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Digitized from Box 35 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
1
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UN PRESENCE IN KOREA
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The UN presence in Korea, a reaction to the conflict
which broke out on that peninsula in 1950, derives from
three resolutions of the UN Security Council and two
resolutions of the General Assembly. (Reproduced in the
Appendix). In chronological order these are:
(1) Security Council Resolution 82 of
June 25, 1950. This resolution, inter alia,
called for the withdrawal of North Korean
forces to the 38th parallel and called upon
UN Member States "to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this
resolution and to refrain from giving assistance
to the North Korean authorities. "
(2) Security Council Resolution 83 of June 27,
1950. This resolution recommended that UN
Members "furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repeal the armed
attack and to restore international peace and
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security in the area."
(3) Security Council Resolution 84 of July 7,
1950. This resolution recommends that Members
providing forces pursuant to the above two resolu-
tions make those forces available to "a unified
ii
command under the United States of America",
and requests the U.S. to "designate the com-
mander of such forces".
(4) General Assembly Resolution 376 (V)
of October 7, 1950. This resolution established
the United Nations Commission for the Unification
and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).
(5) General Assembly Resolution 498(V) of
February 1, 1951. This is the resolution which,
inter alia, found that the PRC engaged in aggression
in Korea. It also called upon "all States and
authorities to continue to lend every assistance
to the United Nations action in Korea. "
For our purposes, the most important resolutions are
of
those/the Security Council, particularly resolution 84
This resolution provided the authority for the United
Nations Command (UNC) in Korea.
Changes in the nature of the UN presence in Korea may have
important legal implication elsewhere in the complex net-
work of arrangements that has developed in relation to
Korea over the last two decades. This paper attempts to
iii
describe the implications which it is most important to
and related aspects.
take account of in considering changes in the UN presence/
The main issues addressed in this paper, and the
general conclusions reached, are as follows:
(1) Termination of the UNC. Termination
would have serious legal consequences in terms
of the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the 1954 UN
SOFA with Japan and a 1960 U.S. Japan secret
understanding regarding the use of Japanese
bases, and under present circumstances it would
appear inadvisable for the USG to seek termina-
tion of the UNC in the absence of an over-all
settlement of the Korean question. Even if the
UNC were not terminated, many of the same legal
consequences would result from removal of the
Thai contingent and ROK forces from UNC opera-
tional control.
(2) UNCURK. Termination of UNCURK would have
no legal implications in terms of the UN
presence in Korea and related questions.
(3) The UN SOFA with Japan and the Acheson-Yoshida
Understanding -- Withdrawal of the Thai Contingent.
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The departure of the Thai military contingent
iv
from Japan would result in the termination of
the UN SOFA with Japan, which in turn would
cause the termination of a 1951 USG-GOJ under-
standing (the Acheson-Yoshida understanding)
regarding use of Japanese facilities and areas
by UN members in support of UN operations in Korea.
(4) South Korean Representative on the Korean
Military Armistice Commission (MAC). Although there
is probably no legal barrier to appointing a
ROK general as Senior Member on the UNC side
of the MAC, such a move might unnecessarily
sacrifice advantages for the U.S. in the
present procedure. There are alternative
ways of strengthening the ROK role in the MAC
machinery.
(5) Deactivation of the Neutral Nations Super-
visory Commission (NNSC). There are legal and
other difficulties with the proposal to deactivate
the NNSC.
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L:L/EA:RIStarr:OTJohnson:cdj:1/6/72 X 23039
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I.
TERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC)
The UNC was established by the United States pursuant
to Security Council resolution 84 of July 7, 1950
recommending that members providing military forces in
Korea make those forces available to "a unified command
under the United States". We examine here the legal
implications of terminating the UNC.
Mechanics of Termination
The mechanics of terminating the UNC are rather simple.
The UN Security Council could repeal the July 7, 1950
resolution, or it could repeal that part of the resolution
(paragraph 3) which authorized a unified command under
the United States. Even in the absence of such a Security
Council decision, the USG could unilaterally terminate
the UNC by reporting to the UN Security Council, pursuant
to paragraph 6 of the July 7, 1950 resolution
that the USG would no longer serve as the unified
1/
command provided for by paragraph 3 of that same resolution.
1/
See page 2.
FOED
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
b
H/03
State Dept Guidelines
By
NARA, Date
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2
The UNC and UN Forces in Korea
The legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in
Korea is the U.S. ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 (TIAS
2/
3097)
, not any UN resolution. Therefore, the termination
of the UNC would in no way affect the legal basis for that
presence. The status of US forces in Korea is governed by our
1967 Status of Forces Agreement with the ROK (TIAS 6127).
Neither is the presence of ROK forces in Korea dependent
upon any UN resolution. However, they are considered UN forces
in Korea becuase they are under the operational control of the
Commander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC). Termination of the
UNC would result in the loss of UNC, and thus US, operational
control, over ROK forces. Upon termination of the UNC, ROK forces
would no longer be
1/
Technically, it would be possible for the United States
to eliminate the UNC from the U.S. command structure without
eschewing its responsibilities as the unified command
pursuant to the July 7, 1950 Security Council resolution.
This would merely constitute a formalistic change in the
name given to the UN military presence in Korea and would
not have any of the substantive legal implications that
would flow from elimination of the UNC as discussed above.
2/ Article IV of the Treaty gives the U.S. "the right to
dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about
the territory of the Republic of Korea, as determined by
mutual agreement". The U.S. is under no obligation to
station forces in South Korea under the Treaty; it has
the right to do so if it determines that such action
would be in its national security interests.
3/ Of course, US operational control could be maintained
through some medium other than the UNC, if the GROK would
agree to it.
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2a
"United Nations forces" as that term is used in the UN SOFA
with Japan and a secret U.S.-Japan agreed minute of June 23, 1960.
The same result would obtain if ROK forces were removed
from UNC operational control, apart from any action taken
to terminate the UNC.
Six other nations maintain a military presence in Korea
known as the Military Liaison Group. 5/ The Thai contingent,
an infantry unit, is under the operational control of the
UNC. With the exception of a British Honor Guard the
military personnel contributed by the other countries in the
group are attached to the UNC as liaison.
Termination of the UNC would result in the loss of UNC,
and thus US, operational control over the Thai contingent,
as well as over ROK forces. In the event of a UNC termination,
or the removal of the Thai contingent from UNC operational
control, a question would arise whether the Thai contingent
continued to qualify as "United Nations forces in Korea".
An argument might be made that the Thai contingent would
continue to so qualify, on the ground that the RTA personnel
4/
For a discussion of the requirements that there be "UN
forces" in Korea if these agreements are to be operative,
see pages 6-8b of this section and section III below.
5/ As of May 31, 1971 these countries and their contributions
in men were:
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Thailand
168
United Kingdom
24
Canada
2
Australia
2
Ethiopia
3
Philippines
2
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2b
are in Korea pursuant to the Security Council resolutions
of June 25 and 27, 1950.
In construing the term "United Nations forces" as it is
used in the UN SOFA with Japan, the USG has consistently
taken the view that similar military liaison personnel
maintained in Japan by other countries are not "forces".
It would be very difficult to justify a different position
in relation to the liaison personnel in Korea. Therefore,
termination of the UNC, or removal of ROK forces and the
Thai contingent from UNC operational control, would create
a situation where the 168 man Thai contingent would be the
only force with an arguable claim to the label "United
Nations forces in Korea".
The UNC as a Party to the Armistice Agreement
The legal effect which termination of the UNC would
have on the Armistice Agreement is not clear. The
Armistice is an agreement between the three military
commanders to, inter alia, "enforce a complete cessation
of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under
their control
" (Article II, para. 12, Military
Armistice Agreement, July 27, 1953, TIAS 2782). Absent
some agreement with the other side, termination of the UNC
would raise the question whether any entity on our
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3
side was both obligated to enforce and capable of
enforcing the terms of the Armistice. The United States
and ROK could take the position that every government which
at the time of the Armistice had forces under the operational
control of the UNC was under a continuing legal obligation
to respect the Armistice even upon termination of the UNC.
Although this argument would have strong legal merit, the
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4
other side could contend with some justification that
upon termination of the UNC no entity on our side was clearly
bound by the Armistice Agreement. Acceptability to the
other side should, therefore, be an important factor in
any decision to terminate the UNC.
The other side would probably be most concerned with
ensuring continued ROK observance of the Armistice Agree-
ment. This has been ensured in the past through UNC
operational control over ROK forces. Upon termination of
the UNC, ROK forces would be formally constrained by the
terms of the Armistice only through Article I of the U.S. -ROK
Mutual Defense Treaty. 6/ In the context of its negotiating
history Article I clearly entails a commitment to the U.S.
by the ROK not to violate the Armistice. However, this is
only a commitment to the U.S., and not to the DPRK or the PRC.
Of course, all parties concerned know that UNC operational
control of ROK forces is little more than a legal formality.
Also, the USG and GROK would presumably take the position
6/ Article I obligates the ROK to refrain in its
international relations "from the threat or use of
force in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any
Party toward the United Nations."
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5
that they considered themselves bound by the Armistice
Agreement even upon termination of the UNC. But the
legal uncertainty which would be created by termination
of the UNC could give rise to attack by the PRC and DPRK,
and might be used as a pretext for a wide variety of
responses by the other side. Therefore, termination of
the UNC without first obtaining a clear indication from
both the PRC and the DPRK that this move would be
acceptable to them could have serious adverse consequences.
Representation on the MAC
Termination of the UNC would also raise the question
of representation on the MAC. The Armistice Agreement
provides in pertinent part:
"20. The Military Armistice Commission shall
be composed of ten (10) senior officers,
five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,
and five (5) of whom shall be appointed
jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers. Of the ten members,
three (3) from each side shall be of general
or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members
on each side may be major generals, brigadier
generals, colonels, or their equivalents."
(Article II, para. 20)
Paragraph 20 of the Armistice provides only for the appoint-
ment of representatives to the MAC by the Commander-in-
Chief of the UNC. It does not make provision for the situation
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6
which would result from termination of the UNC, where
there would no longer be any Commander-in-Chief of the
UNC. In the absence of an appropriate amendment to the
Armistice Agreement it would be unclear upon termination
where the power to appoint MAC representatives for our
side resided. 7/
Use of Japanese Facilities by U.S. Forces in Response
to an Attack from the North
Termination of the UNC would mean that U.S. forces
in Japan could not respond to an armed attack against the
ROK without first consulting with the GOJ.
An exchange of notes between then Secretary of State
Herter and Prime Minister Kishi concerning implementation
of Article VI of the 1960 U.S. - Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security (TIAS 4509) obligates the U.S.
Government to consult with the GOJ prior to using "facilities
7/
Article V, para. 61 of the Armistice describes
the means of amending the agreement: "Amendments
and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be
mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing
sides. "
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7
and areas in Japan as bases for military combat
operations
"
There is, however, a narrow exception to this obliga-
tion contained in a secret agreed minute, dated June 23,
1960 and included in the record of the Preparatory Meeting
of the Security Consultative Committee. That minute
reads in pertinent part, as follows:
"I have been authorized by Prime Minister
Kishi to state that it is the view of the
Japanese Government that, as an exceptional
measure in the event of an emergency
resulting from an attack against the United
Nations forces in Korea, facilities and areas
in Japan may be used for such military combat
operations as need be undertaken immediately
by the United States'armed forces in Japan
under the Unified Command of the United Nations
as the response to such an armed attack in order
to enable the United Nations forces in Korea to
repell an armed attack made in violation of
the Armistice.'
Thus, in order for U.S. forces to use Japanese
facilities for military combat operations without prior
consultation with the GOJ: (1) there must be an attack
8/
The Herter-Kishi note exchange referred to above
reads in pertinent part as follows:
"Major changes in the deployment into Japan of
United States armed forces, major changes in
their equipment, and the use of facilities and
areas in Japan as bases for military combat
operations to be undertaken from Japan other
than those conducted under Article V of the said
Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consulta-
tion with the Government of Japan.' (TIAS 4509)
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8
against the UN forces in Korea; (2) the facilities must be
used by U.S. forces in Japan "under the Unified Command
of the United Nations; and (3) the purpose of these
military combat operations must be to repell an armed
attack in violation of the Armistice.
Termination of the UNC as discussed above would create
a situation where the only "United Nations forces in Korea" --
if any -- would be the 168 man Thai contingent. The ROK
forces could no longer be considered UN forces since they
would no longer be under UNC operational control. And,
as noted earlier, the claim of the Thai contingent to be
UN forces in Korea would ,then rest only upon the authority
of the UN Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27,
1950. 9/
Whatever, the technical merits of an argument
Thai
that an attack on the / forces would be a sufficient
"attack against United Nations forces in Korea" to satisfy
the first prerequisite for invoking the secret minute, it
would be disingenuous in the extreme for the USG to justify a failure
this ground.
to consult the GOJ on / Therefore, any USG decision
regarding termination of the UNC should take account of
the practical consequences of no longer being able to
9/
See pp. 2-2b, above.
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8a
respond to an attack in Korea without first consulting
with the GOJ, pursuant to the 1960 secret minute. 10/
The UN SOFA with Japan
Termination of the UNC, or the removal of ROK and
Thai forces in Korea from UNC operational control, would
raise the question whether Article XXIV of the UN SOFA
with Japan becomes operable. Article XXIV requires that:
"All the United Nations forces shall be with-
drawn from Japan within ninety days after the
date by which all the United Nations forces
shall have been withdrawn from Korea
"
As indicated earlier, it might be argued that the Thai
contingent continues to qualify as "United Nations forces
in Korea" for purposes of 'the UN SOFA with Japan even in
the event of UNC termination or removal from UNC operational
control, on the ground that they are present in Korea
pursuant to the UN Security Council Resolutions of June 25
and 27, 1950. An argument could also be made that
Article XXIV of the UN SOFA is not triggered by anything
other than "withdrawal from Korea". But, at the minimum,
substantial uncertainty as to the legality of the continued
presence of UN forces in Japan would be engendered by
10/
Even in the absence of termination of the UNC
removal of ROK forces and the Thai contingent
LIBRAPY
from UNC operational control would raise the
same question regarding the secret minute.
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8b
termination of the UNC or the removal of ROK forces and
the Thai contingent in Korea from UNC operational control.
Although the only UN forces remaining in Japan are comprised
of a small RTAF contingent, the departure of that contingent
from Japan would have important consequences. 11/
Conclusion
The above discussion indicates that termination of
the UNC would have serious legal consequences. Under
present circumstances it would appear inadvisable for the
USG to seek termination of the UNC in the absence of an
over-all settlement of the Korean question.
Even if the UNC were'not terminated, many of the same
legal consequences would result from removal of the Thai
contingent and ROK forces from UNC operational control.
11/
See Section III, below.
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9
II.
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION
AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK)
Unlike the UNC, which was established by the U.S.
pursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution, UNCURK is
solely a creature of the UN, created by a UN General
Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 (UNGA Res. 376 (v))
UNCURK's principal mandate is to "represent the United
Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified,
independent and democratic government of all Korea" (Para. 2(a)).
Formal dissolution of UNCURK could only be accomplished
by a resolution of the UN General Assembly. Such dissolution
would have no legal implications in terms of the UN
presence in Korea and related questions.
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10
III. THE UN SOFA WITH JAPAN AND THE ACHESON-YOSHIDA
UNDERSTANDING -- WITHDRAWAL OF THE THAI CONTINGENT
If and when the RTAF contingent leaves Japan the UN
SOFA with Japan (TIAS 2995) will automatically terminate.
Termination of the UN SOFA will result in the termination
of a 1951 GOJ commitment, in an exchange of notes between
then Secretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida,
permitting UN members to support in Japan UN forces engaged
in UN action in the Far East.
Article XXV of the UN SOFA reads as follows:
"This Agreement and agreed revisions thereof
shall terminate on the date by which all the
United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from
Japan in accordance with the provisions of
Article XXIV. In case all the United Nations
forces have been withdrawn from Japan earlier
than such date, this Agreement and agreed
revisions thereof 'shall terminate on the date
when the withdrawal has been completed."
Article I, paragraph (d), defines "United Nations forces" as:
"Those forces of the land, sea or air armed
services of the sending State which are sent
to engage in action pursuant to the United
Nations Resolutions. "
Paragraph (c) of that same article defines "sending
State" as:
"Any State which has sent or may hereafter send
forces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations
Resolutions and whose Government is a Party to
this Agreement as the Government of a State
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11
sending forces to Korea pursuant to the United
Nations Resolutions. "
The Government of the United States is not a party to
the UN SOFA as the "Government of a State sending forces to
Korea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions. " Rather,
the UN SOFA was signed for the Government of the United
States acting as the "Unified Command. " Therefore, U.S.
forces in Japan are not "United Nations forces" within the
meaning of Article I, paragraph (d), of the UN SOFA. 12/
Of those States which acceded to the UN SOFA as
"sending States" only Thailand still maintains an operational
military unit in Japan. Since the USG has consistently
taken the view that the liaison groups maintained in Japan
by other countries are mt "forces" within the meaning of
the UN SOFA, the departure from Japan of the RTAF contingent
would result in the automatic termination of the UN SOFA
pursuant to the provisions of Article XXV.
In a September 8, 1951 exchange of notes between then
Secretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida, the
FOND
GOJ made the following commitment:
12/ The question whether U.S. forces in Japan may
be considered to be "under the Unified Command of
the United Nations" for purposes of the 1960 secret
minute regarding prior consultation with Japan raises
separate considerations See Johnson-Kriebel Memorandum
of December 13, 1971.
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12
If
If and when the forces of a member or
members of the United Nations are engaged in
any United Nations action in the Far East after
the Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan
will permit and facilitate the support in and
about Japan, by the member or members, of the
forces engaged in such United Nations action
"
(TIAS 2490)
A time limit was placed on the above commitment by a
January 19, 1960 exchange of notes between then Secretary
of State Herter and Prime Minister Kishi (TIAS 4509), in
which it was agreed that the 1951 Acheson-Yoshida note
exchange "will continue to be in force so long as the
Agreement Regarding Status of the United Nations Forces
in Japan remains in force. "
Withdrawal of the RTAF contingent would, therefore,
have the effect of leaving any future non-U.S. forces
nothing but Article 2, paragraph 5, of the UN Charter as a
basis for requesting use of Japanese facilities and areas
in support of UN operations in Korea. 13/
Neither the termination of the UN SOFA nor the termina-
tion of the Acheson-Yoshida understanding would affect the
U.S. military presence in Japan. U.S. forces are in Japan
13/ Article 2, paragraph 5 of the United Nations
Charter reads, in pertinent part: "All Members shall
give the United Nations every assistance in any
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter
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by virtue of Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual
Cooperation and Security (TIAS 4509) and agreements
concluded pursuant thereto. The status of U.S. forces in
Japan is governed by the 1960 U.S. - Japan SOFA (TIAS 4510) 14/
14/ The 1960 Herter-Kishi note exchange recognizes:
3. The use of the facilities and areas by the
U.S. armed forces under the Unified Command of the
United Nations established pursuant to the Security
Council Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their
status in Japan are governed by arrangements made
pursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security "
1080
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14
IV. SOUTH KOREAN REPRESENTATION ON THE KOREAN MILITARY
ARMISTICE COMMISSION (MAC)
This section considers the legal and related aspects
of the suggestion that a Korean officer be appointed
as Senior Member of the MAC and concludes that there is
no legal barrier to doing so, but that a number
of other factors should also be taken into consideration.
These factors suggest the desirability of resolving
this matter in the broader context of our general policy
with respect to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement
and machinery. Alternative means of strengthening the
ROK's participation in the MAC are described.
Background
In early June 1971 Amembassy Seoul suggested that
we name a Korean general officer as the Senior Member
of the U.N. side of the MAC -- apparently intended as
a first step toward withdrawal of the U.N. Command (UNC)
from Korea accompanied by a "delegation" to the ROK of
responsibility for maintaining the Armistice. Shortly
thereafter Major General Rogers, senior UNC
representative in the MAC, made the "personal suggestion"
that it might be desirable to appoint a Korean officer
as the Senior Member of the U.N. side of the MAC. Subsequently,
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15
the Korean Prime Minister reported to the National Assembly
that if the UNC would accept a Korean as Senior Member,
the ROK would name an officer to the position.
Legal Considerations and Related Aspects
The MAC was created by the Korean Armistice "to
supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement
and to settle through negotiations any violation of
para. 20).
this Armistice Agreement. (Article II, / Under the Agreement,
five senior officers are appointed by each side. For
the UNC, the Senior Member has always been an American;
in addition, there are two Koreans, one Commonwealth
member (always British) and one member on a rotating
basis from among the Military Liaison Group (U.K.,
Thailand, Canada, Australia, Ethiopia, Philippines).
Neither the Armistice Agreement nor any subsequent
arrangement expressly deals with the question of
paragraph 20
eligibility for appointment as Senior Member. Article II,/
of the Armistice Agreement provides only that:
"The Military Armistice Commission
shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers,
five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the
Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and
five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by
the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army
and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
Of the ten members, three (3) from each side
shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2)
remaining members on each side may be major
generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their
equivalents." (Emphasis added)
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The Report of the Unified Command on the Armistice
in Korea transmitted to the U.N. Security Council on
August 7, 1953 U.N. Document S/3079 August 7, 1953
interpreted this provision as establishing "A Military
Armistice Commission,
composed of military officers
of the United Nations Command (emphasis added) and the
communist forces " (Chapter III(C) (2) [6]) This might
be read to preclude ROK officers from serving on the
MAC since ROK forces are merely under the "operational
control" of the UNC. ROK forces are not formally a
part of the UNC.
The more plausible reading of paragraph 20 of the
Armistice Agreement is that the power of appointment
must remain in the U.N. Command ("shall be appointed
by"), but that the only qualifications for membership
are the "rank" requirements for "each side". A similar
use of "side" in the recommendation in Article IV, para 60
"to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides"
that a political conference be held, was understood to include both
the U.N. and ROK after a statement to that effect for
the record by the U.N. Command Negotiator Admiral Joy.
Thus, so long as the appointment is made by the U.N.
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BERALD
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17
Command, the only legal restriction on a ROK appointee
would be rank.
It seems unwise to consider in isolation the suggestion
that a Korean officer be appointed as Senior Member of
the U.N. side of the MAC. Rather, this suggestion should
be viewed in the broader context of our general policy
with respect to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement
and machinery.
The MAC provides the only direct channel of
communication between the U.S. and North Korea.
It is also the only forum presently available for direct
communication between the PRC, the U.S., the DPRK and
the ROK. Particularly in time of emergency, the MAC
offers us a means of rapid communication with Pyongyang.
Moreover, it could serve as a forum for serious
discussions aimed at a settlement in Korea.
If it is decided that we should consider
ways of strengthening the ROK role in the MAC machinery,
achievement of this objective may be possible without
committing ourselves irrevocably to the
principal that a South Korean must serve as Senior
Member. There would be no legal impediment to more
flexible arrangements on the U.N. side which would
accommodate the interest of retaining for the U.S.
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18
a measure of control of the MAC machinery, as well as
the interest of permitting a greater ROK role. For
example, it may be possible to give the ROK representatives
on the UNC side of the MAC a greater share of the
responsibility. This might include chairing the UNC
delegation at MAC meetings from time to time. Alternatively,
one of the South Korean senior officers might even share
the responsibilities of Senior Member with the U.S. officer
serving as Senior Member -- nothing in the Armistice
machinery precludes such a sharing arrangement.
SEGRET
TUND
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19
V.
DEACTIVATION OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS
SUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC)
It has been proposed that the USG take steps to
"quietly deactivate" the NNSC by suggesting to the
Swiss and Swedish Governments that their delegations
on the NNSC not be replaced, and by terminating the
logistic support currently being provided to their
delegations. This section concludes that there are
legal and other difficulties with the proposal to
deactivate the NNSC (although steps might be taken to
reduce the current level of logistic support provided
to the Swiss and Swedish delegations on the NNSC), and
that we should in any event be cautions about undermining
the NNSC machinery at this point in time.
Background
The NNSC was established under the 1953 Korean
Armistice Agreement to carry out supervision, observation,
inspection and investigation functions on both sides
of the demilitarized zone (but not within the DMZ). It
was intended to serve as one of the principal organs
for implementing the Agreement. Article II, para. 37 of
the Agreement provides that the NNSC shall be composed
1980
of four senior officers, two appointed by United Nations
SECRET
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20
Command (UNC) nominees, namely Sweden and Switzerland,
and two appointed by Korean People's Army/Chinese
People's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) nominees, namely Poland
and Czechoslovakia.
From the outset, the NNSC ran into difficulties:
the UNC charged that the North was violating the
Agreement by using other ports of entry for men and
equipment than those where NNSC teams were stationed;
the ROK was strongly opposed to the presence of the
Czechs and Poles on its soil; and internally, the NNSC
was rarely able to agree on any report.
During 1956 and 1955 the Swiss and Swedish Governments
made efforts to have the NNSC liquidated, or if that were
not acceptable to the signatories of the Armistice
Agreement, then a substantial reduction in the size of
the NNSC. The Chinese Government opposed the liquidation
of the NNSC but agreed to a reduction in its size.
At the 70th MAC, on May 31, 1956 the UNC announced
its decision to suspend the activities of the NNSC's
teams south of the DMZ, citing Communist violations
of the Armistice Agreement. These teams moved into
the DMZ and the KPA/CPV vigorously denounced the UNC's
action. Shortly thereafter the NNSC teams in the north
also withdrew to the DMZ.
SEGRET
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21
Since June, 1956 the activities of the NNSC have
been confined to the DMZ and limited to evaluating
personnel reports submitted by the UNC and personnel
and combat materiel reports submitted by the KPA/CPV.
The question of the future of the NNSC was reviewed
by the Department of State in 1960 and 1962, and on
each occasion it was decided to reaffirm support for
the NNSC.
In favor of deactivating the NNSC, it is argued
that: the NNSC has provided no support and has consistently
refused to investigate UNC violation reports or even
forward such complaints to the MAC; neither the Swiss
nor Swedish members have provided any useful information
on conditions in North Korea; the NNSC has not had any
measurable impact on the social sphere; it is difficult
to give the NNSC any credit for maintaining the cease-
fire; quiet deactivation would remove a point of friction
rather than an opportunity for accommodation; any
propaganda attacks by North Korea would be tolerable
and have little significant impact; and the Swiss and
Swedes would welcome such a U.S. initiative.
SECRET
10RD
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22
Formal Termination VS. "Quiet Deactivation"
Formal termination of the NNSC would appear to require
an amendment to the Armistice Agreement (which under
Article V, para. 61 requires mutual agreement by the
Commanders of the opposing sides), or at least approval
by the MAC. In either case, KPA/CPV concurrence would
be required. We should assume on the basis of the past
would
record that they / oppose termination. (At the 1954
Geneva Conference the Chinese representative, Chou En-lai,
exhibited particular fervor in praising the role played
by the NNSC, in advancing the proposal of a similar
international body to supervise free elections in Korea.)
The NNSC's "quiet deactivation" would be extremely
difficult to justify publicly, particularly in light
of the legal rationale' for the action we took in 1956
suspending the NNSC activities south of the DMZ. That
justification was based on the need to take "only such
steps as are indispensable to protection of its [the UNC's] rights
under the Armistice Agreement." The other side
does not appear to have taken action since 1954 with
respect to the NNSC which we could readily invoke as
the basis for further action on our part to protect
our legitimate interests under the Armistice Agreement.
SECRET
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23
An argument could, of course, be advanced that the NNSC
has become an anachronistic facade, but we would be
vulnerable to criticism since this situation was quite
apparent in 1956.
"Perhaps the most significant consideration in any
decision to seek deactivation of the NNSC is the possible
impact of such a decision on the existing political
situation. In 1960 then Ambassador Marshall Green
viewed this consideration as decisive in his recommendation
"to leave the present setup unchanged at this time. "
He reasoned:
"I said I could well understand his [the
Swiss representative's] feelings of boredom
and frustration in having to serve with the NNSC
but that I did not think we were prepared to
regard the organization as useless. Some
maintain that NNSC, by representing an inter-
national presence along the DMZ, helps in some
small way to maintain peace in this troubled divided
country. I added that in my opinion a more
important consideration is the desirability of
making no alterations in the present structure
for maintaining peace in Korea; that a withdrawal
of the NNSC or a change in its national composition
would lead to unfounded beliefs that some new
elements were present in the political situation.
Resulting speculation could likewise produce
considerable uneasiness over what NNSC withdrawal
might portend. There seemed to be considerable
virtue at this time in keeping the situation
stabilized as far as possible. I added that the
relatively small cost involved in maintaining the
NNSC seemed a small price to pay for this benefit,
but that if the cost factor were an important
FORD
ENVODIT
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24
consideration, then I would hope economies might
be effected in the NNSC operation itself (such
as reduced numbers) rather than closing out the
NNSC operation. It would nevertheless seem
wisest to leave the present setup unchanged at
this time. "
Ambassador Green's reasoning seems equally pertinent
today. In light of the recent interest in the Armistice
machinery by the other side, it seems unwise for us now
to embark upon an initiative to undermine the NNSC.
It seems safe to assume that the other side would react
unfavorably, and this might lead to further "unraveling"
of the Armistice machinery. If the Swiss and Swedes
terminate their participation in the NNSC, the Czechs
and Poles might stay on as a "rump" commission. This
could be a continuing source of embarrassment. Also,
the NNSC may well find it can play a positive role in
the future, perhaps by floating proposals to both sides -- Article II
paragraph 49 of the Armistice Agreement gives the NNSC
authority to make recommendations to the MAC with
respect to "amendment or additions" to the Agreement.
FUND
L/EA/RIStarr;OTJohnson/cdj;cbf
1/4/72 X23039
SECRET
VII
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE
376 (V). The problem of the independence of
and democratic government in the sovereign State of
Korea
Korea;
The General Assembly,
(c) All sections and representative bodies of the
population of Korea, South and North, be invited to
Having regard to its resolutions of 14 November
co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in
1947 (112 (II)), of 12 December 1948 (195 (III))
the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and
and of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)),
in the establishment of a unified government;
Having received and considered the report1 of the
(d) United Nations forces should not remain in
United Nations Commission on Korea,
any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary
Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in
for achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraphs
the resolutions referred to above have not been fully
(a) and (b) above;
accomplished and, in particular, that the unification
(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish
of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt
the economic rehabilitation of Korea;
has been made by an armed attack from North Korea
to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic
2. Resolves that
of Korea,
(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile,
Recalling the General Assembly declaration of 12
Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Tur-
December 1948 that there has been established a lawful
key, to be known as the United Nations Commission
government (the Government of the Republic of Korea)
for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be
having effective control and jurisdiction over that part
established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exer-
of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Com-
cised by the present United Nations Commission on
mission on Korea was able to observe and consult and
Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing
in which the great majority of the people of Korea
about the establishment of a unified, independent and
reside; that this government is based on elections
democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such
which were a valid expression of the free will of the
responsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabili-
electorate of that part of Korea and which were ob-
tation in Korea as may be determined by the General
served by the Temporary Commission; and that this
Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the
is the only such government in Korea,
Economic and Social Council. The United Nations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of
Having in mind that United Nations armed forces
Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out
are at present operating in Korea in accordance with
its functions as soon as possible;
the recommendations² of the Security Council of 27
June 1950, subsequent to its resolution³ of 25 June
(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of_the United
1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabili-
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as- may be
tation of Korea, the governments of the States repre-
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore in-
sented on the Commission should form an Interim
ternațional peace and security in the area,
Committee composed of representatives meeting at the
seat of the United Nations to consult with and advise
Recalling that the essential objective of the resolu-
the United Nations Unified Command in the light of
tions of the General Assembly referred to above was
the above recommendations; the Interim Committee
the establishment of a unified, independent and demo-
should begin to function immediately upon the approval
cratic Government of Korea,
of the present resolution by the General Assembly;
1. Recommends that
(c) The Commission shall render a report to the
(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure condi-
next regular session of the General Assembly and to
tions of stability throughout Korea;
any prior special session which might be called to con-
(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the
sider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and
holding of elections, under the auspices of the United
shall render such interim reports as it may deem appro-
Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent
priate to the Secretary-General for transmission to
Members;
1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session,
The General Assembly furthermore,
Supplement No. 16.
2 See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year,
Mindful of the fact that at the end of the present
No. 16.
hostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean econ-
3 Ibid., No. 15.
omy will be of great magnitude,
9
82 (1950). Resolution of 25 June 1950
82 (1950). Résolution du 25 juin 1950
[S/1501]
[S/1501]
The Security Council,
Le Conseil de sécurité,
Recalling the finding of the General Assembly in its
Rappelant les conclusions que l'Assemblée générale a
resolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Govern-
formulées dans sa résolution 293 (IV) du 21 octobre
ment of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established
1949, à savoir que le Gouvernement de la République
government having effective control and jurisdiction over
de Corée est un gouvernement légitime qui exerce
that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary
effectivement son autorité et sa juridiction sur la partie
Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult
de la Corée où la Commission temporaire des Nations
and in which the great majority of the people of Korea
Unies pour la Corée a été en mesure de procéder à des
reside; that this Government is based on elections which
òbservations et à des consultations et dans laquelle réside
were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate
la grande majorité de la population de la Corée; que
of that part of Korea and which were observed by the
ce gouvernement est né d'élections qui ont été l'expression
Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such
valable de la libre volonté du corps électoral de cette
Government in Korea,
partie de la Corée et qui ont été observées par la Commis-
sion temporaire; et que ledit gouvernement est le seul
qui, en Corée, possède cette qualité,
Mindful of the concern expressed by the General
Conscient de ce que l'Assemblée générale, dans ses
Assembly in its resolutions 195 (III) of 12 December
résolutions 195 (III) du 12 décembre 1948 et 293 (IV)
1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the conse-
du 21 octobre 1949, s'inquiète des conséquences que
quences which might follow unless Member States
pourraient avoir des actes préjudiciables aux résultats
refrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to
que cherchent à obtenir les Nations Unies en vue de
be achieved by the United Nations in bringing about
l'indépendance et de l'unité complètes de la Corée et
the complete independence and unity of Korea; and
invite les Etats Membres à s'abstenir d'actes de cette
the concern expressed that the situation described by
nature; et conscient de ce que l'Assemblée générale
the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report
craint que la situation décrite par la Commission dans
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of
son rapport ne menace la sûreté et le bien-être de la
Korea and of the people of Korea and might lead to
République de Corée et du peuple coréen et ne risque
open military conflict there,
de conduire à un véritable conflit armé en Corée,
Noting with grave concern the armed attack on the
Prenant acte de l'attaque dirigée contre la République
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,
de Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée du Nord,
attaque qui le préoccupe gravement,
Determines that this action constitutes a breach of the
Constate que cette action constitue une rupture de
peace; and
la paix; et
I
I
Calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;
Demande la cessation immédiate des hostilités
Calls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw
Invite les autorités de la Corée du Nord à retirer immé-
forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;
diatement leurs forces armées sur le 38e parallèle;
II
II
Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea:
Prie la Commission des Nations Unies pour la Corée:
(a) To communicate its fully considered recom-
a) De communiquer, après mûr examen et dans le
mendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
plus bref délai possible, ses recommandations au sujet
de la situation;
(b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces
b) D'observer le retrait des forces de la Corée du Nord
to the 38th parallel;
sur le 38e parallèle;
(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the
c) De tenir le Conseil de sécurité au courant de
execution of this resolution;
l'exécution de la présente résolution;
III
III
Calls upon all Member States to render every assistance
Invite tous les Etats Membres à prêter leur entier
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution
concours à l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour
See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15,
Voir Procès-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sécurité, cinquième
473rd meeting, p. 2, footnote 2 (document S/1496, incorporating
année, n° 15, 473ᵉ séance, p. 2, note 2 (document S/1496) et docu-
S/1496/Corr.1).
ment S/1496/Corr.1 (miméographié) figurant quant au fond dans
la déclaration du Président, p. 3 et 4 de la même séance.
LIBRARY
4
and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean
l'exécution de la présente résolution et à s'abstenir de
authorities.
venir en aide aux autorités de la Corée du Nord.
Adopted at the 473rd meeting
Adoptée à la 473ᵉ séance par
by 9 votes to none, with 1
9 voix contre zéro, avec une
abstention (Yugoslaria).
abstention ( Yougoslavie 10,
83 (1950). Resolution of 27 June 1950
83 (1950). Résolution du 27 juin 1950
[S/1511]
[S/1511]
The Security Council,
Le Conseil de sécurité,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the
Ayant constaté que l'attaque dirigée contre la Répu-
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes
blique de Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée
a breach of the peace,
du Nord constitue une rupture de la paix,
Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
Ayant demandé la cessation immédiate des hostilités,
Having called upon the authorities in North Korea to
Ayant invité les autorités de la Corée du Nord à retirer
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel,
immédiatement leurs forces armées sur le 38ᵉ parallèle,
Having noted from the report of the United Nations
Ayant constaté, d'après le rapport de la Commission
Commission on Korea 11 that the authorities in North
des Nations Unies pour la Corée 11, que les autorités de
Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their
la Corée du Nord n'ont ni suspendu les hostilités, ni
armed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military
retiré leurs forces armées sur le 38e parallèle, et qu'il faut
measures are required to restore international peace and
prendre d'urgence des mesures militaires pour rétablir la
security,
paix et la sécurité internationales,
Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea
Ayant pris acte de l'appel adressé aux Nations Unies
to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps
par la République de Corée, qui demande que des
to sccure peace and security,
mesures efficaces soient prises immédiatement pour
garantir la paix et la sécurité,
Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
Recommande aux Membres de l'Organisation des
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
Nations Unies d'apporter à la République de Corée
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
toute l'aide nécessaire pour repousser les assaillants et
international peace and security in the area.
rétablir dans cette région la paix et la sécurité interna-
tionales.
Adopted at the 474th meeting
Adoptée à la 474e séance par
by 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia).
7 voix contre une (Yougo-
slavie) 12.
84 (1950). Resolution of 7 July 1950
84 (1950). Résolution du 7 juillet 1950
[S/1588]
[S/1588]
The Security Council,
Le Conseil de sécurité,
Having determined that the armed attack upon the
Ayant constaté que l'attaque dirigée contre la Répu-
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes
blique de Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée
a breach of the peace,
du Nord constitue une rupture de la paix,
Having recommended that Members of the United
Ayant recommandé aux Membres de l'Organisation
Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of
des Nations Unies d'apporter à la République de Corée
Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack
toute l'aide nécessaire pour repousser les assaillants et
and to restore international peace and security in the
rétablir dans cette région la paix et la sécurité inter-
area,
nationales,
10 One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.
10 Undes membres (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques)
était absent.
11 Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16,
11 Procès-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sécurité, cinquième année.
474th meeting, p. 2 (document S/1507).
n° 16, 474e séance, p. 2 (document S/ 1507).
11 Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting;
12 Deux des membres (Egypte, Inde) n'ont pas participe au vote:
one member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.
un des membres (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques)
était absent.
5
1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which
1. Se félicite oe l'appui rapide et vigoureux que les
Governments and peoples of the United Nations have
gouvernements et les peuples des Nations Unies ont
given to its resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25
apporté à ses résolutions 82 (1950) et 83 (1950) des 25
and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in
et 27 juin 1950 en vue d'aider la République de Corée à
defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore
se défendre contre ladite attaque armée, et ainsi rétablir
international peace and security in the area;
la paix et la sécurité internationales dans la région;
2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have
2. Prend acte de ce que des Membres de l'Organisation
transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance
des Nations Unies ont transmis à celle-ci des offres
for the Republic of Korea;
d'assistance à la République de Corée;
3. Recommends that all Members providing military
3. Recommande que tous les Membres fournissant en
forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid
application des résolutions précitées du Conseil de
Security Council resolutions make such forces and other
sécurité des forces militaires et toute autre assistance
assistance available to a unified command under the
mettent ces forces et cette assistance à la disposition d'un
United States of America;
commandement unifié sous l'autorité des Etats-Unis
d'Amérique;
4. Requests the United States to designate the comman-
4. Prie les Etats-Unis de désigner le commandant en
der of such forces;
chef de ces forces;
5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion
5. Autorise le commandement unifié à utiliser à sa
to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations
discrétion, au cours des opérations contre les forces de
against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags
la Corée du Nord, le drapeau des Nations Unies en
of the various nations participating;
même temps que les drapeaux des diverses nations
participantes;
6. Requests the United States to provide the Security
6. Prie les Etats-Unis de fournir au Conseil de sécurité
Council with reports as appropriate on the course of
des rapports d'importance et de fréquence appropriées
action taken under the unified command.
concernant le déroulement de l'action entreprise sous
l'autorité du commandement unifié.
Adopted at the 476th meeting
Adoptée à la 476ᵉ séance par
by 7 votes to none, with 3
7 voix contre zéro, avec 3 ubs-
abstentions (Egypt, India,
tentions (Egypte, Inde, Yougo-
Yugoslavia).¹³
slavie) 13,
85 (1950). Resolution of 31 July 1950
85 (1950). Résolution du 31 juillet 1950
[S/1657]
[S/1657]
The Security Council,
Le Conseil de sécurité,
Recognizing the hardships and privations to which
Conscient des épreuves et des privations qu'impose
the people of Korea are being subjected as a result of
au peuple coréen la poursuite de l'attaque illégale déclen-
the continued prosecution by the North Korean forces
chée par les forces de la Corée du Nord,
of their unlawful attack,
Appreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to
Accueillant avec reconnaissance les offres d'aide au
the Korean people which have been made by Govern-
peuple coréen faites spontanément par des gouvernements,
ments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental
des institutions spécialisées et des organisations non
organizations,
gouvernementales.
1. Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsi-
1. Prie le Commandement unifié de se charger de
bility for determining the requirements for the relief and
déterminer les secours et l'aide dont la population civile
support of the civilian population of Korea and for esta-
de la Corée a besoin et d'organiser sur place la répar-
blishing in the field the procedures for providing such
tition de ces secours et de cette aide;
relief and support;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit all
2. Prie le Secrétaire général de transmettre au Comman-
offers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified
dement unifié toutes les offres de secours et d'aide;
Command:
3. Requests the Unified Command to provide the
3. Prie le Commandement unifié d'adresser au Conseil
Security Council with reports, as appropriate, on its
de sécurité, toutes les fois qu'il le jugera utile, des rapports
relief activities;
sur l'œuvre qu'il aura accomplie dans le domaine des
secours;
FORD
13 One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wasabsent.
13 Un des membres (Union des Républiques socialistes sorié-
tiques) était absent.
6
10
General Assembly-Fifth Session
3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in
Reaffirming the importance of the exercise by the
consultation with the specialized agencies, to develop
Security Council of its primary responsibility for the
plans for relief and rehabilitation on Le termination of
maintenance of international peace and security, and
hostilities and to report to the General Assembly within
the duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity
three weeks³ of the adoption of the present resolution
and to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,
by the General Assembly;
Reaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the
4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Coun-
agreements for armed forces provided for in Article
cil to expedite the study of long-term measures to
43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and
promote the economic development and social progress
desiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such
of Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the
agreements, the United Nations has at its disposal
authorities which decide requests for technical assistance
means for maintaining international peace and security,
to the urgent and special necessity of affording such
assistance to Korea;
Conscious that failure of the Security Council to dis-
charge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member
5. Expresses its appreciation of the services ren-
States, particularly those responsibilities referred to in
dered by the members of the United Nations Commis-
the two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member
sion on Korea in the performance of their important
States of their obligations or the United Nations of its
and difficult task;
responsibility under the Charter to maintain inter-
6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the
national peace and security,
United Nations Commission for the Unification and
Recognizing in particular that such failure does not
Rehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facili-
deprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it
ties, including technical advisers as required; and
authorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses
of its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to
and per diem of a representative and alternate from
the maintenance of international peace and security,
each of the States members of the Commission.
Recognizing that discharge by the General Assembly
294th plenary meeting,
of its responsibilities in these respects calls for possi-
7 October 1950.
bilities of observation which would ascertain the facts
and expose aggressors; for the existence of armed
forces which could be used collectively; and for the
377 (V). Uniting for peace
possibility of timely recommendation by the General
A
Assembly to Members of the United Nations for collec-
The General Assembly,
tive action which, to be effective, should be prompt,
Recognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the
A
United Nations are:
"To maintain international peace and security, and
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of
to that end: to take effective collective measures for
lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to
the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other
of international peace and security in any case where
breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful
there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the
means, and in conformity with the principles of jus-
peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall
tice and international law, adjustment or settlement
consider the matter immediately with a-view to making
of international disputes or situations which might
appropriate recommendations to Members for collec-
lead to a breach of the peace", and
tive measures, including in the case of a breach of the
peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when
"To develop friendly relations among nations based
necessary, to maintain or restore international peace
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
and security. If not in session at the time, the General
determination of peoples, and to take other appropri-
Assembly may meet in emergency special session within
ate measures to strengthen universal peace",
twenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emer-
Reaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all
gency special session shall be called if requested by the
Members of the United Nations, when involved in an
Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or
international dispute, to seek settlement of such a dis-
by a majority of the Members of the United Nations;
pute by peaceful means through the procedures laid
2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its
down in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the
successful achievements of the United Nations in this
rules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present
resolution;
regard on a number of previous occasions,
Finding that international tension exists on a danger-
B
ous scale,
Recalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled "Essen-
3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission
tials of peace", which states that disregard of the Prin-
which, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be
ciples of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily
composed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colem-
responsible for the continuance of international tension,
bia, Czechoslovakia. France, India, Iraq, Israel, New
and desiring to contribute turther to the objectives of
Zealand. Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Social-
that resolution,
ist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, the United States of America
3a See resolution 410 (V), page 31.
and Uruguay, and which could observe and report on
RESOLUTIONS
adopted by the General Assembly during the period
16 December 1950 to 5 November 1951
I
VERIFICATION OF CREDENTIALS
On behalf of the Credentials Committee,' its Chairman made a report² to
the General Assembly. The Assembly took note of the report.
332nd plenary meeting,
5 November 1951.
H
RESOLUTIONS
498 (V). Intervention of the Central People's Govern-
3. Affirms the determination of the United Nations
ment of the People's Republic of China in
to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression ;
Korea
4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue
(Resolution adopted on the report of the
to lend every assistance to the United Nations action
First Committee)
in Korea ;
5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain
The General Assembly,
from giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea ;
Noting that the Security Council, because of lack of
6. Requests a Committee composed of the members
unanimity of the permanent members, has failed to
of the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance
urgency to consider additional measures to be employed
of international peace and security in regard to Chinese
to meet this aggression and to report thereon to the
Communist intervention in Korea,
General Assembly, it being understood that the
Noting that the Central People's Government of the
Committee is authorized to defer its report if the Good
People's Republic of China has not accepted United
Offices Committee referred to in the following paragraph
Nations proposals3 to bring about a cessation of hosti-
reports satisfactory progress in its efforts
litics in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and
7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the
that its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea
United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities
and their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces
in Korea and the achievement of United Nations
there,
objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests
1. Finds that the Central People's Government of
the President of the General Assembly to designate
the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid
forthwith two persons who would meet with him at
and assistance to those who were already committing
any suitable opportunity to use their good offices to
aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities
this end.
against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged
327th plenary meeting,
in aggression in Korea ;
1 February 1951.
2. Calls upon the Central People's Government of
the People's Republic of China to cause its forces and
nationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United
Nations forces and to withdraw from Korea ;
The President of the Generai Assembly, on 19 Feb-
ruary 1951, informed (A/1779) the members of the
3 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth
General Assembly that Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico)
Sesssion, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), page 1.
and Mr. Sven Grafstrom (Sweden) had accepted his
2Sec document A/1936.
invitation to form with him the Good Offices Commit-
a See documents A/C.1/643 and A/C.1/645.
tee, as provided in the above resolution.
USA
1
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"ocrText": "The original documents are located in Box 35, folder \"Korea-UN Command (Working File)\n(2)\" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford\nPresidential Library.\nCopyright Notice\nThe copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of\nphotocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United\nStates of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.\nWorks prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public\ndomain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to\nremain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid\ncopyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.\nDigitized from Box 35 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library\n1\nLEGAL ASPECTS OF THE UN PRESENCE IN KOREA\nINTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY\nThe UN presence in Korea, a reaction to the conflict\nwhich broke out on that peninsula in 1950, derives from\nthree resolutions of the UN Security Council and two\nresolutions of the General Assembly. (Reproduced in the\nAppendix). In chronological order these are:\n(1) Security Council Resolution 82 of\nJune 25, 1950. This resolution, inter alia,\ncalled for the withdrawal of North Korean\nforces to the 38th parallel and called upon\nUN Member States \"to render every assistance\nto the United Nations in the execution of this\nresolution and to refrain from giving assistance\nto the North Korean authorities. \"\n(2) Security Council Resolution 83 of June 27,\n1950. This resolution recommended that UN\nMembers \"furnish such assistance to the Republic\nof Korea as may be necessary to repeal the armed\nattack and to restore international peace and\nLIBRAR\nsecurity in the area.\"\n(3) Security Council Resolution 84 of July 7,\n1950. This resolution recommends that Members\nproviding forces pursuant to the above two resolu-\ntions make those forces available to \"a unified\nii\ncommand under the United States of America\",\nand requests the U.S. to \"designate the com-\nmander of such forces\".\n(4) General Assembly Resolution 376 (V)\nof October 7, 1950. This resolution established\nthe United Nations Commission for the Unification\nand Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK).\n(5) General Assembly Resolution 498(V) of\nFebruary 1, 1951. This is the resolution which,\ninter alia, found that the PRC engaged in aggression\nin Korea. It also called upon \"all States and\nauthorities to continue to lend every assistance\nto the United Nations action in Korea. \"\nFor our purposes, the most important resolutions are\nof\nthose/the Security Council, particularly resolution 84\nThis resolution provided the authority for the United\nNations Command (UNC) in Korea.\nChanges in the nature of the UN presence in Korea may have\nimportant legal implication elsewhere in the complex net-\nwork of arrangements that has developed in relation to\nKorea over the last two decades. This paper attempts to\niii\ndescribe the implications which it is most important to\nand related aspects.\ntake account of in considering changes in the UN presence/\nThe main issues addressed in this paper, and the\ngeneral conclusions reached, are as follows:\n(1) Termination of the UNC. Termination\nwould have serious legal consequences in terms\nof the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the 1954 UN\nSOFA with Japan and a 1960 U.S. Japan secret\nunderstanding regarding the use of Japanese\nbases, and under present circumstances it would\nappear inadvisable for the USG to seek termina-\ntion of the UNC in the absence of an over-all\nsettlement of the Korean question. Even if the\nUNC were not terminated, many of the same legal\nconsequences would result from removal of the\nThai contingent and ROK forces from UNC opera-\ntional control.\n(2) UNCURK. Termination of UNCURK would have\nno legal implications in terms of the UN\npresence in Korea and related questions.\n(3) The UN SOFA with Japan and the Acheson-Yoshida\nUnderstanding -- Withdrawal of the Thai Contingent.\nFOND\nThe departure of the Thai military contingent\niv\nfrom Japan would result in the termination of\nthe UN SOFA with Japan, which in turn would\ncause the termination of a 1951 USG-GOJ under-\nstanding (the Acheson-Yoshida understanding)\nregarding use of Japanese facilities and areas\nby UN members in support of UN operations in Korea.\n(4) South Korean Representative on the Korean\nMilitary Armistice Commission (MAC). Although there\nis probably no legal barrier to appointing a\nROK general as Senior Member on the UNC side\nof the MAC, such a move might unnecessarily\nsacrifice advantages for the U.S. in the\npresent procedure. There are alternative\nways of strengthening the ROK role in the MAC\nmachinery.\n(5) Deactivation of the Neutral Nations Super-\nvisory Commission (NNSC). There are legal and\nother difficulties with the proposal to deactivate\nthe NNSC.\nFUND\nL:L/EA:RIStarr:OTJohnson:cdj:1/6/72 X 23039\nSECRET\nI.\nTERMINATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC)\nThe UNC was established by the United States pursuant\nto Security Council resolution 84 of July 7, 1950\nrecommending that members providing military forces in\nKorea make those forces available to \"a unified command\nunder the United States\". We examine here the legal\nimplications of terminating the UNC.\nMechanics of Termination\nThe mechanics of terminating the UNC are rather simple.\nThe UN Security Council could repeal the July 7, 1950\nresolution, or it could repeal that part of the resolution\n(paragraph 3) which authorized a unified command under\nthe United States. Even in the absence of such a Security\nCouncil decision, the USG could unilaterally terminate\nthe UNC by reporting to the UN Security Council, pursuant\nto paragraph 6 of the July 7, 1950 resolution\nthat the USG would no longer serve as the unified\n1/\ncommand provided for by paragraph 3 of that same resolution.\n1/\nSee page 2.\nFOED\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3\nb\nH/03\nState Dept Guidelines\nBy\nNARA, Date\nSECRET\nSEGRET\n2\nThe UNC and UN Forces in Korea\nThe legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in\nKorea is the U.S. ROK Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 (TIAS\n2/\n3097)\n, not any UN resolution. Therefore, the termination\nof the UNC would in no way affect the legal basis for that\npresence. The status of US forces in Korea is governed by our\n1967 Status of Forces Agreement with the ROK (TIAS 6127).\nNeither is the presence of ROK forces in Korea dependent\nupon any UN resolution. However, they are considered UN forces\nin Korea becuase they are under the operational control of the\nCommander in Chief, UN Command (CINCUNC). Termination of the\nUNC would result in the loss of UNC, and thus US, operational\ncontrol, over ROK forces. Upon termination of the UNC, ROK forces\nwould no longer be\n1/\nTechnically, it would be possible for the United States\nto eliminate the UNC from the U.S. command structure without\neschewing its responsibilities as the unified command\npursuant to the July 7, 1950 Security Council resolution.\nThis would merely constitute a formalistic change in the\nname given to the UN military presence in Korea and would\nnot have any of the substantive legal implications that\nwould flow from elimination of the UNC as discussed above.\n2/ Article IV of the Treaty gives the U.S. \"the right to\ndispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about\nthe territory of the Republic of Korea, as determined by\nmutual agreement\". The U.S. is under no obligation to\nstation forces in South Korea under the Treaty; it has\nthe right to do so if it determines that such action\nwould be in its national security interests.\n3/ Of course, US operational control could be maintained\nthrough some medium other than the UNC, if the GROK would\nagree to it.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n2a\n\"United Nations forces\" as that term is used in the UN SOFA\nwith Japan and a secret U.S.-Japan agreed minute of June 23, 1960.\nThe same result would obtain if ROK forces were removed\nfrom UNC operational control, apart from any action taken\nto terminate the UNC.\nSix other nations maintain a military presence in Korea\nknown as the Military Liaison Group. 5/ The Thai contingent,\nan infantry unit, is under the operational control of the\nUNC. With the exception of a British Honor Guard the\nmilitary personnel contributed by the other countries in the\ngroup are attached to the UNC as liaison.\nTermination of the UNC would result in the loss of UNC,\nand thus US, operational control over the Thai contingent,\nas well as over ROK forces. In the event of a UNC termination,\nor the removal of the Thai contingent from UNC operational\ncontrol, a question would arise whether the Thai contingent\ncontinued to qualify as \"United Nations forces in Korea\".\nAn argument might be made that the Thai contingent would\ncontinue to so qualify, on the ground that the RTA personnel\n4/\nFor a discussion of the requirements that there be \"UN\nforces\" in Korea if these agreements are to be operative,\nsee pages 6-8b of this section and section III below.\n5/ As of May 31, 1971 these countries and their contributions\nin men were:\nFORD\nThailand\n168\nUnited Kingdom\n24\nCanada\n2\nAustralia\n2\nEthiopia\n3\nPhilippines\n2\nSECRET\n2b\nare in Korea pursuant to the Security Council resolutions\nof June 25 and 27, 1950.\nIn construing the term \"United Nations forces\" as it is\nused in the UN SOFA with Japan, the USG has consistently\ntaken the view that similar military liaison personnel\nmaintained in Japan by other countries are not \"forces\".\nIt would be very difficult to justify a different position\nin relation to the liaison personnel in Korea. Therefore,\ntermination of the UNC, or removal of ROK forces and the\nThai contingent from UNC operational control, would create\na situation where the 168 man Thai contingent would be the\nonly force with an arguable claim to the label \"United\nNations forces in Korea\".\nThe UNC as a Party to the Armistice Agreement\nThe legal effect which termination of the UNC would\nhave on the Armistice Agreement is not clear. The\nArmistice is an agreement between the three military\ncommanders to, inter alia, \"enforce a complete cessation\nof all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under\ntheir control\n\" (Article II, para. 12, Military\nArmistice Agreement, July 27, 1953, TIAS 2782). Absent\nsome agreement with the other side, termination of the UNC\nwould raise the question whether any entity on our\nSECRET\nSEGRET\n3\nside was both obligated to enforce and capable of\nenforcing the terms of the Armistice. The United States\nand ROK could take the position that every government which\nat the time of the Armistice had forces under the operational\ncontrol of the UNC was under a continuing legal obligation\nto respect the Armistice even upon termination of the UNC.\nAlthough this argument would have strong legal merit, the\nSECRET\n4\nother side could contend with some justification that\nupon termination of the UNC no entity on our side was clearly\nbound by the Armistice Agreement. Acceptability to the\nother side should, therefore, be an important factor in\nany decision to terminate the UNC.\nThe other side would probably be most concerned with\nensuring continued ROK observance of the Armistice Agree-\nment. This has been ensured in the past through UNC\noperational control over ROK forces. Upon termination of\nthe UNC, ROK forces would be formally constrained by the\nterms of the Armistice only through Article I of the U.S. -ROK\nMutual Defense Treaty. 6/ In the context of its negotiating\nhistory Article I clearly entails a commitment to the U.S.\nby the ROK not to violate the Armistice. However, this is\nonly a commitment to the U.S., and not to the DPRK or the PRC.\nOf course, all parties concerned know that UNC operational\ncontrol of ROK forces is little more than a legal formality.\nAlso, the USG and GROK would presumably take the position\n6/ Article I obligates the ROK to refrain in its\ninternational relations \"from the threat or use of\nforce in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes\nof the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any\nParty toward the United Nations.\"\nSECRET\nSECRET\n5\nthat they considered themselves bound by the Armistice\nAgreement even upon termination of the UNC. But the\nlegal uncertainty which would be created by termination\nof the UNC could give rise to attack by the PRC and DPRK,\nand might be used as a pretext for a wide variety of\nresponses by the other side. Therefore, termination of\nthe UNC without first obtaining a clear indication from\nboth the PRC and the DPRK that this move would be\nacceptable to them could have serious adverse consequences.\nRepresentation on the MAC\nTermination of the UNC would also raise the question\nof representation on the MAC. The Armistice Agreement\nprovides in pertinent part:\n\"20. The Military Armistice Commission shall\nbe composed of ten (10) senior officers,\nfive (5) of whom shall be appointed by the\nCommander-in-Chief, United Nations Command,\nand five (5) of whom shall be appointed\njointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean\nPeople's Army and the Commander of the Chinese\nPeople's Volunteers. Of the ten members,\nthree (3) from each side shall be of general\nor flag rank. The two (2) remaining members\non each side may be major generals, brigadier\ngenerals, colonels, or their equivalents.\"\n(Article II, para. 20)\nParagraph 20 of the Armistice provides only for the appoint-\nment of representatives to the MAC by the Commander-in-\nChief of the UNC. It does not make provision for the situation\nSECRET\nSECRET\n6\nwhich would result from termination of the UNC, where\nthere would no longer be any Commander-in-Chief of the\nUNC. In the absence of an appropriate amendment to the\nArmistice Agreement it would be unclear upon termination\nwhere the power to appoint MAC representatives for our\nside resided. 7/\nUse of Japanese Facilities by U.S. Forces in Response\nto an Attack from the North\nTermination of the UNC would mean that U.S. forces\nin Japan could not respond to an armed attack against the\nROK without first consulting with the GOJ.\nAn exchange of notes between then Secretary of State\nHerter and Prime Minister Kishi concerning implementation\nof Article VI of the 1960 U.S. - Japan Treaty of Mutual\nCooperation and Security (TIAS 4509) obligates the U.S.\nGovernment to consult with the GOJ prior to using \"facilities\n7/\nArticle V, para. 61 of the Armistice describes\nthe means of amending the agreement: \"Amendments\nand additions to this Armistice Agreement must be\nmutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing\nsides. \"\nFORD\nSECRET\nSECRET\n7\nand areas in Japan as bases for military combat\noperations\n\"\nThere is, however, a narrow exception to this obliga-\ntion contained in a secret agreed minute, dated June 23,\n1960 and included in the record of the Preparatory Meeting\nof the Security Consultative Committee. That minute\nreads in pertinent part, as follows:\n\"I have been authorized by Prime Minister\nKishi to state that it is the view of the\nJapanese Government that, as an exceptional\nmeasure in the event of an emergency\nresulting from an attack against the United\nNations forces in Korea, facilities and areas\nin Japan may be used for such military combat\noperations as need be undertaken immediately\nby the United States'armed forces in Japan\nunder the Unified Command of the United Nations\nas the response to such an armed attack in order\nto enable the United Nations forces in Korea to\nrepell an armed attack made in violation of\nthe Armistice.'\nThus, in order for U.S. forces to use Japanese\nfacilities for military combat operations without prior\nconsultation with the GOJ: (1) there must be an attack\n8/\nThe Herter-Kishi note exchange referred to above\nreads in pertinent part as follows:\n\"Major changes in the deployment into Japan of\nUnited States armed forces, major changes in\ntheir equipment, and the use of facilities and\nareas in Japan as bases for military combat\noperations to be undertaken from Japan other\nthan those conducted under Article V of the said\nTreaty, shall be the subjects of prior consulta-\ntion with the Government of Japan.' (TIAS 4509)\nSECRET\n8\nagainst the UN forces in Korea; (2) the facilities must be\nused by U.S. forces in Japan \"under the Unified Command\nof the United Nations; and (3) the purpose of these\nmilitary combat operations must be to repell an armed\nattack in violation of the Armistice.\nTermination of the UNC as discussed above would create\na situation where the only \"United Nations forces in Korea\" --\nif any -- would be the 168 man Thai contingent. The ROK\nforces could no longer be considered UN forces since they\nwould no longer be under UNC operational control. And,\nas noted earlier, the claim of the Thai contingent to be\nUN forces in Korea would ,then rest only upon the authority\nof the UN Security Council resolutions of June 25 and 27,\n1950. 9/\nWhatever, the technical merits of an argument\nThai\nthat an attack on the / forces would be a sufficient\n\"attack against United Nations forces in Korea\" to satisfy\nthe first prerequisite for invoking the secret minute, it\nwould be disingenuous in the extreme for the USG to justify a failure\nthis ground.\nto consult the GOJ on / Therefore, any USG decision\nregarding termination of the UNC should take account of\nthe practical consequences of no longer being able to\n9/\nSee pp. 2-2b, above.\nSECRET\n8a\nrespond to an attack in Korea without first consulting\nwith the GOJ, pursuant to the 1960 secret minute. 10/\nThe UN SOFA with Japan\nTermination of the UNC, or the removal of ROK and\nThai forces in Korea from UNC operational control, would\nraise the question whether Article XXIV of the UN SOFA\nwith Japan becomes operable. Article XXIV requires that:\n\"All the United Nations forces shall be with-\ndrawn from Japan within ninety days after the\ndate by which all the United Nations forces\nshall have been withdrawn from Korea\n\"\nAs indicated earlier, it might be argued that the Thai\ncontingent continues to qualify as \"United Nations forces\nin Korea\" for purposes of 'the UN SOFA with Japan even in\nthe event of UNC termination or removal from UNC operational\ncontrol, on the ground that they are present in Korea\npursuant to the UN Security Council Resolutions of June 25\nand 27, 1950. An argument could also be made that\nArticle XXIV of the UN SOFA is not triggered by anything\nother than \"withdrawal from Korea\". But, at the minimum,\nsubstantial uncertainty as to the legality of the continued\npresence of UN forces in Japan would be engendered by\n10/\nEven in the absence of termination of the UNC\nremoval of ROK forces and the Thai contingent\nLIBRAPY\nfrom UNC operational control would raise the\nsame question regarding the secret minute.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n8b\ntermination of the UNC or the removal of ROK forces and\nthe Thai contingent in Korea from UNC operational control.\nAlthough the only UN forces remaining in Japan are comprised\nof a small RTAF contingent, the departure of that contingent\nfrom Japan would have important consequences. 11/\nConclusion\nThe above discussion indicates that termination of\nthe UNC would have serious legal consequences. Under\npresent circumstances it would appear inadvisable for the\nUSG to seek termination of the UNC in the absence of an\nover-all settlement of the Korean question.\nEven if the UNC were'not terminated, many of the same\nlegal consequences would result from removal of the Thai\ncontingent and ROK forces from UNC operational control.\n11/\nSee Section III, below.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n9\nII.\nTHE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION\nAND REHABILITATION OF KOREA (UNCURK)\nUnlike the UNC, which was established by the U.S.\npursuant to a UN Security Council Resolution, UNCURK is\nsolely a creature of the UN, created by a UN General\nAssembly resolution of October 7, 1950 (UNGA Res. 376 (v))\nUNCURK's principal mandate is to \"represent the United\nNations in bringing about the establishment of a unified,\nindependent and democratic government of all Korea\" (Para. 2(a)).\nFormal dissolution of UNCURK could only be accomplished\nby a resolution of the UN General Assembly. Such dissolution\nwould have no legal implications in terms of the UN\npresence in Korea and related questions.\nFORD\nSECRET\n10\nIII. THE UN SOFA WITH JAPAN AND THE ACHESON-YOSHIDA\nUNDERSTANDING -- WITHDRAWAL OF THE THAI CONTINGENT\nIf and when the RTAF contingent leaves Japan the UN\nSOFA with Japan (TIAS 2995) will automatically terminate.\nTermination of the UN SOFA will result in the termination\nof a 1951 GOJ commitment, in an exchange of notes between\nthen Secretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida,\npermitting UN members to support in Japan UN forces engaged\nin UN action in the Far East.\nArticle XXV of the UN SOFA reads as follows:\n\"This Agreement and agreed revisions thereof\nshall terminate on the date by which all the\nUnited Nations forces shall be withdrawn from\nJapan in accordance with the provisions of\nArticle XXIV. In case all the United Nations\nforces have been withdrawn from Japan earlier\nthan such date, this Agreement and agreed\nrevisions thereof 'shall terminate on the date\nwhen the withdrawal has been completed.\"\nArticle I, paragraph (d), defines \"United Nations forces\" as:\n\"Those forces of the land, sea or air armed\nservices of the sending State which are sent\nto engage in action pursuant to the United\nNations Resolutions. \"\nParagraph (c) of that same article defines \"sending\nState\" as:\n\"Any State which has sent or may hereafter send\nforces to Korea pursuant to the United Nations\nResolutions and whose Government is a Party to\nthis Agreement as the Government of a State\nSECRET\nSECRET\n11\nsending forces to Korea pursuant to the United\nNations Resolutions. \"\nThe Government of the United States is not a party to\nthe UN SOFA as the \"Government of a State sending forces to\nKorea pursuant to the United Nations Resolutions. \" Rather,\nthe UN SOFA was signed for the Government of the United\nStates acting as the \"Unified Command. \" Therefore, U.S.\nforces in Japan are not \"United Nations forces\" within the\nmeaning of Article I, paragraph (d), of the UN SOFA. 12/\nOf those States which acceded to the UN SOFA as\n\"sending States\" only Thailand still maintains an operational\nmilitary unit in Japan. Since the USG has consistently\ntaken the view that the liaison groups maintained in Japan\nby other countries are mt \"forces\" within the meaning of\nthe UN SOFA, the departure from Japan of the RTAF contingent\nwould result in the automatic termination of the UN SOFA\npursuant to the provisions of Article XXV.\nIn a September 8, 1951 exchange of notes between then\nSecretary of State Acheson and Prime Minister Yoshida, the\nFOND\nGOJ made the following commitment:\n12/ The question whether U.S. forces in Japan may\nbe considered to be \"under the Unified Command of\nthe United Nations\" for purposes of the 1960 secret\nminute regarding prior consultation with Japan raises\nseparate considerations See Johnson-Kriebel Memorandum\nof December 13, 1971.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n12\nIf\nIf and when the forces of a member or\nmembers of the United Nations are engaged in\nany United Nations action in the Far East after\nthe Treaty of Peace comes into force, Japan\nwill permit and facilitate the support in and\nabout Japan, by the member or members, of the\nforces engaged in such United Nations action\n\"\n(TIAS 2490)\nA time limit was placed on the above commitment by a\nJanuary 19, 1960 exchange of notes between then Secretary\nof State Herter and Prime Minister Kishi (TIAS 4509), in\nwhich it was agreed that the 1951 Acheson-Yoshida note\nexchange \"will continue to be in force so long as the\nAgreement Regarding Status of the United Nations Forces\nin Japan remains in force. \"\nWithdrawal of the RTAF contingent would, therefore,\nhave the effect of leaving any future non-U.S. forces\nnothing but Article 2, paragraph 5, of the UN Charter as a\nbasis for requesting use of Japanese facilities and areas\nin support of UN operations in Korea. 13/\nNeither the termination of the UN SOFA nor the termina-\ntion of the Acheson-Yoshida understanding would affect the\nU.S. military presence in Japan. U.S. forces are in Japan\n13/ Article 2, paragraph 5 of the United Nations\nCharter reads, in pertinent part: \"All Members shall\ngive the United Nations every assistance in any\naction it takes in accordance with the present Charter\nSECRET\nby virtue of Article VI of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual\nCooperation and Security (TIAS 4509) and agreements\nconcluded pursuant thereto. The status of U.S. forces in\nJapan is governed by the 1960 U.S. - Japan SOFA (TIAS 4510) 14/\n14/ The 1960 Herter-Kishi note exchange recognizes:\n3. The use of the facilities and areas by the\nU.S. armed forces under the Unified Command of the\nUnited Nations established pursuant to the Security\nCouncil Resolution of July 7, 1950, and their\nstatus in Japan are governed by arrangements made\npursuant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and\nSecurity \"\n1080\nSECRET\nLIBRARD'S\nSECRET\n14\nIV. SOUTH KOREAN REPRESENTATION ON THE KOREAN MILITARY\nARMISTICE COMMISSION (MAC)\nThis section considers the legal and related aspects\nof the suggestion that a Korean officer be appointed\nas Senior Member of the MAC and concludes that there is\nno legal barrier to doing so, but that a number\nof other factors should also be taken into consideration.\nThese factors suggest the desirability of resolving\nthis matter in the broader context of our general policy\nwith respect to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement\nand machinery. Alternative means of strengthening the\nROK's participation in the MAC are described.\nBackground\nIn early June 1971 Amembassy Seoul suggested that\nwe name a Korean general officer as the Senior Member\nof the U.N. side of the MAC -- apparently intended as\na first step toward withdrawal of the U.N. Command (UNC)\nfrom Korea accompanied by a \"delegation\" to the ROK of\nresponsibility for maintaining the Armistice. Shortly\nthereafter Major General Rogers, senior UNC\nrepresentative in the MAC, made the \"personal suggestion\"\nthat it might be desirable to appoint a Korean officer\nas the Senior Member of the U.N. side of the MAC. Subsequently,\nSECRET\nSECRET\n15\nthe Korean Prime Minister reported to the National Assembly\nthat if the UNC would accept a Korean as Senior Member,\nthe ROK would name an officer to the position.\nLegal Considerations and Related Aspects\nThe MAC was created by the Korean Armistice \"to\nsupervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement\nand to settle through negotiations any violation of\npara. 20).\nthis Armistice Agreement. (Article II, / Under the Agreement,\nfive senior officers are appointed by each side. For\nthe UNC, the Senior Member has always been an American;\nin addition, there are two Koreans, one Commonwealth\nmember (always British) and one member on a rotating\nbasis from among the Military Liaison Group (U.K.,\nThailand, Canada, Australia, Ethiopia, Philippines).\nNeither the Armistice Agreement nor any subsequent\narrangement expressly deals with the question of\nparagraph 20\neligibility for appointment as Senior Member. Article II,/\nof the Armistice Agreement provides only that:\n\"The Military Armistice Commission\nshall be composed of ten (10) senior officers,\nfive (5) of whom shall be appointed by the\nCommander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and\nfive (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by\nthe Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army\nand the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.\nOf the ten members, three (3) from each side\nshall be of general or flag rank. The two (2)\nremaining members on each side may be major\ngenerals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their\nequivalents.\" (Emphasis added)\nSECRET\nSECRET\n16\nThe Report of the Unified Command on the Armistice\nin Korea transmitted to the U.N. Security Council on\nAugust 7, 1953 U.N. Document S/3079 August 7, 1953\ninterpreted this provision as establishing \"A Military\nArmistice Commission,\ncomposed of military officers\nof the United Nations Command (emphasis added) and the\ncommunist forces \" (Chapter III(C) (2) [6]) This might\nbe read to preclude ROK officers from serving on the\nMAC since ROK forces are merely under the \"operational\ncontrol\" of the UNC. ROK forces are not formally a\npart of the UNC.\nThe more plausible reading of paragraph 20 of the\nArmistice Agreement is that the power of appointment\nmust remain in the U.N. Command (\"shall be appointed\nby\"), but that the only qualifications for membership\nare the \"rank\" requirements for \"each side\". A similar\nuse of \"side\" in the recommendation in Article IV, para 60\n\"to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides\"\nthat a political conference be held, was understood to include both\nthe U.N. and ROK after a statement to that effect for\nthe record by the U.N. Command Negotiator Admiral Joy.\nThus, so long as the appointment is made by the U.N.\nFORD\nBERALD\nSECRET\n17\nCommand, the only legal restriction on a ROK appointee\nwould be rank.\nIt seems unwise to consider in isolation the suggestion\nthat a Korean officer be appointed as Senior Member of\nthe U.N. side of the MAC. Rather, this suggestion should\nbe viewed in the broader context of our general policy\nwith respect to maintenance of the Armistice Agreement\nand machinery.\nThe MAC provides the only direct channel of\ncommunication between the U.S. and North Korea.\nIt is also the only forum presently available for direct\ncommunication between the PRC, the U.S., the DPRK and\nthe ROK. Particularly in time of emergency, the MAC\noffers us a means of rapid communication with Pyongyang.\nMoreover, it could serve as a forum for serious\ndiscussions aimed at a settlement in Korea.\nIf it is decided that we should consider\nways of strengthening the ROK role in the MAC machinery,\nachievement of this objective may be possible without\ncommitting ourselves irrevocably to the\nprincipal that a South Korean must serve as Senior\nMember. There would be no legal impediment to more\nflexible arrangements on the U.N. side which would\naccommodate the interest of retaining for the U.S.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n18\na measure of control of the MAC machinery, as well as\nthe interest of permitting a greater ROK role. For\nexample, it may be possible to give the ROK representatives\non the UNC side of the MAC a greater share of the\nresponsibility. This might include chairing the UNC\ndelegation at MAC meetings from time to time. Alternatively,\none of the South Korean senior officers might even share\nthe responsibilities of Senior Member with the U.S. officer\nserving as Senior Member -- nothing in the Armistice\nmachinery precludes such a sharing arrangement.\nSEGRET\nTUND\nSECRET\n19\nV.\nDEACTIVATION OF THE NEUTRAL NATIONS\nSUPERVISORY COMMISSION (NNSC)\nIt has been proposed that the USG take steps to\n\"quietly deactivate\" the NNSC by suggesting to the\nSwiss and Swedish Governments that their delegations\non the NNSC not be replaced, and by terminating the\nlogistic support currently being provided to their\ndelegations. This section concludes that there are\nlegal and other difficulties with the proposal to\ndeactivate the NNSC (although steps might be taken to\nreduce the current level of logistic support provided\nto the Swiss and Swedish delegations on the NNSC), and\nthat we should in any event be cautions about undermining\nthe NNSC machinery at this point in time.\nBackground\nThe NNSC was established under the 1953 Korean\nArmistice Agreement to carry out supervision, observation,\ninspection and investigation functions on both sides\nof the demilitarized zone (but not within the DMZ). It\nwas intended to serve as one of the principal organs\nfor implementing the Agreement. Article II, para. 37 of\nthe Agreement provides that the NNSC shall be composed\n1980\nof four senior officers, two appointed by United Nations\nSECRET\nSECRET\n20\nCommand (UNC) nominees, namely Sweden and Switzerland,\nand two appointed by Korean People's Army/Chinese\nPeople's Volunteers (KPA/CPV) nominees, namely Poland\nand Czechoslovakia.\nFrom the outset, the NNSC ran into difficulties:\nthe UNC charged that the North was violating the\nAgreement by using other ports of entry for men and\nequipment than those where NNSC teams were stationed;\nthe ROK was strongly opposed to the presence of the\nCzechs and Poles on its soil; and internally, the NNSC\nwas rarely able to agree on any report.\nDuring 1956 and 1955 the Swiss and Swedish Governments\nmade efforts to have the NNSC liquidated, or if that were\nnot acceptable to the signatories of the Armistice\nAgreement, then a substantial reduction in the size of\nthe NNSC. The Chinese Government opposed the liquidation\nof the NNSC but agreed to a reduction in its size.\nAt the 70th MAC, on May 31, 1956 the UNC announced\nits decision to suspend the activities of the NNSC's\nteams south of the DMZ, citing Communist violations\nof the Armistice Agreement. These teams moved into\nthe DMZ and the KPA/CPV vigorously denounced the UNC's\naction. Shortly thereafter the NNSC teams in the north\nalso withdrew to the DMZ.\nSEGRET\nSECRET\n21\nSince June, 1956 the activities of the NNSC have\nbeen confined to the DMZ and limited to evaluating\npersonnel reports submitted by the UNC and personnel\nand combat materiel reports submitted by the KPA/CPV.\nThe question of the future of the NNSC was reviewed\nby the Department of State in 1960 and 1962, and on\neach occasion it was decided to reaffirm support for\nthe NNSC.\nIn favor of deactivating the NNSC, it is argued\nthat: the NNSC has provided no support and has consistently\nrefused to investigate UNC violation reports or even\nforward such complaints to the MAC; neither the Swiss\nnor Swedish members have provided any useful information\non conditions in North Korea; the NNSC has not had any\nmeasurable impact on the social sphere; it is difficult\nto give the NNSC any credit for maintaining the cease-\nfire; quiet deactivation would remove a point of friction\nrather than an opportunity for accommodation; any\npropaganda attacks by North Korea would be tolerable\nand have little significant impact; and the Swiss and\nSwedes would welcome such a U.S. initiative.\nSECRET\n10RD\nSECRET\n22\nFormal Termination VS. \"Quiet Deactivation\"\nFormal termination of the NNSC would appear to require\nan amendment to the Armistice Agreement (which under\nArticle V, para. 61 requires mutual agreement by the\nCommanders of the opposing sides), or at least approval\nby the MAC. In either case, KPA/CPV concurrence would\nbe required. We should assume on the basis of the past\nwould\nrecord that they / oppose termination. (At the 1954\nGeneva Conference the Chinese representative, Chou En-lai,\nexhibited particular fervor in praising the role played\nby the NNSC, in advancing the proposal of a similar\ninternational body to supervise free elections in Korea.)\nThe NNSC's \"quiet deactivation\" would be extremely\ndifficult to justify publicly, particularly in light\nof the legal rationale' for the action we took in 1956\nsuspending the NNSC activities south of the DMZ. That\njustification was based on the need to take \"only such\nsteps as are indispensable to protection of its [the UNC's] rights\nunder the Armistice Agreement.\" The other side\ndoes not appear to have taken action since 1954 with\nrespect to the NNSC which we could readily invoke as\nthe basis for further action on our part to protect\nour legitimate interests under the Armistice Agreement.\nSECRET\nSECRET\n23\nAn argument could, of course, be advanced that the NNSC\nhas become an anachronistic facade, but we would be\nvulnerable to criticism since this situation was quite\napparent in 1956.\n\"Perhaps the most significant consideration in any\ndecision to seek deactivation of the NNSC is the possible\nimpact of such a decision on the existing political\nsituation. In 1960 then Ambassador Marshall Green\nviewed this consideration as decisive in his recommendation\n\"to leave the present setup unchanged at this time. \"\nHe reasoned:\n\"I said I could well understand his [the\nSwiss representative's] feelings of boredom\nand frustration in having to serve with the NNSC\nbut that I did not think we were prepared to\nregard the organization as useless. Some\nmaintain that NNSC, by representing an inter-\nnational presence along the DMZ, helps in some\nsmall way to maintain peace in this troubled divided\ncountry. I added that in my opinion a more\nimportant consideration is the desirability of\nmaking no alterations in the present structure\nfor maintaining peace in Korea; that a withdrawal\nof the NNSC or a change in its national composition\nwould lead to unfounded beliefs that some new\nelements were present in the political situation.\nResulting speculation could likewise produce\nconsiderable uneasiness over what NNSC withdrawal\nmight portend. There seemed to be considerable\nvirtue at this time in keeping the situation\nstabilized as far as possible. I added that the\nrelatively small cost involved in maintaining the\nNNSC seemed a small price to pay for this benefit,\nbut that if the cost factor were an important\nFORD\nENVODIT\nSECRET\nSECRET\n24\nconsideration, then I would hope economies might\nbe effected in the NNSC operation itself (such\nas reduced numbers) rather than closing out the\nNNSC operation. It would nevertheless seem\nwisest to leave the present setup unchanged at\nthis time. \"\nAmbassador Green's reasoning seems equally pertinent\ntoday. In light of the recent interest in the Armistice\nmachinery by the other side, it seems unwise for us now\nto embark upon an initiative to undermine the NNSC.\nIt seems safe to assume that the other side would react\nunfavorably, and this might lead to further \"unraveling\"\nof the Armistice machinery. If the Swiss and Swedes\nterminate their participation in the NNSC, the Czechs\nand Poles might stay on as a \"rump\" commission. This\ncould be a continuing source of embarrassment. Also,\nthe NNSC may well find it can play a positive role in\nthe future, perhaps by floating proposals to both sides -- Article II\nparagraph 49 of the Armistice Agreement gives the NNSC\nauthority to make recommendations to the MAC with\nrespect to \"amendment or additions\" to the Agreement.\nFUND\nL/EA/RIStarr;OTJohnson/cdj;cbf\n1/4/72 X23039\nSECRET\nVII\nRESOLUTIONS ADOPTED ON THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE\n376 (V). The problem of the independence of\nand democratic government in the sovereign State of\nKorea\nKorea;\nThe General Assembly,\n(c) All sections and representative bodies of the\npopulation of Korea, South and North, be invited to\nHaving regard to its resolutions of 14 November\nco-operate with the organs of the United Nations in\n1947 (112 (II)), of 12 December 1948 (195 (III))\nthe restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and\nand of 21 October 1949 (293 (IV)),\nin the establishment of a unified government;\nHaving received and considered the report1 of the\n(d) United Nations forces should not remain in\nUnited Nations Commission on Korea,\nany part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary\nMindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in\nfor achieving the objectives specified in sub-paragraphs\nthe resolutions referred to above have not been fully\n(a) and (b) above;\naccomplished and, in particular, that the unification\n(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish\nof Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt\nthe economic rehabilitation of Korea;\nhas been made by an armed attack from North Korea\nto extinguish by force the Government of the Republic\n2. Resolves that\nof Korea,\n(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile,\nRecalling the General Assembly declaration of 12\nNetherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and Tur-\nDecember 1948 that there has been established a lawful\nkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission\ngovernment (the Government of the Republic of Korea)\nfor the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be\nhaving effective control and jurisdiction over that part\nestablished to (i) assume the functions hitherto exer-\nof Korea where the United Nations Temporary Com-\ncised by the present United Nations Commission on\nmission on Korea was able to observe and consult and\nKorea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing\nin which the great majority of the people of Korea\nabout the establishment of a unified, independent and\nreside; that this government is based on elections\ndemocratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such\nwhich were a valid expression of the free will of the\nresponsibilities in connexion with relief and rehabili-\nelectorate of that part of Korea and which were ob-\ntation in Korea as may be determined by the General\nserved by the Temporary Commission; and that this\nAssembly after receiving the recommendations of the\nis the only such government in Korea,\nEconomic and Social Council. The United Nations\nCommission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of\nHaving in mind that United Nations armed forces\nKorea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out\nare at present operating in Korea in accordance with\nits functions as soon as possible;\nthe recommendations² of the Security Council of 27\nJune 1950, subsequent to its resolution³ of 25 June\n(b) Pending the arrival in Korea of_the United\n1950, that Members of the United Nations furnish\nNations Commission for the Unification and Rehabili-\nsuch assistance to the Republic of Korea as- may be\ntation of Korea, the governments of the States repre-\nnecessary to repel the armed attack and to restore in-\nsented on the Commission should form an Interim\nternațional peace and security in the area,\nCommittee composed of representatives meeting at the\nseat of the United Nations to consult with and advise\nRecalling that the essential objective of the resolu-\nthe United Nations Unified Command in the light of\ntions of the General Assembly referred to above was\nthe above recommendations; the Interim Committee\nthe establishment of a unified, independent and demo-\nshould begin to function immediately upon the approval\ncratic Government of Korea,\nof the present resolution by the General Assembly;\n1. Recommends that\n(c) The Commission shall render a report to the\n(a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure condi-\nnext regular session of the General Assembly and to\ntions of stability throughout Korea;\nany prior special session which might be called to con-\n(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the\nsider the subject-matter of the present resolution, and\nholding of elections, under the auspices of the United\nshall render such interim reports as it may deem appro-\nNations, for the establishment of a unified, independent\npriate to the Secretary-General for transmission to\nMembers;\n1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session,\nThe General Assembly furthermore,\nSupplement No. 16.\n2 See Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year,\nMindful of the fact that at the end of the present\nNo. 16.\nhostilities the task of rehabilitating the Korean econ-\n3 Ibid., No. 15.\nomy will be of great magnitude,\n9\n82 (1950). Resolution of 25 June 1950\n82 (1950). Résolution du 25 juin 1950\n[S/1501]\n[S/1501]\nThe Security Council,\nLe Conseil de sécurité,\nRecalling the finding of the General Assembly in its\nRappelant les conclusions que l'Assemblée générale a\nresolution 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 that the Govern-\nformulées dans sa résolution 293 (IV) du 21 octobre\nment of the Republic of Korea is a lawfully established\n1949, à savoir que le Gouvernement de la République\ngovernment having effective control and jurisdiction over\nde Corée est un gouvernement légitime qui exerce\nthat part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary\neffectivement son autorité et sa juridiction sur la partie\nCommission on Korea was able to observe and consult\nde la Corée où la Commission temporaire des Nations\nand in which the great majority of the people of Korea\nUnies pour la Corée a été en mesure de procéder à des\nreside; that this Government is based on elections which\nòbservations et à des consultations et dans laquelle réside\nwere a valid expression of the free will of the electorate\nla grande majorité de la population de la Corée; que\nof that part of Korea and which were observed by the\nce gouvernement est né d'élections qui ont été l'expression\nTemporary Commission; and that this is the only such\nvalable de la libre volonté du corps électoral de cette\nGovernment in Korea,\npartie de la Corée et qui ont été observées par la Commis-\nsion temporaire; et que ledit gouvernement est le seul\nqui, en Corée, possède cette qualité,\nMindful of the concern expressed by the General\nConscient de ce que l'Assemblée générale, dans ses\nAssembly in its resolutions 195 (III) of 12 December\nrésolutions 195 (III) du 12 décembre 1948 et 293 (IV)\n1948 and 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949 about the conse-\ndu 21 octobre 1949, s'inquiète des conséquences que\nquences which might follow unless Member States\npourraient avoir des actes préjudiciables aux résultats\nrefrained from acts derogatory to the results sought to\nque cherchent à obtenir les Nations Unies en vue de\nbe achieved by the United Nations in bringing about\nl'indépendance et de l'unité complètes de la Corée et\nthe complete independence and unity of Korea; and\ninvite les Etats Membres à s'abstenir d'actes de cette\nthe concern expressed that the situation described by\nnature; et conscient de ce que l'Assemblée générale\nthe United Nations Commission on Korea in its report\ncraint que la situation décrite par la Commission dans\nmenaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of\nson rapport ne menace la sûreté et le bien-être de la\nKorea and of the people of Korea and might lead to\nRépublique de Corée et du peuple coréen et ne risque\nopen military conflict there,\nde conduire à un véritable conflit armé en Corée,\nNoting with grave concern the armed attack on the\nPrenant acte de l'attaque dirigée contre la République\nRepublic of Korea by forces from North Korea,\nde Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée du Nord,\nattaque qui le préoccupe gravement,\nDetermines that this action constitutes a breach of the\nConstate que cette action constitue une rupture de\npeace; and\nla paix; et\nI\nI\nCalls for the immediate cessation of hostilities;\nDemande la cessation immédiate des hostilités\nCalls upon the authorities in North Korea to withdraw\nInvite les autorités de la Corée du Nord à retirer immé-\nforthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel;\ndiatement leurs forces armées sur le 38e parallèle;\nII\nII\nRequests the United Nations Commission on Korea:\nPrie la Commission des Nations Unies pour la Corée:\n(a) To communicate its fully considered recom-\na) De communiquer, après mûr examen et dans le\nmendations on the situation with the least possible delay;\nplus bref délai possible, ses recommandations au sujet\nde la situation;\n(b) To observe the withdrawal of North Korean forces\nb) D'observer le retrait des forces de la Corée du Nord\nto the 38th parallel;\nsur le 38e parallèle;\n(c) To keep the Security Council informed on the\nc) De tenir le Conseil de sécurité au courant de\nexecution of this resolution;\nl'exécution de la présente résolution;\nIII\nIII\nCalls upon all Member States to render every assistance\nInvite tous les Etats Membres à prêter leur entier\nto the United Nations in the execution of this resolution\nconcours à l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour\nSee Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 15,\nVoir Procès-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sécurité, cinquième\n473rd meeting, p. 2, footnote 2 (document S/1496, incorporating\nannée, n° 15, 473ᵉ séance, p. 2, note 2 (document S/1496) et docu-\nS/1496/Corr.1).\nment S/1496/Corr.1 (miméographié) figurant quant au fond dans\nla déclaration du Président, p. 3 et 4 de la même séance.\nLIBRARY\n4\nand to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean\nl'exécution de la présente résolution et à s'abstenir de\nauthorities.\nvenir en aide aux autorités de la Corée du Nord.\nAdopted at the 473rd meeting\nAdoptée à la 473ᵉ séance par\nby 9 votes to none, with 1\n9 voix contre zéro, avec une\nabstention (Yugoslaria).\nabstention ( Yougoslavie 10,\n83 (1950). Resolution of 27 June 1950\n83 (1950). Résolution du 27 juin 1950\n[S/1511]\n[S/1511]\nThe Security Council,\nLe Conseil de sécurité,\nHaving determined that the armed attack upon the\nAyant constaté que l'attaque dirigée contre la Répu-\nRepublic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes\nblique de Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée\na breach of the peace,\ndu Nord constitue une rupture de la paix,\nHaving called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,\nAyant demandé la cessation immédiate des hostilités,\nHaving called upon the authorities in North Korea to\nAyant invité les autorités de la Corée du Nord à retirer\nwithdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel,\nimmédiatement leurs forces armées sur le 38ᵉ parallèle,\nHaving noted from the report of the United Nations\nAyant constaté, d'après le rapport de la Commission\nCommission on Korea 11 that the authorities in North\ndes Nations Unies pour la Corée 11, que les autorités de\nKorea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their\nla Corée du Nord n'ont ni suspendu les hostilités, ni\narmed forces to the 38th parallel, and that urgent military\nretiré leurs forces armées sur le 38e parallèle, et qu'il faut\nmeasures are required to restore international peace and\nprendre d'urgence des mesures militaires pour rétablir la\nsecurity,\npaix et la sécurité internationales,\nHaving noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea\nAyant pris acte de l'appel adressé aux Nations Unies\nto the United Nations for immediate and effective steps\npar la République de Corée, qui demande que des\nto sccure peace and security,\nmesures efficaces soient prises immédiatement pour\ngarantir la paix et la sécurité,\nRecommends that the Members of the United Nations\nRecommande aux Membres de l'Organisation des\nfurnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may\nNations Unies d'apporter à la République de Corée\nbe necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore\ntoute l'aide nécessaire pour repousser les assaillants et\ninternational peace and security in the area.\nrétablir dans cette région la paix et la sécurité interna-\ntionales.\nAdopted at the 474th meeting\nAdoptée à la 474e séance par\nby 7 votes to 1 (Yugoslavia).\n7 voix contre une (Yougo-\nslavie) 12.\n84 (1950). Resolution of 7 July 1950\n84 (1950). Résolution du 7 juillet 1950\n[S/1588]\n[S/1588]\nThe Security Council,\nLe Conseil de sécurité,\nHaving determined that the armed attack upon the\nAyant constaté que l'attaque dirigée contre la Répu-\nRepublic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes\nblique de Corée par des forces armées venues de Corée\na breach of the peace,\ndu Nord constitue une rupture de la paix,\nHaving recommended that Members of the United\nAyant recommandé aux Membres de l'Organisation\nNations furnish such assistance to the Republic of\ndes Nations Unies d'apporter à la République de Corée\nKorea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack\ntoute l'aide nécessaire pour repousser les assaillants et\nand to restore international peace and security in the\nrétablir dans cette région la paix et la sécurité inter-\narea,\nnationales,\n10 One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.\n10 Undes membres (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques)\nétait absent.\n11 Official Records of the Security Council, Fifth Year, No. 16,\n11 Procès-verbaux officiels du Conseil de sécurité, cinquième année.\n474th meeting, p. 2 (document S/1507).\nn° 16, 474e séance, p. 2 (document S/ 1507).\n11 Two members (Egypt, India) did not participate in the voting;\n12 Deux des membres (Egypte, Inde) n'ont pas participe au vote:\none member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was absent.\nun des membres (Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques)\nétait absent.\n5\n1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which\n1. Se félicite oe l'appui rapide et vigoureux que les\nGovernments and peoples of the United Nations have\ngouvernements et les peuples des Nations Unies ont\ngiven to its resolutions 82 (1950) and 83 (1950) of 25\napporté à ses résolutions 82 (1950) et 83 (1950) des 25\nand 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in\net 27 juin 1950 en vue d'aider la République de Corée à\ndefending itself against armed attack and thus to restore\nse défendre contre ladite attaque armée, et ainsi rétablir\ninternational peace and security in the area;\nla paix et la sécurité internationales dans la région;\n2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have\n2. Prend acte de ce que des Membres de l'Organisation\ntransmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance\ndes Nations Unies ont transmis à celle-ci des offres\nfor the Republic of Korea;\nd'assistance à la République de Corée;\n3. Recommends that all Members providing military\n3. Recommande que tous les Membres fournissant en\nforces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid\napplication des résolutions précitées du Conseil de\nSecurity Council resolutions make such forces and other\nsécurité des forces militaires et toute autre assistance\nassistance available to a unified command under the\nmettent ces forces et cette assistance à la disposition d'un\nUnited States of America;\ncommandement unifié sous l'autorité des Etats-Unis\nd'Amérique;\n4. Requests the United States to designate the comman-\n4. Prie les Etats-Unis de désigner le commandant en\nder of such forces;\nchef de ces forces;\n5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion\n5. Autorise le commandement unifié à utiliser à sa\nto use the United Nations flag in the course of operations\ndiscrétion, au cours des opérations contre les forces de\nagainst North Korean forces concurrently with the flags\nla Corée du Nord, le drapeau des Nations Unies en\nof the various nations participating;\nmême temps que les drapeaux des diverses nations\nparticipantes;\n6. Requests the United States to provide the Security\n6. Prie les Etats-Unis de fournir au Conseil de sécurité\nCouncil with reports as appropriate on the course of\ndes rapports d'importance et de fréquence appropriées\naction taken under the unified command.\nconcernant le déroulement de l'action entreprise sous\nl'autorité du commandement unifié.\nAdopted at the 476th meeting\nAdoptée à la 476ᵉ séance par\nby 7 votes to none, with 3\n7 voix contre zéro, avec 3 ubs-\nabstentions (Egypt, India,\ntentions (Egypte, Inde, Yougo-\nYugoslavia).¹³\nslavie) 13,\n85 (1950). Resolution of 31 July 1950\n85 (1950). Résolution du 31 juillet 1950\n[S/1657]\n[S/1657]\nThe Security Council,\nLe Conseil de sécurité,\nRecognizing the hardships and privations to which\nConscient des épreuves et des privations qu'impose\nthe people of Korea are being subjected as a result of\nau peuple coréen la poursuite de l'attaque illégale déclen-\nthe continued prosecution by the North Korean forces\nchée par les forces de la Corée du Nord,\nof their unlawful attack,\nAppreciating the spontaneous offers of assistance to\nAccueillant avec reconnaissance les offres d'aide au\nthe Korean people which have been made by Govern-\npeuple coréen faites spontanément par des gouvernements,\nments, specialized agencies, and non-governmental\ndes institutions spécialisées et des organisations non\norganizations,\ngouvernementales.\n1. Requests the Unified Command to exercise responsi-\n1. Prie le Commandement unifié de se charger de\nbility for determining the requirements for the relief and\ndéterminer les secours et l'aide dont la population civile\nsupport of the civilian population of Korea and for esta-\nde la Corée a besoin et d'organiser sur place la répar-\nblishing in the field the procedures for providing such\ntition de ces secours et de cette aide;\nrelief and support;\n2. Requests the Secretary-General to transmit all\n2. Prie le Secrétaire général de transmettre au Comman-\noffers of assistance for relief and support to the Unified\ndement unifié toutes les offres de secours et d'aide;\nCommand:\n3. Requests the Unified Command to provide the\n3. Prie le Commandement unifié d'adresser au Conseil\nSecurity Council with reports, as appropriate, on its\nde sécurité, toutes les fois qu'il le jugera utile, des rapports\nrelief activities;\nsur l'œuvre qu'il aura accomplie dans le domaine des\nsecours;\nFORD\n13 One member (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wasabsent.\n13 Un des membres (Union des Républiques socialistes sorié-\ntiques) était absent.\n6\n10\nGeneral Assembly-Fifth Session\n3. Requests the Economic and Social Council, in\nReaffirming the importance of the exercise by the\nconsultation with the specialized agencies, to develop\nSecurity Council of its primary responsibility for the\nplans for relief and rehabilitation on Le termination of\nmaintenance of international peace and security, and\nhostilities and to report to the General Assembly within\nthe duty of the permanent members to seek unanimity\nthree weeks³ of the adoption of the present resolution\nand to exercise restraint in the use of the veto,\nby the General Assembly;\nReaffirming that the initiative in negotiating the\n4. Also recommends the Economic and Social Coun-\nagreements for armed forces provided for in Article\ncil to expedite the study of long-term measures to\n43 of the Charter belongs to the Security Council, and\npromote the economic development and social progress\ndesiring to ensure that, pending the conclusion of such\nof Korea, and meanwhile to draw the attention of the\nagreements, the United Nations has at its disposal\nauthorities which decide requests for technical assistance\nmeans for maintaining international peace and security,\nto the urgent and special necessity of affording such\nassistance to Korea;\nConscious that failure of the Security Council to dis-\ncharge its responsibilities on behalf of all the Member\n5. Expresses its appreciation of the services ren-\nStates, particularly those responsibilities referred to in\ndered by the members of the United Nations Commis-\nthe two preceding paragraphs, does not relieve Member\nsion on Korea in the performance of their important\nStates of their obligations or the United Nations of its\nand difficult task;\nresponsibility under the Charter to maintain inter-\n6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the\nnational peace and security,\nUnited Nations Commission for the Unification and\nRecognizing in particular that such failure does not\nRehabilitation of Korea with adequate staff and facili-\ndeprive the General Assembly of its rights or relieve it\nties, including technical advisers as required; and\nauthorizes the Secretary-General to pay the expenses\nof its responsibilities under the Charter in regard to\nand per diem of a representative and alternate from\nthe maintenance of international peace and security,\neach of the States members of the Commission.\nRecognizing that discharge by the General Assembly\n294th plenary meeting,\nof its responsibilities in these respects calls for possi-\n7 October 1950.\nbilities of observation which would ascertain the facts\nand expose aggressors; for the existence of armed\nforces which could be used collectively; and for the\n377 (V). Uniting for peace\npossibility of timely recommendation by the General\nA\nAssembly to Members of the United Nations for collec-\nThe General Assembly,\ntive action which, to be effective, should be prompt,\nRecognizing that the first two stated Purposes of the\nA\nUnited Nations are:\n\"To maintain international peace and security, and\n1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of\nto that end: to take effective collective measures for\nlack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to\nthe prevention and removal of threats to the peace,\nexercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance\nand for the suppression of acts of aggression or other\nof international peace and security in any case where\nbreaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful\nthere appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the\nmeans, and in conformity with the principles of jus-\npeace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall\ntice and international law, adjustment or settlement\nconsider the matter immediately with a-view to making\nof international disputes or situations which might\nappropriate recommendations to Members for collec-\nlead to a breach of the peace\", and\ntive measures, including in the case of a breach of the\npeace or act of aggression the use of armed force when\n\"To develop friendly relations among nations based\nnecessary, to maintain or restore international peace\non respect for the principle of equal rights and self-\nand security. If not in session at the time, the General\ndetermination of peoples, and to take other appropri-\nAssembly may meet in emergency special session within\nate measures to strengthen universal peace\",\ntwenty-four hours of the request therefor. Such emer-\nReaffirming that it remains the primary duty of all\ngency special session shall be called if requested by the\nMembers of the United Nations, when involved in an\nSecurity Council on the vote of any seven members, or\ninternational dispute, to seek settlement of such a dis-\nby a majority of the Members of the United Nations;\npute by peaceful means through the procedures laid\n2. Adopts for this purpose the amendments to its\ndown in Chapter VI of the Charter, and recalling the\nsuccessful achievements of the United Nations in this\nrules of procedure set forth in the annex to the present\nresolution;\nregard on a number of previous occasions,\nFinding that international tension exists on a danger-\nB\nous scale,\nRecalling its resolution 290 (IV) entitled \"Essen-\n3. Establishes a Peace Observation Commission\ntials of peace\", which states that disregard of the Prin-\nwhich, for the calendar years 1951 and 1952, shall be\nciples of the Charter of the United Nations is primarily\ncomposed of fourteen Members, namely: China, Colem-\nresponsible for the continuance of international tension,\nbia, Czechoslovakia. France, India, Iraq, Israel, New\nand desiring to contribute turther to the objectives of\nZealand. Pakistan, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Social-\nthat resolution,\nist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain\nand Northern Ireland, the United States of America\n3a See resolution 410 (V), page 31.\nand Uruguay, and which could observe and report on\nRESOLUTIONS\nadopted by the General Assembly during the period\n16 December 1950 to 5 November 1951\nI\nVERIFICATION OF CREDENTIALS\nOn behalf of the Credentials Committee,' its Chairman made a report² to\nthe General Assembly. The Assembly took note of the report.\n332nd plenary meeting,\n5 November 1951.\nH\nRESOLUTIONS\n498 (V). Intervention of the Central People's Govern-\n3. Affirms the determination of the United Nations\nment of the People's Republic of China in\nto continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression ;\nKorea\n4. Calls upon all States and authorities to continue\n(Resolution adopted on the report of the\nto lend every assistance to the United Nations action\nFirst Committee)\nin Korea ;\n5. Calls upon all States and authorities to refrain\nThe General Assembly,\nfrom giving any assistance to the aggressors in Korea ;\nNoting that the Security Council, because of lack of\n6. Requests a Committee composed of the members\nunanimity of the permanent members, has failed to\nof the Collective Measures Committee as a matter of\nexercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance\nurgency to consider additional measures to be employed\nof international peace and security in regard to Chinese\nto meet this aggression and to report thereon to the\nCommunist intervention in Korea,\nGeneral Assembly, it being understood that the\nNoting that the Central People's Government of the\nCommittee is authorized to defer its report if the Good\nPeople's Republic of China has not accepted United\nOffices Committee referred to in the following paragraph\nNations proposals3 to bring about a cessation of hosti-\nreports satisfactory progress in its efforts\nlitics in Korea with a view to peaceful settlement, and\n7. Affirms that it continues to be the policy of the\nthat its armed forces continue their invasion of Korea\nUnited Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities\nand their large-scale attacks upon United Nations forces\nin Korea and the achievement of United Nations\nthere,\nobjectives in Korea by peaceful means, and requests\n1. Finds that the Central People's Government of\nthe President of the General Assembly to designate\nthe People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid\nforthwith two persons who would meet with him at\nand assistance to those who were already committing\nany suitable opportunity to use their good offices to\naggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities\nthis end.\nagainst United Nations forces there, has itself engaged\n327th plenary meeting,\nin aggression in Korea ;\n1 February 1951.\n2. Calls upon the Central People's Government of\nthe People's Republic of China to cause its forces and\nnationals in Korea to cease hostilities against the United\nNations forces and to withdraw from Korea ;\nThe President of the Generai Assembly, on 19 Feb-\nruary 1951, informed (A/1779) the members of the\n3 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth\nGeneral Assembly that Dr. Luis Padilla Nervo (Mexico)\nSesssion, Supplement No. 20 (A/1775), page 1.\nand Mr. Sven Grafstrom (Sweden) had accepted his\n2Sec document A/1936.\ninvitation to form with him the Good Offices Commit-\na See documents A/C.1/643 and A/C.1/645.\ntee, as provided in the above resolution.\nUSA\n1"
}