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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (3)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library M. Fracle MEMORANDUM ROK NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL d January 28, 1974 N MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Donald G. MacDonald Assistant Administrator for Asia Agency for International Development SUBJECT: PL-480 for Korea We have considered your draft message on PL-480 to Korea at a senior level in the NSC and CIEP staffs. We believe the U.S. should be more positive and that the nature of our PL-480 programs in FY-75 and following years should be left com- pletely open at this time. We have discussed our concerns with Ambassador Habib. At this difficult time of rapid change in the South Korean situation we want to preserve the image of the U.S. as a sound and reliable friend on whose word and commitment the Koreans can rely. Attached is our suggested redraft of the proposed cable. I am available to discuss this with you or your staff at any time. JaneBuhall John A. Bushnell Staff Member Copies to: ASIA/DP:AShakow FFP:WJennette USDA:AMead EA/K/State:HNewsom EB:MSmith ASIA/EA/K:BCRichardson LIMITED OFFICIAL USE lb LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DRAFT CABLE TO AM EMBASSY SEOUL SUBJECT: Korea PL-480 Programs REF: Seoul 169 FOR ADLER FROM MACDONALD 1. Fully understand your need for Washington policy guidance on USG plans to deal with Korea PL-480 commitments, and appreciate your thoughtful suggestions on how program could be implemented over the next few year period in the face of possible reductions in overall USG agricul- tural commodity availabilities for PL-480 and other concessional food assistance. 2. It remains our intention to meet our PL-480 commitments as soon as our commodity availabilities permit. The extreme market conditions in FY-74 have caused us to fall substantially behind. Fortunately Korea has been able to overcome the problems caused by this unexpected shortfall in our assistance. We hope to meet our commitment in FY-75. However, shipments of rice will not be possible until our harvest is largely in, perhaps December. The market situation for wheat and cotton is unclear, and we may again be short of some commodities in which Korea is interested next fiscal year depending not only on our own production but also on production and demand in other parts of the world. In our FY-75 budget we are making provision for a full $150 million program for Korea, but this of course does FORD not guarantee that commodities will be available. GERALD LIBRARY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2 3. We fully recognize that uncertainties on PL-480 complicate Korean planning. There is no easy solution for these uncertainties. The Koreans should be aware that there is no guarantee we shall have commodities avail- able. Suspect experience of this year has brought this element of uncertainty home to them. They should also understand that should they choose to budget for less than the full $150 million, this would not prejudice their receipt of the full amount if commodities are available. 4. At this point it does not appear likely that we will be able to make up a large part of the FY-74 shortfall in FY-75. However, we have our total commitment in mind and we shall address the problem of making up deficiencies as the commodity situation in FY-75 and subsequent years becomes clearer. 5. With regard to your specific question on anticipated extent of PL-480 shipments in second half CY 74 (para 6 reftel), I regret that we still cannot be any more specific than I was in my November letter to you on this subject. a FORD GERALD LIBRARY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 2a MEMORANDUM 572 X NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION SECRET/SENSITIVE February 11, 1974 Guidelines 9/17/03 MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: W. R. SMYSERW RS s/on JOHN A. FROEBE, JR tax SUBJECT: U.K. Plans to Expand Relations with North Korea The U.K. Embassy here has informed the State Department (at the Korean Desk level) that it is prepared to recognize North Korea, but will not do so until after next fall's U.N. General Assembly. The U.K. does intend, Date however, within the next few weeks to tell Pyongyang that they can open a trade office in London; the U.K. for its own part does not plan to open one in Pyongyang in the near future. London has informed Seoul of its contem- plated move; the ROK reaction was strongly negative. E.O. We are concerned over the potential consequences of the planned U.K. NSC move, particularly since this would come on the heels of Australia's By recognition of North Korea, which will probably take place within the coming month: -- Others will be encouraged to follow suit, so as to be among the first and not the last to climb on board. The attached table (Tab A) of Asian and Western European states having diplomatic and consular relations with either or both Koreas makes clear that there are several states in Asia and perhaps half a dozen in Western Europe that would be stimulated to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. (Tokyo would hopefully do no more than accelerate its expansion of trade and cultural relations with Pyongyang.) Our concern, of course, is that this would happen in the absence of any reciprocal movement from the Communist states toward South Korea. This is likely to be the outcome, given Australia's intention to go ahead despite the unresponsiveness of the East European states it has approached on this score. -- North Korea will be encouraged toward intransigence, which will be particularly important to us as it may affect our upcoming negotia- tions over the termination of the U.N. Command. SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS 5b (3) BYAUTH Sec Kissinger SEGRET/SENSITIVE 2 -- North Korea's success will add to the Park Government's problems as it grapples with the recently intensified political criticism at home. State (EA) does not believe that the U.K. move, any more than Australian recognition of North Korea, will impact adversely on our upcoming negotia- tions on the UNC. We disagree. While we cannot positively assert that their moves will have a substantial impact, we believe this to be a risk that we should not take. We believe it would be useful if Under Secretary Sisco would call in the U.K. Ambassador and ask that the U.K. delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA. The U.K. may be somewhat reluctant since it has already informed Seoul of its intended move -- although London's proceeding in this manner seems to be something short of the sort of consultations we might hope for on this problem. Recommendation: That you ask Under Secretary Sisco to call in the U.K. Ambassador to urge him strongly to delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA. Approach Disapprove Concurrences: Mr. Solomon RHS/tron SEGREF/SENSITIVE 2 2b Asian Countries Diplomatic Relations Diplomatic Relations with Democratic with Republic of People's Republic Asian Country Korea (ROK) of Korea (DPRK) Australia Yes Burma Consular Relations Consular Relations Cambodia Yes China, Republic of Yes Fiji Yes India Yes Yes Indonesia Yes Yes Japan Yes Malaysia Yes Yes New Zealand Yes Pakistan Counsular Relations Yes Philippines Yes Singapore Consular Relations Consular Relations Thailand Yes Vietnam, Republic of Yes FORD RALD 2c Western European Countries Diplomatic Relations Diplomatic Relations with Democratic Western European with Republic of People's Republic Countries Korea (ROK) of Korea (DPRK) North Korean Austria Yes Trade Mission Belgium Yes Canada Yes Denmark Yes Yes Finland Yes Yes North Korean France Yes Trade Mission Germany, Federal Republic of Yes Greece Yes Iceland Yes Yes Italy Yes Luxembourg Yes Netherlands Yes Norway Yes Yes Portugal Yes Spain Yes Sweden Yes Yes Switzerland Yes P-10K 3 MEMORANDUM 1077-X NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL Gigidelinos 9/17/03 ACTION TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE March 19, 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER FROM: W. R. SMYSER SUBJECT: Your Meeting with South Korean NARA, Date 12/3/10 Foreign Minister Kim on March 20, 1974 at 6:00 p.m. You have agreed to meet with Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo on March 20, 1974 at 6:00 p.m. Kim is on his way back to Seoul from a tour of South America. He will likely be interested mainly in discussing with you the issue of U.N. Command (UNC) termination and related questions, particularly since he is one of two Korean officials designated by President By Park to be the conduit to us on this problem. As you know, we believe we must move soon to coordinate a negotiating package and strategy with Seoul so that we can approach the PRC and have the ROK approach North Korea hopefully sometime next month. We expect to have the response to NSSM on this question, together with agency comments and recommendations, ready for your and the President's consideration this week. Suggested Talking Points 1. Termination of the UNC. -- It is evident from Ambassador Habib's initial discussion of this question with President Park that we both agree that the UNC cannot be preserved except at an unacceptable political cost. -- (Responding to Park's concern that U.S. forces continue in Korea if the UNC is terminated) We plan no substantial changes in U.S. force levels at least in the near term -- at least until we have completed the transition to the post-UNC termination security arrangements. We would consult the ROK in advance on any changes we would contemplate. Also, we have made no decision to assign the Army division in Korea an additional role of a regional contingency reserve; this is only one longer-term option. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE XGDS 5b (3) BYAUTH Sec Kissinger FOR CECRET/SENSITIVE 2 -- Our major objective in the negotiations on the UNC's termination is to arrive at substitute arrangements that will preserve at least the present degree of security for the ROK. -- We expect to be ready in the next few weeks for detailed discus- sions with the ROK (Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Special Assistant Choe) on a negotiating package and strategy. 2. Diplomatic recognition of North Korea by Australia. Kim may raise the question of Australia's opening negotiations with North Korea looking toward diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. At our urging, Australia approached several East European states suggesting that they recognize South Korea in order to maintain a long-term balance in the diplomatic positions of the two Koreas. The East European states were unresponsive. -- We will continue to urge friendly governments to expand relations with North Korea no faster than the other side expands relations with South Korea. -- As appropriate, we will also take up with the PRC and the Soviets our desire for a balanced expansion of relations with both Koreas. -- We think it would be desirable for the ROK to begin an active campaign to expand trade and diplomatic contacts with states where it does not now have relations. TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE 7405588 3b BRIEFING MEMORANDUM s/skm 074 MAR 13 PM 6 47 ASIAN i.l j AiRS TO: The Secretary FROM: EA - Robert S. Ingersoll Your Meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Kim Wednesday, March 20-6:00 pm Participants: ROK: Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo Hahm Pyong Choon, Korean Ambassador US: The Secretary Assistant Secretary Ingersoll Donald Ranard, EA/K (Notataker) Wesdey Kricber, DA/R (Note Taker) Biographic information is attached at Tab A. Setting: On instructions, Ambassador Habib has started discussions with President Park and Foreign Minister Kim on alternative arrangements to the UN Command. Your meeting with Foreign Minister Kim will empha- size the importance we attach to this matter and our determination to proceed as quickly as we can toward resolving the UN Command problem. Background Kim is on his way home after an official trip to Latin America. He has been charged by Prosident Park with leading the discussions with us on the UN Command problem and he desires an exchange of views with you. DECLASSIFIED TOP SECRET/NODIS E. E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 XGDS By th State Dept Guidelines stdereview 9/17/03 NARA, Date 12/3/10 Hunald FORD-LIBRARY zop SECRET/NODIS 2 We expect that the UN Command issue and the related problem of the fall UN General Assembly session will be the main topics of his conversation. Kim will probably raise the importance of discussions with the PRC on this issue. We have not yet made specific decision on the various problems connected with the Command so that your response will necessarily be of a general nature. Lie would like to be sure the Koreans understand that we desire that Seoul be the primary site of discussions. Kim may also want to raise a number of perennial subjects with you, primarily to provide public and private evidence of US support which is particularly important to the ROKG at this time when its dealings with the North have stalemated. Kim may well try to develop an argument that the North has abandoned peaceful unification and is pre- pared to undertake some kind of overt action against the ROK. We do not think we should encourage him in this line. The whole issue of North-South relations is now deeply enmeshed with the ROKG's own internal difficulties and the South is taking any opportunity to use the security issue with its friends abroad as well as with its populace at home. Issues/Talking Points 1. Courtesv Talking Points -- Congratulate him on his appointment as Foreign Minister (December, 1973). -- Recall effective manner in which Kim repre- sented his country as Ambassador to US (67-73). 2. UN Command Alternatives ROK Position: President Park has agreed with us that the growing difficulties of defending the UN Command against attack in the UN General Assembly make it necessary to consider alternative arrange- FORD TOP SECRET/NODIS XGDS GERALD LIBRARY TOP SECRET/NODIS 3 ments. He does not want to risk defeat in the UN General Assembly on this issue. He has emphasized his desire to have US troops continue their presence in Korea. Ambassador Habib believes the ROKG prefers to respond to our suggestions rather than advance its own. US Position: The UN Command problem has been examined in the response to NSSM 190, but the imple- charges menting decisions have not yet been made. There is 4LL decided agreement in both State and Defense that prior to on a information the opening of the UN General Assembly this fall we should make clear to the other side we are prepared to terminate the UN Command and that we should ascertain PRC views at an early date. Your Talking Points: il the them mile will agree to edequate understand means managements, -- We welcome the ROKG response to Ambassador Habib's initial presentation on the UN Command prob- lem, a problem of great importance to both countries. -- We have not made detailed decisions on the UN Command but we expect to send instructions to Ambassador Habib within the next few weeks for dis- cussions with Kim. -- We want to move with deliberate speed but we also want to ensure insofar as we are able that any changes we make do not lessen the security of the peninsula. -- We recognize importance of discussion with the PRC and at an appropriate point we will approach them. 3. UN General Assembly Consideration of a Korean Item ROK Position: They strongly wish to avoid a debate at: New York this year because it would focus on the UN Command and the US troop presence to the detriment of the ROK. They are unsure the world-wide lobbying required would be worth the effort. They is FORD TOP SECRET/NODIS GERALD LIBRARY XGDS TOP SECRET/MODIS 4 look to us to work out some arrangement with the PRC to avoid inscription of a Korean item on the basis that we will have made some progress on the termination of the UN Command. At the same time the ROK Ambassador at New York has raised with Ambassador Scali the possibility of preemptively inscribing a Korean item which would likely give us the tactical advantage in the General Assembly of prior consideration of our resolution. This proposal has probably been discussed with Foreign Minister Kim. US Position: We share the ROK's preference for no UN debate this year. The likelihood of North Korea's supporters moving to inscribe a "hostile" Korean item on the UNGA agenda will increase if there is no movement from our side on the UN Command issue. Thus consultations with the ROK and PRC on the UNC are necessary to forestall inscription; after inscription, it will be more difficult to work out a compromise with the PRC. USUN has also pointed out to the ROK the anomaly of stimulating a debate on Korea by preemptive inscription. How- ever, if it is not possible to reach some agreement with the other side on termination of the UN Command and a debate appears likely, inscription of a "friendly" Korean item in advance of the other side's move would be tactically desirable. Your Talking Points: -- We would like to avoid a debate on Korea at the UNGA if this is possible. -- The idea of a preemptive inscription has some attraction but there is the obvious disadvantage of forcing a debate in the absence of any consultation with the other side and of requiring us to make public prematurely proposals on the UN Command. I suggest our UN missions stay in close touch on this question and submit their recommendations. -- We should concentrate on our own consultations on the UN Command to develop a position we can then discuss with the PRC and others. FURD TOP SECRET/NODIS GERALD LIBRARY XGDS TOP SECRET/NODIS 5 4. US Troop Presence ROK Position: The ROKG has had our assurances (following inaccurate press accounts of Secretary Schlesinger's testimony February 28) that no changes in US troop levels in Korea are blanned. Kim will likely want your reiteration of this assurance. US Position: We have no plans to reduce US force levels in Korea for the next year or two (i.e. until the UNC issue is settled and new ar- mistice arrangements are in place). Your Talking Points: -- We have no plans for reducing US troop levels this year.] to male in Ld. free for the new term al lecal through the transition L5 UNC units -- We will consult with the ROKG before making averyones further troop reductions. -- The question of a mobile reserve role for the US division in Korea has, as Secretary Schlesinger told Congress, been studied as one of a number of very long-range possibilities. $. ROK Relations with North Korea ROK Position: The ROKG has taken the position that North Korea is becoming increasingly belligerent as shown by the Western Islands dispute, the recent attack on ROK fishing boats and the uncovering of a spy ring aimed at overthrowing the ROKG. The North's military preparations are increasing and its unaccept- able demands in the North-South talks show that its real aim continues to be domination of the South. US Position: We have no hard evidence that the North is preparing for overt military action. The North had stalemated the talks and although it now has shown renewed interest in them it probably does not expect significant progress until it is clear that the Park Government can survive its expected spring confrontation with students and christian groups. FORD TOP SECRET/NODIS XGDS CERALD LIBERTY TOP SECRET/NODIS 6 Your Talking Points: -- We hope the ROKG will react firmly but non- provocatively to North Korean provoked incidents and will continue to do its part in efforts to reduce tension in the peninsula. -- We hope the ROKG will continue its efforts to engage the North in serious discussion. 6. Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea ROK Position: The ROKG is distressed by Australia's decision to recognize North Korea and by its own inability to obtain recognition from any of the communist states. It considers its position in the South-North dialogue weakened and would like our help in discouraging other friendly states from recognizing North Korea and in obtaining recognition from communist states particularly the PRC. US Position: We have agreed to counsel restraint to friendly states proposing to recognize North Korea in those cases we think appropriate. We have also agreed when appropriate to raise the question of recognition with the PRC, USSR and other communist states. Your Talking Points: ore ma C. Time to under pricently governments C5 expend relations [-- Prospects for recognition of the ROK by the PRC or USSR are limited but we will ão what we can.] [-- The ROKG should not over-react to Western recognition of Pyongyang but should continue its own program of seeking recognition by non-aligned countries.] with Natt Knee we party Than Cc. other ride Attachments: effects relations with Smtt lene, l ice as appropriate everything approach to the PNC Ii Tab A -Biographies on Foreign Minister Kim and E Ambassador Hahm TOP SECRET ENODIS are Drafted: EA/K:PWKriebel:dpw LIERARY BARALD FORD 3/18/74:X22332 Concurrences: EA/K - Mr. Ranard IO - Mr. Buffum (draft) Pick for EA - Mr. Sneider PM/ISP - Mr. Brown (draft) Pick june 3C NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032779 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBiography DESCRIPTION Re Republic of Korea Official CREATION DATE 03/1974 VOLUME 1 page COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/02/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 3D NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032780 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBiography DESCRIPTION Re Republic of Korea Official CREATION DATE 03/1974 VOLUME 1 page COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/02/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 4A NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032781 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum CREATOR'S NAME W.R. Smyser, Richard H. Solomon, Richard T. Kennedy RECEIVER'S NAME Secretary Kissinger TITLE NSSM 190: Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea CREATION DATE 03/20/1974 VOLUME 6 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/02/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 4b I : your BERALD 4C NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032782 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger RECEIVER'S NAME The President TITLE Negotiations on Terminating the United Nations Command in Korea CREATION DATE 03/1974 VOLUME 4 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILE: BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/02/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 18.50804 4e NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE National Security Decision Memorandum TO: The Secretary of Defense The Deputy Secretary of State Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency SUBJECT: Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions: 1. Negotiating Package To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek: -- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signa- tory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Dept. Guidelines Korean representatives should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission. E.O. SEC 3.3 12/3/10 -- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force DECLASCIFIED presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for NARA, Date a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized. NSC Memo, -- A. non-aggression pact between the two Koreas. By -- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements. -- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement. 2. Negotiating Strategy The United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks. The Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we TOP SECRET SENSITIVE XGDS 5b(3) BYAUTH H.A. Kissinger TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE 2 should make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should: -- Consult with the ROK before raising proposals with any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC upon its termination to a new U. S.- - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer. -- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement. -- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC. The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall. 3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC. Henry A. Kissinger FORD TOP SECRE /SENSITIVE 9x See SRC book for NSSM 190 4g C a. FORD BERALD LIBRARY 4H NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032783 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum TITLE Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea CREATION DATE 03/06/1974 VOLUME 10 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH D 42 4J NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032784 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum RECEIVER'S TITLE Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs TITLE Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea CREATION DATE 03/07/1974 VOLUME 4 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 4K NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032785 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport TITLE Assigned ROK, US, and Katusa Strengths as of 31 December 1973 CREATION DATE 12/31/1974 VOLUME 2 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 4.l E a. BENGLD FORD A LIBRAS 4M NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032786 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum CREATOR'S NAME W.E. Colby CREATOR'S TITLE Director RECEIVER'S TITLE The President TITLE Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea; NSSM-190 CREATION DATE 03/02/1974 VOLUME 2 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH sanitizel 9/7/02/ Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSU_EA_PA-5-3-4-5 SECRETI stoffing 25X1 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 4m 2 March 1974 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea; NSSM-190 1. Regarding the issue of preserving the UN Command in Korea, I believe that it probably cannot be sustained at the UN beyond this fall's General Assembly session, and that an effort to preserve the UNC for another year would be counterproductive. 2. I feel that North Korea is unlikely to be attracted to any of the three options offered in the response to NSSM-190, but least of all by Option 1. I believe that Option 2, however, stands a chance of gaining serious North Korean consideration, although I am not sanguine in the light of North Korea's cur- rent harsh attitude toward the US and South Korea. Therefore, the issue might hinge on China's willing- ness and ability to persuade Pyongyang that the time had come to modify its hard-line posture. 3. I am concerned that there may be an over- estimation of the degree of influence that China might be able to exercise over North Korean actions in the near term, although I believe that China does want to play a constructive role regarding stability on the Korean peninsula. 4. In this connection, the response to NSSM-190, in its heavy emphasis on US consultation with Peking, may have understated the USSR interest in the situation. I am concerned that Moscow might read the negotiations, w/portions exampted RACNLF-NSC.EA. RACNLF-NSC.EA.PA-5-3-4-591-104 -5-3-4-5 9/7/04 NSC Guifelines BY HR NLF, DATE 1/6/09 25X1 TS No. 200531-74 Cy No. #1 s FORD Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities Requiredor BALO 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5 Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-INSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5 TOP SECRET 25X1 if pursued as projected, as an effort to exclude it from an influential role in Korean affairs. 5. The other matters raised in the response to NSSM-190 and the associated papers on future United States force dispositions in South Korea are in my view primarily operational in nature, not calling for intelligence comment. WEColly Colby Director FORD & LIGRAL -2- TOP SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5 F OLVER 1044 is LIDNA 40 NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032787 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum CREATOR'S NAME Fred C. Ikle RECEIVER'S NAME Mr. Henry A. Kissinger TITLE Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea CREATION DATE 03/04/1974 VOLUME 4 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 4p G e. FORD DERALD 4Q NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032788 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum TITLE NSSM 171 Follow-On -- Analysis of the Role of the Army Division in Korea CREATION DATE 10/13/1973 VOLUME 17 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH H FORD is 0972 his Kennedy 7322517 45 DEPARTMENT OF STATE Washington, D.C. 20520 November 27, 1973 TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT THE WHITE HOUSE Subject: Strategy and Forces for Asia - NSSM 171 In his memorandum of August 28, 1973, to members of the Defense Program Review Committee, Dr. Kissinger directed the Department of State to prepare an analysis of the political and diplomatic implications of con- verting the U.S. Second Infantry Division to a more mobile configuration. The analysis is attached. 2) Thomas 102 R. Pickering Executive Secretary Attachment: Analysis DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3 NSC Memo; 3/30/06, State Dept, Gaidelines By NARA, Date 12/3/11 FORD TOP SECRET GDS RERALO LIBRARD\ H 4T NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 032789 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇReport DESCRIPTION US Force Structure in South Korea CREATION DATE 11/27/1973 VOLUME 7 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700244 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 5 FOLDER TITLE Korea (3) DATE WITHDRAWN 03/03/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 5, folder \"Korea (3)\" of the NSC East Asian\nand Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nM. Fracle\nMEMORANDUM\nROK\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nd\nJanuary 28, 1974\nN\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMr. Donald G. MacDonald\nAssistant Administrator for Asia\nAgency for International Development\nSUBJECT:\nPL-480 for Korea\nWe have considered your draft message on PL-480 to Korea\nat a senior level in the NSC and CIEP staffs. We believe the\nU.S. should be more positive and that the nature of our PL-480\nprograms in FY-75 and following years should be left com-\npletely open at this time. We have discussed our concerns\nwith Ambassador Habib.\nAt this difficult time of rapid change in the South Korean\nsituation we want to preserve the image of the U.S. as a\nsound and reliable friend on whose word and commitment the\nKoreans can rely.\nAttached is our suggested redraft of the proposed cable. I\nam available to discuss this with you or your staff at any time.\nJaneBuhall John A. Bushnell\nStaff Member\nCopies to:\nASIA/DP:AShakow\nFFP:WJennette\nUSDA:AMead\nEA/K/State:HNewsom\nEB:MSmith\nASIA/EA/K:BCRichardson\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nlb\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nDRAFT CABLE TO AM EMBASSY SEOUL\nSUBJECT:\nKorea PL-480 Programs\nREF:\nSeoul 169\nFOR ADLER FROM MACDONALD\n1. Fully understand your need for Washington policy guidance on USG\nplans to deal with Korea PL-480 commitments, and appreciate your\nthoughtful suggestions on how program could be implemented over the next\nfew year period in the face of possible reductions in overall USG agricul-\ntural commodity availabilities for PL-480 and other concessional food\nassistance.\n2. It remains our intention to meet our PL-480 commitments as soon\nas our commodity availabilities permit. The extreme market conditions in\nFY-74 have caused us to fall substantially behind. Fortunately Korea has\nbeen able to overcome the problems caused by this unexpected shortfall in\nour assistance. We hope to meet our commitment in FY-75. However,\nshipments of rice will not be possible until our harvest is largely in, perhaps\nDecember. The market situation for wheat and cotton is unclear, and we may\nagain be short of some commodities in which Korea is interested next fiscal\nyear depending not only on our own production but also on production and\ndemand in other parts of the world. In our FY-75 budget we are making\nprovision for a full $150 million program for Korea, but this of course does\nFORD\nnot guarantee that commodities will be available.\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\n2\n3. We fully recognize that uncertainties on PL-480 complicate Korean\nplanning. There is no easy solution for these uncertainties. The Koreans\nshould be aware that there is no guarantee we shall have commodities avail-\nable. Suspect experience of this year has brought this element of uncertainty\nhome to them. They should also understand that should they choose to budget\nfor less than the full $150 million, this would not prejudice their receipt of\nthe full amount if commodities are available.\n4. At this point it does not appear likely that we will be able to make up\na large part of the FY-74 shortfall in FY-75. However, we have our total\ncommitment in mind and we shall address the problem of making up deficiencies\nas the commodity situation in FY-75 and subsequent years becomes clearer.\n5. With regard to your specific question on anticipated extent of PL-480\nshipments in second half CY 74 (para 6 reftel), I regret that we still cannot\nbe any more specific than I was in my November letter to you on this subject.\na\nFORD\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nLIMITED OFFICIAL USE\n2a\nMEMORANDUM\n572 X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nFebruary 11, 1974\nGuidelines 9/17/03\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSERW RS s/on\nJOHN A. FROEBE, JR tax\nSUBJECT:\nU.K. Plans to Expand Relations\nwith North Korea\nThe U.K. Embassy here has informed the State Department (at the Korean\nDesk level) that it is prepared to recognize North Korea, but will not do so\nuntil after next fall's U.N. General Assembly. The U.K. does intend,\nDate\nhowever, within the next few weeks to tell Pyongyang that they can open a\ntrade office in London; the U.K. for its own part does not plan to open one\nin Pyongyang in the near future. London has informed Seoul of its contem-\nplated move; the ROK reaction was strongly negative.\nE.O.\nWe are concerned over the potential consequences of the planned U.K.\nNSC\nmove, particularly since this would come on the heels of Australia's\nBy\nrecognition of North Korea, which will probably take place within the\ncoming month:\n-- Others will be encouraged to follow suit, so as to be among the\nfirst and not the last to climb on board. The attached table (Tab A) of\nAsian and Western European states having diplomatic and consular relations\nwith either or both Koreas makes clear that there are several states in\nAsia and perhaps half a dozen in Western Europe that would be stimulated to\nestablish diplomatic relations with North Korea. (Tokyo would hopefully\ndo no more than accelerate its expansion of trade and cultural relations\nwith Pyongyang.) Our concern, of course, is that this would happen in\nthe absence of any reciprocal movement from the Communist states toward\nSouth Korea. This is likely to be the outcome, given Australia's intention\nto go ahead despite the unresponsiveness of the East European states it\nhas approached on this score.\n-- North Korea will be encouraged toward intransigence, which\nwill be particularly important to us as it may affect our upcoming negotia-\ntions over the termination of the U.N. Command.\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nXGDS 5b (3)\nBYAUTH Sec Kissinger\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\n2\n-- North Korea's success will add to the Park Government's problems\nas it grapples with the recently intensified political criticism at home.\nState (EA) does not believe that the U.K. move, any more than Australian\nrecognition of North Korea, will impact adversely on our upcoming negotia-\ntions on the UNC. We disagree. While we cannot positively assert that\ntheir moves will have a substantial impact, we believe this to be a risk that\nwe should not take.\nWe believe it would be useful if Under Secretary Sisco would call in the\nU.K. Ambassador and ask that the U.K. delay any approach to North Korea\non a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA.\nThe U.K. may be somewhat reluctant since it has already informed Seoul of\nits intended move -- although London's proceeding in this manner seems to\nbe something short of the sort of consultations we might hope for on this\nproblem.\nRecommendation:\nThat you ask Under Secretary Sisco to call in the U.K. Ambassador to\nurge him strongly to delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office\nor otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA.\nApproach\nDisapprove\nConcurrences:\nMr. Solomon RHS/tron\nSEGREF/SENSITIVE\n2\n2b\nAsian Countries\nDiplomatic Relations\nDiplomatic Relations\nwith Democratic\nwith Republic of\nPeople's Republic\nAsian Country\nKorea (ROK)\nof Korea (DPRK)\nAustralia\nYes\nBurma\nConsular Relations\nConsular Relations\nCambodia\nYes\nChina, Republic of\nYes\nFiji\nYes\nIndia\nYes\nYes\nIndonesia\nYes\nYes\nJapan\nYes\nMalaysia\nYes\nYes\nNew Zealand\nYes\nPakistan\nCounsular Relations\nYes\nPhilippines\nYes\nSingapore\nConsular Relations\nConsular Relations\nThailand\nYes\nVietnam, Republic of\nYes\nFORD\nRALD\n2c\nWestern European Countries\nDiplomatic Relations\nDiplomatic Relations\nwith Democratic\nWestern European\nwith Republic of\nPeople's Republic\nCountries\nKorea (ROK)\nof Korea (DPRK)\nNorth Korean\nAustria\nYes\nTrade Mission\nBelgium\nYes\nCanada\nYes\nDenmark\nYes\nYes\nFinland\nYes\nYes\nNorth Korean\nFrance\nYes\nTrade Mission\nGermany, Federal Republic of\nYes\nGreece\nYes\nIceland\nYes\nYes\nItaly\nYes\nLuxembourg\nYes\nNetherlands\nYes\nNorway\nYes\nYes\nPortugal\nYes\nSpain\nYes\nSweden\nYes\nYes\nSwitzerland\nYes\nP-10K 3\nMEMORANDUM\n1077-X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nGigidelinos 9/17/03\nACTION\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nMarch 19, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER\nSUBJECT:\nYour Meeting with South Korean\nNARA, Date 12/3/10\nForeign Minister Kim on March 20,\n1974 at 6:00 p.m.\nYou have agreed to meet with Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo on March 20,\n1974 at 6:00 p.m. Kim is on his way back to Seoul from a tour of South\nAmerica. He will likely be interested mainly in discussing with you the\nissue of U.N. Command (UNC) termination and related questions,\nparticularly since he is one of two Korean officials designated by President\nBy\nPark to be the conduit to us on this problem.\nAs you know, we believe we must move soon to coordinate a negotiating\npackage and strategy with Seoul so that we can approach the PRC and have\nthe ROK approach North Korea hopefully sometime next month. We expect\nto have the response to NSSM on this question, together with agency comments\nand recommendations, ready for your and the President's consideration\nthis week.\nSuggested Talking Points\n1. Termination of the UNC.\n-- It is evident from Ambassador Habib's initial discussion of this\nquestion with President Park that we both agree that the UNC cannot be\npreserved except at an unacceptable political cost.\n-- (Responding to Park's concern that U.S. forces continue in Korea\nif the UNC is terminated) We plan no substantial changes in U.S. force\nlevels at least in the near term -- at least until we have completed the\ntransition to the post-UNC termination security arrangements. We would\nconsult the ROK in advance on any changes we would contemplate. Also,\nwe have made no decision to assign the Army division in Korea an additional\nrole of a regional contingency reserve; this is only one longer-term option.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nXGDS 5b (3)\nBYAUTH Sec Kissinger\nFOR CECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\n-- Our major objective in the negotiations on the UNC's termination\nis to arrive at substitute arrangements that will preserve at least the\npresent degree of security for the ROK.\n-- We expect to be ready in the next few weeks for detailed discus-\nsions with the ROK (Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Special Assistant\nChoe) on a negotiating package and strategy.\n2.\nDiplomatic recognition of North Korea by Australia. Kim may raise\nthe question of Australia's opening negotiations with North Korea looking\ntoward diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations.\nAt our urging, Australia approached several East European states suggesting\nthat they recognize South Korea in order to maintain a long-term balance\nin the diplomatic positions of the two Koreas. The East European states\nwere unresponsive.\n-- We will continue to urge friendly governments to expand relations\nwith North Korea no faster than the other side expands relations with South\nKorea.\n-- As appropriate, we will also take up with the PRC and the Soviets\nour desire for a balanced expansion of relations with both Koreas.\n-- We think it would be desirable for the ROK to begin an active\ncampaign to expand trade and diplomatic contacts with states where it does\nnot now have relations.\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nTO\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n7405588\n3b\nBRIEFING MEMORANDUM\ns/skm\n074 MAR 13 PM 6 47\nASIAN\ni.l j AiRS\nTO:\nThe Secretary\nFROM: EA - Robert S. Ingersoll\nYour Meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Kim\nWednesday, March 20-6:00 pm\nParticipants:\nROK: Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo\nHahm Pyong Choon, Korean Ambassador\nUS:\nThe Secretary\nAssistant Secretary Ingersoll\nDonald Ranard, EA/K (Notataker)\nWesdey Kricber, DA/R (Note Taker)\nBiographic information is attached at Tab A.\nSetting:\nOn instructions, Ambassador Habib has started\ndiscussions with President Park and Foreign Minister\nKim on alternative arrangements to the UN Command.\nYour meeting with Foreign Minister Kim will empha-\nsize the importance we attach to this matter and\nour determination to proceed as quickly as we can\ntoward resolving the UN Command problem.\nBackground\nKim is on his way home after an official trip to\nLatin America. He has been charged by Prosident Park\nwith leading the discussions with us on the UN Command\nproblem and he desires an exchange of views with you.\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nE.\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nXGDS\nBy\nth\nState Dept Guidelines stdereview 9/17/03\nNARA, Date 12/3/10\nHunald\nFORD-LIBRARY\nzop SECRET/NODIS\n2\nWe expect that the UN Command issue and the\nrelated problem of the fall UN General Assembly\nsession will be the main topics of his conversation.\nKim will probably raise the importance of discussions\nwith the PRC on this issue. We have not yet made\nspecific decision on the various problems connected\nwith the Command so that your response will necessarily\nbe of a general nature. Lie would like to be sure the\nKoreans understand that we desire that Seoul be the\nprimary site of discussions.\nKim may also want to raise a number of perennial\nsubjects with you, primarily to provide public and\nprivate evidence of US support which is particularly\nimportant to the ROKG at this time when its dealings\nwith the North have stalemated.\nKim may well try to develop an argument that the\nNorth has abandoned peaceful unification and is pre-\npared to undertake some kind of overt action against\nthe ROK. We do not think we should encourage him in\nthis line. The whole issue of North-South relations\nis now deeply enmeshed with the ROKG's own internal\ndifficulties and the South is taking any opportunity\nto use the security issue with its friends abroad as\nwell as with its populace at home.\nIssues/Talking Points\n1.\nCourtesv Talking Points\n-- Congratulate him on his appointment as Foreign\nMinister (December, 1973).\n-- Recall effective manner in which Kim repre-\nsented his country as Ambassador to US (67-73).\n2.\nUN Command Alternatives\nROK Position: President Park has agreed with\nus that the growing difficulties of defending the\nUN Command against attack in the UN General Assembly\nmake it necessary to consider alternative arrange-\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nXGDS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n3\nments. He does not want to risk defeat in the UN\nGeneral Assembly on this issue. He has emphasized\nhis desire to have US troops continue their presence\nin Korea. Ambassador Habib believes the ROKG prefers\nto respond to our suggestions rather than advance its\nown.\nUS Position: The UN Command problem has been\nexamined in the response to NSSM 190, but the imple- charges\nmenting decisions have not yet been made. There is 4LL decided\nagreement in both State and Defense that prior to on a information\nthe opening of the UN General Assembly this fall we\nshould make clear to the other side we are prepared\nto terminate the UN Command and that we should\nascertain PRC views at an early date.\nYour Talking Points:\nil the them mile will agree to edequate\nunderstand means managements,\n-- We welcome the ROKG response to Ambassador\nHabib's initial presentation on the UN Command prob-\nlem, a problem of great importance to both countries.\n-- We have not made detailed decisions on the\nUN Command but we expect to send instructions to\nAmbassador Habib within the next few weeks for dis-\ncussions with Kim.\n-- We want to move with deliberate speed but we\nalso want to ensure insofar as we are able that any\nchanges we make do not lessen the security of the\npeninsula.\n-- We recognize importance of discussion with\nthe PRC and at an appropriate point we will approach\nthem.\n3. UN General Assembly Consideration of a Korean\nItem\nROK Position: They strongly wish to avoid a\ndebate at: New York this year because it would focus\non the UN Command and the US troop presence to the\ndetriment of the ROK. They are unsure the world-wide\nlobbying required would be worth the effort. They\nis\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nXGDS\nTOP SECRET/MODIS\n4\nlook to us to work out some arrangement with the\nPRC to avoid inscription of a Korean item on the\nbasis that we will have made some progress on the\ntermination of the UN Command. At the same time\nthe ROK Ambassador at New York has raised with\nAmbassador Scali the possibility of preemptively\ninscribing a Korean item which would likely give\nus the tactical advantage in the General Assembly\nof prior consideration of our resolution. This\nproposal has probably been discussed with Foreign\nMinister Kim.\nUS Position: We share the ROK's preference for\nno UN debate this year. The likelihood of North\nKorea's supporters moving to inscribe a \"hostile\"\nKorean item on the UNGA agenda will increase if\nthere is no movement from our side on the UN Command\nissue. Thus consultations with the ROK and PRC on\nthe UNC are necessary to forestall inscription;\nafter inscription, it will be more difficult to\nwork out a compromise with the PRC. USUN has also\npointed out to the ROK the anomaly of stimulating\na debate on Korea by preemptive inscription. How-\never, if it is not possible to reach some agreement\nwith the other side on termination of the UN Command\nand a debate appears likely, inscription of a \"friendly\"\nKorean item in advance of the other side's move would\nbe tactically desirable.\nYour Talking Points:\n-- We would like to avoid a debate on Korea at\nthe UNGA if this is possible.\n-- The idea of a preemptive inscription has some\nattraction but there is the obvious disadvantage of\nforcing a debate in the absence of any consultation\nwith the other side and of requiring us to make public\nprematurely proposals on the UN Command. I suggest\nour UN missions stay in close touch on this question\nand submit their recommendations.\n-- We should concentrate on our own consultations\non the UN Command to develop a position we can then\ndiscuss with the PRC and others.\nFURD\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nGERALD\nLIBRARY\nXGDS\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n5\n4. US Troop Presence\nROK Position: The ROKG has had our assurances\n(following inaccurate press accounts of Secretary\nSchlesinger's testimony February 28) that no changes\nin US troop levels in Korea are blanned. Kim will\nlikely want your reiteration of this assurance.\nUS Position: We have no plans to reduce US\nforce levels in Korea for the next year or two\n(i.e. until the UNC issue is settled and new ar-\nmistice arrangements are in place).\nYour Talking Points:\n-- We have no plans for reducing US troop levels\nthis year.] to male in Ld. free\nfor the new term al lecal through the transition L5 UNC units\n-- We will consult with the ROKG before making averyones\nfurther troop reductions.\n-- The question of a mobile reserve role for the\nUS division in Korea has, as Secretary Schlesinger\ntold Congress, been studied as one of a number of\nvery long-range possibilities.\n$.\nROK Relations with North Korea\nROK Position: The ROKG has taken the position\nthat North Korea is becoming increasingly belligerent\nas shown by the Western Islands dispute, the recent\nattack on ROK fishing boats and the uncovering of a\nspy ring aimed at overthrowing the ROKG. The North's\nmilitary preparations are increasing and its unaccept-\nable demands in the North-South talks show that its\nreal aim continues to be domination of the South.\nUS Position: We have no hard evidence that the\nNorth is preparing for overt military action. The\nNorth had stalemated the talks and although it now\nhas shown renewed interest in them it probably does\nnot expect significant progress until it is clear\nthat the Park Government can survive its expected\nspring confrontation with students and christian groups.\nFORD\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nXGDS\nCERALD\nLIBERTY\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n6\nYour Talking Points:\n-- We hope the ROKG will react firmly but non-\nprovocatively to North Korean provoked incidents and\nwill continue to do its part in efforts to reduce\ntension in the peninsula.\n-- We hope the ROKG will continue its efforts to\nengage the North in serious discussion.\n6. Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea\nROK Position: The ROKG is distressed by\nAustralia's decision to recognize North Korea and\nby its own inability to obtain recognition from any\nof the communist states. It considers its position\nin the South-North dialogue weakened and would like\nour help in discouraging other friendly states from\nrecognizing North Korea and in obtaining recognition\nfrom communist states particularly the PRC.\nUS Position: We have agreed to counsel restraint\nto friendly states proposing to recognize North Korea\nin those cases we think appropriate. We have also agreed\nwhen appropriate to raise the question of recognition\nwith the PRC, USSR and other communist states.\nYour Talking Points:\nore ma C. Time to under pricently governments C5 expend relations\n[-- Prospects for recognition of the ROK by the\nPRC or USSR are limited but we will ão what we can.]\n[-- The ROKG should not over-react to Western\nrecognition of Pyongyang but should continue its own\nprogram of seeking recognition by non-aligned countries.]\nwith Natt Knee we party Than Cc. other ride\nAttachments:\neffects relations with Smtt lene, l ice\nas appropriate everything approach to the PNC Ii\nTab A -Biographies on Foreign Minister Kim and\nE\nAmbassador Hahm\nTOP SECRET ENODIS\nare\nDrafted: EA/K:PWKriebel:dpw\nLIERARY BARALD FORD\n3/18/74:X22332\nConcurrences:\nEA/K - Mr. Ranard\nIO - Mr. Buffum (draft) Pick for\nEA - Mr. Sneider\nPM/ISP - Mr. Brown (draft) Pick june\n3C\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032779\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇBiography\nDESCRIPTION\nRe Republic of Korea Official\nCREATION DATE\n03/1974\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/02/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n3D\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032780\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇBiography\nDESCRIPTION\nRe Republic of Korea Official\nCREATION DATE\n03/1974\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/02/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n4A\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032781\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nW.R. Smyser, Richard H. Solomon,\nRichard T. Kennedy\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nSecretary Kissinger\nTITLE\nNSSM 190: Diplomatic Initiatives in\nKorea\nCREATION DATE\n03/20/1974\nVOLUME\n6 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/02/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n4b\nI\n:\nyour\nBERALD\n4C\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032782\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nHenry A. Kissinger\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nThe President\nTITLE\nNegotiations on Terminating the United\nNations Command in Korea\nCREATION DATE\n03/1974\nVOLUME\n4 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILE:\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/02/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n18.50804\n4e\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nNational Security Decision Memorandum\nTO:\nThe Secretary of Defense\nThe Deputy Secretary of State\nDirector, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency\nSUBJECT:\nTermination of the U.N. Command in Korea\nThe President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency\ncomments thereon, and has made the following decisions:\n1. Negotiating Package\nTo maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:\n-- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the\nCommander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signa-\ntory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North\nDept. Guidelines\nKorean representatives should then become the principal members\nof the Military Armistice Commission.\nE.O. SEC 3.3\n12/3/10\n-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force\nDECLASCIFIED\npresence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for\nNARA, Date\na Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and\nultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the\nPeninsula is stabilized.\nNSC Memo,\n-- A. non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.\nBy\n-- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of\nsubstitute security arrangements.\n-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.\n2. Negotiating Strategy\nThe United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks.\nThe Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we\nTOP SECRET SENSITIVE\nXGDS 5b(3)\nBYAUTH H.A. Kissinger\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nshould make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC,\nthe Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:\n-- Consult with the ROK before raising proposals with any of the major\npowers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational\ncontrol of ROK forces from CINCUNC upon its termination to a new\nU. S.- - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.\n-- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling\nrole or direct Soviet involvement.\n-- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit\nagreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the\nsecret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty\nfollowing termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in\nJapan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of\nForces Agreement following termination of the UNC.\nThe minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach\nis to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible\ndebate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.\n3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea\nThere should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of\nour forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security\narrangements following termination of the UNC.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nFORD\nTOP SECRE /SENSITIVE\n9x\nSee SRC book\nfor NSSM 190\n4g\nC\na. FORD\nBERALD\nLIBRARY\n4H\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032783\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nTITLE\nDiplomatic Initiatives in Korea\nCREATION DATE\n03/06/1974\nVOLUME\n10 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\nD\n42\n4J\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032784\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nAssistant to the President for National\nSecurity Affairs\nTITLE\nDiplomatic Initiatives in Korea\nCREATION DATE\n03/07/1974\nVOLUME\n4 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n4K\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032785\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇReport\nTITLE\nAssigned ROK, US, and Katusa Strengths\nas of 31 December 1973\nCREATION DATE\n12/31/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n4.l\nE\na.\nBENGLD\nFORD A LIBRAS\n4M\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032786\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nW.E. Colby\nCREATOR'S TITLE\nDirector\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nThe President\nTITLE\nDiplomatic Initiatives in Korea;\nNSSM-190\nCREATION DATE\n03/02/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\nsanitizel 9/7/02/\nApproved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSU_EA_PA-5-3-4-5\nSECRETI\nstoffing\n25X1\nCENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20505\n4m\n2 March 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT\nSUBJECT: Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea; NSSM-190\n1. Regarding the issue of preserving the UN\nCommand in Korea, I believe that it probably cannot\nbe sustained at the UN beyond this fall's General\nAssembly session, and that an effort to preserve\nthe UNC for another year would be counterproductive.\n2. I feel that North Korea is unlikely to be\nattracted to any of the three options offered in the\nresponse to NSSM-190, but least of all by Option 1.\nI believe that Option 2, however, stands a chance of\ngaining serious North Korean consideration, although\nI am not sanguine in the light of North Korea's cur-\nrent harsh attitude toward the US and South Korea.\nTherefore, the issue might hinge on China's willing-\nness and ability to persuade Pyongyang that the time\nhad come to modify its hard-line posture.\n3. I am concerned that there may be an over-\nestimation of the degree of influence that China might\nbe able to exercise over North Korean actions in the\nnear term, although I believe that China does want to\nplay a constructive role regarding stability on the\nKorean peninsula.\n4. In this connection, the response to NSSM-190,\nin its heavy emphasis on US consultation with Peking,\nmay have understated the USSR interest in the situation.\nI am concerned that Moscow might read the negotiations,\nw/portions exampted\nRACNLF-NSC.EA. RACNLF-NSC.EA.PA-5-3-4-591-104 -5-3-4-5 9/7/04\nNSC Guifelines\nBY\nHR NLF, DATE 1/6/09\n25X1\nTS No. 200531-74\nCy No.\n#1\ns\nFORD\nPresidential Library Review of NSC Equities Requiredor\nBALO\n25X1\nApproved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5\nApproved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-INSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nif pursued as projected, as an effort to exclude it\nfrom an influential role in Korean affairs.\n5. The other matters raised in the response to\nNSSM-190 and the associated papers on future United\nStates force dispositions in South Korea are in my\nview primarily operational in nature, not calling for\nintelligence comment.\nWEColly Colby\nDirector\nFORD\n&\nLIGRAL\n-2-\nTOP SECRET\n25X1\nApproved For Release 2004/09/07 : NLF-NSC_EA_PA-5-3-4-5\nF\nOLVER\n1044 is LIDNA\n40\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032787\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nFred C. Ikle\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nMr. Henry A. Kissinger\nTITLE\nDiplomatic Initiatives in Korea\nCREATION DATE\n03/04/1974\nVOLUME\n4 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n4p\nG\ne. FORD\nDERALD\n4Q\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032788\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nTITLE\nNSSM 171 Follow-On -- Analysis of the\nRole of the Army Division in Korea\nCREATION DATE\n10/13/1973\nVOLUME\n17 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\nH\nFORD is 0972 his\nKennedy\n7322517\n45\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nNovember 27, 1973\nTOP SECRET\nMEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Strategy and Forces for Asia - NSSM 171\nIn his memorandum of August 28, 1973, to members\nof the Defense Program Review Committee, Dr. Kissinger\ndirected the Department of State to prepare an analysis\nof the political and diplomatic implications of con-\nverting the U.S. Second Infantry Division to a more\nmobile configuration.\nThe analysis is attached.\n2) Thomas 102 R. Pickering\nExecutive Secretary\nAttachment:\nAnalysis\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3\nNSC Memo; 3/30/06, State Dept, Gaidelines\nBy NARA, Date 12/3/11\nFORD\nTOP SECRET\nGDS\nRERALO\nLIBRARD\\\nH\n4T\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032789\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇReport\nDESCRIPTION\nUS Force Structure in South Korea\nCREATION DATE\n11/27/1973\nVOLUME\n7 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700244\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (3)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH"
}