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Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean Incident)

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The original documents are located in Box 27, folder "WSAG, August 18, 1976, Korean Incident" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Copyright Notice The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. Digitized from Box 27 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library MEMORANDUM 4699 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 1.6 SECRET GDS ACTION August 18, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND FROM: WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on Korean Incident Two American Army officers serving in the U.N. Command were killed in an unprovoked assault by North Korean guards today within the joint security area at Pamunjom. Four other U.S. soldiers and four ROK Army personnel were injured. The killings were the first deaths ever in the joint security area, site of the joint Armistice Command meetings. North Korean Intentions The North Korean personnel involved presumably had received authorization for an attack on a UNC target of opportunity within the joint security area. The assault follows the issuance on August 5 of a long North Korean Govern- ment memorandum and statement charging that the U.S. had "completed preparations for a new war" and "is going into the stage of directly provoking war. " Only hours before release of the statement, there was a shooting incident in the DMZ between North and South Korean forces. Pyongyang probably timed its attack on the American personnel to under- score its charge of increased tension on the Korean Peninsula. Conceivably the North Koreans hoped that U.S. forces would over-react with firearms creating a situation which would have a favorable impact in the current Non-Aligned Conference and in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly deliberations. It is also likely that Pyongyang calculates that an aura of heightened tension will surface the Korean issue in the American election campaign. Over the last several months, we have been concerned that Pyongyang could be contemplating a strategy of provocations and harrassment. This concern was based upon: that Naval and air deployments the past year/have significantly strengthened the North's capability for rapid action in and along the demilitarized zone. Pyongyang is also in a better position to support probes in the vicinity of the Northwest Islands or to respond belligerently to incidents at sea as well as in the DMZ. DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12906 (es assended) SEC 3.3 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, Sick Dept. Guidelines SECRET GDS By NARA, Date 1/21/11 SECRET 2 North Korea's likely assessment of the lessons of Indochina and the Middle East. The U.S. election campaign and our feeling that Pyongyang would be tempted to produce a shock which would bring the issue of U.S. involve- ment in Korea to a head within the U.S. -- South Korea's continuing rapid economic development and military modernization which has probably persuaded the North that time is not on its side. Pyongyang's likely estimate that it was approaching the peak of its political and diplomatic gains vis a vis the South. Future North Korean Moves It could be that Pyongyang intends to take only this one-shot swipe at the U.S. and will not follow up with other provocative actions. If a primary North Korean intention, however, is to underscore for the American public the risk and dangers of a continued U.S. military presence in Korea, Pyongyang might seek to sustain an atmosphere of crisis. We must, therefore, consider the possibility that the current incident will be followed by others or even that it is the opening shot in a strategy of harrassment and limited military action. Danger Areas If North Korea does intend to pursue a policy of harrassment and limited military probes, the areas or targets of possible North Korean action are: The entire DMZ area, including the joint security zone, and the U.S. company deployed within the DMZ. The Northwest Islands. - - Naval and fishing activities. - - Reconnaissance and intelligence operations. Precautions - Issue warnings to U.S. and UNC commanders in the field to be on the alert for further provocations and possibly limited military actions by the North. U.S. commanders should review operations and deployments SEGRET SECRET 3 for vulnerabilities and take necessary action to avoid arelessness in operations. - - Instruct commanders to take necessary actions to guard against incidents and dangerous exposure of U.S. military elements during military exercises such as the forthcoming air defense exercise, COPE JADE DELTA. -- Strengthen coordination and control measures with the ROK. Public and Diplomatic Actions Issue strong public protest. Both the State Department and the White House have issued statements condemning the North Korean action and warning that North Korea will bear the responsibility for the conse- quences. Encourage Congressional statements of condemnation and consider seeking Congressional resolution reasserting U.S. determination to maintain peace in the Korean Peninsula. Inform the Chinese of our strong reaction and the dangerous situation which North Korea appears to be creating. Consider passing similar message to the Soviet Union. -- Consult with the Japanese as soon as possible on the incident and on any U.S. counter-measures. - - Inform U.N. Security Council. -- Seek condemnation of North Korea from friendly governments. -- Exploit the incident to underscore the need to continue the Armistice arrangements. U.S. Counter - Measures Direct limited military action (an air strike against a SAM site, barracks or other military target, seizure of a North Korean military vessel, etc.). This would involve a high risk of provoking further North Korean moves leading to an increase in basic tensions and danger of war in Korea. The moves might well be considered an over-reaction in many U.S. and foreign circles, allowing North Korea to escape the onus for its action. FORD SECRET SECRET 4 -- Urge South Korea military retaliation in the form of some limited ground operation. Although the ROK would probably be willing, their action would involve even greater dangers than U.S. moves and would establish a precedent which we might regret within a very short time. -- Military deployments. Redeploy U.S. forces within Korea to strengthen our forces along the DMZ, especially the security unit stationed immediately in the vicinity of Panmunjom. Send in to Korea additional ground forces, presumably from Okinawa, (probably provoking an adverse Japanese reaction), move a carrier toward Korea, deploy F-111s temporarily to Korea, stage B-52 flights over Korea. Instructions to U.S. Representative on MAC -- If the North Koreans agree, there will be a meeting of the MAC tonight. At a minimum, a U.S. representative should demand a North Korean apology, an investigation, and punishment of those found guilty of the murder and attack. Political Exploitation - Assuming we stop short of military retaliation or massive deployments to Korea, it may be possible to exploit the North Korean aggressiveness to our advantage in dealing with non-aligned governments at the U.N. FUND SECRET DOC RECD LOG NUMBER MO DA MO DA HR INITIAL ACTION o NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE 8 25 8 2712 7604705x 2a TO PRES FROM: SECSTATE $/5 UNCLAS LOG OUT SCOWCROFT X SECDEF LOU NO FORN NODIS DCI X REF c EYES ONLY EXDIS HYLAND DAVIS STATE EXSEC $ CODEWORD SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION OTHER DAVIS TS SENSITIVE SUBJECT Menutes of 8-18 WASAG re Korea INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION REC ACTION REQUIRED ACTION CONCUR- COOR- INFO CY RENCE DINATE FOR ADV CYS 5 CROFT/ WGH MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT STAFF SECRETARY MEMO FOR PRES CONGRESSIONAL REPLY FOR ECONOMIC DISTRIBUTION INITIAL ACTION ASGMT APPROPRIATE ACTION CANADA/ OCEANS MEMO TO FAR EAST/PRC RECOMMENDATIONS INTELLIGENCE JOINT MEMO LATIN AMERICA REFER TO FOR: MID EAST/NO. AFRICA ANY ACTION NECESSARY NSC PLANNING CONCURRENCE , PROGRAM ANALYSIS DUE DATE: SCIENTIFIC COMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS SUB SAH/ AFRICA/ UN DATE FROM TO STATUS SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN): DUE CY TO 8/25 Scrift CIX not L Info by Hyland 8/2 9/21 SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS FORD DISPATCH NSC/S DISP INSTR NOTIFY MICROFILM a FILE ROMTS M/FD BY SPECIAL DISPOSITION: IF CRT ID: NS DY SPECIAL INDEXING: OPEN WH SA FP CLOSE PA SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED NSC 76-21 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976 599-022 2 MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4705 X SECRET August 25, 1976 wat MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT K FROM: Jeanne W. Davis ma SUBJECT: fr Minutes of WSAG Meeting held August 18, 1976 Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea. Attachments cc: William G. Hyland William Gleysteen SECRET/XGDS (3) XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption Category (Section 5 (B) (3)) DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3 is FORD NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines By Wh NARA, Date 1/21/11 670875 LIBBARY 2L NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 033321 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum of Conversation TITLE Washington Special Actions Group Meeting DESCRIPTION Re The North Korean Tree Incident CREATION DATE 08/18/1976 VOLUME 11 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700439 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 27 FOLDER TITLE Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean Incident) DATE WITHDRAWN 04/20/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 2.d SECRET 18 August 1976 DDCI BRIEFING FOR 18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING NORTH KOREA I. We are virtually certain that the violent incident in the Joint Security Area this morning was a de- liberate provocation. We believe it was primarily intended to agitate American public opinion over the issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the US election campaign. II. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the US is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing. --- Pyongyang has warned that these developments have created a "grave situation" in which war may break out at any time. -- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex- change of fire between ROK and North Korean troops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un- usually high level statement, alleged that DECLARRIFIED GERALD F FORD CIRRARY RAC NLF-NSC_EA-PA-27-10-3-4-9123103 HR 1/12/09 SECRET SECRET the US and South Korea have now "completed" war preparations. The statement was the first issued at this level since 1969 that was directed specifically at US actions in the South. III. North Korea's efforts have most recently been focused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo, now drawing to a close. --- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in- tended to affect favorably their prospects in the UN General Assembly debate. A reso- lution has now been introduced that once again calls for American withdrawal from Korea. IV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in- ternational forum, their propaganda efforts have won them little or no return in the American po- litical forum. They may now be raising the ante in hopes of stimulating American opposition to a continued US troop presence. This morning's incident seemed deliberately intended to produce American casualties. FORD & LIBRARY OF - 2 - SECRET SECRET --- The Joint Security Area is one of the very few places where North Koreans have direct, continuing contact with US military personnel. -- In June, there were several similar inci- dents in which US forces in the Joint Security Area were harassed by North Korean personnel. No casualties resulted, however. --- According to the account of today's incident issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at the scene was heard to tell his troops to kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel. -- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after the incident occurred described it as a US provocation that forced North Korean security personnel to take defensive measures. The broadcast warned that future incidents of US aggression would be met in this fashion, but otherwise signaled no major change in Pyongyang's policy. V. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be conditioned by the American reaction. --- Should the response to this probe lead them to believe that they can play effectively FORD & on American sensitivities by further con- LIBRANY - 3 - SECRET SECRET trolled acts of violence, we would expect them to pursue this course. VI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob- jective is to improve upon their 1975 success in the General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that they are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course that would run the risk of major US reprisals or portraying North Korea as significantly raising the threat of instability on the peninsula. FORM & - 4 - SECRET 3a is MEMORANDUM NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 4705 X like SECRET August 25, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT FROM: Jeanne W. Davis mA SUBJECT: Minutes of WSAG Meeting held August 18, 1976 Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea. Attachments CC: William G. Hyland William Gleysteen SECRET/XGDS (3) XGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority of Brent Scowcroft; Exemption Category (Section 5 (B) (3)) DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3 NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines By NARA, Date 1/21/11 FORD I: LIBRARY 3B NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet WITHDRAWAL ID 033322 REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum of Conversation TITLE Washington Special Actions Group DESCRIPTION Re The North Korean Tree Incident, Duplicate CREATION DATE 08/18/1976 VOLUME 11 pages COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID 033700439 COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES BOX NUMBER 27 FOLDER TITLE Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean Incident) DATE WITHDRAWN 04/20/2011 WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH 3C -SECRET 18 August 1976 DDCI BRIEFING FOR 18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING NORTH KOREA I. We are virtually certain that the violent incident in the Joint Security Area this morning was a de- liberate provocation. We believe it was primarily intended to agitate American public opinion over the issue of our troops in Korea in the context of the US election campaign. II. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda has charged almost daily that the US is introducing new weapons into the South, conducting provocative military exercises, and keeping South Korean armed forces on a war footing. -- Pyongyang has warned that these developments have created a "grave situation" in which war may break out at any time. -- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex- change of fire between ROK and North Korean troops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un- usually high level statement, alleged that B. FORD DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY same 750 PA - 27-10-3-11 9/23/03 LISBARD BY NARA DATE 1/22/11 SECRET SECRET the US and South Korea have now "completed" war preparations. The statement was the first issued at this level since 1969 that was directed specifically at US actions in the South. III. North Korea's efforts have most recently been focused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo, now drawing to a close. -- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in- tended to affect favorably their prospects in the UN General Assembly debate. A reso- lution has now been introduced that once again calls for American withdrawal from Korea. IV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in- ternational forum, their propaganda efforts have won them little or no return in the American po- litical forum. They may now be raising the ante in hopes of stimulating American opposition to a continued US troop presence. This morning's incident seemed deliberately intended to produce American casualties. FORD - 2 - SECRET SECRET -- The Joint Security Area is one of the very few places where North Koreans have direct, continuing contact with US military personnel. -- In June, there were several similar inci- dents in which US forces in the Joint Security Area were harassed by North Korean personnel. No casualties resulted, however. -- According to the account of today's incident issued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at the scene was heard to tell his troops to kill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel. -- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after the incident occurred described it as a US provocation that forced North Korean security personnel to take defensive measures. The broadcast warned that future incidents of US aggression would be met in this fashion, but otherwise signaled no major change in Pyongyang's policy. V. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be conditioned by the American reaction. --- Should the response to this probe lead them to believe that they can play effectively & FORD on American sensitivities by further con- - 3 - SECRET SECRET trolled acts of violence, we would expect them to pursue this course. VI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob- jective is to improve upon their 1975 success in the General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that they are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course that would run the risk of major US reprisals or portraying North Korea as significantly raising the threat of instability on the peninsula. is FORD OTHER - 4 - SECRET

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    "ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 27, folder \"WSAG, August 18, 1976, Korean\nIncident\" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.\nFord Presidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 27 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\nMEMORANDUM\n4699\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n1.6\nSECRET GDS\nACTION\nAugust 18, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND\nFROM:\nWILLIAM GLEYSTEEN\nSUBJECT:\nWSAG Meeting on Korean Incident\nTwo American Army officers serving in the U.N. Command were killed\nin an unprovoked assault by North Korean guards today within the joint\nsecurity area at Pamunjom. Four other U.S. soldiers and four ROK\nArmy personnel were injured. The killings were the first deaths ever\nin the joint security area, site of the joint Armistice Command meetings.\nNorth Korean Intentions\nThe North Korean personnel involved presumably had received authorization\nfor an attack on a UNC target of opportunity within the joint security area.\nThe assault follows the issuance on August 5 of a long North Korean Govern-\nment memorandum and statement charging that the U.S. had \"completed\npreparations for a new war\" and \"is going into the stage of directly provoking\nwar. \" Only hours before release of the statement, there was a shooting\nincident in the DMZ between North and South Korean forces.\nPyongyang probably timed its attack on the American personnel to under-\nscore its charge of increased tension on the Korean Peninsula. Conceivably\nthe North Koreans hoped that U.S. forces would over-react with firearms\ncreating a situation which would have a favorable impact in the current\nNon-Aligned Conference and in the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly\ndeliberations. It is also likely that Pyongyang calculates that an aura of\nheightened tension will surface the Korean issue in the American election\ncampaign.\nOver the last several months, we have been concerned that Pyongyang\ncould be contemplating a strategy of provocations and harrassment. This\nconcern was based upon:\nthat\nNaval and air deployments the past year/have significantly strengthened\nthe North's capability for rapid action in and along the demilitarized zone.\nPyongyang is also in a better position to support probes in the vicinity of\nthe Northwest Islands or to respond belligerently to incidents at sea as well\nas in the DMZ.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12906 (es assended) SEC 3.3\nNSC Memo, 3/30/06, Sick Dept. Guidelines\nSECRET GDS\nBy\nNARA, Date 1/21/11\nSECRET\n2\nNorth Korea's likely assessment of the lessons of Indochina and\nthe Middle East.\nThe U.S. election campaign and our feeling that Pyongyang would\nbe tempted to produce a shock which would bring the issue of U.S. involve-\nment in Korea to a head within the U.S.\n-- South Korea's continuing rapid economic development and military\nmodernization which has probably persuaded the North that time is not\non its side.\nPyongyang's likely estimate that it was approaching the peak of its\npolitical and diplomatic gains vis a vis the South.\nFuture North Korean Moves\nIt could be that Pyongyang intends to take only this one-shot swipe at the\nU.S. and will not follow up with other provocative actions.\nIf a primary North Korean intention, however, is to underscore for the\nAmerican public the risk and dangers of a continued U.S. military presence\nin Korea, Pyongyang might seek to sustain an atmosphere of crisis. We\nmust, therefore, consider the possibility that the current incident will be\nfollowed by others or even that it is the opening shot in a strategy of\nharrassment and limited military action.\nDanger Areas\nIf North Korea does intend to pursue a policy of harrassment and limited\nmilitary probes, the areas or targets of possible North Korean action are:\nThe entire DMZ area, including the joint security zone, and the\nU.S. company deployed within the DMZ.\nThe Northwest Islands.\n- - Naval and fishing activities.\n- - Reconnaissance and intelligence operations.\nPrecautions\n- Issue warnings to U.S. and UNC commanders in the field to be on\nthe alert for further provocations and possibly limited military actions by\nthe North. U.S. commanders should review operations and deployments\nSEGRET\nSECRET\n3\nfor vulnerabilities and take necessary action to avoid arelessness in\noperations.\n- - Instruct commanders to take necessary actions to guard against\nincidents and dangerous exposure of U.S. military elements during\nmilitary exercises such as the forthcoming air defense exercise, COPE\nJADE DELTA.\n-- Strengthen coordination and control measures with the ROK.\nPublic and Diplomatic Actions\nIssue strong public protest. Both the State Department and the\nWhite House have issued statements condemning the North Korean action\nand warning that North Korea will bear the responsibility for the conse-\nquences.\nEncourage Congressional statements of condemnation and consider\nseeking Congressional resolution reasserting U.S. determination to\nmaintain peace in the Korean Peninsula.\nInform the Chinese of our strong reaction and the dangerous\nsituation which North Korea appears to be creating. Consider passing\nsimilar message to the Soviet Union.\n-- Consult with the Japanese as soon as possible on the incident and\non any U.S. counter-measures.\n- - Inform U.N. Security Council.\n-- Seek condemnation of North Korea from friendly governments.\n-- Exploit the incident to underscore the need to continue the Armistice\narrangements.\nU.S. Counter - Measures\nDirect limited military action (an air strike against a SAM site,\nbarracks or other military target, seizure of a North Korean military\nvessel, etc.). This would involve a high risk of provoking further North\nKorean moves leading to an increase in basic tensions and danger of war\nin Korea. The moves might well be considered an over-reaction in many\nU.S. and foreign circles, allowing North Korea to escape the onus for its\naction.\nFORD\nSECRET\nSECRET\n4\n-- Urge South Korea military retaliation in the form of some limited\nground operation. Although the ROK would probably be willing, their\naction would involve even greater dangers than U.S. moves and would\nestablish a precedent which we might regret within a very short time.\n-- Military deployments.\nRedeploy U.S. forces within Korea to strengthen our forces\nalong the DMZ, especially the security unit stationed immediately in the\nvicinity of Panmunjom.\nSend in to Korea additional ground forces, presumably from\nOkinawa, (probably provoking an adverse Japanese reaction), move a\ncarrier toward Korea, deploy F-111s temporarily to Korea, stage B-52\nflights over Korea.\nInstructions to U.S. Representative on MAC\n-- If the North Koreans agree, there will be a meeting of the MAC\ntonight. At a minimum, a U.S. representative should demand a North\nKorean apology, an investigation, and punishment of those found guilty\nof the murder and attack.\nPolitical Exploitation\n- Assuming we stop short of military retaliation or massive deployments\nto Korea, it may be possible to exploit the North Korean aggressiveness to\nour advantage in dealing with non-aligned governments at the U.N.\nFUND\nSECRET\nDOC\nRECD\nLOG NUMBER\nMO\nDA\nMO\nDA\nHR\nINITIAL ACTION o\nNSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE\n8\n25\n8\n2712\n7604705x\n2a\nTO PRES\nFROM: SECSTATE\n$/5\nUNCLAS LOG OUT\nSCOWCROFT X\nSECDEF\nLOU\nNO FORN\nNODIS\nDCI\nX REF\nc\nEYES ONLY\nEXDIS\nHYLAND\nDAVIS\nSTATE EXSEC\n$\nCODEWORD\nSOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION\nOTHER DAVIS\nTS\nSENSITIVE\nSUBJECT Menutes of 8-18 WASAG re Korea\nINTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION\nREC\nACTION REQUIRED\nACTION\nCONCUR-\nCOOR-\nINFO\nCY\nRENCE\nDINATE\nFOR\nADV CYS 5 CROFT/ WGH\nMEMO FOR SCOWCROFT\nSTAFF SECRETARY\nMEMO FOR PRES\nCONGRESSIONAL\nREPLY FOR\nECONOMIC\nDISTRIBUTION INITIAL ACTION ASGMT\nAPPROPRIATE ACTION\nCANADA/ OCEANS\nMEMO\nTO\nFAR EAST/PRC\nRECOMMENDATIONS\nINTELLIGENCE\nJOINT MEMO\nLATIN AMERICA\nREFER TO\nFOR:\nMID EAST/NO. AFRICA\nANY ACTION NECESSARY\nNSC PLANNING\nCONCURRENCE\n,\nPROGRAM ANALYSIS\nDUE DATE:\nSCIENTIFIC\nCOMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS\nSUB SAH/ AFRICA/ UN\nDATE\nFROM\nTO\nSTATUS\nSUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):\nDUE\nCY TO\n8/25\nScrift\nCIX\nnot L Info by Hyland\n8/2\n9/21\nSUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS\nFORD\nDISPATCH\nNSC/S DISP INSTR\nNOTIFY\nMICROFILM a FILE ROMTS\nM/FD\nBY\nSPECIAL DISPOSITION:\nIF\nCRT ID:\nNS DY\nSPECIAL INDEXING:\nOPEN\nWH SA FP\nCLOSE\nPA\nSUSPENSE CY ATTACHED\nNSC 76-21\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976\n599-022\n2\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n4705 X\nSECRET\nAugust 25, 1976\nwat\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nK\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis\nma\nSUBJECT:\nfr\nMinutes of WSAG Meeting\nheld August 18, 1976\nAttached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions\nGroup meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea.\nAttachments\ncc: William G. Hyland\nWilliam Gleysteen\nSECRET/XGDS (3)\nXGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority\nof Brent Scowcroft; Exemption\nCategory (Section 5 (B) (3))\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nis\nFORD\nNSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines\nBy Wh\nNARA, Date 1/21/11\n670875\nLIBBARY\n2L\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 033321\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum of Conversation\nTITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nMeeting\nDESCRIPTION\nRe The North Korean Tree Incident\nCREATION DATE\n08/18/1976\nVOLUME\n11 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700439\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n27\nFOLDER TITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nMeeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean\nIncident)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n04/20/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n2.d\nSECRET\n18 August 1976\nDDCI BRIEFING FOR\n18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING\nNORTH KOREA\nI. We are virtually certain that the violent incident\nin the Joint Security Area this morning was a de-\nliberate provocation. We believe it was primarily\nintended to agitate American public opinion over the\nissue of our troops in Korea in the context of the\nUS election campaign.\nII. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda\nhas charged almost daily that the US is introducing\nnew weapons into the South, conducting provocative\nmilitary exercises, and keeping South Korean armed\nforces on a war footing.\n--- Pyongyang has warned that these developments\nhave created a \"grave situation\" in which war\nmay break out at any time.\n-- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex-\nchange of fire between ROK and North Korean\ntroops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un-\nusually high level statement, alleged that\nDECLARRIFIED\nGERALD F FORD CIRRARY\nRAC\nNLF-NSC_EA-PA-27-10-3-4-9123103\nHR\n1/12/09\nSECRET\nSECRET\nthe US and South Korea have now \"completed\"\nwar preparations. The statement was the\nfirst issued at this level since 1969 that\nwas directed specifically at US actions in\nthe South.\nIII. North Korea's efforts have most recently been\nfocused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo,\nnow drawing to a close.\n--- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in-\ntended to affect favorably their prospects\nin the UN General Assembly debate. A reso-\nlution has now been introduced that once\nagain calls for American withdrawal from\nKorea.\nIV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in-\nternational forum, their propaganda efforts have\nwon them little or no return in the American po-\nlitical forum. They may now be raising the ante\nin hopes of stimulating American opposition to\na continued US troop presence. This morning's\nincident seemed deliberately intended to produce\nAmerican casualties.\nFORD & LIBRARY OF\n- 2 -\nSECRET\nSECRET\n--- The Joint Security Area is one of the very\nfew places where North Koreans have direct,\ncontinuing contact with US military personnel.\n-- In June, there were several similar inci-\ndents in which US forces in the Joint Security\nArea were harassed by North Korean personnel.\nNo casualties resulted, however.\n--- According to the account of today's incident\nissued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at\nthe scene was heard to tell his troops to\nkill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.\n-- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after\nthe incident occurred described it as a US\nprovocation that forced North Korean security\npersonnel to take defensive measures. The\nbroadcast warned that future incidents of\nUS aggression would be met in this fashion,\nbut otherwise signaled no major change in\nPyongyang's policy.\nV. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be\nconditioned by the American reaction.\n--- Should the response to this probe lead them\nto believe that they can play effectively\nFORD\n&\non American sensitivities by further con-\nLIBRANY\n- 3 -\nSECRET\nSECRET\ntrolled acts of violence, we would expect them\nto pursue this course.\nVI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob-\njective is to improve upon their 1975 success in\nthe General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that\nthey are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course\nthat would run the risk of major US reprisals\nor portraying North Korea as significantly raising\nthe threat of instability on the peninsula.\nFORM\n&\n- 4 -\nSECRET\n3a is\nMEMORANDUM\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\n4705 X\nlike\nSECRET\nAugust 25, 1976\nMEMORANDUM FOR:\nBRENT SCOWCROFT\nFROM:\nJeanne W. Davis\nmA\nSUBJECT:\nMinutes of WSAG Meeting\nheld August 18, 1976\nAttached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions\nGroup meeting held August 18, 1976 to discuss Korea.\nAttachments\nCC: William G. Hyland\nWilliam Gleysteen\nSECRET/XGDS (3)\nXGDS of E.O. 11652 by authority\nof Brent Scowcroft; Exemption\nCategory (Section 5 (B) (3))\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nNSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines\nBy\nNARA, Date 1/21/11\nFORD I: LIBRARY\n3B\nNATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION\nPresidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet\nWITHDRAWAL ID 033322\nREASON FOR WITHDRAWAL\nÇNational security restriction\nTYPE OF MATERIAL\nÇMemorandum of Conversation\nTITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nDESCRIPTION\nRe The North Korean Tree Incident,\nDuplicate\nCREATION DATE\n08/18/1976\nVOLUME\n11 pages\nCOLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID\n033700439\nCOLLECTION TITLE\nNATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST\nASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES\nBOX NUMBER\n27\nFOLDER TITLE\nWashington Special Actions Group\nMeeting, August 18, 1976 (Korean\nIncident)\nDATE WITHDRAWN\n04/20/2011\nWITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST\nTMH\n3C\n-SECRET\n18 August 1976\nDDCI BRIEFING FOR\n18 AUGUST WSAG MEETING\nNORTH KOREA\nI. We are virtually certain that the violent incident\nin the Joint Security Area this morning was a de-\nliberate provocation. We believe it was primarily\nintended to agitate American public opinion over the\nissue of our troops in Korea in the context of the\nUS election campaign.\nII. Since early this spring, North Korean propaganda\nhas charged almost daily that the US is introducing\nnew weapons into the South, conducting provocative\nmilitary exercises, and keeping South Korean armed\nforces on a war footing.\n-- Pyongyang has warned that these developments\nhave created a \"grave situation\" in which war\nmay break out at any time.\n-- On August 5 -- only a few hours after an ex-\nchange of fire between ROK and North Korean\ntroops on the DMZ -- North Korea, in an un-\nusually high level statement, alleged that\nB.\nFORD\nDECLASSIFIED\nAUTHORITY same 750 PA - 27-10-3-11 9/23/03\nLISBARD\nBY\nNARA DATE 1/22/11\nSECRET\nSECRET\nthe US and South Korea have now \"completed\"\nwar preparations. The statement was the\nfirst issued at this level since 1969 that\nwas directed specifically at US actions in\nthe South.\nIII. North Korea's efforts have most recently been\nfocused on the Non-Aligned Conference in Colombo,\nnow drawing to a close.\n-- Their efforts in Colombo, in turn, were in-\ntended to affect favorably their prospects\nin the UN General Assembly debate. A reso-\nlution has now been introduced that once\nagain calls for American withdrawal from\nKorea.\nIV. While the North Koreans have made gains in the in-\nternational forum, their propaganda efforts have\nwon them little or no return in the American po-\nlitical forum. They may now be raising the ante\nin hopes of stimulating American opposition to\na continued US troop presence. This morning's\nincident seemed deliberately intended to produce\nAmerican casualties.\nFORD\n- 2 -\nSECRET\nSECRET\n-- The Joint Security Area is one of the very\nfew places where North Koreans have direct,\ncontinuing contact with US military personnel.\n-- In June, there were several similar inci-\ndents in which US forces in the Joint Security\nArea were harassed by North Korean personnel.\nNo casualties resulted, however.\n-- According to the account of today's incident\nissued in Seoul, a North Korean officer at\nthe scene was heard to tell his troops to\nkill the UNC (i.e., US) personnel.\n-- A North Korean radiobroadcast shortly after\nthe incident occurred described it as a US\nprovocation that forced North Korean security\npersonnel to take defensive measures. The\nbroadcast warned that future incidents of\nUS aggression would be met in this fashion,\nbut otherwise signaled no major change in\nPyongyang's policy.\nV. North Korea's next moves will undoubtedly be\nconditioned by the American reaction.\n--- Should the response to this probe lead them\nto believe that they can play effectively\n&\nFORD\non American sensitivities by further con-\n- 3 -\nSECRET\nSECRET\ntrolled acts of violence, we would expect them\nto pursue this course.\nVI. But we believe that their principal immediate ob-\njective is to improve upon their 1975 success in\nthe General Assembly. Accordingly, we believe that\nthey are extremely unlikely to embark upon a course\nthat would run the risk of major US reprisals\nor portraying North Korea as significantly raising\nthe threat of instability on the peninsula.\nis\nFORD\nOTHER\n- 4 -\nSECRET"
}