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Korea (4)
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Korea (4)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (4)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
/
ROK
MEMORANDUM
1048
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
March 22, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR
CDR
SUBJECT:
Proposed Letter from the President to
the South Korean President Asking that
He See Mr. Henry Kearns
At Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a
proposed letter from him to President Park Chung-hee of South Korea,
asking that he receive Mr. Henry Kearns. Mr. Kearns, now President
of his own consulting firm, is making a trip through East Asia. Although
he has met President Park, he has asked for such a letter from the
President to help him secure a call on President Park.
We understand that Mr. Kearns is not expected to engage in any activities
in Korea that might embarrass the President. I have no objection to such
a letter. The proposed letter has been coordinated with Dave Gergen.
Since Mr. Kearns is leaving today (March 22), I suggest that the text of
the President's letter be cabled to Embassy Seoul.
Recommendation:
That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.
Concurrence:
Mr. Smyserw RS/OAR
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GDS
1090
1b
MEMORANDUM
1048
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Proposed Letter from You to the
President of South Korea Asking
That He See Mr. Henry Kearns
At Tab A is a proposed letter from you to President Park Chung-hee
suggesting that he receive Mr. Henry Kearns. Mr. Kearns, now
President of his own consulting firm, is making a trip through East
Asia. Although he has met President Park, he has asked (Tab B)
for such a letter from the President to help him secure a call on
President Park.
I have no objection to such a letter. The proposed letter has been
coordinated with Dave Gergen.
Recommendation:
That you sign the draft letter to President Park at Tab A.
FORD
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
GDS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. President:
Mr. Henry Kearns, the former President of the
Export-Import Bank, is visiting your country on
a private business trip. I understand that he has
already made your acquaintance, but know that he
would appreciate the opportunity of calling on you
in this instance.
May I take the occasion of Mr. Kearns' visit to
extend to you my warmest personal regards, and
my good wishes for your continued health and
well-being.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Chung-hee Park
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul
OHO
1048
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
To Generalbeowcroft
Date 3/15/74
From Rose Mary Woods
Rond
FYI
Please Handle
If this is O.K. I
hope we can do this
for Henry because he
did a great job head
f Bunh. Export Import
1048
P
Y
Henry Kearns
Kearns International
March 14, 1974
Dear Rose:
If this is too presumptious please dump in waste basket.
Next Friday, the 22nd, I am leaving for my first trip abroad since
leaving ExIm Bank.
My travels take me to Tiawan, Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Manila,
Singapore and Jakarta.
I have some very definite views that may be very helpful to Korea.
My question: Could I have a note addressed to President Chung Hee Park
-- of greeting ? I have met him on several occasions but my Korean
friends advise that such a note will insure a hearing.
Our plans are slowly developing. A S you can see we are gradually
getting our offices opened. Marge and I plan to live in San Francisco.
Have purchased a beautiful apartment with a world of view -- sold our
house in Spring Valley. When you get out of this "vale of tears" we
are saving a room for you.
Love,
Henry /s/
if
HK
KEARNS INTERNATIONAL
Henry Kearns, President
Wanch 14, 1474
Clean ROSE
It this is too Presamptions
Place damp is wrste besket.
Next Friday they 2241 j
Am lessing fez my first This
Abroad 5144 Loving
travels take me To Travey
Irprul the Koned, Hony King, Monite
Signapore + Jokento-
I have some very definite
viðre that May /4 usey helptal &.
GERALD FORD LIGHABLE
To Kower -
lhy could I Grae A
Noto to President
Chang Hat PARK!- of smiting. I Grat
met him in Ilveral occurious
Principal Office 155 Sansome Street San Francisco, California 94104 Telephone 415/986-2900 Cable KEARNSINTSFO Telex WU 340966
Washington Office 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 Telephone 202/387-7500 Cable KEARNSINTWSH Telex WU 892793
19
АЖ
KEARNS INTERNATIONAL
Henry Kearns, President
but my Kowldy Friends Adoreo that
such A Note will in 54120 A
hearing
OUR plans Ane slowly developing,
As you car 20 we ot ne gradailly
getting oun offices opened. thread
And I play to live in Sry trancisce,
here purchased A beautitul specification
with A would of view soll CC,R
horse in speay Valley - Whom you
git cul it this cib of Trees" ne
Are siving A Rever for yes,
Lout
Quez
FORD is LIBRARY 077356
Principal Office 155 Sansome Street San Francisco. California 94104 Telephone 415/986-2900 Cable KEARNSINTSFO Telex. WU 340966
Washington Office 1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W Washington. DC 20006 Telephone 202/387-7500 Cable KEARNSINTWSH Telex WU 892793
2A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032790
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser, Richard Solomon, Richard
T. Kennedy
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
Reclame on Two Issues in NSSM 190:
Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/22/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700245
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
2B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032791
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry A. Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
The President
TITLE
Negotiations on Terminating the United
Nations Command in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700245
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
2°C
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
National Security Decision Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea
The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency
comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:
1.
Negotiating Package
To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:
-- The transfer of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) into the
South-North Coordinating Committee (SNCC) framework. U.S.
and ROK military commanders would be substituted for the
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signa-
tory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North
Korean representatives would become the principal members of the
MAC.
NARA, Date 12/6/10 Guidelines
-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force
presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for
a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and
ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on the
Peninsula is stabilized.
-- PRC opening of contacts with the ROK, and Soviet expansion of
contacts with that country. The U.S. will undertake a gradual ex-
pansion of contacts with North Korea. In the process, we will
E.O
consult closely with Japan and will keep the ROK informed.
NSC
By
-- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
-- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of
substitute security arrangements.
-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(3)
BYAUTH H.A. Kissinger
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
2.
Negotiating Strategy
The United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks.
The Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we
should make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC,
the Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:
-- Consult with the ROK before raising the proposals with any of the
major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to the organi-
zation, upon the termination of CINCUNC, of a contingency U.S. -
ROK combined command to take operational control in the event of
hostilities.
-- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling
role or direct Soviet involvement.
-- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit
agreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the
secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty
following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in
Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of
Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.
The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating
approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position
for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly
this coming fall.
3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea
There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of
our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security
arrangements following termination of the UNC.
Henry A. Kissinger
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
20
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032792
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Henry A. Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
The President
TITLE
Negotiations on Terminating the United
Nations Command in Korea
CREATION DATE
03/1974
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700245
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
2
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
National Security Decision Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea
The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments
thereon, and has made the following decisions:
1.
Negotiating Packages
To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:
-- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's
signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK
and North Korean representatives should then become the
3503.0
Suidelines
principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.
NARA, Date 12/6/10
-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force
presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return
for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce
and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on
the Peninsula is stabilized.
-- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
E.O.
NSC Memo,
-- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package
By
of substitute security arrangements.
-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.
2.
Negotiating Strategy
A two-track negotiating strategy should be pursued, with the Seoul-
Pyongyang track being primary. In the second track, the U.S. should
FUND
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
2
make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, Soviet
Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:
-- Consult with the ROK before making proposals to any of the
major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer
operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its
termination, to a new U.S. - ROK combined command under a
senior U.S. military officer.
Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling
role or direct Soviet involvement.
-- After contacts with the PRC, inform other members of the UNC
Liaison Group, as well as allies which contributed forces to
the UNC.
-- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an
explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would
extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual
Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not
seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under
the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of
the UNC.
The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach
is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible
debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.
3.
U.S. Force Presence in South Korea
There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our
forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrange-
ments following termination of the UNC.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc:
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS
2F
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032793
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
Richard H. Solomon, John A. Froebe
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
The Korean Situation: Moving on the
U.N. Command in the Wake of the UNGA
Debate
CREATION DATE
12/20/1973
VOLUME
12 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700245
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea (4)
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
3
IDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
27 MARCH 1974
- 21 -
KOREA
DPRK PROPOSES DIRECT PEACE TALKS WITH UNITED STATES
A North Korean announcement on 25 March that Pyongyang was ready
to enter direct talks with the United States on a peace agreement
to replace the "outdated" 1953 Korean armistice agreement appears
to stem in part from DPRK dissatisfaction with its sporadic
negotiations with Seoul. The proposal also seems to be a
tactical maneuver aimed at regaining the propaganda initiative
seized by Seoul on 18 January, when it called for a North-South
nonaggression pact. The proposal for U.S. -DPRK negotiations was
announced by Foreign Minister Ho Tam at a 25 March session of the
Supreme People's Assembly.
The substance of the Pyongyang proposals suggests they were made
largely for propaganda advantage: the DPRK offer is predicated
on the elimination of U.S. military and political influence in
South Korea, demanding a virtual capitulation of U.S. positions
in the ROK as a precondition for a North Korean "pledge" with no
provisions for enforcement--that it would not attack the United
States nor expand its military capabilities. Under Pyongyang's
proposal, the United States would be committed to withdraw all
U.S. troops from South Korea "at the earliest possible date along
with all their weapons" and to agree not to interfere "in any
form" " in the internal affairs of Korea. The proposal recommends
the appointment of delegates at "a rank higher than those of the
Korean Military Armistice Commission" to attend talks at
Panmunjom or in a third country.
Pyongyang has made no secret of its dissatisfaction with the
North-South Korea talks over the past year, but there is no
indication in the new proposal that these stalemated talks would
be interrupted in favor of U.S.-DPRK negotiations. The fifth
session of the current series of North-South meetings of the
Coordination Committee's vice chairmen was held on 27 March and
another is scheduled for 24 April. Ho Tam's reference to the
talks sounded a pessimistic note regarding the level of antagonism
between the two sides, warning that "the dialog between the North
and South has come to the verge of rupture and the situation is
moving to division, not reunification, and to war, not peace."
Thus far there has been little communist comment on the DPRK
proposal, though NCNA has transmitted extensive excerpts of the
SPA letter and pertinent excerpts from Ho Tam's report. TASS has
R
CONFIDENTIAL
AUTHORIT
NSC
LIBRARY
4/24/07
HR
1/6/09
CONF IDENTIAL
FBIS TRENDS
27 MARCH 1974
- 22 -
carried three brief dispatches on the letter, and a TASS review
of IZVESTIYA for 27 March noted that a Yuriy Shtykanov article
hailed the "new, major initiative" as being in the interest of
peace. A PAP report of a DZIENNIK LUDOWY commentary expressed
hope that U.S. officials would examine the SPA document "without
emotions or prejudices."
BACKGROUND
For the past 17 years official North Korean efforts
to prompt a U.S. withdrawal have centered on the
conclusion of a peace agreement with South Korea. In September
1957 North Korean president and party leader Kim Il-song proposed
that an agreement be signed and the armed forces of the two sides
"be reduced drastically after all foreign troops are withdrawn
from our country. " In a more specific offer, the North Korean
Government announced in June 1970 that after a U.S. withdrawal the
two sides could conclude an agreement and reduce the size of their
armed forces to 100,000 or less. Two years later Pyongyang
modified its position, asserting that an agreement could precede
withdrawal. In a report to the SPA session in April 1973,
Premier Kim Il proposed the conclusion of a peace agreement that
would guarantee among other things the eventual withdrawal of
U.S. forces. As a further inducement, a letter sent to all
foreign governments and parliaments by the SPA at the same time
announced that "if the U.S. forces pull out of South Korea, we are
willing to reduce our army strength to 200,000 or less of our own
accord. "
of
FORD
BALD
LIBRARY
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM
LC:
WJDF
F
4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
CONFIDENTIAL
March 26, 1974
I
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
PL-480 Illustrative Country Distribution
for AID Congressional
On March 23 I met with Under Secretary Sisco and representatives of
the various State regional bureaus. Privately Sisco apologized for not
having coordinated fully with the NSC staff earlier. After extensive
discussion, including consultations on Monday, it was agreed that:
-- it is important to show $150 million for Korea; although
AID has a calculation of the Korean commitment at $135 million per
year, this is less than has been discussed with the Koreans;
-- there is a substantial but manageable Congressional problem
in showing a large program for Chile;
-- if the totals for Pakistan and Bangladesh are close, it would
be preferable to have Pakistan equal or higher than Bangladesh.
The $50 million increase for Korea is being obtained by reducing:
Vietnam
$15 million
Chile
$15 million
Bangladesh
$ 6 million
Philippines
$ 6 million
Cambodia
$ 3 million
Sri Lanka
$ 2 million
Small amounts in
$ 3 million
other countries
The Chileans will be informed at a high level that we hope to provide about
$70 million in PL-480 although only $35 million is being shown in this
illustrative presentation.
John A. Bushnell
CC: Cooper/Kennedy/Scowcroft/
Smyser/Horan/Saunders/Low
E.O. 1
SEC 3.3
NSC
Guidslines
CONFIDENTIAL
By
Hh
NARA, Date 12/6/10
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
REAS-11
DEPARTMENT
OF
Fracher
CUNUM
STATE
*
RESEARCH STUDY
UNITED STATES OF
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
THIS ADVANCE COPY IS PROVIDED FOR
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT
March 29, 1974
C
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR
CITE IN LISTINGS OF FINISHED
INTELLIGENCE.
NORTH KOREAN MILITARY FORCES:
GRADUAL GROWTH
Summary
Possibly stimulated by the perennial crop of rumors
that North Korea plans a summer invasion, South Korean
officials have expressed concern that in recent months
the North has:
redeployed its ground forces toward South Korea
"in a major way";
modernized its air, tank, and artillery forces
with the same kind of equipment that the Soviet
Union supplied the Arab countries before the
Middle East War;
-constructed new forward air bases, aircraft
shelters, and antiaircraft and missile emplace-
ments;
built new naval ports near the DMZ; and
stepped up the rate of naval patrols and under-
taken military and diplomatic efforts to reassert
its authority over five South Korean-held islands
off the North Korean coast.
Although Pyongyang has substantially increased its
military capabilities over the course of the past few
years, we see no evidence to support the contention that
a recent acceleration has taken place or that Pyongyang
has acquired equipment comparable to that possessed by the
Arabs.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652: 58. (29ro
This report was produced by the Bureau
DECLASSIFIED
(Classified by D. Mark)
of Intelligence and Research. Aside from
normal substantive exchange with other
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
agencies at the working level, it has not
been coordinated elsewhere.
By
Dr
State Dept Guidslines state 9/17/03
NARA, Date 12/6/10
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
- ii -
Given Pyongyang's desire neither to strengthen Park
against his critics nor to displease the Chinese and
Soviets unnecessarily, Northern moves which might seri-
ously destabilize the situation in the peninsula are
unlikely. A renewed infiltration campaign would be low-
cost but probably ineffective, a seizure of one of the
ROK-held islands off the Northern coast would risk delaying
the departure of the UN Command, and a ground invasion of
the South would involve daunting risks and uncertainties
for Pyongyang.
Prepared by D. T. Jones
x22574
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FORD
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
The Army
The North Korean Army (NKA), with an estimated strength
of 386,000 today compared with 371,000 in 1969, has grown
slowly over the past decade--remaining a relatively constant
3 percent of the population. There has been no evidence
during this period of rapid force buildups or extended mobil-
ization of reserves.
Building on extensive fortifications dating from the
later stages of the Korean war, the North has continued a
vigorous military construction program along the DMZ, today
probably the world's most heavily fortified area. The miles-
deep defensive positions include bomb-proof troop shelters,
stockpiles in caves and tunnels, and extensively interconnected
trenches, bunkers, and defensive positions.
The NKA is a well-armed force, but this stems from effort
dating at least as far back as the mid-1960's, not from any
recent crash reequipment program. Much of its military hard-
ware is produced at home. For more than 10 years, the North
has provided its own light infantry weapons, basic munitions,
mortars, light trucks, and field communications equipment.
More recently, it has begun producing medium and heavy trucks.
Armor, in which North Korea outstrips the South, is
imported. Relatively modern T-54 (USSR) and T-59 (PRC)
medium tanks delivered in recent years are outnumbered by
World War II-vintage Soviet T-34's and assault guns. The
more modern Soviet T-62 medium tank has not been supplied to
the DPRK, nor does the rate of Soviet and Chinese deliveries
appear to have accelerated notably during the past two years.
Anti-tank weapons are mostly low-power (82mm) recoilless
rifles and light AT guns (57mm). But the USSR has also pro-
vided its earliest model wire guided anti-tank missile, the
Snapper/Swatter, 27 units of which were shown at the 1972
North Korean Army anniversary parade.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
FORD
STRALD
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
- 2 -
For many years dependent on the Soviet Union for artil-
lery, the North began making the Chinese-designed 107mm
rocket launcher several years ago, and possibly the 130mm
field gun as well. The current inventory of its well-
organized and effective artillery force consists of about
2,000 "tubes," mostly 76mm and 85mm divisional guns.
Navy
Although still the smallest of the three services, the
North Korean Navy has grown rapidly from a personnel strength
of 9,400 in 1966 to 14,600 in 1972 and 17,500 today; it is
now markedly superior to the ROK navy. Although still pri-
marily a coastal defense force, its guided missile boats and
submarines give it a modest capability to interdict shipping
in the Sea of Japan.
The navy is divided into separate fleets for east and
west coasts, and the vast majority of its 300 units are small
motor gun boats (61), motor torpedo boats (121), or other
light craft. The navy also includes Soviet/PRC-supplied sub-
marines and subchasers, however, and Pyongyang's fleet of
8 Osa and 10 Komar units, delivered by the Soviets over a
period of several years, gives the North the world's fourth-
largest guided missile boat force. In the late 1960's, the
North launched a naval construction program. The construc-
tion of motor torpedo boats and a new type of rocket firing
boat is being emphasized, but two destroyer escorts have also
been completed.
Air Force
Primarily designed to defend North Korean airspace, the
NKAF fighter force consists largely of obsolete MIG-15/17's,
supplemented by approximately 110 Soviet-supplied high per-
formance MIG-21's, the large majority of which have been in
service since the late 1960's. Substantial numbers of MIG-19's
from the PRC, useful for ground attack, are supplemented by
70 aging IL-28 light bombers and 24 more recently delivered
Soviet SU-7's. There is an extensive SAM defense system, but
the North Koreans do not appear to possess surface-to-air
missiles as sophisticated as those supplied by the Soviets
to Middle Eastern nations.
For over a decade the North has been protecting its air
force by hardening existing air bases, constructing individual
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revetted hangerettes and caves for aircraft. Underground
storage facilities for airfields have also been built; three
of these are close to the DMZ, but construction has been
desultory and two are still incomplete after several years
of effort.
Recent Military Activity
North Korean naval operations late in 1973 gave some
cause for concern about Pyongyang's longer term intentions.
Throughout 1973 the North had expanded naval patrols and
operations. In October, for the first time, DPRK naval
patrol operations were mounted south of the Northern Limit
Line (NLL), the unofficial US-ROK extension of the DMZ
westwardinto the Yellow Sea. After several DPRK penetrations
of the three-mile "contiguous waters" around five ROK-held
island groups near the NLL, Seoul protested at a December 1
Military Armistice Commission meeting. While not challenging
the South Korean presence on the islands, Pyongyang claimed
that they lie in North Korean territorial waters, and took
the position that Seoul should seek Pyongyang's permission
for ship visits to the islands. Ignoring Pyongyang's demand,
the ROK continued resupply missions with additional naval
protection.
Thereafter, the confrontation receded. Except for minor
harassment, the North avoided the ROK supply convoys; having
laid the apparent groundwork for claiming legal jurisdiction
over the area when the UN Command is abolished, Pyongyang has
stated that Seoul's supply convoys will not be bothered if
they "come and go quietly." Isolated incidents, such as the
February 15 sinking of an ROK fishing boat, may still occur, *
but DPRK patrol craft have generally stopped harassing ROK
vessels and, since January 5, have not entered ROK-claimed
waters contiguous to the islands.
Capabilities and Intentions
Intensified training and modernized military forces give
From time to time over a period of years the North has
seized small fishing boats, Japanese and South Korean, which
it claims have violated its coastal waters. The February 15
sinking of one ROK fishing boat and capture of another, appar-
ently unpremeditated by Pyongyang, thus falls within an estab-
lished pattern of behavior.
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North Korea the theoretical capability of undertaking any of
several offensive actions against the South: renewing infil-
tration/guerrilla efforts of the type pursued in the 1960's;
launching an amphibious assault against the ROK-held islands
off the North Korean coasts; or opening a limited conventional
attack across the DMZ.
Certain elements in the current situation could lead
Pyongyang into offensive action against the South. There
are tenuous but persistent indications that the military now
has a stronger role in the North Korean hierarchy, and that
Pyongyang expects no further gains in North-South negotiations.
Kim Il Sung, who reportedly believes that the North missed a
golden opportunity for intervention during the 1960 student
uprisings, conceivably might see similar opportunities in
current domestic unrest in the ROK.
Outweighing these considerations, in our estimation,
are a number of constraints on any aggressive impulses in
Pyongyang:
the uncertain reaction of Peking and Moscow, whose
support Pyongyang needs, and who both, while gener-
ally standing behind Pyongyang's positions, clearly
prefer not to see the Korean situation flare up;
the desire to avoid moves that would be likely to
impede North Korean efforts to win wider international
recognition; and
possible recognition that pressure on the ROK may
strengthen the Park regime by creating greater
internal cohesion.
These constraints would appear to be least effective
against a renewed infiltration effort, which the North could
readily mount by utilizing existing manpower and support
capabilities. Pyongyang would regard such an effort as
involving little risk of ROK or US retaliation and would
expect to avoid adverse international reactions by denying
responsibility for what they would describe as locally-
generated insurgent activities.
Under present circumstances, however, an infiltration
campaign would be a nuisance rather than a serious threat
to Seoul. Notwithstanding Park's growing unpopularity,
there is no evidence of significant sympathy for Pyongyang
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in the ROK. In all probability an effort to stimulate
insurgency today would fail as completely as Pyongyang's
effort to do so in the 1960's, and in addition would rally
support for Park. Nonetheless, should the domestic situa-
tion in the South substantially worsen, Pyongyang could
view infiltration as a low-cost opportunity to fish in
troubled waters.
A seizure of one or more of the offshore islands would
carry similar likelihood of strengthening Park against his
domestic critics, and in addition could directly jeopardize
Northern hopes of seeing the UN Command terminated in the
near future. These constraints could diminish, however, if
Park visibly brought his internal problems under control and
the UN Command were terminated. The islands' value is psycho-
logical rather than strategic. In Pyongyang's eyes the seizure
of even the smallest would be a significant victory that could
be achieved at relatively low cost, since the North will have
naval and air superiority even after the South completes
current measures to strengthen the islands' defense.
The last and least likely contingency is a Northern
invasion of the South. ROK officials continue to express
concern that a sudden seizure of Seoul, followed by a cease-
fire agreed to in response to external pressure, would leave
the North in a position to extract concessions, such as US
troop withdrawal. But the North Korean leaders would obviously
also be strongly conscious of the difficulties of crossing the
fortified defenses north of Seoul and of the risks of being
thrown back by South Korean forces supported by US units.
:
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
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March 29, 1974
National Security Decision Memorandum 251
TO:
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
SUBJECT:
Termination of the U.N. Command in Korea
The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments
thereon, and has made the following decisions:
1.
Negotiating Packages
To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:
-- Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commanders for the
Commander in Chief United Nations Command as our side's
signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK
and North Korean representatives should then become the
CRESSSVIDED
principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.
-- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force
presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return
for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce
and ultimately withdraw U.S. forces as the security situation on
the Peninsula is stabilized.
-- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U.N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package
of substitute security arrangements.
-- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.
2.
Negotiating Strategy
A two-track negotiating strategy should be pursued, with the Seoul-
Pyongyang track being primary. In the second track, the U.S. should
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2
make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, Soviet
Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:
Consult with the ROK before making proposals to any of the
major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer
operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its
termination, to a new U.S. - ROK combined command under a
senior U.S. military officer.
-- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling
role or direct Soviet involvement.
After contacts with the PRC, inform other members of the UNC
Liaison Group, as well as allies which contributed forces to
the UNC.
-- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an
explicit agreement from the Japanese Government which would
extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S. - Japan Mutual
Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not
seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under
the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of
the UNC.
The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach
is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible
debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.
3.
U.S. Force Presence in South Korea
There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our
forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrange-
ments following termination of the UNC.
A. Kin
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
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