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Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976
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Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976
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National Security Council Press and Congressional Relations Staff Files (Ford Administration)
Leslie Janka and Margaret Vanderhye's Press Guidance Files
subjects
Angola
Lebanon
Western Sahara
Egypt
Morocco
Israel
Algeria
Arms transfers
International relations
Foreign aid
National security
Concorde (Jet transports)
Middle East conflicts
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1976-02-29
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2
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1976
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1976-02-01
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1976
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The original documents are located in Box 4, folder "Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976"
of the National Security Adviser. NSC Press and Congressional Liaison Staff Files at the
Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
file
IA
February 2, 1976
-3-
MERCENARIES FOR ANGOLA
Q. Are we, either directly or indirectly providing funds for the recruitment
training or hiring of mercenaries in Great Britain - for instance?
A. We have stated before and I will state again that no agency of the US
government is being used for the recruitment hiring or training of American
mercenaries. We have stated further that we have provided limited assist-
ance to countries which share our goals in Angola. But cannot account
abviously for every penny of these funds when they are transmitted to
the recipient government. I would refer you to Secretary Kissinger's
testimony of January 29 when he discussed the question of mercenaries
with the State Foreign Relations Committee.
Q. Well are we providing the British with Funds for use in mercenary
recruitment?
A.
We are not giving the British funds for recruitment of mercenaries in
Angola.
GERALD
A. FORD LIBRARY
IB
/
February 2, 1976
NIXON PLEDGE OF 3 BILLION
TO NORTH VIETNAM
Q.
The New York Times has an atricle today that asserts that President
Nixon pledged over 3 billion in aid to the North Vietnamese after the
signing of the Paris agreement. What is our aid policy toward Vietnam
and was there in fact a Nixon memorandum?
A.
The article correctly points our that Secretary Kissinger in a January 1973
press conference stated that no specific sums in post war reconstruction
aid had been promised to North Vietnam. Discussions were begun in
early 1973, with a Joint Economic Commission, the purpose of which was
to implement the Paris agreement. The Commission did not come to any
conclusions, nor were any decisions reached on specific figures largely
because Hanois behavior was so clearly in violation of the Paris agreement.
Q.
What about the Vietnamese that information on our statement missing in a
action brings on our "responsibility" to provide aid to Vietnam?
A.
Our previously stated policy still holds: we believe that Vietnam has
a unilateral obligation to provide information on our missing in action.
This obligation is in keeping with the Paris agreement and is untied to any
other provisions or conditions.
Q.
What is our general policy with regard to Vietnam?
A.
Our general policy is as stated in the President's East-West Center address
in Hawaii, December 7:
"In Indochina, the healing effects of time are required. Our
GERALO A. FORD LIBRARY
policies toward the new regimes of the Peninsula will be determined
by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate
-2-
by their conduct toward us. We are prepared to reciprocate
gestures of good will -- particularly the return of remains of
Americans killed or missing in action or information about them.
If they exhibit restraint toward their neighbors and constructive
approaches to international problems, we will look to the future
rather than to the past!
Q.
Did Nixon Actually send a memorandum to the Vietnamese?
A.
We never discuss correspondence between heads of State.
GERALD ? FORD
IC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
February 2, 1976
FOR MARGIE VANDERHYE
Margie,
Totals for following years per the attached
chart:
close to a
1973 -- roughly half billion (472 million)
1974 -- $2.6 billion (special situation in Pollawing atternally
& October war)
1975 -- close to three-quarters of a billion
($734 million)
1976 -- $2.3 billion (now before the Congress)
(special agreement) situation Following Singi II
1977 -- figures not announced except for
$1 billion in FMS. Figures for full
Israeli aid will become known when
overall assistance package for FY- 77
goes to the Congress. [However, on
FYI basis only you will see from attached
chart figure will be $1.8 billion. ] How-
package will be "substantial" in line with
our continuing commitment to Israel's
security. 11
Rosemary teld Niehuss
Margie- note 70-72 figures which we just got.
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
ID
1977 figures
U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL (IN $MILLION)
noT aunouu
GERALD
P. FORD LIBRARY
except for
FISCAL YEAR
$ / billionin
1973
1974
1975
1976
19772 Fms
Grants
upporting Assistance
50
50
324.5
510
523.3
mmigration
-
Assistance
49
36.5
40
20
American Schools
Abroad
4.4
3.3
2.4
Subtotal
93.4
89.8
366.9
530
523.3
oans
Supporting Assistance
0
0
0
245
261.7
PL 480
47.9
0
9
15
9
EXIMBANK
21.3
35
39.9
50 (est)
50
AID Housing Investment
Guarantee
0 (was 50 25
25
25
25
in FY
72)
Subtotal
69.2
60
68.9
335
345.7
Military Assistance
FMS Credits
300
982.7
200
750
500
Grant Assistance
0
1,500
100
750
500
Subtotal
300
2,482.7
300
1500
1000
TOTAL
472.6
2,632.5
734.8
2365
1869
FYI
Grants
103.7
1,589.8
466.9
1280
1023.3
one
--Loans
368.9
1,042.7
268.9
1085
845.7
1
Congressional approval of Administration's FY 76 request is still pending
2
Planning figures which will be affected by a variety of factors. Immigration Assistance
figure will be provided by Congress; PL-480, EXIMBANK and AID Housing Guarantee
figures are estimates.
1970-
total
of $93.9 mil
1971-total of $634 mil
1972- total 0/$ 483
(includ $ $30 mil Fms)
(includ 545 Fms)
(includ $300 Fms)
margie Vanderhya
CONFIDENTIAL
January 27, 1976
HEADS OF STATE/GOVERNMENT VISIT SCHEDULE
Announced
Prime Minister Rabin
Official Visit
Yes
of Israel
January 27
10:30 AM Arrival ceremony,
90-minute Office meeting
8 PM Black tie dinner
January 28
11 AM 60-minute Office meeting
January 29
7 PM Attend Israeli Reception
Prime Minister Cosgrave
Official Visit
NO
of Ireland
March 17
10:30 AM Arrival ceremony, Feb.5
60-minute Office meeting announcement
8 PM Black tie dinner
King Hussein of Jordan
Private Visit
NO
March 30
11 AM 60-minute Office Meeting
7:30 PM Black Tie Working Dinner
King CarlXVI Gustaf
Private Visit
NO
of Sweden
April 5
11 AM 30-minute Office meeting
President Giscard d'Estaing
State Visit
Yes
of France
May 17-20
Queen Elizabeth II
State Visit
Yes
of Great Britain
July 7-11
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidellnes
By
dae
, NARA, Date 9/9/04
CONFIDENTIAL
FORD LIBRARY & OERALD
le
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018924
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Cable
CREATOR'S TITLE
AM Embassy Beirut
RECEIVER'S NAME
Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE
Secretary of State
TITLE
Lebanon Report
CREATION DATE
02/02/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
034500060
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC PRESS
AND CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
4
FOLDER TITLE
Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/10/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
DAL
IF
February 3, 1976
FORD PUSHING FOR ISRAELI-JORDANIAN TALKS?
Q.
The New York Times carries a story today that President Ford
has agreed to pursue a suggestion made by Prime Minister
Rabin to see if it would be possible to arrange negotiations
between Israel and Jordan for an accord on the West Bank.
Can you verify the story, and will the U.S. use its good offices
to see whether Jordan has an interest in negotiating with Israel?
A.
We are not going to get into the details of discussions
with the Israelis, but I can assure you that the President
reaffirmed his intentions and the intention of his Administration
to continue to work with the parties in the Middle East to see
how progress can be made toward peace in the r egion.
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
IG
FYI:
Anb. Moynihan was:
NOMINATED:
May 21, 1975
CONFIRMED:
June 9, 1975
SWORN-IN:
June 30, 1975
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
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DE RUQMBE #1076 0341045
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 8463
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1206
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6253
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2523
0
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BEIRUT 1076
DELIVER TO NEA/ARN/DRAPER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, LE
SUBJECT: 0900 LEBANON REPORT
1. CABINET MEETING YESTERDAY DID NOT REPEAT NOT DECIDE
FRANGIE SHOULD VISIT DAMASCUS TODAY. MORE TIME WAS
REPORTEDLY ALLOWED FOR VIEWPOINTS OF MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN
LEADERS TO BE EXPRESSED ON THE AGREEMENT so THAT,
ACCORDING TO KARAME AT LEAST, AGREEMENT WOULD MORE
ACCURATELY REFLECT WISHES OF ALL CONCERNED. IT WAS
ANNOUNCED KARAME WILL ACCOMPANY FRANGIE WHEN HE GOES
TO SEE ASAD AND THAT DATE HAS BEEN PUT AS PROBABLY
THURSDAY OR FRIDAY. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CHAMOUNIST
PRESSURES ARE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE. KHADDAM WENT
BACK TO DAMASCUS YESTERDAY AND IS SAID TO BE RETURNING
HERE TODAY AFTER A LIGHTENING VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA IN
BETWEEN. THIS HAS GIVEN RISE TO SPELATION THAT
MEETING BETWEEN FRANGIE AND ASAD MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY
SUMMIT MEETING IN SAUDI ARABIA OF THESE TWO WITH KING KHALED
AND YASSER ARAFAT.
2. TO FURTHER COMPLICATE POLITICAL SCENARIO, RUMOR APPEARS
IN PRESS THAT PRESIDENT FRANGIE WOULD GO TO PARIS AND THE
VATICAN IN THE NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS, PURPOSE UNSTATED.
3. CABINET PASSED A NUMBER OF MEARURES IN THE ABSENCE OF
PARLIAMENT, INCLUDING THE NEW CONSCRIPTION LAW AND THE
1976 BUDGET. CABINET CALLED FOR UNAUTHORIZED RADIO STATIONS
TO CEASE OPERATING IN THE LEBANON.
*WHSR COMMENT
SCOWCROFT, HYLAND, LL
PSN:041682 PAGE 01
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4. KAREAME HAS MADE SOOTHING NOISES ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE
PRESS IN WAKE OF SATURDAY'S HEAVY BOMBARDMENT OF TWO
IRAQI BACKED NEWSPAPERS, CHAMOUN HAS REPLIED TO CHARGES
BY JUMBLATT BY SAYING THAT NO ONE IS THINKING OF A NEW
ROUND (JUMBLATT HAVING ACCUSED RIGHT WING OF PLANNING ONE
FOR SPRING). WE UN
ERSTAND THAT A "LEBANESE SOLUTION" HAS
BEEN PUT TOGETHER IN THE CASE OF DISSIDENT OFFICER LT. AHMED KHATIB
AND HIS FOLLOWERS, DETAILS FOLLOW.
5. PRESS REPORTS ARRIVAL HERE FOR STAY OF ABOUT A WEEK
OF FATHER HENRI DE RIEDMATTEN, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
POPE LEADING A MISSION TO STUDY THE WELFARE PROBLEM
AN WELFARE PROGRAMS OF LOCAL ECCLESTICAL INWTITUTIONS.
A REPRESENTATIVE OF CARITAS INTERNATIONAL IS IN THE
MISSION. THE WHOLE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES AND OTHERS
DESTITUTE IS GETTING MORE AND MORE ATTUKTION HERE. OUR VIEWS
ARE COMING BY SEPTEL.
LAMBRAKIS
BY
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GERALD
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II
February 4, 1976
KISSINGER'S SPEECH ON US-SOVIET RELATIONS
The purpose of the Secretary's address was to reinforce the
Administration's policy of detente, refuting those who characterize
it as a "sell-out" to the Soviets and secondly, to explain the rationale
for a new SALT agreement in the hopes of building support for it.
In the speech delivered to the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco,
Kissinger spelled out the consequences of failure to reach a new SALT
agreement: an accelerated strategic arms build-up over the next five
years could cost as much as an additional $20 billion dollars, and be
"a tragically missed opportunity."
He said the President's policy would be:
-- We will never stand for the violation of a solemn treaty or
agreement and we will remain alert.
-- We never tolerate a shift in the strategic balance against
us; by violations of agreements, by unsatisfactory agreements
or by neglect of our own programs; we will spend what is
necessary to maintain strategic sufficiency.
-- The President is determined to pursue the effort to negotiate
a saner strategic balance on equitable terms -- because it is in
our interest, and because we have an obligation to our own people
and to world peace.
On Angola, Kissinger outlined the history and philosophy behind
our involvement there, adding that Angola represents the first time
that the Soviets have moved militarily, at long distance, to impose a
regime of their choice; it is the first time the U.S. has failed to respond
to Soviet military moves outside the Soviet orbit, and it is the first time
that Congress has halted national action in the middle of a crisis. He
concluded by saying that our Government has a duty to make clear in the
Soviet Union and Cuba that Angola sets no precedent, that this type of
action will not be tolerated again.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-2-
Q.
Secretary Kissinger has stated that Angola sets no precedent
and that this type of action "will not be tolerated" again. But
what does the Administration intend to do in that eventuality --
what can it do, given the mood in Congress today.
A.
As we have said before, the continuation of Soviet and
Cuban policies and action in an area where they have no legitimate
inter ests cannot help but affect our bilateral relationship with the
Soviets in the long run. While I wouldn't want to expand on the
Secretary's remarks or hypothesize on what the President may
or may not do in a given circumstance, I think our policy is quite
clear on this and needs no further elaboration at this time. We will
not, and cannot, be indifferent to such Soviet actions. and the
President hopes that Congress will come to share his views on
the implications and importance of our American policy on these
questions.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
15
February 4, 1976
SADAT ON U.S. PLEDGES TO RECOGNIZE PLO
Q.
Yesterday you were asked for a reaction to a statement
supposedly made by President Sadat to the effect that he obtained
a U.S. commitment "far beyond" a promise to recognize the PLO.
Can you give us anything on that today?
A]
All I can tell you is that our position on the Palestinians
remain the same:
remains the same: we believe that any final settlement must take
into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.
This position was elaborated most recently in the State Department's
statement on the U.S. veto of the recent UN resolution onthe Middle
East, and I commend it to you.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
IK
February 4, 1976
INTELLIGENCE UPDATE
1.
Algeria/Morocco
2. Lebanon
GERALD A. FORD LIBRARY
/ K
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet
WITHDRAWAL ID 018925
REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL
National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL
Intelligence Report
DESCRIPTION
re Algeria, Morocco, Angola
CREATION DATE
02/04/1976
VOLUME
2 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID
034500060
COLLECTION TITLE
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC PRESS
AND CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON STAFF FILES
BOX NUMBER
4
FOLDER TITLE
Press Guidance, February 1-9, 1976
DATE WITHDRAWN
09/10/2004
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST
DAL
Samitized 9/8/04
Approved For Release 2004/09/08 : NLF-CUDEWURD-24-27-1-5
25X1
1K
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 4, 1976
ANGOLA
1
reports that the southern-based National Union, increasingly
unable to compete with the Soviet-armed Cuban troops doing most of the fighting
for the Popular Movement, is organizing many of its troops into guerrilla units. The
National Union plans to continue using conventional forces, however, to defend
fixed positions and strongholds.
In eastern Angola, the National Union is reportedly grouping some 3,000
troops into guerrilla units, which are already active around the town of Lumege. The
National Union plans to use these units to screen conventional forces that will
attempt to advance toward Teixeira. de Sousa from positions held by the Union
between Luso and Lumege. Other guerrilla units being formed are to operate
northward from Andulo.
The Popular Movement has apparently not made any major gains in recent
days. Its forces in the central sector, however, are pressing hard in the vicinity of
Teixeira da Silva, where there is an important road junction. Two separate Cuban
columns, estimated at 1,000 men each and backed by armored cars, are reportedly
moving on that town. Their ultimate target is probably Huambo (Nova Lisboa), the
National Union's former political headquarters.
25X
25X
DECLASSIFIED w/portions exempted NSC/State Guidelines
AUTHORITY RAC NLF COVEWORD - - 24-27-1-5
BY 1112. NARA, DATE 6/14/2011
9/8/2004
FORD LIBRARY in GENALE
3
25X
Approved For Release 2004/09/08 NLF-CODEWORD-24-27-1-5
Approved For Release 2004/09/08 : NLF-CUDEWORD-24-27-1-5
K
February 4, 1976
ALGERIA-MOROCCO
Neither Algiers nor Rabat appears disposed to make major concessions on
Spanish Sahara, despite the continuing Arab mediation attempts and the dispatch of
a UN envoy to the area.
Algeria's party newspaper yesterday welcomed the decision by UN Secretary
General Waldheim-under pressure from Algiers-to send a personal representative to
the area. Waldheim's envoy, Sweden's ambassador to the UN, will leave for Madrid
today and will visit the Saharan territory later in the week. The newspaper held out
little hope of success for the Arab diplomatic effort.
Algeria's preference for a UN role in mediating the dispute with Morocco over
Sahara reflects its disappointment with the lack of support from other Arabs. Libya
and South Yemen are the only Arab states publicly backing Algiers.
The Algerians presumably will push their case for a referendum on
self-determination with the UN envoy. The envoy, however, is expected to limit his
role to a fact-finding mission and not make any specific commitments on
self-determination.
The most persistent of several Arab mediators, Egyptian Vice President
Mubarak, yesterday continued his diplomatic shuttle between Algiers and Rabat.
Press reports from Rabat indicate the Moroccans are insisting on recognition of their
sovereignty over the territory. Rabat maintains it has already consulted the Saharan
people through the territorial assembly.
Algeria, which has rejected the tripartite agreement signed last November
transferring administrative authority from Madrid to Rabat and Nouakchott,
characterizes Morocco's presence in Sahara as totally illegitimate.
According to the press reports from Rabat, Morocco is also insisting on a
withdrawal of "Algerian forces" from several points in Sahara and northern
Mauritania as a condition for accepting mediation of the dispute. Rabat almost
certainly is including the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas among the Algerian
forces and demanding their withdrawal, a condition unacceptable to Algiers.
1
25% I
FORD HIBRARY
Approved For Release 2004/09/08 NLF-CODEWORD-24-27-1-5
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OP IMMED
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DE RUQMBE #1112 0350914
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8483
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 1210
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 6259
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 2529
G 0 N F I D E N T I A BEIRUT 1112
DELIVER TO NEA/ARN/DRAPER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS, PINT, LE
SUBJECT: 0900 LEBANON REPORT
1. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF INCIDENTS IN TOWN AND COUTNRYSICE
YESTERDAY OF MINOR NATURE: INDIVIDUALS SHOT IN THE STREET,
ARMED ROBBERY AND MURDER, CHRISTIANS KILLING EACH OTHER
I JOUNIEH, MOST OF WHICH HAD FLAVOR OF SETTLEING OLD
SCORES AND GENERALLY LOW LEVEL OF LAW AND ORDER. ZOHER
MOHSEN RETURNED FROM TRIP TO DAMASCUS TO ANNOUNCE
FRANGIE TRIP IMMINENT EITHER TOMORROW OR BY SATURDAY
AT LATEST.
2. FAIR AMOUNT OF SQUABBLING CONTINUES AMONG MOSLEMS OVER
A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS, MOST PARTICULARLY RATION OF DIVIDING
SEATS IN NEW PARLIAMENT. SUNNIS ARE SAID TO BE OPPOSING
SHITE DEMANDS FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION, WHILE DRUZE HAVE
FOR SOME TIME FELT THEY WERE GETTING THE LEAST OUT OF ALL
THIS, JUMBLATT HAS TOLD PRESS HE IS NO LONGER PUSHING AT PRESENT
FOR PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN
PARLIAMENT BUT WILL SETTLE FOR DECONFESSIONALIZATION OF
THE THREE PRESIDENCIES CI.E. OF THE REPUBLIC, OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS AND OF THE PARLIAMENT). IDEA HE HAS
RETURNED TO LAST COUPLE OF DAYS WOULD BE THAT CHRISTIAN
PRESIDENT NEED NOT BE A MARONITE BUT COULD BE SOMEONE
SUCH AS GREEK ORTHODOX AND BY SAME TOKEN OTHER TWO
PRESIDENTS COULD BE MOSLEMS BUT NOT NECESSARILY ONE
SUNNI AND ONE SHIA. JUMBLATT MAKES NO BONES ABOUT
HIS OWN AMBITIONS TO FILL ONE OF THOSE POSITIONS, MOST
WHSR COMMENT
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LIKELY THAT OF PRIME MINISTER (PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS), WHICH EVERBODY EXPECTS WILL HAVE
CONSIDERABLY GREATER POWERS IN FUTURE THAN IN THE PAST.
3. PHALANGE LEADER GEMAYEL HAS COME OUT WITH ANOTHER
STATEMENT INSISTING REESTABLISHMENT OF SECURITY AND
"RETURN OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY" MUST PRECEDE ANY POLI-
TICAL SOLUTION. THIS EMPHASIZES RECENT TENDENCY ON CHRISTIAN
AS ON MOSLEM SIDE OF INDIVIDUAL LEADERS TO VIE FOR
POPULAR SUPPORT. THIS IS A NATURAL TENDENCY IN THE
LEBANON AND ONE WHICH BODES TROUBLE FOR FUTURE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF ANY AGREEMENT, BUT AT THE MOMENT APPEARS RELATIVELY
MUTED AND PROBABLY CAN BE CONTAINED.
4. JOYFUL NOTE: IT HAS JUST BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT VOLUNTEERS
WILL HELP SORT ESTIMATED FIFTEEN MILLION PIECES OF MAIL PILED
UP AT CENTRAL POST OFFICE.
LAMBRAKIS
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[2/4/76 ?]"
If the Decision is Fully Affirmative
Q.
Do you think Secretary Coleman was right in overruling the
strongly expressed concerns regarding the environmental impact
of the Concorde and approving Concorde flights into JFK and Dulles?
A.
Secretary Coleman carried out an exhaustive study of the issues
connected with allowing Concorde entry to the U.S. He
personally held public hearings on the questions involved --
particularly relating to Concorde's possible environmental impact.
He has explained his decision in great detail in the paper released
today. Regarding the environmental questions, his analysis shows
only the slightest impact in noise exposure near the airport and
no measurable effect on the environment otherwise. The President
has complete faith in the Secretary's judgments and his decisions.
Q.
How much pressure was put on us by the British and French for
Concorde approval?
A.
The British and French have made a heavy investment in the
Concorde, not only in terms of money, but also in industrial and
human effort. They have stated their concern for the future of
the project were the U.S. to deny the aircraft entry. We made
no commitment to the British and French to give special consider-
ation to the Concrode -- only that we would be fair and non-
discriminatory. The considerations that shaped Secretary Coleman's
decision are clearly and fully put forth in his paper -- backstage
pressure did not dictate or influence that decision.
FORD a LIBRARY GERALD
- 2 -
Q.
EPA has proposed that all Concorde S-- with the exception of the two
operating before December 31,1974 -- should be banned from the U.S.
How is Secretary Coleman's decision consistent with that recommendation?
A.
These are separate questions with different procedures and different
time tables. EPA made one recommendation to the FAA last year
regarding a so-called SST noise rule which would apply to aircraft
certification. EPA has recently changed that recommendation. I
understand that the new EPA input may have to go through a public
hearing process again, and then be weighed by the FAA within the
statutory guidelines for aircraft rule making. The final outcome
cannot be predicted now and will probably take some time to complete.
&
But might not an eventual SST noise rule have the effect of over-
turning Secretary Coleman's decision today?
A.
There obviously are several possible outcomes of this particular rule
making: the one you suggest is a possibility.
Q.
Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's decision?
A:
I am not in a position to speak for the Congress. However, Secretary
Coleman has done such a thorough analysis of the issue that I
would hope the Congress would accept his judgment.
Q.
Do you expect the courts to intervene?
A.
Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that
one would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is
obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
- 3 -
Q.
Might the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority refuse Concorde
entry to JFK?
A.
The PONYNJA has its rules regarding airport use. If the Concorde
meets those rules, there would not seem to be a basis for denying
Concorde use of JFK.
Q.
Won't Coleman's decision set a precedent whereby more SST flights will
be allowed, and environmental deterioration will eventually occur?
A.
Secretary Coleman made reasonable projections of future SST activity
and concluded that the environmental impact would be small. Also,
the decision today is not a commitment to more and more flights.
Other applications would be evaluated as they are received. If
there are such applications, we will have the experience of the Concorde
flights upon which to make further judgments.
GERALD
FORD & LIBRARY
- 4 -
If the Decision is to Allow Entry to Dulles but not JFK
Q.
Do you think Secretary Coleman was right in overruling the strongly
expressed concerns regarding the environmental impact of the Concorde
and approving Concorde flights into Dulles?
A.
Secretary Coleman carried out a most careful analysis of the issues
connected with allowing Concorde entry to the U.S., and he personally
held public hearings on the questions involved -- particularly relating
to Concorde's possible environmental impact. He has explained his
decision in great detail in the paper released today. Regarding the
environmental questions, his analysis shows no impact in noise
exposure near the airport and no measurable effect on the environment
otherwise. The President has complete faith in the Secretary's
judgments and his decision.
Q.
Is it fair to expose those around Dulles to noise that was not acceptable
for JFK?
A.
I understand that Secretary Coleman's analysis indicated no increase
in noise exposure at Dulles, while a slight increase at JFK was
predicted. Based on this, the Secretary decided it would be
preferable to approve entry only to Dulles. Presumably, after
some experience has been gained at Dulles regarding the actual
noise impact - -- as opposed to the calculation we are now dealing
with -- the question of New York entry may be reconsidered.
GERALD
A. FORD LIBRARY
- 5 -
Q.
How much pressure was put on us by the British and French for
Concorde approval?
A.
The British and French have made a significant commitment in
terms of money, effort and prestige in developing this plane.
They have stated their concern for the future of the project were
the U.S. to deny the aircraft entry. However, we made no commit-
ment to the British and French to give special consideration to the
Concorde -- only that we would be fair and nondiscriminatory.
The considerations that shaped Secretary Coleman's decision are
clearly and fully put forth in his paper -- backstage pressure did
not dictate or influence that decision.
Q.
EPA has proposed that all Concordes, with the possible exception of
two operating before December 31, 1974, be banned from the U.S.
How is Secretary Coleman's decision consistent with that recommendation?
A.
These are separate questions with different procedures and different
time tables. EPA made one recommendation to the FAA last year
regarding a so-called SST noise rule which would apply to aircraft
certification. EPA has recently changed that recommendation. I
understand that the new EPA input may have to go through a public
hearing process again, and then be weighed by the FAA within the
statutory guidelines for aircraft rule making. The final outcome
cannot be predicted now and will probably take some time to complete.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
- 6 -
Q.
But might not an eventual SST noise rule have the effect of over-
turning Secretary Coleman's decision today?
A.
There are obviously several possible outcomes. The one you suggest
is a possibility.
Q.
Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's
decision?
A.
I am not in a position to speak for the Congress. However, Secretary
Coleman has done such a thorough analysis of the issue that I would
hope the Congress would accept his judgment.
Q.
Do you expect the courts to intervene?
A.
Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that
we would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is
obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.
Q.
Won't Secretary Coleman's decision open the door to more and more
SST flights?
A.
Secretary Coleman has made it quite clear by today's decision that
SSR flights would be considered on a case-by-case basis -- and no
future approval can be implied.
GERALD LEGARAY ? FORD
7
If the Decision is to Allow Entry on an Experimental Basis (For example,
six months commercial trials into Dulles)
Q. Isn't this six month approval just the nose-under-the-tent approach
to ultimate approval?
A. No. It has become clear from months of studies and hearings that the
noise impact of the Concorde is uncertain. Calculations have been made
but they are based on models which may or may not be fully valid. The
Secretary has decided that we need experience on which to make a final
decision regarding Concorde, and the Dulles trial will provide that
experience.
Q. Do you expect British or French retaliation to this situation of
incomplete approval?
A. We think the British and French experts understand the uncertainties
we need to resolve. We hope the public will also understand --
particularly that these difficult decisions carry with them no anti-foreign bias,
or are excuses for covering up a commercial concern. The Concorde is a
significant achievement and we look forward to the upcoming experimental
period to answer various questions including those relating to environ-
mental factors.
Q. How much pressure was put on us by the British and French for
Concorde approval?
A. The British and French have made a significant commitment in terms
of money, effort, and prestige in developing this plane. They have stated
their concern for the future of the project were the U.S. to deny the
FORD
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
8
aircraft entry. However, we made no commitment to the British and
French to give special consideration to the Concorde -- only that we
would be fair and nondiscriminatory. The considerations that shaped
Secretary Coleman's decision are clearly and fully put forth in his
paper -- backstage pressure did not dictate or influence that decision.
Q. EPA has proposed that all Concordes, with the possible exception
of two operating before December 31, 1974, be banned from the U.S.
How is Secretary Coleman's decision consistent with that recommendation?
A. These are separate questions with different procedures and different
time tables. EPA made one recommendation to the FAA last year
regarding a so-called SST noise rule which would apply to aircraft
certification. EPA has recently changed that recommendation. I
understand that the new EPA input may have to go through a public hearing
process again, and then be weighed by the FAA within the statutory guide-
GERALD A. FORD LIBRARY
lines for aircraft rule making. The final outcome cannot be predicted now
and will probably take some time to complete. It is completely consistent
to proceed with the trial at Dulles so that we can base future decisions
on experience and not guesses and estimates.
Q. Do you expect Congress to try to overturn Secretary Coleman's decision?
A. We hope Congress will be as interested as we in obtaining information
from the trial period so that a better based decision can be reached.
Q. Do you expect the courts to intervene?
A. Secretary Coleman has done such a superb job of preparation that
we would not expect a basis for judicial intervention. But that is
obviously a question for the courts to decide if they are petitioned.
9
If the Decision is Negative
Q. Does the President agree with Secretary Coleman's decision?
A. Although disappointed that this new mode of air travel will not be
available to the U.S., the President understands and accepts the
decision.
Q. Would the plane have made that much difference environmentally?
A.
No, butTthe Secretary obviously feels that approving the Concorde
would be a reversal of the direction we have been moving toward
improving our environment. He also was concerned that approval
of a few flights would inevitably lead to more flights in the future -- a
trend he did not want to see initiated.
Q. Won't the British and French take retaliatory action?
A. The decision was taken in the most open possible way, and it is clear
that no anti-foreign or commercial bias was involved. Our relationship
with these friends and allies is much broader than that embodied in any
single issue, and we do not expect retaliatory action. It would be
unwarranted.
Q. Might the British and French take legal action against us?
A. Secretary Coleman has considered very carefully the legal aspects of
his decision, and is convinced that he is acting within our legal and treaty
obligations.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
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February 5, 1976
EARTHQUAKE IN GUATEMALA
A major earthquake struck Guatemala yesterday, the effects of
which were felt in neighboring Honduras, El Salvador, and parts of
Mexico. Casualty reports in the papers appear to be exaggerated
according to official accounts from the area which indicate the death
toll may be between 500 and 1500 with the injuries into the thousands.
Q.
What are we doing to assist the Guatemalans, and what can you
tell us about the safety of Americans there?
A.
We have sent a disaster survey team from Panama to inspect
the situation and to discuss with the Guatemalans how our assi stance
recources can best be utilizaed for their immediate needs. The
Embassy in Guatemala (Amb. Francis Malloy) has authorized
$25, 000 in cash for immediate relief needs. $525, 000 has been
obligated from the Disaster Relief funds and supplies are already
enroute to the area. We understand that the International Red
Cross and the Catholic Relief Organization are gearing up to help
and neighboring countries are providing assistance as well.
As for Americans, all official Americans are accounted for
and we have no reports of injured U.S. citizens, although at this
point, our information is not complete.
At this point casualty figures are sketchy. There is
substantial property damage, injury and loss of life, but we
cannot pin down any statistics as yet.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
February 5, 1976
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF COSGRAVE VISIT
President Ford has invited Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave of Ireland
to pay an official visit to the United States in connection with the United
States Bicentennial. Prime Minister Cosgrave has accepted the President's
invitation with pleasure and will meet with President for discussions on
March 17, 1976 during the course of his visit. The two leaders look forward
to marking the close ties of friendship between the American and Irish
people and to reviewing a number of matters of current common interest.
*
Q: Have Prime Minister Cosgrave and the President met?
A: No, they have not. This visit will provide them an opportunity to
become acquainted.
Q: How long has Cosgrave been Prime Minister?
A: Since March, 1973.
Q: What is the purpose of this meeting?
A: The President attaches great importance to maintaining close and
continuing consultations with all our friends in Western Europe. The
Prime Minister's visit will be a part of that process. Also, as the
announcement text indicates, the visit is in connection with our
Bicentennial and will mark the contributions of Irish immigrants to
the cultural heritage and growth of this country.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
-2-
Q: Why is the Prime Minister visiting the United States at this time?
A: As the text of the announcement said, the visit is in connection with
our Bicentennial year. March 17 -- St. Patrick's Day -- seemed an
appropriate time and was convenient for both leaders.
Q: When was the last visit to the U.S. by an Irish Prime Minister?
A: In March 1971 when Prime Minister Lynch was here.
Q: Will the President and the Prime Minister be discussing specific problems?
A: I am sure that during their talks the Prime Minister and the President
will discuss a broad range of issues of mutual interest.
Q: But there is no single issue which brings the two together?
A: No.
Q: Will they discuss Northern Ireland?
A: I really do not have an agenda for the meeting at this time.
Q: What is US policy on Northern Ireland?
A: Long-standing US Government policy is one of specifically avoiding direct
involvement since we do not believe this would serve any useful or
GERALD
FORD & LIBRARY
productive purpose. In our judgment, a solution to this centuries-old
dispute can come about only through the efforts of the parties directly
concerned.
Q: So, in other words, we are standing aside?
A: We are obviously very concerned about the tragic situation in Northern
Ireland. As a people we have close ties of friendship and kinship with
-3- -
all those involved -- Irish, British and the people of Ulster alike.
We therefore have offered and will continue to offer moral support
and encouragement to all those of good will who are working to break
the circle of violence and to build a peaceful, just society in that area.
Q: We hear about Americans contributing funds and guns to terrorists in
Northern Ireland. What about that?
A: I don't think this is the time or forum to go into Northern Ireland, with
all its complexities. Wherever there is evidence of illegal involvement
in the affairs of Northern Ireland by persons in the United States, the
US Government has enforced, and will continue to enforce, the laws
against such involvement to the best of its ability.
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
February 5, 1976
KRAFT STORY ON ARMS CONTROL POLICY
Q.
What can you tell us about the Kraft story today to the effect tha t
Secretary Kissinger's negotiating position in Moscow was at
variance with the Administration's agreed upon SALT strategy and
that by an NSC meeting it was determined that Kissinger should be
called home?
A.
The article is quite misleading. The President had planned
before the Secretary's departure to hold an NSC meeting on
January 21 to review the situation at the time.
It is absolutely false that Kissinger operated at varianace
with NSC decisions. There were agreed upon positions prior
to his departure. The positionshe took in Moscow were directed
by the President, and agreed upon by NSC members. The January
21 NSC meeting was planned in advance in order to review the
bidding at that point.
Furthermore, the Secretary's schedule was dictated by his
appointments in Brussels and Madrid, as well as the Rabin visit
to Washington.
GERALD LIBRARY a FORD
February 5, 1976
SAFIRE COLUMN ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE KURDS
Q.
Will you comment on the Safire story in the New York Times
today which accuses the United States and President Ford of
"betrayal of the Kurdish people? 11
A.
The story you mention is based on leaks from the Pike
Committee and illustrates two problems we have always had
with that Committee -- the first being the use of and leaking
of classified information, the second being the gross distortions
of documented testimony and evidence they have received. It
is extremely difficult to comment on a sensitive subject like
this and obviously we cannot and will not comment on the details
or substance of the issue, but let me just say that the general
thrust of the story is contrary to the record.
To all other questions:
I am not able to go beyond my remarks today.
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY
for Kaugree 3
February 9, 1976
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO EGYPT
Q.
In the context of moving to solidify our relations with Egypt,
is it true that you plan to provide military assistance to Egypt,
beginning with C-130 aircraft?
A:
Egyptian interest in military equipment from the US is not a
new issue. The subject came up in a general way during
the visit of President Sadat and he has also discussed his
desires in this regard with visiting members of the Congress.
We have made it very clear that we would consult with Congress
before selling military equipment to Egypt and whatever is done
in this regard would be done in consultation with Congress.
This is understood by the Egyptians.
As the State Department spokesman indicated last week, a specific
request from Egypt for C-130 aircraft has been received and is
being considered. Congress will be consulted before the sale
of these aircraft is approved. These consultations can be
expected to begin fairly soon.
We will also consult Congress on the development of this relationship,
the shape and size of which would be worked out gradually in
consultation with the Congress.
GERALD a LEBRARY FORD
PAGE 2
Q
Has Rabin been told, during his visit?
A:
The situation is as I have described it and I am not going to
get into a discussion of diplomatic exchanges with other
Governments. I emphasize that any decision on military
equipment for Egypt is dependent on consultations with
Congress.
a
Are you concerned about fueling an arms race by providing
military assistance to Egypt or will you place restraints on
what they can purchase? What is the rationale for providing
arms to Egypt?
Should there be any future military supply relationship, it
would have to be seen within the context of our efforts to
assist our friends in the area who are trying to reach a
negotiated peace and who have certain legitimate security
needs. In the case of Egypt, our emphasis is primarily
on assisting in the economic and development areas. We
have also told them we are prepared to discuss pruchases
of some kinds of equipment but that prior consultations with
Congress would be required for any actual sale to take place.
FORD
?
GERALD
LIBRARY
PAGE 3
Q.
What else besides the C-130s are we planning to give
to Egypt -- F-5s, TOWs?
A.
I have made clear that the shape and size of any future
military sales to Egypt has not been decided and would
only be decided incconsultations with the Congress.
I
am not going to 8 :
FORD
GERALD & LIBRARY
NEW CHINESE PREMIER
Q.
Can you give any additional information on the new acting
Premier Hua kuo-feng? Did President Ford meet him when
he was in China in December?
A.
We are checking the records but as far as we can determine,
no, he did not meet Hua during his trip.
Q.
Do we have any indication that the Nixon visit is connected
with the timing of the announcement on the new acting Premier?
A.
If there is a connection, we don't know of it.
FORD & LIBRARY GERALD
CORPORATE BRIBES TO FOREIGN
LEADERS
Q.
According to reports the Dutch government has concluded
that Prince Bernhard was the "high Dutch official" who
allegedly received over a million dollars from Lockheed
Aircraft. This is another in what seems to be a continuing
series of reports on corporate bribes to foreign officials.
Is the President concerned with these developments? What
What isis our policy on such activities.
A.
The President's views on such activities are well known and
are reflected in a policy statement issued by the Department
of State May 15. ( attached ).
FORD & LIBRARY OERALD
5L
Hond
Department Press Statement of May 15
Bribery of Foreign Officials by U.S. Companies
The Department believes it would be advisable at this time
to amplify recent policy statements regarding illegal activities by U.S.
enterprises abroad.
As indicated in those statements, the U.S. Government does
not condone illegal activities by American business and industrial firms
abroad. The U.S. condemns such actions by U.S. corporations in the
strongest terms. Moreover, any American firm or individual making
unlawful payments to officials of foreign governments cannot look to
the Department of State for protection from legitimate law enforcement
actions by the responsible authorities of either the foreign country in
question or the United States.
At the same time, the United States Government believes it
would be helpful if host governments would clarify the rules for foreign
firms in their countries regarding political contributions and other
payments. We assume that the investigation and prosecution of offenses
by foreign authorities will be nondiscriminatory; that the penalties will
be proportionate to the offense; and that persons or firms found guilty
of improper conduct will be treated fairly and in accordance with
international law.
GERALD LIBRARY ? FORD
US NUCLEAR FUEL POLICY:
HAK TESTIMONY
Q.
According to a New York Times story, Secretary Kissinger
in testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
backed backed away from the previous Administration demand that
private industry take the major role in developing new
enrichment facilities. Can you clarify the Administration
policy on this point?
A.
I do not know how the conclusion you mention was reached, but
I do have excerpts of the Secretary's opening statement Friday
and one section is particularly appropriate:
"Like other landmark U.S. legislation in the nuclear field,
the
the nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy decision
which is essential to the future growth and development of the
nuclear industry. That decision is that uranium enrichment,
like every other activity of the civil nuclear industry - with the
exception of radioactive waste management - and in keeping with
the fundamental nature of our economy, should henceforth be
undertaken in the United States by private industry."
There are additional excerpts I can give you, but I suggest you
read through the entire opening statement on this.
(Excerpts attached)
GERALO A. FORD LIBRARY
-8-
forcing customers to turn away from the United States.
I have concentrated so far on the need to expand
our enrichment capacity at a rate which will ensure
that future capacity keeps up with domestic and foreign
demand. This is the fundamental objective of the
proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act, and is of over-
riding importance both to our domestic and international
goals. I should like to turn now to several additional
features of the proposed program which are of direct
international significance.
The proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act is far more
than a plan for the next increments of uranium enrichment
capacity in the United States, important as that aspect
is. Like other landmark U.S. legislation in the nuclear
field, the Nuclear Fuel Assurance Act involves a policy
decision which is essential to the future growth and
development of the nuclear industry. That decision is
that uranium enrichment, like every other activity of the
civil nuclear industry -- with exception of radioactive
waste management -- and in keeping with the fundamental
nature of: our economy, should henceforth be undertaken
in the United States by private industry. While this
FORD
decision may appear to involve fundamentally domestic
&
LIBRARY
considerations, it has important implications for our
GERALD
international nuclear cooperation as well.
-9-
Under our private enterprise system, capacity
expansion in response to increased demands normally
is provided with few transitional problems given
adequate economic incentives. This capability to
respond to growing needs without resort to our complex
Governmental procedures can serve our foreign policy --
including non-proliferation objectives -- as well as our
domestic interests.
Knowledgeable private and governmental authorities
responsible for nuclear power developments abroad are
well aware that in the United States the continuity
needed to assure that the requirements of an expanding
market are met is best provided by industry, rather than
A
by Government. I am convinced, therefore, that the -
earliest possible establishment of a private enrichment
industry will greatly enhance the credibility of the U.S.
as a reliable source of enrichment. Based on the current
"
state of our technical and economic knowledge and the
schedule on which new enrichment demands must be filled,
this will require commercialization of both the gaseous
diffusion and centrifuge processes. The Nuclear Fuel
Assurance Act will serve this purpose.
Another key feature of the proposed legislation are
GERALD LLBRARY a FORD
the governmental guarantees and assurances to ensure the
early and successful launching of a viable private enrich-
ment industry. This factor should rapidly rebuild
-10-
confidence on the part of both foreign and domestic
users of enrichment services in the reliability of the Un.
States as a nuclear fuel supplier. From this standpoint,
the most important aspects of the proposed legislation
are those enabling the Government to supply and warrant
its technology and to assume the assets and liabilities
of the private venture should it be threatened with
failure. These features, coupled with the President's
pledge that orders placed with a private entity will be
filled as the services are needed, are necessary to instil
that confidence.
A third important feature is that foreign invest-
ment is not precluded for either the gaseous diffusion
or centrifuge enrichment facilities whose construction
the Act will bring about. Aside from the importance of:
such investment in facilitating the successful execution
of any of the uranium enrichment projects under con-
A(
sideration, we consider it important to encourage foreign
investment in private U.S. uranium enrichment facilities
within the limits, of course, defined by the Atomic
Energy Act. We plan to reasonably limit foreign invest-
FORD
&
ment and access to enrichment services both on an
GERALD
LIBRARY
individual nation and overall participation basis. To
discourage or exclude foreign participation would be
inconsistent with our traditional support for freedom
-12-
take place without any Governmental commitment whatsoever
for the transfer of enrichment technology. Access to U.S.
enrichment technology by our partners abroad may, under
certain carefully controlled circumstances, serve U.S.
foreign policy interests, but any proposals toward this
end would be dealt with as a separate issue which would
be subject to Congressional review.
Similarly, the establishment of a private enrichment
industry in the United States will have no adverse effect
on existing U.S. policies and programs designed to avoid
proliferation. Appropriate Agreements for Cooperation
would continue to be required for transfers of the uranium
enriching services abroad and all of the normal guarantees
and safeguards controls would be applied to such transfers.
Given the benefit to U.S. non-proliferation objectives
discussed previously, our national security will
be enhanced, rather than endangered, by the earliest
possible passage and implementation of the Nuclear Fuel
Assurance Act.
In proposing this legislation, President Ford
described the nation as at a crossroads. The Congress
and this Committee have shown strong leadership in the
FORD
past in support of the development of a strong, competitive
GERALD R
LIBRARY
private nuclear industry capable of asserting America's
nuclear leadership throughout the world. The challenge
THE B-1 BOMBER
IS IT NECESSARY ?
Attached for your background are an excerpt from the FY 77
defense report explaining our plans and the budget for the B1
as well as an excerpt from the FY 76 report explaining why the
B1 is needed.
IF ASKED the President's views on the feasibility of the B-1,
you can say that the President has confidence in the way we are
proceeding on the B-1. You may also want to refer to the Pentagon
for technical details on the B-1. The Air Force public affairs
officers are preparing material this morning for use in response
to query.
FORD
&
GERALD
LIBRARY
FY 77 REPORT (RUMSFELD)
unlikely under current circumstances, this crew ratio is the minimum
which will ensure generation of the full bomber force in a short period
of time.
Third, the structural modifications on 80 B-52D aircraft to extend
their safe service life into the 1980s will be completed in FY 1977.
Last, the Department is continuing with the development and testing
of a new short-range attack missile (SRAM) motor to replace those originally
designed for a five-year service life. Although it is not clear how long
the original solid fuel motors will retain their effectiveness, we may
have to begin replacing some of them as early as FY 1977. The budget
requests $16 million in FY 1977 to continue this development and $21
million to procure new SRAMs for the B-1. The B-1 SRAM program has
been phased to correspond to programmed B-1 deployments; however, use
of this funding would be contingent upon a B-1 production decision.
B-1 Bomber
{
As noted last year, the Department wishes to be certain that the B-1
will perform as expected before it is committed to production. To that
end, the Air Force has undertaken an extensive flight testing program
prior to a production decision which is now scheduled for November 1976.
The flight test results on aircraft #1 have been especially reassuring.
Since its successful maiden flight on 23 December 1974, the B-1 has
completed 25 flights and has logged nearly 120 hours.
By November 1976, barring unforeseen problems, there should be more
than 200 flying hours on aircraft #1, which has met every milestone to
date and in most cases exceeded performance expectations. Aircraft 2,
the structural test aircraft, has completed its ground proof load testing,
and will commence flight testing in mid-1976. Aircraft #3, the offensive
avionics test aircraft, has had the initial avionics equipment installed
and has begun its preflight checkout in preparation for its scheduled
first flight in early 1976. By the scheduled November 1976 production
decision date, the Air Force expects to have demonstrated the B-1's
ability to accomplish successfully its primary mission requirements in-
cluding cruise characteristics, air refueling, high altitude supersonic
capability, and low altitude high speed penetration capability. In
addition, the program will have completed engine production verification
testing of over 9,000 hours, fatigue testing of approximately two life-
times, and a demonstration of offensive avionics capability.
Production of RDT&E aircraft #4 was started in September 1975 with
delivery scheduled for early 1979. This aircraft will provide a test
bed for defensive avionics and help maintain continuity between RDT&E
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1
and production should it be decided to produce and deploy the B-1.
Aircraft #4 is intended to become an operational aircraft after testing
is completed.
As a result of the successful flight test program to date and the
demonstrated B-1 performance capability, the Air Force wants to be
in a position to initiate production in late CY 1976, if such a decision
inally
continues to be appropriate. Therefore, Congress is being asked to
ing
appropriate $483 million for continued research and development and
$1,049 million for procurement of the first three production aircraft
in FY 1977. The FY 1978 authorization request contains funding for
procurement of the next eight aircraft. The plan is to build up over
the FY 1977-82 period to a production rate of four B-1s per month.
While none of the procurement funds will be committed prior to the
production decision, it is essential to have the funds available if
B-1 production is approved. Without these funds, the resulting delay
in a production program would increase the cost substantially owing
to the necessity of reconstituting the work force and the cost escalation
1
that occurs from the resulting delay.
Cruise Missiles
The Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) and the Sea Launched Cruise
Missile (SLCM) will be kept in advanced development until the cruise
missile concept has been satisfactorily demonstrated. Both programs
are continuing, stressing maximum commonality in high cost areas such
as the engine, navigation guidance package and warhead. The full-
scale engineering development decision will not be made until early
CY 1977, by which time a single development contractor will have been
g,
selected for the SLCM program and both the ALCM and SLCM will have
e
demonstrated fully-guided powered flights.
During this past year the Congress has expressed concern about
maintaining two separate cruise missile programs. Both the ALCM and
the SLCM may still need to be developed, however, owing to the differences
in sea-based and aircraft platforms and operational environments which
are significant enough to warrant different airframe designs. The
ALCM has been optimized for air launch from strategic bombers and stresses
maximum compatibility with the existing SRAM avionics and ground handling
equipment. The SLCM, on the other hand, has been optimized for launch
at sea. Because of design differences, the ALCM cannot physically
be launched from a submarine. The SLCM could be launched from a bomber;
however, to do so would require modifications to the missile and the
carrier aircraft resulting in a decreased cruise missile load per aircraft,
and added costs for aircraft modifications and support equipment.
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FY 76 REPORT (SCHIESINGER)
have been established to provide the step-by-step testing of these
balance
subsystems.
ticula
into tl
The development contract for the TRIDENT I missile also has
beyond
been awarded and the first flight test is expected in 1976.
can CO
Four supplemental flight tests of the TRIDENT I MK 4 RV using ATLAS/
to com
MINUTEMAN boosters have already been successfully completed. Flight test
aircra
on a TRIDENT I missile of the MK 500 MaRV Evader will be carried through
advanced development only.
T
of our
In view of our experience with the POSEIDON operational tests,
SSBNs
we plan to conduct a larger proportion of such operational tests
operat
early in the TRIDENT program. For these tests to be valid, however,
before
missiles which actually have been operationally deployed must be used.
we sti
Thus the OT flight tests cannot be conducted prior to operational
develo
deployment. Assuming that the desired submarine delivery dates are
compet
met, we would have the first TRIDENT I missiles deployed by the end
potent
of FY 1979.
start
which
TRIDENT II Missile
faster
To provide an option to deploy a higher throw-weight, more accurate
I
SLBM in the late 1980s, if such a system should be needed at that time,
prefer
we propose to continue our studies of the TRIDENT II. The new missile
bomber
would be designed to utilize more fully the available volume of the
system
TRIDENT submarine launch tubes.
evide
velop
We plan to proceed with the TRIDENT II effort at a very
syste
moderate pace. Only about $3 million is included in the FY 1976
altit
Budget for this purpose, plus $1 million more in the Transition
a fas
Budget. An authorization of about $10 million is requested for
diffi
FY 1977.
cult
SSBN Subsystem Technology
could
As indicated earlier, we must continue our search for technology
ing t
that will provide less expensive alternatives for use in future SLBM
would
systems. Accordingly, we have established a new program element,
inclt
"SSBN Subsystem Technology", to focus attention on this essential
not 1
effort. About $2 million is included in the FY 1976 Budget and
a per
$1 million in the Transition Budget for this purpose. In addi-
tion, we are requesting an authorization of about $4 million in
FY 1977.
is III
that
C. Bombers
to b
comp
As I indicated at the beginning of this discussion of strategic
B-1
offensive forces and programs, we believe the retention of bombers
the
in our forces for the foreseeable future is essential to a well
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balanced U.S. strategic posture. The current bomber force, par-
ticularly the B-52Gs and Hs, should be able to fulfill this need
into the 1980s. But if we are to maintain an effective bomber force
beyond that time, a new aircraft will have to be procured. While we
can continue to modify and improve the B-52Gs and Hs for some time
to come, and even equip them with stand-off cruise missiles, these
aircraft may well become less effective during the next decade.
The principal potential threat to the pre-launch survivability
of our current bomber force is the rapidly growing fleet of Soviet
SSBNs which, if equipped with depressed trajectory missiles and
operated close to our shores, could catch many of our alert B-52s
before they could escape from the vicinity of their bases. While
we still have no evidence of a Soviet depressed trajectory SLBM
development program, such a system is clearly within their technical
competence. We have already taken some steps to hedge against that
potential threat, e.g., the satellite basing and the quick engine
start modification programs. But beyond these measures we need a bomber
which has both increased hardening to nuclear effects, and a significantly
faster airfield escape time than the B-52.
With regard to penetration at very low altitude, the currently
preferred U.S. mode, the principal potential threat to our current
bomber force is the deployment of a Soviet AWACS/fighter air defense
system with a good look-down, shoot-down capability. We have no
evidence as yet that the Soviet Union has such a system under de-
velopment but as we ourselves have already demonstrated, such a
system is technologically feasible. Effective penetration at low
altitude against an AWACS/fighter air defense system would require
a faster bomber with a smaller radar cross section which is much more
difficult to "see" against the ground clutter, and which is more diffi-
cult to intercept in a tail chase.
A B-52 force armed with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs)
could attack targets within the Soviet Union without the B-52 penetrat-
ing the air defenses. But a bomber force limited to stand-off operations
would have far less capability and flexibility than a force which
includes penetrating aircraft. A pure stand-off bomber force could
not provide reconnaissance or attack targets of opportunity as could
a penetrating bomber force.
For these reasons, a bomber force which includes penetrating aircraft
is much to be preferred over a pure stand-off bomber force, providing
that the cost of the former is reasonably commensurate with the benefits
to be gained. The difference in costs, we feel, would be modest in
comparison to the difference in gain. Accordingly, we believe the
B-1 development and test program should be continued to provide us
the option to modernize our bomber force with that aircraft in the
1980s.
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