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Korean Military Situation (Working File) (2)
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24468977
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Korean Military Situation (Working File) (2)
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National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Working Files on Guam, Micronesia, and Korea
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1976-04-30
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1975-08-01
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The original documents are located in Box 35, folder "Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 35 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033638
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇRéport
DESCRIPTION
Re North & South Korea
CREATION DATE
08/15/1975
VOLUME
52 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700537
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
35
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033639
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
DESCRIPTION
Re North Korea
CREATION DATE
01/30/1976
VOLUME
7 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700537
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
35
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
open in But 6/5/07
NO Objection TO Deciassncation 2007/00/00 NLR-CODEWORD- 10-0-0-3
ROUTING
Top Secret
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
23
1
(Security Classification)
2
3
4
CONTROL NO
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
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RECOMMENDATION
25X1
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
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INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
RIP
8pago
25X1
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF- CODEWORD - 18-6-3-3 6/5/2007
BY "MD. NARA, DATE 9/20/2011
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
MORI/CDF
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
I
NIO M 76-003J
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
E2 IMPDET
No Object Declas ation.2007 DE-NI E DEWORD
NO IU
-
25X1
30 January 1976
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Recent North Korean Military Developments*
Summary and Conclusions
1. In the past six months, North Korean military activities
have continued to reflect two basic patterns, central to Pyong-
yang's strategy for some time:
-- Across-the-board strengthening of military
capabilities so as to enable the North
Korean armed forces to implement a variety of
military options with maximum effectiveness.
The general effort is as much defensive as
offensive and is obviously related -- al-
though not on a one-to-one basis -- to similar
efforts at force improvement on the ROK side.
-- Maximizing the capability to move rapidly, un-
detected, and in strength from forward positions
in close proximity to the DMZ. Given the geo-
graphy of the peninsula, the offensive implica-
tions of such moves are stronger than the de-
fensive ones.
2. Recent naval and air activities have strengthened al-
25X1
ready impressive North Korean forward capabilities in the south-
west coastal area as well as on the militarily less important
east coast; we have not noted similar ground activities
3. We see no evidence either in these military develop-
ments or in North Korea's political posture to suggest the
* This Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the NIO/
Japan Pacific. It was drafted in part by CIA/OSR which con-
sulted with other elements of CIA.
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF-CODEWORD 18-6-3-3 6/5/2007
BY MLD. NARA, DATE 9/20/2011
25X1
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
NO Objection IV Decassimicationn 2007/00/00 INLF-CUDEVORD- 10-0-0-0
U.S.S.R
5
China
Hwangsuwon
Kusong
Tasa-ri
Sinpo
North Korea
KOREA
RAY
P
"yongyang
Nampo
Kosong-up
Pipa-got+
Northern
Limit Line
Movell Airliald
Taster Airfield
SEA OFJAPAN
Sunwi-do
South Korea
+
0
50
Northern
Miles
Limit Line
25X1
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No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
NO Opjection IU Deciassimicaton 2007/00/00. NLF-UODEWORD-
25X1
imminence of an invasion or a major military probe. Pyongyang
is now in a somewhat better position to support militarily a
decision to carry out probes in the vicinity of the western
islands or to respond more belligerently to unplanned incidents
at sea during the fishing season which begins in the spring.
However, there have also been changes and improvements in the
ROK military posture in this area, which the North would have
to take into account. In the past, while both sides have
seemed to come close to the brink in responding to unplanned
incidents in and over the southwestern waters, they have in
fact exercised great care to leave open the option to edge
back.
25X1
- 2 -
25X1
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
25X1
25X1
9. Since early 1975 new formations of fire support boats
have been deployed near South Korean waters on both coasts.
These boats are armed with 122-mm rocket launchers and have
participated in live-fire exercises, including a simulated
attack on an aircraft carrier.
10. These deployments on both coasts increase the poten-
tial threat to South Korean naval units, permit Pyongyang to
react even more quickly, and with greater firepower, in the
event of naval incidents, and place the navy in a better posi-
tion to support an amphibious assault against the western is25X1
lands.
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11.
Pyongyang is continuing fleet moderniza
tion. A fourth locally-produced R-class submarine has been
launched from the Sinpo South shipyard on the east coast. The
North Koreans now have four R-class boats on each coast, although
the east coast units are not yet fully operational. Pyongyang
also has four older W-class submarines on the east coast. The
additional R-class units improve North Korea's ability to inter-
dict shipping in contiguous waters and pose a greater threat to
South Korean and US naval ships operating in the Sea of Japan.
The new R-class units would also permit Pyongyang to retire or
"mothball" the older W-class boats, but this probably will not
happen for some time.
- 3 -
25X1
TOP SECRET
No Qbjection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
25X1
25X1
12. Ground Force Activity Relatively Static.
25X1
15. Recent Developments Fit Long-Standing Patterns. The
military developments observed over the past six months are
consistent with a pattern that emerged after Pyongyang abandoned
its large-scale harassing operations in the late 1960s. Pro-
gram decisions, probably made at the 5th Party Congress in 1970,
called for strengthening military capabilities and domestic
arms production; in 1972, after the achievement of "Fortress
Korea" had been proclaimed, some greater stress on offensive
capabilities became apparent. These developments probably re-
flected the expectation that by 1975 US troops would be out of
South Korea, the ROK would be substantially weakened, and a
military move to unify the peninsula would be much more likely
to succeed.
- 4 -
25X1
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
NO
25X1
16. Events have not worked out as Pyongyang planned. To
be sure, the North is now in a stronger position to launch con-
ventional operations across the DMZ with little or no warning
than it has ever been before. But Kim obviously feels frus-
trated by the continued US presence and Pyongyang is keenly
concerned over military developments in the South to which it
pays close attention.
25X1
undoubtedly is well aware of the growing strength
of its adversary. Pyongyang's recent blast at General Hollings-
worth's public statements about repulsing a North Korean attack
is but the latest indication of the attention Pyongyang gives
to developments in the South. Thus, while the basic elements
of North Korea's force development strategy seem to date from
the early 1970s, implementation of these long-standing plans
to maximize defensive and offensive capabilities is undoubtedly
influenced by the developments Pyongyang observes across the DMZ.
17. And Political Indicators Remain Unchanged. North
Korea's strengthened military capabilities have not led to any
perceptible shift in the essentially political strategy it has
been following for some time. It continues to be deterred from
an outright assault by the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, the
presence of US troops, the lack of an across-the-board superi-
ority over ROK forces, especially if they are supported by US
tactical air and naval elements, and the need for support from
either Móscow or Peking in a sustained, large-scale conflict.
Moreover, it has reason for satisfaction with the progress of
its political strategy. Although its hopes for the development
of serious political instability in the South have been dis-
appointed, UN endorsement of the pro-North Korean resolution
favoring dissolution of the UN Command underscores the extent
to which Pyongyang's diplomatic struggle with the South has
been successful. But, despite the vote, the North has continued
to participate in the UN Armistice Commission and to recognize
the validity of the Armistice while calling for its replacement
with a peace treaty.
- 5 -
25X1
TOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-3-3
TOP SECRET
25X1
- 9 -
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3
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033640
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
DESCRIPTION
Re North Korea
CREATION DATE
04/1976
VOLUME
15 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700537
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
35
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Military Situation (Working
File) (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
openim part 6/5/07
NO Objection IU Decassincation 2007/00/05 10-0-4-2
3
606348
-Top Secret
fold 77
R10
6-5-07
NSC 140080
CENTIRAL LIMITED INTELLIGENCE AMERICA AGENCY
Jay TayLor
STATES
OF
Intelligence Memorandum
North Korea's Military Forces
NGA Review Completed.
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF CODEWO RD - 18-6-4-2 6/5/2007
MORI/CDF
BY MID. NARA, DATE 9/20/2011
-Top Secret
SR 76-10116J
25X1
April 1976
25X1
Copy 44
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 . NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection IV Declassincationn 2007/00/05 . NLF-CODEWORD- 10-0-4-2
Denied
Page
FORD
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 : NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO IU Declassilication 2007/00/05 25X1
CENTIRAL UNITED INTELLIGENCE STATES AMERICA AGENCY
North Korea's Military Forces
OF
Key Findings
For several years, North Korea has been pursuing a military policy designed to
give its armed forces greater strength and flexibility and, consequently, an increased
capability for offensive operations. Each of its services has improved its standing
relative to its South Korean counterpart.
- The army is smaller than that of South Korea, but it has an edge in
firepower and is far superior in armor.
- The North Korean Air Force, with more than 600 tactical jet aircraft,
outnumbers its South Korean counterpart in air strength and has a better
air defense capability.
- The navies of both Koreas continue to have a primary mission of coastal
defense, but the North Korean Navy, with its larger inventory of patrol
boats, landing craft, and fire support boats, has a growing capability for
limited offensive operations against coastal areas and shipping.
The North Koreans have obtained most of their arms from the Soviet Union
and China. Unlike the South Koreans, however, they have begun producing much of
their own equipment in recent years-including submarines, a guided-missile boat,
frigates, and armored vehicles.
25X1
SR 76-10116J
Top Secret
Apr 76
NO Objection IU Deciassimication
25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
April 1976
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Korea's Military Forces
Preface
Throughout the 1970s, North Korea has been engaged
in various programs to improve its military capabilities.
These efforts--including innovations in training, ac-
quisition of new equipment, and some domestic production
of ships and land armaments--have benefited all three
services. This memorandum reviews the present status
and capabilities of North Korea's ground, air, and
naval forces. It also discusses improvements in
training and the country's efforts to reduce its de-
pendence on imported arms by producing weapons at
home.
The memorandum does not attempt any extensive
comparative analysis of North and South Korean military
capabilities, but does provide (on the reverse of this
page) a table listing the manpower strengths and prin-
cipal equipment of each country's army, air force, and
navy.
25X1
Comments and queries regarding this memorandum are welcome.
They may be directed to
of the Regional
25X1
Analysis Division, Office of Strategic Research
25X1
25X1
SR 76-10116J
Apr 76
Top Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 : NLE-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection TO Deciassimcationn 2007/00/00 . NLF-UODEVORD-0-0-4-2
Page
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 : NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection TO Decassimicaton INLF-CODEWORD- 10-0-4-2
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Contents
Page
Ground Forces
5
Air Force
7
Navy
9
Training
10
Domestic Military Production
10
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3
SR 76-10116J
Top-Secrot
Apr 76
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection TO Deciassincatonn 2007/00/00 NLF-CODEWORD- 10-0-4-2
enied
Page
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 : NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO TO
25X1
Ground Forces
The North Korean Army has an estimated strength
of 386,000 main-force troops and 40,000 unconventional-
warfare forces. Main-force units include 20 infantry
divisions, three infantry brigades, three motorized
infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and three
AAA divisions. Most of these are positioned within 50
miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The unconven-
tional-warfare forces, many of whom are trained in air-
borne and amphibious assault operations, are organized
generally into 11 light infantry brigades and five air-
borne battalions. The ground forces are backed up by a
militia reserve of some 1.3 million men.
Since the late 1960s the North Koreans have been
involved in a major effort to strengthen their ground
forces, especially in the areas of armor, field artil-
lery, and ground mobility. Major items in their arms
inventory now include:
-- 1,500 medium tanks (mostly Soviet T-54/55s
and Chinese Type 59s)
-- 2,600-2,700 field artillery pieces
-- 300 light tanks and assault guns
-- 700 multiple rocket launchers.
The ground forces also have Soviet-supplied FROG
(free rocket over ground) and antitank weapons.
In 1969 the North Koreans began to emphasize the
strengthening of defenses along the DMZ and both
coasts. The firepower of frontline units was increased,
and armor and artillery reserves were dispersed to
forward units. This served to strengthen defensive
capabilities along the DMZ, but the dispersal of armor
assets reduced North Korea's capability for a concen-
trated offensive thrust against the South.
It now appears that Pyongyang has altered that stra-
tegy. Since 1973 the North Koreans have strengthened
their entire armor structure. They have formed a second
armored division, with over 250 medium tanks, within a
25X1
5
SR 76-10116J
rop Secret
Apr 76
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
Deni
nieo
Page
NO
25X1
day's march of the DMZ. Located midway between the
traditional invasion corridors to South Korea, this new
division represents a departure from the concept of
dispersing armor assets and constitutes a force capable
of spearheading an offensive or launching a counter-
offensive in the event of a South Korean attack.
Air Force
The North Korean Air Force is organized into five
fighter divisions, a bomber division, a transport
division, various reconnaissance and training elements,
and an air academy. The backbone of the air force is
its 120 MIG-21 interceptors, the most modern aircraft
the North possesses. These are supplemented by about
90 MIG-19 fighters, 22 SU-7 fighter-bombers, and some
300 older MIG-15/17 fighters. The bomber force con-
sists of 85 IL-28 jet light bombers.
The primary mission of the air force is air defense
of the mainland and coastal areas, but it does have a
capability for offensive operations in support of ground
and naval forces. Indeed, over the past few years the
the North Koreans have placed increasing emphasis on
ground support.
North Korea has 22 permanent-surface airfields
capable of handling jet aircraft. Nineteen currently
are operational and two more--Hyon-ni and Taetan--are
expected to reach that status soon. The North also
has 25 transport/utility fields and 18 highway air
strips for aircraft dispersal. At major fields,
aircraft storage tunnels and hangarettes have been
constructed to provide for greater aircraft sur-
vivability in case of attack. Tunnels or hangarettes
now are present at 18 of the 22 permanent-surface
airfields.
The air force is almost completely dependent on
outside assistance to maintain its effectiveness.
All of its aircraft and most of its other equipment
are of Soviet origin or design, although China has,
7
25X1
Tep-Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection IU Deciassimication 2007/00/00 . NLF-CODEWORD- 10-0-4-2
Denied
Page
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 : NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO Objection TO Deciassimcation NLF-OODEWORD- 10-0-4-2
25X1
since the late 1960s, taken an increasingly larger
role as a supplier.
25X1
Navy
The navy has about 400 combat ships and is divided
into two fleets, one on each coast. The East Coast
Fleet traditionally has been the stronger, but the
North Koreans have considerably strengthened their
western fleet in recent years. The major warships
in the navy include 2 indigenously designed and built
frigates, 19 guided missile boats, 8 torpedo attack
submarines (5 more may become operational in 1976),
and a wide variety of patrol, torpedo, fire support,
and landing craft.
In recent years the North Korean Navy has sur-
passed that of the South in terms of firepower, readi-
ness, and training. Concurrently, it has placed
greater emphasis on fleet modernization. During hos-
tilities, the navy could support limited offensive
operations against coastal areas of the South, pro-
vide rear-area coastal security, and interdict shipping
in the northern portions of South Korean waters, par-
ticularly near the off-shore islands.
Construction and expansion of naval facilities
are continuing apace
25X1
North
Korea also has two major missile support facilities,
one on each coast.
9
25X1
dos
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO
TO
Deciassimication
2007/00/05
25X1
Training
25X1
he armed
forces in the last two years have developed a high
degree of proficiency and combat readiness through ex-
tensive training.
Since 1973, ground force training has stressed
armor and artillery as well as unconventional warfare
scenarios, including exercises involving large- and
small-scale infiltration. No large-scale training by
other conventional ground forces has been noted in
the last two years, but it probably is continuing.
Naval training has grown appreciably. In 1975
there were nine extensive training exercises by units
of both fleets. (In 1974, no large-scale naval ex-
ercises were noted.) Last year's training included
a number of offensively oriented exercises, many
involving amphibious landings and fire support.
In recent years, air force training has emphasized
ground support to a greater degree. The air force has
also been working more closely with the navy to im-
prove coordination between the two services. This
should enhance the ability of the North Koreans to
react quickly to naval incidents in waters near South
Korea.
Domestic Military Production
Over the past several years the North Koreans have
significantly improved their ability to produce mili-
tary equipment. Their capabilities in the field far
exceed those of South Korea, which relies mostly on
the US for its arms. The program is in accord with
Kim Il-song's Chuche (self-reliance) concept and will
reduce North Korea's dependence on the USSR and China.
North Korea is considered self-sufficient in the
manufacture of infantry weapons and ammunition to
meet its peacetime requirements. It currently produces
10
25X1
Top Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NI F-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2
NO
25XT
its own small arms, rocket launchers, mortars, recoil-
less rifles, some light and medium artillery, military
vehicles, communications equipment, ammunition, and
probably the Snapper antitank missile.
25X1
An extensive shipbuilding effort has been under
way since the late 1960s. This is the country's
largest program for producing military equipment.
The program not only permits fleet growth but also
allows for a continual upgrading of the navy as older
units are replaced.
Before 1969 North Korean shipyards were engaged
mostly in producing patrol escorts and torpedo boats.
In 1969, however, the North began construction of
two frigates. Since then the shipbuilding effort has
burgeoned to include submarines, a guided missile boat,
submarine chasers, and a variety of landing and fire
support craft.
11
25X1
Tep Secret
No Objection To Declassification 2007/06/05 NLF-CODEWORD-18-6-4-2