Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Source Description
This file contains material relating to Radio Liberty.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1525316
label
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (4)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1525316
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (4)
description
This file contains material relating to Radio Liberty.
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada (Ford Administration)
Europe and Canada Country Files
subjects
Portugal
Germany (West)
Great Britain
Soviet Union
Jews
Fishing rights
Helsinki Agreement, 1975
Human rights
Radio
Middle East conflicts
Nuclear energy
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1525316
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1975-02-28
month
2
year
1975
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1975-02-01
month
2
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
d1f302a15650c141
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 20, folder "USSR - State Department
Telegrams: To SECSTATE - EXDIS (4)" of the NSA. Presidential Country Files for
Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 20 of the NSA. Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
or STATE
ORINA AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
Wt
SECRET 5695
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01590 041631Z
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
51
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
state
visit
8/3/00
ACTION SS-25
BY be
, NARA, DATE 7/31/01
INFO OCT-01 ISN-00 SS0-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
021922
D R 041527Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6892
AMEMBASSY LIBON IMMEDIATE
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
INFO USMISSION us NATO
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
SERECT MOSCOW 1590
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
Declassify
After
EXDIS
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
PS by 8V
Date 3/3/00
E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PFOR, EFIS, UR, PO
SURJ: REPORT UN SOVIET FISHING FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL
REF: LISBON 610
1. WE SPOKE IN SECURE CIROUMSTANCES FEBRUARY 4 WITH
PROTUGUESE EMBASSY COUNSELOR DE ANDRADE (PRUTECT) REGARDING
REPORT OF SOVIET FISHING FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL. ANDRADE
SEEMED SURPRISED AND PERPLEXED ABOUT REPORT AND CLAIMED
TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ITS SOURCE. HE HAD JUST RECEIVED
COPY OF DENIAL BY PORTUGUESE MFA THAT SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT
FACILITIES FOR THEIR FISHING BOATS. SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF,
HE SAID HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT REQUESTED
FACILITIES. HE SAID THAT THERE ARE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR SHARING OF FISHING TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND
THE SOVIET UNION BUT THAT THESE DID NOT PROVIDE EVEN
FOR SHIP VISITS, MUCH LESS PORT FACILITIES. ANDRADE
NOTED IN PASSING THAT SOVIET FISHING BOATS HAVE BEEN
RECEIVING REPAIR FACILITIES AT SPANISH PORTS IN THE
FORD
CANARIES FOR SOME TIME NOW. BUT HE SAID HE HAD NOTHING
&
TO INDICATE THAT ANYTHING LIKE THIS WAS CONTEMPLATED
BY PORTUGAL.
GERALD
LIBRARY
2. ANDRADE SAID TAT A MEMBER OF HIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN
IN LISBON AND IS RETURNING FEBRUARY 5. WE DID NOT ASK
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM DS-1652
29
TRANTMENT
%
STATE
Department of State
of I UNITED AMERICA HAVE
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01590 041631Z
WHO, BUT WF ASSUME IT IS MANUEL MARCELO MONTEIRO CURTO,
A THIRD SECRETARY WHO IS THE ONLY OTHER OFFICER ON THE
PORTUGUESE DIPLOMATIC LIST BESIDES THE AMBASSADOR AND
ANDRAUE. ANDRADE HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN BACK TO PORTUGAL
RECENTLY.
3. PRAVDA, MOVING UNUSUALLY FAST, HAS ALREADY REACTED
TO THE WESTERN PRESS STORIES. A COMMENTARY FEBRUARY 4,
LARGELY DEVOTED TO ASCRIBING SINISTER MOTIVES TO THE
NATO MANEUVERS NEAR PORTUGAL, STATES: "IT IS NOT BY
CHANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE START OF MANEUVERS IN THE
ATLANTIC IS ACCOMPANIED BY EFFORTS OF WESTERN PROPAGANDA
TO SPREAD LYING REPORTS ABOUT THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET
UNION TO GET WHAT AMOUNTS TO (CHUT LI NE) 'MILITARY
BASES ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA. "
MATLOCK
FORD
&
GERALD
ANNUOIA
NOT TO BE REPRODUCEI /ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
FORM
DS-1652
29
A
of
STATE
EXE-S
Department of State
OF / AMERICA OZLINA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 8323
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01602 0511542
17
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
AECE-00 /026 W
034704
P R 0510227 FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6911
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS
CLIFT
HORMATS
e N F E I MOSCOW 1602
ELLIOTT
FROEBE
HORAN
EXDIS
KENNEDY
LODAL
PARIS EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR STOESSEL
LOW
OBER
E.O. 11652 GDS
RATLIFF
OAKLEY
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, UR, US
SWYSER
SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS
SOUTHEN
STEARMAN
REF: MOSCOW 1566
PARRAR
1. TIMERBAYEV CALLED FEBRUARY 5 WITH COUNTER-DRAFT
OF JOINT RELEASE. SOVIET EXT IS AS FOLLOWS:
"ON FEBRUARY 10, 1975, THE USSR AND THE U.S.
DELEGATIONS RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW
ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THESE
NEGOTIATIONS RESULT FROM THE TREATY BETWEEN
THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE LIMITATION OF
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS OF JULY 3, 1974,
AND FROM THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
FORD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS IS KNOWN, IN THE COURSE
&
OF THE SOVIET-U.S. MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK,
IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE AN ACTIVE SEARCH
GERALD
LIBRARY
FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE
QUESTIONS RELATED TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE HEAD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
GG 7/31/01
FORM DS-1652
of
STATE
EXE-M
Department of State
ORLINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01602 0511542
OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS I.G. MOROKHOV,
FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, STATE COMMITTEE FOR
THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY, THE HEAD
OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IS WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR.,
AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION."
2. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, TIMERBAYEV SAID THAT THE
SOVIETS REMAIN WILLING TO DROP REFERENCES TO BOTH THE
TTBT AND THE NPT, AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED.
3. AS TO RELEASE PROCEDURES, TIMERBAYEV SAID THE
SOVIETS WERE OPEN-MINDED REGARDING THE HOUR OF RELEASE.
HE ASSUMED THAT RELEASE WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS IN MOSCOW
AND WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY 10.
4. SECOND PNE MEETING HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED
FOR 10:30 A.M., FEBRUARY 12,
MATLOCK
EXEMS
BE
FOPO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION = THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
THANTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
CELINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
CONFIDENTIAL 9916
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01641 0517102
64
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
039170
P 061614Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6928
C N I E N T MOSCOW 1641
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJ: BREZHNEV'S HEALTH
EX@-&
FOLLOWING SUBMITTED FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH. DURING
EMBOFF'S CALL ON ROMANIAN EMBOFF FEBRUARY 3, ROMANIAN
SAID THAT BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE MORE SERIOUS THAN
FLU. HE THOUGHT IT WAS EITHER A COLD WITH SERIOUS
COMPLICATIONS, A HEART PROBLEM OF SOME KIND, OR A
RECURRENCE OF THE PARALYSIS WHICH IMMOBILIZED ONE SIDE OF
AREZHNEV'S FACE SEVEN OR EIGHT YEARS AGO. ROMANIAN DID
NOT CLAIM TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF BREZHNEVIS
CURRENT CONDITION.
MATLOCK
FORD
GERALD THOUGH ?
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
GG 7/31/01
NB Feb. 6
7PM
Coass free ea Sirmi S.
3:35
EXCES
P.V.
SERALD a FORD :
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION : THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
state
EXPIS
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SUNFIDENTIAL 9499
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01825 1018342
45
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 1026 W
096393
P 101538Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7045
G N F D N I MOSCOW 1825
EXDIS
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, UR, US
SUBJECT: MFA COMPLAINT ABOUT RADIO LIBERTY
1, MFA USA DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR KOMPLEKTOV, FOLLOWING
PROTEST ON "DIALOGUE" TO DCM FEBRUARY 10 (SEPTEL), COMPLAINED
ORALLY THAT RADIO LIBERTY TRANSMITS ANTI-SOVIET MATERIAL, TO
WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED US ATTENTION.
KOMPLEKTOV SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WHICH RUNS RADIO LIBERTY IS
FUNDED FROM THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND IS, THEREFORE, A FEDERAL
AGENCY. HE TURNED TO CHETVERIKOV, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION'S
BILATERAL SECTION, WHO SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT RADIO LIBERTY WAS
MAKING SLANDEROUS STATEMENTS ON THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN THE
SOVIET UNION, STATEMENTS WHICH SOUGHT TO COMPLICATE RELATIONS
BETWEEN VARIOUS REPUBLICS AND BETWEEN DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES.
CHETVERIKOV CONTINUED THAT RADIO LIBERTY HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF
LENIN ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND OF CURRENT SOVIET LEADERS AS
WELL, PICKING UP THE THEME, KOMPLEKTOV CITED THE UKRAINE AND
CENTRAL ASIA AS FOCI FOR SUCH "SLANDERS." HE SAID THAT THEY
HAD EVOKED INDIGNATION AMONG THE SOVIET PEOPLE, WHO ASKED HOW
FORD
SUCH THINGS COULD BE BROADCAST WHEN THE U.S. LEADERS SPEAK OF
THEIR DESIRE FOR BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE NOTED THAT,
WHILE THIS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROTEST, THE BEHAVIOR OF RADIO
LIBERTY DID NOT CORRESPOND TO IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS AND
GERALD ?
LIBRARY
MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO CURB THE ABUSE CITED.
2. DCM REMARKED IN RESPONSE THAT THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL
BROADCASTING IS AN INDEPENDENT BODY, CREATED AND FINANCED BY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
3) GG 7/31/01
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01825 101834Z
CONGRESS, AND THAT THE OPERATION OF THE RADIO STATION IS SOLELY
UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT COMMISSION AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE
DEPARTMENT'S POLICY GUIDANCE. DCM ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT
EXCLUS
KOMPLEKTOV'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE TRANSMISSIONS,
NOTING THAT IT IS OF COURSE IMPOSSIBLEFOR US HERE TO BE AWARE OF
THE CONTENT OF RADIO LIBERTY BROADCASTS BECAUSE OF JAMING, HE
PROMISED, HOWEVER, TO CONVEY KOMPLEKTOVIS VIEWS TO WASHINGTON.
3, KOMPLEKTOV CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S RAISING THE COMPLAINT
ABOUT RADIO LIBERTY ON THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.
4. COMMENT: SINCE KOMPLEKTOV'S COMMENT WAS CLEARLY TAGGED
UNOFFICIAL, THERE WOULD SEEM LITTLE POINT IN REPLYING.
5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USIA AND MUNICH.
STOESSEL
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USIA, MUNICH.
FORD LIBRARY &
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
9.66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
of I UNITED MAKES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 5086
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01961 1217372
46
ACTION SS-25
EXCES
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
128561
n 1217157 FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7146
C
N
N
₹
1
MOSCOW 1961
EXDIS
E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, UK
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE BREZHNEV-WILSON MEETING
EXPIR
1. FINNISH EMOFF TOOK EMBASSY OFFICER ASIDE AT RECEPTION FEBRUARY
12 AND SAID THAT SERGEY LAPIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR STATE
COMMITTEE FOR TV AND RADIO BROADCASTING, AND A CPSU CENTRAL
COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD THE VISITING FINNISH TELEVISION CHIEF ON
FEBRUARY 11 THAT BREZHNEV WOULD DEFINITELY MEET WITH PRIME
MINISTER WILSON AND THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE SHOWN ON SOVIET
TELEVISION.
2. AS OF THIS WRITING, HOWEVER, THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN
ASSURED BY THE SOVIETS OF A BREZHNEV-WILSON MEETING. ALL THE
SOVIETS HAVE TOLD THE BRITISH IS THAT, IF BREZHNEV IS IN MOSCOW,
HE WILL MEET WILSON.
STOESSEL
GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF IDEN
FORM
DS-1652
GG 7/31/01
OF STATE
WIT
Department of State
OF I AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 5436
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01958 01 OF 03 121930Z
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS0-00 1026 W
130292
R 121544Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7141
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MINICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
G 0 N T D E N SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 1958
EXDIS
FORD
&
E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR
SURJ: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON BREZHNEVIS FUTURE
GERALO
LIBRARY
DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GONF IDENTIAL
a
Gla 7/31/01
of
STATE
Department of State
ORLINA
(
TELEGRAM
I
OF
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 0 01958 01 OF 03 121930Z
GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE
REF: MOSCOW 1127
1. SUMMARY: WHETHER OR NOT BREZHNEV RE-EMERGES DURING PRIME
MINISTER WILSON'S VISIT, HE CANNOT PUT OFF FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS
ABOUT HIS FUTURE MUCH LONGER AND THE QUESTION OF HIS EVENTUAL
SUCCESSION MUST BE PARAMOUNT IN THE MINDS OF ALL HIS COLLEAGUES.
A SERIRES OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS - VE DAY, THE WARSAW PACT'S
20TH ANNIVERSARY, A U.S. SOVIET SUMMIT, THE CSCE THIRD STAGE,
AND A EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE -- BEGINS IN MAYI ALL OF THESE
WOULD ORDINARILY REQUIRE BREZHNEV'S PRESENCE. MOREOVER,
PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS WILL MEAN THAT AT
LEAST PRELIMINARY INTERNAL POLITICAL JOCKEYING SHOULD BE
COMPLETED BY MID-YEAR. IN HIS EFFORT TO ASSURE HIS PLACE IN
HISTORY, BREZHNEV WOULD SEEM TO HAVE THREE BASIC OPTIONS, ALL
EX@-&
OF THEM. WITH SERIOUS DRAWBACKS FROM HIS OWN POINT OF VIEW:
(1) TO MAKE NO PLANS FOR HIS SUCCESSION AND HANG ON AS LONG AS
HE CANI (2) TO RETIRE IN FAVOR OF A COLLECTIVITY OF SENIORS,
WITH KIRILENKO AS HIS DIRECT SUCCESSOR AS PARTY FIRST SECRETARY;
AND (3) TO LIMIT HIS FUNCTIONS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE PARTY
CONGRESS AND PERHAPS ON GROOMING A YOUNGER SUCCESSOR.
2. BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS IS IN ANY CASE LIKELY TO INTENSIFY THE
POLITICAL SPARRING THAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCOMPANY A PRE-
PARTY CONGRESS YEAR. WE HAVE SEEN ALMOST NO OVERT SIGN THAT
THIS PROCESS, IF IT HAS BEGUN AT ALL, IS AS YET EXPRESSING
ITSELF IN POLICY TERMS. OUR TENTATIVE CONCLUSION AT THIS POINT
IS THAT, HOWEVER THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE DEVELOPS, IT IS NOT
LIKELY THIS YEAR TO AFFECT THE OVERALL SOVIET COMMITMENT TO
DETENTE. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE DANGERS FOR THE U.S. ARE
RATHER THAT SUCCESSION PROBLEMS COULD AFFECT THE DEGREE OF
DETERMINATION AND ENERGY WITH WHICH THE REGIME PURSUES DETENTE
AND THUS COULD MAKE IT PROGRESSIVELY LESS CAPABLE OF THE HARD
R.
FORD
DECISIONS THAT MAY BE NECESSARY TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF
IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.
GERALD
LIBRARY
3. DESPITE EARLIER ASSURANCES FROM SOVIET AND OTHER SOURCES
THAT BREZHNEV IS ON THE MEND, HE HAS NOT YET APPEARED PUBLICLY
AND WE CONTINUE TO HEAR VAROUS REPORTS AND RUMORS THAT HE IS
SUFFERING FROM A DISEASE WHICH IS SEVERE ENOUGH TO LIMIT HIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C" THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONF IDEN'
OF
STATE
UNITED
MARKS
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATE
or
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01958 01 OF 03 121930Z
CAPACITIES IN THE FUTURE. HIS APPEARANCE IN GOOD FORM FOR PRIME
MINISTER WILSON, WHO ARRIVES THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, WOULD REDUCE
BUT NOT END SPECULATION ABOUT HIS FUTURE. HIS NON-APPEARANCE
DURING WILSON'S STAY WOULD, OF COURSE, DRIVE THAT SPECULATION
TONEW HEIGHTS.
4. A SERIES OF EVENTS SCHEDULED FOR 1975 WILL CALL FOR TOP=
LEVEL SOVIET LEADERSHIP PARTICIPATON. ON THE EXTERNAL SIDE
ALONE, THE CALENDAR INCLUDES CELEBRATIONS OF THE 30TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF VE DAY, THE WARSAW PACT 20TH ANNIVERSARY, A SOVIET-
AMERICAN SUMMIT, A SUMMIT UPON CONCLUSION OF CSCE, AND A MEETING
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. IN ORDINARY TIMES ALL OF THESE
EVENTS WOULD CALL FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF BREZHNEV PERSONALLY.
5. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR BREZHNEV'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP, PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS MUST BEING
SOON. IF PAST PERFORMACE IS ANY GUIDE, THERE WILL BE A SERIES
OF DOMESTIC SPEECHES BEGINNING AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THIS YEAR
AND LEADING UP TO THE QUADRENNIAL ELECTIONS OF UNION-REPUBLIC
SUPREME SOVIETS. THEY CYCLE OF PARTY ELECTIONS WHICH CULMINATES
IN THE 25TH PARTYCONGRESS SHOULD BEGIN IN THE FALL. IF THE
CONGRESS IS NOT TO BE POSTPONED BEYOND ITS STATUTORY DEADLINE
OF APRIL 1976, THE PRELIMINARY POLITICAL JOCKEYING SHOULD BE
LINED UP IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO THE POLITBURO MAJORITY BY
MID-YEAR. TO KEEP TO THIS TIMETABLE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST
THEREFORE APPROACH FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ON BREZHNEV'S FUTURE
IMMEDIATELY AND ADLPT DECISIONS VERY SOON IF ANY IMPORTANT
CHANGES ARE TO BE MADE. THE HIERARCHICAL ELECTIONS FROM BOTTOM
TO TOP OF THE CPSU, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE INITIATED UNTIL THE
PROBABLE OUTCOME OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION IS CLEAR AND ACCEPTABLE.
ELECTONS BEFORE A PARTY CONGRESS TAKE A MINIMUM OF SIX MONTHS,
FORD
EXEMS
AND THE PROCESS SHOULD GET UNDERWAY IN SEPTEMBER 1975, SHORTLY
&
AFTER THE END OF THE JULY-AUGUST LEADERSHIP VACATIONS. THE
LEADERSHIP will ENGAGE IN A SERIES OF STUMPING SPEECHES FOR
GERALD
LIDRARY
RSFSR AND REPUBLIC SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS BY MID-YEAR, JUST
AS IT DID IN 1974 FOR THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET. FACED WITH A
MID-SUMMER LEGISLATIVE SESSION COMING PERHAPS IN JULY, THE LEADER-
SHIP WILL FIND ITSELF COPING WITH SEVERAL DEMANDS ON ITS TIME AND
ENERGY, NOT LEAST OF WHICH WILL BE THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
or and
of I INTERNAL CELINA AMERICA
Department of State TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 01958 01 OF 03 121930Z
NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.
EXCES
LIBRARY GERALD R. ROBO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED ITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION C THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
UPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
of I ORING AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 5608
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01958 02 OF 03 122025Z
54
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 TSO-00 SSD-00 1026 W
000076
R 1215447 FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7142
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
EX@-&
AMOUNSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMOUNSUL MINICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USI.O PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
USDEL MBFK VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
C
N
D
E
I
SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 1958
FORD LISTARY & GERALD
EXDIS
6. BREZHNEV HIMSELF MUST HAVE THESE TEMPURAL CONSIDERATIONS
VERY MUCH IN MIND. WE ASSUME THAT HIS GROWING PREOCCUPATION,
AS THE DAYS DWINDLE, IS TO GUARANTEE HIMSELF AN HONORED PLACE IN
SOVIET HISTORY -- TO ENSURE THAT, UNLIKE ALL HIS PREDECESSORS
EXCEPT LENIN, EVEN AFTER HIS RETIREMENT OR DEATH, HE WILL
REMAIN LEONID ILYICH AND NOT BECOME LEONID WHO. IT SEEMS TO US
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
COMFIDENTIAL
FORM DS-1652
or STATE
Department of State
OF AMERICA CELINA NAME
TELEGRAM
FORD
&
BERALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01958 02 OF 03 122025Z
THAT HE HAS THREE, AND POSSIBLE ONLY THREE GENERAL OPTIONS.
A. FIRST, THE IMMORTALITY OPTION: BREZHNEV ACTS AS IF HE
WILL NEVER DIE, MAKES NO PLANS FOR HIS SUCCESSION, AND HANGS ON
TO AS MUCH POWER AS HE CAN. THIS IS THE OPTION MOST FAVORED
BY AGING DICTATORS THROUGHOUT HISTORY. IT IS THE MOST SEDUCTIVE
OPTION, BECAUSE IT INVOLVES NO DECISION TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO
AND NO MANEUVERING WITHIN THE PARTY; IN FACT, IT REQUIRES NO
CHOICE AT ALL. IT ALSO WOULD SIT BEST WITH BREZHNEV'S COLLEAGUES
AND WOULD BE MOST COMPATIBLE WITH HIS DWN PENCHANT FOR CAUTION
AND CONSENSUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, BREZHNEV WOULD PROBABLY NOT
BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THIS OPTION FOR LONG UNLESS HE REMAINED NEAR
THE PEAK OF HIS HEALTH AND ENERGY. IF HIS ENERGIES BEGAN TO FAIL
APPRECIABLY, HE WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO HAVING PERSONNELANO POLICY
DECISIONS TAKEN OUT OF HIS HANDS. MOREOVER, AS LONG AS HE
RETAINED HIS FORMAL POSITION, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO
GET THE POLITBURO TO ACCEPT ANY WIELDING OF HIS POWERS BY A
FAVORED SUBORDINATE (E.G., KIRILENKO), THUS, THE IMMORTALITY
OPTION, PERHAPS THE EASIEST AND MOST NATURAL ONE FOR BREZHNEV TO
CHOOSE, WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE THE ONE LEAST LIKELY TO ASSURE
HIM A PLACE IN THE HISTORY BOOKS.
B. SECOND, THE GOLD WATCH OPTION: BREZHNEV GOES INTO
HONORABLE RETIREMENT IN FAVOR OF KIRILENKU OR A COLLECTIVITY OF
SENIORS. THIS WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY OPTION IF BREZHNEV FELT
HE WERE SERIOUSLY ILL AND WANTED HIS DEPARTURE TO BE ACCOMPANIED
BY A MINIMUM OF INTERNAL TURMOIL. ASSUMING BREZHNEV'S POOR
HEALTH PREVENTED HIM FROM GROOMING A SUCCESSOR OF A YOUNGER
GENERATION (SEE OPTION THREE), HE MIGHT FEEL THAT HIS BEST CHANCE
FOR A PASSPORT TO THE PANTHEON LAY IN PASSING THE MANTLE
VOLUNTARILY TO KIRILENKO OR, A LESS APPEALING ALTERNATIVE,
TO SOME COMBINATION OF THE FOUR SENIOR LEADERS (KIRILENKO,
PODGORNY, KOSYGIN, AND SUSLOV). THE EAST EUROPEAN PARALLES
(EnG., ULBRICHT) ARE NOT TOO AUSPICIOUS, BUT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF
GRAVE ILLNESS BREZHNEV MIGHT SEE THIS AS HIS ONLY CHOICE. IT
WOULD AT LEAST HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF GIVING A FAVORITE LIKE
KIRILENKO A CLEARER MANDATE TO WHEEL AND DEAL THAN HE WOULD HAVE
IF BREZHNEV HELD ONTO THE TRAPPINGS OF OFFICE AND POWER.
C. THIRD, THE OLYPIAN OPTION: BREZHNEV RESTIRCTS HIS
FUNCTIONS AND CONCENTRATES ON BIG DECISIONS AND ON PREPARING THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUJNEYE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
OF STATE
Department of State
OF i CELINA AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
EXEMS EXPIN
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01958 02 OF 03 1220252
WAY FOR A YOUNGER SUCCESSOR WHO WOULD CARRY ON THIS NAME AND
HIS PULICIES AFTER THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. THIS OPTION WOULD
GIVE BREZHNEV THE BEST CHANCE OF REAL IMMORTALITY, BUT HE
WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO EMPLOY HIS FULL POLITICAL SKILLS IN
ORDER TO BRING IT OFF. A POSSIBLE SCENARIO WOULD BE FOR
BREZHNEV -- PERMAPS AFTER A TRIUMPHAL U.S. SUMMIT -- TO GIVE UP
HIS QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND HIS GLOBE- TROTTING AND
DEVOTE HIMSELF TO MAKING ONLY THE BIGGEST INTERNAL DECISIONS,
TO PARTY WORK, TO ORGANIZING THE 25TH CONGRESS, AND TO MAN-
EUVERING A YOUNGER ASSOCIATE (E.G., KULAKOV OR SCHERBITSKIY)
INTO POSITION BE BE ELECTED THE NEXT GENERAL SECRETARY. THE
OLYMPIAN OPTION HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING BREZHNEV TO CHANNEL
HIS REMAINING POWERS INTO THE SUCCESSION QUESTION. IT HAS THE
DISADVANTAGE OF MAKING BREZHNEV LOOK LIKE A LAME DUCK, AND LAME
DUCKS ARE NOTORIOUSLY LACKING IN THE POWER THEY WOULD HAVE IF
THEIR POLITICAL DEMISE WERE NOT INCIPIENT. THE OLYMPIAN OPTION
ALSO RISKS INCURRING THE OPPOSITION OF SOME OF THE SENIOR
LEADERS, WHO WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THREATENED BY THE RAPID RISE OF
A YOUNGER MAN. TO WORK THIS OPTION SUCCESSFULLY, BREZHNEV
PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO KEEP SIGNALLING SOMEHOW THAT HE MAY NOT
STEP DOWN AT THE NEXT CONGRESS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GROOMING
SUMEBODY ELSE TO TAKE OVER. IF HE WERE TITO, HIS CHANCES TO
CARRY IT OFF WOULD PROBABLY BE FAVORABLE BUT HIS PERSONAL
PRESTIAGE AND POWER ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE YUGOSLAV
LEADER'S. THUS, HERE TOO THE ODDS ARE NOT VERY GOOD FOR BREZHNEV.
FORD
a
BERALD
1800mn
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHQ CONF OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FORM
DS-1652
OF STATE
Department of State
OF STATES ANITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 5509
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01958 03 OF 03 122011Z
42
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 SS0-00 1026 W
130718
R 121544Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7143
AMFMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMOUNSUL HONG KONG
AMOUNSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MINICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMRASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
e
n
N
0
E
N
T
H
SECTION 3 OF 3 MOSCOW 1958
FORD LIBRARY & OERALO
EXDIS
7. BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS -- DEPENDING ON HOW DEBILITATING IT
IS -- MAY SHARPLY REDUCE HIS ABILITY TO MANIPUTLATE ANY OF THESE
OPTIONS. ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT BLOOD IN THE WATER ATTRACTS
SHARKS, HIS POOR HEALTH IS AT THE LEAST LIKELY TO INTENSIFY
THE PROCESS OF LEADERSHIP SPARRING WHICH WOULD BE NATURAL ANYWAY
IN A PRE-CONGRESS YEAR. AS WE NOTED IN REFTEL, THE STRUGGLE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
IL
or
STATE
UNITED
(1)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
I
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01958 03 OF 03 122011Z
FOR POLITICAL POWER IS USUALLY CLOTHED IN ISSUES BUT WE HAVE
SEEN NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OVER PARTICULAR
EXCES
ISSUES. THE RODIONOV ARTICLE IN PRAVDA JANUARY 21, WHICH S0 FAR
IS SUI GENERIS, DID IMPLY SOME DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INABILITY
OF THE PRESENT POLITBURO TO REACH DECISIONS ON KEY ECONOMIC
ISSUES, BUT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY CRITICAL OF BREZHNEV PERSONALLY.
RODIONOV -- A MAN WHO LOST HIS POST OF SECOND SECRETARY OF
GEORGIA UNDER THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP -- HOWEVER, DID WARN
AGAINST THE TENDENCY OF PARTY LEADERS TO ASSUME ECONOMIC MANAGE-
MENT FUNCTIONS, A POLICY ASSOCIATED WITH BREZHNEV. HE ALSO
MENTIONED THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF YOUNGER
LEADERS TO SENIOR POSTS. AS USUAL. HIS WORDS ON THIS SENSITIVE
SUBJECT WERE CAREFULLY MODULATED WITH RECOGNITION OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIENCED CADRES! BUT SIMPLY TO MENTION THE ISSUE
IS TO REMIND MIDDLE-ECHELON LEADERS OF THE OBSTACLES TO PROMOTION
THE SENIOR INCUMBENTS. MOREOVER, HIS EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLE
OF COLLECTIVITY, THOUGH A FAMILIAR THEME FOR HIM, MAY ALSO CARRY
THE IMPLICATION THAT COLLECTIVITY IS INSUFFICIENTLY REGARDED BY
BREZHNEVI THIS, OF COURSE, WAS THE CHARGE AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV
AND PROBABLY THE STRONGEST REASON FOR HIS OVERTHORW. NEVERTHE-
ESS, RODIONOV'S MESSAGE IS NOT NEW AND HIS MESSAGE IS BASICALLY
THE NEGATIVE ONE OF CHAFING OVER LEADERSHIP INDECISION.
R. WE CONTINE TO FEEL THAT WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT PRIORITIES
FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS WOULD FORM THE TERRAIN ON WHICH A
POSSIBLE STRUGGLE FOR POLTICAL POWER WOULD BE WAGED, IT ALSO
SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE ECONOMIC ISSUES WOULD BE PRIMARILY
INTERNAL ONES (E.G., LIGHT-VS. - HEAVY INDUSTRY, DEFENSE SPEND-
ING, REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE) RATHER THAN ONES DIRECTLY
INVOLVING SOVIET ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST. DISAPPOINTMENT
WITH BREZHNEVIS ECONOMIC DETENTE POLICIES COULD PLAY A SECONDARY
ROLE IN A POWER STRUGGLE, BUT WE DOUBT THAT EVEN THE SETBACK ON
TRADE WITH THE U.S. IS SEEN HERE AS S0 SERIOUS OR so IRREVERS-
TBLE AS TO MAKE ECONOMIC DETENTE A MAJOR BONE OF CONTENTION.
THUS, OUR WORKING HYPOTHESIS AT THIS POINT REMAINS THAT SOVIET
R
INTEREST IN CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IS
FORD
LIKELY TO CONTINUE DURING PRE-PART CONGRESS JOCKING.
GERALD
9. AS REGARDS POLTICAL DETENTE, AN ACTIVE BREZHNEV, COUNTING
LIGHARY
HIS DAYS, WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO KEEP THINGS ON COURSE. THE
PROSPECTS FOR SALT II AND CSCE ARE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO MAKE THIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
D'PANTMENT
OF
STATE
UNITED
(I
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATE
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01958 03 OF 03 122011Z
LOOK POSSIBLE. SALT PROBABLY HAS A SPECIAL IMPORTANCE FOR
BREZHNEV. HOWEVER, WHATEVER LEVERAGE THE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO
DERIVE FROM HIS DESIRE FOR AN AGREEMENT MAY BE OFFSET BY HIS
WANING ABILITY TO KNOCK HEADS TOGETHER IN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY.
A BREZHNEV WHO, FOR HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, IS REGARDED BY HIS
COLLEAGUES AS A LAME DUCK WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD TO MAKE
INTERNAL ENEMIES WITH A SOFT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS. EVEN
IF A MORE PURELY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IS THE NEAR-TERM
CONSEQUENCE OF A SERIOUS BREZHNEV ILLNESS, WE WOULD EXPECT A
STRONG EFFORT TO BRING SALT AND CSCE TO SUCCESSUL CONCLUSIONS
DURING THE YEAR. THE REGIME IS TOO FAR DOWN THE ROAD ON BOTH
ISSUES FOR STARTLING POLICY REVERSALS TO BE LIKELY. THE MIDDLE
EAST ISSUE HAS A MORE NEGATIVE CAST; THE OVER-RIDING OBJECTIVE
FFOR THE REGIME IN GENERAL NO LESS THAN FOR BREZHNEV PERSONALLY)
IS TO ENHANCE SOVIET POWER AND PRESTIGE IN THE AREA, WHICH MEANS
IN THE SHORT TERM TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT BY THE U.S. OR EGYPT.
10. LOOKING AT THE FACTORS CURRENTLY BEFORE US IN THEIR
TOTALITY -- BREZHNEV'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH, THE HEAVY FOREIGN
POLICY CALENDAR TO WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY COMMITTED, THE
SUCCESSION OPTIONS OPEN TO BREZHNEV, THE NEED TO GET PREPARATIONS
FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS SETTLED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS
--WE WOULD ADVANCE TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS OF RELEVANCE TO
U.S.- SOVIET RELATIONS. FIRST, DURING 1975 THE SOVIETS ARE
NOT LIKELY TO UNDO THEIR COMMITMENT TO EITHER THE ECONOMIC OR
THE POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF DETENTE. BUT SECOND --
WHETHER BECAUSE OF A LEADER NO LONGER ABLE TO LEAD, A GREATHER
COLLECTIVITY IN THE LEADERSHIP, OR A FLOW OF POWER TOWARD ANOTHER
LEADER -- THEIR COMMITMENT MAY GROW PROGRESSIVELY MORE FLACCID.
THE DANGERS IN OUR VIEW ARE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY BECOME
LESS DETERMINED AND LESS ENERGETIC IN ITS PURSUIT OF IMPROVED
S. SOVIET RELATIONS AND THUS PROGRESSIVELY LESS CAPABLE OF
MAKING SOME OF THE HARD DECISIONS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED TO KEEP
THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MOVING FORWARD.
STOESSEL
FORD
?
BERALD
SHAR
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SUNFIDENTIAL
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 013587
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Telegram
CREATOR'S NAME
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
RECEIVER'S NAME
SECSTATE WASHDC
DESCRIPTION
Re Gromyko's remarks about Middle East
CREATION DATE
02/13/1975
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
032500349
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EUROPE AND CANADA
BOX NUMBER
20
FOLDER TITLE
USSR - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - EXDIS (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN
08/08/2001
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
GG
DEPARTMENT
OP
STATE
WH
8
Department of State
of STATES AMERICA
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 1222
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02100 1416282
45
ACTION 38-25
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 380-00 NSCE-00 1026 W
036478
D R 1415197 FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7235
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGARDE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
N I E N I MOSCOW 2100
EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, UR
SUBJI BREZHNEV REAPPEARS FOR WILSON VISIT
1. BREZHNEVIS REAPPERANCE AFTER 50 DAYS ABSENCE WAS
TREATED BY SOVIET PRESS AND TV AS COMPLETELY NORMAL
EVENT. EVENING NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA FOCUSED ON
BREZHNEV AT SHORT RANGE IN COVERAGE OF OPENING OF
BRITISH-SOVIET TALKS IN KREMLIN. BREZHNEV SEEMED IN
GOOD FORM AND SPRITS ON TV, BUT FREQUENTLY OPENED
AND CLOSED HIS MOUTH AS IF UNCOMFORTABLE. HE SMOKED
OSTENTATIOUSLY. RED STAR RAN LARGEST (RETOUCHED)
PHOTOGRAPH OF LEADERS WHICH FEATURED BREZHNEV.
P
FORD
SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA RAN SOME PHOTOS IN SMALLER SIZE.
PRAVDA SHOWED SOVIET AND BRITISH LEADERS SEATED
GERALD
LIBRARY
AT LARGE CONFERENCE TABLE. OTHER PAPERS RAN SMALLER
PHOTO OF SEATED LEADERS. BRITISH JURNALIST WHO SAW
BREZHNEV TOGETHER WITH WILSON THIS MORNING CHARACTERIZED
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
GG 7/31/01
BABM
or and
AMERICA assima NAME
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02100 1416282
SOVIET LEADER AS LOOKING "VERY FIT AND THE PICTURE OF
GOOD HEALTH, VERY MUCH IN COMMAND OF THE SITUATION,
AND SEEMINGLY FAR MORE VIGOROUS AND ENERGETIC THAN
EITHER KOSYGIN OR GROMYKO." "
2. COMMENT: SOVIET HANDLING OF BREZHNEVIS REAPPEARANCE
WAS PREDICTABLE IN VIEW OF SOVIET PUBLICH POSITION THAT
NOTHING SERIOUS WAS BOTHERING BREZHNEV AND SOVIET
REFUSAL ON PRINCIPLE TO DIGNIFY STORIES OF LEADERSHIP
PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC RESPONSES. HOWEVER, NATURE OF
BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS OR ILLNESSES STILL NOT KNOWN, IN
THIS CONNECTION, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR FORD SAID LAST NIGHT
THAT HE WAS TOLD TWO WEEKS AGO BY A "TRUSTED SOURCE" THAT
BREZHNEV WOULD REAPPEAR ON TV FEBRUARY 13 FOR WILSON,
BUT THAT HE WOULD NEVER FULLY RECOVER FROM HIS ILLNESS
NOR RESUME A FULL WORK SCHEDULE.
STOESSEL
GERALD R. FORD LIRRIBA
11
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
MARIE
or STATE
Department of State
of I AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET 5253
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02152 170804Z
DECLASSIFIED
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, state visit 8/4/00
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
16
66
ACTION SS-25
, NARA, DATE 7/31/01
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
AECE-00 /026 W
070747
0 170746Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7278
SECRET MOSCOW 2152
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
Retain Class'n
Change to
EXDIS
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
Declassify
After
TAGS: PARM, us, UR
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS
PS by PV
Date 8/4/00
TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER ELEVEN
1. REFERENCE MOSCOW 2101. IN HIS COMMENTS ABOUT OBSERVERS
BEING IN A POSITION TO ACQUIRE PROPRIETARY INDUSTRIAL INFOR-
MATION, MOROKHOV MENTIONED AS EXAMPLES: INFORMATION ON
DRILLING EQUIPMENT, WELL CASINGS AND FILL BACKS.
2. RECOMMEND AN ASSESSMENT BE MADE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS
MATTER AND ASSEMBLY OF A PRELIMINARY BRIEF ON EXISTING LAW
AND AGREEMENTS ON HANDLING OF MATTER OF ACCESS TO PROPRIETARY
INDUSTRIAL INFORMATION, IN ORDER TO BE READY TO DEAL WITH
THIS FEATURE OF EFFECTIVE OBSERVER PRESENCE IF NECESSARY.
EXEMS
3, MORKOKHOVIS EXAMPLES ARE GOOD ILLUSTRATIONS OF NON-
NUCLEAR ENGINEERING COMPONENTS OF PNE PROJECTS WHICH
ENTERPRISES DOMICILED IN NNWS WOULD WANT TO BID ON.
RECOMMEND THAT ANY WORK DONE ON ISSUE OF PARAGRAPH TWO
INCLUDE TREATMENT OF THIS ASPECT.
4, REFERENCE MOSCOW 2101. IN SUGGESTING CATEGORIZATION
GERALO R. FORD LIBHART
OF PNE APPLICATIONS ACCORDING TO THEIR DEVELOPMENT
STATUS, MOROKHOV STATED THAT IAEA HAD ADOPTED THIS
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
OF STATE
Department of State
of / UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02152 170804Z
CHARACTERIZATION. BY THIS, HE WAS REFERRING TO THE
IAEA PNE ACTIVITY AND FEASIBILITY REPORT BEING PREPARED
BY ULF ERICSSON WITH ASSISTANCE FROM MYASNIKOV, PETROV,
CURTIS AND NORDYKE DURING THE WEEK OF JANUARY 27 IN
VIENNA. IN THAT DRAFT REPORT, THREE CATEGORIES WERE
DESCRIBED: THOSE DEVELOPED TO A POINT SUITABLE FOR
INDUSTRIAL USE, THOSE IN THE STAGES OF FULL SCALE FIELD
TESTS, AND THOSE IN THE LABORATORY STUDY STAGE.
5. DURING FIRST WEEK, DELEGATION TRANSMITTED PNE
MESSAGES ONE THROUGH TEN.
6. DURING FIRST WEEK, DELEGATION RECEIVED STATE MESSAGE
29629, 31754 AND 34245. WE UNDERSTAND THE FINAL TTBT/
PNE NUMBERS FOR THESE ARE SIX, SEVEN AND EIGHT.
7. FOR RECORD PURPOSES, WE CONSIDER FIRST WEEK TO HAVE
BEGUN 0048 HOURS, FEBRUARY 10, AND TO HAVE ENDED 1645Z
HOURS, FEBRUARY 14.
EXCES EXCES
STDESSEL
FORD & LIBRARY OERALO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION or THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
THANTMENT OF STATE
WH
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA the
TELEGRAM
SECRET 9759
DECLASSIFIED
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02255 191522Z
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES state visit 8/11/00
43
GG
' MARA, DATE 7/31/01
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
ERDE-00 1026 W
095892
R 1914437 FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7351
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
SECRET MOSCOW 2255
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EXDIS
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
1/1
Declassify
After
.n. 11652 XGDS-3
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
TAGS! PARM. US, UR
IPS by 3V
Date 8/4/00
SUBJ: TTRT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS
TTBT/FNE MESSAGE NUMBER FOURTEEN
FULLOWING IS TEXT OF AMBASSADOR STOESSEL'S STATEMENT
DEI IVERED AT FEBRUARY 19 PLENARY:
BEGIN TEXT: MR. MINISTER: THE US DELEGATION HAS COMPLETED
TS PRESENTATION OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO CONTAINED
NFS. THIS AFTERNOON I SHALL TURN TO THE OTHER MAJOR CATE-
SORY, WHICH BOTH SIDES CALL EXCAVATION PNES. I BELIEVE THAT
OTH SIDES UNDERSTAND THIS TERM TO REFER TO UNDERGROUND
UCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WHICH CAUSE THE
YNAMIC RUPTURE OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE AND WHICH ARE
ESIGNED TO MOVE MATERIAL AT THE EARTH'S SURFACE. I BELIEVE
E AGREE THAT NEITHER THE US NOR THE USSR HAS YET SOLVED
LI OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH CARRYING OUT EXCAVATION
ROJECTS THROUGH THE USE OF PNES. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS
PPROPRIATE FOR OUT TWO SIDES TO CONSIDER WHAT PROVISIONS
FORD
&
N A PNE AGREEMENT SHOULD GOVERN PNES THAT MIGHT BE
SFD FOR EXCAVATION PURPOSES. SUCH PROVISIONS WOULD,
F COURSE, APPLY TO EXCAVATION PNES WHETHER CARRIED OUT
GERALD
LIBRARY
N A RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OR IN FUTURE
RACTICAL PROJECTS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or
STATE
Department of State
of I UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02255 191522Z
I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AT THE OUTSET THAT THE
PROVISIONS WE PROPOSE ARE INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT
EXCAVATION PNES DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS
OTHERWISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE THRESHOLD TEST
BAN TREATY.
I MUST ALSO EMPHASIZE, MR. MINISTER, ANOTHER
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY PNE
AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITED TEST BAN
TRATY OF 1963. THIS REQUIREMENT IS IN ADDITION TO
AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE RELATIONSHIP OF A PNE AGREE-
MENT TO THE TREATY OF JULY 19741 AND IN MY REMARKS TODAY
I ADDRESS ONLY THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE THRESHOLD TEST
BAN TREATY.
WE HAVE STRUCTURED OUR PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION
PNES IN TERMS OF CERTAIN LIMITATIONS, INFORMATION
EXCHANGE, AND OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH WE
BELIEVE WILL GIVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE POTENTIAL
FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT OR WEAPON EFFECTS TESTS WILL
BE CONSTRAINED TO A DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITATIONS
IN THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.
WE PROPOSE FOUR SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON EXCAVATION
PNES:
FIRST, THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF ANY EXCAVATION
SALVO OR GROUP EXPLOSION SHOULD NOT EXCEED 500 KILOTONS.
SECOND, THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREED LIMIT ONLYHE
MAXIMUM YIELD OF EACH INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVE,
WHETHER USED ALONE OR AS ONE EXPLOSIVE OF A SALVO OR
GROUP EXPLOSION.
THIRD, THAT PORTION OF THE TOTAL YIELD OF ANY
EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVE WHICH IS GENERATED BY NUCLEAR
FORD
FISSION SHOULD NOT EXCEED 0.2 KILOTON.
&
FOURTH, EACH EXPLOSIVE IN AN EXCAVATION PNE SHOULD
BE AT A DEPTH, MEASURED IN METERS, OF NOT LESS THAN
GERALD
LIBRARY
30 TIMES THE CUBE ROOT OF ITS YIELD IN KILOTONS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
EXPIS
GRANTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
of STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
AGE 03 MOSCOW 02255 1915222
THE PURPOSE OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND OBSERVER
UNCTIONS ARE TO AUGMENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF
HF OTHER PARTY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE LIMITATIONS
ND TO ASSURE THAT THE EXCAVATION PROJECT CAN BE RECOG-
IZED AS HAVING THE STATED PEACEFUL PURPOSE. AS YOU WILL
OTE, THE INFORMATION WHICH WE PROPOSE BE EXCHANGED FOR
XCAVATION PNES IS SIMILAR TO THAT WE PROPOSED FOR CON-
ATNED PNES.
IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE EXCHANGE INFORMATION IN
DVANCE ON THE PURPOSE, DATE, TIME, DEPTH, YIELD, AND
ENGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF ALL EXPLOSIONS. WE WILL
EFD TO ESTABLISH AN ADEQUATE PERIOD OF TIME FOR ADVANCE
UTIFICATION UF THESE FACTS, THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
UST ENCOMPASS A PROJECT PLAN AND SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES
ELATED TO THE EVENT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE
-- A FULL AND CLEAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNED EVENT
-- DETAILS ON THE EMPLACEMENT OF THE EXPLOSIVES
-- THE PLANNED TIMES OF THE EMPLACEMENTS
THE PLANNED TIMES OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP
EXPLOSIONS
THE WEPTHS OF BURIAL OF THE EXPLOSIVES
THE SELATIONSHIP TO NEARBY GEOLOGICAL
EATURES, AND OTHER RELEVANT FEATURES WHICH EITHER
INFLUENCE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EXPLOSION OR CONSTRAIN
HF YIELDS, DEPTHS OR OTHER CHARACTERISTICS.
IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION
N THE GEOLOGY AND THE GEOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE
EXEMS
EDIUM AT AND NEAR THE BURST POINTS. THIS MUST INCLUDE
DESCRIPTION OF THE GEOLUGICAL SECTION AND A STATEMENT
F THE BASIC PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE LITHOLOGICALLY
ISTINCT ROCK UNITS PRESENT, INCLUDING DENSITY, ROCK
TRENGTH, SETSMIC VELOCITY, POROSITY, DEGREE OF WATER
FORD
&
ATURATION AND THE DEPTH TO THE WATER TABLE.
AFTER THE EXPLOSION, THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE
GERALD
LIBRARY
NF EXCAVATION SHOULD PROVIDE DATA ON THE ACTUAL YIELDS
ND ON THE RESULTS OBTAINED WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CRATER
IMENSIONS AND RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS IN THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or
STATE
Department of State
DELINA
1)
TELEGRAM
or
SECRET
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 02255 1915222
VICINITY OF THE AREA OF THE EXCAVATION.
AS WEAS THE CASE WITH CONTAINED PNES, WE BELIVE
THAT THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS IS NECESSARY TO VERIFY
THE INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN EXCHANGED. HOWEVER, IN
THE CASE OF EXCAVATION PNES THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL
OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE
NECESSARY.
THE PURPOSES OF ON-SITE OBSERVATION FOR EXCAVATION
PNES ARE: (1) TO VERIFY THE DEPTH OF BURIAL OF EACH
EXPLOSIVE, THE RELATIVE EMPLACEMENT POSITION OF EACH
EXPLOSIVE IN THE GROUP, AND THE NEAR-SIMULTANEITY OR
RELATIVE TIMES OF THE EXPLOSIONS, (2) TO VERIFY THE
GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROCK
SURROUNDING THE POINT OF EXPLOSIVE EMPLACEMENTS,
(3) TO CONFIRM THAT THE FISSION YIELD OF EACH EXPLOSIVE
WAS CONSISTENT WITH THE SPECIFIED UPPER LIMIT, (4) TO
MAKE SPOT CHECKS OF THE RADIATION FIELD, (5) TO EMPLACE
AND OPERATE A NETWORK OF PORTABLE INSTRUEMENT PACKAGES,
WHICH WOULD INCLUDE SEISMOMETERS, BROUGHT BY THE OBSERVER
TEAMS, WITHIN A SISTANCE OF 10 KILOMETERS FROM THE
EXCAVATION, AND (6) TO VERIFY THAT CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE
SITE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE STATED PURPOSE OF THE
EVENT.
I HAVE BRIEFLY OUTLINED IN THIS STATEMENT BASIC
ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION AS THEY APPLY TO THE USE OF
PNES FOR EXCAVATION. I WOULD NOTE THAT ANY AGREEMENT
WE MIGHT REACH HERE WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
THRESHOLD VALUE STATED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974,
IF FUTURE REVISIONS OF THE THRESHOLD OR OTHER FORMS
OF LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WERE TO BE
NEGOTIATED, THEN THE PNE PROVISION MIGHT ALSO HAVE
TO BE REVISED.
FORD
IN OUR NEXT PLENARY STATEMENT I WILL ILLUSTRATE
&
THE ACTIVITIES OF OBSERVERS. END TEXT.
STOESSEL
GERALD
LIBHARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or STATE
Department of State
of I UNITED MARKS AMERICA
TELEGRAM
WN
SECRET 9301
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02274 191650Z
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, SEC. 3.5
41
DATE DEPT, GUIDELINES State visit 8/4/00
ACTION 83-25
EG
, MARA, DATE 7/31/01
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
ERDE-00 1026 W
097104
0 191602Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7365
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
SECRET MOSCOW 2274
Retain Class'n
Change to
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EXDIS
EO Declassify 12958, 25X( )( )( )
After
E. 0. 116521 XGDS-3
With concurrence
TAGS: PARM, us, UR
PS by PV
Date (not)(obtained) 24,00
SUBJI TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS PLENARY FIVE
TTRT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER FIFTEEN
BEGIN SUMMARY, FIFTH PLENARY HELD FEBRUARY 19. MOROKHOV IN
BRIEF EXTEMPERANEOUS STATEMENT REVIEWED LAST FEW MEETINGS.
HE SAID THEY AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD BASIC ELEMENTS OF US
POSITION ON CONTAINED PNES, BUT NOT ALL DETAILS. AMBASSADOR
STOESSEL PRESENTED us PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNES. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT PNE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH LTBT,
BUT NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENT DID NOT DEAL WITH THAT RELATION-
SHIP. US PROPOSAL INCLUDED LIMITS ON SALVO YIELD, INDIVIDUAL
EXPLOSIVE YIELD, FISSION YIELD AND DEPTH OF BURIAL.
GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL DATA TO BE EXCHANGED WERE LISTED
EXPIR
AS WELL AS RESULTS TO BE PROVIDED AFTER EVENT. PURPOSES OF
ON-SITE OBSERVATION WERE LISTED INCLUDING PLACEMENT OF
SETSMOMETERS AND CONFIRMATION OF FISSION YIELD LIMIT.
ILLUSTRATIVE OBSERVER ACTIVITIES WILL BE PRESENTED AT NEXT
PLENARY. NEXT PLENARY SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 21. FROSCHER
FORD
&
AND FRYKLUND RESPONED TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SOVIET
DELEGATION AT FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY. MEMBERS OF SOVIET
DELEGATION THEN ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO us
GERALD
LIBRARY
PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNES. END SUMMARY.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
09
PRPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
1
TELEGRAM
STATE
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02274 191650Z
2. MOROKHOV MADE BRIEF EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT REVIEWING
WORK OF PAST FEW MEETINGS DONE IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR
STOESSEL. HE SAID THEY AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD BASIC ELEMENTS
OF US POSITION ON CONTAINED PNES BUT NOT ALL DETAILS. HE
PROMISED MORE QUESTIONS. HE WAS SURE THAT ALL WOULD BE
CLARIFIED IN TIME.
3. THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME US PROPOSALS
FOR EXCAVATION PNES. STATEMENT EMPHASIZED PROPOSALS WERE
INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT EXCAVATION PNES DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-
RELATED BENEFITS PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY TTBT. HE FURTHER
EMPHASIZED THAT PNE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LTBT
BUT NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENT DID NOT DEAL WITH THAT
RELATIONSHIP. PROPOSALS WERE STRUCTURED IN TERMS OF LIMITATIONS,
INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AND OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.
LIMITATIONS PROPOSED WERE (1) 500 KT SALVO YIELD LIMIT, (2)
AGREED LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVE YIELD, (3) 0,2 KT FISSION
YIELD LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVES, (4) DEPTH OF
BURIAL (IN METERS) NO LESS THAN 30 TIMES CUBE ROOT OF YIELD
IN KILOTONS. DATA EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS ON GEOLOGICAL AND
GEOPHYSICAL INFORMATION WERE LISTED. RESULTS TO BE EXCHANGED
AFTER EVENT INCLUDED YIELD, CRATER DIMENSIONS AND RADIATION
FIELD MEASUREMENTS. PURPOSES OF ON-SITE OBSERVATIONS WERE
LISTED. THESE INCLUDED VERIFICATION OF DATA EXCHANGED,
PLACEMENT OF SEISMOMETERS AND CONFIRMATION OF FISSION YIELD
LIMIT.
4. FROSCHER RESPONDED TO MOROKHOVIS QUESTION, RAISED IN LAST
PLENARY AS TO WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO LIMIT AGGREGATE YIELD
OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS TO 100 KILOTONS LF. EACH
EXPLOSIVE LESS THAN 100 KILOTONS. REPLY STATED THAT ELESEISMIC
EXEMS
MEASUREMENTS COULD NOT DETERMINE INDIVIDUAL YIELDS OF SIMUL-
TANEOUS GROUP EXPLOSION. IF EACH EXPLOSION COULD BE DISTINGUISHED
TELESEISMICALLY, THEN YIELD LIMIT OF 100 KT WOULD APPLY TO
EACH EXPLOSIVE.
5. FRYKLUND RESPONDED TO MYASNIKOVIS QUESTIONS, POSED IN LAST
PLENARY, AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY CHIPS FROM THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE
FORD
AND WHAT GEOPHYSICAL DATA US WANTS TO OBTAIN. REPLY WAS THAT
&
CHIPS WERE ROCK FRAGMENTS PRODUCED BY ROTARY BIT, THE LARGER
THE CHIPS, THE EASIER THE DETERMINATION OF GEOPHYSICAL
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
H
THANTMENT
or
STATE
Department of State
of I AMERICA ORLINA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02274 191650Z
CHARACTERISTICS. LIST OF GEOPHYSICAL DATA TO BE PROVIDED IN
DATA EXCHANGE WAS RESTATED.
6, MOROKHOV SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO AN
IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE US POSITION. HE COULD FORESEE MANY
QUESTIONS. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WERE ASKED:
-- BY IZRAEL: OVER WHAT DISTANCE ARE THE RADIATION FIELD
MEASUREMENTS ASKED FOR TO BE TAKEN? WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF THE RADIATION FIELD US IS INTERESTED IN--THE GAMMA INTENSITY
OR RADIATION SPECTRUM? WHERE SHOULD THE GAMMA RADIATION BE
MEASURED--A THE SURFACE, IN THE GROUND, OR IN THE AIR?
WHEN SHOULD THE RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS BE TAKEN?
BY MYASNIKOVS WHY SHOULD OBSERVERS OF EXCAVATION PNES
HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN OBSERVERS OF CONTAINED PNES?
VERIFICATION OF EXCAVATION PNES IS MUCH EASIER BY VIRTUE OF
EXCES
EXISTENCE OF CRATER AND THUS OBSERVERS NEED LESS VOLUMINOUS
DATA.
BY MOROKHOV: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
THRESHOLD OF 150 KT AND THE YIELD LIMITS PROPOSED?
7. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED SAYING US STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL FOR
CONTINUATION OF THE WORK. STOESSEL PROMISED ANSWERS TO SOVIET
QUESTIONS AT FUTURE MEETINGS.
B. NEXT PLENARY SCHEDULED FEBRUARY 21. US STATEMENT WILL
ILLUSTRATE OBSERVER ACTIVITIES.
STOESSEL
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
29
PRANTMENT
%
STATE
WH
Department of State
OF it UNITED AMERICA NAME
TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL 0661
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02520 241906Z
DECLASSIFIED
53
E.O. 12950, SEC. 3.5
State
visit
8/4/00
ACTION SS-25
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
66
MARA. DATE 7/31/01
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
025260
241504Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7523
INFO USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
AMEMBASSY ROME
Retain Class'n
Change to
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X( )( )( )
N F N I MOSCOW 2520
Declassify
After
With concurrence
(not)(obtained)
EXDIS
PS by 30
Date 8/4/00
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION
1.
NETHERLANDS EMBOFF (STRICTLY PROTECT) REPORTED FEBRUARY
P1 THAT HE HAD ISSUED ONLY 659 ISRAELI VISAS TO SOVIET EMIGRANTS
DURING FIRST 20 DAYS OF FEBRUARY. ADDITION TO THIS FIGURE OF
MINOR CHILDREN INCLUDED IN PARENTS! VISAS BRINGS TOTAL NUMBER OF
INDIVIDUALS TO AN ESTIMATED 860 PERSONS. NETHERLANDS SOURCE
ALSO REVISED TO 1,208 NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS PROCESSED IN JANUARY
THIS INCLUDES MORE EXACT COUNT OF MINOR CHILDREN).
P. ASKED IF HE HAD DETECTED INCREASE IN REFUSAL RATE,
NETHERLANDS SOURCE SAID HE BELIEVED MORE LIKELY THAT NUMBER OF
APPLICATIONS HAD DECREASED. HE SAID HE HAS LATELY RECEIVED
FEWER REQUESTS FOR INTERVENTION AND EXIT VISA REPRESENTATION FROM
REFUSED EMIGRANTS THAN IN THE PAST. HARASSMENT AND
BUREAUCRATIC SLUGGISHNESS HAD DETERRED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
NOULD-BE EMIGRANTS FROM APPLYING, WHILE OTHERS SEEM TO BE
POSTPONING DECISION DUE TO RUMORS OF UNFAVORABLE CONDITIONS IN
SRAEL. HE SAID HE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE LARGE NUMBER (10 TO
15 DAILY) OF REQUESTS FOR EXTENSION OF "VYZOV" VALIDITY FROM
PERSONS WHO HAD OBVIOUSLY NOT YET MADE FINAL DECISION.
GERALO FOOD LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
GG
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
I
OF
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02520 241906Z
3. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO OUR FIGURES, ABOUT 4,000 SOVIET
JEWS LEFT COUNTRY IN JAN-FEB, 1974. IF NETHERLANDS! EMBASSY
FIGURES ARE PROJECTED TO END OF MONTH, EMIGRATION VISA ISSUANCE
FOR SAME PERIOD THIS YEAR WILL BE ABOUT 2,400, OR APPROXIMATE
40 PERCENT DECREASE IN FIRST TWO MONTHS. HOWEVER, RATE FOR
FEBRUARY IS ROUGHLY SAME AS THAT FOR JANUARY. IN ANY CASE,
JEWISH ACTIVIST SOURCES IN MOSCOW CONTINUE TO SEE FEW
SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOVIET HANDLING OF EXIT PERMISSION
REQUESTS, BUT POINT OUT THAT CONTINUING SOVIET ANTI-EMIGRATION
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND SELECTIVE HARASSMENT AND REFUSALS OF
SOME CATEGORIES OF APPLICANTS HAVE FED DOUBTS OF NUMBER OF
PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS ABOUT APPLYING FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE
AT THIS TIME. SOME LOCAL VISA OFFICES ARE ALSO ALLEGELLY
ASKING APPLICANTS FOR MORE DOCUMENTS AND THEREBY CREATING
LONGER-THAB-USUAL DELAYS IN PROCESSING. MAIN FACTOR, ACCORDING
TO SOURCES, IS "PSYCHOLOGY" OF SPMUATION: NUMBER OF JEWS
SENSE THAT NOW IS SIMPLY NOT GOOD TIME TO APPLY TO LEAVE.
STOESSEL
EXCES
FORD
is
GERALD
LIGHARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED THOUT CONF IDEN THE AUTHORIZATION C HE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
TRANSPORT
of
STATE
WH
of AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
I
CONFIDENTIAL 3580
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02588 01 OF 02 252116Z
63
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W
(FLE)
041758
R 25164513? 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7570
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN UNN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
e
0
N
F
D
N
SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2588
EXDIS
GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, GW, WB
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FONMIN ON BERLIN, CSCE
1. SUMMARY. THE FRG EMBASSY HERE HAS FILLED US IN ON DETAILS
OF A CALL BY AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY 21. SAHM HAD JUST RETURNED FROM BONN, WHERE
HE SPOKE TO SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT
IN PREPARATION FOR THE CALL. BOTH ZEMSKOV AND SAHM WERE
APPARENTLY PREPARING THEMSELVES TO TALK ABOUT THE TWO CENTRAL
ISSUES IN CURRENT SOVIET-FRG POLITICAL RELATIONS: BERLIN AND
&
FORD
PEACEFUL CHANGE IN CSCE. ON THE LATTER, SAHM REPORTEDLY CAME
AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT ZEMSKOV TRIED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN
TONE WHILE REMAINING VAGUE ON SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, ZEMSKOV WAS
GERALD
CATEGORICAL IN SAYING THE ISSUE CANNOI BE ADDRESSED IN THE
16.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
11 GG 7/31/01
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02588 01 OF 02 252116Z
PRINCIPLE ON INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS. ON BERLIN, BOTH SAHM
AND ZEMSKOV RESTATED IN CATEGORICAL TERMS THEIR GOVERNMENTS'
OPPOSING VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. SAHM INFORMED ZEMSKOV THAT NO
BILATERAL TREATIES AFFECTING MATTERS OTHER THAN QUESTIONS OF
SECURITY AND STATUS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION
WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT
"IT IS USELESS TO EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE"
ON THE ISSUE. ON OTHER QUESTIONS, A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE
DATES FOR THE SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS TO MOSCOW PRODUCED
NO SUGGESTED TIME FRAMES. END SUMMARY.
2. FRG EMBOFF (VON BRAUNMUHL) HAS BRIEFED US ON CALL BY FRG
AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY
21.
3. VON BRAUNMUHL, READING FROM OUTGOING CABLE, SAID THAT
SAHM MADE A GENERAL INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT TO ZEMSKOV, NOTING,
INTER ALIA, THAT HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY RECALLED TO BONN TO
PREPARE FOR THIS CALL. ZEMSKOV RATHER AIRILY DISMISSED THE
PLEASANTRIES AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO COME DIRECTLY TO A
DISCUSSION OF THE TWO MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST: PEACEFUL CHANGE
AND BERLIN.
4, SAHM SAID ON THE FIRST POINT HE HAD NO MANDATE TO
NEGOTIATE. HE CONTINUED THAT IN VIEW OF ZEMSKOV'S ACCUSATION
IN JANUARY THAT THE FRG "HAD NOT FOLLOWED THE RULES IN
NEGOTIATIONS" ON THAT ISSUE, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO OUTLINE
THE HISTORY OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE.
ZEMSKOV SAID THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING ABOUT THE HISTORY
OF THE ISSUE BUT RATHER TO DISCUSS ITS SUBSTANCE. SAHM
REPLIED BY REPEATING THE FRG POSITION: IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO
INSERT THE LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE IN THE INVIOLABILITY OF
FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE, THE BEST SOLUTION IS THE LANGUAGE
&
FORD
PROPOSED BY THE U.S. ON JULY 26.
5. ZEMSKOV ANSWERED THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THERE ARE TWO
GERALD
LIBRARY
FLEMENTS WHICH MUST BE INCLUDED IN LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL
CHANGE: (1) THE ISSUE CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE PRINCIPLE ON
INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS (ZEMSKOV WAS REPORTEDLY EMPHATIC
AND "CATEGORICAL" ON THIS), AND (2) IT MUST CONTAIN ALL OF THE
FOLLWOING ELEMENTS WITH EQUAL STRESS ON EACH: (A) INTERNATIONAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
or
STATE
Department of State
(
TELEGRAM
I
5
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02588 01 OF 02 252116Z
LAW, (B) PEACEFUL MEANS, AND (C) AGREEMENT BY ALL CONCERNED.
ZEMSKOV CONTINUED THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO DISCUSS CONCRETE
LANGUAGE, BUT THE JULY 26 LANGUAGE SEEMED TO HIM TO INCLUDE
AN ELEMENT OF "PROMOTING" CHANGE. UPON QUESTIONING BY SAHM,
ZEMSKOV REPEATED THIS POINT AND SAID THAT THE PROPER LANGUAGE
WOULD BE THAT WHICH SIMPLY MAKES "ALLOWANCE" FOR CHANGE.
SUCH LANGUAGE, ZEMSKOV CONTINUED, HAD ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED
IN THE (UNSPECIFIED) SOVIET PROPOSAL.
6. ZEMSKOV THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF BERLIN. HE EMPHASIZED
THE SOVIET DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP FURTHER GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THE FRG. BUT HE SAID THERE COULD BE NO ROOM FOR FLEX-
IBILITY IN THE SOVIET STANDPOINT ON BERLIN. SAHM REPLIED THAT,
JUDGING FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, THE SOVIET POLICY ON
BERLIN RUNS THE DANGER OF CREATING THE IMPRESSION IN WEST GERMANY
THAT THE SOVIET INTENTION IS TO EXCLUDE BERLIN FROM ANY
IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SAHM THEN QUOTED FROM A
SCHMIDT INTERVIEW SLATED TO APPEAR IN LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
(THE GERMAN EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW WHEN) THAT THE FRG POLICY ON
BERLIN IS "FULL APPLICATION" AND "STRICT OBSERVANCE" OF THE
QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, WITH NO CHANGE IN STATUS. ZEMSKOV
COMPLIMENTED SCHMIDT ON THE STATEMENT AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE
THAT THE FRG ATTITUDE TO BERLIN WOULD CONFORM TO THOSE
PRINCIPLES. SAHM CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE
AIM OF THE FRG POLICY IS TO INSURE THAT BERLIN IS INCLUDED IN
ANY IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS, THIS OBVIOUSLY
FORD
REQUIRES THAT THE CITY BE INCLUDED IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.
&
7. SAHM THEN REFERRED TO A CALL BY SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR
GERALD
LIBRARY
KOPTELTSEV ON FOREIGN OFFICE IN BONN ON FEBRUARY 12,
EXCES
KOPTELTSEV APPARENTLY INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT CONSULAR
SERVICES FOR CITIZENS OF WEST BERLIN IN THE SOVIET UNION "POSE
NO PROBLEM." SAHM EXPANDED ON THIS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE FRG
CONCEPT OF "SERVICES" (VON BRAUNMUHL SAID THAT WORD "CONSULAR"
HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DROPPED) COULD BE ILLUSTRATED BY THE
FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. WHEN THE WEST BERLIN PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA
COMES TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG WOULD EXPECT THE ORCHESTRA
TO BE MET BY THE FRG AMBASSADOR AT THE AIRPORT, WOULD EXPECT THE
AMBASSADOR TO BE INVITED TO THE CONCERTS AND WOULD EXPECT NO
SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE AMBASSADOR HOLDING A RECEPTION FOR THE
ORCHESTRA WHICH APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICIALS WOULD ATTEND.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
OP
Dr
A
of I UNITED AMERICA and
Department of State TELEGRAM
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04 MOSCOW 02588 01 OF 02 2521162
SAHM CONTINUED THAT FOR SOME WEST BERLIN ORGANIZATIONS THIS
OF COURSE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY AND "SERVICES BY THE FRG
EMBASSY WOULD BE SCALED ACCORDINGLY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG IS
READY TO DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS ON A CASE-BY-CABE BABIS,
EXQIN
FOHD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION ( THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
8
STATE
Department of State
of / AMERICA ORLINA
TELEGRAM
EXCES EXCES EXCES EXPIS
CONFIDENTIAL 3581
PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02588 02 OF 02 2521262
63
ACTION 88-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1026 W
041982
R 25164513? 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7571
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN UNN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
FORD
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA
?
G
N
H
N
SECTION 2 OF 2 MOSCOW 2588
GERALD
LIBRARY
EXDIS
GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE
8, SAHM, CONTINUING ON THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE. SAID THAT
IN THE CASE OF DIRECT CULTURAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN WEST
BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG MAY WISH TO ISSUE A
UNILATERAL STATEMENT. (VON BRAUNMUHL EXPLAINED IN THIS REGARD
THAT THE FRG DOES NOT INTEND TO STOP ALL SUCH DIRECT INTERCOURSE
BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WOULD WANT TO
MAKE CLEAR IN SUCH A UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT THE CONTINUATION
OF DIRECT EXCHANGE DID NOT IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF WEST BERLIN
AS A THIRD UNIT IN GERMANNY.) ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT
BOTHER HIMSELF WITH DETAILS OF THIS NATURE BUT WOULD REPORT
SAHM'S STATEMENT TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES.
9. ZEMSKOV, SUMMING UP HIS ARGUMENTS, SAID THAT SPEAKING IN
HIS ROLE AS "ADVISOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON GERMAN AFFAIRS,"
HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO SAHM THAT IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
3
i
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA CELINA
TELEGRAM
STATES or
CONFEDENTIAL
PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02588 02 OF 02 2521267
SOVIET UNION THAT BERLIN CONTINUE TO BE INCLUDED IN DETENTE.
THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE AIMED AGAINST ATTEMPTS
BY THE FRG WHICH COULD CREATE THE "IMPRESSION" THAT WEST BERLIN
IS A PART OF THE FRG OR IS GOVERNED BY IT. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT
WAS THE FINAL CATEGORICAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. HE
SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION IN THIS
REGARDI FOR THEM IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.
10. SAHM REPLIED THAT THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (RECHTSEINHEIT)
BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG WHICH HAS DEVELOPED UNDER
THREE-POWER AUSPICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED BY THE FRG
EXPECT IN MATTERS CONCERNING SECURITY OR STATUS. SAHM MENTIONED
THAT THE MARINE #AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE.
ZEMSKOV ASKED SARCASTICALLY ON WHICH SEA BERLIN WAS LOCATED. SAHM
REPLIED THAT JUST AS MUNICH :AND STUTTGART WOULD BE INCLUDED
IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, so WOULD WEST BERLIN BECAUSE OF THE
UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS.
EXCES
11. SAHM THEN SAID THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING
BILATERAL TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE
SOVIET UNION ON ANY ISSUE, EXCEPT THOSE AFFECTING WEST BERLINIS
SECURITY OR STATUS, WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE.
12, ZEMSKOV SUMMARIZED REMAINING DIFFERENCES, WHICH HE SAID WERE
OBVIOUSLY IRRECONCILABLE IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION, AS FOLLOWS:
(1) THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE Q.A. MUST NOT BE OPEN TO
"ARBITRARY INFERPRETATION" AND (2) "IT IS USELESS TO BELIEVE
THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE ON BERLIN."
13, AFTER DISCUSSION OF ABOVE MAIN ISSUES, SAHM ALSO RAISED
QUESTION OF DATES FOR SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS. ZEMSKOV
MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR -TIME=FRAMES, TIME FRAMES, BUT SAID HE WOULD LOOK
FORD
INTO THE MATTER.
&
14. COMMENT: SAHM'S INTERPRETATION OF ZEMSKOVIS, REMARKS ON
CSCE WAS THAT ZEMSKOV, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH OVER
GERALD
LIBRARY
GLARING DIFFERENCES IN OPINION DURING SAHM'S LAST CALL ON
JANUARY 20, MAD BEEN "MORE FLEXIBLE IN TONE." SAHM FELT,
HOWEVER, THAT ZEMSKOV HAD BEEN TO, VAGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE
ISSUE TO PERMITARY CONCLUSIONS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE
SOVIET STANCE. FROM THE FRG EMBOFFIS CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCE VITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL
Department of State
TELEGRAM
/
5
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03 MOSCOW 02588 02 OF 02 252126Z
DISCUSSION ON BERLIN, IT APPEARS TO US THAT BOTH SIDES ARE
FIRMING UP FOR SHOW-DOWN ON THE ISSUE. CA SIGNED COMMENTARY
BY VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV IN THE FEBRUARY 21 ISSUE OF ZA RUBEZHOM, A
WEEKLY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TOOK A SIMILARLY
HARD-LINE STAND ON BERLIN. IT WARNED AGAINST "DUBIOUS IN-
TERPRETATIONS" OF THE Q.A. SUCH AS GENSCHER'S CONTENTION IN A
FEBRUARY 9 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE Q.A. IS NOT "STATIC," BUT
EXETS EXCES
RATHER ALLOWS "DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT" OF TIES, THE COMMENTARY
CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE IN
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE Q.A. "WOULD AMOUNT TO LOOKING FOR
CONFRONTATION." VON BRAUNMUHL SAID THAT AS FAR AS HIS
GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS ON
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE SOVIETS CASE ON THE ISSUE OF A
BERLIN CLAUSE. HE SAID THAT IF THIS REQUIRES A LONG TIME, THEN
HIS GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO LIVE WITH USCH A WAIT. HE SAID
IN PASSING THAT THIS YEAR (I.E., THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
END OF THE WAR) HOLDS NO GREAT PROMISE FOR MUCH MOVEMENT IN
FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS IN ANY CASE.
STOESSEL
FORD LIBRARY & GERALD
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
CONFIDENTIAL