TO DEVISE AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY
TATWAN'S STATUS QUO CAN BE ASSURED VIS-A-VIS THE PRC. IN THIS CONTEXT
A ROUGHLY SKETCHED FORMULA HAS BEEN AIRED IN PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS
THAT WOULD INVOLVE MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN PEKING,
TAIPEI, WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW, END SUMMARY.
1. MICHAEL YING-MAO KAU, A TAIWAN BORN BROWN UNIVERSITY
POLITICAL SCIENCE PROFESSOR NOW TRANSITING HONG KONG AFTER
PARTICIPATING AS AN INVITEE TO A RECENT TAIWAN DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE, RECOUNTED TO CONGENOFFS AUGUST 15THE GIST OF SOME
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS HELD A FEW DAYS PREVIOUSLY BY GRC OFFICIALS
RE U.S. -PRC -TAIWAN RELATIONS. KAU, WHO LAST YEAR VISITED PRC
AS A MEMBER OF CHINESE AMERICAN SCHOLARS GROUP, SAID A NUMBER OF
HIGH LEVEL GRC OFFICIALS WERE KNOWN TO HIM THROUGH HIS TAIWAN
A.
FORD
BACKGROUND AND SCHOLARLY RESEARCH TIES. THESE OFFICIALS (KAU
MENTINED THSTGRC MINISTER OF EDUCATION, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT JERANTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
5
FORM
DS-1652
9-66
STATE
SAMPLE
Department of State
SELING
,
TELEGRAM
I
of
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 09271 01 OF 02 2008082
OFFICE DIRECTOR FREDERICK CHIEN, AND SEVERAL HIGH KMT OFFICIALS
INVOLVED IN PRC RESEARCH), WERE QUITE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHAT
PRC OFFICIALS, SUCH AS VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO kuan-hua, HAD
SATD ABOUT TAIWAN DURING THAT VISIT (SEE AMCONGEN MEMCON OF
JULY 28 WITH VICTOR LI RE CONVERSATION WITH CHIAO KUAN=HUA).
KAU FOUND MOST OF THESE HIGH LEVEL GRC OFFICIALS PRIVATELY QUITE
OPEN ABOUT THEIR INTEREST IN PRC ATTITUDES AND ALSO WELL INFORMED
AND REALISTIC ABOUT PRC INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. (HE
NOTED THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH LOWER LEVEL GRC FUNCTIONARIES
WHO TENDED TO PARROT USUAL LINE ABOUT "ABSOLUTELY NO COMPROMISE
WITH COMMUNISTS" AND "PRC LEADERSHIP IS COLLAPSING".)
2. KAU SAID THAT RECENT TRANSITION IN U.S. PRESIDENCY HAD
SEVERAL JOLTED GRC OFFICIALS AND ADDED GREAT URGENCY TO THEIR
CONCERN ABOUT FUTURE OF TAIWAN. NEWS PHOTOS OF PRCLO CHIEF
HUANG CHEN WITH PRESIDENT FORD AND OFFICIAL U.S. INDICATIONS THAT
U.S. POLICY TOWARD PRC UNDER SECRETARY KISSINGER WOULD CONTINUE
UNCHANGED DEALT A PARTICULARLY HARD BODY BLOW TO THEM. IN WAKE
OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS KAU SAID HE WAS PRESENT IN PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK IN WHICH SEVERAL HIGH LEVEL GRC OFFICIALS
FWHOM KAU DID NOT CARE TO IDENTIFY) SPOKE ABOUT LATEST U.S.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR TAIWAN.
THEY SAID THAT THE COURSE OF U.S. -PRC RELATIONS WAS NOW
TRREVERSIBLE. SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT U.S. DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION
OF THE PRC WILL OCCUR EVENTUALLY, THE PROBLEM NOW WAS TO KEEP
TATWAN FROM BEING ABSORBED COMPLETELY INTO THE PRC AND FOR THIS
PURPOSE SOME SORT OF U.S. COMMITMENT WAS ESSENTIAL. THIS
MEANT DEVISING, BEFORE THE GRC POSITION WAS COMPLETELY ERODED,
AN ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY AT LEAST A MAJOR PORTION OF TAIWANIS PRESENT
STATUS QUO COULD BE ASSURED. IN THIS CONTEXT THE OFFICIALS IN
THEIR DISCUSSIONS AIRED A ROUGH FORMULA THAT THEY ENVISAGED AS
FEASIBLE, THE FORMULA WOULD MEET BOTH THE OBJECTIVE OF PRESERV-
ING A MEASURE OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO FOR TAIWAN AND YET PROVIDE
DESIRABLE FEATURES FOR EACH OF THE PARTIES HAVING DIRECT INTEREST
IN TAIWAN OR THAT COULD AFFECT THE STATUS OF TAIWAN,
3. THE CORE OF THE FORMULA AS AIRED BY THESE OFFICIALS WAS TO
CONVENE A CONFERENCE INVOLVING THE PRC. THE GRC, THE U.S. AND THE
USSR. THE RESULT OF THE CONFERENCE WOULD BE ALREADY PREORDAINED
IN THE SENSE THAT ALL FOUR PARTIES WOULD AGREE TO FORMALIZE
A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TAINAN. THIS BASIC UNDERSTANDING
FORD
B.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT SREREOTHORIZATION O' HE EXECUTIVE CRALO CRETARY
LIBRARY
FORM 9-56 DS-1652
DEPARTMENT
STATE
Department of State
of / AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 HONG K 09271 01 OF 02 200808Z
WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGES FOR EACH OF THE PARTIES AND ESSENTIALLY
WOULD INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING: THE GRC WOULD MAKE SOME FORMAL
CONCESSION TO THE PRC THAT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE IS
BUT ONE CHINA WITH PEKING BEING SOVEREIGN AND HOLDING CERTAIN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS JURISDICTION. BOTH THE GRC AND PRC WOULD
RENOUNCE ANY USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER. FOR THE GRC THIS
WOULD MEAN GIVING UP ALL EFFORTS TO REGAIN THE MAINLAND, CONDUCT
RAYDS, ETC. SUCH ACTS WOULD CONSTITUTE TAIPEI'S ACCEPTANCE AND
RECOGNITION OF THE PRIMACY OF PEKING IN SUCH INTERNATIONAL FORUMS
AS THE UN. HOWEVER, KAU INDICATED THAT THERE WAS NO SPELLING
OUT IN THE DISCUSSION WHAT SOVEREIGNTY TAIWAN WAS WILLING TO
GIVE UP. TAIWAN WOULD RETAIN A LARGE MEASURE OF POLITICAL
AUTONOMY AND ENOUGH OF THE PRESENT STATUS QUO TO MAINTAIN ITS
ECONOMIC VIABILITY AND PRPSPERITY, BUT THE DEGREE OF AUTONOMY
WOULDBE SHORT OF INDEPENDENCE. THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO ASSURE
PRESERVATION OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF TAIWAN WOULD BE VITAL AND
WOULD BE ASSURED BY THE US MAINTAINING A TOKEN OR SYMBOLIC
U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN TAIWAN, THE U.S. COULD ARRANGE A
SWITCH WITH A LIAISON OFFICE IN TAIPEI AND AN EMBASSY IN PEKING.
U. U.S. -PRC RELATIONS WOULD THEN BE NORMALIZED, BUT WITH A LIAISION
OFFICE, TIAPEI WOULD HAVE SOMETHING MORE THAN A MERE U.S. CONSULATE
CIN THIS CONNECTION IT WAS NOTED THAT SOUTH AFRICA, DESPITE
VERY LIMITED DIPLOMATIC TIES, HAS PROSPERED. NEVERTHELESS,
THERE WAS MUCH CONCERN VOICED ABOUT THE FORTHCOMING ESTABLISHMENT
OF PHILIPPINE -PRC DIPLOMATIC TIES). AS FOR MOSCOW, IT WOULD
CEASE SOVIET NAVAL PASSAGE THROUGH TAIWAN STRAITS. THE
OFFICIALS REASONED THAT THE SOVIET LONG-TERM INTEREST IS TO REACH
SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA,
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECREUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
9.66
ARTME
on
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
TELEGRAM
/
OF
SECRET 2041
PAGE 01 HONG K 09271 02 OF 02 200617Z
16
ACTION SS-30
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 1031 W
123175
R 2003492 AUG 74
PM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1931
INFO USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
s E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 HONG KONG 9271
EXDIS
BY AGREEING NOT TO TRANSIT
SOVIET SHIPS THROUGH THE TAIWAN STRAITS AND IN JOINING THE
UNDERSTANDING ON TAIWAN, THE SOVIETS COULD LAY GROUNDWORK FOR
SUCH ACCOMMODATION WITH CHINA, MITIGATING PEKING'S EVER-PRESENT
CONCERN ABOUT RUSSIAN INTENTIONS.
4. AFTER RELATING HOW THIS FORMULA WAS DISCUSSED, KAU ASKED
CONGENOFFS VIEWS ABOUT FEASIBILITY OF SUCH A CONFERENCE
SCENARIO, IN EXPRESSING PERSONAL VIEWS, CONGENOFFS SAID INTITIAL
IMPRESSION OF SCENARIO WAS THAT PEKING'S ATTITUDE WOULD POST THE
MAJOR QUESTION MARK. IT SEEMED HIGHLY UNLIKELY PRC WOULD WANT TO
DEAL SOVIETS IN ON MATTER WHICH PEKING HAS ALWAYS INSISTED
IS SOLELY A CHINESE AFFAIR. KAU MENTIONED THAT WHILE TAIPEI HAS
CONSISTENTLY SAID THERE COULD BE NO BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH
MOSCOW, THE GRC OFFICIALS APPARENTLY SAW NO PROBLEM DEALING WITH
THE SOVIETS IN THE CONTEXT OF A CONFERENCE.
5. COMMENT. JUDGING BY HIS REPUTATION WITH OTHER HONG KONG
CHINA-WATCHERS AND PAST ASSOCIATIONS WITH CONGENOFFS, KAU APPEARS
TO A SERIOUS AND RESPONSIBLE SCHOLAR WITH PRESUMABLY GOOD
CONNECTIONS IN TAIWAN, WE DOUBT THAT KAU WAS ATTEMPTING
TO FLOAT GRC TRIAL BALLON IN THE SENSE OF ELICITING U.S.
RESPONSE HIMSELF. AS INDICATED, THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY
CONGENOFFS WERE BRIEF, OFF-HANDED AND NONSUBSTANTIVE AND
KAU MADE NO EFFORT TO PURSUE THE SUBJECT. WE BELIEVE KAU WAS RELATING
ACCURATELY THE GIST OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS HE HEARD IN TAIPEI,
FORD
LD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT- ATHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LIBRARY
FORM
/
of
and
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 09271 02 OF 02 2006172
AND NOTE THESE CONVERSATIONS APPARENTLY FOCUSED ON SOME OF THE
SAME BASIC CONCERNS AS DESCRIBED IN TAIPEI 5091, WE WOULD DEFER
TO EMBASSY TAIPEI'S JUDGEMENT AS TO WHAT EXTENT VIEWS REPORTED
BY KAU MIGHT BE EITHER REPRESENTATIVE OR ATYPICAL OF GRC ATTITUDE.
WITH REGARD TO MULTILATERAL FORMULA, IT APPEARS TO US THAT PEKING
WOULD BE UNALTERABLY OPPOSED TO ANY SOVIET PARTICIPATION REGARD
ING THE STATUS OF TAIWAN BUT WE FIND RATHER INTERESTING THAT SOME
CHINESE OFFICIALS IN GRC ARE APPARENTLY CONSIDERING SOME FORM
OF BARGAINING WITH PRC EVEN THOUGH THEIR CURRENT FORMULA SEEMS
FARFETCHED.
CROSS
LETEC
GERALD ? LIBRARY FORD
N.OT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT SUCAR THORIZATION 0 THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012727
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE
Peking's View of Sino-Indian Relations
CREATION DATE
10/25/1974
VOLUME
13 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400174
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
1
DECLASSIFIED, with portions exemptal
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
TATE DEPT, GUIDELINES state visit 8/2/00
BY. 66
. NARA, DATE 4/27/01
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
of
SECRET 7961
EXPIR EXE-M
PAGE 01 HONG K 11684 01 OF 04 250623Z
11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
117254
P R 250500Z OCT 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2652
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLD PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
S-F GRET SECTION 1 OF 4. HONG KONG 11684
EXDIS
NOFORN
CINCRAC FOR POLAD
FORD
&
E.O. 116521 XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR CH IN UR XC us
GERALD
LIURARY
SUBJ: PEKING'S VIEW OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
REF: NEW DELHI 13214
SUMMARY. CONGEN HAS OBTAINED THE SUBSTANCE OF PRC VIEWS ON
CURRENT SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AS EXPOUNDED RECENTLY BY SENIOR
PRC OFFICIALS TO
FOR COMMUNICA-
TION TO INDIAN OFFICIALS. WE ARE REPORTING THIS BY TELEGRAM IN FULL
BECAUSE THERE IS SUCH A LACK OF INFORMATION ON CHINESE ATTITUDES
ON THE SUBJECT AND BECAUSE IT HELPS MAKE CLEARER THE EXTENT OF
PEKING'S CONCERN OVER SIKKIM, THIS INFORMATION INDICATES
CLEARLY THAT PEKING HAS BEEN MORE ACTIVE AND POSITIVE IN CARRYING
ON A BILATERAL DIALOGUE WITH INDIA AIMED AT IMPROVING PEKING-
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED, with intions exempted
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, State visit 8/2/00
BY GG
, NARA, DATE 4/27/01
EXPIN
A
OF
STATE
Department of State
on I UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 11684 01 OF 04 250623Z
NEW DELHI RELATIONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN AWARE HERETOFORE. THE
CHINESE ARE INDEED UPSET OVER INDIA'S MOVE ON SIKKIM, VIEWING IT
AS HAVING DESTABILIZED THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
HIMALAYAN STATES AND SERIOUSLY JEOPARDIZED THE QUIET SINO-
INDIAN BORDER SITUATION AS WELL. HOWEVER, THE CHINESE ARE LEAVING
THE DOOR OPEN FOR FUTHER DIALOGUE. MOST SIGNIFICANTLY
WAS
GIVEN THE CLEAR MESSAGE THAT MAIN DRIVING FORCE BEHIND CHINA'S
EFFORTS TO REACH BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH INDIA, AS IS THE CASE
FO RAPPROACHEMENT EFFORTS VIS-A-VIS U.S. AND JAPAN, IS RELATED
TO THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION ISSUE. WHEREAS OLD GENERA-
TION PRC LEADERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MANAGE AND CONTRBB CHINESE ANTI-
FOREIGN FEELINGS, THERE IS CONCERN WHETHER THE NEW SUCCESSORS
WILL HAVE SAME ABILITY AND WISDOM. HENCE THE NECESSITY ZQFORE
THE OLD LEADERS PASS FROM THE SCENE TO ACHIEVE BETTER SPECIFIC
INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, END SUMMARY.
1. DURING OCTOBER 15 AND 16, CONVERSATIONS WITH U.S. CONGENOFFS
RELATES SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WAS TOLD
ON OCTOBER 12=13 FOLLOWING LATTER'S EXIT FROM MONTH-PLUS VISIT
TO PRC.
HAS FOR SEVERAL YEARS BEEN INVOLVED IN PERSONAL EFFORT
TO PROMOTE BETTER SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. DURING VISIT, AS CASE
PREVIOUS SOJOURNS, SHE DISCUSSED SUBJECT AT LENGTH WITH SENIOR
PRC OFFICIALS, INCLUDING ONE SESSION WITH VICE PREMIER TENG
KSIAO-PING AND TWO SESSIONS WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO
KUAN-JUA AT WHICH NUMBER RESPONSIBLE MFA OFFICIALS WERE PRESENT.
SHE ALSO HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH TENG YING-CHIAO (MADAME CHOU
EXCES
EN-LAI) AND NPC VICE CHAIRMAN SOONG CHING-LING.
2.
IS OLD FRIEND* OF
AND REVEALED HE HIMSELF
HAS HAD INVOLVEMENT IN PROMOTING SINO-INDIAN DIALOGUE BY SERVING
AS LOCAL HONG KONG CONDUIT.
R.
FORD
MENTIONED ALSO THAT LATE
LAST YEAR HE WAS HONG KONG CONTACT BY WHICH CHINESE SENT FEELERS
RE PROPOSED PRC PING PONG TEAM VISIT (REFTEL).
GERALD
LIBRARY
IDENTIFIED
HONG KONG NCNA DEPUTY EDITOR-IN-CHIEF CHIANG CHING-CHAO (WHO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 HONG K 11684 01 OF 04 250623Z
RECENTLY RETURNED TO PRC) AS CHINESE REP WHO APPROACHED
TO SEEK INDIAN ASSURANCES THAT MATTER WOULD BE HANDLED SMOOTHLY.
ADDED THAT HE AND PREVIOUS HONG KONG INDIAN COMMISSIONER
WERE PERSONALLY AT ODDS AND MOST OF WHAT HE TOLD U.S. CONGENOFFS
WAS NOT KNOWN TO INDIAN COMMISSION. THUS
HAS BROAD
BACKGROUND RE SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS AS WELL AS CLOSE RAPPORT
WITH
WHO HE SAID DOUBTLESSLY WOULD RELAY MAIN POINTS
EXETS EXETS EXCES
OF CONVERSATIONS (AS SHE HAS IN PAST) TO INDIAN AUTHORITIES,
POSSIBLY TO MRS. GANDHI HERSELF, DURING
CURRENT TRAVEL
THROUGH INDIA.
FORD
a
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
on STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
SECRET 0530
RAGE 01 HONG K 11684 02 OF 04 260301Z
64
ACTION 88-25
INFO, OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
000656
P R 250500Z OCT 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSRATE WAS DC PRIORITY 2653
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATMMANDU
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLQ PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
up
ECRE I SECTION 2 OF 4 HONG KONG 11684
EXDIS
NOFORN
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
3. WITH REGARD TO THE SINO-INDIAN SCENARIO
v
SAID VICE
FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO AND VICE PREMIER TENG BOTH
MENTIONED THAT A HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME
BETWEEN NEW DELHI AND PEKING WITH THE COMMUNICATION BEING
TRANSMITTED BY FOREIGN VIP'S AS THEY TRAVELED THROUGH INDIA AND
EXPIN
PRC AND BACK AGAIN. DURING PAST YEAR MRS, GANDHI SENT WORK TO
PRC THROUGH TWO DIFFERENT AFRICAN CHIEFS OF STATE AND SEVERAL
EUROPEAN MINISTERS ABOUT DESTRABILITY OF PRC AND INDIA IMPROVING
RELATIONS. CHINESE HAD UTILIZED SAME CHANNELS TO RESPOND IN
FORD
POSITIVE WAY. IN ONE MESSAGE TO PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI, MRS,
a
GANDHI STATED THAT SINO-INDIAN BORDER QUESTION WAS VERY
COMPLICATED PROBLEM, RESOLUTION OF WHICH WOULD TAKE MUCH TIME.
GERALD
LIBRARY
SHE MENTTONED CERTAIN DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES AND SPOKE OF BETTER
UNDERSTANDING AND WARMER RELATIONS BENEFITTING BOTH COUNTRIES.
EMPHASIZING HER VIEW THAT KEY POINT WOULD BE FOR BOTH SIDES TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATE UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02. HONG K 11684 02 OF 04 260301Z
WORK TO RESTORE MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, SHE PROPOSED AS ONE STEP THE
RESUMPTION OF AMBASSADORIAL RELATIONS. CHOUIS REPLY LAID STRESS
ON FACT THAT BORDER HAD BEEN QUIET SINCE 1962 AND SAID THEREFORE
TWO COUNTRIES NEED NOT SETTLE BORDER PROBLEMS BEFORE MOVING ON TO
OTHER MATTERS. HE AGREED IT WOULD BE IN MUTUAL INTERST TO
ESTABLISH GREATER SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS
EXC-S EXC-S
TO PROCEED ACCORDINGLY. USING THE JUNE 1974 VISIT TO THE PRC
OF THE DR. D. S. KOTNIS MEDICAL GROUP AS A DEVICE THE
CHINESE SUGGESTED INCLUSION OF AN INDIAN REP AUTHORIZED TO
DISCUSS BILATERAL MATTERS WITH CHINESE. INDIANS ACCORDINGLY
INCLUDED MP MUKUND RAI VYAS, A GANDHI CONFIDANT. CHINESE ACCORDED
GROUP
HIGH LEVEL ATTENTION (HONG KONG 6955) AND PARTY VICE CHAIRMAN
VEH CHIEN-YING TOLD MP THAT CHINA WAS PREPARED TO TAKE STEP OF
PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING BY RESUMING AMBASSADORIAL
RELATIONS. YEH SAID THAT SINCE DELHI'S WITHDRAWAL OF INDIAN
AMBASSADOR IN 1962 HAD PRECEDED THE PRC AMBASSADOR'S WITHDRAWAL
BY SIX MONTHS, INDIAN OUGHT TO GIVE CHINA SOME "FACE" BY SENDING
THE INDIAN AMBASSADOR BACK FIRST WITH THE SAME SIX MONTHS LEAD.
YEH LATER MODIFIED THIS BY SAYING THREE MONTHS LEAD WOULD BE
ENOUGH. THIS AS COMMUNICATED BACK TO NEW DELHI, AND APPARENTLY
THE PROPOSAL WAS ON TRACK BUT NOTHING SINCE HAS HAPPENED.
COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE SUSPECT CAND HE AND
AGREE) THAT THE SOVIETS SOME MONTHS AGO BECAME AWARE OF THE
IMPROVING SINO-INDIA DIALOGUE AND SUCCESSFULLY PUT PRESSURE,
PERHAPS ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL, UPON INDIA TO DESIST OR AT LEAST
SLOW DOWN.
4. THE CHINESE BROUGHT UP THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST, NOT THE
ACT ITSELF BUT THE MANNER IN WHICH MRS. GANDHI TOOK UP MATTER
WITH CHINA, AS BEING SOMEWHAT INCOSISTENT WITH HER WORDS
EXPIN
ABOUT BETTER UNDERSTANDING: SHE HAD SENT MESSAGE TO CHOU SAYING
PKC HAD CONDENMED INDIA'S NUCLEAR TEST AND ASKED HOW CHINESE
COULD TAKE SUCH LINE WHEN THEY THEMSELVES HAD DEVELOPED NUCLEAR
FORD
BOMB. IN REPLY CHOU INFORMED MRS, GANDHI THAT FACTS WERE TO THE
a
CONTRARY AND THE INDIANS SHOULD READ CHINESE STATEMENTS VERY
CAREFULLY. THE CHINESE WERE NEITHER UPSET NOR CONCERNED ABOUT
GERALD
LIBRARY
INDIA DEVELOPING NUCLEAR DEVICE, CHINA ONLY WANTED TO KNOW IF
INDIA USED SOVIET HELP IN SUCH DEVELOPMENT. CHINESE WERE PLEASED
TO LEARN THAT INDIANS HAD ACCOMPLISHED THIS ON THEIR OWN,
IF INDIA STUDIED CAREFULLY WHAT CHINESE HAD SAID THEY WOULD NOTE
NOTTO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or
STATE
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 HONG K 1 11684 02 OF 04 260301Z
CHINESE MEDIA MERELY REPLAYED PAKISTAN COMMENTS AND REPORTS.
CHINESE WOULD NOT FORESAKE PAKISTAN FRIENDSHIP AND PEKING HAD
TO SHOW MINIMUM SUPPORT; INDIAN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT.
EXC-S
5. IT WAS UNMISTAKABLY CLEAR TO
THAT WHAT HAS MOST DEEPLY
RANKLED CHINESE WAS INDIA'S MOVE ON SIKKIM, CHINESE LEADERS
DWELT LONG ON THE INDIAN "ANNEXATION " AND ITS SERIOUS
IMPLICATIONS. MUCH OF CHINAIS CURRENT PERCEPTION SEEMS HINGED
ON THIS. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO CHARGED THAT INDIA,
BY MOVING ON SIKKIM, HAS STARTED A DANGEROUS GAME THAT WAS
DESTABILIZING TO WHOLE AREA AND THAT IN LONG RUN WOULD BACKFIRE
ON INDIA. THIS IS SOMETHING INDIA MUST RECKON WITH: IT CERTAINLY
WAS NOT JUST INDIA'S OWN AFFAIR. CHINA HAS LEARNED THAT INDIA'S
NETGHBORS, INCLUDING NEPAL, BHUTAN, CEYLON, BURMA AND EVEN
MALAYSIA, WERE UNCERTAIN NOW ABOUT WHAT INDIA WAS UP TO. WHILE
INDIAN HAD BY "ASSOCIATION" SCHEME TAKEN OVER SIKKIM, CENTRAL
FACT was 75 PERCENT OF SIKKIMESE POPULATION WERE NEPALESE.
EXC-S
SOONER OR LATER THIS ETHNIC NEPALESE MAJORITY MIGHT IMPEL SIKKIM
ASSEMBEY TO JOIN WITH NEPAL. NERALESE KING BIRENDRA HAS TOLD
CHINESE THAT INDIA HAS THREATENED THAT IF NEPALESE DO NOT
COOPERATE WITH INDIA'S POLICIES, NEW DELHI WOULD ASSIT FORMER
NEPALESE PRIME MINISTER KOIRALA TO SUBVERT AND TO DEPOSE
BIRENDRA. WHERE WOULD ALL THIS END?
6, NEPAL AND BHUTAN, ALARMED BY NEW DELHI'S POLICY ON SIKKIM,
HAVE ASED CHINA FOR ASSISTANCE IN EVENTUALITY OF SIMILAR INDIAN
MOVES AGAINST THEM. THE CHINESE REPLIED THAT PRC RESOURCES
WERE LIMITED BUT CHINA WOULD RESPOND WITH ASSITANCE THAT IS
NOT MILITARY BUT ECONOMIC WHICH WOULD HELP THESE COUNTRIES
DEVELOP "SELF RELIANCE". IN VIEW OF MRS. GANDHI'S IGNORING
INTERNATIONAL LAW RE LAND-LOCKED COUNTRIES CHINA WAS WILLING TO
EXPIN
BUILD FOUR OR FIVE FEEDER ROADS TO NEPAL AT NO COST TO NEPALESE
so THAT NEPALESE EXPORT GOODS COULD BE SHIPPED OUT THROUGH CHINA
AND SENT TO NORMAL MARKETS, INCLUDING INDIA. DISCUSSIONS ON
THIS MATTER WERE UNDERWAY NOW, IN RESPONSE TO PARTY-TO -PARTY
AND PEOPLE-TO -PEOPLE PREQUESTS, CHINESE WOULD ASSIT SOME 250 TO
500 NAGAS AND MIZOS FROM INDIA TO DEVELOP THEIR SELF RELIANCE
AS WELL.
7, CHINESE TOLD
THEY REJECT NEW DELHI'S RATIONALE FOR
ITS SIKKIM POLICY WHICH ALLEGES THAT INDIA HAD TO ACT IN ORDER
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PAGE 04 HONG K 11684 02 OF 04 260301Z
TO FORESTALL GROTH OF U.S INFLUENCE IN SIKKIM BY WHICH
WASHINGTON COULD HAVE GAINED CONTROL OF SIKKIM. IN THIS
CONNECTION CHINESE WERE AWARE INDIAN CLAIMED THAT HOPE COOKE,
AMERICAN WIFE OF SIKKIMIS CHOYGAL, WANTED SIKKIM TO BE
INDEPENDENT OR AT LEAST HAVE SAME STATUS AS BHUTAN. TOWARDS
THIS END SHE ALLEGEDLY SOUGHT U.S. GOVERNMENT ASSISTNACE TO
MODERNIZE SIKKIM, WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT'S REWARD TO BE DOMINANT
INFLUENCE IN SIKKIM. IN ACTUAL FACT CHINESE SAID THAT U.S.
WAS NOT SU NAIVE. SIKKIM WAS LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY AND ONLY WAY
U.S. AID GOODS COULD BE PHYSICALLY SHIPPED WOULD BE VIA INDIA
AND BY INDIAN SUFFERANCE. ONLY OTHER COUNTRY THAT COULD EFFECT
CHANGE WAS CHINA BUT SIKKIM HAD NEVER EITHER DIRECTLY NOR
INDIRECTLY CONTACTED CHINA. THE CHINESE SAID THE OPTIMUM TIME
FOR SUCH CONTACTS WOULD HAVE BEEN APRIL 1973 WHEN SIKKIMESE
PRINCESS, SISTER OF THE CHOYGAL, WAS IN HONG KONG AND COULD HAVE
EASILY CONTACTED PRC REPEYTHERE. NO SUCH CONTACT HAD EVEN BEEN
TRIED OR MADE ON EITHER SIDE AND NOW PRINCESS WAS UNDER HOUSE
ARREST IN INDIA.
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PAGE 01 HONG K 11684 03 OF 04 2507042
12
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
117658
P R 250500Z OCT 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2654
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLO PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
SECRET SECTION 3 OF 4 HONG KONG 11684
EXC-S EXPIN
EXDIS
NOFORN
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
8. THE CHINESE LAID EVEN SHARPER STRESS UPON THE IMPLICATIONS
OF INDIA HAVING UNILATERALLY REMOVED AN IMPORTANT BUFFER BETWEEN
INDIA AND CHINA, THE CHINESE ASSERTED THAT WHEREAS CHOU EN-LAI
HAD SPENT MANY HOURS PERSONALLY EXPLAINING PRC POSITION TO NEHRU
AND OBTAINING NEHRUIS AGREEMENT BEFORE PRC MOVED AGAINST TIBET
IN 1954, INDIA HAD NOW MOVED AGAINST SIKKIM UNILATEREDLY WITHOUT
ANY CONSULTATION OR NOTIFICATION. IT REPRESENTED GROSS IGNORING
OF LEGITIMATE CHINESE INTERESTS, THE PRC MFA STATEMENT OF NON-
RECOGNITION OF NEW DELHI'S ACTION WAS MEANT TO RESERVE CHINA'S
OPTIONS AND WAS ISSUED WITH COMPLETE CONSENSUS
AND APPROVAL OF ALL LEVELS OF CHINESE LEADERSHIP.
SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT THE CHINESE SAID MILITARY AND PARTY
LEADERS ON ALL LEVELS INCLUDING WANG HUNG-WEN HAD CONCURRED IN
THE PROMULGATION OF THE MFA STATEMENT.) THE CHINESE POINTED OUT THE
REMOVAL OF THE SIKKIM BUFFER HAD REPERCUSSIONS ON BORDER SITUATION,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FORD
6
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PAGE 02 HONG K 11684 03 OF 04 250704Z
WHICH WAS NOW MORE VULNERABLE TO TENSION. PREVIOUSLY SAFE-
GUARDED BY THE BUFFER, SOLDIERS ON EITHER SIDE COULD MAKE NORMAL
MOVEMENTS IN THE AREA WITHOUT CAUSING ALARM BUT THAT NOW WAS ALL
CHANGED. THE CHINESE MADE SPECIFIRUMENTION OF THE RISK NOW HAVING
BEEN CREATED OF SOME RASH INDIAN OR CHINESE COMMANDER CREATING
A MAJOR SERIOUS SITUATION ON THE BORDER THROUGH SOME UNTOWARD
LOCAL ACTION.
9. WHILE AT THE SAME TIME DECRYING THE REMOVAL OF THE SIKKIM
BUFFER, THE CHINESE, ESPECIALLY CHIAO KUAN-HUA, WENT ON AT
GREAT LENGTH TO DECLARE THE PRC DOES NOT FEAR INDIA. CHIAO SAID,
FOR EXAMPLE, THAT INDIA WAS AT LEAST TEN YEARS BEHIND CHINA
MILITARILY. IN FACT INDIA WAS STILL TRYING TO FORM ONE NATION
OUT OF MANY NATIONS, WHEREAS CHINA HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THIS.
CHIAO SAID INDIA RANKS FAR DOWN THE LIST OF CHINESE CONCERNS,
PERHAPS SEVENTH OR EIGHTH. HE MENTIONED THAT THE SOVIET UNION
TOPS THIS LIST, THEN THE U.S. AND THEN PRC DOMESTIC MATTERS
EXBIN
FOLLOWED BY AT LEAST THREE OR FOUR MORE PROBLEMS AHEAD OF INDIA.
THE SOVIET UNION WAS MANIPULATING INDIA AND BANGLADESH BUT THE
LATTER TWO ARE ENVELOPED BY ENORMOUS ECONOMIC AND INTERNAL
PROBLEMS. CHINA HAURNO BAD FEELING OF ANY SORT TOWARDS THE
INDIAN PEOPLE, CHIAO SAID THE INDIANS OUGHT TO KNOW THAT THE
SOVIET AID TO INDIA IS NOT INTENDED TO HELP DEVELOP INDIA BUT
TO KEEP NEW DELHI DEPENDENT SO THAT INDIA CAN ALWAYS BE USED
BY MOSCOW. RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE (INCLUDING GRAIN SUPPLIES) IS
NOT EXTENDED TO ENCOURAGE INDIAN SELF RELIANCE BUT MANIPULATED
TO KEEP INDIA ON THE SOVIET STRING.
10, AS TO THE BASIC CHINESE THRUST AND INTENT IN THEIR
CONVERSATIONS WITH
SAID IT WAS CLEAR THE CHINESE
WANT NEW DELHI TO CLARIFY INDIAN INTENTIONS. THEY REPEATEDLY
VOICED THE THEME THAT MRS. GANDHI'S ACTIONS DO NOT MATCH HER
WORDS. INDIA'S ACTIONS ARE EXPANSIONIST AND SEEM PART OF A
SCHEME WHEREBY INDIA INTENDS TO IMPOSE SOME SORT OF CONFEDERATION
WITH PAKISTAN, BANGLADESH, NEPAL, SIKKIM, BHUTAN UNDER INDIA'S
BATON. IT IS UP TO INDIA TO TAKE ACTION TO REESTABLISH ITS BONA
FIDES IN THE CONTEXT OF MRS. GANDHI'S PROTESTATIONS ABOUT INSTILLING
GREATER CONFIDENCE AND UNDERSTANDING ON THE OTHER SIDE. THE
CHINESE DID NOT, HOWEVER, SUGGEST TO
WHAT ACTIONS MIGHT BE
TAKEN, INDICATING ONLY THAT THE NEXT STEP WAS NOW UP TO NEW
FORD
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DELHI.
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PAGE 03 HONG K 11684 03 OF 04 250704Z
11. MOST STRIKING WAS THE MESSAGE THE CHINESE LEADERS CONVEYED
TO
THAT THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND PEKING'S EFFORTS TO DEVELOP
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING WITH INDIA WAS TIED TO CHINA'S LEADERSHIP
SUCCESSION QUESTION. THE SENIOR PRC LEADERS TOLD
THAT BY
THE SAME TOKEN IT WAS NECESSARY FOR CHINA TO HAVE BETTER
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND JAPAN BEFORE CHINA'S PRESENT EXPERIENCED
LEADERS PASSED FROM THE SCENE, so TOO THE CASE OF RELATIONS WITH
INDIA. ANTI-U.S., ANTI-JAPANESE, ANTI-INDIAN AND ANTI-FOREIGN
FEELINGS HAD A HISTORY AND WERE STRONG IN CHINA BUT THEY MUST
NOT BE CARRIED TOO FAR NOR BE ALLOWED TO GET OUT OF HAND. (ONLY
THE ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS ARE TO BE CONTINUED AND STRENGTHENED
AND ACCORDINGLY THEY ARE BEING so EMPHASIZED IN THE ANTI-LIN
ANTI-CONFUCIUS CAMPAIGN.) CHINA'S PRESENT LEADERS KNOW THE
SITUATION AND THEY HAVE CONTROLLED IT BUT THEY WERE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE NEW AND AS YET INEXPERIENCED LEADERS WHO WILL SUCCEED
THEM. WHEN THESE CAME FORWARD WOULD THEY HAVE THE SAME RESTRAINT
AND FORESIGHT? THAT IS WHY IT WAS NECESSARY AT PRESENT TO ESTABLISH
BETTER INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING.
12, IN THE SESSIONS WITH
THE CHINESE, AGAIN PARTICULARLY
CHIAO KUAN-HUA, INDULGED IN SOME PERSONAL DEPRECATION OF MRS.
GANDHI. CHIAO SAID THE CHINESE KNEW MRS. GANDHI HAD A PERSONAL
FIXATION (WHICH
ADDED WAS TRUE) ABOUT BLAMING THE 1962
PRC ATTACK ON INDIA FOR THE DEATH OF NEHRU, HER FATHER. THE
CHINESE SAID THE FACT IS THAT NEHRU AS A STATESMAN HAD ACCEPTED
THE BURDENS OF OFFICE, IT WAS HE WHO IN 1962 MADE A PUBLIC
STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT HE HAD ORDERED HIS TROOPS TO "KICK
OUT" THE CHINESE AND HE SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THIS WOULD COMPEL A
CHINESE REACTION. HENCE HE AND NOT CHINA WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE CONSEQUENCES. CHIAO SAID MRS, GANDHI FACED STAGGERING
EXPIN
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS AT HOME AND SHOULD TAKE CARE OF
THESE INSTEAD. OF MEDDLING WITH REGIONAL MATTERS. SHE SEEMED
SURROUNDED BY TWO COMPETING SETS OF ADVISERS, ONE FOR IMPROVING
RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND THE OZWER OPPOSED. HADN'T INDIA SUFFERED
ENOUGH ALREADY? CORRUPTION WAS RAMPANT AROUND MRS. GANDHI
INVOLVING EVEN HER SON AND HIS HOTELS. WHAT KIND OF LEADERSHIP
WAS THIS? MRS. GANDHI NEEDED HER HEAD EXAMINED AND CHINA HAD
THE FACILITIES AND WOULD MAKE THEM AVAILABLE IF SHE WANTED TO
USE THEM.
FORD
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EXPIS EXP-3
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PAGE 04 HONG K 11684 03 OF 04 250704Z
13, GNo/BANGLADESH, CHIAO TOLD
THAT PEKING WAS IN NO HURRY
TO ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH BANGLADESH: CHINA ALREADY HAD ALL
THE INFORMATION AND CONTACTS IT NEEDED TO DEAL WITH DACCA.
ALREADY ANTI-INDIAN AND ANTI-SOVIET CHAOS WAS SPREADING THERE,
BANGLADESH WAS SUFFERING AND WOULD GO ON SUFFERING BECAUSE IT
WAS so FULL OF PROBLEMS. IN TIME MUJIB WOULD HAVE TO COME ON
BENDED KNEE TO PEKING.
GERALD ? LIBRARY FORD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT THE AUTHORIZATION O' HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
178235
OF STATE
EXP
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET 8043
PAGE 01 HONG K 11684 04 OF 04 250650Z
16
ACTION SS=25
EXPIR S
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
117569
P R 2505007 OCT 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2655
INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USLD PEKING
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 4 HONG KONG 11684
EXDIS
NOFORN
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
14
CONFIDED ABOVE INFORMATION TO CONGENOFFS ON ASSURANCE
THAT BOTH HE AND HIS SOURCE WOULD BE STRICTLY PROTECTED.
HIMSELF HAS FILED ONLY ONE STORY WHICH REFERS IN GENERAL TERMS
TO CHINESE CONCERN RE SIKKIM BUT NOTHING MORE, HE DOUBTED
WOULD PUBLISH ANYTHING SENSITIVE IN NEAR FUTURE HERESELF, ALTHOUGH
SHE IS COLLECTING MATERIAL FOR FORTHCOMING BOOK. AS FOR
CONVEYING SELECTED PORTIONS OF PRC VIEWS TO INDIAN AUTHORITIES,
NOTED MRS. GANDHI'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 18 IN WHICH
PRIMIN REMARKED THAT SINCE INDIA HAD SAID NOTHING WHEN PAKISTAN'S
PRESIDENT BHUTTO ANNEXED HUNZA AND NOTHING WHEN CHINA TOOK TIBET,
WHY WAS so MUCH BEING MADE OF SIKKIM?
THOUGHT THIS MAY
WELL BE MRS. GANHDI'S FIRST RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION BROUGHT
BY
SAID ON HEELS OF HIS STORY HE HAD RECEIVED
QUERY FROM HIS HOME OFFICE FOR MORE DETAILS ABOUT
BUT HE HAD
ADVISED THAT IT CONTACT
DIRECTLY.
FORD
&
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIV PRALO SECRET
LIBRARY
SRY
6
OF
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CIRLINA
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PAGE 02 HONG K 11684 04 OF 04 250650Z
15, COMMENT. FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT
THE ABOVE ACCOUNT AS AN ESSENTIALLY ACCURATE VERSION OF WHAT THE
CHINESE TOLD
SUCH CLUES AS THE INCLUSION OF
DERROGATORY REMARKS ABOUT MRS. GANDHI, THE FACT THAT
SAID
NOTHING PUBLICLY IN HONG KONG ABOUT INDIA, AND LOCAL
INFORMATIONINDICATING
HAS GOOD RELATIONS WITH NCNA REPS
HAVE ALL TENDED TO CONFIRM THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ABOVE ACCOUNT.
AS SUCH IT IS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE AND RECENT EXPOSITION OF
PEKING'S CURRENT VIEW OF INDO-CHINA RELATIONS THAT WE HAVE SEEN
HERE.
16. THE COMBINATION OF CHINESE SECRETIVENESS AND PRC MEDIA
RHETORIC HAVE APPARENTLY OBSCURED THIRD COUNTRY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT
PEKING'S ACTUAL ATTITUDES ABOUT AND WILLINGNESS TO CARRY ON A
DIALOGUE WITH INDIA. (CONSIDER FOR EXAMPLE, HOW WELL KNOWN THE
CHINESE VIEWS ON WESTERN EUROPE AND JAPAN ARE IN CONTRAST TO THOSE
ON INDIA AND THE SUB CONTINENT.) THE
ACCOUNT HELPS
CONSIDERABLY TO CORRECT THE WIDELY HELD THIRD COUNTRY IMPRESSION
THAT THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN AN ILLOGICALLY HARD LINE ON RELATIONS
WITH INDIA (REFTEL). WHILE NO DOUBT A NUMBER OF THE CHINESE
STATEMENTS TO
ARE OBVIOUSLY SELF SERVING AND BLUSTERING, IT
IS NEVERTHELESS SIGNIFICANT THAT DESPITE THEIR UPSET OVER SIKKIM,
THE CHINESE STILL SEEM WILLING TO RESUME THE DIALOGUE, AND HAVE
LEFT THE DOOR OPEN FOR AN INDIAN RESPONSE. ADDITIONALLY IT ISL
INTERESTING THATTHE CHINESE ARE TAKING PAINS IN THIS DIALOGUE
NOT TO OVERDO SOVIET LINKAGE WITH INDIA, PRESUMABLY BELIEVING
THERE ARE STILL POSSIBILITIES FOR COUNTERING TO SOME DEGREE
MOSCOW'S PRESENT INSIDE TRACK POSITION RE INDIA.
17, THE RATIONALE PUT FORTH BY THE CHINESE ABOUT THE LEADERSHIP
SUCCESSION ISSUE INFLUENCING CHINESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIA IS
BOTH FASCINATING AND NEW. THIS IS TIED IN WITH WHAT ORIGINALLY
APPEARED TO BE RANDOM REFERENCES IN
ACCOUNT ABOUT AN ALL-
LEVEL CHINESE LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS SUPPORTING THE RECENT MFA
STATEMENT ON SIKKIM AND ABOUT THE STRESS ON THE RISK OF A SERIOUS
BORDER SITUATION ARISING FROM RASH LOCAL ACTIONS BY A COMMANDER
ON EITHER SIDE. THIS ASPECT HAS IMPORTANT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
FORD
&
NOT ONLY FOR CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS BUT FOR THE PRESENT
INTERNAL POLPCICAL SITUATION AS WELL.
COMMENTS
ON CURRENT INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS BEING REPORTED BY
GERALD
LIBRARY
SEPTEL.
CROSS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED 'ITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
4
or STATE
*
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SEGRET 7211
PAGE 01 HONG K 13927 2710482
10
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
044666
R 2709552 DEC 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3299
INFO USLO PEKING
8 E:C EL R E T HONG KONG 13927
EXDIS/NOFORN
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJ: PACE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
REF: A. PEKING 2305 B. PEKING 23311 C. HONG KONG 137081
D. PEKING 2290
1. RECENT INDICATIONS OF ALLEGED DISPLEASURE OF PRC OFFICIALS
AT THE PAC OF PROGRESS IN SINO- AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE COME FROM
SEVERAL PLACES. IN ADDITION, SINCE LATE NOVEMBER, PRC
ATTITUDES AS EXPRESSED TO FOREIGNERS HAVE FEATURED UNIFORM
POINTS THAT THE USG MUST SEVER TIES WITH THE GRC, ABROGATE ITS
TREATIES, AND WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM TAIWAN IF RELATIONS ARE
TO BE "NORMALIZED". BY REFERRING TO THE "JAPAN MODEL", THE
PRC APPARENTLY IS AT THE SAME TIME INDICATING THAT CONTINUING
U.S. TRADE, CULTURAL, AND OTHCER RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN WOULD BE
ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRC, BOTH OF THESE THEMES APPEAR TO BE WELL-
ORCHESTRATED AND DESIGNED TO BECOME WIDELY PUBLICIZED.
2. THESE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THIS PRC FORMULATION
&
FORD
HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO CHICAGO DAILY
S
NEWS CORRESPONDENT SAME JAFFE (REF A) AND TO AMERICAN
NEWSMAN IN HONG KONG (REF C).
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED, with portions exempted
11
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, state visit 8/2/00
BY GG
NARA, DATE 4/27/01
OF
STATE
Department of State
OF / AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 13927 2710482
3, THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS IN HONG KONG HAS OBTAINED ADDITIONAL
INDICATIONS OF THE PRC'S POSITION FROM ARTICLES WRITTEN BY
AFPIS SERGE RMENSKY (REF D) IN PEKING BASED ON JAFFE'S EXCLUSIVE
INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR MANSFIELD. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE
SENATOR WILL BE PRESSED HARD ON THIS ISSUE DURING HIS
VISIT IN HONG KONG AND WILL, OF COURSE, INFORM HIM OF THIS
POSSIBILITY IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ARRIVAL.
EXCES EXC-S EXPIN
4. ALTHOUGH NO HONG KONG-BASED CORRESPONDENTS HAVE YET PUBLISHED
THESE ACCOUNTS AND NONE KNOW THE FULL EXTENT OF THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE AT THIS POINT, WE BELIEVE THAT PUBLICATION OF JAFFE'S
ARTICLES WILL PROBABLY LEADTO CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG
OUR CHINA-WATCHING PRESS COLLEAGUES. SINCE CHINESE "IMPATIENCE"
WITH THE PACE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WAS PROVIDED TO AN
AMERICAN REPORTED IN HONG KONG BY COMMUNIST EDITOR FEI I-MIN
FIRST LAST AUGUST CHONG KONG 9217) WE WOULD ALSO ANTICIPATE
FURTHER SUCH COMMENTS BY LOCAL CADRES TO THE PRESS CORPS.
IN TURN AMERICAN PRESS CORPS WOULD THIS LINE TO
SPECULATE ON CHINESE MOTIVES IN INITIATING THIS KIND OF CORRDINATED
CAMPAIGN so FAR IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S ANTICIAPTED VISIT TO
PRC AND so SOON AFTER SECRETARY'S TRIP WHEN NO PUBLIC EXPRESS-
IONS OF DISSATISFACTION WERE VOICED.
CROSS
FORD
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012732
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
....
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE
PRC Initiative toward ROKG
CREATION DATE
10/29/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400174
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012728
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
TITLE
Pace of Sino-U.S. Relations
CREATION DATE
12/27/1974
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400174
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
DECLASSIFIED with poitions exemptal exem
STATE E.O. DEPT, GUIDELINES state visit 8/2/00
12950, SEC. 3.5
BY
0
MARA, DATE 4/27/01
4
GRARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF the
TELEGRAM
SECRET 7211
PAGE 01 HONG K 13927 2710482
10
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /026 W
044666
R 2709552 DEC 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3299
INFO USLO PEKING
DECLASSIFIED with portions exempted
S E e R E T HONG KONG 13927
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines stale visit 8/2/00
EXDIS/NOFORN
By
lob
. NARA, Date 4/27/01
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJ: PACE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS
REF: A, PEKING 2305 B. PEKING 23311 C. HONG KONG 137081
0. PEKING 2290
1. RECENT INDICATIONS OF ALLEGED DISPLEASURE OF PRC OFFICIALS
AT THE PAC OF PROGRESS IN SINO- AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE COME FROM
SEVERAL PLACES. IN ADDITION, SINCE LATE NOVEMBER, PRC
ATTITUDES AS EXPRESSED TO FOREIGNERS HAVE FEATURED UNIFORM
POINTS THAT THE USG MUST SEVER TIES WITH THE GRC, ABROGATE ITS
TREATIES, AND WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS FROM TAIWAN IF RELATIONS ARE
TO BE "NORMALIZED". BY REFERRING TO THE "JARAN MODEL", THE
PRC APPARENTLY IS AT THE SAME TIME INDICATING THAT CONTINUING
U.S. TRADE, CULTURAL, AND OTHCER RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN WOULD BE
ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRC. BOTH OF THESE THEMES APPEAR TO BE WELL-
FORD
&
ORCHESTRATED AND DESIGNED TO BECOME WIDELY PUBLICIZED.
2. THESE ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS OF THIS PRC FORMULATION
GERALD
LIBRARY
HAVE BEEN PROVIDED TO CHICAGO DAILY
NEWS CORRESPONDENT SAME JAFFE (REF A) AND TO AMERICAN
NEWSMAN IN HONG KONG (REF C).
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
11
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
CANADA
UNITED
NUMBER
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 13927 2710482
3, THE FOREIGN PRESS CORPS IN HONG KONG HAS OBTAINED ADDITIONAL
INDICATIONS OF THE PRC'S POSITION FROM ARTICLES WRITTEN BY
AFPIS SERGE RMENSKY (REF D) IN PEKING BASED ON JAFFE'S EXCLUSIVE
INTERVIEW WITH SENATOR MANSFIELD. WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THE
SENATOR WILL BE PRESSED HARD ON THIS ISSUE DURING HIS
VISIT IN HONG KONG AND WILL, OF COURSE, INFORM HIM OF THIS
POSSIBILITY IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ARRIVAL.
4. ALTHOUGH NO HONG KONG-BASED CORRESPONDENTS HAVE YET PUBLISHED
THESE ACCOUNTS AND NONE KNOW THE FULL EXTENT OF THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE AT THIS POINT, WE BELIEVE THAT PUBLICATION OF JAFFEIS
ARTICLES WILL PROBABLY LEADTO CONSIDERABLE SPECULATION AMONG
OUR CHINA-WATCHING PRESS COLLEAGUES. SINCE CHINESE "IMPATIENCE"
WITH THE PACE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS WAS PROVIDED TO AN
AMERICAN REPORTED IN HONG KONG BY COMMUNIST EDITOR FEI I-MIN
FIRST LAST AUGUST CHONG KONG 9217) WE WOULD ALSO ANTICIPATE
FURTHER SUCH COMMENTS BY LOCAL CADRES TO THE PRESS CORPS.
IN TURN AMERICAN PRESS CORPS WOULD THIS LINE TO
SPECULATE ON CHINESE MOTIVES IN INITIATING THIS KIND OF CORRDINATED
CAMPAIGN so FAR IN ADVANCE OF PRESIDENT FORD'S ANTICIAPTED VISIT TO
PRC AND so SOON AFTER SECRETARY'S TRIP WHEN NO PUBLIC EXPRESS-
IONS OF DISSATISFACTION WERE VOICED.
CROSS
S
FORD
&
OFRACO
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF PHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
5
ARTMENT
OF
DEP
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECRET 8915
PAGE 01 HONG K 13929 280617Z
15
ACTION SSW25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
005395
R 2805107 DEC 74
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3301
INFO USLO PEKING
M HONG KONG 13929
EXDIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NOFORN
MR # 10-042-149
ptate dept ltr 5/4/10
E.O. 116521 GDS
By dal NARA, Date 6/24/10
TAGS: PFOR CH US
SUBJECT: US-PRC RELATIONS
REF: PEKING 2331
1. WE HAVE BEEN PASSED BRITISH FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM
WHICH REPORTS ON CONVERSATION BETWEEN UK FOREIGN SECRETARY
AND PRC AMBASSADOR (REFTEL) AND THINK IT IMPORTANT TO
NOTE THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED SINO-
U.S. RELATIONS AS "DEVELOPING" OR "PROGRESSING." THE
AMBASSADOR VOLUNTEERED HIS COMMENT AND COUCHED IT AS A
DENIAL OF PRESS ALLEGATIONS TO THE CONTRARY.
2. THIS PORTION OF THE TELEGRAM READS: QUOTE SUNG
VOLUNTEERED THAT ALTHOUGH THE PRESS PERSISTED IN ALLEGING
THAT SINO-U.S. RELATIONS WERE LESS GOOD IN FACT THEY WERE
DEVELOPING. HIS INTERPRETER IN FACT TRANSLATED THIS AS
THERE WAS PROGRESS', UNQUOTE
FORD LIBRARA
3. COMMENT: IT MAY, OF COURSE, BE COINCIDENCE THAT
AMBASSADOR SUNG DENIES PRESS ALLEGATIONS ABOUT A DOWN-
TURN IN SINO-U.S. RELATIONS ON THE SAME DAY (DECEMBER 179
THAT VICE FOREIGN MINISTER YU CHAN IS PUMPING UP
AMERICAN JOURNALIST SAM JAFFE TO MAKE JUST SUCH AN
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or &
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
EXPES EXPIS
STATES OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 13929 280617Z
ALLEGATION (PEKING 2305). EASTEST EXPLANATION IS
THAT CHINESE LINE SHIFTED SUDDENLY AND RENDERED
GRATE R.FORD
AMBASSADOR'S INSTRUCTIONS OUT OF DATE. WE WOULD
NOT RULE OUT YET, HOWEVER, THE ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY
THAT THE CHINESE COULD BE SHADING THEIR LINE TO FIT
DIFFERENT AUDIENCES. PEKING MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, WANT
TO INJECT A GREATER SENSE OF ANXIETY INTO AMERICAN
PUBLIC OPINION, WHILE REASSURING A CLOSE AND WELL-
ATTUNED U.S. ALLY LIKE THE UK THAT AFFAIRS ARE PROPERLY
IN HAND.
CROSS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION F THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
ACTION CUP B
/
Department of State
OF 15 COPIES
UNITED STATES OF
TELECRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
N00487
PAGE 01 HONG K 01152 01 OF 02 310926Z CONTROL: 68200
RECD: 31 JAN 75
00
1:46AM
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 /001 W
108884
P 310515Z JAN 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MR # #10 10.042.1910
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3666
state dept. lets 5/6/10
c 0 N F I D E N T I A to SECTION 1 OF 2 HONG KONG 1152
By doe NARA, Date 6/24/10
NODIS
E.O. 11652/ XGDS-2
TAGS: PINT, CH
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO TALK WITH NEW ZEALAND AMBASSADOR
1. FOLLOWING IS MAIN PORTION OF A REPORT FROM THE NEW ZEALAND
AMBASSADOR (HARLAND) IN PEKING OF HIS TALK JANUARY 12 WITH
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA. IT WAS PASSED TO US
BY A NEW ZEALANDER COLLEAGUE HERE (PROTECT) WITH THE COMMENT THAT
CHIAO'S REMARKS WERE INTENDED TO REACH AMERCIAN EARS. HOWEVER
WE BELIEVE OUR COLLEAGUE IS OPERATING ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE
IN PASSING US THIS.
FURD
BEGIN TEXT.
2. INDO CHINA
I TCLO CHIAO THAT WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE CURRENT UPSURGED
FIGHTING IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE DISMISSED IT AS A MINOR PROBLEM,
AND COMMENTED THAT THE AMERICANS WERE OVER-REACTING, AS USUAL.
HE ALSO PLAYED DOWN THE IMPORTANCE OF CAMBODIA: QUOTE WHAT
DOES IT MATTER WHETHER CAMBODIA ENDS UP RED OR BLUE? UNQUOTE,
BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT CHINA HAD ON THREE OCCASIONS IN THE
PAST YEAR SPOKEN SERIOUSLY TO THE AMERICANS ABOUT CAMBODIA, AND
THEY WOULD NOT LISTEN. THE LAST OCCASION WAS KISSINGER'S VISIT,
THEN I SAID THAT WE HAD TALKED TO THE AMERICANS
MORE RECENTLY, AND IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT THEY MIGHT NOW BE
- MOVING: THEY WANTED A POLITCIAL SETTLEMENT, AND WERE NOT WEDDED
TO ANY PARTICULAR PERSON OR TO ANY PARTICULAR SOLUTION.
CHIAO DEMURRED: HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES WANTED A
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
UNITED
Department of St
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 01152 01 OF 02 3109267
SOLUTION. THE PROBLEM MIGHT WELL DRAG ON FOR A
CONSIDERABLE TIME YET (QUOTE FOUR OR FIVE YEARS UNQUOTE),
3. I SAID THAT SIHANOUK'S RECENT STATEMENTS SUGGESTED THAT HE
AT LEAST WANTS A POLITICAL SOLUTION. CHIAO REPLIED THAT WE QUOTE
SHOULD NOT READ TOO MUCH INTO THOSE STATEMENTS UNQUOTE. BUT HE
DID AGREE THAT ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD HAVE TO CENTRE
ON SIHANOUK. AND IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION OF MINE, HE ASSERTED
WITH A GREAT DEAL OF CONFIDENCE THAT THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WOULD
NOT TORPEDO A SETTLEMENT SIHANOUK AGREED TO, I REMARKED THAT,
AS THE CHINESE AMBASSADOR IN HANOI PAID A CALL ON LE DUAN A
FEW DAYS AGO, CHIAO WAS PRESUMABLY IN A POSITION TO KNOW. HE
DID NOT DENY IT. HE EXPLICITLY ADMITTED THAT CHINA WAS PROVIDING
MILITARY SUPPORT FOR THE KHMERS ROUGES, AND, IN A RESPONSE TO
A QUESTION, DENIED THAT SUCH SUPPORT WAS BEING HELD UP IN TRANSIT
IN NORTH VIETNAM.
4. QUOTE TO SPEAK FRANKLY UNQUOTE, CHIAO WENT ON, SAIA'S
PROBLEMS ARE BEING PERPETUATED BY THE FACT (PRECISELY
REPRODUCED--HONG KONG). CHIAO APPEARED SURPRISINGLY TOLERANT
OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. HE CONCEDED THAT THE
ADMINISTRATION FACED CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS IN SORTING CUT ITS
ASIAN POLICIES, AND IMPLIED THAT CHINA WAS PREPARED TO WAIT.
QUOTE THEY CAN DO IT LITTLE BY LITTLE, AND SAVE THEIR FACE
UNQUOTE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE CHINESE VIEW THE U.S.
HAD, SINCE FORD BECAUME PRESIDENT, BEEN DRAGGING ITS FEET IN
ASIA, AND THAT THIS WOULD ULTIMATELY BE TO THE UNITED STATES'
OWN DISADVANTAGE. HE DESCRIBED PRESIDENT FORD AS A QUOTE WEAK
UNQUOTE PRESIDENT: THIS BE QUALIFIED BY SAYING THAT FORD HAD
NOT BEEN ELECTED, BUT THE REMARK CLEARLY HAD WIDER IMPLICATIONS.
5. I OBSERVED THAT KISSINGER DID NOT NOW SEEM TO BE DEVOTING
MUCH THOUGHT TO RELATIONS WITH CHINA. CHIAO REPLIED THAT KISSINGER
REMAINED CONCERNED, BUT HAD BECOME PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER, MORE
PRESSING MATTERS. THAT WAS NOT TO SAY, HE SAID IN RESPONSE TO
FURTHER QUESTIONS, THAT CHINA WOULD BE HAPPY TO SEE KISSINGER
DEVOTE HIMSELF ENTIRELY TO EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THE
UNITED STATES SHOULD TIDY UP ITS AFFAIRS IN ASIA, SO THAT IT
COULD CONCENTRATE ON DEALING WITH THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET
UNION.
CONFIDENTIAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HONG K 01152 21 OF 02 3109262
5. I WAS SURPRISED TO FIND THAT, IN SPEAKING OF KISSINGER,
CHIAO DISPLAYED SOME PERSONAL ANIMOSITY. HE HIMSELF TURNED THE
CONVERSATION TO THE INTERVIEW KISSINGER RECENTLY GAVE TO QUOTE
SUSINESS WEEK UNQUOTE. HE WAS CLEARLY ANNOYED BY THE SABRE-
RATTLING ATTITUDE KISSINGER ADOPTED TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST, BUT
HIS GREATEST CONCERN WAS WHAT THE INTERVIEW REVEALED ABOUT
KISSINGER'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS EUROPE. IF THE UNITED STATES WAS
UNHAPPY WITH ITS ALLIES, IT SHOULD SPEAK TO THEM PRIVATELY,
CHIAO COMMENTED. KISSINGER'S STATEMENT WAS UNNECESSARY AND
DAMAGING,
FORD LIBRARA
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONF IDENTIAL
NOD476
PAGE 01 HONG K 01152 02 OF 02 310732Z
00
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 /001 W
107820
P 310515Z JAN 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 3667
CON F D E N T I A SECTION 2 OF 2 HONG KONG 1152
GERATO, FORD LIBRER
NODIS
7. THE CONVERSATION MADE IT CLEARER THAN EVER THAT CHIAO'S
MAIN PREOCUPATION IS WITH EUROPE, AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE
EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE THERE. AND WHAT HE SAID SCRE
LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO CHINAIS PUBLIC UTTERANCES.
8, IN HIS VIEW, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRAT AND LABOUR
PARTIES REPRESENT THE GREATEST DANGER IN WESTERN EUROPE- THOUGH
NOT, HE HASTENED TO SAY, IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA.
CONSERVATIVE PARTIES ARE MUCH LESS LIKELY TO FALL FOR SOVIET
BLANDISHMENTS, AND THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IS LIKELY TO BRING THEM
BACK TO POWER BEFORE LONG. BUT, I POINTED OUT, IN THE CRISIS
OF THE 19308 IT WAS NOT THE TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVES WHO CAME
TO POWER IN COUNTRIES LIKE ITALY AND GERMANY, BUT THE LUNATIC
FRINGE OF THE EXTREME RIGHT. THE REAL DANGER NOW IS THAT/PEOPLE
IN EUROPE WILL LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR OWN SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT,
AND DO UNPREDICTABLE THINGS. THIS SEEMED ALMOST A NEW THOUGHT
TO CHIAO. BUT I FELT HE TOOK MY POINT THAT THE FALL OF EUROPEIS
LEFT OF CENTRE GOVERNMENTS WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BRING ABOUT A
SITUATION MORE FAVORABLE TO CHINAIS INTERESTS. STILL, HE WAS
FAR FROM ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THOSE IN OFFICE IN EUROPE AT PRESENT.
IN THE CASES OF BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY HE SPOKE MORE
APPROVINGLY OF THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERS. HE HAS NOT MET
GISCARD, HE SAID, IS COMING TO CHINA LATER THIS YEAR.
(WE HAD NOT HEARD THIS BEFORE.) (PRECISELY REPORDUCED--HONG
KONG.)
9. CHIAC SEEMED LESS CONCERNED ABOUT THE STABILITY OF THE
GOVERNMENTS NORTH OF THE ALPS THAN BY THOSE TO THE SOUTH. HE
CONP IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 01152 02 OF 02 3107322
OBSERVED THAT COMMUNIST TAKEOVER COULD WELL TAKE PLACE IN FOUR
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES-. GREECE, ITALY, PORTUGAL AND SPAIN. WHEN I
SAID THAT, IN ITALY AT LEAST, A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT WOULD
PROBABLY BE PRETTY INDEPENDENT OF MOSCOW, HE REPLIED THAT AS
FAR AS CHINA WAS CONCERNED, A COMMUNIST ITALY MIGHT BE A GOOD
THING, FOR, WHATEVER THE REALITY, IT WOULD BE WIDELY REGARDED
AS A CREATURE
OF MOSCOW. CI ASSUME HIS MEANING WAS THAT RESISTANCE TO SOVIET
OVERTURES ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE WOULD BE STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT.)
10. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD DEARLY LIKE TO CAPITALIZE ON THE
PRESENT UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE, CHIAO SAID. ONLY ONE THING
PREVENTED IT: THE UNSATISFACTURY STATE OF ITS RELATIONS WITH
CHINA. (IN SAYING THIS, CHIAO INVERTED WHAT IS GENERALLY
REGARDED AS BEING THE CHINESE POSITION- THAT THE SOVIET UNION
WILL NOT MAKE TROUBLE ON ITS BORDER WITH CHINA BECAUSE IT IS
PREOCCUPIED WITH EVENTS IN EUROPE.) CHIAO STRESSED THAT THE SOVIET
UNION VERY MUCH WANTS TO IMPROVE ITS RLEATIONS WITH CHINA,
BUT UP TC THE PRESENT ONLY ON ITS OWN TERMS. HE THEN SAID WITH
EMPHASIS THAT THERE IS, NO WAY IN WHICH SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
CAN BE IMPROVED-- AND
IMMEDIATELY BACKTRACKED BY SAYING THAT OF COURSE
CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT CHANGE IN THE FUTURE. A PROPOS OF THE
ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE, TO WHICH I REFERRED, CHIAO REMARJED THAT
THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STANCES OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE NOT
ALWAYS IDENTICAL, BUT HE DENIED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MADE
ANY PRIVATE APPROACH TO CHINA LATELY.
R.FORD LIBRANT
11. COMMENT
WHAT CHIAO SAID WENT SOME DISTANCE TOWARDS CONFIRMING MY RECENT
SPECULATIONS ABOUT CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE U.S. AND THE
SOVIET UNION. IT CERTAINLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE CHINESE STILL
SEE THE RUSSIANS AS THEIR MAIN ENEMY. IT ALSO INDICATED THAT
THEY ARE UNHAPPY ABOUT CURRENT AMERICAN POLICY. OSTENSIBLY,
WHAT THEY OR AT LEAST CHIAO ARE MOST UNHAPPY ABOUT IS WHAT
THEY REGARD AS KISSINGER'S MISHANDLING OF EUROPE, RATHER THAN
HIS FAILURE TO TIDY UP THE ASIAN PROBLEMS LEFT OVER FROM THE
FIFTIES. YET IN CLAIMING THAT CHINA IS PREVENTING THE SQVIET
UNION FROM CAPITALISING ON THE CRISIS IN EUROPE, AND ALSO IN
REMINDING ME THAT SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS CAN CHANGE, CHIAO WAS
SURELY SUGGESTING THAT. CHINA IS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN WORLD
CONFIDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HONG K 01152 02 OF 02 310732Z
POLITICS AND ITS POSITION CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. SO HE
SEEMS TO ME TO BE ARGUING, OBLIQUELY BUT QUITE CLEARLY, THAT
THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE MORE NOTICE OF CHINA.
12. ON INDOCHINA THE IMPORTANT THING THAT EMERGED WAS CHIACIS
CONFIDENCE THAT HANOI WILL NOT TORPEDO A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA
CENTERED ON SIHANOUK. THIS CONFIRMS MY IMPRESSION THAT, IN SPITE
OF WHAT MANAC'H SAYS, THE CHINESE HAVE BEEN TALKING TO THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE, AND HAVE PROBABLY REACHED SOME UNDERSTANDING
WITH THEM. IF SO, THE RISKS INVOLVED IN WORKING OUT POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT MAY NOT BE AS GREAT AS MANACIH THINKS. END TEXT.
CROSS
FORD EVERY
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
STATE
Department of State
of I MAKE ALINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 7553
PAGE 01 HONG K 01836 2205052
15
ACTION SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1020 W
008052
R 220312Z FEB 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3890
INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
USLO PEKING
e 0 N N t HONG KONG 1836
EXDIS
NOFORN
E.O. 116521 XGDS-2
TAGS: PINT CH CB
SUBJ: SIHANOUK DEPRESSED AFTER HANOI TRIP
DAILY TELEGRAPH PEKING CORRESPONDENT CLARE HOLLINGWORTH,
PRESENT IN HONG KONG, TOLD CONGENOFF THAT HUGH GIBB,
HONG KONG DOCUMENTARY FILM MAKER, MET WITH SIHANOUK
IN PEKING FEBRUARY 20 AND FOUND THE PRINCE MOROSE. GIBB, WHO
FILMED A SIHANOUK INTERVIEW TWO OR so YEARS AGO, TOLD
HOLLINGWORTH HERE FEBRUARY 21 THAT
SIHANOUK SAID IT WAS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY HE WOULD EVER
FORD
RETURN TO CAMBODIA AND THAT HE WAS THINKING OF GOING TO
LIVE IN FRANCE. THE CHINESE WOULD NEVER TURN HIM OUT BUT
HE DID NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THEM BY STAYING ON WHEN IT
GERALD A.
LIBRARY
WAS CLEAR THAT HE HAD NO USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN CAMBODIAN
AFFAIRS. GIBB SAID SIHANOUK LEFT LITTLE DOUBT THAT
HIS DEPRESSION STEMMED FROM HIS RECENT VISIT TO HANOI
(FEBRUARY 9-15) BUT WOULD SAY NOTHING ABOUT WHAT HAD
TRANSPIRED THERE.
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CROSS
Retain Class'n
Change to
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify in part and excise as shown
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
state visit 8/3/00
EO 12958, 25X )( )( )
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
Declassify
After
BY GG
,
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
IPS by JL
Date 8/3/00
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF IDENT
6
FORM DS.1652
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012730
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re People's Republic of China
CREATION DATE
02/26/1975
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400174
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED
5/6/10
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 012731
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
RECEIVER'S NAME
USLO PEKING
DESCRIPTION
Re People's Republic of China
CREATION DATE
03/05/1975
VOLUME
1 page
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032400174
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EAST ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Hong Kong - State Department Telegrams
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/27/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
EXEMPTED
5/6/10
10
OF STATE
WH
EX@
Department of State
of / AMERICA UNITED and
TELEGRAM
SECRET 6396
PAGE 01 HONG K 03026 220634Z
14-11
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
054365
0 220615Z MAR 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4270
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SAIGON IMMEDIATE
SECRET HONG KONG 3026
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, VN, vs, PINS, CH
SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF BANCROFTIS RELIABILITY
REF: A) BANGKUK 47321 B) HONG KONG 8706 NOTAL, AUG. 2, 1974
1. WILLIAM H. BANCROFT, JR. IS WELL KNOWN TO CONGENOFFS AS
AN UNRELIABLE AND ERRATIC BUSINESS SOURCE WHO HAS FLOATED
NUMBER OF ALLEGED "BIG TIME" SCHEMES HERE, AND APPARENTLY
TRIES TO CAPITALIZE ON "CRISIS OPPORTUNITIES. AS REPORTED
IN REF R, HE WLAIMED INVOLVEMENT IN SEVERAL BIG DEALS THAT
DID NOT TURN OUT. THE LATEST WAS IN CONNECTION WITH FOREIGN
ENERGY RESOURCE INVESTMENT GUARANTEES WHICH HE ALLEGEOLY
ARRANGED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF BANGLADESH.
2, WITH REGARD TO BANCROFT'S ACCOUNT ABOUT PRESIDENT THIEU
WE HAVE NO INFORMATION HERE WHICH WOULD IN ANY WAY SUBSTANTIATE
SUCH ALLEGATION AND WE ALSO REGARD IT AS HIGHLY IMPLAUSIBLE.
CROSS
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
FORD
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
&
Declassify
After
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
PS by JL
Date
8/3/00
GERALD
LIBRARY
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GG 4/23/01
Or and
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
of STATES
SECRET 1785
PAGE 01 HONG K 03095 250741Z
14
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 w
087246
R 2501582 MAR 75
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
Retain Class'n
Change to
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4303
Declassify in part and excise as shown
INFO USLO PEKING
EQ 12958, 25X( )( )( )
Declassify
After
SECRET HONG KONG 3095
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
PS by
JL
Date 8/3/00
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS-3
TAGS: EEWT, EAIR, CH, KN, US
SUBJ: us AIRCRAFT SALES TO PRC UNLIKELY, SAYS BOEING
OFFICIAL
REFS: A) 1974 PEKING 1276
B) 1974 STATE 194262
C) 1974 PEKING 1688
1. SUMMARY. A BOEING OFFICIAL SAYS THE COMPANY HAS
BEEN TOLD REPEATEDLY BY THE PRC THAT IT WILL NOT BE
BUYING ANY MORE US AIRCRAFT UNTIL THE USG RELENTS ON
ITS NOT ALLOWING THE PRC TO PASS us PLANES ALONG TO
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
TATE DEPT, GUIDELINES state vi Sit 8/3/00
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
NORTH KUREA. END SUMMARY.
2. MR. AL STOFFEL, A RETIRED FSO NOW WITH THE INTER-
NATIONAL DIVISION OF BOEING CALLED TO DISCUSS OTHER
MATTERS. IN THE COURSE OF TALKING ABOUT CHINA HE SAID
IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE CHINESE WOULD NOT BE BUYING MORE
BY GG
US AIRCRAFT FOR AWHILE BECAUSE THEY DID NOT LIKE THE
RESTRICTIONS THE USG PLACED ON AIRCRAFT SALES.
3. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE CHINESE WANTED TO PASS THREE
BOFING 707'S ON TO NORTH KOREA AND THAT UPON LEARNING
FORD
THAT THE USG WOULD NOT ALLOW IT THE CHINESE INDICATED
THEY WOULD NOT BE BUYING ANY MORE US AIRCRAFT. SINCE
GERALD ?
LIBRARY
THEN BOEING HAS GOTTEN THIS CHINESE MESSAGE "FROM ABOUT
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT SAGRE -THORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
DEPARTMENT or STATE
*
EXPIS
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
SECRET
PAGE 02 HONG K 03095 2507412
TEN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS", HE SAID.
CROSS
DECEIVENED
60 15398 2EC 33
DAVIE DELI
STAD ARAM.
FORD & LIBRAR DERALO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT SECRET THE AUTHORIZATION
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM DS-1652
12
OF STATE
WH
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONFIDENTIAL 4771
PAGE 01 STATE 155715
62
ORIGIN SS=25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 R
DRAFTED BY EA/VN:JDFINNEY:FMLC
APPROVED BY EA:RHMILLER
EA/VN#RHWENZEL
DIKPENDLETON
PPT:MRS. KELLER (DRAFT)
S/S -LCJOHNSTONE
E:CROBINSON
019599
P 0123512 JUL 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY
EXCES
C 0 N I D E N I STATE 155715
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: BTRA, EEWT, EGEN, PFOR
SUBJECT: VISIT OF AMERICAN CITIZEN TO HANOI
REF: HONG KONG 7262
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
WE ARE NOT AWARE THAT DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN CONSULTED ON
SAUBOLLE VISIT TO HANOI. IS HE IN FACT AN AMERICAN
CITIZEN? INGERSOLL
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Retain Class'n
Change to
DECLASSIFIED
Declassify in part and excise as shown
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
State visit 8/3/00
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES,
BY GG
NARA, DATE 4/23/01
Declassify
After
0
With concurrence
PS by JL
(not)(obtained)
Date 8/3/06
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOOHHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
13
COPY
OF 15 COPIES
FILE
200-0
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
NOD405
PAGE 01 HONG K 08431 231041Z
CONTROL: 5630Q
RECD: 23 JUL 75
12
6:15 AM
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
032997
R 2308272 JUL 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
N
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6070
INFO USLO PEKING
C
D
LII
N
H
A
HONG KONG 8431
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: ENRG, CH, US, HK
SUBJECT: PROPOSED FLUOR REFINERY COMPLEX
REF: HONG KONG 8333
S
1. PARA 3 REFTEL INDICATED THAT THE PRC WOULD GIVE FLUOR FINAL
DECISION ON THE HUGE REFINERY/PETRO-CHEMICAL PROJECT BY LATE
NOVEMBER AT THE LATEST. ACCORDING TO HOOSE, CHINESE SIDE SAID
THE DECISION WOULD BE POSITIVE IN ANY CASE BUT ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD
BE TIED TO PRESIDENT'S VISIT WHICH CHINESE CLAIMED WOULD BEGIN
NOVEMBER 4 OR 5. IF PRIOR TO VISIT US MADE SOME GESTURE WHICH
PROPONENTS COULD POINT TO AS SIGN OF REAL IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-
AMERICAN RELATIONS, THEN ANNOUNCEMENT COULD BE MADE IN SEPTEMBER
OR OCTOBER. IF US UNABLE TO 00 OR SAY ANYTHING HELPFUL, THEN
ZODIU
ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE AFTER TRIP AS INDICATION OF VISIT'S
SUCCESS. KINDS OF GESTURES HOOSE SAID CHINESE SAID THEY HAVE
IN MIND WERE SUCH THINGS AS REMOVAL OF MORE US FORCES FROM TAIWAN,
SETTLEMENT OF CLAIMS PROBLEM AND, OF COURSE, BEST OF ALL,
ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRC.
2, I WAS NONCOMMITTAL, AS I ALWAYS AM WITH HOOSE ON THIS
KIND OF THING, BUT IT STRIKES ME AS PRETTY LOW LEVEL AND
BLATANT STUFF PROBABLY EMANATING FROM THE HONG KONG FRONT-MEN
SIDE OF THE CHINESE TEAM. HOWEVER, I AM REPORTING IT IN THIS
FASHION BECAUSE HOOSE PLANS TO CALL ON GENERAL SCOWCROFT OF
NSC AND BECAUSE DATE FOR PRESIDENT'S VISIT GIVEN ABOVE IS
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD
GG 4/23/01
&
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE ERALO SECRETARY
LIBRARY
ZOPIU
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 08431 231041Z
IDENTICAL TO DATE RECENTLY TOLD TO OTHER AMERICANS BY OTHER
CHINESE CONNECTED WITH THE PRC. IF THIS IS ACCURATE AND
CHINESE ARE PASSING THE WORD THIS WAY, IT MIGHT BE OF POSSIBLE
IMPORTANCE TO WASHINGTON IN DETERMINING TIMING OF ANNOUNCEMENT
OF VISIT.
CROSS
ZODIU
ZODIU
CONF IDENTIAL
GERALD R FORD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
14
THANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 8297
PAGE 01 HONG K 11090 200604Z
11
ACTION SS-25
TNFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
049677
P R 200500Z SEP 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7069
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
Retain Class'n
Change to
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EQ 12958, 25X( )( )( )
C
N
HONG KONG 11090
Declassify
After
With concurrence
EXDIS
PS by
JL
(not)(obtained)
Date 8/3/00
F.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: BTRA EEWT EGEN PFOR
SUBJ: AMERICAN INTEREST IN TRADE WITH INDOCHINA
REF: HONG KONG 72621 HONG KONG 8244 (NOTAL)
8/3/00
SUMMARY: THE CONGEN HAS COME ACROSS EVIDENCE THAT AT
LEAST TWO AMERICAN CHAMGERS OF COMMERCE (AMCHAM) IN EA
ARE ACTIVELY CONSIDERING PRESENTING RESOLUTIONS AT THE
ASIAN PACIFIC COUNCIL OF AMERICAN CHAMBERS (APCAC) MEETING
IN SEOUL DURING NOVEMBER, CALLING FOR USG EFFORTS TO OPEN
UP ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS WITH THE DRV. IN
CLOSELY REALTED MATTERS, U.S. BUSINESSMAN HAS ASKED US FOR
INFORMAL ADVICE ON WHETHER U.S. TREASURY WOULD GRANT
LICENSE FOR SALE OF AMERICAN COTTON DIRECTLY TO THE DRV.
BECAUSE OF THE OBVIOUS POLITCAL IMPLICATIONS OF THESE
TWO DEVELOPMENTS, WE ARE REPORTING THEM WITH REQUEST FOR
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES statevisit
GUIDANCE BY FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, WHEN CONGEN HAS ITS
GG NARA, 4/23/01
DATE
REGULAR MEETING WITH LOCAL AMCHAM BOARD OF GOVERNORS AT
WHICH THESE MATTERS WILL BE DISCUSSED. END SUMMARY
1. THE HONG KONG AMCHAM HAS PREPARED A DRAFT RESOLUTION
PROPOSING THE EARLY NORMALIZATION OF COMMERCIAL AND
POLITICAL REALTIONS WITH THE DRV AND CAMBODIA. THE
AMCHAM IS CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF PRESENTING ITS
DRAFT TO THE APCAC MEETING IN SEOUL, NOVEMBER 7 TO 10.
FORD
LIBRARY & SECRETARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOU CODE AUTHORIZ OF THE EXECUTIVE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 HONG K 11090 200604Z
IT IS BEING STIRRED IN THIS DIRECTION BY THE JAPAN AMCHAM
WHICH HAS ALREADY APPROVED A SIMILAR RESOLUTION, A COPY
OF WHICH HAS BEEN BOOTLEGGED TO US. AMCHAM'S BOARD OF
GOVERNORS INTENDS TO RAISE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF OPENING
UP TRADE WITH THE DRV AT THE REGULAR MONTHLY MEETING
WITH THE CONSUL GENERAL ON FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 26. IN
TYPICAL RESONSIBLE FASHION AMCHAM HAS KEPT us FULLY
INFORMED OF ITS PLANS AND HAS ASKED US TO OFFER OUR VIEWS
ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE MEETING ON FRIDAY.
2. SINCE THE WHOLE QUESTION OF OPENING UP TRADE WITH THE
DRV IS ON ITS WAY TO BECOMING A HOT ISSUE IN THE VARIOUS
APCAC CHAMBERS, AND SINCE WE KNOW THAT OUR REGULAR MEETINGS
ARE REPORTED FULLY TO THE MEMBERS' HOME OFICES, WE WOULD
LIKE TO BE AS AUTHORITATIVE AND HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE.
HOPEFULLY BY THE RIGHT KIND OF APPROACH WE COULD ALSO
HEAD OFF SOME UNWELCOME INITIATIVES. THEREFORE, REQUEST
DEPARTMENT'S VIEW AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE PRIOR TO THE
SEPTEMBER 26 MEETING. TEXT OF THE HONG KONG AMCHAM DRAFT
RESOLUTION FOLLOWS.
3. BEGIN QUOTE: THE ASIA-PACIFIC COUNCIL OF AMERICAN
CHAMBER S FEELS THAT A STRONG, INDEPENDENT, AND PEACEFUL
ASTA WILL BE BEST ACHIEVED IF THERE IS A DIRECT AND OPEN
DIALOUGE , ACCOMPANIED BY NORMALISED RELATIONS, BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND ALL COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. FURTHERMORE,
APCAC FEELS THAT COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL INTERCHANGE
WOULD MATERIALLY CONTRIBUTE TO REGIONAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC STABILITY. TO THIS END, A BOLD INITIATIVE IS
REQUIRED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO ASSURE A SMOOTH AND
RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF OUR COUNTRY'S POLITCIAL AND COMMER-
CIAL RELATIONS WITH THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
AND THE KHYMER REPUBLIC. PARTICULARLY, THE U.S. a GOVERNMENT
EXCES
SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PREMIT U.S. TRADE WITH VIETNAM
AND THE KHYMER REPUBLIC UNDER TERMS AT LEAST AS FAVORABLE
AS THOSE GRANTED WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
END QUOTE.
4. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF JAPAN AMCHAM'S DRAFT RESOLUTION:
BEGIN QUOTE: TO BOLSTER BOTH THE UNITED STATES IMAGE
AND U.S. BUSINESS RELATIONS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA, AND TO
GERACO R. FORD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOU THEDAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 HONG K 11090 200604Z
CARRY FORWARD THE LONG ESTABLISHED AMERICAN OBJECTIVE
OF HELPING CREATE AN ECONOMICALLY VIABLE, INDEPENDENT
VIETNAM, APCAC URGES A U.S. GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED, PRIVATE
SECTOR ECONOMIC MISSION BE DISPATCHED PROMPTLY TO SAIGON
EXCES
AND HONOI, LED BY A SENIOR AMERICAN BUSINESS FIGURE.
PRECENDENT EXISTS IN THE U.S TRADE MISSION TO THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, NOVEMBER 1973, IN SUPPORT OF AN ONGOING
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP, LEADING TO EVENTUAL ADJUSTMENT IN
DIPLOMATIC TIES. EXPERIENCE SHOWS CLARLY THAT AMERICAN
LONG TERM, STABILIZING INTERNATIONAL OBJECTIVES
ARE NOT ACHIEVED THROUGH BOYCOTT AND THE ENDING OF ALL
DIALOGUE. THEREFORE WE URGE A UNITED STATES INTITIATIVE
TO
RE-UPEN THE ECONOMIC REALTIONSHIP WITH VIETNAM. END QUOTE
5. IN ANOTHER CLOSELY RELATED MATTER, THECONGEN WAS
APPROACHED BY LOUIS SAUBOLLE, VICE PRESIDENT AND FAR
EAST REPRESENTIATIVE OF THE BANK OF AMERICA, AWITH AN
INQUIRY CONCERNING THE FEASIBILITY OF SELLING AMERICAN
COTTON DIRECTLY TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. DEPARTMENT
WILL RECALL THAT SAUBOLLE WAS THE FIRST AMERICAN BUSINESS-
MAN TO BE INVITED TO HANOI FOLLOWING THE DRV TAKEOVER OF
THE SOUTH CHONG ONG 8244). ACCORDING TO SAUBOLLE, NORTH
VIFTNAMESE OFFICIALS CANDIDLY ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE
CURRENTLY IMPORTING U.S. COTTON THROUGH UNNAMED JAPANESE
TRADING FIRM, BUT WOULD PREFER TO PURCHASE DIRECTLY FROM
THE U.S SUPPLIERS. QUANTITIES OF U.S. COTTON ALREADY
PURCHASED OR PLANNED TO BE PURCHASED WERE NOT REPORTED
BY SAUBOLLE, BUT ARE BELIEVED TO BE MODEST AMOUNTS.
6. OBVIOUSLY SAUBOLLE IS INTERESTED IN SHOWING HANOI
THAT HIS VISIT HAS PAID OFF IF USG WERE TO RELAX CONTROLS
EXEMS
EVEN IN THIS MODEST WAY. IT WOULD ALSO BE INTERPRETED
BY THE DRV AND EVERYONE ELSE AS A POLITCIAL SIGNAL AS
WELL.
7. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE DEPARTMENT'S REPLY TO SAUBOLLEIS
INQUIRY FOR PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM, THIS
FORD
MATTER WILL NOT COME UP AT OUR FRIDAY MEETING.
&
CROSS
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHO THECAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM