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The probable NVN strategy will be to make its gains in the spring and
early summer and then offer a cease-fire before the GVN is able to
recoup many of its losses. Congressional pressure to accept such an
offer would no doubt be great since it would be seen as a chance to end
the fighting and to reduce our military aid. As it is unlikely that the GVN
will be ready to accept the NVN proposals, the Communists would probably
seek tp pressure us, through the Congress, into forcing Thieu to acquiesce.
We may, therefore, soon be facing a situation in which heavy pressure will
be placed on the Executive Branch to accept Hanoi's proposals. These
will probably center around establishing the National Council of Recon-
ciliation and Concord with some quasis-governmental powers and providing
the Communists complete access to the GVN-controlled population.
FORD
P. (TOBA)
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Document source description
This item is a National Security Council memorandum from William L. Stearman to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
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"ocrText": "SECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nThe probable NVN strategy will be to make its gains in the spring and\nearly summer and then offer a cease-fire before the GVN is able to\nrecoup many of its losses. Congressional pressure to accept such an\noffer would no doubt be great since it would be seen as a chance to end\nthe fighting and to reduce our military aid. As it is unlikely that the GVN\nwill be ready to accept the NVN proposals, the Communists would probably\nseek tp pressure us, through the Congress, into forcing Thieu to acquiesce.\nWe may, therefore, soon be facing a situation in which heavy pressure will\nbe placed on the Executive Branch to accept Hanoi's proposals. These\nwill probably center around establishing the National Council of Recon-\nciliation and Concord with some quasis-governmental powers and providing\nthe Communists complete access to the GVN-controlled population.\nFORD\nP. (TOBA)\nSECRET/SENSITIVE"
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