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    "title": "Korea (6)",
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    "coverageEndDate": {
        "logicalDate": "1974-09-30",
        "month": 9,
        "year": 1974
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        "logicalDate": "1974-05-01",
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        "year": 1974
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    "seq": 1,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/ford/grf-0337/604294/24465890.pdf",
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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 5, folder \"Korea (6)\" of the NSC East Asian\nand Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nla\n1738\nMEMORANDUM\nRok\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nJ\nACTION\nMay 3, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER\nSUBJECT:\nCall on the Vice President by\nKorean Chief Justice Min\nThe State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice\nPresident and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).\nState's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support\nof Korean \"regular and traditional judicial institutions\" at a time of\n'increasing authoritarian rule and government\" in Korea.\nI see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political\nmaneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.\nMrs. Davis concurs.\nRecommendation:\nThat you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to\nMr. Springsteen at Tab A.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nFORD\nDigitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMr. George S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nDepartment of State\nSUBJECT:\nCall on the Vice President by\nKorean Chief Justice Min\nThe Vice President is unable to receive Chief Justice Min Bok\nKi of the Korean Supreme Court.\nWe recommend that alternate arrangements be made for the\nKorean Chief Justice to meet with members of the U.S.\nJudicial Branch.\nJeanne W. Davis\nStaff Secretary\nFOOD\n1C\n7408574\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\n7401738\nWashington, D.C. 20520\nApril 30, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nSubject: Call on the Vice President by Korean\nChief Justice Min\nChief Justice Min Bok Ki of the Korean Supreme\nCourt will visit the United States during May under\nA.I.D. auspices.\nChief Justice Min is a highly respected Korean\njurist. At a time when Korea is experiencing in-\ncreasingly authoritarian rule and government by Presi-\ndential decree we are interested in strengthening the\nregular and traditional judicial institutions in the\nROK and in giving support to those who have a similar\nview. We believe that Chief Justice Min is in this\ncategory. It would be useful if the Vice President\ncould see him during his stay in Washington. A bio-\ngraphic report on Chief Justice Min is enclosed.\nHe will be available on May 14 and the Department\nof State recommends that the Vice President receive a\ncourtesy call from Chief Justice Min on that date.\nYou George (S. Springsten\nExecutive Secretary\nAttachment:\nBiographic sketch\nFORD\n10\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032794\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇBiography\nDESCRIPTION\nRe Republic of Korea Official\nCREATION DATE\n05/1974\nVOLUME\n1 page\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700247\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (6)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n2a\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nINFORMATION\nMay 10, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nRICHARD T. KENNEDY\nFROM:\nDAVID M. RANS\nSUBJECT:\nKorea\nIn the course of a meeting today of the Interagency Steering Group for\nthe Korean Modernization Program (see attachment), Dick Sneider made\nit clear he thought major changes were going to be necessary in both how\nand what we funded in this program. He disclaimed a desire to recast\nthe Presidential commitment; he merely wanted to make it achievable.\n-- How we fund: Sneider wants to program much more FMS\nrelative to MAP. (DOD and OMB agree.) He pointed to the\ngrowing shortfall in the Mod program, which is now in its\nfourth year. Instead of a billion dollars, by the end of FY 74\nwe will have provided something over $600 million in MAP.\nCongressional sympathy for MAP was continuing to decline,\nand it was unlikely we could end the Mod program before FY 78\nat the earliest. Sneider said NSSM 227 in effect, locked in the\nUSG not only to low FMS levels but also to low MAP levels. If\n7\nwe gave up the quest for high MAP levels, Sneider believes,\nthere is a good change that we could get much higher FMS\n(\ncredit levels from Congress. Sneider specifically recommended\nasking for a line-item, three year program of credits for Korea\nto supplement what we already have in the FY 75 budget for\nKorea.\nWhat we fund: Sneider wants to rethink the equipment mix,\nin line with what he says are changing Korean interests. We\nare wed, he feels, to a package of equipment may be growing\nobsolete, in Korean eyes. He pointed out the Koreans want to\nexpand this package with purchases of aircraft perhaps\nfrom third countries. (DOD again agreed.)\nI said there was little flexibility I could see in the aims the President is\npursuing in offering Korea a modernization program. However, there\nFORD\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nCONFIDENTIAL\nNSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines\nBy\nIn\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nCONFIDENTIAL\n- 2 -\nwas flexibility where the means were concerned, as evident in the willing-\nness to make the program open-ended. I added I questioned whether it\nwas wise, when we were trying to renegotiate security arrangements on\nthe Peninsula, to tell the Koreans that we were no longer seeking grant\nfunds as agreed --better to let Congress fail to provide the funds we seek.\nSneider said our failure to provide funds was jeopardizing the credibility\nof the President's commitments, which could have its own consequences\nfor the negotiations we were trying to carry out. He preferred a closed\nend package that we (1) could deliver and (2) use to get full Korean\nunderstanding of our position, starting in September when the UNC out-\ncome might be in sight. Talking to the Koreans candidly would reduce\nanother danger he foresaw: Korean purchases prompted by less and\nless faith in our ability to deliver MAP. Sneider alluded to numerous re-\nports of equipment that Park reportedly wanted --- none on the USG\npriority list and some from third countries. (I question the latter point,\nbut the observations about funding strike me as accurate and important.)\nSneider said the Koreans F-4 request (which the Country Team had recom-\nmended) put us on the spot. They want credits. This is likely to be the\nfirst of a series of FMS credit proposals, including perhaps A-7's from co-\nproduction facilities. These items are not on our priority list.\nI said we had made the move last year to change the priority from ground to\nair defense. DOD reps said the study had just arrived from CINCPAC and\nKorea. I went on that the priority list could therefore change if both sides\nagreed. DOD said a new priority list, negotiated with the Koreans, was\nalso in the wings. At this point it was agreed to defer further discussion\n?\nof the equipment issue until the two studies were in hand.\nOne more issue was discussed: how much money (and what equipment)\nwould be added to Korea before the end of this fiscal year. The DOD rep\nagreed to draw up illustrative programs assuming different levels of\nincrease (up to $40 million).\nComment: We are just where we were last summer: everyone but NSC\nthinks the program is \"a mess\" because of the high MAP requirements.\nThey insist the \"mess\" is getting worse although there is $52 million in\nFMS credits in FY 75 (vice $25 million in FY 74). I discouraged them from\nseeking an end to our commitment to seek MAP but as a practical matter I\nstrongly agree we must come up with more credits in FY 75 to cover some\nof our MAP shortfall.\nThe equipment mix and the final funding level this year are also questions\nwe must (and can) solve. The more serious question, however, is how do\nwe serve the President's wishes if the MAP shortfall continues to accumu-\nlate without offsetting credit increases?\ncc:\nSmyser\nFroebe\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2\nIASG Meeting on ROK Forces Modernization Program\nFriday, May 10 at 10:30, Room 6210\nSTATE\nEA - Richard L. Sneider\nEA/K - Donald L. Ranard\nEA/K - Howard F. Newsom\nPM - Jonathan F. Ladd (Fred)\nRA/PMU - Richard Finch\nACDA - Jan Kalicki\nDOD\nGen. Arthur Hanket\nDavid L. Evans\nRobert Vandegrift\nCol. Samuel Adams\nCdr. James Moore\nPaul Flint\nOMB\nPaul Baltay\nNSC\nDavid Ransom\nORD\n2 2c C\nIASG Agenda\nBackground\nMAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)\nGrant MAP Shortfall\nF-4E Aircraft\nA-7 Aircraft\nF-5B Aircraft\nFMS\nAnnual Review\n2d\nGeneral\nMAP Funding for FY 1974 (as of March 29, 1974)\nTotal Grant Allocation:\n$134.3 million\nNew Equipment\n$110.1\nTraining\n2.2\nSupply Op\n22.0\nFunded MAP Grant FY 1974\n$ 62.75\nUnfunded\n49.55\nUnfunded Items ($ thousand)\nF-5B Aircraft\n15,880\nF-5B AGE\n1,323\nLanding Vehicle, Amphib.\n420\nTrucks\n1,017\nAA Guns\n2,484\nAircraft Support Equip.\n1,024\nShip Overhaul (in-country)\n737\nOther Weapon and Ordnance Equip.\n20\nAmmunition\n3,161\nMissle Support Equip.\n3,561\nCommunications Equip.\n3,923\nOther Support Equip.\n1,268\nSpare Parts\nAircraft\n3,410\nShip\n380\nWeapons\n1,173\nCommo\n1,470\nMissle\n2,288\nAutomotive\n952\nTA and Spec Sves\n539\nRepair and Rehab.\n3,595\nSale of Excess\n39\nTraining\n886\n$49,550\nIf MAP grant should be reduced by $19 million, F-5B aircraft\nand AGE would be excluded plus an unidentified $800,000. A\nlarger reduction would cause deferment until FY 75 of other\nitems.\n2e\n29 March 1974\nFY 74 KOREA MAP\n($ Thousands)\nTOTAL PROGRAM\nFUNDED PROGRAM\nITEM DESCRIPTION\nQTY\nCOST\nQTY\nCOST\nAircraft Fighter F-5B\n8\n15,880\nF-5B AGE, Engines & CSP\n2,323\n1,000\nAircraft Fighter F-5E\n24\n38,400\n24\n38,400\n57.7\nF-5E AGE, Engines & CSP\n19,303\n19,303\nLanding Vehicle Amphib\n3\n420\nMiscellaneous Boats & Craft\n1\nNo cost\n1\nNo cost\nTrailers (Excess)\n69\n22\n52\n22\nTrucks (Excess)\n1,370\n121\n157\n121\nTrucks (Non-Excess)\n82\n1,017\nAmbulances (Excess)\n4\n2\n3\n2\nAnti aircraft Guns\n8\n2,484\nCranes (Excess)\n2\nNo cost\nTractors (Excess)\n10\n5\n7\n5\nMajor Construct Eqp Items\n5\n6\n4\n6\nAircraft Support Eqp\n1,024\nShip Overhaul (In-country)\n737\nOther weapons & Ordnance Eqp\n20\nAmmunition\n3,161\nMissile Support Eqp\n4,286\n725\nCommunications Eqp\n3,923\nOther Support Eqp\n1,435\n167\nSpare Parts:\nAircraft\n3,518\n108\nShip\n405\n25\nWeapons\n1,173\nCommo\n2,264\n794\nMissile\n2,495\n207\nAutomotive\n963\n11\nTech Assistance & Spec Svcs\n712\n173\nRepair and Rehabilitation\n3,595\nUN Forces support In Korea\n300\n300\nSale of Excess in Korea\n100\n61\nTraining\n2,206\n1,320\nTotal MAP\n112,300\n62,750\nDECLARCIFIED\nE.O.\nSEC 3.3\nNSC Memo,\nDept, Guidelines:\nDirative\n5200.30\nBy\nhas\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\n)\nCONFIDENTIAL\n2f\nCumulative Funding Data\nGrant MAP Shortfall\nFunding of the entire allocation in FY 74 will still\nleave the MAP Modernization Program $311 million behind\nthe initially planned five year schedule. (Following table\nin $ million)\nGrant\nFY 71\nFY 72\nFY 73\nFY 74\nTotal\nPlan\n295\n280\n250\n215\n1040\nFunding\n292\n152.5\n149.5\n134.8\n728.8\nDifference\n-3\n-127.5\n-100.5\n-80.2\n-311.2\nFMS\n15.0\n17.0\n24.2\n25.0\nEDA\nPlan\n158.9\n24.9\n19.7\n11.5\n215.0\nActual\n46.9\n75.6\n9.3\nn.a.\n131.8 (add na\nDifference\n-112.0\n+50.7\n-10.4\nn.a.\n-71.7 (add na\nRecapitulation\nFunded FY 71-73\n594.0\nAllocated FY 74\n134.8\nFMS charged to Modernization Program FY 73\n1.2\nFMS charged to Modernization Program FY 74\n14.8\nTotal through FY 74\n744.8\nFMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 75*\n45\nFMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 76\n65\nFMS approved by NSDM 227 FY 77\n90\n200.0\nMAP Grant Required FY 75-77\n305.2\n1250.0\n*$12 million FMS for FY 75 is for items not included in the\nORO\nMOD Plan, namely PG ships: $5 million; M-16: $3 million;\nAnimo plant: $4 million. The CPD for FY 75 provides for\n$52 million FMS.\nROK Investment Priorities FY 7: and FY 75\n2g\nFY 74\nCategory ^- - Highest Priority -- $127.0 million\nConversion I bn basic Hawk to Improved Hawk\nChapparel batteries and missiles\nVulcan guns\nHardening of POL facilities and aircraft shelters\nF-5E (24)\nGap filler radar\nHarden radar sites\n/\nF-4D\nPG Co-Production (FMS)*\nM-16 Co-Production (FMS)*\nPRC-77 Co-Production (FMS)*\nCategory B - Middle Priority - -- $52.0 million\nImproved command and control for ADA\nF-5B (4)\nCPIC\nC-123K (repair and rehab)\nForward area radar\nHawk TOE and terminal equipment\nCommo and radar (ROKAF)\nCategory C - Lowest Priority -- $13.0 million\nRepair and Modernize 3 NIKE-HERC batteries\nPLL/ASL (Army)\nWeapons (LAW)\nCommo equip (llavy and MC)\nShipyard MOD\nVehicles\nUH-1H Helicopters\nOEH support\nAttrition Equip.\nFY 75\nCategory A - Hinhest Priority -- $111.0 million\nGSBALO FORD LIBRARY\nConversion 1 In basic that to Improved Howk\n1\nChapperal batteries and missiles\nSEVARE\nAircraft shelter and harden POL storage\nHarden radar sites\nPG Co-Production*\nM-16 Co-Production*\nPRC-77 Co-Production*\nCategory B - Middle Priority -- $102.0 million\nCommo Equip (Army)\nForward area rada:\n/\nCPIC\nF-5E (24) **\nF-5B (12) **\nCommo and radar (ROKAF)\nASL/PLL, tools\nCategory C - Lowest Priority -- $26.0 million\nAttrition equip\n08M support\nVehicles\nNavy spt and shipyard MOD\nUH-1H\n* Prior-year FMS commitments\n** Highest priority within Category 8. Could be split with a portion of these\naircraft bought in FY 75, remainder 76 or 77. F-5E in category A complete i;\nsquadrons in MOD Plan.\nNOTE: Items within categories are not listed in priority sequence.\nFORD\nHERALD\nLIBRARY\n3a\nRECEIVED\nNSC\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3015\nCONFIDENTIAL\nJUL 2 7 32 PM '74\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03015 130452Z\n20\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-07 NSC-07 SP-03 SS-20 RSC-01 CIAE-00\nINR-10 NSAE-00 AEC-11 COME-00 EB-11 TRSE-00 ACDA-19\nPA-04 PRS-01 USIA-15 DRC-01 OMB-01 SCI-06 SAJ-01 L-03\nH-03 IO-14 /153 w\n127240\nR 130316Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3745\nSECDEF WASHDC\nINFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO\nCINCPAC\nONFIDENTIALSEOUL 3015\nJOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: MASS KS\nSUBJECT: LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT ASSISTANCE TO ROK DEFENSE INDUSTRY\n1. ROKG AGENCY FOR DEFENSE DEVELOPMENT (ADD) HAS\nASKED LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS FOR THREE\nSEPARATE JOINT VENTURES WITH KOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS\nAND FIVE PROPOSALS FOR ASSISTANCE TO ADD ITSELF IN\nRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.\n2. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH CHIEF JUSMAG AND AT EMBASSY\nLOCKHEED VICE PRESIDENT FOR ASIA, WILLIAM R. TUCK,\nSAYS ADD HAS REQUESTED PROPOSALS FOR: A) PROPELLENT\nPILOT PLANT AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FACILITIES\nFOR PROPELLENTS BOTH TO BE OPERATED BY ADD; B) TRAINING\nPROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT R AND D,\nDESIGN, ENGINEERING, AND PRODUCTION; C) CONSTRUCTION\nOF A 4 x 4' WIND TUNNEL TO BE OPERATED BY ADD;\nD) TRAINING PROGRAM FOR ADD PERSONNEL IN FIRE\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03015 130452Z\nCONTROL SYSTEMS DESIGN, ENGINEERING, SYSTEMS\nINTEGRATION AND PRODUCTION; E) AN ADD/LOCKHEED\nPARTNERSHIP OR JOINT VENTURE TO RESEARCH, DESIGN,\nENGINEER, BUILD AND TEST MISSILE PROTOTYPES. IN\nADDITION TO DIRECT SUPPORT FOR ADD, BLUE HOUSE\nOFFICIALS AND ADD HAVE ALSO ASKED LOCKHEED TO\nFORD\nEXAMINE POSSIBILITIES OF JOINT VENTURES WITH\nKOREAN COMMERCIAL FIRMS TO PRODUCE: A) A SMALL\nSERALD\nMISSILE; B) FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS; c) COMBAT VEHICLES\nLIBRARY\nOBJECT OF THESE LATTER JONT VENTURESSVOULD BDMTO\nDEVELOP ROK CAPABILITY TO DESIGN, ENGINEER, TEST\nAND PRODUCE THESE TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.\nACCORDING TUCK, REQUEST FOR JOINT VENTURE PROPOSALS\nSTILL RATHER VAGUE. HE BELIEVES ROKS THINKING ABOUT\nANTI-TANK ROCKETS, AIR TO GROUND MISSILES, SOMETHING\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE\n1\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nState Dept Guidelines\nBy\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3015\nCONFIDENTIAL\nTO COUNTER RUSSIAN MADE STIX MISSILE AND FIRE CONTROL\nSYSTEMS FOR VULCAN B. JUSMAG CHIEF HAS BEEN TOLD\nBY MND THAT ROKG IS INTERESTED INITIALLY IN\nESTABLISHING MISSILE MAINTENANCE CAPABILITY AS ITS\nFIRST PRIORITY IN MISSILE FIELD.\n3. WHILE TUCK HAS MADE CLEAR THAT HIS DISCUSS FNS WITH\nKOREANS ARE STILL IN PRELIMINARY STAGE HE INDICATES\nKOREAN ANXIOUS TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY. PROPELLENT\nPILOT PLANT DISCUSSIONS ARE APPARENTLY ALREADY\nPROCEEDING AT LOCKHEED HEADQUARTERS AND ADD IS NOW\nPREPARING DETAILED EXPLANATION OF TRAINING PROGRAM\nIT WISHES FOR ITS PERSONNEL IN PROPELLENT RESEARCH\nAND PRODUCTION. TUCK HAS HIMSELF GIVEN US PAPER\nOUTLINING YEAR LONG TRAINING PROGRAM FOR FOUR TO\nFIVE ADD ENGINEERS IN RESEARCH, DESIGN, DEVELOPMENT\nAND PRODUCTION FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM. TUCK HAS ALSO\nSUGGESTED TO ADD THAT AGENCY AND LOCKHEED FORM A\nJOINT STUDY TEAM TO WORK OUT THE ORGANIZATION OF\nTHE JOINT COMPANY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH ON AND TO DEVELOPE\nA KOREAN MISSILE CAPABALITY.\n4. WHILE EXPRESSING APPRECIATION TO UCK FOR KEEPING\nCONF ID ENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03015 130452Z\nUS INFORMED, EMBASSY AND JUSMAG HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT\nDETAILED REVIEW IN WASHINGTON WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE\nNECESSARY APPROVALS, LICENSES AND SECURITY CLEARANCES\nINVOLVED IN THESE EXTENSIVE PROPOSALS CAN BE\nDECIDED ON. TUCK HAS INDICATED FULL APPRECIATION\nOF THIS FACT. HE EVINCES HIMSELF SOME SURPRISE\nAND DOUBTFULNESS ABOUT THE EXTENSIVE NATUE OF THE\nPROPOSALS LOCKHEED IS BEING REQUESTED TO SUBMIT\nAND THE COMPLEXITY OF SOME OF THE PROJECTS BEING\nPROPOSED.\n5. COMMENT: SOME OF VAGUENESS TUCK HAS FELT ON ROK\nSIDE UNDOUBTEDLY DUE FACT KOREANS ALSO BEGINNING TO\nTALK ABOUT THESE AND OTHER PROJECTS TO A NUMBER OF\nOTHER US AIRCRAFT COMPANIES, INCLUDING BOEING,\nNORTHRUP, LTV, SIKORSKY, AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS.\nROKG CLEARLY SHOPPING AT THIS STAGE AND WISHES TO SEE\nWHAT PROPOSALS VARIOUS CAMPANIES WILL COME UP WITH\nFORD\nWHILE NOT COMITTING THEMSELVES.\n6. IN GENERAL, ROKS EXEHLORATION OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY\nRERALD\nPOSSIBILITIES IS HEALTHY SIGN THAT THEY MOVING\nLIBRARY\nREAPIDLY IN THIS AREA TOWARD GREATER SELF-RELIANCE\nAND IN KEEPING WITH SECRETARY CLEMENT'S DISCUSSIONS\nWITH MND YU AT SECURITY CONSULTATION MEETING SEPT 1973,\nDUIRNG WHICH SECRETARY ENCOURAGED ROK JOINT VENTURES\nWITH US INDUSTRY. WE ARE SKITTISH ABOUT\nCOMPLEXITY AND ECONOMIC WISDOM OF SOME OF PROJECTS\nCONTEMPLATED HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN HIGHLY\nSOPHISTICATED ELECTRONICS AND MISSILE BUILDING\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE\n2\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3015\nCONFIDENTIAL\nAREAS, WHERE THEY APPEAR TO BE BITING OFF MORE THAN\nTHEY WILL BE ABLE TO DIGEST. ROKG MAY REACH THIS\nCONCULSION ON ITS OWN.\n7. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SOME OF PROJECTS BEING\nCONSIDERED BY ROKG, PARTICULARLY IN MISSILE FIELD,\nMAY POSE SIGNIFICANT POLICY QUESTIONS. THEREFORE FOR\nTHE PRESENT RECOMMEND WASHINGTON AGENCIES ADOPT CAUTIOUS,\nNON-COMMITTAL APPROACH TO ANY US COMPANY\nPROPOSLAS IN MORE SENSITIVE, OVERLY SOPHISTICATED\nFIELDS UNTIL ROKG HAS MORE CLEARLY DEFINED ITS\nCONFIDENTIAL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 04 SEOUL 03015 130452Z\nREQUESTS.\nHABIB\nCONF IDENTIAL\nNNN\nFORD\nRERALD\nLIBRARY\nPAGE\n3\n3b\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\n12/67\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19\nMC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nSAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 w\n054136\nR 160908z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819\nSECDEF WASHDC\nINFO CINCPAC\nSECRETSECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/1\nNOFORN\nCORRECTEDCOPY (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: MASS KS\nSUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY\nREF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015\nJOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE\nBEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION\nOF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH\nITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES\nAND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY\nPROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES\nAND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.\n1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS\nTO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY\nTHROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\nTHINKING ON R&D AREA.\n2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND\nIS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG\nCLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY\nFUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW\nTO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT\nASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN\nCONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE\nPERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS\nBEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR\nBEBALD FORD VIBRARY\nITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.\n3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS\nFORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN\nOBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT\nASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS\nUS ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE\nOF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE.\nHOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT\nSECRET\nPAGE\n1\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nWe\nState Dept Guidelines,\nBy\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY\nEVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED,\nIMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST\nSCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE\nWILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION\nROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY\nTO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL\nAS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY\nDEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.\n4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT\nON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION\nOF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOQNR JEAUELN\nCOUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS ICREASINGLY\nABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS\nCOMPLITCH AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT\nASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF\nMILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN\nRESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST\nACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING\nROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\nTHAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN\nFINAL DETERMINATIONS.\n5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED\nCOURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION\nCONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED\nIN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:\nA. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES\nBY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A\nTARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.\nB. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE\nROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.\nC. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR\nAGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.\nD. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK\nIS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PRO-\nCUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL\nCREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT\nAND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.\n6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE,\nESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE\nFORD\nFIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-\nFILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE\nDERALD\nMOD PALN STRETHC-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO\nLIBRASY\nMEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT\nIS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO\nPUBLICLY ABANDON MOD PLAN BUT, IT HAS NO SERIOUS\nEXPECTATIONS THAT REQUISITE GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS\nWILL BE FORTHCOMING. RATHER IT SEES ESSENTIAL PROBLEM\nAS BEING THE AVAILABILITY OF A HIGH LEVEL OF FMS CREDIT IN THE\nSECRET\nPAGE\n2\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nFY 75-80 PERIOD.\nFROM ROKG POINT OF VIEW, ITS\nCONCESSIONAL CREDIT NEEDS ARE BEYOND MOD PLAN LEVELS\nAND INVOLVE MANY ITEMS NOT IN MOD PLAN.\n7. CONSEQUENTLY, WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE MONTHS BEFORE\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\nTHE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY\nCONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF\nGRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE\nIMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT\nLEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-\nTION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS\nOF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE\nNORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.\n8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE\nFY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT\nPOM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-\nCOMING ON THE FMS CREDIT USSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS\nWOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN\nREQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF\nTIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN\nEFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE\nELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS\nWE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN\nHAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED.\nSECRET\nNNN\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\n67\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19\nMC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nSAJ-01 I0-14 DRC-01 /160 w\n049950\nR 160908Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820\nSECDEF WASHDC\nINFO CINCPAC\nFORD\nS-E CRET SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2\n9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH\nON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:\nRERALD\nLIBRARY\nA. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN\nFUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND\nHONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-\nCOMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL\nCONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN\nOBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,\nSECRET\nPAGE\n3\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nWE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT\nAND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY\nEMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING\nMOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.\nB. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF\nGRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT\nFY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW $112\nMILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN\nFY 74. GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER\nMAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS,\nTHERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M.\nTHEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\nTHAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE\nIN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE\nLEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR\nPROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL\nALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M\nREQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO\nEFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA &FMS CASH CASES\nFOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY,\nWEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE\nREQUIRED).\nC. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY\nBASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE\nTO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR\nINTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR\nSECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG\nINCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT\nAND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN\nPROCUREMENT.\nD. ROK THIRD-COUTNRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT\nROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US\nEQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY\nMAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND.\nTHIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY\nTRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET.\nIN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE\nTHAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP\nPROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST\nPRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME\nFORD\nWE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND\nAPPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS\nBERALD\nWHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND\nLIBRARY\nWHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN\nTHE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH\nTHESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G.\nSWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE\nWE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK\nARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN\nSECRET\nPAGE\n4\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nEFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE\nROK DEFENSE COSTS.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\n10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED\nABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR\nMILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY\nIN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY\nIS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES\nAS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY\nASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZA-\nTION\nHAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINA-\nTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH\nOUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY\nASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID so. IN THE SCM WE\nCAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR\nPROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE\nTRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.\n11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT\nTHE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN\nTHE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG\nWILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY\nPROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN\nPRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS\nIN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS\nIN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS\nSINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN\nWHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR\nCOSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.\n12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.\nERICSON\nSECRET\nNNN\nis\nFORD\nHERALD\nLIBRARY\nPAGE\n5\n3C\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3335\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z\n11\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19\nMC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nSAJ-01\nIO-14\nDRC-01\n/160\nw\n023773\nP R 241000Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3968\nSECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY\nINFO CINCPAC\nSECR E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3335\nJOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE\nEO 11652: GDS\nTAGS: MASS, KS\nSUBJECT: OUTSTANDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE/MILITARY PROCUREMENT\nISSUES\nREF: A SEOUL 3134 B. SEOUL 3053 C. SEOUL 2684\nSUMMARY: MND HAS BEEN PRESSING FOR USG RESPONSE TO\nSEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT MATTERS. EMBASSY/COMUSK\nBELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD RESPOND TO ROKG REQUESTS ALONG LINES\nRECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED THIS MESSAGE.\n1. IN PAST WEEKS MND HAS BEEN PRESSING STRONGLY FOR\nUSG RESPONSE ON SEVERAL MAJOR MAP MILITARY PROCUREMENT\nMATTERS.\n2. LATEST DISCUSSION WAS MAY 21 MEETING BETWEEN MND\nASST. MINISTER PAIK SEOK CHU AND JUSMAG CHIEF. DISCUSSION\nCOVERED FY 74 MAP LEVELL, O&M QUESTION, AND\nMAJOR ROK MILITARY PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. THESE\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z\nINCLUDE F4E PROCUREMENT, TOW FOREIGN MILITARY SALES\nCREDIT CASE, STANDARD MISSILE PROCUREMENT AND AIM-9E\nPROBLEM. PAIK ALSO BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF ROK PRO-\nCUREMENT OF OERLIKON 35 MM AA GUNS WHICH BEING\nREPORTED SEPARATELY.\n3. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 GRANT LEVEL, APIK WAS\nFORD\nTOLD THAT PROSPECT LOOKED BLEAK AND THAT THERE WILL\nBE FURTHER REDUCTION IN LEVEL BELOW THAT ALREADY\nCONVEYED TO ROKG. ON QUESTION OF FY 74 O&M, PAIK\nLIBRABU\nTOKD BY JUSMAG CHIEF THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO\nEXPECT LITTLE OR NO O&M FOR FY 74. PAIK DID NOT\nREACT STRONGLY, INDICATING THAT MAJOR MND CONCERN\nNOW IS TO GET FIRM FIX ON HOW MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE\nWILL BE AVAILABLE so THAT MND CAN TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS\nTO COMPENSATE. PAID INDICATED MND WILL BE REQUESTING FUNDS\nTO COMPENSATE FOR O&M SHORTFALL IN SUPPLEMENTAL BUDGETARY\nREQUEST LATER IN YEAR.\nSECRET\nPAGE\n1\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nState Dept Guidelines\nBy\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3335\nSECRET\n4. HOWEVER, PAIK WAS EMOTIONAL AND ADAMANT IN\nCONVEYING SENSE OF URGENCY WHICH EXISTED WITHIN MND,\nJCS, AND BLUE HOUSE REGARDING MAJOR PROCUREMENT\nITEMS WHICH KOREANS HAVE ALREADY REQUESTED FROM\nUS AND NEED FOR INCREASED OUTYEAR FMS CREDITS.\nPAID SAID BLUE HOUSE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND MND'S\nINABILITY TO SECURE REQUISITE INFORMATION ON COST\nAND AVAILABILITY AND TO BEGIN PROCUREMENT PROCESS.\n5. FOLLOWING IS SUBSTANCE OF PAIK'S COMMENTS RE\nSPECIFIC MAJOR PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS:\nA. F4ES: PAIK STRESSED THAT ROKG ANXIOUSLY\nWAITING FOR LETTER OF OFFER ON F4ES. HE REQUESTED\nTHAT LETTER BE EXPEDITED AND PRESENTED TO ROKG NO\nLATER THAN THE END OF MAY. PAIK STATED THAT FIRM\nDECISION HAS BEEN MADE TO PURCHASE ONE F4E SQUADRON\nPRODUCED IN U.S. AND TO REQUEST FMS CREDIT FUNDING FOR\nTHEIR PURCHASE. REQUIRED ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT WILL\nBE ASSEMBLED IN ROK UNDER JOINT VENTURE ARRANGEMENT WITH\nMCDONNELL-DOUGLAS. PAID INDICATED ROKG FULLY AWARE THAT FUNDING\nFOR JOINT VENTURE F4E ASSEMBLY WOULD HAVE TO BE DIRECT\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z\nCOMMERCIAL FINANCING. (DISCUSSION RE JOINT VENTURE\nIS ALREADY UNDERWAY BETWEEN ROKG AND MCDONNELL-\nDOUGLAS. COMPANY REPS HAVE INDICATED TO US INFORMALLY\nTHEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT.)\nB. TOW FMS CASE: PAIK SAID THAT IN-DEPTH\nANALYSIS OF TOW REQUIREMENTS HAS LED MND TO CONCLUSION\nONLY SIX COMPANIES ARE REQUIRED. THEREFORE, IN\nADDITION TO THE TWO COMPANIES INCLUDED IN FY 74\nPHASE II FMS CREDIT PROGRAM, ROKG WISHES TO\nPURCHASE FOUR ADDITIONAL COMPANIES (18 PER COMPANY).\nPAIK STRESSED MND MUST RECEIVE IN TIMELY FASHION\nINFORMATION EARLIER REQUESTED CONCERNING PRICE,\nAVAILABILITY AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TOW\nPURCHASE. SAID THIS INFORMATION ESSENTIAL\nso THAT MND CAN MAKE PROPER BUDGETARY ARRANGEMENTS.\nC. STANDARD MISSILES: PAIK INDICATED THAT\nFURD\nROKG'S DESIRE TO PURCHASE 40 STANDARD MISSILES\nREMAINS FIRM. MND HOPES THAT THESE CAN BE\nPURCHASED FROM U.S. NAVY THROUGH FMS CREDIT. MND\nSERALD\nWORKING DIRECTLY WITH GENERAL DYNAMICS CORP. TO\nLIBRARY\nPURCHASE EIGHT LAUNCHERS. JUSMAG CHIEF POINTED OUT\nFY 74 CREDIT LEVEL COULD NOT ACCOMMODATE\nPURCHASE OF MISSILES. PAIK EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING,\nBUT SAID HE HOPED WE WOULD BE ABLE TO OBTAIN\nADDITIONAL FMS FUNDS FOR THIS. IF FMS CREDIT NOT\nPOSSIBLE, PAIK SAID ROKG PREPARED MAKE CASH PAYMENT.\nHOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO KNOW HOW MUCH THE 40 MISSILES\nWOULD COST AND WHAT TERMS OF PAYMENT WOULD BE. PAIK\nALSO REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION ON PRIORITY BASIS.\nSECRET\nPAGE\n2\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3335\nSECRET\nD. AID 9E PROJECT: MND REQUESTS EARLIEST POSSIBLE USG\nACTION ON AID-9E PROJECT. AS WASHINGTON AWARE,\nPHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS INFORMED ROKG OF THEIR INTENT\nTO STOP ACTIONS ON CURRENT CONTRACT EFFECTIVE 1 JUNE\n74 UNLESS PAYMENT OF $3.3 MILLION MADE PRIOR. IN VIEW\nOF FACT WE ENCOURAGED ROKG TO GO FMS ROUTE ON THIS\nPROJECT, THEY SIGNED CONTRACT IN AUGUST 1973 AND HAVE\nBEEN PAYING $12,000 MONTHLY INTEREST SINCE THAT DATE\nFAILURE TO PROMPTLY APPROVE FMS CREDIT PREVIOUSLY\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 SEOUL 03335 01 OF 02 241102Z\nREQUESTED AND IN CURRENT FY 74 PROGRAM, WOULD BE\nEXTREMELY EMBARASSING AND IMPOSSIBLE TO EXPLAIN\nADEQUATELY TO ROKS (PHILCO FORD CORPORATION HAS\nALREADY STOPPED SHIPMENT OF EQUIPMENT AND PARTS\nAGREED TO IN INITIAL CONTRACT).\nSECRET\nNNN\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03335 02 OF 02 241052Z\n11\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 MC-02\nACDA-19 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nIO-14 SAJ-01 DRC-01 /160 w\n023709\nP R 241000z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3969\nSECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY\nINFO CINCPAC\nSECR E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3335\n6. COMMENT: PAIK CLEARLY UNDER HEAVIEST PRESSURE FROM\nBLUE HOUSE AND MND TO GET SOME MOVEMENT FROM US ON\nROKG PROCUREMENT REQUESTS. ROKG DOES NOT UNDERSTAND\nCONTINUING DELAY ON OUR PART IN EVEN PROVIDING COST AND\nAVAILABILITY INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND. THIS IS CREATING\nSERIOUS IRRITATION AT HIGHEST LEVELS OF ROKG. RECOGNIZE THAT\nSOME OF ROKG REQUESTS REQUIRE MAJOR DECISIONS ON OUR PART\nAND CANNOT BE ACTED UPON INSTANTLY AS ROKG OBVIOUSLY WISHES.\nHOWEVER, BELIEVE IT ESSENTIAL THAT WE RESPOND SOONEST\nTO AT LEAST SOME OF THE ROKG REQUESTS LISTED ABOVE.\nFORD\n7. TO MEET OUR NEEDS HERE, EMBASSY/USFK WOULD\nRECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING APPROACH:\nSERALD\nA. WASHINGTON AGENCIES PROVIDE SOONEST\nLIBRARY\nPROCUREMENT INFORMATION REQUESTED BY MND\nON TOW FMS CASE AND ON THE STANDARD MISSILES AND\nAT SAME TIME, INFORM MND OF RELEASE PHASE II FMS\nCREDIT FUNDS FOR AID-9E MISSILES. (IF WE COULD ALSO\nINFORM MND OF RELEASE ALL OF PHASE II FY 74 FMS CREDIT\nSECRET\nPAGE\n3\nMILLS CHARLES N\n74 SEOUL 3335\nSECRET\nFUNDS THIS WOULD DO MUCH TO MEET OUR MOST PRESSING\nPROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH MND.)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03335 02 OF 02 241052Z\nB. EXPEDITE CONSIDERATION OF ROKG REQUEST\nFOR F4E LETTER OF OFFER. AS WE SEE IT, THERE ARE TWO\nQUESTIONS INVOLVED: FIRST IS POLICY DETERMINATION\nTHAT WE WILL ALLOW SALE OF F4ES TO ROKG; SECOND IS\nQUESTION OF FMS FUNDING. WITH REGARD TO POLICY CONSIDERATION,\nEMBASSY/USFK BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD INFORM ROKG NOW THAT WE\nHAVE NO OBJECTION TO SALE OF F4ES. WE HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED\nBACKGROUND ROKG DECISION ON THIS. QUESTION OF HOW MANY\nF4ES ROKG WILL PROCURE STILL UNDER DEBATE WITHIN\nGOVERNMENT. BUT AT MINIMUM KOREANS WANT TO PURCHASE\nONE SQUADRON NOW AND TO EVENTUALLY CO-PRODUCE ONE\nOR TWO ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS IF JOINT VENTURE\nARRANGEMENT WORKS OUT. ON QUESTION OF FMS FINANCING,\nBELIEVE THAT ROKG WILL RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT AN INITIAL\nUSG RESPONSE INDICATING THAT EARLY ANSWER NOT\nPOSSIBLE SINCE WE MUST STUDY ROKG REQUEST AND WEIGH\nIT IN TERMS OF OTHER COMPETING PRIORITIES.\n8. ACTION REQUESTED:\nA. REQUEST THAT WASHINGTON AGENCIES ACT\nIMMEDIATELY ALONG LINES RECOMMENDED IN PARA 7A ABOVE.\nB. WITH REGARD TO RECOMMENDATION RE F4ES,\nREQUEST WASHINGTON GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION THIS\nPROBLEM AS REQUESTED IN PARA 7B ABOVE AS WELL AS\nAUTHORIZE US NOW TO INFORM MND THAT EARLY REPLY WILL\nBE FORTHCOMING.\nERICSON\nSECRET\nNNN\nGERALD FORD VIBRIES\nBlake UPS\n5/5/74\ncalled\n1738\nMay 8,\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nMr. John Marsh\n1974 weater say his irom.\nAssistant to the Vice President\nfor Defense Affairs\nSUBJECT:\nCall on the Vice President by Korean\nChief Justice\nThe State Department has recommended that the Vice President\nreceive Korean Supreme Court Chief Justice Min Bok Ki for a\ncourtesy call on May 14 (Tab A). The Chief Justice, who is\nvisiting the U.S. under the auspices of AID, has not requested\nan appointment with the Vice President but he would, of course,\nbe pleased if an appointment were arranged.\nState's purpose in requesting the meeting is to underline our\nsupport of Korean \"regular and traditional judicial institutions\"\nat a time of \"increasing authoritarian rule and government\" in\nKorea.\nThe NSC staff recommends against the appointment. We believe\nit is inappropriate to involve the Vice President in political\nmaneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs. Nor\ndo we believe it necessary to offer a meeting with such a high\nofficial of the Executive Branch and would plan to recommend to\nState that they arrange appointments with appropriate ranking\nmembers of the U.S. Judiciary.\nWill you please let me know the Vice President's wishes in this\nregard so that we may take the necessary steps with the State\nDepartment.\nSERALD FORD LIBRATO\nJeanne W. Davis\nStaff Secretary\nCC: Mr. Smyser\n1738\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nMay 3, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER\nSUBJECT:\nCall on the Vice President by\nKorean Chief Justice Min\nThe State Department has proposed a meeting between the Vice\nPresident and Korean Chief Justice Min Bok Ki (Tab B).\nState's purpose in requesting this meeting is to underline our support\nof Korean \"regular and traditional judicial institutions\" at a time of\n'increasing authoritarian rule and government\" in Korea.\nI see no reason why we should involve the Vice President in political\nmaneuvers designed to influence Korean internal affairs.\nMrs. Davis concurs.\nRecommendation:\nThat you authorize Jeanne Davis to sign the memorandum to\nMr. Springsteen at Tab A.\nApprove BD\nDisapprove\nFORD\nPAGE\n1\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 State (es Dept amended) Guidelines SEC 3.3 statement state 9/17/03\nBy like NARA, Date 12/6/10\nWHITE JOYCE A\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\n12/67\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19\nMC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nSAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 W\n054136\nR 160908Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3819\nSECDEF WASHDC\nINFO CINCPAC\nSECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/1\nNOFORN\nCORRECTEDCOP Y (CORRECT GARBLED TEXT THROUGHOUT)\n<-\nE.O. 11652: GDS\nTAGS: MASS KS\nSUBJECT: ROK DEFENSE PROCUREMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY\nREF: A. SEOUL 3053 B. SEOUL 3015\nJOINT EMBASSY/COMUSK MESSAGE\nBEGIN SUMMARY: THE ROKG IS MOVING IN THE DIRECTION\nOF SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY THROUGH\nITS OWN RESOURCES. IN THIS SITUATION THE ROKG DOES\nAND WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK OUR BEST ADVICE ON MILITARY\nPROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT WILL ALSO SET ITS OWN PRIORITIES\nBOOK\nAND ACT ON THEM. END SUMMARY.\n1. REF A. GIVES THE BACKGROUND ON RECENT ROKG ACTIONS\nTO BEGIN SIGNIFICANT DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ESSENTIALLY\nTHROUGH ITS OWN RESOURCES. REF B. REPORTS CURRENT ROKG\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\nTHINKING ON R&D AREA.\n2. ROKG MOVEMENT IN THIS DIRECTION IS NOT UNEXPECTED AND\na. FORD\nIS ESSENTIALLY A HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT. THE ROKG\nCLEARLY HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ANY LIKELY\nFUTURE MAP GRANT ASSISTANCE LEVELS WILL BE TOO LOW\nTO MEET ROK DEFENSE NEEDS. AND ROKG VIEWS GRANT\nASSISTANCE AS INCREASINGLY PROBLEMATICAL GIVEN\nCONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES. CONSEQUENTLY, UNDER THE\nPERSONAL DIRECTION OF PRESIDENT PARK, GOVERNMENT HAS\nBEGUN THE PROCESS OF PLANNING AND PROGRAMMING FOR\nITS PROCUREMENT NEEDS IN THE MID-70S.\n3. THESE ROKG ACTIONS DO NOT MEAN THAT ROKG HAS\nFORMALLY ABANDONED ITS EXPECTATIONS RE MOD PLAN\nOBJECTIVES. AND IT HOPES FOR SOME LEVEL OF US GRANT\nASSISTANCE IN NEAR TERM. ROKG WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS\nUS ON QUESTION OF UNFULFILLED MOD PLAN LEVELS IN HOPE\nOF EXACTING AS MUCH GRANT ASSISTANCE AS POSSIBLE.\nHOWEVER, ROKG HAS NO SERIOUS EXPECTATIONS THAT GRANT\nSECRET\nPAGE\n1\nWHITE JOYCE A\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nASSISTANCE WOULD CONTINUE BEYOND MOD PLAN IN ANY\nEVENT. FURTHER, MND FULLY AWARE OF, AND HAS ACCEPTED,\nIMPLICATIONS OF SECDEF CLEMENT'S STATEMENT AT LAST\nSCM THAT FMS AS WELL AS GRANT ASSISTANCE\nWILL BE USED IN COMPLETING MOD PLAN. IN THIS SITUATION\nROKG APPEARS TO BE MOVING REALISTICALLY AND QUICKLY\nTO TAKE UP POST-MOD PLAN PROCUREMENT BURDEN AS WELL\nAS TO MEET WHAT IT VIEWS AS ITS OWN HIGH PRIORITY\nDEFENSE NEEDS WHETHER THEY ARE IN MOD PLAN OR NOT.\n4. FOR OUR PART, WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS INCUMBENT\nON USG ALSO TO REALISTICALLY ASSESS FUTURE DIRECTION\nOF OUR MAP. IN OUR PARA CONTRIBUTION (SEOONR JEAUELN\nCOUNTRY TEAM POINTED OUT THAT: ROKG IS ICREASINGLY\nABLE TO BEAR COSTS OF ITS OWN DEFENSE; ROKG IS\nCOMPLUTCH AWARE OF DOWNWARD DIRECTION OF US GRANT\nASSISTANCE; AND IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT PROCUREMENT OF\nMILITARY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL WILL BE ITS OWN\nRESPONSIBILITY. WE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT WE MUST\nACCEPT THAT FORMER DOMINANT US ROLE IN DETERMINING\nROK MILITARY REQUIREMENTS WILL INEVITABLY CHANGE, AND\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 170444Z\nTHAT ROKG WILL INCREASINGLY EXPECT TO MAKE ITS OWN\nFINAL DETERMINATIONS,\n5. GIVEN CURRENT ROKG ACTIONS, WE BELIEVE PROPOSED\nCOURSE OF ACTIONS OUTLINED IN OUR PARA SUBMISSION\n0000\nCONTINUE TO REMAIN A VALID STATEMENT. AS OUTLINED\nUNIT\nIN THAT PAPER, WE BELIEVE THAT THE USG SHOULD:\nA. CONTINUE TO MEET OUR MOD PLAN OBJECTIVES\nBY A COMBINATION OF GRANT ASSISTANCE AND FMS WITH A\nTARGET COMPLETION DATE OF FY 77.\nB. CONTINUE TO TRANSFER DEFENSE COSTS TO THE\nROK BY USING INCREASED FMS CASH AND CREDIT FACILITIES.\nC. PROJECT ADEQUATE FMS LEVELS TO MEET MAJOR\nAGREED ROK PROCUREMENT REQUIREMENTS.\nD. WORK TOWARD A SITUATION IN WHICH THE ROK\n1022\nIS ABLE TO USE NORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PRO-\nCUREMENT AND, AS THE ROK MOVES TOWARDS COMMERCIAL\nCREDIT PROCUREMENT, WORK TO ASSURE THAT US EQUIPMENT\nAND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION.\n6. WITHIN THE POLICY FRAMEWORK OUTLINED ABOVE,\nESSENTIAL PROBLEM NOW FACING US IN MILITARY ASSISTANCE\nFIELD IS NOT A BOOKKEEPING APPROACH TO MOD PLAN FUL-\nFILLMENT. ROKG HAS INTERPRETED OUR PAST COMMENTS RE\nMOD PALN STRETHC-OUT, AND INCREASING USE OF FMS TO\nMEET MOD PLAN AS SIGNS THAT ORIGINAL MOD PLAN CONCEPT\nIS IN EFFECT WITHERING AWAY. ROKG WOULD NOT WISH TO\nP**ONTHS BEFORE\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 04 SEOUL 03134 01 OF 02 1704442\nTHE NEXT SCM IN SEPT, WASHINGTON AGENCIES MUST SERIOUSLY\nCONSIDER PRESENTING ROKG WITH REALISTIC PICTURE OF\nGRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FUTURE. FURTHER, AND MORE\nIMPORTANTLY, WE SHOULD FOCUS ON QUESTION OF FMS CREDIT\nLEVELS OVER NEXT FEW YEARS TO ALLOW A NEEDED TRANSI-\nTION FROM THE LARGE SCALE GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS\nOF THE PAST TO A SITUATION IN WHICH ROK IS ABLE TO USE\nNORMAL COMMERCIAL CHANNELS FOR PROCUREMENT.\n8. THE FMS CREDIT LEVELS WHICH WE WOULD SEE IN THE\nFY 75-78 PERIOD WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE PRESENT\nPOM LEVELS. IF USG WERE IN A POSITION TO BE FORTH-\nCOMING ON THE FMS CREDIT USSUE, BELIEVE THAT KOREANS\nWOULD IMPLICITLY ACCEPT SITUATION IN WHICH MOD PLAN\nREQUIREMENTS WOULD GRADUALLY BE ABSORBED IN COURSE OF\nTIME IN AN EXPANDED FMS CREDIT PROGRAM WE WOULD IN\nEFFECT HAVE A SMOOTH TRANSITION IN WHICH GRANT ASSISTANCE\nELEMENTS WOULD DISAPPEAR AND AT SOME POINT IN PROCESS\nWE WOULD BE IN POSITION TO STATE THAT MOD PLAN\nHAD BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETED,\nSECRET\nNNN\nSECRET\nPAGE 01 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\n67\nACTION EA-14\nINFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00\nNSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15 ACDA-19\nMC-02 AID-20 IGA-02 OMB-01 EB-11 COME-00 TRSE-00\nSAJ-01 IO-14 DRC-01 /160 W\n049950\nR 160908Z MAY 74\nFM AMEMBASSY SEOUL\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 3820\nSECDEF WASHDC\nINFO CINCPAC\nS-E C R B T SECTION 2 OF 2 SEOUL 3134/2\n9. SPECIFICALLY WE RECOMMEND FOLLOWING APPROACH\nON KEY POLICY QUESTIONS:\nA. MOD PLAN FUTURE: WITH REGARD TO MOD PLAN\nFUTURE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL REALISTICALLY AND\nHONESTLY WITH ROKG ON PROSPECTS. USG SHOULD USE FORTH-\nCOMING SCM TO POINT OUT TO KOREAN SIDE THAT WE WILL\nCONTINUE TO DO BEST WE CAN TO MEET REMAINING MOD PLAN\nOBJECTIVES. HOWEVER, GIVEN CONGRESSIONAL REALITIES,\nSECRET\nPAGE\n3\nFORD is GREATO LIBRARY\nWHITE JOYCE A\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nWE CANNOT BE HOPEFUL ABOUT GRANT ASSISTANCE COMPONENT\nAND THEREFORE WE AND ROKG WILL HAVE TO GIVE PRIMARY\nEMPHASIS TO FMS CREDIT AND CASH PURCHASES FOR REMAINING\nMOD PLAN HIGH PRIORITY ITEMS.\nB. O&M QUESTION: WE ARE SCHEDULED TO BE OUT OF\nGRANT ASSISTANCE FOR O&M BY FY 76. IN LIKELY EVENT\nFY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE IS SUBSTANTIALLY BELOW $112\nMILLION, WE MAY WELL ALREADY BE OUT OF O&M BUSINESS IN\nFY 74, GIVEN ROKG WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO CONSIDER\nMAJOR DEFENSE PROCUREMENT ITEMS OUT OF ITS OWN FUNDS,\nTHERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUING GRANT O&M.\nTHEREFORE, WE BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD TELL ROKG NOW\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 02 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\nTHAT THERE WILL BE NO SIGNIFICANT O&M GRANT ASSISTANCE\nIN FY 75 AND WHATEVER OUR EVENTUAL FY 74 GRANT ASSISTANCE\nLEVEL WE WOULD BE BETTER ADVISED TO USE IT FOR\nPROCUREMENT OF INVESTMENT ITEMS, NOT O&M. THIS WILL\nALLOW MND TO REALISTICALLY PLAN ITS FUTURE O&M\nREQUIREMENTS. (IN VIEW OF LEAD TIME REQUIRED TO\nEFFECTIVELY ARRANGE AND IMPLEMENT SSA &FMS CASH CASES\nFOR CRITICAL SUPPORT OF ESSENTIAL HIGH PRIORITY,\nWEAPONS SYSTEMS, SOME GRANT AID O&M SUPPORT MAY BE\nREQUIRED).\nc. FMS CREDIT LEVELS: USG SHOULD ON PRIORITY\nBASIS ADDRESS QUESTION OF LIKELY FMS LEVELS AVAILABLE\nTO ROK IN COMING YEARS. IN OUR VIEW, IT IS IN OUR\nINTEREST TO PROVIDE EXPANDED FMS LEVELS NOT ONLY FOR\nSECURITY REASONS BUT ALSO TO ASSURE THAT, AS ROKG\nINCREASINGLY BEARS ITS OWN DEFENSE COSTS, US EQUIPMENT\nAND MATERIAL RETAIN A MOST-FAVORED POSITION IN KOREAN\nPROCUREMENT.\nD. ROK THIRD-COUTNRY PROCUREMENT: AT PRESENT\nROKG STILL ESSENTIALLY ORIENTED TO PROCUREMENT OF US\nEQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS. HOWEVER, AS ROKG INCREASINGLY\nMAKES ITS OWN DECISION IT IS ALREADY BEGINNING TO SHOP AROUND.\nTHIRD-COUNTRY REPS ARE ALREADY QUIETLY BUT ACTIVELY\nTRYING TO MOVE IN ON WHAT THEY SEE AS A NEW MARKET.\nIN OUR VIEW, WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE A FIRM LINE\nTHAT AS LONG AS THERE IS MAJOR USG CONCESSIONAL MAP\nPROGRAM HERE, ROKG MUST GIVE US EQUIPMENT HIGHEST\nPRIORITY. ROKG WILL UNDERSTAND THIS. AT SAME TIME\nLIBRARY HORALD FORD\nWE DO EXPECT ROKG TO PRESS US FOR UNDERSTANDING AND\nAPPROVAL OF LIMITED PROCUREMENT OF THIRD-COUNTRY ITEMS\nWHICH THEY BELIEVE ARE ESSENTIAL TO THEIR NEEDS AND\nWHICH ARE EITHER UNAVAILABLE IN US INVENTORIES OR IN\nTHE ROK VIEW INADEQUATE. WE WILL HAVE TO DEAL WITH\nTHESE ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS AS THEY ARISE (E.G.\nSWISS OERLIKON AA GUNS). HOWEVER, AS STATED ABOVE\nWE NO NOT BELEIVE USG SHOULD COUNTENANCE MAJOR ROK\nARMS PURCHASES FROM THIRD-COUNTRIES WHILE WE ARE IN\nSECRET\nPAGE\n4\nWHITE JOYCE A\n74 SEOUL 3134\nSECRET\nEFFECT STILL UNDERWRITING SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE\nROK DEFENSE COSTS.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nPAGE 03 SEOUL 03134 02 OF 02 162256Z\n10. BEYOND THE SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS NOTED\nABOVE, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO RECOGNIZE THAT OUR\nMILITARY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH KOREA IS ALREADY\nIN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION. THE ROKG IN ITS OWN WAY\nIS ATTEMPTING TO REACT REALISTICALLY TO WHAT IT SEES\nAS THE PHASE DOWN OF THE USG'S MASSIVE MILITARY\nASSISTANCE PROGRAMS OF THE PAST. THIS REALIZA-\nTION\nHAS NOT LED THE ROKG TO PANIC OR TO UNDUE RECRIMINA-\nTIONS DIRECTED AGAINST US. IT HAS BEEN UNHAPPY WITH\nOUR PERFORMANCE IN PAST YEAR ON MANY MILITARY\nASSISTANCE MATTERS AND HAS SAID so, IN THE SCM WE\nCAN EXPECT SOME COMMENT ON ON-FULFILLMENT OF OUR\nPROMISES. AT SAME TIME, ROKG HAS NOT IGNORED THE\nTRENDS OF EVENTS AND IS NOT TRYING TO TURN CLOCK BACK.\n11. FOR OUR PART THIS MEANS THAT WE MUST ACCEPT THAT\nTHE ROKG INCREASINGLY WILL TELL US WHAT IT WANTS IN\nTHE MILITARY PROCUREMENT FIELD. THE ROKG\nWILL CONTINUE TO ASK OUR ADVICE ON MILITARY\nPROCUREMENT MATTERS BUT IT WILL SET ITS OWN\nPRIORITIES AND ACT ON THEM. HOWEVER, THE ROKG IS\nIN THE PROCESS OF MOVING FROM A PAST DEPENDENT STATUS\nIN WHICH, IN EFFECT, IT ACCEPTED OUR DETERMINATIONS\nSINCE WE WERE PAYING THE FREIGHT TO A SITUATION IN\nWHICH IT SEES ITSELF AS BEARING ESSENTIALLY THE MAJOR\nCOSTS OF ITS DEFENSE BY THE MID-70S.\n12. AMBASSADOR HABIB HAS CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.\nERICSON\nSECRET\nNNN\nFORD\nBERALD\n2291\n6a\nFROEBE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nFYI Rok\nJune 13, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nS\nMr. George S. Springsteen\nExecutive Secretary\nDepartment of State\nSUBJECT:\nReply to Letter for Korean National\nAssemblyman (S/S 7410736)\nP\nI enclose a slightly revised version of the reply to Mr. Row\nand suggest it be signed by a State Department officer.\nJeanne Davis\nStaff Secretary\nAttachment\nDispatched 6/13/1974 (adc)\nFORDO LIBRARY 077336\nSUGGESTED LETTER\nHonorable Chin Hwan Row\nNational Assembly of the\nRepublic of Korea\nSeoul, Korea\nDear Mr. Row:\nI have been asked to respond to your letter to the President,\nin which you express your appreciation for the visit of Mr. John\nNidecker, Special Assistant to the President, to Korea.\nWe are indeed pleased that you found Mr. Nidecker's visit\nhelpful. For his part, Mr. Nidecker benefited considerably\nfrom his visit and has provided us with a valuable report of\ndevelopments in Korea and of his visit. We are grateful that\nhe was so well received.\nSincerely yours,\nFBIS 63\nDPRK DEPUTY PREMIER ATTACKS ROK-U.S. OBSTRUCTION OF REUNIFICATION\nB231011 PYONGYANG KCNA IN ENGLISH 0800 GMT 23 JUN 74 B\nR\n(TEXT) PYONGYANG JUNE 23 (KCNA) -- A GRAND PYONGYANG REPORT\nMEETING WAS HELD AT THE PEOPLE'S PALACE OF CULTURE SATURDAY EVENING\nTO MARK THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE PUBLICATION OF \"LET US PREVENT A\nNATIONAL SPLIT AND REUNIFY THE COUNTRY\", HE HISTORIC SPEECH MADE BY\nTHE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG.\nPUT WITH DUE RESPECT ON THE PLATFORM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF A\nHUGE DEEP BLUE AND RED FLAG OF THE REPUBLIC WAS A PORTRAIT OF THE\nRESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE GENIUS OF\nREVOLUTION AND THE SUN AND SAVIOUR OF OUR NATION.\nPRESENT AT THE REPORT MEETING WERE FUNCTIONARIES OF PARTY AND\nPOWER ORGANS, WORKING PEOPLE'S S ORGANIZATIONS AND ECONOMIC BODIES AND\nMEN OF SCIENCE, EDUCATION, CULTURE AND ART AND THE PRESS AS WELL AS\nWORKING PEOPLE IN THE CITY AND SERVICEMEN OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY.\nTHE PLATFORM WAS TAKEN BY COMRADES SO CHOL AND CHONG CHUN-KI:\nHO CHONG-SUK, DIRECTOR OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE\nOF THE FATHERLAND FRONT: KANG CHANG-SU, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL\nCOMMITTEE OF THE CHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY: KIM SONG-YUL, VICE-CHAIRMAN\nOF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY: HONG KI-\nMUN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE\nFATHERLAND; MEMBERS OF THE PRESIDIUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE\nFATHERLAND FRONT: KANG HUI-WON, CHAIRMAN OF THE PYONGYANG MUNICIPAL\nADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE: AND RESPONSIBILE FUNCTIONARIES OF PUBLIC\nORGANIZATIONS.\nDeputyPremer\nCOMRADE CHONG CHUN-KI DELIVERED A REPORT AT THE MEETING.\nTHE REPORTER SAID: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY THE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM\nIL-SONG IS A MOST PATRIOTIC PROPOSITION FOR REUNIFICATION CORRECTLY\nREFLECTING THE URGENT DEMAND OF THE PREVAILING SITUATION AND THE\nARDENT DESIRE OF THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO ACHIEVE NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE, AND A FAIR AND\nREALISTIC NATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE\nTHREE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE\nNORTH AND SOUTH.\nHE CONTINUED: THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION IS THE CHUCHE-ORIENTED, GREAT PROPOSITION FOR PEACEFUL\nREUNIFICATION WHERE THE GREAT CHUCHE IDEA THAT PEOPLE ARE THE MASTER\nOF THEIR OWN DESTINY AND THEY HAVE ALSO THE CAPACITY TO HEW OUT\nTHEIR OWN DESTINY HAS FOUND A BRILLIANT EMBODIMENT IN THE QUESTION\nOF REUNIFICATION AND AN INSPIRING BANNER OF ACTIVELY SEEKING A\nSHORTCUT TO NATIONAL REUNIFICATION BY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE\nTHEMSELVES THROUGH THE MOBILIZATION OF ALL THE PATRIOTIC FORCES OF\nTHE NORTH AND SOUTH.\nTHE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION NEWLY\nCLARIFIED BY THE GREAT LEADER IS ALSO A PROPOSITION OF INDEPENDENT\nAND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION IN FULLIACCORD WITH THE UNANIMOUS\nDESIRE OF THE WORLD PROGRESSIVE PEOPLES TO SEE PEACE IN KOREA AND THE\nPEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WITH THAT HE TREND OF THE\nPRESENT\nTIMETWHEN\nROAD OF INDEPENDENCE,\nTHE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLARIFIED BY\nTHE RESPECTED AND BELOVED LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG IS A HISTORICAL\nNATIONAL SALVATION PROPOSITION POINTING TO THE ONLY WAY TO SHAPE THE\nDESTINY OF THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION BY THE EFFORTS OF THE KOREAN\nPEOPLE THEMSELVES AT THE GRAVE HISTORIC JUNCTURE WHEN THEY ARE AT THE\nCROSSROADS OF REUNIFICATION OR PERMANENT SPLIT, A REUNIFICATION\nDECLARATION BRINGING DOWN A SLEDGE UPON THE HEADS OF A TINY HANDFUL\nOF NATIONAL SPLITTISTS WHO CAME OUT WITH THE \"SPLITTING DECLARATION\"\nAND (WORD INDISTINCT) REFLECTING THE ASPIRATION OF THE NATION FOR\nREUNIFICATION AND A GREAT MILITANT PROPOSITION POWERFULLY ROUSING THE\nENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO THE SACRED STRUGGLE AGAINST THE DIVISION AND\nTREACHERY AND FOR REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.\n(MORE)\n23 JUN 1808Z BG/MC\nFBIS 65\nFIRST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)\nHarler\n$5078\nXXX REUNIFICATION AND PATRIOTISM.\n6068\n(TEXT) ONE'S APPROACH TOWARDS THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION\nOF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS THE TOUCHSTONE TESTING WHETHER HE\nWANTS REUNIFICATION OR NOT, WHETHER HE RESPECTS OR NOT THE THREE\nP\nPRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WHICH THE NORTH AND SOUTH\nPLEDGED TO FULFIL BEFORE THE NATION, THE REPORTER SAID, AND CONTINUED:\nIN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION THE\nGREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG ADVANCED IT AS A NATIONAL SALVATION\nMEASURE OF GREATEST URGENCY TO REMOVE MILITARY CONFRONTATION\nAND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TO BEBIN WITH.\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:\n\"TO IMPROVE THE PRESENT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH\nOF KOREA AND ACCELERATE THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY,\nIT IS NECESSARY, FIRST OF ALL, TO ELIMINATE MILITARY CONFRONTATION\nAND EASE TENSION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH\".\nTHIS PROPOSAL ADVANCED BY THE LEADER IS A MOST REASONABLE\nAND FAIR ONE FOR ELIMINATING THE SOURCE OF MISUNDERSTANDING AND\nMISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, IMPROVING THE NORTH-SOUTH\nRELATIONS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE NATION AND\nCREATING PRECONDITIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION\nOF THE COUNTRY.\nTHE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE AGREED IN THE JOINT STATEMENT\nTO ACHIEVE REUNIFICATION IN A PEACEFUL WAY. BUT WHEN WE PRACTICALLY\nPUT FORWARD A CONCRETE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE\nMILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EAST TENSION, THEY CAME OUT WITH\nTHE STEREOTYPED SOPHISM THAT \"IT IS STILL PREMATURE\" AND \"NOW\nIS NOT THE STAGE TO SETTLE THIS MATTER\" AND WENT THE\nLENGTH OF REFUSING TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.\nAND THEY TOOK THE ROAD OF SPEEDING UP WAR PREPARATIONS\nAND FURTHER KEYING UP TENSION, WHILE REINFORCING THE ARMED\nFORCES, EXPANDING ARMAMENTS, BEGGING FOR THE PERMAMENT\nSTATIONING OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS AND\nINTRODUCING LARGE QUANTITIES OF NEW TYPE WEAPONS AND MILITARY\nEQUIPMENT.\nTHE DARK DESIGN PURSUED BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE\nBEHIND THE SINGBOARD OF \"PEACE\" AND \"CO-EXISTENCE\" HAS\nBEEN MORE FULLY REVEALED IN THE \"NON-AGGRESSION PACT\"\nBROUGHT FORWARD BY THEM.\nTHE *NON-AGGRESSION PACT\" BRAZEN-FACEDLY PUT FORWARD BY\nTHE PAK CHONG-HUICLIQUE IS NOTHING BUT A SMOKESCREEN TO COVER\nUP THEIR CRIMINAL WAR POLICY AND TURN DOWN OUR PROPOSAL FOR PEACE\nAGREEMENT. IT AIMS ONLY AT MAINTAINING THE PRESENT SITUATION\nFRAUGHT WITH THE DANGER OF WAR AS IT IS.\nAS LONG AS THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR TROOPS, THE SOURCE\nOF WAR IN OUR COUNTRY, STAY ON, PEACESIN OUR COUNTRY CANNOT BE\nGUARANTEED NOR CAN THE DANGER OF WAR BE REMOVED THERE NO\nMATTER WHAT SIGNBOARD MAY BE PUT UP TO \"JUSTIFY\" THEIR OCCUPATION\nOF SOUTH KOREA AND NO MATTER WHAT EMPTY \"DECLARATION\" BE MADE.\nA\nIN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMPADE KIM IL-SONG ALSO CLARIFIED A NATIONAL\nSALVATION PROPOSAL TO REALISE MANY-SIDED COLLABORATION AND\nINTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT AS FOLLOWS:\n\"TO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND EXPEDITE THE COUNTRY'S\nREUNIFICATION, IT IS NECESSARY TO MATERIALIZE MANY-SIDED\nCOLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH IN THE\nPOLITICAL, MILITARY, DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS\".\nTO IMPROVE THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS AND SETTLE THE\nREUNIFICATION QUESTION IN A PEACEFUL WAY, MANY-SIDED\nCOLLABORATION AND INTERCHANGE MUST BE REALISED BETWEEN THE\nNORTH AND SOUTH FOR CREATING AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING\nAND TRUST, RESOIRING THE SEVERED NATIONAL LINKS IN AN ALL-ROUND\nWAY AND PROMOTING THE INDEPENDENT AND UNIFORM DEVELOPMENT OF THE\nCOUNTRY. THERE IS NO OTHER WAY.\nBUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE WHO HAD BEEN TRYING TO USE\nTHE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AS AN IMPLEMENT FOR PERMANENT DIVISION\nOBSTINATELY OPPOSED TO GIVING A CONCRETE SHAPE TO AND TRANSLATING\nINTO PRACTICE NORTH-SOUTH COLLABORATION THOUGH THEY AGREED ON IT\nAND PERSISTENTLY PURSUED THE LINE OF 'CONFRONTATION\" AND\n\"COMPETITION\".\n(MORE)\nR.\nFORD\n23 JUN 18152 BG/GS\nSERALD\n:\nFBIS 66\n7507\n6068\nSECOND ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)\nXXX \"CONFRONTATION\" AND \"COMPETITION\".\nd\nT (TEXT) THE CRIMINAL MOVES THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE\nSTEPPING UP IN PURSUANCE OF \"CONFRONTATION\" AND COMPETITION\"\nBETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, TURNING AWAY THEIR FACE FROM COLLABORATION\nAND INTERCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS, ARE TREACHEROUS ONES TO\nPROLONG THE DIVISION, NOT REUNIFICATION, AND INCITE ANTAGONISM, NOT\nUNITY.\nIN HIS HISTORIC JUNE 23 SPEECH THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM\nIL-SONG PROPOSED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION TO CONVENE A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS COMPOSED\nOF REPRESENTATIVES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA AND POLITICAL PARTIES\nAND SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH.\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:\n\"IN ORDER TO SETTLE THE QUESTION OF THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION\nIN' CONFORMITY WITH THE WILL AND DEMAND OF OUR PEOPLE, IT IS NECESSARY\nTO ENABLE THE MASSES OF PEOPLE OF ALL STRATA IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH\nl\n>>\nTO PARTICIPATE IN THE NATIONWIDE PATRIOTIC WORK FOR NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION\".\nIN VIEW OF ITS NATURE THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION\nIS NOT A MATTER PERTAINING TO THE INTERESTS OF ANY ONE CIRCLE\nOR POLITICAL GROUPING BUT AN ALL-PEOPLE, NATIONWIDE WORK IN WHICH ALL\nCLASSES AND CIRCLES, ALL PARTIES AND GROUPINGS OF OUR COUNTRY\nDESIROUS OF REUNIFICATION ARE VITALLY INTERESTED.\nFROM THE FIRST DAYS OF THE DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH\nTHE WORKERS PARTY OF KOREA, THE KOREAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY, THE\nCHONDOIST CHONGU PARTY AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTHERN\nHALF PROPOSED THAT BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL CONTACTS BE REALISED\nAMONG ALL THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NORTH\nAND SOUTH AND A NORTH-SOUTH POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE BE\nCONVENED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, AND\nTHE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY FOR REUNFICATION, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY,\nTHE DEMOCRATIC UNIFICATION PARTY AND ALL OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES\nAND PERSONAGES OF ALL STRATA IN SOUTH KOREA ALSO CEASELESSLY\nDEMANDED MANY-SIDED CONTACTS AND POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN\nTHE NORTH AND SOUTH.\nBUT THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE MONOPOLIZED A DISCOURSE\nON THE REUNIFICATION QUESTION IN SOUTH KOREA AS IF IT WERE THEIR\nEXCLUSIVE PROPERTY, DOGGEDLY OPPOSED OUR PROPOSAL ON HOLDING\nPOLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND HARSHLY SUPPRESSED EVEN THE DEMAND\nOF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL PERSONAGES\nOF SOUTH KOREA FOR CONTACTS WITH US FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE\nCOUNTRY.\nTHIS SHOWS HOW MUCH THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE ARE\nAFRAID OF THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION\nBY THE EFFORTS OF OUR PEOPLE THEMSELVES AND WHAT A BASE TRICK\nTHEY ARE RESORTING TO TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.\nA\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG NEW YOUROSED IN THE\nFIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION TO INSTITUTE\nA NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER THE SINGLE NAME OF THE CONFEDERAL\nREPUBLIC OF KORYO.\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:\n\"WHAT IS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE TODAY IN SPEEDING UP THE COUNTRY'S\nREUNIFICATION IS TO INSTITUTE A NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER\nTHE NAME OF A SINGLE COUNTRY\".\nORIGINALLY, THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS ONE TO\nBE SETTLED PEACEFULLY ON AN INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC\nPRINCIPLE. THE BASIC WAY OF ITS SOLUTION IS TO ESTABLISH A UNITED\nCENTRAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH NORTH-SOUTH GENERAL ELECTIONS. THIS\nPROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION HAS BEEN INVARIABLY MAINTAINED\nBY OUR PARTY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC FROM THE FIRST\nDAYS OF THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY.\nAS THIS FAIR AND AGOVEBOARD PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION HAS NOT\nBEEN ACCEPTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES, THE NORTH-SOUTH\nCONFEDERATION WAS PROPOSED AS A TRANSITIONAL STEP FOR ACHIEVING\nREUNIFICATION. THIS IS A MOST CORRECT PROPOSAL FOR REUNIFICATION\nTAKING INTO FULL ACCOUNT THE OBJECTIVE REALITIES IN THE NORTH\nAND THE SOUTH WHERE THERE EXIST THE TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.\n(MORE)\n23 JUN 1831Z BG/GS\nRESALO FORD LIBRAS\nFBIS 67\nTHIRD ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)\nXXX TWO DIFFERING SYSTEMS.\n(TEXT) IT CANNOT BUT BE A MOST REASONABLE MATTER OF\nR\nURGENCY TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH CONFEDERATION AFTER\nCONVENING A GREAT NATIONAL CONGRESS AND ACHIEVING\nGREAT NATIONAL UNITY, UNDER THE CONDITION IN WHICH\nTHE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE BECOME EVER MORE UNDISGUISED\nM\nIN THEIR \"TWO KOREAS\" PLOTS.\nBUT, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE TURNED DOWN EVEN THIS\nJUST PROPOSAL OF OURS TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-SOUTH\nCONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE, CRYING\nTHAT THE CONFEDERATION IS \"POSSIBLE ONLY BETWEEN THE\nMULTI-NATIONAL STATES WITH ONE AND THE SAME SYSTEM\"\nAND IT IS AN \"UNREALISTIC\" PROPOSAL WHICH IS\n\"INFEASIBLE\" BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WHERE THERE ARE TWO\nDIFFERING SYSTEMS.\nTHE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES' REFUSAL TO INSTITUTE THE NORTH-\nSOUTH CONFEDERATION UNDER A SINGLE NATIONAL TITLE ON THE PRETEXT THAT\nTHERE IS THE DIFFERENCE OF SYSTEMS PATENTLY SHOWS THAT THEY ARE A\nPACK OF TRAITORS TO THE NATION, SEEKING THE SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE\nARDENT DESIRE OF THE NATION FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION.\nIT IS ALSO CLARIFIED IN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION OF THE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG THAT THE NORTH\nAND SOUTH SHOULD WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY.\nTHE GREAT LEADER COMRADE KIM IL-SONG HAS TAUGHT:\n\"WE CONSIDER THAT OUR COUNTRY SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM BEING SPLIT\nINTO TWO KOREAS PERMANENTLY AS A RESULT OF THE FREEZING OF NATIONAL\nDIVISION AND THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH SHOULD ALSO WORK TOGETHER IN\nTHE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY\".\nONLY WHEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK TOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF\nEXTERNAL ACTIVITY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PREVENT OUR NATION FROM BEING\nSPLIT INTO TWO AND PROVIDE A FIRM INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR\nRESOLVING ALL PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S\nREUNIFICATION.\nIN SPITE OF OUR JUST PROPOSAL THAT THE NORTH AND SOUTH WORK\nTOGETHER IN THE FIELD OF EXTERNAL ACTIVITY, THE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE\nCOMMITTED SUCH UNPARDONABLE SPLITTING ACTS AS DECLARING THE \"TWO\nKOREAS\" PLOT AS THEIR POLICY\" AND BRINGING THE MOTION CALLING FOR\nSEPARATE UN MEMBERSHIP FOR TWO KOREAS\" BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS.\nTHE \"TWO KOREAS\" PLOT. OF THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AND THEIR\nSTOOGES, HOWEVER, TOTALLY MISCARRIED AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY LAST\nYEAR.\nTHE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE DO NOT HESITATE TO MAKE EYES AT\nSOCIALIST COUNTRIES, ADVOCATING THE \"OPEN-DOOR POLICY\" IN AN ATTEMPT\nTO CREATE \"TWO KOREAS\" AT ANY COST. BUT, IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYONE\nTHAT THIS TRICK CAN NEVER SUCCEED.\nWHOLE COURSE OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND ALL THE EFFORTS\nMADE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GREAT FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF\nNATIONAL REUNIFICATION CLEARLY SHOW WHO TRULY WANTS PEACE IN OUR\nCOUNTRY AND HAS STRIVEN FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND WHO HAS\nACTUALLY SOUGHT A WAR AND PERMANENT DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY, WHO HAS\nBEEN TRULY FAITHFUL TO THE PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION LAID\nDOWN IN THE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT AND WHO HAS VIOLATED THESE\nPRINCIPLES AND CLEARLY TELL WHO IS TO BLAME FOR THE PRESENT\nDEADLOCK OF THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, THE REPORTER NOTED, AND\nCONTINUED:\nPAK CHONG-HUI MADE PUBLIC ON THE 22ND A \"STATEMENT\" IN WHICH HE DID\nNOT GIVE UP THE \"TWO KOREAS\" POLICY THAT HAD BEEN OPENLY. DECLARED IN\nTHE \"SPECIAL STATEMENT\" ONE YEAR AGO AND \"PLEDGED HIMSELF\" TO CARRY\nON HIS MANOEUVRES TO PERPETUATE THE DIVISION, DEFYING THE DENUNCIATION\nOF THE WHOLE NATION.\nTHE PAK CHONG-HUI CLIQUE ARE ONLY SEEKING THE CONFRONTATION\nBETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH, PERMANENT NATIONAL SPLIT AND FRATRICIDAL\nWAR, WITH THE BACKING OF OUTSIDE FORCES, VIOLATING THE THREE\nPRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE TWO\nSIDES AND TURNING DOWN THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION, A GREAT PROPOSITION OF THE NATION TO EMBODY THE THREE\nPRINCIPLES. THEY ARE THE VICIOUS SPLITTISTS UPSETTING THE\nASPIRATION OF THE WHOLE NATION FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, A PACK OF\nDESPICABLE TRAITORS SELLING OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AND THE\nNATION AND WICKED BELLICOSE ELEMENTS DISTURBING PEACE IN THE COUNTRY.\n(MORE)\nFORD\n23 JUN 18412 BG/MC\nGERALD\nML\nFBIS 68\nFOURTH AND LAST ADD 63 (DPRK DEPUTY PREMIER)\nXXX IN THE COUNTRY.\n(TEXT) THE SOUTH KOREAN FASCIST CLIQUE ARRESTED AND IMPRISONED\nTHOUSANDS OF PATRIOTIC STUDENTS AND DEMOCRATIC FIGURES WHO FOUGHT FOR\nDEMOCRACY AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION ON CHARGES OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE\nFAKED-UP \"CASE OF THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF YOUTH AND STUDENTS FOR\nDEMOCRACY\" AND SENT OVER 250 OF THEM TO THE \"EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY\nTRIBUNAL\" ON CHARGES OF VIOLATION OF THE \"ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW\" AND\n\"EMERGENCY MEASURES\" AND ARE STAGING EVERY DAY A TRIAL OF 34 OF\nTHEM, TO BEGIN WITH, IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUNISH AND MURDER THEM\nRUTHLESSLY.\nALL THE TREACHEROUS MANOEUVRES STEPPED UP BY THE PAK CHONG-HUI\nPUPPET CLIQUE UNDER THE SLOGAN OF \"ANTI-COMMUNISM\" HAVE ORIGINATED\nFROM THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY AND \"TWO KOREAS\" PLOT OF THE U.X. AND\nJAPANESE IMPERIALISTS AND ARE ZEALOUSLY BACKED BY THEM.\nTHE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE OBSTRUCTED FROM ITS VERY START THE\nNORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE, DESPERATELY HAMPERED THE REUNIFICATION OF\nKOREA, SUPPLIED WEAPONS FOR AGGRESSION TO THE SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE\nELEMENTS AND CEASELESSLY KEYED UP THE TENSION IN KOREA WITH AN EYE TO\nKEEP A HOLD ON SOUTH KOREA AS THEIR PERMANENT COLONY AND MILITARY\nBASE.\nTHE 3RD SESSION OF THE 5TH SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY, DIRECTING\nDEEP ATTENTION TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' POLICY OF AGGRESSION ON KOREA,\nPROPOSED TO CONCLUDE A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEMOCRATIC\nPEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO CREATE\nPREREQUISITES TO THE ACCELERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL\nREUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY.\nBUT THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY PROPER RESPONSE OR\nGIVEN ANY REPLY TO OUR PEACE-LOVING PROPOSAL. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY\nARE TAKING THE ROAD OF FURTHER INTENSIFYING THEIR AGGRESSIVE AND\nSPLITTIST MANOEUVRES AGAINST OUR COUNTRY.\nTHE JAPANESE MILITARISTS, TOO ARE NOW PURSHING THE POLICY OF\nAGGRESSION ON KOREA AND ZEALOUSLY EGGING THE PAK CHONG- HUI PUPPET\nCLIQUE ONTO THE \"Two KOREAS\" PLOT. THEY ARE ZEALOUSLY PLAYING IN\nTHE INTERNATIONAL ARENA THE ROLE OF \"DETACHED FORCE\" TO KEEP KOREA\nSPLIT INDEFINITELY.\nTHE ONLY WAY OF SAVING THE COUNTRY AND NATION FROM THE DANGER OF\nPERMANENT SPLIT AND PROMOTING THE CAUSE OF NATIONAL REUNIFICATION IS\nTO BRING TO REALISATION THE FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL\nREUNIFICATION ADVANCED BY COMRADE KIM IL-SONG, THE RESPECTED AND\nBELOVED LEADER AND THE GREAT SUN OF THE NATION, THE REPORTER DECLARED.\nHE WENT ON:\nWE, AVAILING OURSELVES OF THIS OPPORTUNITY, EXTEND POWERFUL SUPPORT\nAND ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE JUST AND PATRIOTIC STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTH\nKOREAN PEOPLE AND SOLEMNLY DECLARE THAT WE WILL ACTIVELY SUPPORT THEIR\nSTRUGGLE WITH ALL OUR EFFORTS FROM THE STAND OF SHARING ALWAYS WITH\nTHEM THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR STRUGGLE.\nTHE ENTIRE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD VIGOROUSLY STRUGGLE TO\nPUT AN END TO THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS' OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA AND\nTHEIR COLONIAL RULE AND DRIVE THEM OUT OF OUR COUNTRY.\nTHE SOUTH KOREAN PEOPLE SHOULD WAGE A POWERFUL STRUGGLE TO\nFRUSTRATE THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS' REINVASION, HOLDING HIGHER THE\nBANNER OF THE STRUGGLE AGAINST JAPANESE MILITARISM AND FOR NATIONAL\nSALVATION.\nTO HASTEN NATIONAL REUNIFICATION A STRUGGLE SHOULD BE WAGED ALSO\nAGAINST THE NATION-SPLITTISTS OF SOUTH KOREA, FAITHFUL STOOGES OF\nTHE U.S. AND JAPANESE AGGRESSORS.\nNO ONE SHOULD SEEK THE PERMANENT DIVISION OF KOREA OR UPSET THE\nUNANIMOUS DESIRE OF OUR NATION FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL\nREUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY. THERE IS NO GROUND OR PRETEXT\nWHATSOEVER FOR THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS TO REMAIN IN SOUTH KOREA.\nm\nTHE U.S. IMPERIALISTS MUST GIVE UP AT ONCE THEIR POLICY OF\nAGGRESSION AGAINST OUR COUNTRY AND \"TWO KOREAS\" PLOT, WITHDRAW\nFORTHWITH FROM SOUTH KOREA TAKING ALONG ALL THE LETHAL WEAPONS, AND\nACCEPT WITHOUT DELAY THE DPRK GOVERNMENT S PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCLUSION\nOF A PEACE AGREEMENT AIMED AT CREATING PREREQUISITES TO PEACE IN\nKOREA AND HER PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION.\nTHE UNITED NATIONS SHOULD STRIP THE U.S. IMPERIALISTS AGGRESSOR\nFORCES IN SOUTH KOREA OF THE \"UN FORCES\" BERETS AND TAKE STEPS FOR\nA\nTHEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE JAPANESE MILITARISTS MUST STOP THEIR REINVASION\nOF SOUTH KOREA, GIVE UP THE HOSTILE POLICY AGAINST THE DPRK AND CEASE\nINTERFERING WITH THE CAUSE OF THE REUNIFICATION OF OUR COUNTRY.\nTHE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES MUST RENOUNCE THE ANACHRONISTIC WAY\nOF THINKING TO LIVE BY RELYING ON THE OUTSIDE FORCES, DISCONTINUE\nTHE TREACHERIES OF SELLING OUT THE COUNTRY AND THE NATION AND THE\nFASCIST REPRESSION OF PEOPLE, STOP SEEKING THE PERMANENT NATIONAL\nSPLIT, ACCEPT OUR FIVE-POINT PROPOSITION OF NATIONAL REUMIFICATION\nAND TAKE HONEST APPROACHES TOWARD THE DIALOGUE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF\nTHE NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT. IF THE U.S. AND JAPANESE\nAGGRESSORS AND THE PAK CHONG-HUI PUPPET CLIQUE PERSIST IN THE\nAGGRESSIVE MANOEUVRES AND TREACHERIES AND KEEP FOLLOWING THE ROAD\nOF NATIONAL SPLIT, GOING AGAINST THE TREND OF THE TIMES, THEY WILL\nCERTAINLY SUFFER A SHAMEFUL DESTRUCTION BEFORE HISTORY AND THE NATION,\nTHE REPORTER WARNED.\n(ENDALL)\nHOMO\n23 JUN 18572 BG/MC\n80\nMEMORANDUM\n2784\npok\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\nJuly 5, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER\nRICHARD T. KENNEDY\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Sale of F-4 Squadron to\nRepublic of Korea\nThe Republic of Korea has asked us to sell it 57 F-4Es, or three\nsquadrons, as an FMS cash purchase. State and Defense have in\nprinciple approved the sale of one squadron of F-4Es, and they\nrecommend that the question of selling two more squadrons be\nconsidered as part of the current annual review of the Korean Force\nModernization Plan. A cable to Embassy Seoul (Tab A) would give\neffect to their recommendations.\nWe agree with this basic State/Defense recommendation, though we\nhave some reservations. You should be aware that this action would\nin a sense go beyond the President's decision a year ago on the\nKorean Force Modernization Plan (Tab B). His decision in effect\napproved the State/Defense recommendation that the Plan include\nanother three squadrons of F-5Es rather than a second squadron of\nF-4s. The President had, however, in 1971 approved a second F-4\nsquadron which was found not to be available. So the second squadron\nis not in absolute contravention of his wishes.\nFor us to put a second squadron of F-4s back into the plan now, in\naddition to the three additional squadrons of F-5Es, would add\nsomewhat to Republic of Korea air defense capabilities. We believe\nthis addition is acceptable because it would not be enough to destabilize\nthe basic political-security balance on the Korean Peninsula postulated\nby last year's review of the Modernization Plan. Moreover, the\nsquadron would not physically be turned over to the Republic of\nKorea until well after the F-4 squadron now on bailment to the\nRepublic of Korea is withdrawn next spring. (It is not, however,\naccurate to speak of the second F-4 squadron as replacing the bailed\nsquadron, as the State/Defense draft cable does. The F-5As on loan\nto Vietnam will replace the bailed squadron under the Enhance Plus\nAgreement when they are returned to the Republic of Korea. We have,\ntherefore, deleted that sentence from the draft cable.)\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 1230\nSEC 3.3\nTOP.SECRET/SENSITIVE\nXGDS\nNSCjMemo,\nGuidelines\nBy an\nNARA Date 12/6/10\n1/17/06\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nA final consideration is the timing of any publicity given to our\nagreement to sell a second F-4 squadron to the Republic of Korea.\nWe do not want such publicity to undercut our approach to the PRC\non the termination of the U.N. Command. We have amended the draft\ncable to make this clear.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you approve the draft State/Defense cable at Tab A as amended.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nFORD\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET\nsb\nMaterial which has been lined\nthrough is that which we\nPRIORITY\nrecommend be deleted.\nMaterial in square brackets\nis that which we recommend\nTO: CINCPAC HONOLULU HAWAI\nbe added.\nCOMUSKOREA SEOUL KOREA\nINFO: AMEMB SEOUL KOREA\nCJUSMAG SEOUL KOREA\nCSAF WASH DC\nJOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE\nSUBJECT: F-4E Aircraft for ROK\nREF: STATE 109114, dtd 232357Z May 74\n1. Ref advised that the F-4 matter is extremely involved and too\nmany issues are at hand for the USG to move on short notice. The Inter-\nAgency Steering Group (IASG) has met twice and is continuing to\nreview all issues associated with ROK's decision to purchase 57 F-4Es.\n2. At this time, it is considered prudent to withhold a letter of offer\non the entire 57 F-4 aircraft for ROK until the LASG has finished its\nreview and made its recommendations. However, to be forthcoming\nwith the ROK's, a letter of offer is approved for nineteen F-4E aircraft\n(one squadron, one attrition aircraft), provided the purchase is on a\ndependable undertaking cash basis. At this time, no commitment\ncan be made on the use of FY 75/76 FMS credit for the F-4E program.\nThese-aircraft,ineffect-would replacethe-bailed-sguadron-oP-4Ds.\nMonies as expended repeat expended will be counted against the MOD\nplan balance.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O.\nSEC 3.3 DND Directive 5211.30\nSECRET\nGDS\nNGC\nGuidelines; state 9/17/03\nBy\nNARA, Dato 12/6/10\nSECRET\n2\n3. The- P&A data-is being formulated-and -will be forwarded- seenest.\n[Until you receive further instructions, no repeat no publicity whatsoever\nshould be given to the contemplated transfer. We would strongly\nreque'st R OK cooperation in this request. ] You will be advised of\nthe results and recommendations of the IASG.\nTORD\nSECRET\n8c\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nSECRET\nJuly 27, 1973\nNational Security Decision Memorandum\n227\nTO:\nThe Secretary of State\nThe Secretary of Defense\nSUBJECT:\nKorean Force Modernization Plan\nThe President has reviewed the Under Secretaries' memorandum on\nRe-examination of the Korean Force Modernization Plan and has\ndecided:\n-- Air defense should be emphasized in modernizing ROK\nforces in order to assist the ROK in moving toward combat self-\nsufficiency for defense against the North Korean threat.\n-- Modernization of ROK divisions beyond the 16 active and\nthree ready reserve divisions recommended in the military study should\nreceive low priority but the ROK should not be told the U. S. will not\nsupport modernization of additional divisions.\n- - NSDM 129 continues in effect but no termination date should\nbe established for grant MAP assistance.\n-- Planning for grant MAP and requests to Congress should\nnot be precipitously reduced nor should assistance be switched rapidly\nto FMS (Option Two of the Steering Group's Report is approved).\n- - Before high performance aircraft beyond replacement\naircraft in the original modernization plan are funded, a complete\nreview of the threat and air defense requirement should be undertaken\nand recommendations submitted to the President.\nSECRET\nGDS\nDECLASSIFIED\nClassified by Henry A. Kissinger\nAUTI\nASC 1/30/09\nBY\n12/6/10\nSECRET\n2\nSubject to the foregoing the recommendations of the Under Secretaries'\nCommittee are approved and the Korean Force Requirements Study\nshould be the general basis for military assistance planning.\nH A. Kim\nHenry A. Kissinger\ncc: The Director, Office of Management and Budget\nThe Acting Director of Central Intelligence\nThe Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nFUND\nLIBRARY\nSECRET\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\n9 in\nSEGRET\nWASHINGTON\nJuly 18, 1973\nMEMORANDUM FOR\nTHE SECRETARY OF STATE\nTHE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE\nSUBJECT:\nU.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula\nThe President has approved the following as interim guidance on our\nbasic policy toward the Korean Peninsula:\n-- We shall continue to reassure the ROK of U.S. support for its\ntimely and constructive foreign policy initiative announced in President\nPark's speech of June 23.\n--\nThe U.S. will make no further adjustments in its present force\nlevels in the ROK except in the context of the overall security situation\non the Peninsula. We will consult with the ROK well in advance of any\nfurther force reductions.\n-- The U.S. will continue military assistance to the ROK, and in\nparticular will complete the Five Year Modernization Plan, although\nCongressional funding limitations will require that U.S. assistance on\nthis plan be stretched out through FY 1977. We also believe that the\nemphasis in the plan should be shifted from ground forces to air defense.\nThe other recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee on the\nplan are presently under consideration; pending decision we should avoid\nfurther detailed discussion of U.S. military assistance.\n-- We are keenly aware of President Park's desire that we discuss the\nKorean question with the PRC and the Soviet Union, and can assure the\nROK that we have that desire very much in mind. We will do nothing that\nwill harm South Korean vital interests, and will consult with the ROK to\nthe maximum extent possible.\nWe should avoid attempting to force the pace of the South-North\ntalks either by suggesting a reduction of our support for the ROK,\nFUND\nby pressing on the ROK a series of initiatives that it might take up with BERA\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (no amended) SEC 3.3\nLIBRARY\nBy\nhh Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines\nSEGRET\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\n9/17/03\nSECRET\n2\nPyongyang. Beyond lending every encouragement to the ROK to persist\nin the talks, and assuring the ROK of continued support, U.S. direct\nintervention with Seoul should be limited to averting any threatened\nbreak-down in the talks.\n-- We accept the proposition that the termination of UNCURK would\nbe a very useful step in helping avoid a confrontation at next fall's UNGA.\nAny termination of UNCURK, however, should be without prejudice to its\npast activities. We should seek to persuade the members of UNCURK\nto recommend termination in their annual report. A decision on whether\nto seek a UNGA resolution formally accepting the report, however, will\nnot be made until we have more certain indication of the intentions of the\nother side.\n-- We are reviewing the status of the UNC and will consider the possibil-\nity of terminating this body, provided that the related aspects of existing\nsecurity arrangements can be adjusted in a way that will not diminish the\nsecurity of the ROK. Since this is a delicate and complex undertaking,\nwe should proceed with caution and are confident that we can defend the\nUNC against a possible hostile resolution in the next UNGA.\n-- As to U. N. membership for the two Koreas, we support the position\ntaken by President Park in his June 23 speech. We will continue to consult\nclosely with the ROK and other friendly nations on the tactics we will adopt\non the Korean question in next fall's UNGA.\nThe President has asked that you use the above interim guidance in your\ncontacts with ROK officials and others, and that you not go beyond this\nposition pending further guidance from him.\nHenry A. Kissinger\nFORD\narease\nsibnaul\nSECRET\n10\nUNPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED STATE STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nwas\nP\nCONFIDENTIAL 9696\nPAGE 01 MOSCOW 11563 261600Z\n61\nACTION EUR-25\nINFO OCT-01 EA-11 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03\nINR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03\nSS-20 USIA-15 DRC-01 NIC-01 /128 W\n002150\nR 261450Z JUL 74\nFM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW\nTO SECSTATE WASHDC 1160\nINFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA\nAMEMBASSY SEOUL\nUSMISSION USUN NEW YORK\nC N I D E N I A L MOSCOW 11563\nE.O. 11652 GDS\nTAGS: PFOR, KN. KS, AS, UR\nSUBJI SOVIET VIEWS ON KOREA\n1. IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH KAPITSA, DEPARTMENT\nHEAD IN MFA, AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SOLICITED SOVIET\nVIEWS ON KOREA. KAPITSA STRESSED THAT NORTH KOREA\nIS \"FRIEND AND ALLY\" OF SOVIET UNION AND THIS IS\nMAJOR CONSIDERATION FOR LATTER. AT SAME TIME,\nKAPITSA COMMENTED THAT SOVIETS REALIZE THAT NORTH\nKOREAN OBJECTION TO ENTRY OF BOTH KOREAS INTO UN\nIS INCONSISTNET WITH MEMBERSHIP OF BOTH IN UN\nSPECIALIZED ORGANIZATIONS. KAPITSA SAID THAT\nSOVIET UNION HAD GIVEN SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO\nRECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA AND ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC\nRELATIONS WITH HER BUT HAD DECIDED AGAINST THIS\nAFTER BALANCING BENEFITS AND LOOSES. SOVIETS FELT\nTHAT GAINS FROM RECOGNIZING SOUTH KOREA WOULD BE\nLESS THAN THE LOSSES IT WOULD SUFFER IN INFLUENCE IN\nAND SUPPORT FROM NOTH KOREA, KAPITSA SAD THAT,\nEVEN NOW. SOVIETS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTIES WITH NORTH\nKOREA BECAUSE SOVIET UNION PERMITS ENTRY OF SOUTH\nKOREANS FOR PARTICIPATION IN SPORTS EVENTS AND\nE.O.\nSEC 3.3 sthreview 9/17/03\nDa\nStates\nCONF IDENTIA\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nAn\nBy\nFORM DS.1652\nDEPARTMENT OF STATE\nDepartment of State\nUNITED and STATES OF AMERICA\nTELEGRAM\nCONFIDENTIAL\nPAGE 02 MOSCOW 11563 261600Z\nCONFERENCES.\n2. WHEN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ONE\nADVANTAGE OF HAVING BOTH KOREAS IN UN WOULD BE\nRECOGNITION OF TWO INTERNATIONAL ENTITIES, WHICH\nWOULD MEAN THAT ATTACK BY ONE AGAINST THE OTHER WOULD\nBE CONSIDERED AS AGGRESSION, KAPITSA SAID THAT HE\nWAS SURE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY SOUTH KOREA\nAGAINST NORTH KOREA IF U.S. DID NOT WANT IT. LIKEWISE\nTHERE WOULD BE NO ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA AGAINST SOUTH\nKOREA IF CHINESE AND SOVIET UNION DID NOT WANT IT.\nAMBASSADOR ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF CHINESE AND\nSOVIET UNION DID NOT AGREE, AND KAPITSA SAID CHINA\nWOULD NOT WANT TO CAUSE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET\nUNION OR THE U.S. AT PRESENT.\n3. AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE THOUGHT\nAUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION OF NORTH KOREA WOULD TAKE PLACE\nIN NEAR FUTURE. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WILL BE\nESTABLISHED, BUT AN AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR WILL NOT\nBE RESIDENT IN PYONGYANG. STOESSEL\n717853\ne\nCONFIDENTIAL\nFORM 1652\nFRoebe\nmpr.\"\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nWASHINGTON, D.C. 20506\nTOP SECRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nJuly 29, 1974\nNational Security Decision Memorandum 262\nTO:\nThe Secretary of Defense\nThe Deputy Secretary of State\nDirector, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency\nSUBJECT:\nUse of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of\nAggression Against South Korea\nThe President has reviewed the memorandum of the Deputy Secretary\nof State of April 27, 1974 which proposed a modification in the\nguidance contained in NSDM 251 concerning extension of the 1961 Kishi\nMinute on the Use of U.S. Bases in Japan in the Event of Aggression\nAgainst South Korea.\nThe President has approved the recommendation in Option 3 of the\nmemorandum, i.e., with the purpose of retaining at least the effect of\nthe Korean Minute without seeking an explicit, formal extension of the\nMinute, we should:\n--\nNot raise the question of the Korean Minute itself directly\nwith the Japanese Government.\n-- Rather, during discussion with the Japanese Government on\nthe future of the U.N. Command, take the position that we are confident\ntermination of the U.N. Command will not adversely affect our ability\nto deter a North Korean attack, even though the U.N. cover and the U.N.\nSOFA for Japan are terminated, and that no further formal U.S. - -Japanese\nactions are required.\nAccordingly, the guidance contained in NSDM 251 is amended in this\nrespect.\nA.\nHenry A. Kissinger\ncc: Director of Central Intelligence\nDECLARATIVE\nChairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff\nAUT\nASC 1/30/29\nTOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE - XGDS\nBY\nIn\n12/6/10\n12A\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032795\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJohn E. Nidecker\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nGeneral A. M. Haig, Jr\nDESCRIPTION\nRe US-Republic of Korea Relations\nCREATION DATE\n07/29/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700247\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (6)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n12B\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032796\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇLetter\nCREATOR'S NAME\nPhilip C. Habib\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nMr. John E. Nidecker\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nDESCRIPTION\nRe US-Republic of Korea Relations\nCREATION DATE\n07/15/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700247\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (6)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n12 C\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032797\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇLetter\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJohn E. Nidecker\nCREATOR'S TITLE\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nRECEIVER'S NAME\nThe Honorable Philip C. Habib\nRECEIVER'S TITLE\nAmbassador\nDESCRIPTION\nRe US-Republic of Korea Relations\nCREATION DATE\n07/03/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700247\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (6)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011.\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n12D\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 032798\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇLetter\nCREATOR'S NAME\nJohn E. Nidecker\nCREATOR'S TITLE\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nDESCRIPTION\nRe US-Republic of Korea Relations\nCREATION DATE\n07/03/1974\nVOLUME\n2 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700247\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n5\nFOLDER TITLE\nKorea (6)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n03/03/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\nBa\nMEMORANDUM\n3245\nsubj\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nECRET\nACTION\nAugust 2, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJOHN A. FROEBE, JR\nCAR\nSUBJECT:\nSouth Korean Ambassador Requests to\nCall on the Vice President\nThe Vice President's office has informed me that they have been\ninformally approached by the Korean Embassy for a call on the\nVice President for their Ambassador.\nI recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm\nat this juncture. Ambassador Hahm undoubtedly wants to seek the\nVice President's understanding and sympathy for President Park's\nhandling of his currently sensitive political situation. Ambassador Hahm\nsince his return from Seoul recently has been mounting a campaign\naround town to counter Congressional interest in reducing our military\nassistance to South Korea as a means of inducing Park to relax his\nauthoritarian controls. It is true that the Vice President could merely\nhear Hahm out and could refuse to make substantive comment on the\nquestion. However, Ambassador Hahm might misconstrue any comments\nthe Vice President would make, and the mere fact of the Vice President's\nseeing Hahm in the present context might be misinterpreted. On\nbalance, I believe that we have little to gain and something to risk by\nthe Vice President's receiving Ambassador Hahm at this time.\nAttached at Tab A is a draft memorandum from Mrs. Davis to\nMr. Marsh recommending against the Vice President's receiving\nAmbassador Hahm.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you approve Mrs. Davis' sending the draft memorandum at\nTab A to Mr. Marsh.\nApprove\nDisapprove\nE.O.\nSEC 3.3\nSECRET\nGDS\nNSC Memo,\nGuidalines\nBy\nMARA,\nDate\n01/9/01\n13b\nMEMORANDUM\n3245\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSECRET\nACTION\nAugust 2, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nMR. MARSH\nFROM:\nJEANNE W. DAVIS\nSUBJECT:\nSouth Korean Ambassador's Request\nto Call on the Vice President\nColonel Walker has informally informed Mr. Froebe that the South\nKorean Embassy informally sought a call on the Vice President for\nAmbassador Hahm. Although we understand the purpose of the call\nwas not specified, Ambassador Hahm's intention in all probability is\nto seek the Vice President's understanding and sympathy for President\nPark's handling of his current sensitive domestic political situation.\nThe Park Government recently has been particularly concerned about\nmounting Congressional criticism, and about the proposal being\ndiscussed in committee to reduce U.S. military assistance to South\nKorea as a means of trying to induce the Park Government to relax\nthese controls.\nWe would recommend against the Vice President's receiving Ambassador\nHahm. The mere fact of Ambassador Hahm's calling on the Vice\nPresident could be misinterpreted in this context. In addition, any\ncomments that the Vice President might make in response to\nAmbassador Hahm's presentation would be subject to misinterpretation.\nSECRET GDS\nSECC.S\nE.O.\nMSC\nBy\nWe NARA, Date 12/6/10\n14\n4009-X\nMEMORANDUM\nRok\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nEGRET/SENSITIVE\nSeptember 11, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJOHN A. FROEBE, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nYour Meeting with Ambassador Sneider\non September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.\nYou have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on\nSeptember 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing\nshortly to take up his new post in Seoul.\nCurrent Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides\nwithin the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot.\nGuidelines 9/02\nThe Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime\nMinister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary\nand that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter\nis now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledg-\nment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park\nand the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassina-\ntion plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing\nNorth Korea in Japan) involvement.\nNARA, Date 12/16/10\nWe have played a key role in the resolution of this crsis -- we have effec-\ntively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have\nacted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive pro-\nposals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution\nof the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus\navoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese,\nand ourselves -- which could have only benefited such as North Korea.\nU.S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy\nAssistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in\nBy\nthe past year floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and\npressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense\nhas now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation\nfor the U.S.- ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month,\nDeputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo pro-\nposing an end to U.S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY 76. The memo was\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nnot coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed\nsomehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times\npiece earlier this week.\nPresidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not\nyet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately follow-\ning his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes\nhe should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he\n(Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South\nKoreans.\nI will not plan to sit in on the meeting.\nRecommended Talking Points\nWe are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-\nJapan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's\nEA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful\nrole in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North\nKorea's hands at a most unpropitious time.\nWe believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK\nthrough the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the\npost-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the\nNorth Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last\nregard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to\nSecretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary --\nthat we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as\nthey do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow\nand Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.\n-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he\nprobably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will\ncarry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly\nat this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the\nPresident's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we\nmight minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's\nvisit to Japan?\n-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe\nwe should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib\nhas staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nhis domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call\nto the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact\nhis handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far\nas this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.\nConcurrence: Mr. Smyser wes/tric\nSECRE T/SENSITIVE\nFraele 15a\nMEMORANDUM\n3915 Rok R\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nUNCLASSIFIED\nACTION\nSeptember 18, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nMR. ELLIOTT\nFROM:\nJEANNE W. DAV\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Reply to Mr. Darrell C.\nSchroeder Responding to Your Letter\non South Korea\nAttached at Tab A is a draft reply from you on behalf of the President\nto Mr. Darrell C. Schroeder, who wrote the President recently asking\nhim to express gratitude to the South Korean Government for their\nhelp in reuniting his adopted Korean daughter with her brother and\nsister. The reply has been coordinated with the State Department.\nFOR\nUNCLASSIFIED\nDear Mr. Schroeder,\nI have been asked to respond to your letter of August 15, 1974, to the\nPresident in which you describe the extensive assistance that General\nKim, Colonel Park, Mr. Woon and others gave in helping you reunite\nyour adopted daughter with her brother and sister in the Republic of\nKorea. I can well understand your deep feelings of gratitude to these\npeople for the strenuous efforts they made in your behalf.\nIt would not, however, be appropriate for the President to express\ngratitude on your behalf and to the Government of the Republic of\nKorea. I believe that it would be appropriate, and much appreciated,\nif you yourself wished to call the attention of the Korean Government\nto the manifold efforts which these individuals have made. You could\ndo so by writing to the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, 2320\nMassachusetts Avenue, N. W., Washington, D.C. 20008.\nSincerely,\nRoland L. Elliott\nSpecial Assistant to the President\nMr. Darrell C. Schroeder\nEvans-Mills-Gardner\n108 W. Monroe\nBloomington, Illinois 61701\n16\nFroebe\n4009-X\nMEMORANDUM\nROK\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSeptember 11, 1974\nR\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nGENERAL SCOWCROFT\nThanks\nBS\nFROM:\nJOHN A. FROEBE, JR.\nSUBJECT:\nYour Meeting with Ambassador Sneider\non September 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m.\nYou have agreed to meet with Ambassador Richard L. Sneider on\nSeptember 12, 1974 at 2:30 p.m. As you know, Mr. Sneider is departing\nshortly to take up his new post in Seoul.\nCurrent Crisis in South Korean - Japanese Relations. The two sides\nwithin the past day or so now seem to have broken the Gordian knot.\nThe Japanese have agreed to the basic South Korean demand that Prime\nMinister Tanaka's letter be carried by a ranking Japanese emissary\nand that it be addressed to President Park. Final language of the letter\nis now being worked out as regards the issues of Japanese acknowledg-\nment of responsibility of the assassination attempt against President Park\nand the killing of Mrs. Park, the Japanese investigation of the assassina-\ntion plot, and the question of Chosen Soren's (the organization representing\n12/6/10 Guidelines\nNorth Korea in Japan) involvement.\nONS\nWe have played a key role in the resolution of this crsis -- we have effec-\ntively set limits on the lengths to which both parties could go, and we have\nacted as a traditional Asian go-between in conveying the substantive pro-\nNARA, Date\nposals to each of the parties. (We played a similar role in the resolution\nof the Kim Dae-jung case earlier this year.) The outcome has thus\navoided serious adverse consequences for the South Koreans, the Japanese,\nand ourselves which could have only benefited such as North Korea.\nNSC Me\nU.S. Continued Strong Support of South Korea. As the State EA Deputy\nAssistant Secretary concerned with Korea, Dick Sneider has at times in\nBy\nthe past year floated the idea of U.S. troop reductions in South Korea and\npressed for a reduction of our military assistance to South Korea. Defense\nhas now picked up the cudgel again on this latter issue -- in preparation\nfor the U.S.- ROK annual security consultative meeting later this month,\nDeputy Secretary Clements has sent Secretary Kissinger a memo pro-\nposing an end to U.S. grant MAP to the ROK after FY 76. The mento was\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n2\nnot coordinated with State -- we have asked DOD to do so -- and seemed\nsomehow to have been picked up in its substance in a New York Times\npiece earlier this week.\nPresidential Visit to South Korea. As you know, the President has not\nyet decided finally whether he will visit South Korea immediately follow-\ning his visit to Japan in mid-November. Secretary Kissinger believes\nhe should, primarily because of commitments to this effect that he\n(Secretary Kissinger) and former President Nixon have made to the South\nKoreans.\nI will not plan to sit in on the meeting.\nRecommended Talking Points\n-- We are relieved that the most recent crisis in South Korean-\nJapan relations now seems well on the way to solution. We believe State's\nEA Bureau and our Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo played a highly skillful\nrole in resolving this imbroglio, which could have played into North\nKorea's hands at a most unpropitious time.\n-- We believe that we must maintain strong support for the ROK\nthrough the completion of the UNC termination negotiations, until the\npost-UNC termination arrangements are solidly in place, and until the\nNorth Koreans decide to pull back from their military option. In this last\nregard, we will be particularly interested in the North Korean reaction to\nSecretary Kissinger's recent proposal to the Romanian intermediary --\nthat we will consent to direct contacts with the North Koreans as long as\nthey do not attempt to exploit this politically against Seoul and if Moscow\nand Peking are willing to undertake similar contacts with Seoul.\n-- Although the President has not yet made a final decision, he\nprobably will visit Korea immediately after his visit to Japan. This will\ncarry obvious dividends for our relations with South Korea particularly\nat this juncture, but will inevitably detract to some extent from the\nPresident's visit to Japan. What suggestions do you have as to how we\nmight minimize the adverse effect of the Seoul visit after the President's\nvisit to Japan?\n-- As regards South Korea's internal political problems, we believe\nwe should carefully stick to the neutral middle ground Ambassador Habib\nhas staked out -- maintaining an equal distance between President Park and\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\nSEGRET/SENSITIVE\n3\nhis domestic critics. At the same time, we must when necessary call\nto the Park Government's attention whatever substantial adverse impact\nhis handling of internal politics may be having on our Congress in so far\nas this threatens our military assistance and other support for the ROK.\nConcurrence:\nMr. Smyser\nwes/tric\nSECRET/SENSITIVE\n17a\nMEMORANDUM\n4163\nROK\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nCONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nSeptember 25 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nFROM:\nW. R. SMYSER B\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Reply From the President to\nSouth Korean President Park Chung Hee\nAccepting His Invitation for the President\nTo Visit South Korea Following His\nJapan Visit\nAt Tab I is a draft memorandum from you to the President attaching a\nproposed reply from the President to President Park Chung Hee\nresponding to President Park Chung Hee's letter of September 10, 1974,\ninviting the President and Mrs. Ford to visit South Korea following\ntheir visit to Japan. The President's draft reply simply conveys the\nPresident's formal acceptance of President Park's invitation which has\nalready been relayed to Park through normal diplomatic channels.\nThe President's draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis'\noffice.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.\nNSC Mar\nFORD\nCONF IDENTIAL\nGDS\nNARA, Date\nBy\n12/6/10\n4163\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nCONFIDENTIAL\nACTION\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nTHE PRESIDENT\nFROM:\nHENRY A. KISSINGER\nSUBJECT:\nProposed Reply From You to the South\nKorean President Park Chung Hee\nAccepting His Invitation To Visit Korea\nFollowing the Japan Visit\nAt Tab A is a draft letter from you to President Park Chung Hee of\nKorea. In that letter you formally accept his invitation (Tab B) for\nyou and Mrs. Ford to visit Korea.\nThe draft reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis' office.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you sign the draft reply to President Park at Tab A.\nNSC\nBy\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nCONF IDENTIAL GDS\nFroebe FYI\n4163\npor\n170\nTHE WHITE HOUSE\nWASHINGTON\nR\nOctober 1, 1974\nDear Mr. President:\nThank you for your letter of September 10,\n1974, and your most gracious invitation to\nMrs. Ford and me to visit the Republic of\nKorea. We are delighted to accept and\nlook forward to seeing you at that time and\nto discussing issues of common concern.\nSincerely,\nHeald R. 3rd\nHis Excellency\nPark Chung Hee\nPresident of the\nRepublic of Korea\nSeoul\nLIBRARST\nlet S I Stallx In\n01 010 HLC Klo\n\"\"\"\nJot_\nto\nTO\nthe\nRE\nloi\nE mjru top F° totals 5/2\n6 n/o\nItata ta min K to K 10 & to aho njo HE to the tek to 707\nthe to ojn a Y 1 [2] of IK E to F/e 7/r 1x No\nof 1/2/20 to mjru K FE Foll 1/0 totc IL IN Eto la 1/0 to ½₁₀ Etc totet 707\nnH U! THO HH O|IJ\nof NY of xt He trite TO TO Io 0 TKO KHO F< off To τπ 7/8 o|n njm I/J Its o|n\ntetc Hokly to /L Ir fat [ 7 totat to FN To 2T = == In 'to THO II F n 707 r/o r}\n'to the\n\" OT 6 . 4261\nto 19 of of E) au\nPresident of the Republic of Horsa\n(Translation)\nSeptember 10, 1974\nExcellency:\nI have the honor to extend my cordial invitation\nto Your Excellency and Mrs. Ford to visit my country\nin late November or early December this year at Your\nExcellency's convenience.\nI am confident that Your Excellency's visit to\nKorea will greatly contribute to further strengthening\nthe friendly relations between our two countries.\nI look forward to the pleasure of welcoming Your\nExcellency and Mrs. Ford in Seoul.\nAccept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my\nhighest consideration.\nSincerely,\n/s/ Park Chung Hee\nHis Excellency\nGerald R. Ford\nPresident of the\nUnited States of America\nWashington, D. C.\n4438-X\n18\nMEMORANDUM\nkok\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nACTION\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nSeptember 27, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nSECRETARY KISSINGER\nn\nFROM:\nW. R. Smyser 5\nSUBJECT:\nMemorandum of your Conversation with\nForeign Minister Kim Dong-jo,\nSeptember 27, 1974\nAt Tab A is a memorandum of your conversation with Korean Foreign\nMinister Kim Dong-jo on September 27, 1974.\nRECOMMENDATION:\nThat you approve the memorandum of conversation at Tab A.\nApprove\nDisapprove\n4080\nE.O.,11\n5083\nLIBRAR\nBy NSC\nGuidalines\nNARA,\nDate\n12/6/10\nTOP SEGRET/NODIS - XGDS\n18b\nMEMORANDUM\n4438-X\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\nMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION\nPARTICIPANTS:\nKim Dong-jo, Foreign Minister of the\nRepublic of Korea\nLee Sang-ock, Director of the American\nAffairs Bureau in the Korean Foreign\nMinistry\nHenry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State\nPhilip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of\nState for East Asian and Pacific Affairs\nW. R. Smyser, Senior Staff Member, NSC\nDonald L. Ranard, Dir, Korean Desk\nDATE, TIME\nSeptember 27, 1974; 5:00 p.m.\nPLACE:\nThe Secretary's Office, State Department\nSUBJECT:\nU.S. -Korean Relations\nKim: I have talked today to Messrs. Sisco and Buffum to see if we can\nget the Arabs to help us at the United Nations.\nKissinger: We will do what we can to help you with them. I am not sure\nif it will work. The North Koreans give pilots to the Arabs. Whenever\nI fly around the Middle East they meet me.\nKim: President Park asked me to convey his appreciation for your assistance\nin settling the dispute between us and Japan. The President looks forward to\nseeing you. I will be the Chairman of the Welcoming Committee.\nKissinger: Please express my condolences to the President for the tragedy\nof the loss of his wife. Also, please tell him that I am glad I shall see\nhim soon. We had good talks the last time I was in Seoul.\nKim: How are things going in your talks with the Chinese?\nKissinger: We gave our proposal to them, which you know. They rejected\na non-aggression treaty. We have discussed the United Nations Command\nand keeping the armistice arrangements. They have not replied so far.\nISSIFIED\nE.O.\nEBC 3.3\nTOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS\nNSC\nGuidelines\nBy\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\n9/17/03\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n2\nI will see Chiao in New York next Wednesday and I expect to get an\nanswer then.\nKim: We think that in New York our resolution is acceptable to many\ncountries. We have gained 21 co-sponsors.\nI have already spoken to Mr. Habib about the admission of South Korea\nto the United Nations. We would like to ask your good offices in your\ntalks with the PRC to help us get us in the UN, together or separately.\nKissinger: You mean North Korea first?\nHabib: No. South Korea. North Korea can join with South Korea or it\ncan stay out.\nKissinger: Then not North Korea first.\nHabib: No. It is North Korea that says it does not want to go into the\nUnited Nations.\nThe resolutions now before the UN are designed to let the other side know\nwe will deal on the UNC. If we do not get anywhere with our private\nproposal, we can still use it and surface it if necessary. We are talking\nfrom a strong position.\nKissinger: I always talk from a strong position.\nKim: President Park has already talked to Ambassador Habib in Korea\nabout the next subject I want to raise. What is the situation with regard\nto military aid? What are your long-range plans?\nKissinger: We are not ready to answer you on that right now. We will\nbe able to do-so:by the President's visit to Korea. We will study the\nmatter. We will study it sympathetically. I belong to the minority who\nbelieve our allies should come first.\nKim: I appreciate that.\nOn another matter, President Park has decided that he would like to\nmeet with foreign newsmen. He would welcome them. If you have any\nsuggestions, please let us know. We had troubles with Elizabeth Pond,\nbut we have now decided we will let her return to Korea.\nKissinger: That seems good.\nTOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS\nTOP SECRET/NODIS\n3\nI wantyou to know that we will support you strongly in the United Nations.\nWe will study aid sympathetically. (Turning to Mr. Smyser) Let's get a\nNSSM out on that question.\nHabib: Our planning is, of course, dependent on the Congress.\nKim: Next week I shall return to Washington and I shall see a number of\nCongressmen.\nKissinger: I will let you know what the PRC says.\nHabib: We are fully in agreement. We can go ahead.\nKissinger: We are getting feelers all over the world for North Korea to\ntalk to us. We are not accepting. We have nothing we want from them.\nWe want to keep them quiet, of course. But we will talk to you before we\ndo anything.\nKim: Good.\nKissinger: You are our ally and we back you. We only tell you this because\nwe do not know what they are saying and what is reaching you,\nKim: How are things going with the Soviet Union on our proposal?\nKissinger: I spoke to Gromyko a few days ago and told him of the proposal.\nThey want to get the PRC out of Panmunjon. He asked me who was there\nunder our proposal. I told him four countries. Then he asked me why.\nBut he did not reject it.\nI said we would work it out with the PRC.\nKim: If the PRC worked out something with you, would the Soviet Union\naccept it?\nKissinger: No. But the PRC is more important.\nI think things look good in New York. And, even if we lose there, it is\nnot a disaster. We will still keep what we have.\nTOP SECRET/NODIS - XGDS\nMEMORANDUM\n1412\n941\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nTOP SECRET\nGDS\n(9/11) kokDamis\nACTION\nThan\nSeptember 30, 1974\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nMRS. DAVIS\nFROM:\nJOHN A. FROEBE, JR.\nmy\nSUBJECT:\nDeclassification of 1949-50 Korean Papers\nI agree to the release of all of the attached 1949-50 Korean papers,\nwith the exception of the following:\n1) NSC 8/1 and 8/2. I most strongly recommend against the release\nof these two documents at this time. Their release would carry a\nconsiderable risk that North Korea would misinterpret U.S. intentions\non the Korean problem at the present time, and that South Korea might\nsee the release as presaging a decline in U.S. support. This risk would\nbe produced by the fact that these two NSC studies, the conclusions of\nwhich were adopted as basic U.S. policy toward Korea, recommended\nthe removal of the remaining 7, 500 U.S. troops in Korea, even though\nthe study recognized that the withdrawal involved a substantial risk that\nNorth Korea, supported by the Soviets or the Chinese, would thereby\nbe encouraged to attack South Korea. Specifically,\nThe Joint Chiefs took the position that the U.S. had little\nstrategic interest in maintaining its troops and bases in South Korea.\nThe study recognized that the removal of U.S. troops might\nbe followed by a North Korean attack on South Korea.\nThe study held that the\nextension of Soviet-backed\nCommunist control throughout all of Korea would enhance the political\nand strategic position of the USSR with respect to both China and\nJapan and adversely affect the position of the U.S. in those areas and\nthroughout the Far East. 11\nThe study took note of the fact that the U.S. had decided less\nsons\nthan six months earlier to postpone the withdrawal of the remaining\nU.S. forces in part because of the dangers just cited.\nLIDRAN\nTOP SECRET\nE.O.\nEC3.3\nGDS\nNSC\nGuidelines\nState 9/17/03\nBy\nlike\nNARA, Date 12/6/10\nTOP SECRET\n2\nThese two documents should be withheld in their entirety, since the\nobjectionable passages constitute the essence of the study and of the\nsubsequent policy decision.\n2) 1950 Documents, Document No. 4, Memorandum of July 10, 1950\nfrom the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: This document should\nbe withheld in its entirety, since the essence of it is, as stated in\nparagraph 3, that the Korean Peninsula is of \"slight strategic importance\"\nto the United States. If released at this time, this document would risk\nseriously misleading North Korea and others as to the basic importance\nthe U.S. attaches to the Korean Peninsula.\n3) 1950 Documents, Document No. 6, Memorandum of July 25, 1950\nfrom the NSC Executive Secretary: I recommend the deletion of the\nfirst two sentences of paragraph 3. These sentences repeat and comment\non the argument made by the Joint Chiefs in their memorandum of\nJuly 10, 1950, to the effect that Korea is of slight strategic importance\nto the United States.\n4) 1950 Documents. Document No. 24. Memorandum of November 9,\n1950 from the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense: I recommend\nthe deletion of paragraph 5 (c) and of paragraphs (d) and (e). In these\nparagraphs the Joint Chiefs make the same argument as in their memorandum\nof July 10, 1950, an argument that would entail the risk to the United States'\ninterests described above.\nTOP SECRET"
}