Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
24468985
label
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
24468985
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
citationUrl
collections
National Security Council East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Working Files on Guam, Micronesia, and Korea
subjects
Korea (South)
Korea (North)
Korea
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
24468985
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1974-10-31
month
10
year
1974
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1973-12-01
month
12
year
1973
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
fe92d5ec8d65ee55
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 36, folder "Korean Northwest Islands (Working
File)" of the NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R.
Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 36 of NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff: Files, 1969-1977 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
WÖNSAN
Söp'o-dong.
LIBRAH
Samdung
Anbyon
PYONGYANG
SEA
KOREA
FORD
Onch'on
Pana
Kuum-ni
.
JAPAN
BAY
Kosan,
and
Songnim
CHANGADAE-KKÜT
ervay
Namp'o
Kosöng
Kyum-nl
SOK-TO
*Sinan-ni
Hwangi
Chiha-ri
DEMARCATION LINE
NORTH
KOREA
CH'O-DO
o
Sariwon
Demilitarized Zone is two
*Ich'on
Pokkye-ri
kilometers wide on each
Pyönggang
side of demarcation line
Sinch'on
Chaeryong
Kansöng.
P'yongsan®
Kumhwa
Changyon,
.Ch'órwõn
Sokch'o
Sinwon-ni
*Kümch'on
Hwach'on
Yanggu
*Yönch'on
Paraho
Yangyang,
Tendony
Haeju
o
Kaesong
PAENGNYÖNG-
Onglin
DO
Haziu
P'anmunjom
man
TAECH'ONG-
Yonan
Ch'unch'on
ROK ARMY
Chumunjin®
DO
Munsan-ni
SECTOR
Kangnüngo
SOCH'ÖNG-DO
o
Üljöngbu
TÜNGSAN-GOT
US ARMY
Hongch'on
YÖNP'YÖNG-YÖLTO
SECTOR
U-DO
KANGHWA-DO
ROK MARINE
SECTOR
SOUTH
KOREA
Hoengsong
SEOUL
Yangp'yöngümnae
YELLOW
SEA
YONGYU-DO
INCH'ON
Chöngsön
o
P'yöngch'ang*
Wönju
Yoju
Suwon
D
Ich'on'
Yemi-ri
Yöngwö
Osan
TÕKCHÖK-KUNDO
Changhowön,
*Chech'on
KOREA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA
Ansong
Pyöngt'ack.
Ch'ungiu
Tanyang
0
10
20
30
40 Miles
,Punggi
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
Yongju
.Sosan
*Ch'onan
T'aean
57023 9-67
2
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0767 3400350
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC/ /
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS SECTION I OF VI
SUBJ: 346TH MAC MEETING
FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF THE 346TH MILITARY ARMISTICE
COMMISSION MEETING BETWEEN OFFICIALS OF THE UN COMMAND MAC
AND THE KPA/CPV, ON 1 DECEMBER 1973. THIS TRANSCRIPT CANNOT
BE CONSIDERED OFFICIAL UNTIL APPROVED BY THE LANGUAGE OFFICIALS
OF EACH SIDE, HOWEVER IT WAS MADE FROM TAPES OF THE MEETING
AND IS CONSIDERED ACCURATE, AND LITTLE OR NO CHANGES ARE EXPECTED.
YOU WILL BE ADVISED IF THERE ARE SUBSTANTIV CHANGES TO THESE
STATEMENTS AS A RESULT OF THE LANGUAGE OFFICIALS MEETING,
HOWEVER FINAL KPA APPROVAL IS NOT EXPECTED FOR 7 TO 10 DAYS.
STATEMENT 1
I HAVE A STATEMENT TO MAKE ON GRAV VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT COMMITTED BY THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AT THE INSTIGATION OF YOU
U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. AS YOU KNOW, PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMIST-
ICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHALL BE APPLIED
To ALL OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES WHICH NAVAL FORCES SHALL RESPECT THE
WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND THE LAND AREAS OF KOREA
UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDES, AND SHALL NOT ENGAGE
IN BLOCKADE OF ANY KIND OFF KOREA.
HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE HAS KEPT ON VIOLATING EACH PROVISION SINCE THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, AND OF LATE, INFILTRATING LARGE NUMBERS
OF NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS TO COMMIT VICIOUS ESPIONAGE
AND HOSTILE ACTS. IT IS CLEAR TO EVERYBODY THAT IF YOUR SIDE CONTINUES
TO COMMIT SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS, IT WILL BRING GRAV IRRETREIVABLE
CONSEQUENCES. THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO PREV NT AGGRAVATION OF TENSION
IN OUR COUNTRY, AND TO KEEP GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FROM BEING BROUGHT
ABOUT, OUR SIDE HAS PATIENTLY DEMANDED YOUR SIDE TO CEASE SUCH CRIMIN-
AL ACTS WHENEV R YOUR SIDE INFILTRATED NAVAL V SSELS INTO OUR SIDE TO
COMMIT ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS.
AT THE 344TH MAC MEETING, HELD ON OCTOBER 12, OUR SIDE ALSO POINTED
OUT THAT YOUR SIDE HAD COMMITTED ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY MORE
FREQUENTLY INFILTRATING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED SPY-SHIPS AND
OTHER V SSELS INTO THE SEA OFF HAEJU, DUNGSANGOT AND ONGJIN PENINSULAS
*WHSR
COMMENT
SMYSER FROEBE
PSN:001029
PAGE 01
TOR:340/03:54Z
DTG:060230Z NOV073
*******UNCL ASSIFIED*******S COPY
CERALS
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
IN OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA OF LATE, AND STRONGLY DEMANDED
YOUR SIDE TO CEASE AT ONE SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS.
THIS NOTWITHSTANDING, YOUR SIDE HAS KEPT ON VICIOUSLY COMMITTING
SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS INSTEAD OF CARRYING OUT OUR JUST DEMANDS. AMONG
THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED RECENTLY BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR COASTAL WATERS
IN THE WEST SEA, I WILL NOW POINT OUT ONLY THE INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED
ON NOVEMBER 27, 28 AND THIS MORNING. HAVE A CLOSE LOOK AT THAT CHART.
AROUND 0330 HOURS ON NOV MBER 27, OUR SIDE WATCHED CLOSELY THE DEST-
ROYER 96 OF YOUR SIDE AFTER FINDING HER APPROACHING OUR COASTAL WATERS
FROM THE SOUTHERN SEA TO THE WESTERN SEA. THIS DESTROYER CONTINUED TO
MOVE NORTHWARD. AROUND 0415 HOURS IT INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS
IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 30MIN NORTH, 125DGS 13 MIN EAST AND VEERED
TO THE EAST. THIS VESSEL MOVED INTO THE DIRECTION OF YONPYONG-DO
ISLAND, PASSING THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 125DGS 22MIN EAST
AROUND 0530 HOURS AND THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 33MIN NORTH, 125DGS 32MIN
EAST AROUND 0600 HOURS. AFTER THAT, THE VESSEL MOVED ABOUT THE SEA
BETWEEN DAEYOPYONG-DO AND SOYONPYONG-DO SILANDS FOR ABOUT HOURS FROM
AROUND 0645 HOURS; AND, IT VEERED TO THE WEST AND PASSED THE SEA IN
THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 35MIN NORTH, 125DGS 25MIN EAST AROUND 0920 HOURS;
AND, THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125DGS 13MIN EAST
AROUND 0955 HOURS. THE DESTROYER MET YOUR SIDE'S DESTROYER 91 ON THE
SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 125 05 EAST AROUND 1045
HOURS. AT AROUND 1200 HOURS, IT ARRIV D ON THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF
37DGS 29MIN NORTH, 1250GS 23MIN EAST, VIA THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 30MIN
NORTH, 125DGS 06MIN EAST, AND IT V ERED TO THE WEST, MOVING TO THE
NORTHWEST VIA THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124DGS 58MIN EAST AT
ABOUT 1730 HOURS. THAT DAY THE DESTROYER 91 OF YOUR SIDE APPEARED FROM
THE SOUTHERN SEA AROUND 0540 HOURS AND MOVED TO THE NORTH. AROUND 0615
HOURS AT INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS AT COORDINATES 37DGS 29MIN
NORTH, 125DGS 06MIN EAST. THE DESTROYER MET THE AFORESAID DESTROYER 96
OF YOUR SIDE ON THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 27MIN NORTH, 1250GS
05MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1045 HOURS AFTER PASSING THE SEA AT COORDINATES
37DGS 29MIN NORTH, 1250GS 02MIN EAST. AROUND 1130 HOURS IT PASSED THE
VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124 DGS 57MIN EAST AND ARRIVED ON THE
SEA AT COORDINATES 370GS 32MIN NOR H, 125DGS 04MIN EAST AROUND 1700
BEFORE FLEEING SOUTHWARDS.
SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS OF YOUR SIDE WERE REPEATEDLY COMMITTED ON NOVEMBER
28, TOO. THAT IS, THE DESTROYER 96 OF YOUR SIDE WHICH HAD BEEN
MOVING TO THE NORTHWEST IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 31MIN NORTH, 124DGS
58MIN EAST AROUND 1720 HOURS ON NOV 27, AFTER INTRUDING INTO OUR
COASTAL WATERS, DID NOT WITHDRAW FROM OUR COASTAL WATERS ON NOVEMBER
28, BUT MOVED AROUND THE SEA WEST OF BAEKRYONG-DO, DAECHONG-DO AND
SOCHONG-DO ISLANDS. AROUND 1245 HOURS, IT WENT TO THE SOUTH AFTER
PASSING THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 41MIN NORTH, 124DGS 50MIN EAST AT ABOUT
1220 HOURS, AND ON THE DAY APB, HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT SHIP, WHICH APP-
EARED FROM THE SOUTHERN SEA TO THE WEST SEA, INTRUDES INTO OUR COASTAL
WATERS. THIS SHIP INTRUDED INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 38MIN
NORTH, 124DGS 47MIN EAST AROUND 0430 HOURS AND THE SEA AT COORDINATES
37DGS 43MIN NORTH, 124DGS 47MIN EAST AT ABOUT 0530 HOURS AND THEN MOVED
PSN: 001029 PAGE 02
DTG:060230Z NOV 73.
IBRARY
TOR:340/03:54Z
N CLASSIFI E D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
ABOUT ON THE SEA WEST OF BAEKRYONG DO, DAECHONG-DO AND SOCHONG-DO
ISLANDS BEFORE FLEEING TO THE SOUTH. LSMR 311 OF YOUR SIDE, WHICH WAS
MOVING ABOUT ON THE SEA IN THE VICINITY OF 37DGS 26MIN NORTH, 125DGS
27MIN EAST ON THE DAY INTRUDED INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 31
MIN NORTH, 125DGS 19MIN EAST AROUND 1030 HOURS VIA VICINITY OF 37DGS
27MIN NORTH, 125DGS 18MIN EAST AT ABOUT 1015 HOURS BEFORE MOVING TO
THE SOUTH.
OUR PERSONNEL WHO WERE PERFORMING THEIR PATROL DUTY IN OUR COASTAL
WATERS ON THE WEST SEA, TOOK IT SERIOUS THAT THE NAVAL CRAFT OF YOUR
SIDE INTRUDED INTO THE COASTAL OF OUR SIDE AND REPEATEDLY DEMANDED
THEM 0 WITHDRAW FROM OUR COASTAL WATERS. HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE'S NAVAL
VESSELS THAT HAD INTRUDED INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE DID NOT
COMPLY WITH OUR DEMAND, BUT CONTINUOUSLY MOVED HERE AND THERE TO COMMIT
ESPIONAGE ACTS AGAINST OUR SIDE AND COMMIT PROVOCATIVE HOSTILITIES
OF HINDERING OUR NAVAL V SSELS FROM PERFORMING THEIR ROUTINE PATROL
DUTY. IT IS BY NO MEANS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE WHAT GRAVE CONSEQUENCES
WOULD HAVE HAPPENED ON THAT DAY BUT FOR THE PATIENCE OF OUR PERSONNEL.
DURING THE PERIOD WHEN YOUR DESTROYERS 96 AND 91 AND APB HIGH-SPEED
TRANSPORT SHIP AND LSMR 311 WERE COMMITTING ESIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS
AFTER INTRUDING INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS, LANDING SHIP MEDIUM AND
PATROL BOAT AND OTHER SHIPS OF YOUR SIDE WERE READY FOR ACTION MOVING
IN THE AREAS MARKED ON THAT CHART. THE FACTS UNDOUBTEDLY PROV THAT
THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITTED BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE
WEST SEA ON NOV MBER 27 AND 28 LAST WERE INTENTIONAL AND PREPLANNED
ONES. AROUND 0745 HOURS THIS MORNING, DESTROYER 96 OF THE SOUTH
KOREAN NAVY, NAVIGATED BY YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, INTRUDED
INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES 37DGS 30MIN NORTH, 125DGS 12MIN EAST OFF
DUNGSANGOT IN THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE AFD VEERED TO THE EAST
AND AROUND 0940 HOURS IT COMMITTED AN ESPIONAGE ACT OF TAKING
PICTURES AFTER INTRUDING AS FAR INTO THE SEA AS COORDINATES 37DGS
32MIN NORTH, 125DGS 24MIN EAST.
BT
FORD LIBRARS is 87511
PSN:001029
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:340/03:54Z
DTG:060230Z NOV 73
N CLASSIFI E D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0768 3400350
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC/ /
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS SECTION II OF VI
AS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ORGANIZED THE
SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL CRAFTS TO INTRUDE INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS TO COMMIT
ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AND TO ENFORCE THE SEA BLOCKADE AND WHAT
IS WORSE, COMMIT WITHOUT HESITATION SUCH OUTRAGEOUS ACTS AS HINDER
SEA NAVIGATION OF FOREIGN MERCHANT THIPS ENTERING THE PORT IN THE
WEST SEA OF OUR COUNTRY.
HOW CAN SUCH CONDUCT BE REGARED AS AN EXPRESSION OF RESPECT OF THE
SEA OF OUR SIDE? IT IS NOT ONLY A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT BUT ALSO A VICIOUS CHALLENGE TO PEACE IN KOREA AS WELL AS IN
THE FAR EAST THAT SOUTH KOREAN NAVAL V SSELS INTRUDED INTO OUR COASTAL
WATERS TO PERPETRATE VICIOUS ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OUR
SIDE AT THE INSTIGATION OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORSM WHILE
COMMITTING ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY INTRUDING SOUTH KOREAN
NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE AS MENTIONED ABOV ,
YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS PERPETRATED THE SHAMELESS ACTS OF
SLANDERING AND DEFAMING OUR SIDE AT RANDOM BY FABRICATING NON-EXISTENT
INCIDENTS WORDING THAT OUR VESSLES INTRUDED INTO WATERS CONTIGOUS
TO YOUR SIDE, COMMITTED ALLEGED PROVOCATIONS AND THE LIKE IN A DIRTY
ATTEMP TO COVER UP YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS AND TO MISLEAD THE WORLD PUBLIC.
ARE YOU TALKING SUCH STUPID NONSENSE IN A CLEAR MIND? ON THE MORNING
OF NOVEMBER 28, OUR NAVAL VESSELS HAS NEVER BEEN TO THE LOCATION TO
WHICH YOU ARE REFERRING. EVEN IF THEY WERE THERE, IT CAN BY NO MEANS
BE A VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, NOR ANY INTRUSION, NOR PR-
OVOCATION. REFERE TO PAR 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH EXPRESSLY
PRESCRIBES THAT QUOTE ALL THE ISLANDS LYING TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF
THE PROVINCEAT BOUNDARY LINE WHICH IN WHANGHAE-DO AND KYONGGI-DO SHALL
BE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE KOREAN
PEOPLE'S ARMY AND COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS, EXCEPT
THE ISLAND GROUP OF BAEKRYONG-DO, 37DGS 58MIN NORTH, 124DGS 40MIN
EAST, DAECHONG-DO, 37DGS 50MIN NORTH, 124DGS 42MIN EAST, SOCHONG-DO,
37DGS 46MIN NORTH, 124DGS 46MIN EAST, YONGPYONG-DO, 37DGS 38MIN NORTH,
125DGS 40MIN EAST, AND UDO, 37DGS 36MIN NORTH, 125DGS 58MIN EAST,
WHICH SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER IN
*WHSR COMMENT
SMYSER FROEBE
FURD
PSN:001035
PAGE 01
TOR:340/03:58Z
DTG:060230Z DEC
73
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. UNQUOTE.
AS IS CLEARLY WRITTEN IN THE PARAGRAPH, THESE FIVE ISLAND GROUPS ARE
IN OUR COASTAL WATERS. NO PROVISION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES
FOR ANY BOUNDARY OR THE SO-CALLED ARMISTICE STRAIT ON THE WESTERN SEA.
THE SEA AREA INVOLVING THE WATERS CONTIGOUS TO THE FIV ISLANDS IN THE
WEST SEA BELONG TO OUR COASTAL WATERS. IT ACCORDS WITH THE REQUIREMENTS
OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND IS ROUTINE THAT OUR NAVAL CRAFTS HAVE
THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN OUR COASTAL WATERS AND THEREFORE, NO
PROBLEM WILL ARISE THEREFROM. WE HAV THE RIGHT OF FREE ACTIVITY IN
OUR COASTAL WATERS. NO ONE CAN INFRINGE UPON THIS RIGHT AFD NO ACTION
DESIGNED TO VIOLATE THIS RIGHT OF OURS CAN BE TOLERATED.
OUR SIDE STRONGLY PROTESTS AND DENOUNCE YOUR SIDE FOR ITS HAVING
RECENTLY COMMITTED ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS BY INTRUDING VARIOUS
NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE IN GROSS VIOLATION
OF THE PREAMBLE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND PARAGRAPHS 15 AND 17
THEREOF, AND FOR ITS NASTY CONDUCT OF DEFAMING AND SLANDERING OUR
SIDE AT RANDOM BY FABRICATING NON-EXISTENT INCIDENTS. AT THE SAME
TIME, OUR SIDE STRONGLY DEMANDS YOUR SIDE TO MAKE ASSURANCE AT THIS
TABLE THAT IT WILL NOT REITERATE SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE FUTURE.
UNC 1
AT THE 344TH MILITARY ARMISTICE COMMISSION MEETING, 12 OCTOBER 1973,
AND AGAIN TODAY, YOUR SIDE CHARGED OUR SIDE WITH NAVAL VIOLATIONS
OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN THE SEA OFF HAEJU, TEUNGSANGOT, AND
ONGJIN PENINSULA. ALTHOUGH YOUR PREVIOUS CHARGES WERE GENERAL IN
NATURE, OUR SIDE, IN A SINCERE EFFORT TO IMPLEMENT THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT, MADE A THOROUGH INVESTIGATION OF YOUR CHARGES BUT COULD
FIND NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO SUBSTANTIATE YOUR ALLEGATIONS.
CONVINCED THAT YOUR SIDE AHD SOME NOTIVE FOR MAKING THE CHARGES, OUR
SIDE HAS MAINTAINED CLOSE SURV ILLANCE OF THIS ENTIRE SEA AREA AND
HAS INSURE THAT OUR VESSELS IN NO WAY VIOLATE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
THAT IS WHY I CAN ASSURE YOU TODAY, WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION,
THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHATSO-
AVER BY NAVAL VESSELS OF OUR SIDE, IN SPITE OF YOUR ALLEGATIONS. IN SHORT,
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR YOUR CHARGES AND WE CATEGORICALLY DENY THEM AS
COMPLETE FABRICATIONS. HOWEVER, OUR SURVEILLANCE HAS REVEALED THE
FOLLOWING ACTIVITY BY NAVAL VESSELS OF YOUR SIDE.
ON THE MORNINGOF 28 NOVEMBER 1973, TWO OF YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS
VIOLATED WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG DO IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF
PARA 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. APPROACHING FROM THE NORTHEAST,
TH SE BOATS WERE WITHIN 1300 YARDS OF SOCHONG DO AT COORDINATES
37DGS47MIN06DGS N, 124DGS45MIN48" E AT 0815 HOURS. IN FURTHER VIOLATION
OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, THESE BOATS THEN MADE AN EXTREMELY PROVOCA-
TIVE MANEUVER IN THE DIRECT PATH OF AND IN PROXIMITY TO A NAVAL
VESSEL OF OUR SIDE BEFORE DEPARTING THE AREA IN A NORTHEASTERLY
DIRECTION.
ON THE SAME DAY, ONE OF YOUR SIDE'S PATROL GUN BOATS AGAIN VIOLATED
OUR WATERS, THIS TIME WATERS CON IGUOUS TO PAENGNYONG DO. AT 1315 HOURSD
THIS BOAT WAS ATCOORDINATES 37DGS53MIN42" N, 124DGS43MIN00" E, A
FORD
POSITION WHICH IS WITHIN 3000 YARDS OF PAENGNYONG DO. IN ADDITION,
68863
LIBRARY
PSN:001035 PAGE 02
TOR:
340/03:58Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
NCLASSIFI E D*******S COPY
N CLASSIFI E D*******S COPY
DURING THE EARLY MORNING OF 19 NOV MBER 1973, ONE OF YOUR V SSELS,
IN VIOLATION OF PARA 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, MOVED INTO
CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF PAENGNYONG DO AND, AT 0450 HOURS, WAS WITHIN 1800
YARDS OF THE ISLAND. SINCE THE VESSEL WAS NOT CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AT
THAT TIME BECAUSE OF THE DARKNESS, OUR SIDE DID NOT CHARGE YOUR SIDE
WITH THIS VIOLATION AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER SINCE OUR SIDE'S VESSELS WERE
ALL ACCOUNTED FOR, SINCE YOUR SIDE'S V SSELS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY
IDENTIFIED IN THE AREA, AND SINCE YOUR SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS HAVE MADE
YOUR INTENT CLEAR, OUR SIDE NOW CONCLUDES THAT THIS VESSEL ALSO BE-
LONGED TO YOUR NAVAL FORCES. THUS WE CHARGE YOU WITH THIS VIOLATION ALSO
OUR SIDE CHARGED YOUR SIDE WITH VIOLATION OF THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO
SOCHONG DO BY MESSAGE WHICH YOUR SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT YOU HAD RECEIV D
AT 1758 HOURS ON 28 NOVEMBER 1973. THEREFORE, IT IS WITH EVEN GREATER
CONCERN TO OUR SIDE THAT, SUBSEQUENT TO THE RECEIPT OF OUR CHARGE,
YOUR SIDE HAS CONTINUED TO VIOLATE THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF OUR SIDE'S
ISLANDS.
THERE IS ABOSLUTELY NO DOUBT THAT THE PRESENCE OF YOUR GUN BOATS 1300
YARDS OFFSHORE SOCHONG-DO IN THE CASE OF THE TWO PATROL GUN BOATS OF
YOUR SIDE ON 28 NOVEMBER, 3000 YARDS OFFSHORE PAENGNYONG-DO IN THE CASE
OF ANOTHER VIOLATION BY ONE OF YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS LATER THAT DAY,
AND 4400 YARDS OFFSHORE TAEOHONG-DO BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ON 30
NOV MBER, AND 5000 YARDS OFFSHORE SOCHONG-DO BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOAT
LATER THAT SAME DAY, AND 4600 YARDS OFFSHORE TAEYONGPYONG-DO THIS V RY
MORNING CONSTITUTE ENCROACHMENT OF OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS IN
CLEAR VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTIC AGREEMENT.
ALL YOUR DENIALS CAN NOT CHANGE THE TRUTH AND I AGAIN REMIND YOU
THAT YOR SIDE'S NAVAL ACTIVITIES IN THIS AREA ARE OF GREAT CONCERN.
OUR SIDE MUST REITERATE - LET THERE BE NO DOUBT - THESE ISLANDS
ARE TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF OUR SIDE IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH
13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND YOUR SIDE VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 15 WHEN
YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ENTERED THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THESE ISLANDS.
BT
8.-
FORD
GENALS
PSN:001035
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:340/03:58Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0769 3400350
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA / / A UNC/ I
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS SECTION III OF VI
STATEMENT #3
BEING DENDUNCED BY OUR SIDE, YOU ARE NOW UNREASONABLY COMPLAINING
THAT IT IS WRONG TO ADDRESS AN INDIVIDUAL MEMBER NATION OF THE UNC.
YOUR ALLEGATION IS NO MORE THAN A PRETEXT TO HIDE THE TRUE NATURE OF
THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR ARMY WITH THE SIGNBOARD OF THE UN FORCES.
THAT IS ALREADY WELL KNOWN To THE WORTD THAT SO-CALLED U.N. FORCES
IS IN ITS NATURE THE U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSOR ARMY OCCUPYING SOUTH
KOREA. YOUR SUCH SELESS CHARGES ONLSERV TO REVEAL MORE CLEARLY THE
SHAMELESSNES OF THE U.S. IMPERIALIST APHRESSORS. DTN'T REITERATE ANY
LONQEYYOUY SILLY REMARKS.
SUB70-6-&4-0# 13D OF THE ARMISTCBAPFVEP POINTSHOUO THAT
BAEKRYONGDO DAECHONG-DOXN SOCHONG-0 YONPYONG-DO:UDOISLANDS IOCATEDT
LI OUR CLASTUL WEERS ANDTHAT YOUR SIEONPK EXERCISES KZNTROLOF THEMQM
PAGEQU RKAA07M NCLAS
YOU SHOULD EASE THE APGRESSIVE AND BURGLARIOUS CONDUCT OX ARBIORARILY
DOTERMINGOTNER SECUASTAL WATERLBY ALTERING THE FACTS.
YOUR WORDS ARE NO MORE THAN A OPEN ADMISSION OF THE INTRUSION OF
YOUR NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS. ACCORDINGLY, WHAT YOU HAVE
TO DO AT THIS TABLE IS NOT TO ENGAGE IN MAKNG USELESS CHARGES BUT TO
ASSURE FOR TAKING STEPS TO CEASE YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS.
WHAT ACTION WILL YOUR SIDE TAKE TO PRECLUDE CRIMINAL ACTS? MAKE A
CLEAR CUT ANSWER TO THIS.
YOU HAVE JUST DECLARED THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT STATED THAT THE
PAENGNYONG-DO, TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-DO ARE
WITHIN YOUR COASTAL WATERS. PARA 13B DOES NOT MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT.
AGAIN OUR SIDE STATES CATEGORICALLY THAT OUR V SSELS HAV OPERATED
ONLY IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'
ISLANDS.
KPA STATEMENT #4
YOUSEEM TO HAVE NO CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTENTS OF THE ARM-
ISTICE AGREEMENT. LISTEN CAREFULLY TO MY STATEMENT. PARA 15 OF THE ARM-
ISTICE AGREEMENT READS AS FOLLOWS: THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT SHALL APPLY
TO ALL OPPOSING NAVAL FORCES, WHICH NAVAL FORCES SHALL RESPECT THE
FORD
LIDHARD
PSN:001041
PAGE
01
TOR:340/04:05Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
*******U NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
*******UNCLASSTFIED*******S COPY
WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND TO THE LAND AREA OF
KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE, AND SHALL NOT
ENGAGE IN BLOCKADA OF AMY KIND OF KOREA, AND PARA 13B OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT STIPULATES AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE ALL THE ISLANDS LYING TO THE
NORTH AND WEST OF PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN WHANGHAE-DO AND
KYONGGI-DO SHALL BE UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER
OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMANDER OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S
VOLUNTEERS EXCEPT THE ISLAND GROUPS, BAEKRYONG-DO, 37DGS 58MIN NORTH
124DGS 40MIN EAST, DAECHONG-DO 37DGS 50MIN NORTH, 124DGS 42MIN EAST,
SOCHONG-DO 37DGS 46MIN NORTH, 124DGS 46MIN EAST, YONGPYONG-DO, 37DGS
38MIN NORTH, 125DGS 40MIN EAST, AND U-DO, 37DGS 36MIN NORTH, 125DGS 58
MIN EAST, WHICH SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF THE COMMANDER
IN CHEIF OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAFD UNQUOTE. AS YOU SEE, NO PARA OF
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT ANY PART OF WATERS OF THE WEST
SEA IS THE WATERS OF YOUR SIDE. THEREFORE, Q AGAIN CALL YOUR ATTENTION
TO THE FACT THAT ALL THE WATERS INVOLVING THE WATERS OFF THE FIVE IS-
LANDS IN THE WEST SEA ARE THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE.
NOW, IS THIS CLEAR TO YOU? DON'T BE IN A HURRY, BEING IGNORANT OF
YOUR RIGHT HAND FROM THE LEFT AND THE CONTENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREE-
MENT. WHEN WILL YOUR SIDE CEASE IT PROVOCATIVE ACTS? ANSWER.
YOUR INTERPRETATION OF PARAGRAPH 13B BEGINS TO SOUND LIKE YOUR
INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORY OF THE WAR IN 1950 AS YOU HAVE EXPLAINED
THAT IN PAST MEETINGS.
I UNDERSTAND THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT V RY WELL, AND IT
DOES NOT STATE THAT THE ISLANDS IN QUESTION LIE WITHIN YOUR TERRITORIAL
WATERS AS YOU STATED. PERHAPS YOU SHOULD READ IT AGAIN.
IN REFERENCE TO PARA 15, MUST I EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE FOR YOU BE-
TWEEN LAND AND SEA? ISLANDS ARE LAND - THE SEA IS COMPOSED OF WATER.
STATEMENT #5.
YOU HAVE JUST GIVEN US A DISTORTED INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE
AGREEM NT AND WHAT IS WORSE YOU HAV GONE SO FAR AS TO REITERATE
YOUR ABSURD ALLEGATIONS THAT OUR COASTAL WATERS BELONG TO YOUR SIDE.
AS IS CLEAR IN SUB PARA 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, FIV ISLANDS
IN THE WEST SEA LIE TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF THE BOUNDARY LINE OF
WHAENGHAE-DO PROVINCE AND KYONGGI-DO PROVINCE, THEREFORE THE WATERS
NORTH OF THE BOUNDARY LINE OF WHAENGHAE-DO PROVINCE AND KYONGGI DO PRO-
VINCE BELONG TO OUR COASTAL WATERS. NOW, IF THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE
THE LAND OF AFRICA? CEASE MAKING SUCH RECKL SS REMARKS WHICH EXPOSE
UNWITTINGLY THE BIGANDISH NATURE OF YOU AGGRESSORS.
WILL YOUR SIDE STOP COMMITTING ESPIONAG AND HOSTILE ACTS BY
INTRUDING ITS NAVAL VESSELS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF OUR SIDE?
ANSWER.
#5
AGAIN I SAY OUR SIDE'S VESSELS HAV NOT COMMITTED ANY VIOLATIONS OF
THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THEY HAVE ONLY OPERATED IN INTERNATIONAL
WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY.
FORD
KPA STATEMENT #6
INSTEAD OF FRANKLY ADMIT YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS OF HAVING INTRUDED NAVAL
MERALD
VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS, APOLOGIZING FOR THEM TO OUR SIDE AND
PSN: 001041
PAGE 02
TOR:340/04:05Z DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
GIVING RESPONSIBLE ASSURANCE FOR CEASING SIMILAR CRIMINAL CATS IN THE
FUTURE, YOU AREMAKING A VAIN ATTEMPT TO COVER UP YOUR CRIMINAL ACTS,
TALKING ABOUT HIGH SEAS OR THE LIKE.
HOW CAN OUR COASTAL WATERS BE THE HIGH SEA? WHAT IS THIS BUT
TUGLARIOUS LOGIC OF A MAN WHO JUNPED INTO THE ROOM OF OTHERS INSISTING
THAT HE IS OUTSIDE THE HOUSE? WITH SUCH A SHAMELESS REMARK AS HIGH SEA
OR THE LIKE, YOU CANNOT COVER UP THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF HAVING DIS-
PATCHED NAVAL VESSELS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS.
ON 30 NOVEMBER 1973,AT 0715 HOURS, TWO OF YOUR PATROL BOATS
APPROACHED TO A POINT WITHIN 4400 YARDS OF TAECHONG 00, AT
COORDINATES 37 48' 00'' N, 124 471 55''E. AT 0830 HOURS ON
30 NOVEMBER ANOTHER PATROL BOAT OF YOIR SIDE APPROACHED
TO A POINT WITHIN 500 YARDS OF SOCHONG DO AAT COORDINATES 37 47'
48'' N, 124 49' 36''E. AND FINALLY THIS VERY MORNING AT 0715
HOURS STILL ANOTHER PATROL BOAT OF YOUR SIDE APPROACHED WITHIN
4600 YARDS OF TAEYONGPYONG-DO AT COORDINATES 37 39' 02"N, 125 37'
04'' E. THUS BETWEEN 19 NOV MBER AND 1 DECEMBER YOUR SIDE HAS VIO-
LATED THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OF OUR SIDE ON 6 DIFFERENT OCCASIONS. FIV
OF THESE HAVE OCCURRED IN THE LAST THREE AND A HALF (3 1/2) DAYS.
THESE VIOLATIONS HAVE OBVIOUSLY BEEN DELIBERATELY PLANNED AND
EXECUTED. YOUR SIDE'S ACTIONS ARE HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE AND ARE OF
GRAVE CONCERN TO OUR SIDE. THE ONLY INTERPRETATIONS THAT CAN BE
PLACED ON YOUR ACTIONS IS A TOTAL DISREGARD FOR THE PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. PET THERE BE NO
DOUBT-THESE ISLANDS ARE TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF OUR SIDE IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 13B OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND YOUR
SIDE VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 15 WHEN YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS ENTERED THE
WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THESE ISLANDS.
KPA NR2
YOU HAVE MADE SILLY ATTEMPT TO DENY THE CRIMINAL ACTS COMMITED BY
SOUTH KOREAN ARMY WHICH DELIBERATELY DISPATCHED ITS NAVAL V SSELS,
ARMED SPYSHIPS AND BOATS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AT
BT
B.
FORD
GENALD
PSN:001041
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:340/04:05Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N ICLASSIFI'E D*******S COPY
*******UNC LASSIFIED*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0770 3400350
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC/ I
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS SECTION IV OF VI
THE INSTIGATION OF YOU U. S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS. AS WAS DISCLOSED
AT THE PAST MEETINGS AND THIS MEETING, IT IS AN IRREFUTABLE FACT
THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY COMMITTED SUCH HOSTILE ACTS OF DISPATCHING
NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED SPY SHIPS AND BOATS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS OFF
HAEJU, DUNGSANGOT AND JANGSANGOT IN THE WEST COAST. YOUR SIDE,
HOWEVER, ATTEMPTED TO DENY IT. THIS A MERE INDICATION OF YOUR SIDE'S
INTENTION NOT TO TAKE PRACTICAL STEPS TO STOP ITS CRIMINAL ACTS BUT
TO CONTINUE SIMILAR CRIMINAL ACTS IN THE FUTURE, TOO. YOU ARE
BRAZEN-FACED ENOUGH TO MAKE SUCH PREPOSTEROUS REMARKS THAT DOUR
NAVAL CRAFTS COMMITTED VIOLATIONS AND PROVOCATIONS AND WHAT NOT.
HOW COULD YOU MAKE TH NONSENSICAL REMARKS ON VIOLATING WATERS
CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG-DO ISLAND? IN YOUR TELEPHONE MESSAGE SENT TO ME
AT 1755 HOURS ON NOV MBER 28 AND TODAY, YOU STATED THAT OUR TWO NAVAL
BOATS VIOLATED WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO SOCHONG-DO ISLANDAT COORDIN-
ATES 37 47' 0611 NORTH, 124 45' 48'' EAST. ACCORDING TO THE SOUTH
KOREAN RADIO CHUNGANG AT 1300 HOURS ON NOVEMBER 28, THE SPOKESMAN
OF THE SOUTH KOREAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANNOUNCED THAT
OUR NAVAL V SSELS INTRUDED FOR A WHILE INTO THE SEA AT COORDINATES
37 50' NORTH, 125 50' EAST. THE LOCATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM
THE ONE YOU EXPLAINED. STILL IN ILLCONCERTED ACTIONS, HOWEV R, YOU
VOCIFEROUSLY TALKED AS IF OUR NAVAL VESSELS INFILTERATED INTO THE
DIFFERENT SPOT FOURM MILES AWAY. THIS CLEARLY PROV S THAT YOU WERE
IN A GREAT HURRY TO FABRICATE THE INCIDENTS. YOU HAVE SHAMELESSLY
TALKED ABOUT THE SO-CALLED "INTRUSION" INTO THE TERRITORIAL WATERS.
HOW COULD YOU POSSIBLY ALLEGE OTHERS COASTAL WATERS TO BE YOUR TERR-
ITORIAL WATERS IF YOU ARE NOT MAD IN THE AGGRESSION AND BURGLARIOUS
PLUNDER? DO YOU REGARD OUR WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AS THE WATERS IN
THE SOUTH SEA OF KOREA? HOW CAN YOU POSSIBLY ALLEGE OUR COASTAL WATERS
IN THE WEST SEA INDICATED ON THE CHART SHOWING THE INTRUSION OF
YOUR NAVAL VESSELS TO BE YOUR TERRITORIAL WATERS? CAN'T YOU
DISTINGUISH NORTH, EAST, SOUTH AND WEST? YOU, WHO ARE MATCHLESSLY
SHAMELESS, HAVE PILED UP SUCH NONSENSICAL REMARKS THAT OUR NAVAL
B.
1080
BOATS COMMITTED PROVOCATIONS IN THE PATH OF YOUR NAVAL V SSELS.
CERALS
PSN:001044
PAGE 01
TOR:340/04:09Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFI E' D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
WHICH PATH OF YOUR NAVAL VESSELS. WHAT NONSENSE! YOUR SIDE HAS
COMMITTED PROVOCATIONS BY DISPATCHING NAVAL BOATS WHICH WERE ON THEIR
ROUTINE PATROL DUTY, BUT ALLEGED THAT OUR BOATS BLOCKED THE PATH OF
ITS VESSELS, REVERSING BLACK AND WHITE. THIS ALLEGATION VIVIDLY SHOWS
THAT THE BURGLARIOUS NATURE AND SHAMELESSNESS OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST
AGGRESSORS. STOP MAKING THE BURGLARIOUS REMARKS OF THE AGGRESSORS.
TODAY AT THIS TABLE, YOU ARE ATTEMPTING TO REV RSE RIGHT AND WRONG
BY DISTORTING THE STERN FACTS AT RANDOM. THIS IS A SELF-EXPOSURE
THAT NONE OTHER THAN YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ARE THE RING-
LEADERS OF YOUR SIDE'S CRIMINAL ACTS BEING COMMITTED RECENTLY IN OUR
COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA. AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED, IN DIS-
REGARD OF OOUR PATIENT WARNING, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ARE
INSTIGATING SOUTH KOREAN ARMY BELLICOSE ELEMENTS TO CONTINOUSLY
DISPATCH NUMEROUS NAVAL V SSELS TO OUR COASTAL WATERS AND COMMIT
ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS. DURING THE P RIOD FROM FEBRUARY
TO NOV MBER 20 THIS YEAR ALONE, YOUR SIDE INFILTRATED INTO OUR COASTAL
WATERS DESTROYERS ON 11 OCCASIONS AND LSMR'S ON 9 OCCASIONS,
LSTIS ON 10 OCCASIONS, LSMIS ON 46 OCCASIONS, PCE'S ON 10 OCCASIONS,
APB HIGH-SPEED TRANSPORT SHIPS ON 4 OCCASIONS AND VARIOUS ARMED
BOATS AND SHIPS ON 12 OCCASIONS, THAT IS , NAVAL VESSELS, ARMED APY
SHIPS AND ARMED BOATS ON A TOTAL OF 100- 000 OCCASIONS TO COMMIT
ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS. THE AFORESAID FACT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT THE
ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS RECENTLY COMMITTED BY YOUR SIDE IN OUR
COAST WATERS ON THE WEST SEA ARE NOT ANY ACCIDENTAL ONE BY ANY
INDIVIDUAL UNIT OF SOUTH KOREAN ARMY BUT ARE DELIBERATE AND SYSTEMATIC
HOSTILE ACTS FULLY CONSPIRED BY YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS
AND SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS. IT ALSO PROVES TO BE THE
EXTREMELY GRAVE PROVOCATIONS ON THE PART OF YOUR SIDE WHICH IS
INTENTIONALLY STRAINING THE MILITARY SITUATION BY CAUSING THE ARMED
CONFLICT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES ON THE WEST SEA. IF YOUR SIDE CONTIN-
UNUSLY INFILTRATE YOUR NAVAL V SSELS INTO YOUR COASTAL WATERS TO
ARROGANTLY SAIL ABOUT HERE AND THERE AND COMMIT PROVOCATIONS OF
HINDERING OUR NAVAL CRAFTS FROM PERFORMING THEIR ROUTINE PATROL DUTY,
WHAT SITUATION WILL BE CREATED? SUCH RECKLESS PROFOCATIONS ON YOIR
PART IS AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS PLAY WITH FIRE THAT WILL MAKE THE CON-
FRONTATION BETWEEN THE NAVAL VESSELS OF BOTH SIDES ACUTE AND FURTHER
CAUSE UNCONTROLLABLE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES.
NOT WITHSTANDING THIS, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS, LIKE A
THIEF CRYING FOR A THIEF, INSTIGATED THE SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE
ELEMENTS TO SPELL OUT THE NONSENSE THAT RESOLUTE MEASURES WILL BE
TAKEN IF OUR NAVAL CRAFTS INTRUDE INTO SOME TERRITORIAL WATERS.
TO WHOM ARE YOU MOUTHING SUCH NONSENSE AS TAKING RESOLUTE MEASURES?
IT IS LIKE A PUPPYDOG WHICH DOES NOT FEAR THE TIGER. THERE
IS A LIMIT IN OUR PATIENCE. AS WE HAVE ALREAKY TOLD YOU MANY TIMES,
OUR SIDE WILL ANSWER YOUR PROVOCATIONS WITH PUNISHMENT. IN THAT CASE
FOND
THE PROCESS OF HITTING AND BEING HIT WILL BE REPEATED. YOUR OUTCRY
SUCH AS MEASURES OR THE LIKE ONLY SERV S TO VIVIDLY SHOW THE
BLACK -HEARTED INTENTION OF YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS TO
MAKE KOREANS FIGHT AGAINST EACH OTHER. BECAUSE OF YOUR RECKLESS
PSN:001044
PAGE 02
TOR:340/04:09Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
*******U N CLASSIFI E D'*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
COMMOTIONS TODAY IN THE WEST SEA THE ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN
BOTH SIDES MAY OCCUR AND GRAVE IRRETRIEVABLE SITUATION MAY BE CREATED.
IS THE CREATED SITUATION GRAVE OR NOT? YOU SHOULD CORRECTLY VIEW
THE CREATED SITUATION AND BEHAVE IN A DISCREET MANNER. TODAY, THE
ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE ACTIVELY STRIVING TO REALIZE THE INDEPEN-
DENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY WITHOUT RELYING UPON OUT-
SIDE FORCES. THE PEACE-TOVING PEOPLES THE WORLD DV R ARE RENDERING
POSITIV SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT TO IT. YOU UNITED NATIONS GENERAL
ASSEMBLY THIS YEAR DISSOLV D THE UNCURK, AN AGGRESSION TOOL OF U.S.
IMPERIALISM AND SUPPORTED NORTH-SOUTH VALOGUE BASED ON THE
TH
EE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND
GREAT NATIONAL UNITY. AT THIS V RY JUNCTURE, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST
AGGRESSORS HAVE INFILTRATING MANY NAVAL ARMED FORCES INTO OUR
COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA TO MORE FREQUENTLY COMMITT
ESPIONAGE AND HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST OUR SIDE, GOING AGAINST THE TREND
OF THE TIMES AND WITH THESE AS A MOMENTUM ARE PLAYING WITH FIRE OF
DRIVING SOUTH KOREAN BELLICOSE ELEMENTS TO THE BATTLEFIELD.
SUCH CRIMINAL MACHINATION OF YOUR SIDE IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND AN INTOLERABLE VICIOUS CHALLENGE TO THE
ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE AND PEACE-TOVING PEOPLES OF THE WHOLE WORLD
WISHING FOR PEACE AND INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA.
ALL THE FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS
ARE THE MAIN CULPRITS WHO ARE RUNNING WILD TO INCREASE THE DANGER OF
WAR IN KOREA BY FOSTERING ANTAGONISM AND DISTRUST BETWEEN THE NORTH
AND SOUTH AND AGGRAVATING THE SITUATION. I ONCE AGAIN STRONGLY
DEMAND YOUR SIDE TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE ITS OWN CRIMINAL ACTS AND
GIVE ASSURANCE AT THIS TABLE THAT YOUR SIDE WILL NOT INFILTRATE
NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS ON THE WEST SEA IN THE
FUTURE.
UNC NR2
ONCE AGAIN OUR SIDE IS FORCED TO REMIND YOU AT THIS TABLE , YOU ARE
BT
FORD
PSN:001044
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:340/04:09Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0771 3400350
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC / /
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS SECTION V OF VI
IN FACT ADDRESSING THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND NOT ANY INDIVIDUAL
MEMBER NATION OF THAT ORGANIZATION. OUR SIDE CATEGORICALLY STATES
THAT OUR V SSELS DURING THE TIME IN QUESTION HAV OPERATED ONLY IN
INTERNATIONAL WATERS OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S
TERRITORY. FIVE OF THESE SIX VIOLATIONS BY YOUR PATROL GUN BOATS
INTO WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS OCCURRED DURING DAY-
LIGHT HOURS UNDER CONDITIONS OF CLEAR VISIBILITY. YOUR PATROL GUN
BOATS WERE VISUALLY TRACKED FROM LAND AND SEA AND WERE ELECTRONI-
CALLY TRACKED BY OUR SIDE'S RADAR. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO
DOUBT AS TO THE VALIDITY OF OUR SIDE'S CHARGES AND
YOU SHOULD GIV US AN ASSURANCE FOR PROMPTLY CARRYING OUT OUR SIDE'S
DEMAND INSTEAD OF MAKING USELESS CHARGES.
NO. 6
UNC No. 6
AGAIN I SAY OUR VESSELS HAVE ONLY OPERATED INTERNATIONAL WATERS
OR IN WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY. ON THE OTHER HAND,
YOUR SIDE HAS CLEARLY VIOLATED THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ON 6 OCCASSIONS
BY INTRUDING INTO WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S ISLANDS BY SAILING AS
CLOSE TO 1300 YARDS TO THESE ISLANDS. THESE ACTS OF YOURS ARE THE ONLY
VIOLATIONS THAT HAV BEEN COMMITTED. YOUR ACTS ARE THE ONLY PROVOCATIV
ACTS THAT HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.
I SUGGEST YOU RESPECT UNITED NATIONS COMMAND CONTIGUOUS WATERS AS
UNITED NATIONS COMMAND RESPECTS YOUR CONTIGUOUS WATERS AND HONOR
PARAGRAPH 15 OF THE ARMISTIC AGREEMENT.
AS IT IS NEARLY 1400 HOURS I PROPOSE THAT THIS MEETING BE RECESSED
FOR 20 MINUTES FOLLOWING THE CONCLUSION OF TRANSLATION.
KPA STATEMENT NO. 7
KPA NO. 7
I HAVE NOTED YOUR LAST STATEMENT THAT YOU WILL RESPECT THE COASTAL
WATERS OF OUR SIDE IN THE WEST SEA. IN ORDER TO RELAX TENSION CREATED
IN THE WEST SEA AND TO MAINTAIN THE SECURITY IN THAT AREA, YOUR SIDE
SHOULD CEASE AT ONCE COMMITTING CRIMINAL ACTS OF ESPIONAGE AND
HOSTILITIES BY INTRUDING ITS NAVAL CRAFTS INTO THE COASTAL WATERS OF
OUR SIDE. OUR SIDE WILL WATCH YOUR SIDE'S FUTURE MOVE. OUR SIDE HAS NO
OTHER SUBJECTS TO BRING UP AT TODAY'S MEETING.
LIQUED
PSN:001049 PAGE 01
TOR:340/04:13Z DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NO. 7
UNC NO. 7
DO NOT PUT WORDS IN MY MOUTH. OUR SIDE STATED THAT YOU SHOULD RESPECT
OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS JUST AS OUR SIDE RESPECTS YOUR CONTIGUOUS
WATERS.
I WISH TO MAKE ONE POINT CLEAR. YOUR FABRICATIONS OF CHARGES AGAINST
OUR SIDE HAVE CONSUMED MUCH OF OUR TIME TODAY. DO NO LOST THIS POINT.
THE CHARGES OUR SIDE HAS LEVIED AGAINST YOU TODAY CONCERNING YOUR 6
VIOLATIONS
OF THE WATER CONTIGUOUS TO OUR SIDE'S TERRITORY WE CONSIDER VERY SERIOUS
AND WE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN. YOUR ACTIONS ARE AGGRESSIVE AND
PROVOCATIVE AND AGAIN OUR SIDE STRONGLY PROTESTS YOUR ACTIONS.
OUR SIDE HAS NOTHING FURTHER.
KPA NO. 8
YOU HAVE NOT GIVEN ANY RESPONSIBLE ASSURANCE AT THIS TABLE THAT YOU WILL
CEASE PROVOCATIVE ACTS OF INFILTRATING NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS
INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA. BUT INSTEAD, YOU ARE NOW
CALLING OUT INVECTIVES AGAINST US SUCH AS "PROVOCATIVE ACTS" "AGGRESSIV
ACTS" OR THE LIKE. THIS IS LIKE A THIEF TURNING ON THE MASTER WITH A
CLUB. AS WAS EXPOSED AT TODAY'S MEETING, OF LATE TOO, YOU U.S.
IMPERIALISTS AND SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, BEING INSTIGATED BY YOU, HAVE BEEN
DELIBERATELY INFILTRATING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS INTO
OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA TO COMMIT CRIMINAL ACTS OF ESPIONAGE
AND HOSTILITIES IS SUCCESSION AGAINST OUR SIDE. SUCH HOSTILE ACTS OF
YOUR SIDE CONSTITUTE A FLAGRANT DESTRUCTION AND VIOLATION OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND CRIMINAL ACTS OF AGGRAVATING MILITARY
CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH AND CREATING TENSION. THAT'S
WHY OUR SIDE PROTESTED AND DENOUNCED AT TODAY'S MEETING THE RECKLESS
PROVOCATIVE ACTS OF YOUR SIDE, STRONGLY DEMANDING IT TO CEASE AT ONCE
SUCH CRIMINAL ACTS. HOWEVER, YOUR SIDE, INSTEAD OF GIVING AN
ASSURANCE FOR CARRYING OUT OUR SIDE'S DEMANDS HAS BEEN MAKING CLUMSY
ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY ITS OWN SEA INTRUSIONS UNDER THE PREPOSTEROUS
PRETEXT OF SO-CALLED HIGH SEAS OR THE LIKE, WHILE BEHAVING IN A
SHAMELESS MANNER TO SLANDER AND DEFAME THE OTHER SIDE AT RANDOM WITH
NON-EXEISTENT INCIDENTS. WHO ON EARTH IS THE CRIMINAL WHO COMMITED
PROVOCATIVE ACTS AND AGAINST WHOM 00 YOU MAKE PREPOSTEROUS CHARGES?
AS THE STERN FACTS VIVIDLY SHOW, YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS
AND SOUTH KOREAN WARLIKE ELEMENTS WHO ARE AT YOUR INSTIGATION,
ARE THE V RY CRIMINALS THAT HAVE BEEN SYSTEMATICALLY INFILTRATING NAVAL
VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS INTO OUR COASTAL WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AND
THE MAIN CULPRITS THAT HAVE BEEN CREATING TENSION BY SYSTEMATICALLY
COMMITTING PROVOCATIV ACTS.
YOU U.S. IMPERIALIST AGGRESSORS ALWAYS PROVOKED FIRST AND CHARGED THE
OTHER SIDE OF IT, WITH SUCH HABITUAL FALSE PROPAGANDA DESIGNED TO
SLANDER THE OTHER SIDE. YOU CAN NEITHER CONCEAL YOUR TRUE NATURE AS
CRIMINALS NOR DECEIV THE WORLD.
AT TODAY'S MEETING, YOUR SIDE HAS STATED THAT IT WILL RESPECT OUR
FORO
COASTAL WATERS. IF YOUR SIDES WORDS ARE NOT EMPTY TALKS, YOU SHOULD
SHOW IT BY ACTUAL DEEDS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
ARMISTIC AGREEMENT WHICH WILL INSURE A COMPLETE CESSATION OF
SEASLD
PSN:001049
PAGE 02
TOR:340/04:13Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
N CLASSIFI E D*******S COPY
N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
HOSTILITIES AND OF ALL ACTS OF ARMED FORCE IN KOREA, AND SHALL RESPECT
THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY
CONTROL OF THE OPPOSING SIDE, AND SHALL NOT ENGAGE IN BLOCKADE OF ANY
KIND OF KOREA. YOUR SIDE SHOULD STOP FORCIBLY THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF
DISPATCHING VARIOUS NAVAL VESSELS AND ARMED SPY SHIPS TO OUR COASTAL
WATERS. IF YOUR SIDE WANTS TO SAIL TO THE WATERS OFF PAENGYONG-DO
ISLAND, DAECHONG DO ISLAND, SO CHONG DO ISLAND YONGPYONGDO ISLAND AND
UDO ISLAND IN OUR COASTAL WATERS OF THE WEST SEA, IT SHOULD MEASURE
A REQUEST TO OUR SIDE AND GET OUR APPROVAL IN ADVANCE. SUCH A MEASURE
FULLY ACCORDS WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF THE ARMISTIC AGREEMENT AND SERV S
THE SECURITY ON THE WATERS IN OUR COASTAL IN THE WEST SEA AND YOUR
SIDE WILL NOT HAVE ANY OBSTACLE IS SAILING TO THE ISLANDS IN OUR COASTAL
WATERS UNDER THE CONTROL OF YOUR SIDE.
OUR SIDE WILL MAKE ALL EFFORTS TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN OUR COASTAL
WATERS AND TO IMPLEMENT THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
IF YOUR SIDE DOES NOT RESPOND TO OUR JUST DEMANDS, OUR SIDE WILL TAKE
PROPER STEPS FOR IT. IF YOUR SIDE MISJUDGES OUR SIDE'S PATIENCE AS
WEAKNESS, RECKLESSLY INFILTRATING NAVAL VESSELS INTO OUR COASTAL
WATERS IN THE WEST SEA AND OBSTRUCT FREE NAVIGATION OF OUR NAVAL
VESSELS, OR COMMIT PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THEM, OUR SIDE WILL NOT
TOLERATE THEM, BUT DEAL OUT SEVERE PUNISHMENT TO THEM. IN THIS CASE,
YOUR SIDE WILL HAVE TO BEAR THE FULL REPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THE
CONSEQUENCES ARISING THEREFROM.
OUR SIDE WILL CLOSELY WATCH YOUR FUTURE MOVE.
OUR SIDE PROPOSES TO RECESS THIS MEETING.
UNC NO. 8
YOUR SIDE'S INTERPRETATION TODY OF PRAGRAPHS 13B AND 15 OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, PARTICULARY TO INDICATE THAT THE 5 ISLANDS
DISCUSSED TODY LIE WITHIN YOUR SIDE'S TERRITORIAL WATERS, IS A
SERIOUS MISTAKE ON YOUR SIDE'S PART AND IS IN DIRECT VIOLATION OF THE
LETTER AND THE SPIRIT OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.
BT
B.
FORD
PSN: 001049
PAGE 03
OF 03
TOR:340/04:13Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
*******U N CLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
NCLASSIFIE D*******S COPY
FLASH
DE RUAGAAA #0772 3400350
Z 060230Z DEC 73 ZFF-3
FM CINCUNC SEOUL KOREA//AA UNC/ /
TO WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ATTN: MR SMYSER
INFO JCS
UNCLAS FINAL SECTION OF VI
YOUR SIDE'S SUGGESTION THAT OUR SIDE MUST REQUEST PERMISSION TO SAIL
TO THE ISLANDS OF PAENGNYONG-00, TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO
AND U-DO IS UTTERLY RIDICULOUS. OUR SIDE HAS FREELY SAILED TO AND FROM
THESE ISLANDS FOR OVER 20 YEARS SINCE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS
SIGNED.
I SUGGEST YOU PURSUE THIS PREPOSTEROUS COURSE OF ACTION WHICH
IS IN WANTON VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTIC AGREEMENT NO FURTHER.
ON NUMBEROUS OCCASIONS WITHIN THIS FORUM YOUR SIDE HAS DEMANDED
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. YOU HAVE BASED YOUR
DEMANDS THE YOUR CLAIM THAT YOU DESIRE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA
AND THAT OUR SIDE HAS NO NEED WHATSOEVER TO FEAR AN ATTACK TO THE SOUTH
BY YOUR SIDE. YOUR ACTIVITIES IN THE VICINITY OF PAENGNYONG-DO THESE
LAST FEW DAYS MAKE A MOCKERY OF YOUR SO-CALLED PEACEFUL INTENTIONS.
YOUR ACTIONS IN REPEATEDLY VIOLATING OUR SIDE'S CONTIGUOUS WATERS
AND THE THREATS CONTAINED IN YOUR SUMMARY STATEMENT ARE
AGGRESSIV , WAR-LIKE AND COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. SUCH ACTIONS ONLY TEND TO PROV THE CONTINUED
NEED FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IN KOREA TO ASSIST
IN PRESERVING THE PEACE.
OUR SIDE AGREES TO YOUR SIDE'S PROPOSAL TO RECESS THIS MEETING.
BT
B.
FUND
PSN:001051
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:340/04:14Z
DTG:060230Z DEC 73
*******U NC LASSIFIED*******S COP
3a
6473-X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
SECRET/SENSITIVE
December 3, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
THROUGH:
W.R. SMYSER w tro
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. tron
SUBJECT:
Proposed WSAG Meeting on Korean Situation
I strongly believe that we need a WSAG no later than tomorrow to decide
what position we should take on the North Korean demand that UNC naval
and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters
contiguous to the five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of
Korea (see attached map). North Korea, which made the demand at the
MAC meeting December 1, threatened unspecified actions if the UNC
did not comply. The UNC representative on the MAC, U.S. Army Major
General Greer, rejected the demand.
The urgency of the issue is posed by the fact that the ROK plans to pro-
ceed with its regularly scheduled weekly resupply convoy to two of the
islands before the end of the week, either Thursday or Friday. (The
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12808 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept, Guidelines
11/14/2
ROK has about 1, 000 forces stationed on two of the islands.) The ROK,
in coordination with CINCUNC, who has operational control of all ROK
NARA, Date
forces in the event of hostilities, intends to reinforce the convoy. In
the meantime, it also intends to continue the normal ROK naval patrols
in the area, keeping them 10-12 miles from North Korean territory but
reinforcing them. Since these questions and possible actions involve a
number of agencies and interests, a WSAG offers an essential forum
for hearing all views and for getting everybody on the same track.
The immediate U.S. policy issues are:
-- Whether the regular ROK resupply convoy should proceed as
planned and, if so, how (including whether we should reinforce the
convoy itself or make a reinforcing show of force in the area). To
proceed risks a military clash, while postponing it unduly implies UNC
ROK acquiescence in the North Korean demand.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(2)
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger
SEGRET/SENSITIVE
2
-- Whether to call for a MAC meeting before December 6 to discuss
the North Korean demand, and thus to try to reduce the risk of a military
confrontation.
-- Whether and how to approach the PRC and/or the Soviets on this
issue.
-- How to relate this problem to the basic issue of the UNC's future
status. (A principal North Korean objective in the situation may be to
force early U.N. Security Council consideration of the UNC.)
Recommendation:
That a WSAG meeting be scheduled for tomorrow to consider this issue.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET/SENSITIVE
WONSAN
Sop'o-dong.
Things
Samdung
*Anbyon
PYONGYANG
.Onch'on
Кийт-пі
Kosan,
Songnim
CHANGADAE-KKÜT
Namp'o
o
Kosöng*
Кийт-пі
SÕK.TO
*Sinan-ni
Chiha-ri
DEMARCATION LINE
NORTH
KOREA
CH'O-DO
o
Sariwon
Demilitarized Zone is two
'Ich'on
Pokkye-ri
kilometers wide on each
.Pyonggang
side of demarcation line.
Sinch'on
Chaeryong
Kansong,
Pyongsan®
Kumhwa
Changyon
.Ch'ōrwōn
Sokch'o
Sinwon-ni*
*Kümch'on
"Yönch'on
Hwach'on.
.Yanggu
Yangyang.
Haeiu
o
OKaesong
PAENGNYONG-
Ongiin
DO
P'anmunjom
TAECH'ONG-
Yonan
°Ch'unch'δn
Chumunjin*
DO
Minsan-ni
ROK ARMY
SECTOR
Kangnüngo
SOCH'ONG-DO
Uljöngbu
TÜNGSAN-GOT
US ARMY
Hongch'on
YÖNP'YÖNG-YÖLTO
SECTOR
U-DO
KANGHWA-DO
ROK MARINE
SECTOR
SOUTH
KOREA
Hoengsong
SEOUL
Yangp'yöngümnae*
YONGYU-DO
INCH'ÓN
Chongson
Pyöngch'ang*
wonju°
Yoju
Suwon
Ich'on'
Yemi-ri
Yongwol
Osan
TÕKCHÕK-KUNDO
Changhowon,
Chech'on
KOREA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA
Pyöngt'aek.
Ansong
Ch'ungiu
Tanyang
0
10
20
30
40 Miles
"Punggi
.
0 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
Yongju
*Ch'onan
.Sosan
.T'aean
57023 9-67
4a
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
December 3, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
RICHARD H. SOLOMON RETS
SUBJECT:
The Korean Situation and the China Element
North Korea's provocative action over the islands, coming as it does
within a week of conclusion of General Assembly consideration of the
compromise resolution on the Korean issue, has the quality of an effort
by Pyongyang to assert its case for further action against the U.N. and
U.S. presence in Korea. The compromise GA resolution, worked out
at Chinese initiative, was highly favorable to the ROK in that it referred
neither to the future of the U.N. Command or to the U.S. troop presence
in the ROK. We were totally surprised by Peking's willingness and ability
to bring the North along on such a favorable compromise, and Pyongyang
may now be attempting to act somewhat independently of Peking in calling
attention to the remaining issues where it seeks, U.N. and U.S. action, or
to force Chinese and Soviet hands in support of their position in the Security
Council. (The Soviets at one point late in the GA debate made noises about
at the indications of U.S.- PRC cooperation on the compromise.)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12806 (as amended) SEC 3.3
MC, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines
raising the UNC issue in the Security Council. They were probably miffed
We must assume that the Chinese were able to gain the cooperation of the
NARA, Date
North Koreans for the GA compromise precisely because they could tell
Pyongyang that we had privately indicated a willingness to reconsider the
future of the UNC after this session of the GA. The North, not fully trust-
ing Peking, and wanting to keep us off balance in a situation where we
clearly have the initiative (only two weeks ago you flew from Peking to
Seoul), appears to want to force our hand and impart public momentum to
NSC1
By
its drive against the UNC and U.S. forces in Korea.
In these circumstances, one of our major objectives should be to keep the
Chinese as fully engaged in the evolution of the Korean situation as possible.
By all indications Peking has much greater influence in Pyongyang than
Moscow. The Chinese undoubtedly see it in their interest to maintain
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
XGDS 5b(3)
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger
TOP SECRET / SENSITIVE
2
stability on the Korean Peninsula even as our posture there evolves. We
should take advantage of Pyongyang's provocative action regarding the
islands to try to invoke Peking's constraint over the North's game-playing.
To the degree that Pyongyang feels that the Chinese are able to move us
on the UNC issue, they have reason to continue to follow Peking's lead.
I believe that two messages to the Chinese are now in order. The first,
which is intended to engage Peking with Pyongyang regarding its provoca-
tion, reiterates our intention to reconsider the future of the UNC now that
the GA compromise has been concluded, but raises the prospect that such
action will be impeded-by any incidents which raise tensions on the Penin-
sula (see Tab 1). This message should be conveyed to the PRCLO as soon
as possible. -
A second message should be sent to the Chinese just prior to any unusual
resupply move that we may make to reassert our right to access to the
west coast islands. Its intent would be to inform the PRC of exactly what
we were doing, in effect communicating the limits of our action (yet our
determination to act) and implicitly inviting their imposition of restraint
on Pyongyang. The exact text of such a message would be based on the
specifics of our resupply move, and is thus difficult to draft this far in
advance of any action.
Recommendation:
That you approve the message to the PRCLO at Tab 1.
Approve
Disapprove
and
That you approve in principle a second message to the PRCLO, to be delivered
a few hours before our resupply effort begins, indicating the extent and
objective of our resupply effort.
Approve
Disapprove
TOP SEGRET/SENSITIVE
46
(Draft message for delivery to the PRC Liaison Office)
The U.S. side wishes to advise the Chinese side of its serious
concern about recent provocative actions by North Korean authorities off
the west coast of Korea, including unusual naval patrol activity, a
heightened state of military alert, and a demand presented on December 1
which would interfere with access to five islands. As a. signatory to the
Korean Armistice, the Chinese side will understand that this demand is
unacceptable, being in contravention of both international agreement and
past practice.
These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less
than two weeks after adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a com-
promise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12656 168 americied) SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept, 2/4/n Guidelines
compromise, which avoided an unnecessary confrontation between the
NARA, Date
representatives of North and South Korea and their supporters, was
worked out in a spirit of accommodation by both sides. This development
seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions
By
on the Korean Peninsula.
The U.S. side has advised the Chinese side on several occasions,
most recently during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in November,
that it would be prepared to reconsider the future of the U.N. Command
before the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly. We must state,
however, that provocations by the North Korean authorities which risk
military confrontation and heighten tension will seriously complicate
2
efforts by the U.S. side to consider and put into effect new arrange- -
ments affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.
It is our understanding that normal communication and supply
activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis.
The U.S. side hopes that no incident will be created which would alter
the improved atmosphere which has been created as a result of U.N.
General Assembly action on the Korean question.
5A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033398
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
North Korean Attempt to Restrict Our
Access to West Coast Islands
CREATION DATE
12/04/1973
VOLUME
5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/21/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
5b
TRANSMITTED BY:
RECEIVED BY
(Date & Time Stamp)
Ungest DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(Date & Time Stamp)
Dev
1
Operations Center
if STATE
'73 DEC 4 PM 7 : 05
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
1. 4 P.! 7 02
S/S #
WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM
546
LDX MESSAGE NO.
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
NO. PAGES 3
,
.
DESCRIPTION OF MSG / TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE KOREAN NORTHWEST. COASTAL SITUATION
Hash
FROM: MR. MILLER
, S/S
, 23126
9
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
NSC
MR. SMYSER
.
9
;
,
,
.
?
9
.
,
,
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE / XX INFORMATION / PER REQUEST / / COMMENT /
/
REMARKS:
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
DWN
Executive Secretariat Officer
1084 is LIBRARY
Sc
FORM DS 322{0CR}
SECRET
E.O. 12958 DECLASSIFIED (as amended) SEC 3.3; ADDivective 6200.30
State Dept Guidelines shereview 12/4/03
EA/K DLRANARD :LM
By
NARA, Date 2/4/11
12/4/73 EXT 20780
EA: RLSNEIDER
DOD/ISA -
JCS-J/5 -
L/EA - EGVERVILLE
NSC -
S/S -
FLASH
SEOUL
EXDIS
RLS
E.O. 11652: -GDS
DLR
The
TAGS: MOPS, PINT, KN, KS
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJECT: KOREAN NORTHWEST COASTAL SITUATION
EGV
REF:
A. SEOUL 8106
B. CINCUNC 021532Z DEC 73
WE ARE AGREED ON THE FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION IN RESPONSE
TO POSITION TAKEN BY NORTH KOREA IN DECEMBER 1 MAC
MEETING.
A. DIPLOMATIC-POLITICAL MEASURES.
1. YOU ARE- TO INFORM ROKG THAT WE AGREE TO CALL
MAC MEETING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR REAFFIRMATION OF OUR
POSITION AND REJECTION OF NORTH KOREAN CLAIMS "CONCERNING
ACCESS TO FIVE ISLANDS UNDER UNC CONTROL. ACCORDINGLY,
YOU ARE TO TAKE NECESSARY STEPS TO REQUEST THE MEETING
IMMEDIATELY. GUIDANCE FOR POSITION WE INTEND TO TAKE NOW
BEING DRAFTED AND WILL BE FURNISHED ASAP.
2. SIMULTANEOUSLY, YOU ARE TO URGE THAT THE ROK
FORD
UTILIZE THE HOT LINE FOR DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES AND,
ASSUMING MAC MEETING DOES NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE DECEMBER 5
MILITARY
PRELIMINARY MEETING OF SNCC, YOU ARE TO RECOMMEND THAT
ADDRESSEES
ATTACHED
SECRET
FORM DS 322A-0CR}
SECRET
12
ROK ALSO RAISE SUBJECT IN THAT FORUM. WHILE WE UNDERSTAND
NATURE OF ROK OBJECTIONS TO UTILIZING HOT LINE, YOU SHOULD
REMIND THEN THAT, CONSISTENT WITH PLEDGES IN JULY 49 1972
COMMUNIQUE, THIS CHANNEL WAS ESTABLISHED TO DEAL WITH
HOSTILE INCIDENTS AND TO OUR KNOWLEDGE IT HAS BEEN USED
FOR RELATED OCCURRENCES SUCH AS DMZ CROSSINGS AS WELL AS
FIRINGS. IN HOT LINE DISCUSSION WITH THE NORTH, WE
SUGGEST ROKG POINT OUT THEIR INTENTION IS {A} NOT TO
DEBATE THE ISSUE WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED IN MAC MEETING,
BUT RATHER {B} TO MAKE CLEAR THE ROKG INTENDS NO
PROVOCATIVE INITIATIVES AND EXPECTS NORTH TO BE, SIMILARLY
RESPONSIBLE, AND {C} WILL CONTINUE COMMUNICATION AND
SUPPLY TO THESE ISLANDS AS HAS BEEN THE PRACTICE IN THE
PAST. NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE IN HOT LINE-CONVERSATION
MAY SHED LIGHT ON THEIR MOTIVATIONS AND PROVIDE VACUABLE
INFORMATION TO US CONCERNING THEIR INTENTIONS AND TIMING.
INITIATIVES BY SOUTH TO USE THIS CHANNEL MAY ALSO PROVE
USEFUL SUBSEQUENTLY IN DEVELOPING THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT
FOR ROKG IN HER EFFORTS TO AVOID PROVOCATIVE SITUATION
ON PENINSULA.
3. YOU MAY ALSO INFORM PRESIDENT PARK IN
STRICTEST CONFIDENCE THAT WE INTEND TO APPROACH THE PRC
AND SOVIETS, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, TO INFORM THEM
WE HAVE NOTED THE INCREASED NORTH KOREAN PATROLS NEAR
THESE ISLANDS AND THE UNPRECEDENTED CLAIM MADE AT THE
RECENT MAC MEETING. WE CAN NOT ACCEPT THIS NORTH KOREAN
INTERPRETATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTEND TO
PROTECT UNC LONG-STANDING RIGHTS under the agreement to these
ISLANDS. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE INTEND STRESS COMMON
INTEREST IN AVOIDING PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION. GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF THIS CHANNEL,
WE EXPECT ROKG TO HOLD ESPECIALLY- CLOSE OUR INTENTIONS TO
MAKE THESE APPROACHES.
4. WE INTEND TO BRIEF THE JAPANESE CONCERNING
ACTIONS WE PROPOSE TO TAKE WITH EXCEPTION OF APPROACH TO
USSR AND PRC AND MAY DO so SIMILARLY WITH OTHER POWERS
WHO HAVE CLOSE INVOLVEMENT WITH KOREAN QUESTION.
B. MILITARY ACTION. WE CONCUR IN BASIC POSTURE AND
FORD
GENERAL GUIDANCE SET FORTH IN REFTEL B. FOLLOWING IS MORE
SPECIFIC GUIDANCE:
1. IT IS OUR GENERAL POSTURE THAT WE DO NOT
REPEAT NOT WISH TO SEE OR PROVOKE MILITARY INCIDENTS OVER
THESE ISSUES, BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE DO NOT INTEND TO
ACCEPT INTERFERENCE WITH ESTABLISHED RIGHTS under the agreement to
THESE ISLANDS.
SECRET
2. We concur in plans of UNC naval command to resupply the
islands on a "business as usual" basis, as well as to continue normal
ferry service without interruption. Exact timing of next convoy to three
outer islands should be left open, however, subject to our guidance.
3. Should the NK Interfere with single unescorted ferry service
such as that scheduled 5 and 6 December, which Embassy/CINCUNC
apparently considered unlikely, we believe that ferry should proceed
in the most prudent manner under the circumstances so as not to
endanger lives of personnel. ROKG should avoid military activities
and response except as necessary for protection of life or property.
We will provide recommendations on ROK response to possible interdiction
of other types of ferry. service and supply cenvoys.
4. It is emphasized that ROK Forces should not repeat not fire
except in self-defense. Under no circumstances should ROKG frre the
first shot.
5. Since this message was prepared, we have been informed that a
convoy to Paengnyong-do has been planned, departing Dec 6 at 0600. (We
understand this convoy is to consist of three commercial vessels, one or
more ROK naval vessels as close -in escort, and one or more ROK destroyers
positioned nearby. ) Departure of this convoy should be postponed for 24 hours,
during which time we will forward guidance covering action to be taken in event
of North Korean attempt to interdict this convoy.,
6. Our understanding is that no US units are involved in escort or
protective services for supply missions. Please confirm.
7. No US military personnel should be involved without approval
from Washington.
DECLASSIFIED
5300
E.O. 10958 State (as Dept amended) Guidelines SEC 3.3 State DoD 12/4/03
By
Da
NARA, Date 2/4/11
FORD
(Draft message for delivery to the PRC Liaison Office)
The U.S. side wishes to advise the Chinese side of its concern
about the situation created by North Korean authorities. North Korea
has recently instituted unusual naval patrol activity off the west coast
of Korea, has placed its forces in a heightened state of military alert,
and made demands on December 1 that would interfere with access to
five islands. As a signatory to the Korean Armistice, the
Chinese side will understand that these demands are in contravention of
both international agreement and long-established practice, and are
therefore unacceptable.
These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less
than two weeks after adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a com-
promise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This
agreement, which avoided an unnecessary confrontation between the
E.O. SEC 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/90/06, Dept. Guidelines
representatives of North and South Korea and their supporters, was
NARA, Date
worked out in a spirit of accommodation by both sides. This development
seemed to establish conditions for further progress in reducing tensions
on the Korean Peninsula. The demands and actions of the North
By
Korean authorities are completely contrary to the spirit of the agreement.
The U.S. side has advised the Chinese side on several occasions,
most recently during Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking in November,
that it would be prepared to reconsider the future of the U.N. Command
before the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly. We must state,
2
however, that provocations by the North Korean authorities which risk
military confrontation and heighten tension will seriously complicate
efforts by the U.S. side to consider and put into effect new arrange-
ments affecting the security of the Korean Peninsula.
It is our understanding that normal communication and supply
activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis,
and that North Korea will be informed of this policy. The U.S. side
hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved
atmosphere which has been created as a result of U.N. General
Assembly action on the Korean question.
5f
(Draft message for delivery to the Soviet Ambassador)
The U.S. side wishes to advise the Soviet side of its concern
about the situation created by North Korean authorities. North Korea
has recently instituted unusual naval patrol activity off the west coast
of Korea, has placed its forces in a heightened state of military alert,
and made demands on December 1 that would interfere with access to
five islands.
These actions are all the more disturbing coming as they do less
than two weeks after adoption by the U.N. General Assembly of a com-
promise resolution on Korea abolishing the UNCURK organization. This
development seemed to establish conditions for further progress in re-
ducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. The demands and actions of
the North Korean authorities are completely contrary to the spirit of
the agreement.
It is our understanding that normal communication and supply
activities will be maintained to the five islands on their usual basis,
and that North Korea will be informed of this policy. The U.S. side
hopes that no incident will be created which would alter the improved
atmosphere which has been created as a result of U.N. General
Assembly action on the Korean question.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (os emended) SEC 3.3
By
NSCM like 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidellnes
NARA. Date 2/4/11
5g
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Suggested Talking Points for Congressional Consultations
-- The current situation has resulted from North Korea's demand,
made in the Military Armistice Commission on December 1, that the U.N.
Command (UNC) side obtain North Korea's prior permission in order to
send at least naval vessels -- but also possibly commercial vessels as
well -- to any of the five UNC - controlled islands off the west coast of Korea.
The UNC's military control of these islands is explicitly provided for in the
Armistice Agreement. The UNC's right of-access to the contiguous waters,
which we define as extending 12 miles outward from the islands, has long
been recognized. Under Article 15 North Korea is bound to respect the
waters contiguous to these islands, which obligates them not to interfere
with the right of access.
-- We are proceeding on a business as usual basis as regards
continued weekly ferry service and resupply convoys to these islands
in accord with our claimed right of access to the islands and the practical
logistic needs of those on the islands. (The ROK has approximately 1, 500
military personnel on these islands, and they are inhabited by much large
civilian populations. We have no U.S. military personnel on them, but
there are four U.S. citizens on one -- two missionaries and two nurses.)
CINCUNC, who has operational control of all ROK forces, and the ROK
have decided to provide an adequately reinforced -- but non-provocative --
ROK naval and air cover for these ferries and resupply convoys. No U.S.
forces will be involved without express Washington approval.
-- We intend to go back in the next day or two to the North Koreans
in the MAC to discuss the substantive issues invólved, and will ask the
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. SEC 3.3
By NSC Memo, 3/90/06, Sixe Dept Guidelines
11/H/2
ROK to ask North Korea in the South-North talks framework to refrain
from provocative actions, in accord with the July 1972 Joint Communique
NARA, Date
issued by Seoul and Pyongyang.
-- (If asked.) We intend to approach the PRC and the Soviet Union
to seek their involvement in avoiding any military incident over the North
Korean demand.
-- We are consulting with Japan on our view of the situation and
intended actions.
1080
-- For the present we do not plan to take up in the U.N. Security
Council either the present North Korean demand or the more basic issue
of the UNC's future status.
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
Has
WONSAN
Söp'o-dong.
Samdung
"Anbyon
PYÖNGYANG
0
KOREA
Onch'on
Kuüm-ni
N
Kosan,
Songnim
CHANGADAE-KKÜT
Namp'o
1
Kosöng
Kuum-nl
SÕK-TO
"Chiha-ri
*Sinan-ni
Hwangju
DEMARCATION LINE
NORTH
KOREA
CH'O-DO
Sariwön
Demilitorized Zone is two
*Ich'on
Pokkye-rl
kilometers wide on each
.Pyönggang
side of demarcation line.
Sinch'on
Chaeryong
Kansong,
Pyongsan®
Kumhwa
Changyon,
.Ch'örwön
Sokch'o
Sinwön-ni
*Kümch'on
*Yönch'ön
Hwach'óne
.Yanggu
Yangyang,
Haeju
o
Kaesong
PAENGNYÖNG-
Onglin
DO
herse
P'anmunjom
TAECH*ÖNG-
mum
Yönan
°Ch'unch'on
DO
*Mensan-ni
ROK ARMY
Chumunjin
SECTOR
SOCH'ÖNG-DO
KangnüngO
Üljöngbu
TÜNGSAN-GOT
US ARMY
*Hongch'on
YONP'YÖNG-YÖLTO
SECTOR
U-DO
KANGHWA-DO
ROK MARINE
SECTOR
SOUTH
KOREA
Hoengsong
SEOUL
Yangp'yöngümnas
VELLOW
S
E
YONGYU-DO
INCH'ON
Chöngsön
Pyöngch'ang®
Wönju
Yolu
Suwön
Ich'on®
Yemi-ri
Yöngwöl
Osan
тӧкснӧк-киndо
Changhowön,
Chech'on
KOREA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA
Pyöngtaek.
Ansöng
Ch'unglu
Tanyang
Q
10
20
30
40 Miles
Pungel
o 10 20 30 40 Kilometers
Yönglu
.Sõsen
Ch'onan
Taean
57023 9.67
Sh
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033399
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
TITLE
WSAG Meeting on Korea
CREATION DATE
12/04/1973
VOLUME
9 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/21/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
12
6516X
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SEGRET/NODIS
December 5, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
pmo
SUBJECT:
Minutes of the WSAG Working Group Meeting
of December 4, 1973
Attached is a summary of the conclusions of the WSAG Working Group Meeting
held on December 4, 1973 to discuss North Korea's demand that UN Command
naval and merchant ships obtain prior permission to navigate the waters con-
tiguous to five UNC-controlled islands off the west coast of Korea.
cc: Mr. Smyser
Mr. Froebe
Mr. Solomon
Mr. Hyland
Col. Stukel
Attachment
DECLASSIFIED
E.C. SEC 3.3
reso
By
NSCMiemo, Was 3/30/08, Sexe Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 2/4/11
q
TOP SECRET/NODIS
XGDS
1B
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033400
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMinute
TITLE
Washington Special Actions Group
Working Group Meeting
DESCRIPTION
Re North Korea
CREATION DATE
12/04/1973
VOLUME
4 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/21/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
8A
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033644
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
CREATOR'S NAME
W.R. Smyser
RECEIVER'S NAME
Secretary Kissinger
DESCRIPTION
Re North & South Korea
CREATION DATE
12/06/1973
VOLUME
3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
818
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033401
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇCable
TITLE
Korean Northwest Coastal Situation
CREATION DATE
12/06/1973
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
04/21/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 033645
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
ÇNational security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
ÇMemorandum
DESCRIPTION
Re North Korea
CREATION DATE
12/08/1973
VOLUME
10 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
033700539
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
36
FOLDER TITLE
Korean Northwest Islands (Working File)
DATE WITHDRAWN
05/11/2011
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
TMH
10a
6747
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
CRET
December 22, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR in
SUBJECT:
Korean West Coast Island Situation
At Tabs A. and Bare draft joint State,- Defense cables to Embassy Seoul
giving guidance for the Military Armistice Commission (MA C) meeting
tentatively scheduled for December 24 and comments on the ROK's pro-
posed memorandum to be circulated to all diplomatic missions in Seoul
explaining the South Korean position on the west coast island situation.
at Tab A
-- The proposed guidance for the MAC meeting/-- which will be the
first full MAC meeting since that on December 1, in which the North Koreans
attempted to restrict access to the UNC-controlled islands on the basis of
claimed territorial waters -- would have our UNC representative avoid the
conflicting territorial waters claim of the two Koreas. Rather, he would
base our rejection of the North Korean demand on our rights of access to
the islands as conferred by the Armistice Agreement. He would also not
I have no objection to the legal case proposed in the cable, but would pro-
DECLASCIFIED
E.C. 10# awarded) SEC 3.3 3.3
NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept, Guidelines 12/4/03
make a legal defense of the Northern Limit Line (see map at Tab C), which
the UNC declared unilaterally in the mid-1950s but which North Korean
naval patrols began penetrating in late October. Rather, to solve the
question of overlap between the "contiguous waters" (the term used in the
Agreement) of the islands and those of North Korea we would use a median
line, which is the customary solution under international law.
NARA, Date 2/4/11
pose deleting the second sentence of paragraph 5, and reword the preceding
sentence to eliminate reference to reference B. I disagree with the draft
cable's assertion that the talking points contained in reference B which were
used with the ROKs are appropriate for our UNC representative's use in
the MAC meeting.
-- The proposed comments on the ROK memorandum defending its
position on the island situation (Tab B) are aimed at bringing the ROK
By
memorandum in line with the legal position proposed in Tab A - - that awe
not attempt to defend the legality of the Northern Limit Line. We would
SECRET.
GDS
SECRET
2
inform the ROK that we believe that the U.S. and ROK must take consis-
tent positions on the legal aspects of the island issue. I have no objection
to this draft cable.
Recommendation:
That you approve the draft State-Defense cables at Tab A (as amended)
and Tab B.
Approve
Disapprove
SE CRET
&
1000
106
FORM DS 322{0CR}
CONFIDENTIAL
L/EA - MISS VERVILLE:DPU
12/21/73 EXT. 23039
/FA - MR. LEITZELL
JCS - COL. ADAMS
S/S -
RO:&IMMEDIATE SEOUL
E.O. 12958 DECLASSIFIED assended) SEC 3.3 DOD Directive 5201.31
State (as Dept Guidelines 12/4/03
By Wa NARA, Date 2/1/11
RLS 7
E.O. 11652: GDS
EV 'Dr
TAGS: PBOR, MARR, KS, KN
SUBJ: QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT LINE
DLR 5
REF: [A] SEOUL 8450 [B] SEOUL 05124 { } SEOUL 8574
TL D.
{.} SEOUL 8575
NSC
JOINT STATE/DEFESSE MESSAGE
RV 81
1. IN ANSWERIN, QUESTIONS RAISED PARA 6 REFTEL A 1 AND IN
REA I
CONNECTION WITH MAC MEETING, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO
S/S
KEEP WELL IN MIND DISTINCTION BETWEEN ISSUES OF TERRITOR-
IAL CLAIMS CI.E., QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER ISLANDS
AND RELATED L/W OF THE SEA ISSUES} AND QUESTIONS OF RIGHTS
UNDER ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS
SUGGESTED BY EMBASSY, THAT IT IS HIGHLY PREFERABLE TO
LIMIT US/UNC POSITIONS TO INTERPRETATIONS ANDELL OF AND
ASSERTION OF RIGHTS UNDER ARMISTICE<AGREEMENT AND TO AVOID
UNNECESSARY AND POSSIBLY PROVOCATIVE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRI-
TORIAL DISPUTES. IN THIS REGARD - CARE SHOULD BE EXERCISED
TO AVOID B,SING OUR POSITION ON SUPPORT OF ROK CLAIMS TO
OR RIGHTS LN "TERRITORIAL SEA" OR "TERRITORIAL WATERS"
AROUND ISLANDS WHICH TERMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW CONNOTE
SOVEREIGN'Y AND RAISE COMPLEX LAW OF THE SEA ISSUES.
INSTEAD aiR ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE CAST IN TERMS OF UNC RIGHTS
UNDER ARICLE 13 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT OF MILITARY CON-
TROL OVER ISLANDS AND TO DPRK OBLIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 15
TO RESPECT THE "WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO" THE ISLANDS. LIMIT
MILITARY
ADDRESSE
ATTACHED
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
CONFIDENTIAL
I 2
OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" AROUND THE ISLANDS WOULD BE THE
SAME AS THE LIMIT OF "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF THE COAST
OF THE ROK AND UMERE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF ISLANDS OVER-
LAPS THOSE OFF THE COAST OF NORTH KOREA, A MEDIAN LINE
SHOULD BE DREWN SINCE THAT IS THE USUAL METHOD OF DE-
LIMITING MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN OPPOSIT OR ADJACENT
STATES.
2. THIS APPROACH, WITH BACKGROUND AND MORE DETAIL, GEARED
TO ARGUMENTS PUT FORWARD BY DPRK, WOULD BE OUTLINED AS
FOLLOWS:
{A} WE REJECT THE DPRK'S ASSERTION THAT PARAGRAPH 13
{8} OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ES-TABLISHES PAENGYONG-
DO, TRECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO AND U-D:O AS
WITHIN DPRK COASTAL WATERS. PARAGRAPH 13{8} DOES NOT
ADDRESS H1 THE QUESTION OF "TERRITORIAL WATERS". THE
ONLY REFERENCE TO WATERS IN PARAGRAPH 13{8} IS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF
MILITARY FORCES OF BOTH SIDES FROM "THE COASTAL
ISALNDS AND WATERS OF KOREA OF THE OTHER SIDE".
THERE IS NO ATTEMPT TO DELINEATE SUCH "COASTAL"
WATERS OR TO REFER TO THEM FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE.
IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE PROVINCIAL BOUNDARY
LINE MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH 13{8} SERVES ONLY AS A
CONVENIENT MEANS OF DESCRIBING WHICH ISLANDS ARE
UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF WHICH SIDE, NI AND DOES
NOT PURPORT TO DIVIDE WATERS. THIS LIMITED PURPOSE
OF THE LINE IS MADE CLEAR IN THE TEXT OF MAP 3,
VOLUME 2 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH INDI-
CATES THAT THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF THE PROVINCIAL
LINE DRAWN ON THE MAP TIS SOLELY TO INDICATE THE
CONTROL OF COASTAL ISLANDS ON THE WEST COAST OF KOREA.
THIS LINE HAS NO OTHER SIGNIFICANCE AND NONE SHALL BE
ATTACHED THERETO. THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF PARA-
GRAPH 13{6} TO THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY IS, OF COURSE,
THE FACT THAT IT SPECIFICALLY PLACE THE ABOVE ISLANDS
UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL OF CINCUNC.
(B} PARAGRAPH 13{8} WHICH PLACES THE ISLANDS UNDER
UNITED STATELET NATIONS COMMAND "MILITARY CONTROL"
MUST BE READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH
REQUIRES THE NAVAL FORCES OF BOTH SIDES TO "RESPECT
TO THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE AND
THE LAND AREA OF KOREA UNDER THE MILITARY CONTROL
OF THE OTHER SIDE." IT SEEMS CLEARS CONTRARY TO THE
B.
FORD
LISSARY
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS 322420CR}
CONFIDENTIAL
3
ASSERTIONS OF THE KPA, THAT THE TERM "LAND AREA OF
KOREA" AS USED IN ARTICLE 15 INCLUDES OFFSHORE ISLANDS
AS WELL AS THE MAINLAND. ABSENT SOME SPECIAL UNDER-
STANDING TO THE CONTRARY, WHICH THE KPA DOES NOT
TO OUR KNOWLEDGE ASSERT, THE ORDINARY MEANING OF THE
TERM "LAND AREA" WOULD NOT APPEAR MORE RESTRICTIVE
THAN THE TERM "COAST", WHICH FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINING
MARITIME JURISDICTION WOULD INCLUDE ISLANDS AS WELL
AS MAINLAND TERRITORY. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH UNDER
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PERTINENT CON-
VENTIONS, {1958 CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA
AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, 1958 CONVENTION ON THE
VPM111 CONTINENTAL SHELF}, ISLANDS ARE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT IN DETERMINING THE BOUNDARY OF A COUNTRY'S
TERRITORIAL SEA AND CONTIGUOUS ZONE, AS WELL AS THE
BOUNDARY OF ITS CONTINENTAL SHELF. ALSO, ISLANDS
FAR OFFSHORE HAVE THEIR OWN TERRITORIAL SEA AND
CONTIGUOUS ZONE.
(() THE DPRK IS, THEREFORE, OBLIGATED UNDER PARA-
GRAPH 15 TO RESPECT THE WATERS CONTIGUOUS TO THE
ABOVE-NAMED ISLANDS. It SINCE THE AGREEMENT DOES
NOT PROVIDE ANY FORMULA FOR RESOLUTION OF THE
BOUNDARY BETWEEN THE OVERLAPPING CONTIGUOUS WATERS
or THE TUO SIDES, SUCH RESOLUTION MUST BE FOUND BY
REFERENCE TO GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAU USED IN THE DRAWING OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES.
SUCH PRINCIPLES DICTATE THE DRAWING OF A MEDIAN
time WISHANT BETWEEN THE COAST {TINCLUDING
LINE EQUILISTANT BETWEEN THE COAST {INCLUDING
SCATH KORCAN ISLANDS} AND THE ISLANDS. THIS
PRINCIPLE or EQUIDISTANCE HAS SERVED AS THE BASIS
04208 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN THE ADOVE-
BANCO CONVENTIONS TO DETERMINE VIRTUALLY ALL MARITIME
SUCH LS THE BOUNDARIES OF THE TERRITORIAL
::# 163 CONTIGUOUS ZONE AND THE CONTINENTUAL SHELF
ACTUCEN BOTH OPPOSITE AND ADJACENT ARG**1STATES.
***** ::. OF COURSE, NO DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS
:4 ANTICLE 15 OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IN
ALCARD. BASED IN THE RECORDS AND INFORMATION
TO us HERE, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT WE HAVE IN FACT
2 "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT OF TWELVE MILES OFF
CAN COAST AS CLAIMED BY NORTH KOREA EXCEPT WHERE
TO ISLANDS ORCONFLICTING ROK TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIM
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JSAO [JOINT SEA AIR
8.10RD
NECE FROM ITS COAST FOR ARMISTICE AGREEMENT PURPOSES.
ROK LIKEWISE PATROLS OUT TO AT LEAST TWELVE
CONFIDENTIAL
FORM DS 322A{0CR}
CONF IDENTIAL
UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD APPEAR DIFFICULT TO
CLAIM OTHER THAN TWELVE MILES "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT
FOR ISLANDS UNDER ARTICLE 15. {THIS, OF COURSE, WOULD
BE LIMIT SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF DEFINITION OF "CONTIGUOUS"
IN ARTICLE 15 OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND HENCE FOR
DEFINITION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARTIES UNDER ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT, AND WOULD HAVE NO RPT NO IMPLICATION IN TERMS
OF TERRITORIAL SEA QUESTION OR CLAIMS. } IN THIS CONNECTION,
WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION OF REFERENCE IN PARA 6 {C}
REF A THAT UNC/ROK HAVE CLAIMED THREE MILE"CONTIGUOUS
WATERS" LIMIT FOR ISLANDS.
4. FOLLOWING ABOVE APPROACH AND ARGUMENT, ANSWERS TO
QUESTIONS POSED PARA 6 REF {A} ARE AS FOLLOWS
[A} THE U.S. DOES NOT RECOGNIZE TERRITORIAL SEA
CLAIMS BEYOND THREE MILES AND PROTESTS SUCH CLAIMS.
CONSEQUENTLY WE SHOULD NOT RECOGNIZE THE NORTH KOREAN
CLAIMED TWELVE MILE TERRITORIAL SEA LIMIT. WE SHOULD,
HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO RESPECT DPRK CLAIMED TWELVE MILE
"CONTIGUOUS WATERS" LIMIT IN AREAS WHERE IT DOES NOT
RELATE TO ACCESS TO ISLANDS AND WHERE ROK TERRITORIAL
WATERS DO NOT OVERLAP IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT RULES
AND AUTHORITIES ISSUED TO U.S. FORCES.
{B} AS FAR AS WE CAN TELL, NLL IS UNILATERAL LINE
AND IS NOT RPT NOT RECOGNIZED BY NORTH KOREA AS A DIVIDING
LINE BETWEEN THE "CONTIGUOUS WATERS" OF. THE ISLANDS AND
THOSE OF THE NORTH KOREAN COAST FOR PURPOSES OF THE
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON THIS ASSUMPTION WE BELIEVE PATROL
LIMIT LINE SHOULD REFLECT MEDIAN LINE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE
RATHER THAN NLL.
{C} THE UNC SHOULD TAKE NO POSITION AS TO THE
TERRITORIAL WATERS CLAIMS OR EITHER NORTH KOREA OR THE
ROK. WITH RESPECT TO UNC CLAIMS REGARDING "CONTIGUOUS
WATERS" UNDER ARTICLE 15, SEE PARA 3 ABOVE.
5. ABOVE GUIDANCE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY PREPARED PRIOR TO
RECEIPT OF REFS B AND C. AND D. WE CONCUR IN ARGUMENTS
OUTLINED REF B FOR PRESENTATION BY SENIOR UNC COMMANDER.
OUR YY COMMENTS ON ROK MEMORANDUM AND NLL FOLLOW SEPTEL.
FORD
savent.
CONF TIDENTIAL
IT:
RECEIVED BY:
. line $1452)
TRGENT
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center
us 626
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
'73 DEC 21 PM 6 : 53
S/S #
WHITE HOUSE
RESEASE NO. 021 . CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL
SITUATIONSON
. NO. PAGES 4
INDIPTION CT NSG.
TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE QUESTIONS REGARDING NORTHERN LIMIT
L
LINE
S/SISRGAMMON
,
9
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
pay JEANNE DAVIS - URGENT CLEARANCE PER TELECON
,
,
,
,
.
.
assurance /XX / INFORMATION 17 PER IEQUEST / / COMMENT
/
& MUST FOR DISPATCH 00B SAT.
MAID FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
all for SRCammon
Executive Secretar:at Officer
TUAU
10d
FORM DS 322{0CR}
SECRET
E.O. 12958 DECLASSIFIED (as amended) SEC 3.3 shatDoD Directive 5200.30 C
State Dept Guidelines Blue 12/4/03
By H
NARA, Date 2/4/11
EA/K: EHKELLY: DPW
12/21/78 EXT 29330
EA - MR. SNEIDER
L - MR. ROH
- MR. LEITZELL
115C
JCS - MR. VANDEGRIPT
S/S
JCS - MR.832 COL. ADAMS
EA/K - DONALD L. RANARD
IMMEDIATE
SEOUL
PRIORITY
SEE ATTACHED
E.O. 11652: GDS
[HE ,
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PBOR, KS, KN
SUBJ: ROKG LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON NORTHUEST COASTAL INCIDENTS
CR :
REF: A. SEOUL 8574; B. SEOUL 8575
TL 1
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
RCA
ASC
1. CONCUR IN REACTION TO PROPOSED MEMORANDUR. ALTHOUGH
#CEC MAY ISSUE MEMO UNILATERALLY. USC CUNDER UNC ROLE) VILL
BLAD
#C CALLED UPON TO DEFEND CONTENTS AT MAC MEETINGS AND
RV
******** CLSEWHERE. ACCORDINGLY. UC HAVE VALID GROUNDS
''' CARISTING THAT OUR VIEUS BC TREEN INTO CONSIDERATION
1/1
11:10 10 POLLOWING AMC MORE DETAILED COMMENTS
" TRANSMITTAL TO noFA.
:. USC 419 MCKG MUST BE IN COMPLETE ACCORD ON PUBLIC
PARTICULARLY AS THEY RELATED TO THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT. IF FOKG TAKES PUBLIC LINE THAT WE CANNOT
ILUSEQUENTLY DEFEND UNDER OUR INTERPRETATION OF ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT. NORTH KOREA UILL BE QUICK TO EXPLOIT DIVERGENCES
LITHER APPARENT OR REAL.
3. UE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT MOFA'S ATTEMPT TO GIVE NLL
VALIDITY AS A "RESPECTED" ELEMENT OF "ARMISTICE REGIME"
WHICH HAS DEVELOPED OVER PAST 20 YEARS. WE ARE AWARE OF
MILITARY
NO EVIDENCE THAT NLL HAS EVER BEEN OFFICIALLY PRESENTED
ADDRESSE
ATTACHED
SECRET
FORM DS 322A10CR}
SECRET
2
TO NORTH KOREAS. WE WOULD BE IN AN EXTREMELY VULNERABLE
POSITION OF CHARGING THEM WITH PENETRATIONS BEYOND A LINE
THEY HAVE NEVER ACCEPTED OR ACKNOWLEDGED. ROKG IS WRONG
IN ASSUMING WE WILL JOIN IN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE NLL ON NK.
4. IF ROKG PROCEEDS WITH MEMO IT SHOULD BE REVISED ALONG
FOLLOWING LINES TO AVOID SITUATION ANTICIPATED PARA TWO.
S. PARA L {A} OF REFTEL B IS ACCEPTABLE RESTATEMENT OF
NK POSITION. PARA L {B} SHOULD BE REVISED ALONG FOLLOWING
LINES. "SINCE OCTOBER 23, 1973, NORTH KOREAN NAVAL
VESSELS HAVE BEGUN CARRYING OUT A SERIES OF PROVOCATIVE
NAVAL MANEUVERS IN THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OFF THE FIVE
ISLAND GROUP. IN PARTICULAR, THE NORTH KOREANS NAVAL
VESSELS HAVE ILLEGALLY INTRUDED, -ON NINE DIFFERENT
OCCASIONS, TO POINTS RANGING FROM 5,000 TO 1,000 YARDS IN
THE CONTIGUOUS WATERS OFF THE SAID ISLANDS DURING THE
PERIOD FROM NOVEMBER 19 TO DECEMBER 19, 1973. MOREOVER,
NORTH KOREAN VESSELS HAVE BEGUN TO DANGEROUSLY HARASS
VESSELS IN TRANSIT TO THESE SAID ISLANDS EVEN THOUGH
THE TRANSITTING VESSELS HAVE FOLLOWED A LONGER, MORE
INDIRECT COURSE WHICH KEEPS THEM BELOW THE NORTHERN LIMIT
LINE {NLL}. THIS LINE WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE UNC SIDE
SOON AFTER THE ARMISTICE IN AN EFFORT TO AVOID POTENTIAL
CONFRONTATION BY KEEPING UNC NAVAL AND CIVILIAN VESSELS
SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR OF NORTH KOREAN SHORELINES TO AVERT
INCIDENTS. THE WISDOM OF THIS PRUDENT MEASURE HAS BEEN
DEMONSTRATED BY THE ABSENCE OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS UP UNTIL
THE BEGINNING OF RECENT NORTH KOREAN MANEUVERS. END QUOTE.
b. PARA 2{A} AND {B} REQUIRE NO CHANGE.
7. PARA 2{C} SHOULD BE DELETED.
8. IN PARA 3{A} THE VAGUE PHRASE "SEA AREA" SHOULD BE
CHANGED TO "CONTIGUOUS WATERS".
9. PARA 3{C} SHOULD BE REVISED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE THE
NORTHERN LIMIT LINE HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PRE-
SERVING PEACE IN THE WATERS FOR THE PAST TWENTY R ± YEARS.
LAUNCHED BY THE NORTH KOREANS FOR THE PURPOSE OF
LINE, CAN ONLY BE REGARDED AS NEW MILITARY PROVOCATIONS
THE RECENT NORTH KOREAN HARASSMENT OF VESSELS BELOW THAT
G
FIANCE OF THE SPIRIT AND PROVISIONS OE THE ARMISTICE
DISRUPTING THE LONG EXISTING AND STABLE SITUATION IN DE-
AGREEMENT. END QUOTE.
FORD
SECRET
FORM DS 322A(0CR)
SECRET
3
BO. IN PARA 4{8} THE WORDS "ARMISTICE REGIME" SHOULD BE
DELETED AND THE WORDS "Et PEACE AND STABILITY OF KOREA"
INSERTED.
11. IN sum, YOU SHOULD INFORM MOFA THAT WE CONSIDER THE
MEMO WILL HAVE LITTLE PUBLIC IMPACT. WE ARE MAINLY
INTERESTED IN RESOLVING PROBLEM AND ARE INCLINED TO BELIEVE
THAT THE WORDING AND TONE OF ROKG MESSAGE, UNLESS AMENDED
AS ABOVE, WILL EXACERBATE THE DISPUTE. THE ROKG SHOULD
UNDERSTAND THAT OUR POSITION WILL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY
THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH MAKES NO
REFERENCE TO NLL. YY
TRANSMITTED BY:
RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)
URGENT
(Date & Time Stamp)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
w 27
Operations Center
LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT
DEC 21 PM 6:53
"T's
S/S #
SITUATIONO.COM
WHITE HOUSE
LDX MESSAGE NO. 022
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET
PAGES - 3
,
DESCRIPTION OF MSG. TELEGRAM TO SEOUL RE ROKG LEGAL MEMORANDUM ON
NORTHWEST COASTAL INCIDENTS
FROM: S/S : SRGAMMON
,
,
,
Officer
Office Symbol
Extension
Room Number
LDX TO:
DELIVER TO:
EXTENSION:
ROOM NUMBER:
NSC
MRS. JEANNE DAVIS - URGENT CLEARANCE PER TELECON
,
,
,
,
9
9
,
9
,
r
,
FOR:
CLEARANCE XX / INFORMATION
/
PER REQUEST
/
/
COMMENT
/
REMARKS:
A MUST FOR DISPATCH 00B SAT.
VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY:
and for SRGammon
Executive Secretariat Officer
WÖNSAN
Söp'o-dong.
FORD
Samdung
Anbyon
PYÖNGYANG
Onch'on
Кийт-пі
Kosan,
Songnim
CHANGADAE-KKÜT
Namp'o
Kosöng
Кийт-пі
SÕK-TO
*Sinan-nl
Chiha-ri
DEMARCATION LINE
NORTH
KOREA
CH'O-DO
Seriwon
Demilitarized Zone is two
*Ich'on
Pokkye-rl
kilometers wide on each
P'yönggang
side of demarcation line.
Cheeryong
Kansong,
Sinch'on
Pyöngsan®
Kumhwa
Changyon,
.
.Ch'örwön
Sokch'o
Sinwon-ni
*Kümch'on
*Yönch'ön
Hwach'on
eYanggu
Yangyang,
Haeju
o
OKaesong
PAENGNYÖNG-
Ongiin
DO
P'anmunjom
TAECH'ONG-
Yonan
Ch'unch'on
DO
ROK ARMY
Chumuniin®
*Mansan-ni
SECTOR
Kangnüngo
SOCH'ÖNG-DO
Üljöngbu
TÜNGSAN-GOT
US ARMY
Hongch'on
YÖNP'YÖNG-YÖLTO
SECTOR
U-DO
KANGHWA-DO
ROK MARINE
УНАШ УМЕНЬ
SECTOR
SOUTH
KOREA
Hoengsong
SEOUL
Yangp'yöngümnae
YONGYU-DO
INCH'ON
Chöngsön
Pyöngch'ang®
Wönju
Yoju
Suwon
Ich'on'
Yemi-ri
Yöngwol
Osan
тӧкснӧк-киnоо
Changhowön,
*Chech'on
KOREA
DEMILITARIZED ZONE AREA
Pyöngt'aek.
Ansong
Ch'ungju
Tanyang
o
10
20
30
40 Miles
Pungs
0
10
20
30
40
Kilometers
Yongju
*Ch'önan
.Sosan
.Taean
57023 9-67
TJB
FYY
[10/7/7]
R.M. 1103
KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS PERTAINING TO
FIVE COASTAL ISLANDS IN THE YELLOW SEA: PAENGYONG-DO,
TAECHONG-DO, SOCHONG-DO, YONPYONG-DO, AND U-DO
In January 1952, the U.N. Command and Communist delegations
negotiating the Korean armistice agreement decided to turn over
to staff officers the task of negotiating the technical details
of Agenda Item Three--the arrangements for the realization of
a ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including the composition,
authority, and functions of a supervisory organization for
carrying out the terms of the agreement. Sub-delegations had
already agreed that, after the armistice became effective, all
armed forces under the control of either side should be withdrawn
from coastal islands "which were formerly controlled by the other
side and any others specifically and mutually agreed." Within
this context, the problem to be solved by the staff officers
was to agree specifically and mutually on the disposition of
five coastal islands lying to the north and west of the provincial
boundary line between Hwanghae-do (North Korea) and Kyonggi-do
(South Korea). The five islands were Paengyong-do, Taechong-do,
Sochong-do, Yonpyong-do, and U-do.
At the first staff officers meeting, January 27, the U.N.
Command presented a draft agreement providing that within five
days after the armistice agreement had become effective the
commanders of the opposing sides would withdraw all forces,
supplies, munitions, and implements of war from the rear and
from the coastal waters and coastal islands of the other side;
the Commander-in-Chief, U.N. Command, however, would retain
control of, and might continue to occupy, the five islands in
question. The U.N. Command proposal defined "coastal waters"
as those waters within three miles from shore at mean low tide;
it defined "coastal islands" as those islands which, though
occupied at that time by one side, were controlled by the other
side on June 24, 1950.
During the second and third meetings, January 29 and 30, and
in the sixth, February 2, the discussions on this issue revolved
around the questions (1) whether the demarcation line between
the two provinces should be extended over water as the basis
for withdrawal from the five islands and (2) whether, with
reference to all coastal islands affected by the armistice, there
should be any distance specified in terms of coastal waters.
With regard to the five islands, the Communists stated their
belief that those islands which at that time were in their
2
controlled waters, near to the mainland, should come under
Communist control. They presented the following considerations:
(1) the location of the military demarcation line, (2) the
administrative dividing line over the waters between Hwanghae-do
and Kyonggi-do Provinces, and (3) the stability of the armistice
and the prevention of the resumption of hostilities.
The U.N. Command maintained that its forces would be withdrawn
from all those islands formerly controlled by the Communist side
on June 24, 1950, but that those islands that were formerly the
territory of the Republic of Korea and under the military control
of the U.N. Command would remain under the control of the U.N.
Command. As for the five islands specifically named, the U.N.
Command stated that, in addition to being under its military
control, they were also under the political control of the
Republic of Korea; it did not think the islands should "be
changed to the other side just because they, at one time, were
under the control of a prefecture other than the control they"
were under in 1952. The U.N. Command pointed out that these five
islands were a considerable distance from the shoreline, and what
few forces were on the islands would not present a threat to the
armistice. The point was not made that all five islands were
located south of the 38th parallel, the dividing line between
North and South Korea at the time hostilities began in June 1950.
The Communists argued that to maintain a stable armistice
and to prevent a resumption of hostilities both sides should take
the dividing line between the two provinces as a basis upon which
both sides would withdraw from islands formerly controlled by
the other side and others specifically and mutually agreed upon.
Therefore, it was their view that there should be a withdrawal
from the coastal islands, including the five islands specifically
named by the U.N. Command, on the basis of the dividing line over
the waters between the two provinces. They asked if it was the
intention of the U.N. Command to retain five islands north of
the provincial dividing line.
The U.N. Command replied that the demarcation line previously
agreed to by the delegations of both sides had not been projected
west of where it had been drawn over land. Therefore, the U.N.
Command intended to retain control of the five islands even
though they lay north and west of the provincial dividing line.
Furthermore, these islands had not been formerly controlled by
the Communist side and there had been no specific and mutual agreement
that U.N. forces should withdraw from them, and there would be none.
3
As for the issue of the distance of coastal waters, the
Communists maintained that it was unnecessary to define a
specific distance. They said it was not the task of the
military armistice negotiations specifically to decide on
questions of high seas navigation or territorial waters. During
the armistice, it would be the obligation of both sides to desist
from any military naval acts against the other side, including
blockade, patrol, and the stationing of naval forces. The
abandoning of these actions should not be limited only to the
territorial waters; therefore, there was no necessity to stipulate
a specific distance. As for individual and specific questions
which might arise concerning the coastal waters, the Communists
felt they could be handled through the Military Armistice
Commission. The U.N. Command said it wanted to prevent uninten-
tional violations of the waters of either side; unless there was
some distance specified, it would be difficult for the captain
of a vessel to know exactly where he was permitted to go on
the high seas.
In reaction to a Communist statement made at the sixth
meeting that the staff officers should mutually agree on the
islands which remained to be settled, the U.N. Command at the
seventh meeting, February 3, proposed that the Communists
control all of the islands to the west and north of the provincial
line except the five islands in question, which should remain under
the control of the U.N. Command. The Communists replied that,
with respect to the islands, their side had been of the opinion
that all the islands close to Communist-controlled mainland
territory would come under its military command after the armistice
was signed. For the benefit of the effectiveness of the armistice,
however, and in order to resolve this point at issue, the Communists
stated that they agreed with the U.N. Command position that
those five islands to the west and north of the provincial
dividing line would be placed under the military control of
the U.N. Command. Both sides then agreed to prepare a new draft
on this point which would leave no doubt as to the control of the
islands by both sides.
In subsequent meetings various drafts from both sides were
submitted and discussed, with a final draft, as it appeared in
the armistice agreement in June 1953, being proposed by the
Communists and accepted at the fifty-eighth meeting on March 25,
1952. The only difference in the March 1952 text and that of
June 1953 was the number of days (five or ten) within which the
withdrawal had to take place. Except for disagreements regarding
the distance of coastal waters, an issue which remained unresolved,
the discussions involved no substantive matters; instead, the
negotiators concentrated on revisions in wording, spelling, and
precise locations.
4
During the 1952 discussions the Communists continued to urge
that the distance for coastal waters not be specified, stating
that, if there had to be a specification, twelve nautical miles
would assure the effectiveness of the armistice and would
eliminate the possiblity of post-armistice disputes within
those waters. They indicated that, since all of the coastal
islands fell within twelve nautical miles from the shore, to
specify a distance of three nautical miles would be inappropriate;
the shorter distance would not be suffficient to guarantee the
armistice. A deadlock was reached on this issue and after the
eleventh meeting, February 7, there was little mention of it.
At the twenty-sixth meeting on February 22, the U.N. Command
prepared a draft which contained no reference to coastal waters
distance.
The pertinent paragraphs of the armistice agreement signed on
June 8, 1953, at Panmunjom, are as follows:
13. In order to insure the stability of the Military
Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful
settlement through the holding by both sides of a political
conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing
sides shall:
b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement
becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces,
supplies, and equipment from the rear and coastal islands and
waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces
are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is
no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other
side shall have the right to take any action which it deems
necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The
term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands
which, though occupied by one side at the time when this
Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by
the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all
the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial
boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under
the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean
People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's
Volunteers, except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N,
124°40'E), TAECHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO
(37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and
U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the
military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations
5
Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea
lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall
remain under the military control of the Commander-in-
Chief, United Nations Command.
Historical Studies Division
Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs
Department of State
"304
MISSARYA
PA/HO:AHKitchens:mmb 10/7/74