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Korea (5)
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24465887
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Korea (5)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Country Files
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Korea (South)
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1974-04-30
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea (5)" of the NSC East Asian
and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
'la
MEMORANDUM
X-1343
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
April 4, 1974
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER
EAS
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:
UNC Termination
At Tab A is our redraft of State's instruction to Ambassador Habib
authorizing him to undertake discussions with the ROKG on our
negotiating package and strategy for termination of the UNC (Tab C).
Our redraft is intended to:
--Separate the issue of successor U.S. and ROK military
commanders from that of continued U.S. operational control of
ROK forces. The State draft attempts to tie these issues together
in a way that violates the intent of the NSDM. The State draft also
tries to solve the procedural question of who would designate U.S.
and ROK members on the MAC under the new arrangements. This
procedural issue does not need to be addressed at this point -- and
the State approach (that we appoint both U.S. and ROK representatives)
would needlessly offend ROK nationalist sensitivities.
--Set out clearly the elements of our negotiating proposal as a
package. The State draft obscures these by trying to weave the
question of continued U.S. operational control of ROK forces into
the description of the negotiating package.
--Clarify our basic negotiating strategy. The State draft,
partly because of intentionally ambigious language in the NSDM
on this point, is not specific on the question of the interrelationship
between our approaches to the PRC, the USSR, and Japan. In
FO&D
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(2)
BYAUTH Gen Scowcroft
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSGMemo, in 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
state
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE
2
addition, the State draft tries to solve the question of timing between
our approaches to the PRC, the Soviets, and the Japanese. We
believe this tactical move should be left for later consideration
and should be carefully controlled by the NSC.
2. At Tab B is a draft backchannel message from you to Ambassador
Habib which would give him a more complete statement of our
thinking on the negotiating package and strategy than we believe can
be included in the front channel message.
Recommendation:
That you approve our redraft of the proposed State message at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
That you approve the draft backchannel to Ambassador Habib at Tab B.
Approve
Disapprove
FORN
are
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
if
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12
led)
SEC 3.3
TOP SEGRET/NODIS
NSC Memo,
$/35/00,
State
Dept. Guidellnes
state wiew
)
By
m
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
IMMEDIATE
TO: SEOUL
FROM: SECSTATE
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
SUBJECT: Discussions with ROKG on UN Command
REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL
1. You are authorized to inform Foreign Minister Kim that USG
has completed review of possible alternative arrangements to UNC
and is prepared to work with ROKG toward this objective. As
substitute for UNC, we would propose to offer the other side the
following package as a basis for negotiations:
--Substitution of U.S. and ROK military commands for CINCUNC
as our side's signatory to the Armistice Agreement. The ROK
and North Korean representatives would become the principal
members of MAC. Whether substitution of these successor
signatories would be done by formal amendment of the Armistice
Agreement, or by a unilateral declaration by our side which
FOKN
OP SEGRET/NODIS
XGDS 5b(2)
TOP SECRET/NODIS
2
would be agreed to by the other side, is a tactical question that
we would leave for the negotiations. The successor U.S. signatory
presumably would be COMUSFK. The ROK commander would be for
the ROKG to designate.
-Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U.S. force
presence'in South Korea for at least the intermediate term, in
return for a Shanghai-type public statement or communique committing
ourselves to reduce and ultimately to withdraw U.S. Forces from
Korea as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
By "intermediate term, " we
mean at least until we are confident that substitute arrangements
are formally in place -- which presumably would require a minimum
of one to two years after the conclusion of substitute arrangements.
During this time we would contemplate no substantial changes in
the level or the missions of our forces in South Korea.
--A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
-- UN Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package
of substitute security arrangements.
- --Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
3
2. The essential element in this package is the continued effective
direct U.S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the ongoing implementation
of the Armistice Agreement.
3. Corollary Questions.
a. Operational control of ROK forces. Since operational
control of the ROK Armed Forces has been given to CINCUNC by the
ROKG, we propose that the ROKG agree to transfer operational
control of ROK forces from CINCUNC, upon its termination, to
a U.S. - ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military
officer. We have not considered the details of such a combined
command, but if the principle is acceptable to the ROKG, the
appropriate U.S. and ROK military staffs could begin drafting
proposals for consideration by our two governments.
b. FYI: Questions of U.S. use of Japanese bases for the defense
of South Korea under the U.S. - Japan SOFA and of UN third country
use of Japanese bases under the UN - Japan SOFA are being
handled separately. END FYI.
4. Negotiating Strategy. We would intend to pursue this negotiation
along two tracks: (a) Seoul - Pyongyang, this track being primary;
TOP SECRET/NODIS
TOP SECRET/NODIS
4
and (b) paralleling this, U.S. approaches to the PRC and USSR.
We would also consult closely with Japan as well as with other
members of the UNC Liaison Group and allies who have contributed
forces to the UNC. We will be prepared to approach the PRC,
USSR, Japan, and others after we have concerted with the ROK
on the negotiating package and basic strategy. We will at that
time address the question of the precise timing of these several
approaches.
5.- Our minimum immediate objective in these negotiations is
to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for
possible debate of the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly
this coming fall.
6. You are requested to discuss above on a close-hold basis
with CINCUNC.
7. DOD concurs.
1080
TOP SECRET/NODIS
IC
DECLARUISED
E.O.
SEC 3.3
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
NSC Memo
foot. Guidelines
By May
State review
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
BACKCHANNEL
TO: AMERICAN EMBASSY SEOUL
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
(Exclusively EYES ONLY for Ambassador Habib from General Scowcroft)
SUBJECT: UNC Termination
1. In a front channel message from State, you will be
receiving the basic instruction for your approach to the
ROKG on our negotiating package and strategy for the
termination of the UNC. This backchannel is intended
to elaborate on the State message by outlining our view
regarding the basic negotiating strategy, our immediate
objectives, and tactics in these negotiations.
2. Basic Strategy. We believe our fundamental approach
in these negotiations should be that, while eliminating the
UNC, we should hold the other elements in the security
equilibrium constant, until we can be assured that the
substitute arrangements are firmly in place. Thus, we
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(2)
BYAUTH Gen Scowcroft
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
want to keep the US -- and the PRC -- directly involved in the ongoing
implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Given the present inef-
fectiveness of the SNCC and the unlikelihood that the US and PRC could
operate in a meaningful manner in that forum, we believe the MAC and
our involvement in it must not repeat not be transferred to the SNCC,
at least at' this time. Similarly, we want to keep both the level and
missions of U.S. forces in South Korea constant, at least through the
transition to post-UNC termination arrangements.
3. Minimum Immediate Objectives. As stated in the front channel,
our minimum immediate objective should be to place ourselves by early
summer in a defensible position vis-a-vis a possible UNGA debate of
the Korean question. We hope Pyongyang will agree to negotiate on the
basis of our initial package (perhaps with PRC urging), although we have
no illusions on this score. Thus, while pressing the other side to agree to
negotiate our initial package, we should use the negotiating process asa
means of exploring the range of new arrangements which might be
acceptable to Pyongyang. We will consider fallbacks, but only after
we find ourselves unable to get the other side to negotiate on the basis
of our initial package. In particular, we want to avoid a fallback
which would transfer the MAC into the SNCC.
We do not
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
3
want to begin back-pedaling until we have a clear idea
of the other side's position -- if we must back-pedal
at all.
4. Negotiating Tactics.
a. For obvious reasons, our front channel indicates
that we would approach the PRC and Soviets as equals on
this problem. In fact, we intend to work primarily in
parallel with the PRC both to backstop and to restrain
our respective Korean allies as necessary -- while still
aiming to leave the primary negotiating role to the two
Koreas. We have complex objectives with the USSR: to
keep the Russians generally informed of our new position
in hopes of discouraging them from attempting to play a
spoiling role; but also to box them out of any direct part
in the negotiations.
b. We believe our principle negotiating leverage will
lie with two factors: first, our very willingness to go
through with the termination of the UNC; and second, the
presumed interest on the part of the PRC -- and secondarily
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
4
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
the Soviets -- - - in limiting instability on the Peninsula,
along with their probable distrust of North Korea's
militant inclinations. We recognize that current PRC
internal developments may have reduced Peking's influence
with Pyohgyang. We have not, however, concluded that
any decline in influence has been so great as to vitiate our
proposed approach.
5. As the imminent arrival in New York of a high-level
PRC delegation to participate in the special UNGA session
may afford the Secretary an opportunity to discuss the UNC
package with Chinese leaders on a personal basis, we hope
you can give us at least a provisional read-out of ROK
thinking on the negotiating package by April 9 at the latest.
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
Id
FORM DS 322{0CR}
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
review
9/17/03
By Wa
State Dept Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/6/10
EA/K:PWKRIEBEL:LM
4/3/74 EXT 22332
D - KENNETH RUSH
EA RSINGERSOLL
EA - - RLSNEIDER
EA/K - DLRANARD
I0/UNP - LTSTULL {DRAFT}
PM/ISP - LHBROWN {DRAFT}
DOD/ISA - RADMTJBIGLEY {DRAFT}
DOD/JCS - BGAPHANKET {DRAFT}
NSC - WRSMYSER
IMMEDIATE
SEOUL
NODIS
KR
E.O 11652: XGDS
PL
TAGS: PFOR MARR KS
RS
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
RL
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH ROKG ON UN COMMAND
3r
IL
LT
REF
STATE 35341 NOTAL
LH
1.
YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER THAT USG
HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS
TJB
TO UN COMMAND AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD
APH
THIS OBJECTIVE. OUR PROPOSAL CENTERS AROUND GROUP OF
WRS
RELATED AGREEMENTS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, INCLUDING A
on
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE UN COMMAND, TACIT ACCEPTANCE OF A
CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA, A NONAGGRESSION
and
GHA
PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS, AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL
S/S
ENDORSEMENT OF THESE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS.
SPECIFICALLY, YOU MAY DISCUSS OUR PROPOSAL WITH FOREIGN
MINISTER ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:
A. WE WISH TO AVOID ANY CHANGE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
OTHER THAN DENOTING A SUCCESSOR TO THE UN COMMAND.
11.
NONSTITUTE FOR UN COMMAND. WE SUGGEST SUBSTITUTING
11.5 AND NOK MILITARY COMMANDERS AS SUCCESSORS IN COMMAND
MILL
is THE UN COMMAND AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE 1953
ADDRE
MII !AN: ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IN EFFECT THIS WOULD MEAN
ATTA
TOP in SECRET
BRAR
FORM DS 322A(0CR)
TOP SECRET
la
ESTABLISHING NEW COMBINED U.S. -ROK MILITARY COMMAND. 11 IN
this
OUR VIEW THAT THE COMMANDER OF THIS COMBINED COMMAND WOULD
No
DESIGNATE A RON OFFICER AS THE SENIOR MEMBER OF THE MAC FOR
OUR SIDE, AND THAT THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES
WOULD THUS BE,COME THE PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY
pre The - and
ARMISTICE COMMISSION.
-
in,
1.5
C. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF*THE OF ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCUNC
it!
United
BY THE ROKG. PROPOSE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES TO THE NEW U.S. -ROK
COMBINED COMMAND WHICH WOULD BE HEADED BY A SENIOR U.S.
MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED THE DETAILS OF
SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND BUT, IF PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO
THE ROKG, THL APPROPRIATE U.S. AND ROK MILITARY STAFFS
COULD BEGIN DRAFTING NECESSARY PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION-
D. ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. FORCES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO
SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED
U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE KOREAN, PENINSULA IS STABILIZED. FYI. WE HAVE IN
MIND A SHANGHAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO REDUCE
AND ULTIMATEL! WITHDRAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY POSITION
IMPROVES. WE 30 NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE
LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK DURING THE
PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
END FYI.
E. OTHER ELEMENTS IN OUR PACKAGE: A NONAGGRESSION PACT
BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS: AND UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT
OF THE SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. PRESIDENT PARK'S
FORD
JANUARY NONAGGREESION PACT PROPOSAL WOULD BE THE BASIS FOR
DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT.
SERALD
LIBRARY
2. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE BELIEVE THAT TWO SETS OF
NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE NECESSARY.
THE FIRST AND PRIMARY WILL BE ROK NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
NORTH. THE SECOND WILL BE U.S. PARALLEL APPROACHES TO THE
MAJOR POWERS: PRC, USSR AND JAPAN. TIMING WILL BE
w - smalled m and
IMPORTANT IN DETERMINING THE ACTUAL INITIATION OF THE
Role DPAK plan
APPROACHES. you MAY INFORM THE ROKG THAT WE ARE PREPARED
TO APPROACH THE PRC AND USSR JUST AS 500N AS WE AND THE
us esse
ROKG ARE IN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
MENTS. UE BLLIEVE WC SHOULD CONSULT WITH JAPAN, OTHER
inform this l
NATIONS CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO THE UN COMMAND, AND MEMBERS
counding Iquart
OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP. IN THIS CONNECTION, WE INTEND
widout wal
TO CONSULT CLOSELY AND FREQUENTLY WITH JAPAN AND WE LEAN
TOWARD CONSUL ING WITH JAPAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PROBABL
to ful PRC l
JUST BEFORE WE TALK TO PRC AND SOVIETS.
Smit m epal
plane M
TOP SECRET
thire.
FORM DS 322A{0CR)
TOP SECRET
I 3
3. TIMING. OUR MINIMUM OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS
IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE
POSITION IN ANTICIPATION OF A POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN
ISSUE IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS FALL.
WITH CINCUNC.
4. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON CLOSE HOLD BASIS
5. DOD CONCURS. YY
:
FORD
GREATO
LIBRARY
TOP SECRET
TALE
le
TRANSMITTED BY:
TAI-
(
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
'7'
APR
Adv
PM 6:58
Operations Center
3 APR 74 18: 52
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
WHITE HOUSE
Mann
S/S #
SITUAT ION ROOM
LDX MESSAGE NO. 828 CLASSIFICATION TOP SECRET/NODIS . NO. PAGES 3
DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Telegram to Seoul re Discussions with ROKG on UN EXXXX
Command
FROM:
S/S
,
,
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
NSC
MRS. DAVIS
,
,
.
,
,
,
,
,
.
,
,
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE XXXXX INFORMATION
/
PER REQUEST
!
COMMENT
/
REMARKS:
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
Executive Secretariat Aray Officer
LIBRARY BERALD ? FORD
2a
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT ACTION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 9, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W.R. SMYSER
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
SUBJECT:
UNC Termination
We believe that in this instance it would be highly useful to supplement our
front channel instruction to Ambassador Habib on the negotiating package
for UNC termination (Tab B) with a backchannel. The draft backchannel
at Tab A gives Ambassador Habib our thinking behind the negotiating
package and strategy. We believe this would be particularly useful in light
of continuing differences in approach between ourselves and the bureaucracy,
including Embassy Seoul. State, Defense, and Habib all would reduce U.S.
involvement in the Korean Peninsula at a considerably faster pace than we
believe wise -- and in a manner than would carry an excessive risk of
destabilizing the political-security situation. This supplementary guidance
to Habib should reduce divergences in implementing the policy on UNC
termination outlined in our front channel.
We have, however, suggested that Habib use a front channel to make any
comments he may wish to on the general thrust of our backchannel.
Recommendation:
That you approve the backchannel cable to Ambassador Habib at Tab A.
Approve
Disapprove
FURD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O.
12008
) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo,
Guidelines
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
BACKCHANNEL
TO:
American Embassy Seoul
FROM:
Brent Scowcroft
(Exclusively EYES ONLY for Ambassador Habib from General Scowcroft)
SUBJECT:
UNC Termination
1. In a front channel message from State, you have received the
basic instruction for your approach to the ROKG on our negotiating
package and strategy for the termination of the UNC. This back-
channel is intended to elaborate on the State message by outlining our
view regarding the basic negotiating strategy, our immediate objectives,
and tactics in these negotiations.
2. Basic Strategy. We believe our fundamental approach in these
negotiations should be that, while eliminating the UNC, we should hold
the other elements in the security equilibrium constant, until we can
be assured that the substitute arrangements are firmly in place.
Thus, we want to keep the US -- and the PRC -- directly involved in
the ongoing implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Given the
present ineffectiveness of the SNCC and the unlikelihood that the US
and PRC could operate in a meaningful manner in that forum, we
believe the MAC and our involvement in it must not repeat not be
FORD
DEGLASSIFIED
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
SERALD
=
SEC 3.3
Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/6/10
SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
transferred to the SNCC, at least at this time. Similarly, we want
to keep both the level and missions of US forces in South Korea constant,
at least through the transition to post-UNC termination arrangements.
3. Minimum Immediate Objectives. As stated in the front channel,
our minimum immediate objective should be to place ourselves by
early summer in a defensible position vis-a-vis a possible UNGA debate
of the Korean question. We hope Pyongyang will agree to negotiate on
the basis of our initial package (perhaps with PRC urging), although we
have no illusions on this score. Even if it does not, we think we can use
the package to minimize damage in the UNGA.
4. While pressing the other side to agree to negotiate our initial package,
we envisage using the negotiating process as a means of exploring the
range of new arrangements which might be acceptable to Pyongyang in
case ours do not float. But we are not trying to reach agreement quickly
at the expense of substance. We will consider fallbacks, but only after
we find ourselves unable to get the other side to negotiate on the basis
of our initial package. In particular, we want to avoid a fallback which
would transfer the MAC into the SNCC. We do not want to begin back-
pedaling until we have a clear idea of the other side's position -- if we
must back-pedal at all.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
3
5. Negotiating Tactics.
a. For obvious reasons, our front channel indicates that we would
approach the PRC and Soviets as equals on this problem. In fact, we
intend to work primarily in parallel with the PRC both to backstop and
to restrain our respective Korean allies as necessary -- while still
aiming to leave the primary negotiating role to the two Koreas. We have
complex objectives with the USSR: to keep the Russians generally in-
formed of our new position in hopes of discouraging them from attempting
to play a spoiling role; but also to box them out of any direct part in the
negotiations.
b. We believe our principle negotiating leverage will lie with two
factors: first, our very willingness to go through with the termination
of the UNC; and second, the presumed interest on the part of the PRC --
and secondarily the Soviets -- in limiting instability on the Peninsula,
along with their probable distrust of North Korea's militant inclinations.
We recognize that current PRC internal developments may have reduced
Peking's influence with Pyongyang. We have not, however, concluded
that any decline in influence has been so great as to vitiate our proposed
approach.
6. The arrival
in New York of a high-level PRC delegation
to participate in the special UNGA session may afford the Secretary an
FORD
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
SENSITIVE
4
opportunity to discuss the UNC package with Chinese leaders on a
personal basis. Please give us as soon as you can at least a provisional
read-out of ROK thinking on the negotiating package and any comments
you want us to bear in mind.
7. We have no objection to your making any comments on the general
thrust of the above by front channel reply, without of course citing
this message.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
COPY 15 OF 15 COPIES 24
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES 08 AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
OP 0719552 APR 74 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
CONTROL: 1998Q
S
TO RUEHCR/AMEMEASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1217
INFO RUROHGA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUADOPA/CINCUNC
BT
DECLASSIFIED
0 P $ E G R t. T STATE 070275
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines stole review 9/17/03
NODIS
By th NARA, Date 12/6/10
E.O. 11652: XCDS
N S
TAGS: PFOR, MAMR, KS
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH RO KG ON UN COMMAND
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL
1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT
USG HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
MENIS TO UNC AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD
DEFINING A SUCCESSOR EODY. AS SUBSTITUTE FOR UNC, WE
WOULD PROPOSE TC OFFER THE OTHER SIDE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE
AS A BASIS FOR NECOTIATIONS:
--SUBSTITUTION OF U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR
CINCUNC AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
N
THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BECOME THE
PRINCIPAL MEMBERS 0F MAC. WHITHER SUBSTITUTION of THESE
SUCCESSOR SIGNATORIES WOULD BE DONE BY FORMAL AMENDMENT OF
THE ARNISTICE AGREEMENT, OR BY A UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY
SIDE WHICH WOULD BE AGREED TO BY THE OTHER SIDE, IS A
TACTICAL QUESTION THAT WE WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE SUCCESSOR U.S. SIGNATORY PRESUMABLY WOULD 85 COMUSFR.
THE ROK COMMANDER WOULD BE FOR THE RO KG TO DESIGNATE.
--ACCEPTANCE OF U.S. FORCES. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO
SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED
U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION
FORD
IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA is SOLIDLY STABILIZED. FYI. WE
HAVE IN MIND A SHANCHAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO
RUCE AND ULTIMATELY WITHIRAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY
BERALD
LIBRARY
POSITION IMPROVES. WE DO NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK,
TAP SECTION
NOT TO БЕ REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
-2- STATE 070275 7 APR'74
AT LEAST THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END FYI.
(Un)
--A NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS.
--UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREED-UPON
PACKAGE OF SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
--AVOIDANCE OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS PACKAGE IS THE CONTINUED
EFFECTIVE DIRECT U.S --AND PRC--INVOLVEMENT IN THE ONGOING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. COROLLARY QUESTIONS.
A. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCUNC
BY THE ROKO, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROX FORCES FROM CINCUNC, UPON
S
TERMINATION OF UNC, TC A U.S. - ROK COMBINED COMMAND UNDER
A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED
THE DETAILS OF SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND, BUT IF THE
PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROKG, THE APPROPRIATE
U.S. AND ROX MILITARY STAFFS COULD BEGIN DRAFTING PRO-
POSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
N
B. FYI: QUESTIONS OF U.S. USE OF JAPANESE BASES FOR
THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE U.S. - JAPAN SOFA
AND OF UN THIND COUNTRY USE OF JAPANESE BASES UNDER THE
UN - JAPAN SOFA ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. END FYI.
4. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE WOULD INTEND TO PURSUE
THIS NEGOTIATION ALONG TWO TRACKS: (A) SEOUL - PYONGYANG
THIS TRACK WLING PRIMARY: Aili) (E) PARALLELING THIS, J.S.
APPROACHES TO THE PRC AND USSR. WE WOULD ALSO CONSULT
CLOSELY WITH JAPAN H:S WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
UNC LIAISON GROUP AND ALLIES WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED
FORCES TO THE UNC. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO APPROACH
THE PRC, USSR, JAPAN, AND OTHERS AFTER WE HAVE CONCERTED
WITH THE ROK ON THE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE ANU BASIC STRATEGY.
WE WILL AT THAT TIME ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE
TIMING 0 / THESE SEVERAL APPROACHES.
FORD
TOP SECRET
7817
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES ()F
TELEGRAM
TAB
EUS SECRET
-3- - STATE 070275 7 APR'74
5. OUR MINIMUM INNEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS
IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE
POSITION FOR POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS COMING FALL.
6. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON A CLOSE-HOLD
BASIS WITH CINCUNC.
7. DOD CONCURS. RUSH
S NA.
TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE US
4/7/74 21512
S/S-0: R. ELTZ
EA:RSINGERSOLL
EA:RLSNEIDER
EA/K:DLRANARD
IN/UNP:LTSTULL {DRAFT}
PM/ISP:LHBROWN EDRAFT3
DOD/ISA:RADM TJBIGLEY (DRAFT)
DOD/JCS: BG ARHANKET EDRAFT}
NSC:WRSMYSER
ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:
9. L - GHALDRICH EDRAFT}
20. S/S - RE0:RELTZ
S
QSRALO FORD LISKNEY
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
3a
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
807
Aug
WASHINGTON
ACTION
IONFIDENTIAL
R
April 11, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
MRS. JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT:
Invitation to You from the President of
People-to-People/Korea
We recommend you accept the invitation from Dr. Sanguine You,
President of People-to-People/Korea, to attend the first worldwide
conference of People-to-People International to be held in Seoul on
October 13 and 14, 1974.
The State Department and Ambassador Habib, in response to our
request, have reported that the organization involved has wide support
throughout the Korean and American communities and that its plans for
the conference are well-conceived. They include participation by
affiliates from many other countries as well. The Ambassador believes
your presence would be deeply appreciated by your Korean hosts.
As you know, there has been some turmoil in South Korea growing
out of the political confrontation between President Park and many
Korean students. This turmoil may deepen over the summer. We
will keep you advised if the situation deteriorates to the point where
it might be inadvisable for you to attend. In the meantime, however,
there is no reason you should not accept the invitation.
Attached at Tab I is a draft response which you may wish to use to reply
to Dr. You.
Please let me know if we can be of help in any way with regard to
arrangements or briefings for your trip.
DECLASSIFIED
is
FORD
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
CONF IDENTIAL
NARA, Date 12/6/10
GERALD
LIBRARY
By
30
Dear Dr. You:
I wish to thank you for your very kind invitation to attend the first
worldwide conference of People-to-People International to be held
in Seoul on October 13 and 14, 1974. The celebration of the People- -
to-People program--a program in which President Eisenhower
believed so strongly and supported so vigorously-- is appropriate
and timely. It will be a pleasure to attend and to have the oppor-
tunity to visit your country.
I look forward to hearing further from you as more detailed plans
for the conference develop. I also look forward to meeting you and
joining you for the conference.
Sincerely,
Sanguine You, Ph. D. L LD.
President
People-to-People/Korea
Room 323, Grand Building
17-12 4-KA Namdaemun-Ho Chung-Ku
Seoul 100, Korea
MEMORANDUM
807
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
CONFIDENTIAL
April 5, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER B
SUBJECT:
Invitation to Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower
to Visit Korea
Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower has received an invitation (Tab D) to
attend the first worldwide conference of People-to-People International
to be held in Seoul on October 13 and 14, 1974. She indicated that she
would like the visit to be "seriously considered" and asked Susan Porter
to check with us.
The State Department asked Ambassador Habib for his views, which were
positive (Tab C). Habib thought attendance by Mrs. Eisenhower would
be "thoroughly appropriate" and that her presence would be deeply
appreciated by her Korean hosts. The State Department has now advised
us (Tab B) that it recommends Mrs. Eisenhower's accepting the
invitation.
We concur with the Department and with Ambassador Habib, subject of
course to the possibility of major disturbances in Korea arising out of
President Park's confrontation with the students. We may need to
reassess our thinking if the situation in South Korea turns very sour,
but in the meantime there is no reason not to go ahead.
Recommendation:
That you sign the attached memorandum to Mrs. Eisenhower.
Approve
Disapprove
DECLASSIRED
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
E.O.
12333
SEC 3.3
idelines
By
NSC in Memo,
NARA, Date 12/6/10
7405819
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
3e
March 26, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Invitation to Mrs. Julie Nixon
Eisenhower
Dr. Sanguine You, President of People-to-People/
Korea, wrote to Mrs. Julie Nixon Eisenhower on January
25 inviting her to attend the first Worldwide Confer-
ence of People-to-People International to be held
in Seoul, October 13-14, 1974. We advised you March
13 that we were requesting Embassy Seoul's views on
the advisability of acceptance. The response
indicates that the organization involved has wide
support throughout the Korean and American communi-
ties. Its plans for the conference are well-conceived
and the host organization anticipates participation by
affiliates from several other countries. The Embassy
believes Mrs. Eisenhower's attendance would be deeply
appreciated.
Accordingly, the Department recommends that Mrs.
Eisenhower accept the invitation.
Pare H.
for
George S. Springsteen, Jr.
Executive Secretary
Department of State
STATES UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
or
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
2353
PAGE 01 SEOUL 01699 1504052
11
ACTION EA-14
INFO OCT=01 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-07 CU-04 RSC-01 DRC-01 1048 W
103654
R 1503432 MAR 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHOC 2877
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SEOUL 1699
COOPER
ELLIOTT
EO 11652 NA
FROEDE
TAGS: PFOR, OVIP, SCUL, KS, US
HORAN
SUBJ: ATTENDANCE OF MRS. JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER AT
HYLAND
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONFERENCE
JORDEN
KENNEDY
REF: STATE 050078
LEHMAN
LODAL
EMBASSY VIEWS ATTENDANCE MRS JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER
RATLIFF
AS THOROUGHLY APPROPRIATE. HER PRESENCE WOULD
SAUNDERS
BE DEEPLY APPRECIATED BY KOREAN HOSTS. AS DEPARTMENT
CMYSER
AWARE PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE/KOREA IS BONA FIDE ORGANIZATION
SOLOMON
ENJOYING WIDE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT KOREAN AND AMERICAN
STEARMAN
COMMUNITY BOTH CIVIL AND MILITARY. OCTOBER MEETING
WILL INCLUDE PARTICIPATION BY AFFILIATES FROM MANY
JONKI
COUNTRIES, AND PLANS FOR THE OCCASSION ARE WELL-
ADVANCED AND WELL-CONCEIVED.
HABIB
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Y
ROOM 323 GRAND BUILDING
17.12 4 NA. NAMUAL MUN.NO CHUNG x11
pp>>
Ab><
it'n "I 3914 1:1:15
SPOUL in ALPIEA
vur " 1992 214170 . FUT 79
PEOPLE
KPO not in CAME PEOPLETOPERAL sirus
KOREA NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INTERNATIONAL
7404370
Mrs. Julio Nixon Eisenhower
39
January 25, 1974
The Whito House
Washington, D. C.
U. S. A.
Dear Mrs. Elsenhower:
We most cordially extend our official invitation to you to attend the
First World Wide Conference of People-to-People International to be held in
Seoul on October 13-14, 1974.
Your participation in this historical event is respectfully requested in
order to further the cause of International Understanding. We hope that you
will bring many outstanding delegates of your country with you to this significant
event. Further details of the Conference will be sent to you in the near future.
We have planned a most active and colorful program for you in this,
our land of the Orient, and look forward to welcoming you to Seoul. We hope
that you will have a wonderful memory-making stay here in Korea.
Very sincerely yours,
8:4 Sanguine You Ph.D.LL. D.
President
SGY/sjk
People-to-People/Korea
FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON, D.C.
seal 70 NSC
for opinion
the ic seriously
insidered """
FORD
WITH : "
BERALD
" VOLUNTARY EFFORT OF PRIVAIF CITIZENS to ADVANCE THE CAUSE (if INTERN: 11."MAL
DWH.HT " -
LIBRARY.
807
3h
7404370
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 26, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Jedine Davis
FROM:
Susan Porter
Julie Eisenhower has asked for an
opinion on the attached letter inviting her
to attend the First world Wide Conference of
People-to-People International to be held
in Scoul on October 13-14, 1974. You will
note she feels it should be seriously considered.
I look forward to receiving your assessment.
Thank you.
GERALD FORD
4a
1693
MEMORANDUM
the
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
Ali (IN)
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
April 26, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
W. R. SMYSER 8
SUBJECT:
Termination of UN Command in Korea
At Tab A is a draft State cable instruction to Embassy Seoul, responding
to the Government of the Republic of Korea's (ROKG) comments (Tab B)
on our proposed negotiating package and strategy for the termination of
the UN Command (UNC). The ROKG agrees with the basic elements of
our proposed negotiating package and strategy, except that they hope
that we, rather than they, would carry the main burden of the negotiations.
The draft State cable notes the agreement between ourselves and the
ROKG on these basics, and states that we are both therefore in a position
to proceed with our approaches to the other side -- but asks Ambassador
Habib for his confirmation of this. The draft State cable also notes for
Ambassador Habib's information some divergence on the questions of
coordinating with Japan and other countries and of the comparative
burden that we as opposed to the ROK will carry in negotiations.
I believe that the draft State cable is adequate as far as it goes, and that
we do not have to delay our initial approaches to the other side in order
to try to compose the differences between ourselves and the ROKG at
this point. Nevertheless, I believe it would be useful to convey to
Ambassador Habib at this point, for his information, our position on
several particular aspects of the negotiation. If Ambassador Habib
in his on-going discussions with the ROKG perceives a substantial
divergence on any of these points, he can on the basis of this guidance
FOBO
discuss these matters with them.
--We should underscore with the ROKG our belief, as expressed in
the original instruction (Tab C), that the Seoul-Pyongyang track will be
primary in this negotiation.
--The ROKG has taken the position that all elements of our negotiating
package are "inter-related. " If necessary, we should make clear that
this does not imply that all elements are inseparable. As pointed out
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By NSC wn Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidellnes
istableview
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
GDS
NARA, Date 12/6/10
9/17/03
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
2
in our basic instruction, the essential element in this package is the
continued effective direct U.S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going
implementation of the Armistice Agreement.
-The ROKG has expressed the view that it would be "desirable" to
obtain the other side's understanding that, once the UNC is terminated,
they will not raise at the UN General Assembly the question of the continued
presence of the U.S. forces in Korea. If necessary, we should point out
to Seoul that while this might be desirable, it is not essential that the other
side desist from raising the question. What is essential is that the other
side not press seriously for the removal of U.S. forces from Korea.
--As regards the means by which the successor's signatories would
formally subscribe to the Armistice Agreement, the ROKG prefers that
each side sign the Agreement separately, for immediate tactical reasons
which are somewhat obscure. I believe, as we stated in the original
instruction to Ambassador Habib, that we should keep this tactical question
open until we get a better feel during the course of negotiations for what
means will be tactically feasible with as well as adequately binding on the
other side.
Paragraph 3 of the draft State cable asking Ambassador Habib to confirm
that the ROK is substantially in agreement with our approach is useful --
not so much because we believe there are significant differences in this
respect but rather to make sure no approach is made to the PRC before
you return.
I have included proposed changes in the draft State cable to reflect the
above recommendations.
Messrs. Solomon, Froebe, and myself are proceeding to draft a detailed
scenario for an initial approach to the other side and the others concerned.
This should be ready for your consideration on your return from your
upcoming trip.
Recommendation:
That you approve the draft Siaie cable al Tab A as revised.
Approve
Disapprove
TAP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET NODIS
4b
ROUTINE SEOUL
[Material in square brackets is my
addition to State cable. ]
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS ON UN COMMAND
REFERENCE: (A) SEOUL 2457 (L) STATE 70275
FOR AMBASSADOR
1. We have the following comments with respect to ROK memorandum
on alternative arrangements to the UNC (ref A).
A. We appear to be in general agreement with the ROKG regarding the
package and the scenario to be followed, except mainly as concerns
operational control.
B. Agree that problem of operational control is a bilateral issue and
will be interested in receiving ROK Study.
C. In the meanwhile, however, we are prepared to initiate discussions
with the PRC and USSR along the lines of our package proposal.
2. FYI. Following items are those which appear to be in question
or at some variance with our position, but are not substantial enough
to delay progress of negotiation.
DEC
E.O.
SFC 3.3
TOP SECRET NODIS
NSC Memo,
Guidelines
; ;stotheriew 9/17/03
By
in
NARA, Date 2/6/10
TOP SECRET NODIS
2
A. Coordination with Japan and other countries. We agree that such
coordination will depend on response of other side, but believe consultation
with Japan in particular should be at the earliest practical date. We
can determine subsequently how and when to approach allies and who
should take the initiative.
B. Parallel discussions with the north. We are in complete agreement
with your views as expressed to Kim Dong Jo that we should keep open
option of using direct Seoul-Pyongyang channel at any stage. We note
ROK willingness to be flexible on this point and hope you will be able to
impress on them need to be prepared to move in parallel with U.S.
[We should make clear that, although we recognize the problem they are
up against with Pyongyang and because of which we will do our best to
backstop them in our own approaches to the PRC and USSR, we cannot
assume the main burden of negotiations.
C. Package Approach. We note (para 1, ref A) that ROKG has emphasized
the "inter-related" character of the negotiating package. We agree with
this as long as "inter-related" is not construed to mean "inseparable."
As pointed out in paragraph 2, reference b, the essential element in
this package is direct U.S. -- and PRC -- involvement in the on-going
implementation of the Armistice Agreement.
TOP SECRET NODIS
TOP SECRET NODIS
3
D. U.S. Force Presence, The ROKG has expressed the view that it
would be "desirable" to obtain the other side's understanding that, once
the UNC is terminated, they will not raise at the UN General Assembly
the question of the continued presence of the U.S. forces in Korea.
If necessary, we should point out to Seoul that while this might be desirable,
it is not essential that the other side desist from raising this question in
at least a pro forma way. What is essential is that the other side not
press seriously for the removal of U.S. forces from Korea.
E. Means By Which Successor's Signatories Subscribe to Armistice
Agreement. ROKG has expressed preference (para 4, ref A) that both
sides should subscribe to successor Armistice Agreement by signing
separately. We understand ROKG concerns, but believe that other
factors must also be taken into account -- legal and political insufficiency
and political feasibility. We believe, as stated in paragraph 1, reference
b, that this question should be left open for present time. ] END FYI.
3. Before initiating approaches to PRC/USSR would appreciate
confirmation we are in substantial agreement.
TOP SECRET NODIS
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
TOP SECRET
P 1802452 APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
CONTROL: 4 7 5 3 Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3374
BT
RECD: 18 APRIL 74 -
TOPSECRET SEOUL 2457
12 31 AM
NODIS
E.O. 12
SEC 3.3
h
stateneview 9/17/03
EO 11652: XGDS
By
NARA, Date 12/6/12
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS
SUBJECT: DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN ON UN COMMAND
REF: A) STATE 070275; B) SEOUL 2246
SUMMARY: ROKG HAS REPLIED TO OUR PROPOSALS ON UN COMMAND
BY GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THEM, WHILE EXPLICTLY LEAVING
OPEN QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES WHICH
THEY RETAIN UNDER REVIEW FOR LATER DISCUSSION. THEY ARE
HOPEFUL WE CAN BEGIN EXPLORATION WITH PRC AND USSR AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE. END SUMMARY
1. I MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KIM DONG JO APRIL 17 TO
RECEIVE ROKG REPLY TO PROPOSALS I HAD SUBMITTED TO HIM
REGARDING TYE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. HE
OPENED DISCUSSION BY REMARKING THAT BEFORE GIVING ME HIS
GOVERNMENT'S DETAILED VIEWS HE WISHED TO NOTE TWO THINGS:
(A) HIS GOVERNMENT REGARDS THE PROPOSALS AS A QUOTE
PACKAGE UNQUOTE IN THE SENSE THAT THEY ARE ALL INTER-
RELATED; (B) HIS GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THAT QUESTIONS
INVOLVING THE TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND
AND THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS WERE
MULTILATERAL. THE QUESTION OF THE EXERCISE OF OPERATIONAL
CONTROL WAS A BILATERAL QUESTION TO BE RESOLVED BETWEEN
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES AND NOT A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION
WITH THE CHINESE, SOVIETS OR NORTH KOREANS.
2. HE THEN HANDED ME A MEMORANDUM THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS
(REFERENCES IN TEXT ARE TO TALKING PAPER I HAD GIVEN KIM):
QUOTE
1. THE ROKG HAS STUDIED CAJEFULLY THE U.S. PROPOSED
PACKAGE WHICH WE WILL OFFER THE OTHER SIDE AS A BASIS FOR
NEGOTIATION. IT REGARDS THE PACKAGE AS CONFORMING IN
GENERAL TO ROK'S POSITION ON THIS MATTER. HOWEVER, THE
FOLLOWING AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS ARE SUGGESTED:
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
TAP SECRET
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
HEALTH
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
-2- SEOUL 2457
A. (RE PARA. A) WITH REGARD TO THE SUBSTITUTION OF OUR
SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AS SUGGESTED IN
THE U.S. PROPOSAL, OUR SIDE WILL FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER
SIDE OF THE SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS. IN THIS CASE, THE
OTHER SIDE WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE A FORMAL RESPONSE
WITH THEIR AGREEMENT TO THE ARRANGEMENTS.
B. (RE PARA. B) IN ADDITION TO SECURING AN ACCEPTANCE BY
THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA
UNT THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE ALSO TO
ACQUIRE AN UNDERSTANDING FROM THE OTHER SIDE THAT THE
QUESTION REGARDING U.S. FORCES IN KOREA SHALL NOT BE
RAISED AT THE UN ONCE THE UNC IS DISSOLVED.
C. (RE PARA. E) IT IS ROKG'S INTENTION TO KEEP THE
PRESENT ARMISTICE AGREEMENT INTACT. THEREFORE, THE
ROKG DOES NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT.
2. WITH REGARD TO THE NEGOTIATING STRATEGY, THE
FOLLOWINGS (SIC) ARE SUGGESTED:
(1) AT THE INITIAL STAGE, THE MAIN CHANNEL OF NEGOTIATIONS
SHOULD BE BETWEEN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR;
(2) THE PROBLEM OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS MATTER
BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG WILL BE CONSIDERED ONLY
AFTER SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IS MADE IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-
USSR NEGOTIATIONS;
(3) THE TIME OF CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN AS WELL AS MEMBERS
OF THE UNC LIAISON GROUP AND OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE
CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC WILL BE DETERMINED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROGRESS IN U.S.-PRC AND U.S.-USSR
NEGOTIATIONS AND IN CLOSE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ROK
AND U.S.
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT TO UNDERTAKE
CONSULTATION WITH SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND, BOTH THE
CURRENT MEMBERS OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY
COMMISSION, SHOULD ALSO BE CONSIDERED IN DUE COURSE.
IN UNDERTAKING CONSULTATIONS WITH THE FRIENDLY
COUNTRIES, THE ROK WOULD PLAY A PRINCIPAL ROLE WHILE
THE U.S. WOULD ASSIST IN THE EFFORT.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
not SECRET
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
-3- SEOUL 2457
3. WITH REFERENCE TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC TO A U.S.-
ROK COMBINED COMMAND, THE ROKG NEEDS MORE TIME TO MAKE
FURTHER STUDY OF THE PROBLEM. THE ROKG'S POSITION ON
THIS MATTER WILL BE NOTIFIED TO THE U.S. AS SOON AS THE
STUDY IS COMPLETED.
4. IT IS NECESSARY THAT THE ROK AND U.S. WILL CONSIDER
IN DUE COURSE OF TIME VARIOUS DIPLOMATIC MEASURES NEEDED
IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.
5. IN PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE IMPASSE IN THE PROCESS
OF NEGOTIATIONS DUE TO NK'S NEGATIVE ATTITUDE, APPROPRIATE
UN STRATEGIES SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN CLOSE CONSULTATION
BETWEEN THE ROK AND U.S.
ONE POSSIBLE MOVE WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO TAKE
UP THE QUESTIONS OF THE UNC AND THE ROK'S ADMISSION TO UN
MEMBERSHIP (TOGETHER WITH NK IF IT SO WISHES) AT THE
SECURITY COUNCIL, THUS COUNTERING ANTICIPATED NK MOVES
AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.
IT IS REMINDED THAT THE ADOPTION OF ADEQUATE AND
EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONTINUED
MAINTENANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS PREREQUISITE
TO THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNC.
6. IT IS ADVISABLE FOR THE ROK AND U.S. TO MAKE A CAREFUL
STUDY OF PROBLEMS ENSUING FROM THE TERMINATION OF THE UN
SOFA WITH JAPAN AND THE EXPIRATION OF ACHESON-YOSHIDA
NOTES OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1951.
UNQUOTE.
3. I SAID ! WOULD FORWARD HTC GOVERNMENT'S VIEWS TO
WASHINGTON BUT WOULD MAKE A FEW BRIEF COMMENTS AND ASK
SOME QUESTIONS FOR CLARIFICATION AT THIS STAGE. FIRST
OF ALL I COULD ASSURE HIS IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE
ALSO LOOKED UPON THE PROPOSALS AS A PACKAGE DEAL. SECONDLY,
THE QUESTION OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL WAS A MATTER FOR
BILATERAL DECISION SINCE IT ONLY AFFECTED UNITED STATES
AND KOREAN INTERESTS.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAI
-TOP SECRET
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
4- SEOUL 2457
4. WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 1A OF HIS MEMORANDUM I ASKED
IF THIS MEANT THE SOUTH DID NOT INTEND TO SIGN A
SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT MERELY TO INFORM
THE OTHER SIDE OF ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE SAID THE SOUTH WAS
WILLING TO SIGN THE SUCCESSOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT DID
NOT WISH TO DO SO AT A MEETING WITH THE NORTH. IT PREFERRED
MERELY THAT EACH SIDE SEPARATELY SIGN AND ACCEDE TO THE
SUCCESSOR AGREEMENT AND THEN FORMALLY NOTIFY THE OTHER
SIDE OF THAT ACT. HE SAID THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE THE
SOUTH DID NOT WISH TO NTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH PYONGYANG
WHICH WOULD ALLOW NORTH KOREA TO RAISE QUESTIONS BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF.
5. I ASKED HIM IF HE COULD DEFINE WHAT WAS MEANT BY THE
STATEMENT IN PARAGRAPH 2 (2) WHICH REFERRED TO QUOTE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNQUOTE IN U.S. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE
MAJOR COMMUNIST POWERS BEFORE CONSIDERING DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN SEOUL AND PYONGYANG. HE SAID THEY HAD IN MIND THAT
THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST SOME INDICATION THAT OUR PROPOSALS
WERE LIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED BEFORE THEY WOULD BEGIN TO
DISCUSS THE ISSUES DIRECTLY WITH PYONGYANG. I REPLIED THIS
SEEMED TO ME TO BE TOO RIGID AND THAT WHILE I COULD UNDERSTAND
WHY THEY WISH TO HAVE US BEGIN THE PROCESS WITH MAJOR POWERS,
WE SHOULD LEAVE OURSELVES THE OPTION OF USING THE DIRECT
SEOUL-PYONGYANG CHANNEL AT ANY STAGE. HE SAID THEY WOULD
BE FLEXIBLE ON THIS POINT.
6. I ASKED HIM WHEN THE ROKG STUDY OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL
ON OPERATIONAL CONTROL, MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF HIS
MEMORANDUM, WOULD BE READY. HE SAID THE MATTER WAS
CURRENTLY BEING REVIEWED IN HIS GOVERNMENT TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT SUCH THINGS AS THE NATO ARRANGEMENTS, AND THOSE
WHICH EXISTED IN VIET-NAM. HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS
THE MATTER IN DETAIL AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO
POINT OUT TO ME THAT WITHOUT THE COVER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND IT WAS POLITICALLY AND PSYCHOLOGICALLY
DIFFICULT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT TO ACCEPT DESIGNATED U.S.
COMMAND OF ROK FORCES. THEY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO
ACCUSATIONS, BY NORTH KOREA AND OTHERS, THAT THEY DID NOT
EXERCISE SOVEREIGNTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY OR OVER THEIR
OWN PEOPLE. THIS COULD BE USED AGAINST THE SOUTH IN MANY
WAYS. HE CONSIDERED THE PROBLEM TO BE HIGHLY POLITICAL
AND IT WOULD REQUIRE SOME MORE TIME BEFORE THEY COULD
GIVE US AN ANSER. I NOTED THAT WE HAD PROPOSED A COMBINED
COMMAND WHICH WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE THE SAME
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR'
TAD SECRET
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
-5- SEOUL 2457
CONNOTATION OF WHICH HE SPOKE. I POINTED OUT THAT MOREOVER
THERE WERE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN THIS QUESTION WHICH
I WAS SURE HE RECOGNIZED. HE REPLIED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE
NATURE OF THE PROBLEM BUT THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO
CONSIDER THE MATTER IN PURELY MILITARY TERMS. THE
QUESTIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY AND NATIONAL POLICY WERE INVOLVED.
7. I ASKED HIM WHAT WAS MEANT IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF HIS
MEMORANDUM WHICH SPEAKS OF CONSIDERATION OF DIPLOMATIC
MEASURES IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND. HE SAID THIS REFERRED MERELY TO THE
MANNER IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DONE AFTER AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED, I.E., HOW IT WOULD BE HANDLED IN TERMS OF
NOTIFICATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERESTED
PARTIES.
8. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 5 OF HIS MEMORANDUM, I POINTED
OUT THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT MEASURES HIS GOVERNMENT WAS
PROPOSING, IT MIGHT STILL BE POSSIBLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE
TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HIS
PROPOSAL IMPLIED THAT BY MOVING IT TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL WE COULD AVOID DEALING WITH THE RESOLUTION IN THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY. I WAS NOT SURE THIS WAS POSSIBLE.
9. REFERRING TO PARAGRAPH 6, I SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT
TO ENVISAGE ANY FORMAL ARRANGEMENT WITH REGARD TO
THE RIGHTS IN JAPAN WHICH WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. HE AGREED AND SAID IT MIGHT BE
POSSIBLE TO HAVE SOME KIND OF TACIT UNDERSTANDING TO
REPLACE THE EXISTING AGREEMENT.
10. IN CLOSING, HE REFERRED AGAIN TO THE QUESTION OF
OPERATIONAL CONTROL, SAYING THAT THIS WAS A MATTER TO BE
DECIDED BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AND WHILE IN ABEYANCE IT
NEED NOT HOLD UP OUR GOING AHEAD AND CONSIDERING
THE PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS 10 DE EXPLORED WITH THE OTHER SIDE.
HE WAS HOPEFUL WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT AND MOVE QUICKLY
SO AS TO BE PREPARED FOR ANY EVENTUALITY.
11. COMMENT: I BELIEVE FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESPONSE IS
POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE. I RECOMMEND THAT FOR THE
PRESENT WE PROCEED TO ADDRESS HIS COMMENTS AND THEN MOVE
ALONG LINES GENERALLY AGREED IN APPROACHES TO PRC AND
USSR. I WOULD PROPOSE THAT WE NOT PRESS ROKG ON ISSUE ON
OPERAZIONAL CONTROL UNTIL WE RECEIVE THE STUDY PROMISED
IN THE ROK MEMORANDUM. HABIB
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
TAP CHOPET
COPY 15 OF 15 COPIES
C STATE
4d
Department of State
UNITED STATES of AMERICA
TELEGRAN
FOR SECRET
OP 0719552 APR 74 ZFFC
FT! SECSTATE WASHDC
CONTROL: 1998Q
S
TO RUEHCR/AMEMEASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1217
INFO RURGHGA/CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUADOPA/CINCUNC
BT
DECLASSIFIED
TOPSECRETSTAIE 070275
9/17/11
E.O. 12953 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines,
state
NODIS
By
NARA, Date 12/6/10
ESE
E.O. 11652: XCDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, KS
FORD
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH RO KG ON UN COMMAND
017819
EYES ONLY AMBASSADOR
/
REF: STATE 35341 NOTAL
1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM FOREIGN MINISTER KIM THAT
USG HAS COMPLETED REVIEW OF POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGE-
S
MENIS TO UNC AND IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH ROKG TOWARD
DEFINING A SUCCESSOR EODY. AS SUBSTITUTE FOR UNC, WE
WOULD PROPOSE TC OFFER THE OTHER SIDE THE FOLLOWING PACKAGE
AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS:
--SUBSTITUTION OF U.S. AND ROK MILITARY COMMANDERS FOR
CINCUNC AS OUR SIDE'S SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
N
THE ROK AND NORTH KOREAN REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BECOME THE
PRINCIPAL MEMBERS OF MAC, WHETHER SUBSTITUTION OF THESE
SUCCESSOR SIGNATORIES WOULD DE DONE BY FORMAL AMENDMENT OF
THE ARNISTICE AGREEMENT, OR BY A UNILATERAL DECLARATION BY
U:JII SIDE WHICH WOULD LE AGREED TO BY THE OTHER SIDE, IS A
TACTICAL QUESTION THAT wit WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS.
THE SUCCESSOR U.S. SIGNATORY PRESUMABLY WOULD BE COMUSFR.
THE ROK COMMANDER WOULD DE FOR THE RO KG TO DESIGNATE.
SACCEPTIME C1. U.S. FORCES. IT 15 OUR INTENTION TO
SEEK A TACIT ACCEPTANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE OF A CONTINUED
U.S. FORCE PRESENCE IN KOREA UNTIL THE SECURITY SITUATION
IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA IS SOLIDLY STABILIZED. FYI. WE
HAVE IN MIND A SHANCRAI-TYPE COMMUNIQUE COMMITTING US TO
RUCE AND ULTIMATELY WITHERAW U.S. FORCES AS THE SECURITY
POSITION IMPROVES. WE DO NOT INTEND ANY SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGE IN THE LEVEL OR MISSIONS OF OUR FORCES IN THE ROK,
TOP SECRET
NOT TO БЕ REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SI
N
DIPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
TOP SECRET
-2- - STATE 070275 7 APR'74
AT LEAST THROUGH THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION TO THE NEW
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. END FYI.
S
--A NON-AGGRESSION PACT BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS.
--UN SECURITY COUNCIL ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREED-UPON
PACKAGE OF SUBSTITUTE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.
--AVOIDANCE OF OTHER CHANGES IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THIS PACKAGE IS THE CONTINUED
EFFECTIVE DIRECT U.S --AND PRC--INVOLVEMENT IN THE ONGOING
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
3. COROLLARY QUESTIONS.
A. OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES. SINCE OPERATIONAL
CONTROL OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES HAS BEEN GIVEN TO CINCUNC
BY THE ROKG, WE PROPOSE THAT THE ROKG AGREE TO TRANSFER
OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES FROM CINCUNC, UPON
S
TERMINATION OF UNC, TO A U.S. - ROK COMBINED COMMAND UNDER
A SENIOR U.S. MILITARY OFFICER. WE HAVE NOT CONSIDERED
THE DETAILS OF SUCH A COMBINED COMMAND, BUT IF THE
PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROKG, THE APPROPRIATE
U.S. AND ROX MILITARY STAFFS COULD BEGIN DRAFTING PRO-
POSALS FOR CONSIDERATION BY OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.
N
B. FYI: QUESTIONS OF U.S. USE OF JAPANESE BASES FOR
THE DEFENSE OF SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE U.S. - JAPAN SOFA
AND OF UN THIND COUNTRY USE OF JAPANESE BASES UNDER THE
UN - JAPAN SOFA ARE BEING HANDLED SEPARATELY. END FYI.
4. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY. WE WOULD INTEND TO PURSUE
THIS DEGOTIATION ALONG TWO TRACKS: (A) SEOUL - PYONGYANG
THIS TRACK BLING PRIMARY: Aili) (i) FARALLELING THIS, U.S.
APPROACHES TO THE PRC AND USSR. WE WOULD ALSO CONSULT
CLOSELY WITH JAPAN HS WELL AS WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE
UNC LIAISON GROUP nive ALLIES w110 HAVE CONTRIBUTED
FORCES TO THE UNC. WE WILL BE PREPARED TO APPROACH
THE PRC, USSR, JAPAN, AND OTHERS AFTER WE HAVE CONCERTED
WITH THE ROK ON THE NEGOTIATING PACKAGE ANU BASIC STRATEGY.
WE WILL AT THAT TIME ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF THE PRECISE
TIMING 07 THESE SEVERAL APPROACHES.
FORD
TOP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECF
N
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
STATES of AMERICA
TELEGRAV
TOP SECRET
-3- STATE 070275 7 APR'74
5. OUR MINIMUM INNEDIATE OBJECTIVE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS
IS TO PLACE OURSELVES BY EARLY SUMMER IN A DEFENSIBLE
POSITION FOR POSSIBLE DEBATE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN
THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS COMING FALL.
6. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO DISCUSS ABOVE ON A CLOSE-HOLD
BASIS WITH CINCUNC.
7. DOD CONCURS. RUSH
TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE:US
4/7/74 21512
S/S-O: R. ELTZ
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in
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PM/ISP:LHBROWN CDRAFT)
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ADDITIONAL CLEARANCES:
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9. L - GHALDRICH EDRAFT}
20. S/S - RE0:RELTZ
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GIVNIG
LIBRARY\
INP SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SEC
1715
Roles
MEMORANDUM
FROEBE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
April 29, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
R
FROM:
W.R. Smyser
Thanks By
John A. Froebe, Jr.
CAR
SUBJECT:
Why We Belabor the Obvious on Korea
You may wonder why we have added several paragraphs straight out
of the NSDM to State's cable for Habib. We have not bothered to
explain this earlier because we felt the explanation would be too
lengthy, but we want you to have it in case you have any doubt about
what we are doing.
There are three subjects on which we and the ROK have different
views. State also has its own views, but for the moment these are
not a crucial element, though they lead to somewhat different tactical
approaches:
-- The negotiating package. The ROK is not eager to
conclude an agreement with the North; that is why it insists
that all points in the package should be "inseparable. " We
are not sure that an agreement can be reached, but we would
be prepared to go for one if the North accepted our major
points but refused to agree to something minor like, for
example, a non-aggression pact. We do not want to finesse
this issue now because it might become important later, if
the North takes up our offer. This is far from certain, as
you know, but we are not prepared to exclude it.
-- The channel. The ROK wants our contact with Moscow
and China to be the main channel for two reasons. First, Seoul
would be spared the considerable burden of negotiating. Second,
the ROK thinks we can again save the UN situation by working
with Peking. We believe the negotiating process between the
two Koreas can have a healthy effect all around and thus we want
to encourage it. We also think we can have a much better position
FURN
SEGRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY - GDS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956
SEC 3.3
By
NSC h State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/6/10
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
2
at the UN next year if there have been actual South-North
contacts rather than just U.S. -Peking-Moscow contacts,
since the latter must perforce be kept discreet.
-- The signature question. This is a murky issue involving
complex matters of prestige and mutual political recognition. We
are not sure we fully understand South Korea's reservations to
signing an agreement with the North, but this is one issue where
we think we can let the situation evolve. It is less likely to
determine the outcome than the first two problems, though
at some point we may have to review the bidding.
State does not quarrel with our wish to reiterate all this in a message.
It has its own backchannel going to Habib. Sneider has told me they
have a pretty good understanding of where they want to go. Our
problem is to make sure that the front channel does not begin wobbling.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY