Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
1555842
label
Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (2)
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
1555842
sourceUrl
contentType
document
title
Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (2)
citationUrl
collections
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
subjects
China
Pakistan
India
Soviet Union
Arms transfers
Middle East conflicts
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
1555842
coverageEndDate
logicalDate
1975-10-31
month
10
year
1975
coverageStartDate
logicalDate
1975-09-01
month
9
year
1975
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
63ea0bde55928a94
ocrText
The original documents are located in Box 3, folder "Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto
(2)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
/
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5743 Add-on #3
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
ACTION
October 15, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
520
HAK thinks no smith
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17
1p
from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan
You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President
and you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara
[Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral
instructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively
closed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto,
you also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17,
indicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to
discuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.
The President has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still owes Bhutto a
reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that
letter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed
from a State draft and coordinated here, revised to reflect the fact of
the Presidential meeting last week.
RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the
President seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.
APPROVE
APPROVE AS AMENDED
Roe Peppe
Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, Clift
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
FORD
&
lob 3/9/04
GERALD
Digitized from Box 3 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
I
THE WHITE HOUSE
10/9th
WASHINGTON
Bob.
Reviseto tahe
account of Aziz
meeting with Presedent
B
FORD
a at Eo En ro
10/9
5743 Add-on #2
the
MEMORANDUM
IC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
filyped I&A TABS
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
ACTION
September 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
ROBERT B.
OAKI
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17
from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan
You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President and
you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara [Tab II].
You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral instructions
to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively closed out the
June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto, you also acknow-
ledged his new letter to the President of August 17, indicating that the
President would respond after you had a chance to discuss it with him
following your return from the Middle East.
has new sean Aciz Ahmed bt he still
in
tight
+
buyone
The President owes Bhutto a reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab
I is a memo transmitting that letter and proposing a reply. The suggested
reply has been developed from a State draft and coordinated here You
will be seeing Aziz amed on September 30 in connection with the UNGA
and can take up in more detail any of the issues be may raise which are
eflected in Bhutte's letter. It would bendesivable to have the President
sign his reply prior to your meeting Ahmed
Revised to
reflect the
The proposed Presidential reply mentions at the conclusion, the issue fact
of a visit to Pakistan. You will recall having sent an interim message
the
7
to Bhutto on this subject, promising an early reply as to what the Pres
Presibutial
dent's schedule might permit this year [Tab IV]. The President's reply
would definitively rule out this year.
last meeting week.
RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President
seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.
APPROVE
APPROVE AS AMENDED
Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs.
Solonon,
solgraph
Clift
an
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
FORD
We 3/9/04
&
LIBHARY
GERALD
1d
MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 5743
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan
At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his
concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These con-
cerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such
as the Helsinki Summit which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to
devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia and statements
allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying
sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.
Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political
and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on
Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support
from the US. 11
the Ahmed
Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before
you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Within the
framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in
avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we
can for Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs. Yes and 1 have
made this clear L Aciz Alimed Recemence assistance, military sales
a withen
I believe that you should reply in general terms to Bhutto, giving
broad reassurance on the issues he raises
Ialso recommend that you
use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip
to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he
Ficked reasons
has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not
going to India this year.
RECOMMENDATION:
although you have
said as much
point LIGHSHY & OTHERS
to Aziz Admed.
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text
has been cleared with Paul Theis.)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
We 3/9/04
Fellow the Same themes
in his talks with you here
adwite me in New York
19
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
opportunity to exchage
views with your Minister
Estate, Aziz Ahmed
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important
that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we
so effectively began in our very constructive meetings
of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger
has also been in touch with you, and both of us have had the
Let me assure you at the outset there is no question
that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are
important to the United States and essential to the
stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are
working to lessen tensions between the major powers,
while safeguarding our vital security interests and those
of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of
its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in
one area does not create opportunities for exploitation
elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on
our relations with other countries in our objectives of
regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore,
made clear to the Soviet leadership that our continuing
attention to improved relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union is heavily conditioned by develop-
ments in other parts of the world. I believe this position
is well understood and will continue to benefit your
Nation's security and independence.
Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our
resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary
Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for
Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of
GERALD a FORD LIDRARY
2
and as how have cutainly Leard from Aziz
should and your
continuing attention in the United States Government for
some time, as you know from our discussions here last
February. I believe we have taken significant steps to
help Pakistan, both through the lifting of the arms embargo
and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In
the months ahead there will be visible results, as we
respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as
we reach new agreements on various economic develop-
ment programs.
We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process
of normalization of relations among the countries of South
Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum en-
couragement to your efforts.
In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit
Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again.
It now appears that my schedule through the remainder
of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your
warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to
visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend
to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests
in promoting stability in South Asia and your important
contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your
hospitality at a mutually convenient time next year. In
the meantime, I remain grateful for and committed to the
further strengthening of the close relations between our
two countries.
With best personal wishes,
Sincerely,
wt are Tratical
GERALD A LIBRARY FORD
that your part Flu
world has managed to retain
its equilibovin and stay relatively
His Excellency
free I great power interforce,
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
dispite varine recent events which
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
call must here upset the regional
Islamabad
balance, Let hope teat the
continue to be the case.
5743 Add-on
if
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
INFORMATION
August 26, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
FROM:
ROSEMAI VANEHUSS
BUD # FARLANE
SUBJECT:
Bhutto Message -- State of Play
I appreciated your response on the package at Tab A. Just to wrap
this up, you may have seen the attached cables in which State went
out to the party, conveying the text of the Bhutto letter and seeking
guidance on handling it. You will note that, as we suspected, no
replies to Bhutto's two previous messages have gone out and that
State has now been instructed to come up with a new draft message
taking into account all of Bhutto's letters. We will probably see a
new package go by in the traffic, seeking the Secretary's approval
for a proposed response. I will flag it for you.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Cables Class. by State
Wer 3/9/04
The
Beed
FORM
&
GERALD
COPY I OF 15 COPIES
OF
DE
D
STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES of
SECRET
NOD692
ACTION CUP
PAGE 01 SECTO 10077 240947Z
21
ACTION NOUS-00
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 W
053664
0 2409352 AUG 75
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECRET SECTO 10077
USD 0
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PK
SUBJECT: REPLY TO BHUTTO
FOR SOBER FROM ATHERTON
S
REF: TOSEC 100091
REPLY TO BHUTTO HAS NOT BEEN SENT. WILL APPRECIATE
NEW DRAFT IN RESPONSE TO BOTH BHUTTO LETTER BY COB
(WASHINGTON) MONDAY.
KISSINGER
ww CD X
Bhutto messages:
June 13 to the President
June 13 to the Secretary
August 17 to the President
S
SECRET
Cola 3/9/05
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECHET
N00599
PAGE 01 STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091
60
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
DRAFTED BY NEA:SSOBER:LAB
State Dept. Guidelines,
state Review 9/17/03
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
S/S :JLHOGANSON
NEA/PABIRPECK
NSC:RNIEHUSS (INFO)
050913
0 231950Z AUG 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
SECRET STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091
NODIS
E.O. 116521 XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, PK, us
SUBJECT: NEW LETTER FROM BHUTTO.
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FROM SOBER
1. PM BHUTTO HAS WRITTEN ANOTHER LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT
(TEXT IN FOLLOWING MESSAGE), EXPRESSING DEEP CONCERN OVER
ALLEGED SOVIET PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN AND REPEATING THE
STATEMENTS BY SOVIET REPS IN KABUL WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY
REPORTED TO US. SPECIFICALLY, THE SOYS WERE SAID TO HAVE
RAISED THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE PAK TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS
TO AFGHANISTAN.
2. RESPONSE TO BHUTTO'S TWO PREVIOUS LETTERS (TO PRESIDENT
AND TO SECRETARY) IS PENNING IN S/S 7515991 WHICH IS WITH
YOU, IF REPLY AS PROPOSED THEREIN HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT,
I SEE NO PARTICULAR PROBLEM ALTHOUGH WE WOULD WISH TO
SUPPLEMENT IT LATER WITH REFERENCE TO BHUTTO'S LATEST
SECRET
07V830
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
0
Department of State
ONLITED
SECRET
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
PAGE 02 STATE 201500 TOSEC 100091
LETTER. ON OTHER HAND, IF REPLY NOT YET SENT, I SUGGEST
IT BE HELD UP UNTIL WE MAVE HAD A CHANCE TO GIVE ADEQUATE
CONSIDERATION TO BHUTTOIS NEWEST LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT.
WILL TRY TO GET YOU FURTHER SUBSTANTIVE RECUMMENDATION
WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS WITH REGARD BOTH TO PROPOSED WRITTEN
REPLY FROM SECRETARY (WHICH WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE ONLY
SLIGHT MODIFICATION) AND TO POINTS TO BE MADE ORALLY
BY BYRUADE. MAW
Sp
SECRET
NOI TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
]
5.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
"rec'd
8/26
Rosemary the Leneral
assumes that a
statted Jasumed
repty rs being
him it was
Bud
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
COPY / OF 15 COPIES
0
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF
TELEGRAM
SECRET
N00598
PAGE 01 STATE 201499 TODEC 100000
60
S
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
DRAFTED BY NEA:SSOBERILAB
State Dept. Guidelines
state Ro view 9/16/03
APPROVED BY NEAISSOBER
By
lab
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
S/S :JLHOGANSON
N
NEA/PA5:RHECK
NSC:RNIEHUSS
050864
0 231948Z AUG 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
To USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE
S E CRE T STATE 201499 TOSEC 100089
NODIS
S
E, E.O. 116521 XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, US, PK
SUBJECT: TEXT OF AUGUST 17 LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER
BHUTTO
FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON FROM SOBER
1, FOLLOWING is TEXT OF LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM
PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO DATED AUGUST 17, 1975. IT WAS
DELIVERED TO THE WHITE HOUSE AUGUST 22 BY THE PAKISTAN
S 0
EMBASSY.
2. BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,
I AM WRITING TO SHARE WITH YOU OUR APPREHENSIONS OVER THE
LIKELY SOVIET ROLE IN ASIA AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT,
PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR REGION.
SECHET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
STATE
UNITED
are
AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 STATE 201498 TOSEC 100000
WE FEEL DEEPLY DISTURBED OVER THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEM IN INDIA ON THE ONE HAND, AND THE
GROWING HOSTILITY OF AN UNSTABLE AFGHAN REGIME TOWARDS
PAKISTAN ON THE OTHER. OUR FEARS ARE HEIGHTENED BY OUR
PERCEPTION OF THE INCREASING DEPENDENCE OF THESE TWO
REGIMES IN OUR IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOURHOOD ON THE SOVIET UNION
WITH WHICH THEY ARE ALLIED AND WHICH IS ENABLED BY THE
HELSINKI ACCORD TO PAY GREATER ATTENTION TO OUR REGION IN
PURSUANCE OF ITS HISTORIC OBJECTIVES AND GLOBAL AMBITIONS.
WE FORESEE THAT, ASSURED OF SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE SOVIET
UNION WILL RELENTLESSLY EXENT PRESSURES ON THE SMALLER
STATES OF ASIA AND ON PAKISTAN IN PARTICULAR, WITH A VIEW
TO ACHIEVING ITS PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING AN UNCHALLENGABLE
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN THIS CONTINENT.
SITUATED AS WE ARE, WE CANNOT BUT BE CONSCIOUS OF SOVIET
DESIGNS AND THE NATURE OF SOVIET AMBITIONS IN ASIA, AND
WHAT THESE PORTEND FOR US. DESPITE THE SOVIET UNION'S
ROLE IN THE DISMEMBERMENT OF OUR COUNTRY IN 1971, WE HAVE,
WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, LEFT
NO STONE UNTURNED TO IMPROVE OUR RELATIONS WITH IT IN
ORDER TO REDUCE ITS HOSTILITY TOWARDS PAKISTAN WHICH,
RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, IT HAS REGARDED AS AN OBSTACLE IN THE
PATH OF ITS AMBITIONS IN ASIA, THIS ABOVE ALL WAS THE
PURPOSE OF MY VISIT TO MOSCOW IN MARCH 1972 AND AGAIN IN
OCTOBER LAST YEAR.
SOVIET GOALS AND AMBITIONS ARE INFLEXIBLE AND HARDLY
AMENABLE TO ANY BASIC CHANGE AS A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF
A SMALL COUNTRY SUCH AS OURS, WHICH IN THE INTEREST OF
THE PRESERVATION OF ITS OWN SOVEREIGNTY, NATIONAL
INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, HAS STOUTLY
DECLINED TO TUE THE SOVIET LINE. THE PASSAGE OF TIME
MAKES CLEARER BOTH THE EVER-GROWING THREAT TO OUR
EXISTENCE FROM MOSCOWIS EXPANSIONIST POLICIES AND THE
WOEFUL INADEQUACY OF OUR RESOURCES TO MEET THIS THREAT.
THE SOVIET UNION IS DETERMINED TO SUBJECT US TO INTENSI-
FIED PRESSURES WHILE CONTINUING TO BE OUTWARDLY APFABLE.
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM!
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 STATE 201499 TOSEC 100009
THE MOST RECENT AND DISTURBING ILLUSTRATION OF THIS CAME
DURING RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN OUR DIPLOMATS AND THEIR
SOVIET COUNTER PARTS IN KABUL. OUR MINISTER WAS ASKED BY
HIS SOVIET COUNTER PART WHETHER PAKISTAN WOULD AGREE TO
CEDE SOME TERRITORY TO AFGHANISTAN, ON RECEIVING A FIRM
REPLY IN THE NEGATIVE THE SOVIET MINISTER THREW UP HIS
HANDS AND SAID, "THEN GOD ALONE KNOWS WHAT wILL HAPPEN.
WHEN OUR AMBASSADOR SOUGHT CLARIFICATION OF THE SOVIET
ATTITUDE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, THE LATTER NOT ONLY
ACCUSED PAKISTAN OF NOT WANTING TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH
AFGHANISTAN BUT WENT so FAR AS TO ASSERT THAT THE DURAND
AGREEMENT - DEFINING THE INTERNATIONAL FRONTIER BETWEEN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN " WAS A LEGACY OF THE COLONIAL
TIMES WHICH PAKISTAN SHOULD NOT THY TO DEFEND AND THAT
THE DURAND LINE HAD BEEN FOISTED UPON THE AFGHANS, SINCE
NO NATION WOULD, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR,
"WILLINGLY AGREE TO HAVE ITS OWN PEOPLE DIVIDED INTO TWO
PARTS." THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT
THE ASIAN SECURITY PACT WAS THE REAL AND THE ONLY ANSWER
FOR ESTABLISHING PEACE AND SECURITY IN ASIAs
I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS COGNIZANT OF THE
SOVIET THREAT TO THE COUNTRIES OF THIS REGION AND IN
PARTICULAR TO PAKISTAN WHICH HAS SO FAR STOOD ITS GROUND.
WE GREATLY APPRECIATE THE VARIOUS STATEMENTS OF POLITICAL
SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN WHICH WERE GIVEN TO US BY THE UNITED
STATES AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT,
THE FACT, HOWEVER, NEEDS TO BE REGISTERED THAT THESE
DECLARATIONS, VALUABLE THOUGH THEY ARE, SEEM TO HAVE MADE
LITTLE IMPACT ON SOVIET EXPANSIONISM. SOVIET POLICIES
CONTINUE TO BE STRIDENTLY ASSERTED AND SOVIET PURPOSES
AGGRESSIVELY REITERATED.
IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR ABILITY TO HESIST SOVIET
PRESSURES WILL DEPEND NOT so MUCH ON THE RELIANCE WE PLACE
ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL ASSURANCES AS ON THE CREDIBILITY
THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHES TO THEM. THE LACK OF A CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FROM THE U.S. ENCOURAGES THE SOVIET
UNION TO EXPECT THAT THE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF
PAKISTAN WOULD COMPEL US TO MAKE READJUSTMENTS DEMANDED BY
THE CHANGING POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN OUR REGION,
SECHET.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
D
Department of State
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 04 STATE 201499 TODEC 150000
I NEED HARDLY ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, OF HOW MUCH WE
CHERISH OUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE
SINCERELY HOPE THAT THEY WILL CONTINUE TO EXPAND AND GAIN
STRENGTH IN THE COMING MONTHS AND WILL BE SUSTAINED BY
OUR COMMITMENTS TO THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF PEACE AND
STABILITY WHICH WE SHARE.
WITH MY BEST WISHES AND WARMEST PERSONAL REGARDS,
YOURS SINCERELY, ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO.
END TEXT. MAW
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
General Sconcroft
Dacoin
5743
has seen.
1 Pm
MEMORANDUM
TOSCO
211
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/NODIS
INFORMATION
August 23, 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR
K ROSEMARY NIEHUSE
GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM:
SUBJECT:
New Message for the President from
Prime Minister Bhutto
Ambassador Yaqub-Khan returned from Pakistan late yesterday
with another letter to the President from Prime Minister Bhutto.
The original was delivered here with the hope that it would be
transmitted immediately. I believe it is safe to assume that the
Ambassador will seek an early meeting with you (he has not re-
quested this yet) on your return from Vail to discuss the range of
Pakistani security concerns and such issues as (a) the President's
trip to Pakistan and (b) a possible meeting for Aziz Ahmed with the
President during UNGA (Chavan has asked for a meeting the Paks
will be sensitive), as well as developments in South Asia (Bangladesh).
The full text of Bhutto's message is attached, but its main themes --
Soviet/Indian/Afghan pressures on Pakistan and the need for greater
US support for Islamabad are consistent with Bhutto's previous
two messages to the President and Secretary Kissinger of June 13.
Two points are worth noting, however: (a) The linkage between
the conclusion of the Helsinki Summit (paragraph 2) and prospects
for accelerated Soviet efforts to carve out a sphere of influence in
South Asia; (b) The assertion that US assurances to Pakistan to date
(while greatly appreciated) have not curbed Soviet designs (paragraph
6) and particularly, that this situation only further encourages Moscow
in its pressures on Pakistan (paragraph 7). While Bhutto makes no
specific requests in this letter, by developing a negative line on US
support for Pakistan, he is in effect asking for increased political
and materiel support, arms being of foremost interest to Islamabad.
You will note that Bhutto makes no mention of having received replies
to his two messages of June 13 and this has probably prompted his
third letter. I have checked with State and understand that the Secretary has not
(as of this writing) given final clearance to the proposed replies and
that he has this action package with him. State is now aware of this
SECRET/NODIS
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY
laba
NARA, DATE 3/9/04
SECRET/NODIS -- 2
new message and Deputy Assistant Secretary Sober will be staffing
the Secretary. I am also doing a daily briefing item. In sum, this
action is now on the tracks.
SECRET/NODIS
Attachment: Message from the Prime Minister to the President
dated August 17, received NSC late August 22.
Islamabad,
August 17, 1975.
PRIME MINISTER
Dear Mr. President,
I am writing to share with you our
apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in
Asia after the Helsinki Summit. particularly
following recent developments in our region.
2.
We feel deeply disturbed over the
establishment of an authoritarion system in
India on the one hand, and the growing hostility
of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan
on the other. Our fears are heightened by our
perception of the increasing dependence of these
two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on
the Soviet Union with which they are allied and
which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay
greater attention to our region in pursuance of its
historic objectives and global ambitions. We
foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the
Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on
the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in
particular, with a view to achieving its purpose
of establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence
in this continent.
3.
Situated as we are, we cannot but be
conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of
Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend
for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the
dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have,
within the framework of our principles and policies,
DECLASSIFIED
...2-
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
caba
State Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
Page- 2
PRIME MINISTER
left no stone unturned to improve our relations
with it in order to reduce its hostility towards
Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has
regarded as an obstacle in the path of its
ambitions in Asia. This above all was the
purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and
again in October last year.
4.
Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible
and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result
of the efforts of a small country such as ours,
which in the interest of the preservation of its
own sovereignty, national independence and
territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe
the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer
both the ever-growing threat to our existence from
Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful
inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.
5.
The Soviet Union is determined to subject
7
Thisis a recast of a
us to intensified pressures while continuing to be
recent message to
outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing
Byroade - that Paks
illustration of this came during recent exchanges
have "definite proof"
between our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts
in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet
low-level
of Soviet support for
Afghan twitorial ambitions
counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede
in Pakistan and that this
some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm
is a major change in the
reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw
Sovietposition. Bothour
up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what
embassies in Kabue and
will happen." When our Ambassador sought clarification
Islamabad noted the low of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador,
level of the Sov-Afghan
the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting
Crichange, conchaed account to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far
was exaggerated and surmisedas to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining
for US Arms.
it was Pak lead-in to pressing the international frontier between Afghanistan and
Page- 3
PRIME MINISTER
Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times
which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the
Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans,
since no nation would, according to the Soviet
Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own
people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador
concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was
the real and the only answer for establishing
peace and security in Asia.
6.
I have no doubt that the United States
is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries
of this region and in particular to Pakistan which
has so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate
the various statements of political support to
Pakistan which were given to us by the United States
at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat.
The fact, however, needs to be registered that
these declarations, valuable though they are, seem
to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism.
Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted
and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.
7.
In these circumstances, our ability to
resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much
on the reliance we place on the American political
assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union
attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence
of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union
to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan
would compel us to make readjustments demanded by
the changing power equilibrium in our region.
Page -4
PRIME MINISTER
8.
I need hardly assure you, Mr. President,
of how much we cherish our relations with the United
States. We sincerely hope that they will continue
to expand and gain strength in the coming months
and will be sustained by our commitments to the
goals and objectives of peace and stability which
we share.
9.
With my best wishes and warmest
personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
Zulfilen ui Illents
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.
Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi
Tab 4
13 June 1975
TAB II
My de r Dr. Kissinger,
As you are aware, we have done, and will continue
to do, Jur utmost to normalize our relations with India in
accor ince with the Simla Agreement. Nevertheless, we are
seriou ly concerned over the probability of India deciding to
launch il war against Pakistan in which Afghanistan will also
join a: : both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such
a war ould come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the
situati 11 to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed
within two years, before we have had the time adequately to
strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext
on the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an
integral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the
State.
Against this background, I was relieved to hear
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State state 9/17/03
from Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what
you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States
NARA, 3/9/04
would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to
Dept. Guidelines
Date
Pakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.
This latter assurance could have a most vital
bearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and
stability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most
effective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony
DVCT the region comprising the Persian Gulf and the sub-continent.
-2-
To Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions,
it come ; as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the
United States Administration to safeguard peace and stability in
South ;ia.
I should also add that this assurance is another
manifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of
vision nich I, like many others, have always admired in you.
Only SU h a perception of lurking dangers and the undistracted
will to Stert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes
of tome row.
May I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance
to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with
the Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It
could help them materially to decide what China could do in that
contingency.
Mr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese
press attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador
along the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.
With warm personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
Bruss hn hi Shiendo
Gulfikar Ali Bhutto
His Excellency Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Washington D.C.
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi
13 June 1975
Dear Mr. President,
I have been wanting to write to you on a matter
of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the
peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However,
since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating
to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until
you returned home and had time to address your attention to
other matters of importance to world peace.
On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister
of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met
in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed
Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan
with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United
States.
stateriens.9/17/03
It is an established fact that practically all of
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines 9/17/03
India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.
esvcr,
view ri the Inde-Soviei Treaty of 1971, an armed
NARA, Date 3/9/04
attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
and, indeed, direct involvement.
As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government
is determined to further the process of normalization of relations
with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will
sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
Neverthcless, our considered assessment of the situation,
as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could
come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would
have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one.
For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim
to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral
part of India and prepare the stage for an: invasion of Azad
Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's
control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.
Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the
event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely
the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited
Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering
this question but have given us no answer so far. Their
decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence
of the Indo-Sovict Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom
to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated
when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while
Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.
Dr. Missinger then enquired whether he could
ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan
and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what
the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed
that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if
in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United
States would not be able to stay out of that situation.
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming
military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and
backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the
determination of the United States to ward off a, danger of vast
and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.
I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the
clarity with which your Administration has perceived the
implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability
of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for
the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power
equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive
factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting
the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the
shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the
horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it,
a turning point would be reached in its history. The global
balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace
in our critical region could become truly inviolable.
With best wishes and warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Julian his Shanks
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
\
His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America
White House,
Washington D.C.
III
Tab
COPY 9 OF 15 COPIES
Palastan TABITI
DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATE
30 AUG 75Z 10 06
lp
Department of State
008449
OFFINA
SECRET
N00658
TELEGRAM
PAGE
51
SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z
21
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
030931
0 3009132 AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S ECRE F SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
Reply to Bhutt
Eo. 11652: XGDS-3
Messages of June
TAGS: PFOR, P.K, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
to President are
REF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162
Secretary
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER
BHUTTO,
2, BEGIN MESSAGE:
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA
THIS COMING MUNDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE
0
YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED
IN THE INTENSIVE NEGUTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND
ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR
VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TUWARD THE JUST AND
LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING
OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS
ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-
SECRET
DECLASSIPIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state leview 9/17/03
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEOR
STATES
OF
SECHET
PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z
CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STIL LIE
IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE ARAB HURLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF
THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF Tnc PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED.
DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, 1 BELIEVE WE
HAVE MADE CUNSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR
ACHIEVING This AGREEMENT ARE GOOD EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF
OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR
THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE MAU HEARTENING SUPPORT
FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS.
I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT
THIS AGREEMENT, IF ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST
IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR BN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL
ASPECTS OF THE ARAB ISRAELI PROBLE, IT IS OUR FIRM IN-
TENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS --
S
HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY
MAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING
LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE RE-
ASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE
PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND,
DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT
HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND
EPOPLE WILL SUPPORT DUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF
STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS, THE VERY
ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE
EFFECT UN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS
SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE
BAIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BUTH SIDES TO TAKE
THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATN
PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE ThIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME
MINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I
Stat
WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING
YOU CONCERNS FOR PAKISTANIS SECURITY, I REGRET THAT
SECRET
WITH
min
revis
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRA
SECRET
PAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 3009462
THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED
MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. 1
HAVE DISCUSSED YOOK LETTERS IN DETAIL WITM TME PRESIDENT
AND ME HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY
SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCEERNS. IT WAS HITH THESE IN MIND
THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF ThE EMBARGO ON
ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED
TO DO WHAT NE CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AMEAD. THIS IS AN
76
INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED
SECURITY AND KELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE
TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS UN VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN
YOU EARLIER LETTER,
Since MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE
PRESIDENT HAKEU WITH Mt YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE
EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATION
BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL.
UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILLDISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH
THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, or COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU.
MEANNHILL, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE
BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND 1 HOPE YOU WILL KEEP
AMBASSADUR BYROADE INFORMED,
WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER
END MESSAGE
3, IN CONVEYING THE ABUVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
30 AUG 75Z 10 12
008450
Department of State
UNITED
SECRET
TELEGRAM
NOD660
D
STATES
OF
PAGE 01 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z
12
ACTION NODS-00
S
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 1001 W
031197
0 300913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLANABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
N
S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198
NODIS
0
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-
PRESSION, IN nIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES
S
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING ThIS
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.
IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED
HOSTILITIES UN THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH wt FULLY SHARE WITH
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH
THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO
FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH
THE UNITED STATES KOULD REGARD AN INDICAN ATTACK AGAINST
PAKISTAN.
E.R
N TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE PUSITION OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE UF THE UNITED STATES
S
WOULD BE A MATTER FUR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
EGRET
PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 62 OF 02 301007Z
BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION
AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION
AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY
WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH
LEADERS OF THE PEOPLETS REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR.
THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE Aiv OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE
FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GUVERNMENT
MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
ITS SECURITY,
THE SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ
ARMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT
THE FFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY
TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.
IN DISCUSSNG YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A
DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN
S
PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO
BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN
LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOU UWN DISCUSSIONS WITH
AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN,
THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AULE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL
FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF
OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET
REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING
THE DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW
THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.
WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON
THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS
WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.
TERRET
BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA!
DEPARTMENT OF & STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 23 SECTO 10196 02 of 02 3616072
4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU
SHOULD SEEK TU CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES "MICH EXIST BETWEEN
WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKAKA ON MAY 22 AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S
LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FULLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE
MADE so THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:
DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE
MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED
AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME
IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD
LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID,
THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE
SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY
IN PAKISTAN.
(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER
INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO GROMYKO IN
VERY STRNE TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON
PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE
FROM THE UNITED STATES.
THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE
CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS
ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL
WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING
THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA.
(SHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: =
I WAS
RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED
WHAT YOU PLANNED TO
TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD
TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTANIS
ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.
BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER
ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO
WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN
INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF
INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND
IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEARTMENT THE OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECHET
PAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 3010072
UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT
SITUATION. )
KISSINGER
N
S
SECRET
EXECUTIVE
STATE
Pakistan
1g
Department of State.
LTED
?
TELEGRAM
STATES
of
SECRET 2244
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 98056 0217392
AFR/UN
EUR/CAN
13
FE
ACTION SS=25
LA
INFO OCT-01 Isn-00 1026 W
D/DT
NEA/SA
059650
3
PRC
SEA
R 0237317 SEP 75 ZNK
INSC/PLNS
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
Secretary's reply closes
PGM/ANL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1835
SCIJENV
SECRET ISLAMARAD 8056
out June 13 messages
ECON
OPIIL/IIIT
(ace to Byronde -par 5->)
SS/PR
FXOIS
CONGR
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEOR, PK, US
SURJ: BHUTTO INFORMED OF USG POSITION CONCERNING POINTS
RAISED IN HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
REF: SECTO 10198
!. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE
FOR SAUDI ARABTA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAINING
OUR LETTER TO HTM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY ORAL
REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM HIM TO
vou AND THE PRESIDENT BHUTTO WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED
TO RECEIVE THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM YOU IN THE
State Guidelines stateleview to
9/19/03
MIDDLE EAST, AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GAVE HIM TO BE
UP-TO-DATE AND IN TOUCH WITH YOU JUST BEFORE VISITING
SAUDI ARABIA.
DECLASSIPIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NARA, Date 3/9/04
Dept.
E
?. AFTER HTS REMARKS TO ME ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH
HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO HIM
TN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE,
T SAID THE EXAPT PHRASEOLOGY OF THE POINTS I WAS
INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT VERY CAREFULLY
AND THAT SOME OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED WERE COMPLEX,
CONTAINING IMPORTANT NUANCES. T SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST
OF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING, AND AS A KINDNESS TO HIM,
MIGHT Br PERT THAT "L READ THE TEXT 01 THESE POINTS
PATHER PA THAN JUST LISTEN TO AN ORAL PRESENTATION FROM ME.
!
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SPEREL
or
STATE
Department of State
STATE € AMERICA Line
TELEONAIN
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08956 021739Z
3. BHUTTO READ CAREFULLY MY PREPARED TEXT WHICH HAD
BEFN EXTRACTED VERRATIM FROM ABOVE REFTEL. WHEN HE
FINISHED, WE TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND
WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS MATTER SETTLED so THAT NO FURTHER
CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN US WOULD BE NECESSARY
HE SAID AGAIN BE REGRETTED HAVING BAD ADVICE
ON His LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT GROWING OUT
!
OF YOUR TALK WITH AZ17 AHMED IN ANKARA Y HAVE NO
DOUBT BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOND COMPLETELY THAT I WAS IN THE
PROCESS OF A NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE RECORD.
A. BHUTTO ASKEN IF HE COULD KEEP THE COPY OF MY
ADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HE HAD READ. WHILE I OBVIOUSLY
DO NOT WANT TO BECOME Á PARTY IN HIS PRICTIONS WITH
A272 AHMED, I GAVE HIM MY PERMISSION TO no so THINKING
THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO SERVE TO MAKE THE RECORD
COMPLETELY CLEAR FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. THERE WAS NO
DOUBT BUT THAT HE PLANNED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH BOTH
AZ*Z AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI ON THE PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA
ON BOTH YOUR LETTER AND MY ADDITIONAL POINTS.
5, YOU MAY RFST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO HOLDS
NO RESENTMENT AT US ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT IS A
COMPLETELY CLOSED SUBJECT AND BEST NOT REFERRED TO
X
AGAIN ON ANY LEVEL.
BYROADE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or
STATE
Pakistan IN
Department of State
OF (?)
TELEGRAM
/
SECRET 1827
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08047 0211367
EN
A6
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 Isn-aB 1026 W
054797
AFR/UN
R 0215277 SEP 95
EUR/CAN
FN AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
FE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1831
LA
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
b
NEA/SA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PRC
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SEA
NSC/PLNG
SECRETISLAMABAM 3047
PGM/ANL
SCI/ENV
EXPIS
ECON
OPNL/INT
SS/PR
F.O. 116521 GDS
CONGR
TARS: PFOR, PK, AF, UR
SUBJECT: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS: PM BHUTTO'S COMMENTS
REF: ISLAMABAD 7507 AND 7433
1. IN A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS WITH BHUTTO IN
KARACHI, AUGUST 31. HE DIGRESSED TO GIVE ME WHAT HE
SATD HE ACCEPTED AS THE FINAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE
ALTEGED PULICY REMARKS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
KABUL RE THE DURAND LINE AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THEIR
SUBSEQUENT DOHNGRADING BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE (AND
THAT THEIR POLICY RE PAKISTAN REMAINED AS SET FORTH IN
THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THF TIME OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW
IN OCTOBER 1970
TEXCATT
ACCORDING TO THE
SOVIETS, WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY ASREGARDS ANY ALLEGED
Dept. Guidelines, state 9/17/03
Review
T SUSPECT TN MOSCOW). HE SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS
REMARKS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
0. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED TO HIS AMBASSADOR
DECLASSIPIED
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
NARA, Date 3/9/04
KARUL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE ALLEGED REMARKS WERE
TRUTHFULLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED. HE SAID IT APPARENT
State
THAT OUR JOINT SPECULATION ON THIS MATTER (REFTELS) WAS
PROBABLY CORRECT. RUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP ON ANY
FFFORT TO GET ANY PUBLIC REASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIETS TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTSACE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
i
Dr.
STATE
Department of State
ETATES of AMERICA
TELEGRAM
BECRET
PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08047 0211362
COMPENSATE FOR THE DISQUIETING MANOUVER ON THEIR PART
AS TOO MANY THINGS HAD HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL (AN
OBVIOUS REFERENCE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO BANGLADESH)
AN HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULDN'T no IT.
BYRDADE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHO UISEBAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ITOF
OF
STATE
Pakistan
Department of State
SITED STATES OF
COPY
OF 13 COPIES
SECRET
N00967
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08041 0108272
20
at)
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 N
045140
0 72 6447 SEP. 75
Fn AREMOASSY ISLAMABAD
DECLASSIFIED
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1829
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
SECRET ISLAMABAD 8041
lubi
State Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
,
NARA, Date 3/9/04
NOCIS/CHERUKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFCR, PK, US, XF
SUBJ: BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ON THE MIUDLE EAST
REF: SECTO 10198
1, I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPART-
URE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAIN-
ING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING IIY
ORAL REMARKS IN CONNECTION RITH PAST LETTERS FROM
HIM TO YOU AND ThE PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE WILL COVER
ONLY HIS REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF YOUR
LETTER.
2. BHUTTO SAID HE HOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO PUT ACROSS TO
THE SAUDIS THE POSITIVE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR
LETTER. ME HAS HIMSELF IMMENSELY PLEASED TO NOTE YOUR
EMPHASIS THAT OTHER MOVES SUCH AS ON THE SYRIAN PROGLEM
AND THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO bE TACKLED, AND THE DETER-
MINATION OF BOTH YOUKSELF AND THE PRESIDENT THAT 1T HAD
TO BE SO. Ht. HAD NO DOUBLT WHATSOEVER THAT YOU BOTH
MEANT THIS AND WOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND AT WHAT-
EVER ENERGY AND EFFORT REQUIRED, TO MAKE IT SO,
3. HAVING SAID THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT OUT OF OUR FRIEND-
SHIP HE WOULD TELL US THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THINGS WOULD
134275
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
2 OF STATE
Department of State
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE p2 ISLAMA 08641 0108272
WORK OUT AS WE WISHED AND THAT THE NEXT STEP, ASSUMING
YOUR PRESENT EFFORT SUCCEEDS AS REGARDS THE EGYPTIAN FRONT,
KOULD LEAD TO AN IMPASSE. ht SAID ME AAS SPEAKING AS UNE
4:10 CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS VITAL AND WHO
BELIEVED THAT ANY SETBACK IN 1htM WOULD ot DISASTROUS
FOR PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT ME THOUGHT YOU AND THE
PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TU CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF EVERY
PRO-LEN IN Tnt MIDDLE EAST AND PERMAPS HIS OWN PESSI-
MISTIC FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE,
4, BHUTTO SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD NOT MENTION IT IN
CONNECTION WITH ANY OF THE SPECIFICS HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL
ME, AN UNDERLYING FACTOR IN HIS THINKING WAS ThE UNFOR-
TUNATE TIMING of OUR COMING ELECTIONS AS FAM AS THE MIDDLE
EAST WAS CONCERNED. HE SAIU HL HAS FIRST AND FOREMOST
A POLITICIAN, AND KNEH FIRST HAND THAT THE EMOTIONS OF
PEOPLE HAD A POWER OF THEIR OWN THAT COULD NOT BE IG-
NORED, PARTICULARLY IN A DEMOCRACY SUCH AS OURS,
5. BHUTTO SAID HE hAD HIGH REGARD FOR SADAR AND THOUGHT
THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY ACCORMODATING. but ME SAID HE
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DESCRIBE THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD
MADE AS STATESMANSHIP BUT MORE AS AN ACCOMMODATION. HE
SAID (1) ht THOUGHT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD LOST THIER
WILL TO FIGHT AND SAUAT HAS HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNTT,
AND (2) THAT SADAT WAS STAKING EVERYTHING, ON BOTH HIS
FIRST AND SECOND AGREEMENTS THROUGHT YOUR GOOD EFFORTS, TO
MAKE POSSIBLE AN ECONOMIC BOOM TO TURN ATTENTIONS AWAY
FROM THE ISRAELI PROBLEM. HE SAID (1) ABOVE HAD INHERENT
IN IT THE DANGER THAT SADAT COULD BE OVERTHROWN. AS
REGARDS (2) ABOVE, BHUTTO REMINDED ME THAT HE WAS FROM AN
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY AND HE KNEW THAT THE ECONOMIC
MINACLES SADAT WAS HOPING FOR JUST DIDN'T HAPPEN OVER-
NIGHT, WHETHER IN A VERY RICH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY LIKE
IRAN OR A VERY POOR COUNTRY. so THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT QUICK
CHANGE FROM POVERTY FOR THE EGYPTIANS. AFTER A PERIOD
OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BUDYANCY, IN WHICH THE PUBLIC
POSTURE OF EGYPT MIGHT APPEAR TO TURN BELLICOSE OR EVEN
CHAUVANISTIC, THE LETDOWN KHICH WOULD COME WOULD ALSO
ENDANGER SADAT. IF HE TRIED TO RECOUP BY BOLDNESS AGAIN
ON THE ISRAELI FRONT HISPMILITARY MIGHT GET RID OF HIM AS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
IMENT
OF
STATE
Department. of State
STATES OF AMERICA
SECRET
PAGE 03 ISLAMA 08041 0168272
A PRETEXT FOR NOT FIGHTING AGAIN,
6. AS A COROLLARY TO ThIS SCE ARIO HE SEES THE ISRAELIS
SAYING "BAS" (AKABIC AND URDU FOR ENOUGH OR STOP) AS
REGARDS FURTMER MOVES NE SYRIA, ThE PALESTINIANS, ETC,
(ME AAS PULITE ENOUGH NOT TO SAY 50 BUT I THINK HE HAD
OUR ELECTIONS IN MIND). THEN HE SAID THERE WOULD BE
A DIVISIVE EFFECT AMURG THE ARABS. ht THOUGHT SAUDI
ARABIA AND The GULF STATES WOULD TOLERATE A STATUS QUO
FOR AWHILE AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA. MOROCCO MAYBE AND
SUDAN PERMAPS. LIBYA WOULD DENOUNCE AND ALGERIA (UNLESS
NE ARE MAKING MORE INROADS THAN ME KNOwS THERE). IRAQ OF
COURSE KOLLD BE IN THIS CAMP. SYRIA, AND ASSAD IN
PARTICULAR, HOULD BE INTENSELY TROUBLED, CHINAFOULDNIT
LIKE IT--AND ThE SOVIETS KOULD DE AROUND SMILING LIKE
CHESHIRE CATS!
7. BHUTTO RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT HIS DWN
PREDICTIONS WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SUPPORTING YOUR VIEWS
IN YOUR LETTER AND YOUR OBVIOUS DETERMINATIONM HE SAID
ME EARNESTLY HOPED IS PREDICTIONS WERE WORNG, AS PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS SO VITAL TO US, AND INDEED TO
PAKISTAN AS WELL. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEYOND
THE ROLE OF TRYING TO BE HELPFUL ÀS PAKISTAN WAS MUSLIMN
BUT NOT AKABIC, AND THE ARABS HAD TO MAKE THEIR OwN
POLICY, BE IT WAR OR NEGOTIATIONS, STEP BY STEP OR
GENEVA, PEACE OR CAPITULATION.
8. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR LETTER AND ITS
OBVIOUS STRESS UN NECESSARY NEXT STEPS, HE AGREED BUT
REMINDED ME AS A LAST THOUGHT THAT THE ISHAELIS KERE
VERY SMART PEOPLE. I SAID I SUSPECTED YOU KNEW THEM
PRETTY KELL YOURSELF BY NOW,
9. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH BHUTTO ON THE LETTERS TO YOU
AND THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AMMED
WENT wtil. IN VIEN OF PAST TALKS WITH BHUTTO BY BOTH
YAQUB AND MYSELF, TMIS IS NO LONGER A LIVING SUBJECT
HERE. MY NEXT MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY TO
COMPLETED AND CLOSE THE RECORD ON THIS SUBJECT.
BYROADE
SECRET
NOT to BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Tab
Lar
that LESTIN is STATE
Pakestan
in
U
Department of State THEOD
D
STATES AMELICA
OF
#5 TABIV
S
CONFIDENTIAL
NOD444
PAGE 01 STATE 193876
01
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO DCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/PABIRAPECKILAB
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
PIJJSISCO
I
NSC:ROAKLEY (DRAFT)
NEAISSUSER
S/S of MR, CRTIZ
081429
P 15151cZ AUG 75 ZFF4
FM WASHIN
S
TO AMERBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
C 0 N 1 A STATE 193875
NODIS
E,O, 116521 GDS
07
TAGS: PFOR, FK, US
0
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
07w39 & FORD LIBRARY
REF.: ISLAMABAD 7272
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
BRUITO:
(in
QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
I
AMBASSADOR BYROADE HAS TOLD ME OF YOUR DEEP PERSONAL
DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT FORD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS YEAR. I
HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT YUUR CONCERNS AND THE
HIGH INFORTANCE BUTH UUK GOVERNMENTS: ATTACH TO 1115 VISIT
TU PAKISTAN AS A SYMBOL OF OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATION-
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
4a 3/9/04
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRA
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 193875
SHIP.
WE ARE STILL IN THE MIDST OF WORKING OUT A SCREDULE FOR
POSSIBLE FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE
REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL
THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CHINA BEFORE THE
END OF THE YEAR, BUT THE SCHEDULE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AND NO
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING
OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME TRIP. THUS THE TIMING OF A
VISIT TO PAKISTAN REMAINS UNSETTLED, BUT THE PRESIDENT
HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE REMAINS MOST ANXIOUS
TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF
NOT THIS YEAR AT LEAST NEXT YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR
INVITATION.
WE HILL BE IN TOUCH HITH YOU AGAIN AS SOON AS NE HAVE A
MORE DEFINITE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IN THE
MONTHS AHEAD,
WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A , KISSINGER. END
QUOTE.
2, FYI: ABOVE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ASSURE BHUTTO THAT
THIS MATTER IS INDEED RECEIVING THE MOST CAREFUL
ATTENTION, BUT ALSO TO CONVEY THOUGHT THAT THERE IS
LIKELY 10 BE SLIPPAGE IN PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO PAKISTAN.
KISSINGER
FORD
I
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
1)
1.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12953, SEC. 3.5
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Devi w 9/17/0
BY Wh
, NARA, DATE 3/9/04
PARTICIPANTS:
Pakistan
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yaqub Khan, Ambassador to the US
Iqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy
Iqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN
United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff Fir
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, September 30, 1975
11:30 a. m. - 12:15 p.m.
PLACE:
Suite 34-A, Waldorf Towers
New York, New York
Ahmed:
Congratulations on your success in the Middle East.
It must have been tough.
Kissinger:
It was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came
back. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional
behaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by
this since the really damaging thing politically would be
to attack the Administration on domestic policy rather
than foreign policy. What do they think they are doing?
In any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.
Ahmed:
Look at the investigation of the CIA and everything elsc.
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 2
Kissinger:
It is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused
to allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to
testify on what their policy recommendations were.
This would be like the McCarthy period. My decision
will cause a tremendous brawl.
Ahmed:
We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.
Kissinger:
I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.
Ahmed:
They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on
the second list.
Kissinger:
The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any
intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time
frame. The people who are pushing all this are the
pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to
Israel. But you didn't want it anyway.
Ahmed:
No, only the nuclear weapons.
Kissinger:
The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should
be able to give you some--but I had better watch what
I say since there is no telling what you might report
back to Bhutto.
Ahmed:
We are being modest and restrained in handling the
arms question.
Kissinger:
Do you have the money yet?
Ahmed:
We will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will
be easier to get answers first from you on just what
is available and how much it costs. Then we can go to
the Saudis.
Kissinger:
I can inform you that we have approval to supply you
with 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can
get started on a training program while awaiting
delivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly
on our new military relationship with you, concentrating
on defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 3
Kissinger:
be disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to
(Continuing)
the TOW's or the invitation we are extending to
your Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but
steadily--with maybe some artillery next--weapons
that can reasonably be described as defensive.
Ahmed:
We have been very careful in compiling our lists.
Kissinger:
If you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will
be in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong
enough so that India will be afraid to attack.
Ahmed:
We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India
might well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November
in Kashmir.
Kissinger:
Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain
was too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.
Ahmed:
According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir
is part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir
but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot
be certain but we think this will happen and we must
look out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war
with Afghanistan joining in anytime there is war with
India. But we can handle this with the A-7.
Kissinger:
It has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?
Ahmed:
Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive?
It is a fighter as well.
Kissinger:
I am simply stating facts about the plane.
Ahmed:
We have been very interested in this plane for a long
time. We want about 110 of them. We also need
weapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery
will never get them in our hands before the war in
November. We will do our best by ourselves but we
need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians
cannot move without Soviet approval because of their
treaty which obliges the USSR to help India.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 4
Kissinger:
The treaty is not so binding.
Ahmed:
Yes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is
obliged to come in until the threat is removed.
Really, this would bring the Soviets in even if
India went first and we hit back. So whenever
India wants to start something, she must have
Soviet support. We think India will probably start
a war. Mid-November to mid-December is the
probable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be
watchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem
to be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told
our chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts
and not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside
help is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran
could stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up
to the borders but it would not do so for fear of the
USSR. So what they will really do to help us is
questionable. Nor have we been able to get China
to assure us of support. That is why we need weapons
off the shelf.
Kissinger:
We have serious problems with our own army on
rapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon?
We can discuss all this when they come in October.
Ahmed:
Thank you. That is the best approach. Also, con-
cerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet
Ambassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet
Ambassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had
us all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would
report immediately to Moscow and was sure it would
be cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he
has never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow
took it up there, the Forcign Ministry expressed
surprise that we would credit any such statement.
But when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the
Durand line, they said they were "not empowered"
to discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is
very worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed
you and the Iranians and the Chinese.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 5
Kissinger:
As I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view
of Soviet machinations and you can be certain that
the Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign
Minister will be in Washington next week and I will
tell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will
ruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the
United States. They are trying hard to improve their
relations with us at the present time, due to their
internal developments. It is nothing spectacular,
but it is interesting.
Ahmed:
Will there be a Communique in connection with
Chavan's visit?
Kissinger:
An agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting,
words but no real substance. The biggest question
concerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive
a dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague,
Ambassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort
of comment about each of his guests after dinner, and
since he takes at least half a minute for at least forty
guests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives
a long toast in which he attacks United States policy.
It is very boring. The last time I was at one of his
affairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like
economic power and some like military power but
India likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised
that he came out with spiritual power since I had
expected him to say India has chosen nuclear power.
In Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that
Pakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the
political realities in the area. What does that mean?
Ahmed:
There will be no change in our relationship with you
or with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.
Kissinger:
What is the Chinese mood?
Ahmed:
We hope we can get more support from them. They have
been hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that
you will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.
SECRET NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 6
Kissinger:
What is their attitude toward the United States?
Ahmed:
Last night, Chou gave me the impression that it
is about time something happened as a follow-up by
you to the Shanghai Communique. As you know,
they have been very cautious and patient on this issue
but for the first time I detected a bit of impatience.
In the past he has always said he appreciates the
problems of the United States. This time he did not
say that and he hinted that China is impatient. But
they clearly want to continue to have good relations
with you.
Kissinger:
I will get eager on October 17 or 18.
Ahmed:
Will you also visit Pakistan?
Kissinger:
I simply do not have the time although I would love
it. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister
is excited over the visit by President Ford. You know
we never set a date for the visit and whether or not
President Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon
what he does with India. We have a special relationship.
Ahmed:
Can he come in connection with his visit to China?
Kissinger:
This was never planned and I cannot imagine how
anyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are.
Certainly we would never consider going to India or
even to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China.
It has always been seen as a separate trip. The
President may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps
the Philippines. They need to be shored up after
what happened in Indo-China. Is it true that you are.
buying arms from North Vietnam?
Ahmed:
We have made some inquiries but there is nothing
definite. The article in Newsweck saying we are
interested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset
them very much although the leak did not come from us.
We have no details of what they can supply and we have
made no decision but we are checking. It appears that
almost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall
have to see what happens.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET NODIS (GDS)
Page 7
Kissinger:
I do not know what they have to sell. Some things
in some categories but I do not believe they have
large overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind
of shape it is in.
Ahmed:
We are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam.
Last year we had to empty the reservoir in order
to repair damage to the tunnels. This has been
fixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been
scarred by closing the tunnels and this must be
repaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir
with a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We
had been counting on a good crop this year, especially
for wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have
to wait for another year. Can you help us with more
PL 480 wheat?
Kissinger:
What do we have already planned?
Atherton:
500,, 000 tons in the planning figure. The same as
for India.
Ahmed:
We needed at least one million before learning of the
Tarbela problem. Now we need more.
Kissinger:
We shall review the problem and see what can be done.
Who built the dam with which you are having so much
trouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.
Ahmed:
It was a French, Italian construction with some parti-
cipation by the United States. It is the biggest dam
in the world and they may have taken on more than they
could handle.
Kissinger:
We shall see what we can do with PL 480.
(GDS)
IN
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
5743
which Bherto
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
think will permit
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime
Minister Bhutto of Pakistan
our the christman of
These burt they unders have fun heightunity
are went new
At Tab is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his
concern/about Soviet policies in South Asia. The themes are not new
but they are pegged on recent events inem that the effect of detente
in other areas Helsinki Summit will motivate the Soviets to devote
even more time to their ambitions in South sumply Asia. Bhutto provides
specific evidence statements allegedly made by the Soviet represen-
tative in Kabul to illustrate that the Soviets are already in a more
aggressive mode. simplying sympothy for afghm cleargies uniting. on Pak
Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political
and material support although we know these are his principal con
cerns and we will doubtless hear them expressed more bluntly when
Aziz Ahmed is here in connection with UNGA (I have recommended you
meet with him). He approaches these issues indirectly in his argumen-
tation that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the
lack of "credible evidence of support from the US" to back up our verbal
commitment to Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity.
but does state
Neither the Bhutto letter nor its timing reflect any new departure from
Pakistan foreign policy line and its continuing search for external
support to offset Indian pre-eminence and fears of Soviet/Indian/Afghan
designs against Pakistan. However, this summer Bhutto has been
unusually active in pressing these themes and making a case for greater
US support of all kinds. (He has sent parallel messages to me.) In part
this may be due to some recent developments in South Asia where the
emergency in India (the Paks fear a diversion campaign against Islamabad),
the coup in Bangladesh and somewhat increased tensions between Pakistan
and Afghanistan have combined to refresh traditional Pakistani security
concerns. In part, it seems due to concern that the US may not be able
of willing to provide the degree of support which Bhutto had expected
2
SECRET NODIS (GDS)
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
GERALD
We 3/9/04
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
- 2 -
when he was here last February. Since then, the collapse of Indochina,
Congressional blockage of arms deals with Turkey and Jordan, and our
continued pursuit of detente have added to doubts in Islamabad. But it
all seems to add up to a strong Pakistan desire to get all they can in the
way of economic and military support from the US. Bhutto has asked
for 1 million tons of PL 480 food this year and is also pressing for our
agreement to an arms supply program.
and support
before-you
On balance I believe Bhutto's letter is mainly a further attempt to keep
his security concerns on the front burner and to have your personal
reassurance that this is the case, Within the framework of our current
policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing
moves, we are doing about as much as we can for Pakistan, including affirma Thodust
tive action on these urgent arms requests which fall within the framework
of your earlier policy decision on the lifting of the embargo and continuing
our economic assistance and PL 480 programs while things in India and
Bangladesh are so unsettled.
should
PL-480 shingh and FIVIS programs.
I believe that you can reply in general terms to Bhutto, giving broad
reassurance on the issues he raises but avoiding details, which I can
deal with in my meeting with Aziz Ahmed at the UNGA
wor
I also recommend that you use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that
you do not believe a trip to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto
suspects as much but he has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan
even if you are not going to India this year. This is the kind of minor
problem that could be removed by a personal word from you.
RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto
at Tab A. [Mr. Theis office coordinated in the text.
(The text has been cleared with Pand Theis)
SECRET (GDS)
Gen S:wgh:26 Sep 75 (retyped)
ACTION - 5743
SEGRET/NODIS (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan
At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his
concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These con-
cerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events -- such
as the Helsinki Summit -- which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to
devote even more time to their ambitions la South Asia -- and statements
allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying
sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.
Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political
and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan
are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US."
Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before
you and to have your personal reassurance and support. Within the frame-
work of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding
any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we can for
Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs.
I believe that you should reply in general terms to Bhutto, simply giving
broad reassurance on the issues he raises. I also recommend that you
use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip
to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he
has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not going
to India this year.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutte at Tab A. (The text
has been cleared with Paul Theis.
&
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
GERALD
LIBRARY
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
wh 3/9/04
14
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
which we so
effectively began
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
the close pressured -
Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is impor-
tant that we maintain a sound dialogue on matters of
mutual concern, following our very constructive meet-
ings of last February. I know, Secretary of State
Kissinger has also been in touch that with you.
Let me assure you at the outset there is no question
that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are
important to the United States and essential to the
stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are
working to lessen tensions between the major powers,
while safeguarding our vital security interests and
those of our friends, my Government remains fully
cognizant of its responsibility to insure that an easing
of tensions in one area does not create Llicense for
exploitation elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact
adversely on our relations with other countries in our
objectives of regional stability and world peace. We
have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet leadership
that we do not regard our continuing attention to im-
proved relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union as an effort isolated from developments
in other parts of the world. Threats to peace, stimulated
or supported by the Soviet Union, would have an adverse
impact on our bilateral relations and cause us to ques-
tion the prospects for further progress in detente.
There should be no mistaken belief that the fact of the
Helsinki Summit will in any way reduce the resolve of
is heaving emditioned by
the United States to oppose attempts to undermine the
security of friends and allies in any part of the world.
This includes South Asia and our determination to pur-
sue our long-standing and constructive relationship
with Pakistan. I believe this position is well under-
stood and will continue to carry weight to the benefit
of your Nation's security and independence.
Let me emphasize add, too, that there will be no leadening reduction in our
resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary
made Mar our
Kissinger has already assures you of my appreciation
for Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject
of continuing attention in the United States Government
for some time, as you lost know from our discussions dur-
ing our meeting here February. I believe both we have
taken significant steps to help Pakistan through the lift-
ing of the arms embargo and in our on-going economic
assistance be programs. In the months ahead our offe there
will achieve visible results as we respond to specific
requests for arms purchases and as we reach new
agreements on various economic development programs,
we admire the progress your have in the of Mather mouse of driving uninaling the countries other
Finally we intend to continue to lend maximum en
couragement to your efforts.te formalize relations of Smith
among the countries of South Asia. We admire the
asia and
progress you have stimulated. I realize there will
always be problems involved in the process of recon-
ciliation but there can also be immense benefits essen-
offer
tial to the stability of your area and the security and
well-being of Pakistan. You will continue to have the
support of my Government in your efforts to pursue better
and more constructive relations with the nations of
South Asia.
story with to
In closing, I want to reiterate my deep interest in
with
visiting Pakistan at an early date and to meeting you
again. It now appears that my schedule through the
remainder of this year will make it impossible for
me to accept your warm hospitality at this time. In
as you berner, the foresecable future, I do plan to visit the People's
family soon,
Republic of ChinaA Given our desire to further im-
prove relations with Peking and in view of the events
of this year in Indochina and the effect they have had
in East Asia, I know you will fully understand the rea-
sons for such a visit at this pa rticular time. You can
to
be certain that Secretary Kissinger and I will, discuss
with the Chinese leaders in Peking what we can do to
assist Pakistan. I do look forward to accepting your
hospitality at a mutually convenient time in the next
year. In the meantime, I remain grateful for and
have full confidence in the relations which exist be-
tween our two countries, under your leadership.
With best personal wishes,
Sincerely,
our corrumor whents
in processing stability
in Smith asia and
your important
contribution me. to that good
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
committed to the further
the close
FOAD
ACTION - 5743
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan
At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his
concern over the direction of Seviet policies in South Asia. These con-
cerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such
as the Helsinki Summit -- which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to
devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia -- and statements
allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying
sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.
Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political
and material support but does state that Seviet aggressive designs on
Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support
from the US.
Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before
you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Within the
framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in
avoiding any destabilising moves, we are doing about as much as we
can for Pakistan, including modest PL-480 and FMS programs.
I believe that you should reply in general terms to Bhatte, giving
broad reassurance on the issues he raises. I also recommend that you
use this reply to inform Bhutto personally that you do not believe a trip
to Pakistan will be possible this year. Bhutto suspects as much but he
has pressed repeatedly for you to visit Pakistan even if you are not
going to India this year.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text
has been cleared with Paul Theis.)
FORD
s
SEGRET/NODIS (GDS)
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
Wa 3/9/04
GERALD
LIBRARY
#5743
Gen S:wgh:26 Sep 75 (retyped)
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important
that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we
so effectively began in our very constructive meetings
of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger
has also been in touch with you.
Let me assure you at the outset there is no question
that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are
important to the United States and essential to the
stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are
working to lessen tensions between the major powers,
while safeguarding our vital security interests and those
of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of
its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in
one area does not create opportunities for exploitation
elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on
our relations with other countries in our objectives of
regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore,
made clear to the Soviet leadership that our continuing
attention to improved relations between the United States
and the Soviet Union is heavily conditioned by develop-
ments in other parts of the world. I believe this position
is well understood and will continue to benefit your
Nation's security and independence.
Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our
resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary
Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for
Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of
FORD
GERALD
2
continuing attention in the United States Government for
some time, as you know from our discussions here last
February. I believe we have taken significant steps to
help Pakistan, both through the lifting of the arms embargo
and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In
the months ahead there will be visible results, as we
respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as
we reach new agreements on various economic develop-
ment programs.
We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process
of normalization of relations among the countries of South
Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum en-
couragement to your efforts.
In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit
Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again.
It now appears that my schedule through the remainder
of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your
warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to
visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend
to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests
in promoting stability in South Asia and your important
contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your
hospitality at a mutually convenient time next year. In
the meantime, I remain grateful for and committed to the
further strengthening of the close relations between our
two countries.
With best personal wishes,
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Zulfikar All Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
GERALD
1-b
RECD
LOG NBR
INITIAL ACTION o
NSC RRESPONDENCE PROFILE
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
8
25
7505743
mehuss
REFERENCE:
CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER
S/S
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
KISSINGER
COLBY, W
OTHER
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
SCOWCROFT
X
SCHLESINGER, J
C
EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS
ST EX SEC
$
CODEWORD
TS
ENSITIVE
re USSR / India & Afghanstan pressurer I
SUBJECT: Magr to Pres for PM Bhutto of
need INTERNAL for ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION greater ACTION INFO. us REC CY support ACTION REQUIRED
STAFF ADVANCE FAR EAST SECRETARY CYS Colon TO HAK SCOWCROFT
FOR
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
MEMO FOR PRES
(
)
x
REPLY FOR
(
)
SUB-SAHArAN AFRICA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
I
)
DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / so. ASIA
MEMO
TO
(
)
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
EUROPE / CANADA
LATIN AMERICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
REFER TO
FOR:
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
(
)
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
CONCURRENCE
)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING
COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL
OCEANS POLICY
INTELLIGENCE
FORD
DATE
FROM
TO
S
SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):
CCY TO
5/23
Scroft
CIX Info
8/28
NSCIS
Noted by Rcm
GERALD
C
SUBLEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
9/23
Oakley
HK
meme for This
9/23
9/23
HAK
X
her Reopened to she lt to Blutto (9/3)
10/16
NSC/S
HAK disapproved recom
10/17
/s
(11/10
18/20
Oaklls
20
C 7506981 for Aclin MICROFILM
Rogafr ther At the are
DISPATCH
& FILE RQMTS:
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:
NSC/S DISP INSTR
NOTIFY
& DATE
BY
M/FID
BY
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:
AUG27 1975
CRT ID:
CROSS REF W/
7506981
OPEN
OCT
23
1975
SF
HP
NS
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:
FOLDER:
OCT
CLOSE
WH
EP
PA
DY
(
NSC 75-22
575-600