Memorandum Regarding the Situation in Asia

SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY In Indochina, I am in no hurry to proceed back though I think we should keep a mission in Laos as long as decently possible as a morale booster for the Thai. In Korea, I think we are on the right course of making our concern shrilly known. But I see little beyond stalemate, unless and until Moscow and Peking change their attitudes. Bringing about such a change should be a major objective. In Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, the best we can do is to expand military aid. It is what they need and what they will appreciate. As for the rest, our course is generally set and will probably work if we can keep control. One specific recommendation is that we seriously consider having the President visit Manila, Jakarta, and Singapore on his way from Peking. I have discussed this with Brent and with Phil. I was against it until a month or two ago but have begun to change my mind for three reasons: -- First and most important, the President does very well on these trips. They will help us in Asia, and will cheer over friends. Second, the Chinese cannot really object because they want to keep us in Asia. Third, it will reduce the pressures on him for immediate results, whatever they may be, in Peking. I recognize the disadvantages, including the risk of over-commitment and the danger that a jealous opposition here will reduce aid money to undercut the President's impact. But I think we should study such a trip seriously. RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize the NSC Staff to prepare a study on having the President FORD visit Manila, Jakarta and Singapore on his way back from Peking. a APPROVE DISAPPROVE SEC-RET/SENSITIVE./EYES ONLY - XGDS