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Korea - NSDM 48
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Korea - NSDM 48
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The original documents are located in Box 5, folder "Korea - NSDM 48" of the NSC East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential
Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
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copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 5 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NSDM +8 1a
TOREA
ACTION
August 2, 1971
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL KENNEDY
MR. HOLDRIDGE
FROM:
K. Wayne Smith hm. for Kus
SUBJECT:
Five-Year Korea Program
My understanding is that the attached memo incorporates your
views and proposed changes. Would you please concur or let
me know if you have any problems. I need to move this to HAK.
TOP SEGRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By
NSC Memo, in 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 12/8/10
1/202017 AMALD P. FORD
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET
ACTION
July 30, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
K. Wayne Smith
SUBJECT: Five-Year Korea Program
Under Secretary Irwin has forwarded for the President's consideration
a five year military program for Korea developed by the Under
Secretaries Committee (Tab B). The recommendation of the Under
Secretaries Committee is that the President "approve this plan as
setting the major objectives for our military assistance program in
FY 71-75 subject to annual review
11
Our Strategic Objectives and the Korea Program
The military objectives set for our policy in Korea by the
President (NSDM-48) are as follows:
-- Force Size. "To develop ROK forces capable of deterring
or conducting a defense against a conventional or unconventional attack
by North Korea. 11 By implication, the ROK forces would not be designed
either to meet the threat of a combined Chinese and North Korea attack
or to allow South Korea to successfully attack North Korea.
-- Force Balance. To develop a balanced ROK defensive
capability in hopes of reducing the immediacy and scope of U. S.
involvement should a conflict break out between North and South Korea.
It was understood, however, that it would nevertheless be necessary
to provide the ROKs some support even in the event of a North Korean
attack.
Based on this strategic guidance, the USC was tasked with the job
of developing a five-year plan for all U. S. and ROK programs that
would achieve these objectives. The principal features of the resulting
plan weighed against our best idea of the forces required to achieve these
objectives are:
TOP SECRET
E.O.
3.3 Directive 5200.30
NSC Mb
Guidelines streetiew 9/18/03
By in
NARA, Date 12/8/10
TOP SECRET
TABLE 1
THE KOREA PROGRAM AND ROK FORCE REQUIREMENTS
(1976)
USC
/
Recommendation
Forces Required
NK Threat
CPR/NK Threat
21
ROK Army
18 Modernized
12-14 Divisions
18-22 Divisions
Divisions
($500 million)
ROK Air Force
280 Modernized Fighter
400-500 Fighter
900-1200 Fighter
Aircraft
Aircraft
Aircraft
($221 million)
ROK Navy
28 Modernized Ships
20 Ships
30-40 Ships
($1 n9 million)
1/ The force requirements are derived from NSSMs 27 and 69. The JCS believe
that the ROKs would need 21 divisions, 630 aircraft, and 40 ships to defend
against the North Korean threat without U. S. force assistance.
2/ In addition, the ROK ground forces include one active Marine Division, three
ready reserve divisions, and seven rear area security divisions. The U. S.
has one division stationed in Korea.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
2
-- 18 modernized ROK divisions (540, 000 men) are planned
compared to the 12-14 divisions (400, 000 men) required to meet a
North Korean attack. In effect, the plan provides enough ground forces
to defend initially against attack by China and North Korea combined.
The reason for DOD planning a force of this size is the JCS requirement
that 21 divisions (600, 000 men) would be required to hold an attack by
North Korea (300, 000 men). The planned 18 divisions plus the 3 ready
reserve divisions meet this 21 division requirement.
-- 280 modernized fighter aircraft including 54 F-5s. Together
with the 100-odd U. S.-fighter aircraft now deployed in Korea, this force
will be adequate to match the North Korean air threat of 500 aircraft.
However, the USC plan will not provide the ROKs alone with an air
capability to defend themselves against North Korea and, therefore, the
USAF wing will have to be retained in Korea. A principal reason for
this is that the ground forces planned absorb half of the modernization
funds, with little less than half left over for tactical air.
-- 28 modernized ROK ships including an offensive force of
8 DD/DEs and a defensive force of 20 Minesweeps to keep the South
Korean ports clear. In addition, about 20 modern fast boats would be
provided. Aside from a large number of small boats, the North Koreans
essentially have no offensive naval capability and so the building of any
sizeable ROK navy is a luxury. Certainly, the naval force planned will
be more than adequate against the North Korean naval threat, including
NK infiltration by sea, but prove inadequate against the Chinese without
U. S. assistance.
In general, the Korea capability plans an unbalanced ROK force
structure that will give South Korea major elements of an independent
defense capability vis a vis the North Korean threat. However, it should
be noted that while the ground forces provided will be adequate to meet
a Chinese attack while Korea's air force will be inadequate even against
North Korea. This general approach is consistent with Secretary Laird's
emphasis on "no U. S. ground forces for Asia" but inconsistent with the
President's specific strategic guidance on Korea.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
3
Recognizing these possible problems in its plan, the USC memo poses
three variations on their basic plan:
Emphasize ground force modernization with less air and
naval modernization than planned. This approach is supported by those
who see extreme interdependence with emphasis on indigenous ground
forces as a useful device to reduce DOD costs.
-- Emphasize air forces possible financed by a reduction in
the number of MAP-supported ground force units. Most parties agree
that the ROK air forces-could profitably be increased. State and
Ambassador Porter appear to feel that ROK ground forces are too large
and should be reduced.
-- Make no changes in the basic USC program but aim toward
requiring the ROKs to absorb a greater share of the defense burden. All
agencies seem to agree that the ROKs could do more to absorb the
modernization costs.
While these alternatives are conceptually interesting, they are not
offered as real choices -- they have not been defined in program terms
or assessed in any detail. For example, the USC Steering Group notes
that while it "is unanimous in its support for the concept of moving the
ROK toward absorbing a greater proportionate share of its defense
burden.
additional in-depth study will be required to determine the
feasibility of this approach. 11
In short, whereas your directive of September 5, 1970, called for
"detailed alternative force structure and modernization programs.
should be developed by the (USC) Committee, " the USC has not really
developed any alternatives for the President's consideration. Given the
pressing need last year to get the ROKs acceptance of our withdrawal,
this oversight was acceptable but now some 10 months after your
request -- it is not acceptable. More work is needed.
The Funding of the Korea Program
As you know, the size and source of U.S. funding for the ROK
modernization program has been a major bone of contention within the
government. When the President first approved withdrawals from
Korea (NSDM 48), it was stipulated that "the U. S. will attempt to provide
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
4
annual average military assistance to Korea over FY 71-75 at a level of
$200 million per year comprised either of grant MAP of $200 million per
year or its equivalent in grant MAP at a lower level, such as $160 million
per year, supplemented by other supplies excess to U. S. needs, " Since
then:
-- On September 5, 1970, the overall level of military assistance
was raised from $1. 0 billion to $1. 5 billion with a $1.25 billion ceiling
set on grant MAP. As with the earlier directive, it was stipulated that
"maximum use should be made of excess/long supply to reduce (the program)
below the $1.25 billion upper limit of the funding authority. 11
-- On February 18, 1971, it was formally agreed with the ROKs
that the equipment levels contained in the ROK modernization plan would
be "subject to annual review to evaluate program changes 11 In other
words, while the broad outlines of a modernization plan were jointly
agreed, the questions of the size of the overall ROK force structure and
relative ROK and U. S. shares of modernization costs were kept some-
what open.
In general, the USC plan seems to follow the President's financial
guidance. Specifically, an overall resource level of $1. 5 billion is
provided for with a ceiling of $1.25 billion on grant MAP. However,
regarding details of the financing, there are a number of inconsistencies.
For example:
-- The full amount of excess equipment to be given the ROKs is
not acknowledged nor credited against grant MAP. .For example, the
plan includes only $250 million in U. S. excess equipment over a five-
year period whereas actual excess deliveries are likely to be at least
$500 million and could run to $800 million as the ROKs are given U. S.
equipment held by U. S. forces in Korea ($200 M) and the ROKs in
Vietnam ($80 M). In effect, the plan includes only enough of this excess
equipment to allow grant MAP to rise to the ceiling set by the President
even though the intent of the guidance was to reduce grant MAP as more
excess was provided. Secretary Laird was, in effect, following this
guidance when he told the ROKs that excess would count against the MAP
program.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
5
-- The full portion of the program to be funded by the ROKs,
even when it is indirectly paid for by the U. S., is treated as an add-on
to the program not an offset as specified by the guidance. Inclusion of
the PL-480 funded MAP transfer programs would add $220 million while
we also expect about $90 million in sales to the ROKs. However, a
good argument could be made that if these programs were included as
full offsets, the ROKs would have a greatly reduced incentive to pick
up a greater share of our mutual burden.
-- A number of additional programs are under consideration
or have been added over and above the equipment lists agreed to. They
include the M-60 plant ($60 million) and additional fast patrol boats.
Other additions are sure to follow.
On the whole, it is clear that the USC plan could provide as much as
$2. 0 billion in assistance to the ROK's rather than the $1. 5 billion provided
for by the Presidential guidance unless it is made very clear that your
earlier guidance should be followed in two respects:
-- Excess equipment should be used as an offset to grant MAP
within the $1. 5 billion overall ceiling provided that it meets real military
needs.
Additions to the program should require trade-offs within it
unless there are valid military or diplomatic reasons for increasing the
overall program.
While we have every reason to be generous with the ROKs, it is in
our interest at this point to not promise more assistance to the ROKs than
we should or could actually provide.
-- It reduces leverage with them that might be gained if increases
in the modernization program were more visible. This could be very
important in our talks on textiles or ROK forces in RVN.
-- It builds a bigger ROK program than is necessary on military
grounds or can be supported by the ROKs themselves.
TOP SECRET
TOP SECRET
6
For these reasons, it is important that the President's guidance be
tight enough so that the assistance program cannot be increased in an
"ad hoc" basis without his approval. On the other hand, the guidance has
and will continue to provide generous assistance to Korea.
I have prepared a memo to the President (Tab A) which recommends
that he approve in principle the ROK modernization plan and asks for
continuing work on:
-- Possible modification to the ROK and U. S. force structure
in Korea;
-- Possible changes in the funding and the relative ROK/U. S.
shares of the modernization burden.
This work could be carried out by the DPRC where we have some
measure of working-level control over the product and have laid a
valuable analytical framework in the U. S. strategy and forces study
(NSSM-69). The most important bureaucratic benefit to be gained by this
work will be to throw a net over Secretary Laird's plans for withdrawal
of another U. S. division from Korea in FY 73 and provide for the
development of a full range of alternatives.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the enclosed memo to the President (Tab A) on the ROK
Modernization Plan.
CONCURRENCE: John Holdridge
Dick Kennedy
TOP SECRET
TAB A
/c
J
Id
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Five-Year Korea Program
Under Secretary Irwin has forwarded for your consideration a five-
year military program for Korea developed by the Under Secretaries
Committee (Tab B). His recommendation is that you "approve this
plan as setting the major objectives for our military assistance
program in FY 71-75 subject to annual review.
"
You have established the following military objectives set for our
security assistance program.
-- Force Size, "To develop ROK forces capable of
deterring or conducting a defense against a conventional or uncon-
ventional attack by North Korea. 11 By implication, the ROK forces
would not be designed either to meet the threat of a combined Chinese
and North Korea attack or to allow South Korea to successfully attack
North Korea.
-- Force Balance. To develop a balanced ROK defensive
capability in hopes of reducing the immediacy and scope of U.S.
involvement should a conflict break out between North and South Korea.
It was understood, however, that it would nevertheless be necessary
to provide the ROKs some support even in the event of a North Korean
attack.
Based on this strategic guidance, the USC was tasked with the job of
developing a five-year plan for all U.S. and ROK programs that would
achieve these objectives. The principal features of the resulting plan
are:
-- 18 modernized ROK divisions (540 divisions (540, 000 men)
are planned compared to the 12-14 divisions (400, 000 men) required
to meet a North Korean attack. In effect, the plan provides enough
ground forces to defend initially against attack by China and North
Korea combined.
ASSIFIED
DOD Directire 5200.30
Guidelines
NSC
TOP SECRET
By
12/8/10
state revew 9/18/03
TOP SECRET
2
-- 280 modernized fighter aircraft including 54 F-5Es.
Together with the 100-odd U.S. fighter aircraft now deployed in
Korea, this force will be adequate to match the North Korean air
threat of 500 aircraft but require extensive reinforcement in the
case of Chinese attack.
-- 28 modernized ROK ships. In addition, about 20 modern
fast boats would be provided. Aside from a large number of small
boats, the North Koreans essentially have no offensive naval capa-
bility. The naval force planned will be more than adequate against
the North Korean threat including efforts to infiltrate by sea.
In general, the Korea plan provides for an ROK force structure that
will give South Korea an independent defensive capability vis a vis
the North Korean threat. However, the ground forces planned
appear adequate to meet even a Chinese attack while its air forces
will be inadequate even against North Korea. This general approach
is consistent with Secretary Laird's emphasis on "no U.S. ground
forces for Asia, " but inconsistent with your specific strategic guid-
ance in Korea. This broader strategic question involving the timing
of further U.S. withdrawals, if any, from Korea will be ready for
your consideration in the NSC meeting planned for mid-August on
U.S. Strategy and Forces for Asia (NSSM-69).
Despite this possible defect, the Korea plan forms a generally sound
basis for ROK modernization. Therefore, I recommend that you
approve the Korea modernization program in principle recognizing
that further work needs to be done.
Enclosed is a directive for me to forward to the agencies incorporating
these recommendations. It also provides for the further assessment
of security and economic assistance options to correct the deficiencies
noted above.
RECOMMENDATION
That you approve the enclosed memo to the agencies (Tab A) authorizing
them to proceed with the Korea Modernization Plan.
Approve
Disapprove
TOP SECRET
TAB A
if
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
TOP SECRET
National Security Decision Memorandum
TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT:
ROK Force Structure and Modernization Program
The President has approved in principle the five-year Korea
Modernization Program prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee.
As recommended by the Under Secretaries Committee, the President
authorizes:
1. A military assistance and sales program totaling $1. 5 billion
in FY 71 75 comprised of = combination of grant military assistance
(MAP), excess defense articles, and other U.S. military equipment
transferred to the ROK at no cost.
2. A maximum of $1.25 billion in new obligational authority
(NOA), this amount to be reduced to the maximum extent possible
through foreign military credit and cash sales, provision of excess
defense articles, and other "no cost" U.S. equipment transfers.
3. The annual review of the plans reflecting program changes,
new cost factors, resource availabilities, and the situation as it evolves
on the Korean peninsula.
4. Program additions or changes shall be considered as offsets
to the assistance levels contained within these ceilings unless specifically
considered and approved by the President.
TOP SECRET
EC
3.3
NSC
Guidelines 9/18/03
By
2/8/10
TOP SECRET
2
Further, the President directs that as set forth in NSDM-48, a
five-year Korea memorandum should be developed for his
consideration covering all U. S. activities and programs related
to Korea and posing alternative U. S. presence and assistance options
over the next five years. These preparations shall be carried out by
the agencies responsible under the direction of the Defense Program
Review Committee. The Korea Program Memorandum shall be
completed by September 1, 1971, prior to its review by the DPRC.
Henry A. Kissinger
cc: The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
TOP SECRET
TAB B
7109603
ih
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
NSC UNDER SECRETARIES COMMITTEE
SECRET/NOFORN
June 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Republic of Korea Force Structure
and Modernization Program
NSDM 48 and follow-on directives instructed
the Under Secretaries Committee to coordinate discussions
with the Republic of Korea on a five-year force structure
and modernization plan for the Korean armed forces.
Recommendations
The Committee has reviewed the enclosed plan
(Tab A) and recommends:
-- that you approve this plan as setting the
major objectives for our military assistance program
in FY 71-75, subject to annual review to evaluate program
changes, cost factors, resource availabilities, and the
evolving situation on the Korean peninsula;
-- that you authorize a military assistance and
sales program totalling $1.5 billion in FY 71-75, comprised
of a combination of grant military assistance (MAP), excess
defense articles, and other U.S. military equipment
transferred to the Republic of Korea at no cost; and
including a maximum of $1.25 billion in new obligational
authority (NOA), this amount to be reduced to the maximum
extent practicable through foreign military credit and
cash sales, provision of excess defense articles and other
"no cost" U.S. equipment transfers.
SECRET/NOFORN
NSC
SEC 3.3
By
Guidelines
12/8/10
SECRET/NOFORN
- 2 -
-- that you authorize Vice President Agnew during
his visit to Seoul June 30-July 3 to convey to President
Park your approval of the objectives plan, subject to
annual review as stated above.
APPROVE
DISAPPROVE
Discussion
On February 10 we and the Koreans jointly announced
the satisfactory completion of talks on the modernization
of the Korean armed forces and the reduction of U.S.
forces in Korea. Our troops have since been replaced
on the DMZ by Korean forces. At the end of this month
our force level in Korea will have been reduced by 20,000
men.
At the time of our joint statement we told the
Koreans that the modernization plan provided an acceptable
framework but that the specifics of the plan required
further study in Washington. We now request authorization
to inform the Korean Government that this plan has your
approval and that we are prepared to move forward with
its implementation.
As you recall, the Vice President was directly
involved in the negotiations concerning our troop
reduction and modernization plan during his earlier visit
to Seoul. We still have difficult bridges to cross with
the Koreans in regard to our future force levels, and we
would profit from the good will created if the Vice President
could personally convey your decision.
shen) I
John N. Irwin II
Chairman
Attachment
Tab A - Report of the NSDM 48
Interagency Steering Group
ROK Force Structure and Five-Year
Modernization Program
SECRET/NOFORN
T A B A
IJ
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 032811
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇReport
TITLE
Report of the NSDM 48 Interagency
Steering Group ROK Force Structure and
Five-Year Mondernization Program
DESCRIPTION
With Attachments
CREATION DATE
08/1971
VOLUME
56 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700250
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
5
FOLDER TITLE
Korea - NSDM 48
DATE WITHDRAWN
03/03/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH