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This file unit contains material related to the North Korean Tree Incident.
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24468963
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Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean Incident)
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24468963
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document
title
Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean Incident)
description
This file unit contains material related to the North Korean Tree Incident.
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Meetings Files
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Korea (North)
Korea
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24468963
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1976-08-31
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8
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1976
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1976-08-01
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8
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 27, folder "WSAG, August 19, 1976, Korean
Incident" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
MEMORANDUM
INFORMATION
1.6
4796X
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET-(XGDS) (3)
August 25, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
with
SUBJECT:
Minutes of WSAG Meeting,
Held August 19, 1976
Attached are the minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group
meeting held August 19, 1976, to discuss Korea.
Attachment
cc: William G. Hyland
William Gleysteen
SECRET (XGDS) (3)
ESA440 FORD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956 (as amended) SEC 3.3
NSC he Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
NARA. Date 1/21/11
Digitized from Box 27 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033323
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum of Conversation
TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
DESCRIPTION
Re North Korean Tree Incident
CREATION DATE
08/19/1976
VOLUME
12 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700440
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
27
FOLDER TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
Meeting, August 19, 1976 (Korean
Incident)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/20/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
IC
DCI Briening
LUSAG 19 Aug 76
SECRET
This morning I will address two questions. First, likely
North Korean responses to measures we might take. Second, what
the intelligence community is doing to keep North Korean move-
ments under maximum surveillance.
Show of force. Demonstrative military measures of the
type we have already taken will reinforce existing deterrents
to major North Korean acts of force and also discourage further
provocations for the immediate future.
-- The North Koreans will read our actions as evidence
that we will be more alert to the possibility of violence and
quicker to take effective defensive action for some time to
come.
-- Pyongyang's propaganda response is entirely predictable:
US military movements will be described as further efforts on
our part to "light the fuse of war," in line with their in-
tensive propaganda campaign of the past several months portray-
ing the US as the major source of tension in Korea. We believe
that their announcement of a state of alert is essentially a
propaganda move.
At the same time, Pyongyang will be attentive to the
reaction in the US to the loss of American lives and to the
subsequent actions taken by the administration.
-- If the North Koreans perceive the promise of a
significant debate over the troop presence and our commitment,
they may well resort to additional small scale violence in
order to point up the continuing threat to American lives.
The tree clearing exercise. Two alternate actions have been
proposed by General Stillwell, who believes--out of tactical
necessity and principle--that the original tree clearing
exercise must be completed.
-- with no prior warning, cut down the tree using the
maximum legal guard force of 35 men, and depart as rapidly
as possible. The advantage would lie in completing the operation
before the North Koreans could react. The disadvantage is that
the North Koreans might still have time to react--and with a
force larger than the rules permit.
-- alternately, to the North Koreans in advance our intent
to prune the tree, and invite neutral observers and members of
the press as witnesses. This course would underscore the
SECRET
FORD
RAC
NLF-NSC.EA.PA-297-11-24912303
in NLF, DATE 1/12/09
LIBRARY
SECRET
2.
non-provocative nature of our intent; the disadvantages are
that the North Koreans would dispute our right to proceed and
that the proposal would be submerged in inconclusive debate.
General Stillwell prefers the first course. Assuming that
the tree clearing exercise must be completed soon, we would
agree with the General's preferred course of action--provided
that he feels he has an adequate back up force on hand. We
believe the North Koreans would react if they have the time
and superior forces on hand. As for the second alternative,
the North Koreans are likely to object to our proposal and it
is unlikely to move forward quickly.
Reprisals. We do not know how the North Koreans calculate
the odds of a US reprisal. They are certainly aware of the
possibility, even though previous incidents involving US loss
of life in Korea (the seizure of the USS Pueblo and the shoot
down of the EC-121 in the late 1960's) did not prompt one.
In any event, a US reprisal would present the North Koreans
with several difficult decisions.
-- their response to the reprisal itself would be dictated
by the balance of forces immediately at hand. The North
Koreans would probably react to a reprisal--or any aspect of
a reprisal operation--if superior forces could be deployed.
Conversely, Pyongyang would probably not risk deploying a
reaction force if its chances of success were no better than
even.
-- in the wake of successful reprisal, Pyongyang would
consider retaliatory action against US forces elsewhere in the
general area--lightly armed ships or aircraft within range or
US personnel at Panmunjom. Should Pyongyang perceive no
vulnerable US target, it might consider attacking a South
Korean target most anywhere along the DMZ or perhaps by
attempting to duplicate the form of the US reprisal.
On balance, we do not believe that Pyongyang would decide
to embark upon a series of escalatory incidents. A military
response at an equal or somewhat lower level is more probable,
while a response at a higher level--perhaps caused by differing
US and North Korean perceptions--certainly cannot be ruled out.
SECRET
DIA FACT BOOK
12
NORTH KOREAN AIR FORCE
124
125
128
130
Sungart
NORTH KOREA
Returnels
FIGHTERS AND BOMBERS
MiG-15/17
300
MiG-19
36
MIG-21
120
= Su.7
24
U.S.S.R
IL-28
70
Total: 610
AIRFIELDS (JET CAPABLE)
Tumen
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
o
25
50
75 Miles
0
25
50
75 Kilemators
42
12
Sinmusong
40 MiG-15/17
Yalu
Hoemun Ni
Manpo Up
50 MiG-15/17
*
4 M16 15/17
OIRANG
READY
Hwangsuwon
4
R
Changjin Up
2 M16-195
Yalw
4 11-280
20 IL-28
READY
Uniu
READY
50 IL-28
36 MiG-21
40
Hamhung
81 MiG-15/17
*
Namsi
Sondeng Ni
2 M16-210
34 MiG-15/17
Taechon
READY
62 MiG-19
SEA
Saamcham
AN-240
4
2 M16-17A
MIG 210
Pukchang Ni
OF
2 27
READY
47 M:G-21
2 MIG-21s
AN-ASE
PEADY
Pyong Ni
READY
JAPAN
LI-2,JAY
24 Su-7
Sunan Up
Wonsan
3 M16-190
65 MiG-15/17
2 MIG-17A
READY
Pyongyang East
Onchen-Up
READY
34, MiG-19
30 MC-15/17
Koksan
Demarcation line
IMIG-21
Hwangju
READY
37 MIG-21
Hyon Ni
Pungchon
INCREASED
Taetan
38
ACTIVITY
38
!
SOUTH
KOPEA
YELLOW SEA
00:00
"
AND
124
NOT
:
128
130
&
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY DIA RAC Parient 9/24/03; nGA BAC Review, 9/26/03
76F nsc. PB.- 27-11-3-3
GERALD
BY oh
NLF, DATE 5/18/05
3.22
SECRET