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Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (3)
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Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders (Ford Administration)
Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
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The original documents are located in Box 3, folder "Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto
(3)" of the National Security Adviser's Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders
Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Copyright Notice
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of
photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United
States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections.
Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public
domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to
remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid
copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.
Digitized from Box 3 of the NSA Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library
/
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
5743 Add-on #3
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
ACTION
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SECRETARY KISSINGER
HAK
October thinkson 15, 1975
FROM:
ROBERT B. OAKLEY
TO
SUBJECT:
Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17
from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan
You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President
and you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara
[Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral
instructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively
closed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto,
you also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17,
indicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to
discuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.
The President has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still owes Bhutto a
reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that
letter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed
from a State draft and coordinated here, revised to reflect the fact of
the Presidential meeting last week.
RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the
President seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.
APPROVE
APPROVE AS AMENDED
Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, Clift
Repe Peper
MICROFILM DATA
DO
NOV 11 1975
Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
TO
)
Automatically Downgraded at Two
WHO
Year Intervals and Declassified on
SUBF
December 31, 1983.
FORD
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
a
labs 3/9/04
GERALD
LIBRARY
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
5743 - Add-on #3
ACTION
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan
At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his
concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These con-
cerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such
as the Helsinki Summit--which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to
devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia--and statements
allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying
sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.
Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political
and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on
Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support
from the US. 11
Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before
you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Aziz Ahmed
followed the same themes in his talks with you here and with me in
New York. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia
and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about
as much as we can for Pakistan, including economic assistance, PL-480
and military sales programs. You and I have made this clear to Aziz
Ahmed.
If only for reasons of courtesy, I believe that you should send a written
reply to Bhutto, giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises,
although you have said as much to Aziz Ahmed.
FURD
A
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text
GERALD
has been cleared with Paul Theis.)
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Wh 3/9/04
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important
that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we
so effectively began in our very constructive meetings
of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger
has also been in touch with you, and both of us have now
had the opportunity to exchange views with your Minister
of State, Aziz Ahmed.
Let me assure you at the outset there is no question that
the integrity and independence of Pakistan are important
to the United States and essential to the stability of South
Asia. In a period in which we are working to lessen
tensions between the major powers while safeguarding
our vital security interests and those of our friends, my
Government remains fully cognizant of its responsibility
to insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not
create opportunities for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can
it in any way impact adversely on our relations with other
countries in our objectives of regional stability and world
peace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet
leadership that our continuing attention to improved
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union
is heavily conditioned by developments in other parts of
the world. I believe this position is well understood and
will continue to benefit your Nation's security and inde-
pendence.
Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our
resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary
Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for
Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of
continuing attention in the United States Government for
some time, as you know from our discussions here last
February and as you have certainly heard from Aziz Ahmed
and your Ambassador in Washington.
I believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan,
both through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our
on-going economic assistance programs. In the months
ahead there will be visible results, as we respond to
specific requests for arms purchases and as we reach
new agreements on various economic development programs.
We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process
of normalization of relations among the countries of South
Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum encourage-
ment to your efforts.
In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit
Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again.
It now appears that my schedule through the remainder
of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your
warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to
visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend
to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests
in promoting stability in South Asia and your important
contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your
hospitality at a mutually convenient time. In the meantime,
I remain grateful for and committed to the further strength-
ening of the close relations between our two countries.
With best personal wishes,
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
Islamabad,
August 17, 1975.
PRIME MINISTER
Dear Mr. President,
I am writing to share with you our
apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in
Asia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly
following recent developments in our region.
2.
We feel deeply disturbed over the
establishment of an authoritarion system in
India on the one hand, and the growing hostility
of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan
on the other. Our fears are heightened by our
perception of the increasing dependence of these
two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on
the Soviet Union with which they are allied and
which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay
greater attention to our region in pursuance of its
historic objectives and global ambitions. We
foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the
Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on
the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in
particular, with a view to achieving its purpose
of establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence
in this continent.
3.
Situated as we are, we cannot but be
conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of
Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend
for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the
dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have,
within the framework of our principles and policies,
2-
DECLASSIFIED
B.O. 12938, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
Stateleview 9/17/03
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
Page- 2
PRIME MINISTER
left no stone unturned to improve our relations
with it in order to reduce its hostility towards
Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has
regarded as an obstacle in the path of its
ambitions in Asia. This above all was the
purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and
again in October last year.
4.
Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible
and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result
of the efforts of a small country such as ours,
which in the interest of the preservation of its
own sovereignty, national independence and
territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe
the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer
both the ever-growing threat to our existence from
Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful
inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.
5.
The Soviet Union is determined to subject
us to intensified pressures while continuing to be
outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing
illustration of this came during recent exchanges
between our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts
in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet
counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede
some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm
reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw
up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what
will happen. When our Ambassador sought clarification
of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador,
the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting
SERALO
to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far
as to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining
the international frontier between Afghanistan and
Page- 3
PRIME MINISTER
Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times
which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the
Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans,
since no nation would, according to the Soviet
Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own
people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador
concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was
the real and the only answer for establishing
peace and security in Asia.
6.
I have no doubt that the United States
is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries
of this region and in particular to Pakistan which
has so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate
the various statements of political support to
Pakistan which were given to us by the United States
at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat.
The fact, however, needs to be registered that
these declarations, valuable though they are, seem
to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism.
Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted
and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.
7.
In these circumstances, our ability to
resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much
on the reliance we place on the American political
assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union
attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence
of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union
to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan
would compel us to make readjustments demanded by
the changing power equilibrium in our region.
Page -4
PRIME MINISTER
8.
I need hardly assure you, Mr. President,
of how much we cherish our relations with the United
States. We sincerely hope that they will continue
to expand and gain strength in the coming months
and will be sustained by our commitments to the
goals and objectives of peace and stability which
we share.
9.
With my best wishes and warmest
personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
Zulfilen ui Illunts
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.
Prime Minister House
Rawalpindi
Tab 4
13 June 1975
TAB II
My de r Dr. Kissinger,
As you are aware, we have done, and will continue
to do, Jar utmost to normalize our relations with India in
accor ince with the Simla Agreement. Nevertheless, we are
seriou ly concerned over the probability of India deciding to
launch it war against Pakistan in which Afghanistan will also
join a: both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such
a war ould come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the
situati to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed
within two years, before we have had the time adequately to
.strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext
on the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an
integral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the
State.
Against this background, I was relieved to hear
leview
Guidelines state 9/17/13
from Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what
you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. 3/9/04
would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to
NARA, Date
Pakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.
This latter assurance could have a most vital
bearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and
FORD
stability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most
&
GERALD
effective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony
over the region comprising the Persian Gulf and the sub-continent.
-2-
To Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions,
it come ; as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the
United States Administration to safeguard peace and stability in
South ;ia.
I should also add that this assurance is another
manifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of
vision which I, like many others, have always admired in you.
Only SU h a perception of lurking dangers and the undistracted
will to avert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes
of tome row.
May I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance
to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with
the Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It
could help them materially to decide what China could do in that
contingency.
Mr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese
press attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador
along the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.
With warm personal regards,
Yours sincerely,
Zurs hn hi Shinado
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
His Excellency Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
GERALD a LIBRARY FORD
Washington D.C.
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi
13 June 1975
Dear Mr. President,
I have been wanting to write to you on a matter
of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the
peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However,
since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating
to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until
you returned home and had time to address your attention to
other matters of importance to world peace.
On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister
of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met
in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed
Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko
in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan
with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United
9/17/03
States.
It is an established fact that practically all of
DECLASSIMED
State E.O. Dept. Guidelines state leview
India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.
NARA, Date 3/9/04
her
esvcr,
wisw 19 the Inde-Soviei Treaty of 1971, an armed
12958, Sec. 3.5
attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval
and, indeed, direct involvement.
As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government
is determined to further the process of normalization of relations
with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will
sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation,
as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could
come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would
have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one.
For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim
to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral
part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad
Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's
control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.
Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the
event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely
the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited
Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering
this question but have given us no answer so far. Their
decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence
of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom
to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated
when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while
Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.
Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could
ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan
and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what
the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed
that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if
in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United
States would not be able to stay out of that situation.
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming
military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and
backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the
determination of the United States to ward off a, danger of vast
and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.
I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the
clarity with which your Administration has perceived the
implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability
of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for
the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power
equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive
factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting
the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the
shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the
horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it,
a turning point would be reached in its history. The global
balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace
in our critical region could become truly inviolable.
With best wishes and warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
July Jun his Shunks
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
\
His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America
White House,
Washington D.C.
COPY 9 OF 15 COPIES
Palastan TABITI
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
30 AUG 75Z 10 06
12
Department of State
008449
AMERICA
SECRET
N00658
TELEGRAM
PAGE
19
SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z
21
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 1001 W
030931
0 3009132 AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECRE T SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198
NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
Reply to Bhutto's
ED. 11652: XGDS-3
Messages of June3
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
to President and
REF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162
Secretary
1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER
BHUTTO,
2, BEGIN MESSAGE:
DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA
THIS COMING MONDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE
0
YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST
NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED
IN THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND
ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR
added by Sec.
VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE JUST AND
LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING
OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS
ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-
SECRET
FORD
?
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
We
GERALD
LIBRARY
State Dept. Guidelines State Review 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE #2 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z
CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STIL LIE
IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF
THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF Tnc PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED.
DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, 1 BELIEVE WE
HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR
ACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOOD EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF
OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION
IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR
THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE HAD HEARTENING SUPPORT
FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS,
I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT
THIS AGREEMENT, If ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST
IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL
ASPECTS OF THE ARAB ISKAELI PROBLE, IT IS OUR FIRM IN-
TENTION, HOREVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS --
HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY
MAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS
OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING
LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE RE-
ASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE
PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND,
DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT
HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND
EPOPLE HILL SUPPORT OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF
STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY
ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE
EFFECT UN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS
SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE
BAIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BUTH SIDES TO TAKE
THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATNG
PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.
I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE ThIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME
MINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I
State
WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING
YOU CONCERNS FOR PAKISTANIS SECURITY, I REGRET THAT
part
SECRET
FORD
WITH
&
LIBRARY
mine
CLAALD
revisic
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRA
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 3009462
THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED
MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. 1
HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT
AND ME HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY
SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCEERNS. IT WAS HITH THESE IN MIND
THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF ThE EMBARGO ON
ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED
TO DO WHAT AC CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AMEAD, THIS IS AN
INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTANIS CONTINUED
SECURITY AND wELL WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE
TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS UN VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN
YOU EARLIER LETTER,
Since MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE
PRESIDENT HARED WITH ME YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE
EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATION
BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL.
UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILLDISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH
THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, or COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU.
MEANNAILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE
SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE
BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP
AMBASSADUR BYROADE INFORMED,
WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER
END MESSAGE
3, IN CONVEYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
30 AUG 75Z
10 12
008450
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UNITED
AMERICA
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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
N
SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198
NODIS
0
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
D
YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-
PRESSION, IN nIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES
S
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING ThIS
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.
IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED
HOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH wt FULLY SHARE WITH
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH
THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO
FOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH
THE UNITED STATES KOULD REGARD AN INDICAN ATTACK AGAINST
PAKISTAN. ER Rt N TL BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET
LEADERSHIP MAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.
DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
FORD
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE UF THE UNITED STATES
S
WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE
SECRET
GENATE
NOI TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZ ATION OF THE ENECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
STATES
OF
PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 62 OF 02 301007Z
BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION
AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION
AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY
HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH
WILL LEADERS OF THE PEOPLETS REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS THE YEAR,
THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS
FULL COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT
RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN
OUR MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN
ITS SECURITY.
THE AHMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT
SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ
THE FFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY
TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.
DISCUSSNG YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A
DEEP IN AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN
PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO
BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN
LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.
I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOU UWN DISCUSSIONS WITH
AS AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN,
THE UNITED STATES IS NOT AULE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL OF
FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK
OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS,
REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET
WITH representatives TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING
THE SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW
DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN
THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.
WE THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS
WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON
WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.
SECRET
BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETAR
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 23 SECTO 16196 02 of 02 3616072
4, IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU
SHOULD SEEK TU CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN
WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S
LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FULLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE
MADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:
DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE
N
MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED
AND SECRETARY KISSINGER, OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME
IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD
LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID,
THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE
SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY
IN PAKISTAN.
(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER
INFORMED MR. AMMED THAT ME HAD SPOKEN TO GROMYKO IN
VERY STRNG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON
PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE
FROM THE UNITED STATES.
THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE
CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS
ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL
WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING
THE SUVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA.
0
(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: " I WAS
RELIEVED TO PEAR FROM MR. AZIZ ARMED HAT YOU PLANNED TO
TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD
TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTANIS
ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN.
BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER
ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO
WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN
INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF
INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND
IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
^^
1
UNITED DEPARTMENT OF BA STATE
Department of State TELEGRAM
STATES OF
SECKET
PAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 3010072
UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT
SITUATION. )
KISSINGER
N
ZOP
D
SECRET
THE
AITHORIZATION
OF
TYF
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
or
STATE
Pakistan
Department of State
THE
my
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
SECRE 2244
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 98056 0217392
AFR/UN
EUR/CAN
A3
FE
ACTION SS-25
LA
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 1026 W
D/DT
NEA/SA
059650
3
PRC
SEA
R 0217312 SEP 75 ZOK
NSC/PLNS
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
Secretary's reply closes
PGM/ANL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1835
SCI/ENV
SECRET
ISLAMARAD 8056
out June 13 messages
ECON
OPIIL
OPIL/INT
(ace to Byroade -par 5->)
SS/PR
FXDIS
CONGR
F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
SURJ: BHUTTO INFORMED OF USG POSITION CONCERNING POINTS
RAISED IN HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY
REF: SECTO 10198
!. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE
FOR SAUDI ARABTA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAINING
YOUR LETTER TO HTM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY ORAL
REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM HIM TO
von AND THE PRESIDENT BHUTTO WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED
TO RECEIVE THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM YOU IN THE
MIDDLE EAST, AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GAVE HIM TO BE
UP-TO-DATE AND IN TOUCH WITH YOU JUST BEFORE VISITING
SAUDI ARABIA.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines stateleview
NARA, Date 3/9/04
E
?. AFTER HTS REMARKS TO ME ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH
HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS
UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO HIM
TN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXCHANGES UF CORRESPONDENCE.
T SAID THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY OF THF POINTS I WAS
INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT VERY CAREFULLY
AND THAT SOME OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED WERE COMPLEX,
CONTAINING IMPORTANT NUANCES. 1 SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST
OF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING, AND AS A KINDNESS TO HIM,
: MIGHT BE REST THAT BE READ THE TEXT OF THESE POINTS
PA HER THAN JUST LISTEN TO AN ORAL PRESENTATION FROM ME.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
or
STATE
Department of State
Curred STATES /
TELEGRAM
OF
SECRET
PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08056 0217392
3. BHUTTO READ CAREFULLY MY PREPARED TEXT WHICH HAD
BEFN EXTRACTED VERRATIM FROM ABOVE REFTEL. WHEN HE
FINISHED, HE TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND
WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS MATTER SETTLED so THAT NO FURTHER
CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN US WOULD BE NECESSARY
HE SAID AGAIN HE REGRETTED HAVING ACCEPTED BAD ADVICE
ON His LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT GROWING OUT
!
np YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA 1 HAVE NO
попвт BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOND COMPLETELY THAT I WAS IN THE
PROCESS OF A NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE RECORD.
A. BHUTTO ASKED IF HE COULD KEEP THE COPY OF MY
ADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HE HAD READ. WHILE I OBVIOUSLY
DO NOT WANT TO BECOME A PARTY IN HIS FRICTIONS WITH
12"2 AHMED, I GAVE HIM MY PERMISSION TO DO SO THINKING
THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO SERVE TO MAKE THE RECORD
COMPLETELY CLEAR FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. THERE WAS NO
DOUBT BUT THAT HE PLANNED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH BOTH
AZ-Z AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI ON THE PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA
ON BOTH YOUR LETTER AND MY ADDITIONAL POINTS.
5. YOU MAY RFST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO HOLDS
NO RESENTMENT AT US ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT IS A
COMPLETELY CLOSED SUBJECT AND BEST NOT REFERRED TO
X
AGAIN ON ANY LEVEL.
BYROADE
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SECRET
STATE
Pakistan
10
(?)
Department of State
TELEGRAM
/
OF
SECRET 1827
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08047 0211367
EN
A6
ACTION SS-25
INFO OCT-01 ISO-90 1026 W
$/05/20
054797
AFR/UN
R 0245277 SEP 75
EUR/CAN
FN AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
FE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1831
LA
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
b
NEA/SA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
PRC
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SEA
NSC/PLNG
SECRET ISLAMABAD 8047
PGM/ANL
SCI/ENV
EXPIS
ECON
OPNL/INT
F.O. 116521 GDS
SS/PR
TAGS: PFOR, PK, AF, UR
CONGR
SUBJECT: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS: PM BHUTTO'S COMMENTS
REF: ISLAMABAD 7507 AND 7433
1. IN A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS WITH BHUTTO IN
KARACHI, AUGUST 31. HE DIGRESSED TO GIVE ME WHAT HE
SATD HE ACCEPTED AS THE FINAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE
ALTEGED PULICY REMARKS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN
KARUL RE THE DURAND LINE AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THEIR
SUBSEQUENT DOWNGRADING BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE CAND
T SUSPECT TN MOSCOW). HE SAID THF SOVIET POSITION WAS
THAT THEIR POLICY RE PAKISTAN REMAINED AS SET FORTH IN
THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW
YN OCTOBER 1970
TELCATTO
ACCORDING TO THE
SOVIETS, WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY ASREGARDS ANY ALLEGED
REMARKS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR.
0. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKEN TO HIS AMBASSADOR
KARUL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE ALLEGED REMARKS WERE
TRUTHFULLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED. HE SAID IT APPARENT
DECLASSIFIED
THAT OUR JOINT SPECULATION ON THIS MATTER (REFTELS) WAS
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
NARA, Date 3/9/04
PROBABLY CORRECT. RUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP ON ANY
State
FFFORT TO GET ANY PUBLIC REASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIETS TO
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUTSHE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF
Department of State
STATES or AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
PARE 02 ISLAMA 08047 0211362
COMPENSATE FOR THE DISQUIETING MANOUVER ON THEIR PART
AS TOO MANY THINGS HAD HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL (AN
OBVIOUS REFERENCE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO BANGLADESH)
AN HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULDN'T DO IT.
BYRDADE
or
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUISE BEAUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
IT OF
OF
STATE
Pakistan
Department of State
GRUIN
AMERICA
COPY OF 13 COPIES
STATES
OF
SECRET
N00987
PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08041 0108272
20
ACTION NODS-00
INFO OCT-01 IS0-00 /001 iN
045140
0 72 6447 SEP. 75
FM AMERICASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1829
$ E CRE T ISLAMABAD 8041
NODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFCR, PK, US, XF
SUBJ: BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST
REF: SECTO 10198
1, I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPART-
URE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAIN-
ING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY
ORAL REMANKS IN CONNECTION RITH PAST LETTERS FROM
HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE WILL COVER
ONLY HIS REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF YOUR
LETTER.
2. BHUTTO SAID Ht WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO PUT ACROSS TO
THE SAUDIS THE POSITIVE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR
LETTER. ME WAS HIMSELF IMMENSELY PLEASED TO NOTE YOUR
EMPHASIS THAT OTHER MOVES SUCH AS ON THE SYRIAN PROBLEM
AND THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO BE TACKLED, AND THE DETER-
MINATION OF BOTH YOURSELF AND THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAD
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines ew 9/17/03
NARA, Date 3/9/04
TO BE SO. Mt HAD NO DOUBLT WHATSOEVER THAT YOU BOTH
MEANT THIS AND WOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND AT WHAT-
EVER ENERGY AND EFFORT REQUIRED, TO MAKE IT SO,
3. HAVING SAID THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT OUT OF OUR FRIEND-
SHIP HE WOULD TELL US THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THINGS WOULD
By
SECKET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF STATE
Department of State
AMERICA
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE p2 ISLAMA 08641 0108272
WORK OUT AS WE WISHED AND THAT THE NEXT STEP, ASSUMING
YOUR PRESENT EFFORT SUCCEEDS AS REGARDS THE EGYPTIAN FRONT,
WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPASSE. HE SAID HE AAS SPEAKING AS UNE
4:10 CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS VITAL AND WHO
BELIEVED THAT ANY SETBACK IN THEM WOULD ot DISASTROUS
FOR PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT HE THOUGHT YOU AND THE
PRESIDENT WOULD MANT TO CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF EVERY
PRO-LEN IN ThE MIDDLE EAST AND PERMAPS HIS OWN PESSI-
MISTIC FEELINGS ACCUT THE FUTURE,
4, BHUTTO SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD NOT MENTION IT IN
CONNECTION WITH ANY OF THE SPECIFICS HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL
ME, AN UNDERLYING FACTOR IN HIS THINKING WAS THE UNFOR-
TUNATE TIMING or OUR COMING ELECTIONS AS FAR AS THE MIDDLE
EAST WAS CONCERNED. HE SAID HL WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST
A POLITICIAN, AND KNEW FIRST HAND THAT THE EMOTIONS OF
PEOPLE HAD A POWER OF THEIR OWN THAT COULD NOT BE IG-
NORED, PARTICULARLY IN A DEMOCRACY SUCH AS OURS.
5. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD HIGH REGARD FOR SADAR AND THOUGHT
THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING. BUT ME SAID HE
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DESCRIBE THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD
MADE AS STATESMANSHIP BUT MORE AS AN ACCOMMODATION. HE
SAID (1) ME THOUGHT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD LOST THIER
WILL TO FIGHT AND SAUAT HAS HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNTT,
ANU (2) THAT SADAT HAS STAKING EVERYTHING, ON BOTH HIS
FIRST AND SECOND AGREEMENTS THROUGHT YOUR GOOD EFFORTS, TO
MAKE POSSIBLE AN ECONOMIC BOOM TO TURN ATTENTIONS AWAY
FROM THE ISHAELI PROBLEM. HE SAID (1) ABOVE HAD INHERENT
IN IT THE DANGER THAT SADAT COULD BE OVERTHROWN. AS
REGARDS (2) ABOVE, BHUTTO REMINDED ME THAT ME WAS FROM AN
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY AND HE KNEW THAT THE ECONOMIC
MIRACLES SADAT WAS HOPING FOR JUST DIDN'T HAPPEN OVER-
NIGHT, WHETHER IN A VERY RICH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY LIKE
IRAN OR A VERY POOR COUNTRY. 50 THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT QUICK
CHANGE FROM POVERTY FOR THE EGYPTIANS. AFTER A PERIOD
OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BUDYANCY, IN WHICH THE PUBLIC
POSTURE OF EGYPT MIGHT APPEAR TO TURN BELLICOSE OR EVEN
CHAUVANISTIC, THE LETDOWN WHICH WOULD COME WOULD ALSO
ENDANGER SADAT. IF HE TRIED TO RECOUP BY BOLDNESS AGAIN
ON THE ISRAELI FRONT HIS MILITARY MIGHT GET RID OF HIM AS
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
IMENT
OF
STATE
Department. of State
OMINA
AMERICA
STATES
OF
SECRET
PAGE 03 ISLAMA 08041 0108272
A PRETEXT FOR NOT FIGHTING AGAIN,
6. AS A COROLLARY TO ThIS SCE ARIO HE SEES THE ISRAELIS
SAYING "BAS" (ARABIC AND URDU FOR ENOUGH OR STOP) AS
REGARDS FORTMER MOVES RE SYKIA, THE PALESTINIANS, ETC,
(ME HAS PULITE ENOUGH NOT TO SAY 50 BUT I THINK BE HAD
OUR ELECTIONS IN MIND). THEN HE SAID THERE WOULD BE
A DIVISIVE EFFECT AMONG THE ARABS. ht THOUGHT SAUDI
ARABIA AND The GULF STATES WOULD TOLERATE A STATUS QUO
FOR AWHILE AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA. MOROCCO MAYBE AND
SUDAN PERMAPS. LIBYA WOULD DENOUNCE AND ALGERIA (UNLESS
NE ARE MAKING MORE INROADS THAN Ht KNOWS THERE). IRAQ OF
COURSE KOLLD BE IN THIS CAMP. SYRIA, AND ASSAD IN
PARTICULAR, WOULD BE INTENSELY TROUBLED, CHINAFOULDNIT
LIKE IT--AND IT ThE SOVIETS WOULD DE AROUND SMILING LIKE
CHESHIRE CATS!
7. BHUTTO RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT HIS OWN
PREDICTIONS WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SUPPORTING YOUR VIEWS
IN YOUR LETTER AND YOUR OBVIOUS DETERMINATIONM ME SAID
HE EARNESTLY HOPED IS PREDICTIONS WERE WORNG, AS PEACE
IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO VITAL TO US, AND INDEED TO
PAKISTAN AS WELL. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEYOND
THE ROLE OF TRYING TO BE HELPFUL AS PAKISTAN WAS MUSLIMN
BUT NOT AKABIC, AND THE ARABS HAD TO MAKE THEIR OWN
POLICY, BE IT WAR OR NEGOTIATIONS, STEP BY STEP OR
GENEVA, PEACE OK CAPITULATION.
8. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR LETTER AND ITS
OBVIOUS STRESS UN NECESSARY NEXT STEPS, HE AGREED BUT
REMINDED ME AS A LAST THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE
VERY SMART PEOPLE. 1 SAID I SUSPECTED YOU KNEW THEM
PRETTY KELL YOURSELF BY NOW.
9. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH BHUTTO ON THE LETTERS TO YOU
AND THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED
WENT wtil. IN VIEW OF PAST TALKS WITH BHUTTO BY BOTH
YAQUB AND MYSELF, TMIS IS NO LONGEK A LIVING SUBJECT
HERE. MY NEXT MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY TO
COMPLETED AND CLOSE THE RECORD ON THIS SUBJECT.
BYROADE
SECRET
LICRARY
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
S STATE
Pakestan Lar 12
U
Department of State THE
D
E
AMERICA
STATES OF
#5 TELEGINA TABIV
S
CONE
N00444
2420.
PAGE 01 STATE 193876
51
ORIGIN NODS-00
INFO DCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R
DRAFTED BY NEA/PABIRAPECK:LAB
0
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
PIJJSISCO
NSC:ROAKLEY (DRAFT)
NEAISSUBER
S/S at MR. ORTIZ
081429
P 15 51eZ AUG 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHOR
SD
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
G 0 N F I E HTIAL STATE 193875
NODIS
E,O, 116521 GDS
WORD
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
0
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO
D
REF $ ISLAMABAD 7272
FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
1, PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER
BRUITO:
QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:
I
AMBASSADOR BYROADE MAS TOLD ME OF YOUR DEEP PERSONAL
DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT FORD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS YEAR. I
HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT YOUR CONCERNS AND THE
HIGH INFORTANCE BUTH OUR GOVERNMENTS ATTACH TO THIS VISIT
T.U PAKISTAN AS A SYMBOL DF OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATION-
NOT 10 BE REPRODUCED WITH BULING AUTHORIZATION Of THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
Gh 3/9/04
or
SCATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES of AMERICA
TELEGRA
CONF IDENTIAL
PAGE 02 STATE 193676
SHIP.
WE ARE STILL IN THE MIDST OF WORKING OUT A SCREDULE FOR
POSSIBLE FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE
REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL
THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CHINA BEFORE THE
END OF THE YEAR, BUT THE SCHEDULE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AND NO
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING
OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME TRIP. THUS THE TIMING OF A
VISIT TO PAKISTAN REMAINS UNSETTLED, BUT THE PRESIDENT
HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE REMAINS MOST ANXIOUS
TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF
NOT THIS YEAR AT LEAST NEXT YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR
INVITATION.
WE HILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN AS SOON AS NE HAVE A
S
MORE DEFINITE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IN THE
MONTHS AHEAD,
WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END
QUOTE.
2. FYI: ABOVE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ASSURE BHUTTO THAT
THIS MATTER IS INDEED RECEIVING THE MOST CAREFUL
ATTENTION, BUT ALSO TO CONVEY THOUGHT THAT THERE IS
LIKELY 10 BE SLIPPAGE IN PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO PAKISTAN.
KISSINGER
CONF IDENTIAL
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BY
NSC MEMO, labs 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/17/03
, NARA, DATE 3/9/04
PARTICIPANTS:
Pakistan
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yaqub Khan, Ambassador to the US
Iqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy
Iqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN
United States
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, September 30, 1975
11:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.
PLACE:
Suite 34-A, Waldorf Towers
New York, New York
Ahmed:
Congratulations on your success in the Middle East.
It must have been tough.
Kissinger:
It was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came
back. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional
behaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by
this since the really damaging thing politically would be
to attack the Administration on domestic policy rather
than foreign policy. What do they think they are doing?
In any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.
Ahmed:
Look at the investigation of the CIA and everything elsc.
Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.
SECRET/ NODIS (GDS)
Page 2
Kissinger:
It is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused
to allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to
testify on what their policy recommendations were.
This would be like the McCarthy period. My decision
will cause a tremendous brawl.
Ahmed:
We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.
Kissinger:
I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.
Ahmed:
They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on
the second list.
Kissinger:
The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any
intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time
frame. The people who are pushing all this are the
pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to
Israel. But you didn't want it anyway.
Ahmed:
No, only the nuclear weapons.
Kissinger:
The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should
be able to give you some--but I had better watch what
I say since there is no telling what you might report
back to Bhutto.
Ahmed:
We are being modest and restrained in handling the
arms question.
Kissinger:
Do you have the money yet?
Ahmed:
We will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will
be easicr to get answers first from you on just what
is available and how much it costs. Then we can go to
the Saudis.
Kissinger:
I can inform you that we have approval to supply you
with 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can
get started on a training program while awaiting
delivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly
on our new military relationship with you, concentrating
on defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can
SECRET / NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 3
Kissinger:
be disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to
(Continuing)
the TOW's or the invitation we are extending to
your Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but
steadily--with maybe some artillery next--weapons
that can reasonably be described as defensive.
Ahmed:
We have been very careful in compiling our lists.
Kissinger:
If you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will
be in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong
enough so that India will be afraid to attack.
Ahmed:
We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India
might well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November
in Kashmir.
Kissinger:
Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain
was too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.
Ahmed:
According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir
is part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir
but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot
be certain but we think this will happen and we must
look out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war
with Afghanistan joining in any time there is war with
India. But we can handle this with the A-7.
Kissinger:
It has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?
Ahmed:
Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive?
It is a fighter as well.
Kissinger:
I am simply stating facts about the plane.
Ahmed:
We have been very interested in this plane for a long
time. We want about 110 of them. We also need
weapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery
will never get them in our hands before the war in
November. We will do our best by ourselves but we
need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians
cannot move without Soviet approval because of their
treaty which obliges the USSR to help India.
SEGRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 4
Kissinger:
The treaty is not so binding.
Ahmed:
Yes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is
obliged to come in until the threat is removed.
Really, this would bring the Soviets in even if
India went first and we hit back. So whenever
India wants to start something, she must have
Soviet support. We think India will probably start
a war. Mid-November to mid-December is the
probable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be
watchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem
to be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told
our chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts
and not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside
help is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran
could stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up
to the borders but it would not do so for fear of the
USSR. So what they will really do to help us is
questionable. Nor have we been able to get China
to assure us of support. That is why we need weapons
off the shelf.
Kissinger:
We have serious problems with our own army on
rapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon?
We can discuss all this when they come in October.
Ahmed:
Thank you. That is the best approach. Also, con-
cerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet
Ambassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet
Ambassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had
us all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would
report immediately to Moscow and was sure it would
be cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he
has never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow
took it up there, the Foreign Ministry expressed
surprise that we would credit any such statement.
But when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the
Durand line, they said they were "not empowered"
to discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is
very worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed
you and the Iranians and the Chinese.
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
SECRET/ NODIS (GDS)
Page 5
Kissinger:
As I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view
of Soviet machinations and you can be certain that
the Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign
Minister will be in Washington next week and I will
tell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will
ruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the
United States. They are trying hard to improve their
relations with us at the present time, due to their
internal developments. It is nothing spectacular,
but it is interesting.
Ahmed:
Will there be a Communique in connection with
Chavan's visit?
Kissinger:
An agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting,
words but no real substance. The biggest question
concerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive
a dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague,
Ambassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort
of comment about each of his guests after dinner, and
since he takes at least half a minute for at least forty
guests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives
a long toast in which he attacks United States policy.
It is very boring. The last time I was at one of his
affairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like
economic power and some like military power but
India likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised
that he came out with spiritual power since I had
expected him to say India has chosen nuclear power.
In Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that
Pakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the
political realities in the area. What does that mean?
Ahmed:
There will be no change in our relationship with you
or with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.
Kissinger:
What is the Chinese mood?
Ahmed:
We hope we can get more support from them. They have
been hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that
you will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.
SECRET (GDS)
SECRET NODIS (GDS)
Page 6
Kissinger:
What is their attitude toward the United States?
Ahmed:
Last night, Chou gave me the impression that it
is about time something happened as a follow-up by
you to the Shanghai Communique. As you know,
they have been very cautious and patient on this issue
but for the first time I detected a bit of impatience.
In the past he has always said he appreciates the
problems of the United States. This time he did not
say that and he hinted that China is impatient. But
they clearly want to continue to have good relations
with you.
Kissinger:
I will get eager on October 17 or 18.
Ahmed:
Will you also visit Pakistan?
Kissinger:
I simply do not have the time although I would love
it. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister
is excited over the visit by President Ford. You know
we never set a date for the visit and whether or not
President Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon
what he does with India. We have a special relationship.
Ahmed:
Can he come in connection with his visit to China?
Kissinger:
This was never planned and I cannot imagine how
anyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are.
Certainly we would never consider going to India or
even to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China.
It has always been seen as a separate trip. The
President may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps
the Philippines. They need to be shored up after
what happened in Indo- China. Is it true that you are.
buying arms from North Vietnam?
Ahmed:
We have made some inquiries but there is nothing
definite. The article in Newsweck saying we are
interested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset
them very much although the leak did not come from us.
We have no details of what they can supply and we have
made no decision but we are checking. It appears that
almost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall
have to see what happens.
SECRET/ (GDS)
SECRET/NODIS (GDS)
Page 7
Kissinger:
I do not know what they have to sell. Some things
in some categories but I do not believe they have
large overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind
of shape it is in.
Ahmed:
We are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam.
Last year we had to empty the reservoir in order
to repair damage to the tunnels. This has been
fixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been
scarred by closing the tunnels and this must be
repaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir
with a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We
had been counting on a good crop this year, especially
for wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have
to wait for another year. Can you help us with more
PL 480 wheat?
Kissinger:
What do we have already planned?
Atherton:
500,, 000 tons in the planning figure. The same as
for India.
Ahmed:
We needed at least one million before learning of the
Tarbela problem. Now we need more.
Kissinger:
We shall review the problem and see what can be done.
Who built the dam with which you are having so much
trouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.
Ahmed:
It was a French, Italian construction with some parti-
cipation by the United States. It is the biggest dam
in the world and they may have taken on more than they
could handle.
Kissinger:
We shall see what we can do with PL 480.
FORD
GERALO
/NODIS (GDS)
2
Sent 3/19/76
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PA
March 18, 1976
Brent:
The Paks and French are within a few
days of making a public announcement
of the conclusion of the arrangements for
the reprocessing deal. It will be even more
difficult to get Bhutto to consider backing
away after that occurs. State therefore requests
urgent action on this package. They would
like to cable the President's letter Friday
or Saturday if possible.
DE E
David Elliott
MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 1625
Joseped a It
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SEGRET
March 18, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
DAVID ELLIOTT D.E.
ROBERT OAKLEY
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Bhutto on
Pakistani Nuclear Issues
HAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him
to forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and
a heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these
facilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one
uranium
natural reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of
these facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent
position eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
We have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and
unless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic
assistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such
pressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point
we should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.
HAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan
with these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch devel-
opments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in
New York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador
Yaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U.S. will not
apply economic or military leverage on this matter.
The proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic
try and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending
that he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/17/03
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
FORD LIDRABY is OTVHED
BY
Wa
, NARA, DATE 3/9/04
you
Gen S:wgh: 18 Mar 76 (retyped)
# 1625 - Tab A - - Page 1
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual
understanding which has traditionally characterized
exchanges between our two Governments. During your
visit to Washington last year, we held very productive
discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on
matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the
openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly
on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear
facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my
Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you share our
fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-
restrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My
Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that
Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts
into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear
activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is considerable
apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread
on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with
the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,
uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical
reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN
General Assembly last September the view of this Government
that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities
under national control would seriously aggravate the problem
of nuclear proliferation.
For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego
acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same
a FORD the LIBRARY
reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious
consideration to the broader implications of this matter for
stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,
#/625
- 3 -
I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. I would not raise
this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be
of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would
let me have your views on the points I have raised.
Sincerely,
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
Retyped page 3:GRF:BS:feg:3/19/76
FORD LIBRARY &
2d
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual
understanding which has traditionally characterized the
exchanges between our two Governments. During your
visit to Washington last year, we held very productive
discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on
matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the
openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly
on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear
facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my
Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you share our
fear over the threat to the general peace posed by un-
restrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My
Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that
Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts
into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear
activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is considerable
apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread
on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with
the development of nuclear explosives specifically, uranium
enrichment heavy water production and chemical reprocessing.
In fact, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly
last September the view of this Government that the further
spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control
would
will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.
For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego
acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same
reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious
consideration to the broader implications of this matter for
stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,
- 3 -
I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this
matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the
utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me
have your views on the points I have raised.
Personal regards,
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
3A
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 19, 1976
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual
understanding which has traditionally characterized
exchanges between our two Governments. During your
visit to Washington last year, we held very productive
discussions and reached broad areas of standing on
matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the
openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly
on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear
facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my
Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you share our
fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-
restrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My
Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that
Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts
into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear
activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is considerable
apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread
on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with
the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,
uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical
reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN
General Assembly last September the view of this Government
that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities
under national control would seriously aggravate the problem
of nuclear proliferation.
DECLASSIFIED
For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC BY Wa MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES stateleview 9/17/03
NARA, DATE 3/9/04
acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same
reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious
consideration to the broader implications of this matter for
stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,
- 2 -
I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a
highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively
to forestall further nuclear proliferation.
My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your
Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear
facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to
perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances
which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful
uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such
perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-
mine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must
be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the
lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining
sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience
of the United States, as well as of all countries with major
nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor
fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program
than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.
I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed
similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline
to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect
of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support
in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad
range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear
that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's
actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship
with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this
country among the public and in the Congress over the years.
However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities
would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode
this support.
With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give
serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire
reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future
nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need
and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are
thoroughly explored.
- 3 -
I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. I would not raise
this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be
of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would
let me have your views on the points I have raised.
Sincerely,
Heald R. Good
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
FORM
4
BENALD
3B
MEMORANDUM
PRESIDENT HAS SEE
ACTION - 1625
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
March 19, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
SUBJECT:
Letter to Bhutto on Pakistani
Nuclear Issues
Secretary Kissinger has requested that you send a letter to Prime
Minister Bhutto concerning Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear
facilities (Tab B).
Consistent with our long-standing efforts to prevent increased national
access to sensitive nuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG,
and Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving national reprocessing
and heavy water facilities for Pakistan. If these projects were to go
forward, they would provide Pakistan with important basic elements
needed for a nuclear explosive program.
Secretary Kissinger direct and forceful intervention on this subject
with Prime Minister B hutto last month was politely but frankly rejected.
We also have other reliable indications of continuing high-level Pakistani
determination to pursue this independent nuclear option. Our concern is
heightened by the obvious lack of economic justification for these projects
and the equally obvious Pakistani concern not to be at the mercy of India.
Although these facilities and their products would be safeguarded, it would
be possible for the GOP to contravene or abrogate any safeguards agree-
ments, a possibility we must take seriously in view of Pakistan's perception
of its critical security situation.
Even if Pakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a potential nuclear
explosives capability could by itself adversely affect South Asian stability.
Future decisions on nuclear issues by other regional states such as Iran
could be affected, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan might
be jeopardized as Congressional and public opinion focus increasingly on
the implications of Pakistan's nuclear activities. This has already been
raised with Secretary Kissinger in Congressional hearings.
FORD
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
&
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES televiow 9/17/03
BY.
lah
GERALD
LIDRARY
, NARA, DATE 3/9/04
SECRET
2
In order to underscore the extent of our concern, Secretary Kissinger
recently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of France and the FRG
reinforcing the demarches already made with their governments (Tab C).
It would be most helpful for you to sign the attached letter (Tab A) to
Prime Minister Bhutto, reinforcing our request for reconsideration
of its present plans.
Bob Hartmann's office has cleared the text of the letter.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto.
SECRET
30
MEMORANDUM
ACTION - 1625
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET
March 18, 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM:
DAVID ELLIOTT
ROBERT OAKLEY
SUBJECT:
Presidential Letter to Bhutto on
Pakistani Nuclear Issues
HAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him
to forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and
a heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these
facilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one
uranium
natural reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of
these facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent
position eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.
We have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and
unless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic
assistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's
acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such
pressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point
we should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.
HAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan
with these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch devel-
opments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in
New York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador
Yaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U.S. will not
apply economic or military leverage on this matter.
The proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic
try and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending
that he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.
SECRET
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
BY. NSC MEMO, Leb 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Aeriew 9/17/03
, NARA, DATE 3/9/04
1625 3D
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
7605327
WASHINGTON
March 16, 1976
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
From:
Henry A. Kissinger HK
Subject:
Further Demarches on Pakistani
Nuclear Issues
Consistent with our long-standing efforts to
prevent increased national access to sensitive
nuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG,
and Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving
national reprocessing and heavy water facilities
for Pakistan. If these projects were to go for-
ward, they would provide Pakistan with important
basic elements needed for a nuclear explosive pro-
gram. We have reliable indications of continuing
high-level Pakistani interest in pursuing this op-
tion, and our concern is heightened by the lack of
economic need for these projects. Although these
facilities and their products would be safeguarded,
it would be possible for the GOP to contravene or
abrogate any safeguards agreements, a possibility
we must take seriously in view of Pakistan's percep-
tion of its critical security situation. Even if
Pakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a
potential nuclear explosives capability could by it-
self adversely affect South Asian stability, future
nuclear decisions by other regional states such as
Iran, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan
in the future as Congressional and public opinion
focuses increasingly on the implications of Pakistan's
nuclear activities.
SECRET/EXDIS
XGDS 3
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
statekriew 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
SECRET/EXDIS
-2-
France and Pakistan appear intent on moving
ahead quickly on the reprocessing plant despite our
previous demarches and my expression of concern to
Prime Minister Bhutto in New York. The FRG is tempor-
arily delaying a decision on the heavy water plant
until France and Pakistan have responded to our
demarches.
In order to underscore the extent of our concern,
I have recently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers
of France and the FRG reinforcing the demarches
already made with their governments (copies attached).
I believe it would be helpful with Pakistan for you
to sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto
underlining our request for reconsideration of its
present plans.
Following my recent communications to the French
and German Foreign Ministers, and my decision to
recommend that you write to Prime Minister Bhutto,
I appeared before the Senate Government Operations
Committee on non-proliferation and nuclear export
questions on March 9th. In response to Committee
questions, I indicated that we were pursuing the is-
sue of the reprocessing facility with the governments
involved.
I anticipate that these additional approaches
will prompt serious review before France, the FRG,
and Pakistan make their final decisions. If these
communications should not lead to cancellation of the
reprocessing transaction, they may at least contrib-
ute to the evolution of French and German nuclear ex-
port policy in more reassuring directions. I would
also hope that these efforts would enhance our ability
to act affirmatively in the future in preserving our
important continuing relationship with Pakistan.
Recommendation:
That you send the attached letter concerning
Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear technol-
ogy to Prime Minister Bhutto.
SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS
-
-3-
Attachments:
1. Suggested letter to Prime Minister Bhutto
2. Letters to Foreign Ministers of France
and FRG
SECRET/EXDIS
3E
SECRET/EXDIS
SUGGESTED LETTER
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship
and mutual understanding which has traditionally
characterized the exchanges between our two Govern-
ments. During your visit to Washington last year, we
held very productive discussions and reached broad
areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest.
I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship
to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to
acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a
matter which is of deep concern to my Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you
share our fear over the threat to the general peace
posed by unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
technology. My Government has welcomed your forth-
Date 3/9/04
right assurances that Pakistan will not divert its
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Department of State
SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS
-2-
civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives
program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will
be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is con-
siderable apprehension in this country and elsewhere
over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear
technology associated with the development of nuclear
explosives--specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy
water production and chemical reprocessing. Indeed,
Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly
last September the view of this Government that the
further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under
national control will seriously aggravate the problem
of nuclear proliferation. This is why we welcomed Korea's
decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocess-
ing plant, and also why I am writing to you to ask
that you give serious consideration to the broader
implications of this matter for stability both in your
region and in the world. At this juncture, I believe
your Government has an opportunity to make a highly
important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively
to forestall further nuclear proliferation.
FORD
?
SECRET/EXDIS
GERALD
SECRET/EXDIS
-3-
My concern is not the reliability of the assur-
ances of your Government. It is that the establish-
ment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national
control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many
quarters that, under circumstances which perhaps can
not even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be
contemplated. Whether justified or not, such percep-
tions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-
mine the mutual confidence and sense of security which
must be created if we are to build a system of inter-
national peaceful nuclear cooperation.
These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's
case by the lack of a persuasive economic justifica-
tion for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For
example, the experience of the United States, as well
as of all countries with major nuclear power programs,
is that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only
economic within a very much larger reactor program
than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable
future.
I know that Secretary Kissinger has already ex-
pressed similar views to you on this matter, but I
want to underline to you my deep personal concern
SECRET/EXDIS
SECRET/EXDIS
-4-
over the possible effect of your actions in this area
on our ability to sustain support in public opinion
here for our close cooperation on a broad range of
issues of interest to both our governments. I fear
that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's
actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friend-
ship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support
in this country among the public and in the Congress
over the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of
these sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse
considerable criticism and could erode this support.
With these considerations in mind, I hope that
you will give serious consideration to not proceeding
with present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy
water facilities until your future nuclear program
is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need
and until other alternatives, such as a multinational
venture, are thoroughly explored.
I believe that I understand the difficulties
that my request to you will present to your Government.
I would not raise this matter with you, however, if
FORD
R
SECRET/EXDIS
BERALD
SECRET/EXDIS
-5-
I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance.
I would be grateful if you would let me have your
views on the points I have raised.
Sincerely,
Gerald R. Ford
FORD
SECRET/EXDIS
&
GERALD
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Jean:
I am writing you on a matter of profound
importance to our efforts to promote stability and
deter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities:
the threat posed to those efforts by increased
national access to sensitive nuclear technology --
particularly chemical reprocessing facilities --
especially in areas of conflict and instability.
I have been heartened by the progress we have
made since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974.
The meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have
succeeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines
for nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very
seriously their provisions for consultation,
restraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encourage-
ment of multinational alternatives to such exports.
We have applauded the active cooperation of France
which has made possible the success of this effort.
I continue to believe, as I noted last September
to the UN General Assembly, that the further spread
under national control of reprocessing facilities
will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear
proliferation. My concern is all the greater in the
case of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear
His Excellency
Jean Sauvagnargues,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the French Republic,
Paris.
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIPIED
GERALD
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state loview 9/17/03
By
tabs
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
weapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed
Korea's decision to forego acquiring a national
reprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated
France's constructive stance which contributed so
much to our efforts. We have made emphatically
clear to the Korean Government that future US
cooperation should not hamper or replace its peace-
ful nuclear cooperation with France.
We are therefore at a juncture where we can
move to consolidate a pattern of restraint in
sensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively
safeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the
nuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are
asking France to join us in an act of leadership to
deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national
reprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is
clear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a
multinational venture in the region.
In this connection, we have asked Pakistan to
consider cancellation of present plans to acquire a
reprocessing plant until its future nuclear program
is sufficiently developed to establish clear need and
until other alternatives have been more thoroughly
explored. I expressed my personal concern about these
plans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in
pointing out that-compared to Korea, Pakistan is
pursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability,
for which it has no economic need but it does have
considerable potential for being used either to counter
India's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions
for not doing so. We must also face the danger of
contravention or abrogation of even the most effective
safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its
national interest.
I believe that I understand the difficulties that
my request may present to your Government. While I would
prefer that France participate with us in persuading
Pakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts
with Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further
actions on this transaction for a reasonable period of
FORD
CONFIDENTIAL
?
GENALD
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
time. I believe that we can make no more enduring
contribution to international stability than a
decisive act to forestall further transfers of
national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in
circumstances where there is a substantiál risk that
they might be used for non-peaceful purposes.
Warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
3
FORD
tie
CONFIDENTIAL
a
GERALD
34
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. Minister:
I know that you are aware of our concern over the
Government of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot
reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant
from the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed
the matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet
received a definitive response. In the meantime, I
wanted to ensure that you understand the importance we
attach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a
decision on this transaction, you take into account not
only the immediate risks which we perceive but some of
the longer-term implications which in my view must be
considered.
In reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned
nuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the
conclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear
proliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a
heavy water production capability are needed to meet
Pakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would,
however, provide important elements in an indigenous
capability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or
not Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I
believe the capability to do so would in itself
contribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia,
with sharply increased danger that other nations will
His Excellency
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.
&
CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
GERALO
State Dept. Guidelines state Deview 9/17/03
labor
, NARA, Date 3/9/DN
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
feel impelled to take countermeasures. In such
circumstances, there would inevitably be a greater
risk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect
could threaten the security of countries both within
and without the area.
I am also concerned that our long-term mutual
objective of developing nuclear power as an alter-
native world energy source may be prejudiced if we
fail to contain the proliferation problem. This has
been an important consideration in pursuing greater
cooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The
recent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an
important role, are an impressive start toward such
cooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly
the growing apprehension in this country about the
dangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view
that unless supplier governments deal adequately and
convincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful
nuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests
as well as our security may be affected.
I am grateful for your Government's recent
decision to defer further action on the proposed heavy
water sale until we have received the reactions of
France and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you
may be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the
French/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent
IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to
allow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in
its own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear
facilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.
For Pakistan, an independent ability to produce
heavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous
fuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to
develop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would
CONFIDENTIAL
3.
GERALO
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
appreciate your personally reviewing this problem
irrespective of what positions other governments
may adopt.
Warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
BERALD
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Jean:
I am writing you on a matter of profound
importance to our efforts to promote stability and
deter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities:
the threat posed to those efforts by increased
national access to sensitive nuclear technology --
particularly chemical reprocessing facilities --
especially in areas of conflict and instability.
I have been heartened by the progress we have
made since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974.
The meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have
succeeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines
for nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very
seriously their provisions for consultation,
restraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encourage-
ment of multinational alternatives to such exports.
We have applauded the active cooperation of France
which has made possible the success of this effort.
I continue to believe, as I noted last September
to the UN General Assembly, that the further spread
under national control of reprocessing facilities
will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear
proliferation. My concern is all the greater in the
case of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear
His Excellency
Jean Sauvagnargues,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the French Republic,
Paris.
&
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state Deview 9/17/03
GERALD
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
weapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed
Korea's decision to forego acquiring a national
reprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated
France's constructive stance which contributed so
much to our efforts. We have made emphatically
clear to the Korean Government that future US
cooperation should not hamper or replace its peace-
ful nuclear cooperation with France.
We are therefore at a juncture where we can
move to consolidate a pattern of restraint in
sensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively
safeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the
nuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are
asking France to join us in an act of leadership to
deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national
reprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is
clear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a
multinational venture in the region.
In this connection, we have asked Pakistan to
consider cancellation of present plans to acquire a
reprocessing plant until its future nuclear program
is sufficiently developed to establish clear need and
until other alternatives have been more thoroughly
explored. I expressed my personal concern about these
plans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in
pointing out that compared to Korea, Pakistan is
pursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability,
for which it has no economic need but it does have
considerable potential for being used either to counter
India's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions
for not doing SO. We must also face the danger of
contravention or abrogation of even the most effective
safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its
national interest.
I believe that I understand the difficulties that
my request may present to your Government. While I would
prefer that France participate with us in persuading
Pakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts
with Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further
actions on this transaction for a reasonable period of
CONFIDENTIAL
&
GERALD
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
time. I believe that we can make no more enduring
contribution to international stability than a
decisive act to forestall further transfers of
national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in
circumstances where there is a substantiál risk that
they might be used for non-peaceful purposes.
Warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
I
CONFIDENTIAL
BERELO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Dear Mr. Minister:
I know that you are aware of our concern over the
Government of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot
reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant
from the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed
the matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet
received a definitive response. In the meantime, I
wanted to ensure that you understand the importance we
attach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a
decision on this transaction, you take into account not
only the immediate risks which we perceive but some of
the longer-term implications which in my view must be
considered.
In reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned
nuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the
conclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear
proliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a
heavy water production capability are needed to meet
Pakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would,
however, provide important elements in an indigenous
capability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or
not Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I
believe the capability to do SO would in itself
contribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia,
with sharply increased danger that other nations will
His Excellency
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.
FORD
&
DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
lake
State Dept. Guidelines state leview 9/17/03
DERALD
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
CONFIDENTIAL
- 2 -
feel impelled to take countermeasures. In such
circumstances, there would inevitably be a greater
risk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect
could threaten the security of countries both within
and without the area.
I am also concerned that our long-term mutual
objective of developing nuclear power as an alter-
native world energy source may be prejudiced if we
fail to contain the proliferation problem. This has
been an important consideration in pursuing greater
cooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The
recent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an
important role, are an impressive start toward such
cooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly
the growing apprehension in this country about the
dangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view
that unless supplier governments deal adequately and
convincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful
nuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests
as well as our security may be affected.
I am grateful for your Government's recent
decision to defer further action on the proposed heavy
water sale until we have received the reactions of
France and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you
may be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the
French/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent
IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to
allow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in
its own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear
facilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.
For Pakistan, an independent ability to produce
heavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous
fuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to
develop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
- 3 -
appreciate your personally reviewing this problem
irrespective of what positions other governments
may adopt.
Warm regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
CONFIDENTIAL
3
LD
33
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual
understanding which has traditionally characterized the
exchanges between our two Governments. During your
visit to Washington last year, we held very productive
discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on
matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the
openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly
on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear
facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my
Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you share our
fear over the threat to the general peace posed by un-
restrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My
Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that
Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts
into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear
activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is considerable
apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread
on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with
the development of nuclear explosives--specifically, uranium
enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing.
In fact, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly
last September the view of this Government that the further
spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control
will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.
For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego
acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same
reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious
consideration to the broader implications of this matter for
stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,
DECLASSIPIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
By
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
- 2 -
I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a
highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively
to forestall further nuclear proliferation.
My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your
Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear
facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to
perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances
which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful
uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such
perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-
mine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must
be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the
lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining
sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience
of the United States, as well as of all countries with major
nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor
fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program
than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.
I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed
similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline
to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect
of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support
in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad
range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear
that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's
actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship
with Pakistan ha/s enjoyed broad popular support in this
country among the public and in the Congress over the years.
However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities
would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode
this support.
With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give
serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire
reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future
nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need
and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are
thoroughly explored.
- 3 -
I, believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this
matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the
utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me
have your views on the points I have raised.
Personal regards,
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
3k
DOC
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LOG NUMBER
MO
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NSC CORLESPONDENCE PROFILE
3
16
3
17
17
7601625
Eliot INITIALACTION o
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REFER TO
FOR:
MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
X
ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
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PROGRAM ANALYSIS
DUE DATE:
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X
3-24
COMMENTS: INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
SUB-SAH/ AFRICA/ UN
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SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS
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DISPATCH
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hand-carried by DR. Elliott 3-20-76 NOTIFY
MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS
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WH SA FP
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SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED
NSC 76-21-
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022
7607747
2211
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
April 14, 1976
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter
to the President
The attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto is in response to the President's letter to him
of March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by
Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the
Secretary's office on April 12.
The Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of
your staff and representatives of ACDA, is consider-
ing options as to possible further steps which might
be taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the
President's letter of March 19.
C. arthmBood
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Letter to the President
FORD
is
SECRET/EXDIS
GDS
GERALO
lab 3/9/04
*)
*
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.
30 March 1976
Dear Mr. President,
I have given the most careful consideration to
your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire
a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was
handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on
March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from
being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the
serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which
permeates your communication.
In this spirit and mindful of the traditional
bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour
and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual
position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching
importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I
recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression
of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,
I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not
fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.
As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily
given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of
our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted
iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.
Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I
must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need
to be borne in mind in this context.
First, neither our nuclear programme nor the
plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision
FORD
DECLASSIFIED
&
B.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
Dept. Guidelines state Review 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
GERALD
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
or a reaction to what others may have done. The programme
is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research
reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace
Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in
1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research
centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a
Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was
completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.
About that time, we also started discussions with France
for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in
principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work
was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the
signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on
the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.
This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral
safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by
its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of
great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements
were approved by consensus and without opposition not only
in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in
Brussels.
Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA
rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent
conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines
recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.
This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment
to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.
I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's
proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after
&
DERALD
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to
inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in
sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of
Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the
small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for
meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used
for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all
our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed
to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe
to satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the
nuclear suppliers.
Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced
examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear
programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral
part. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous
fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent
energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast
tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable
by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process
persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and
operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal
with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the
accelerating energy needs of our increasing population
and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do
not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer
to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation
in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,
it is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale
nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the
4
necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train
GERALD
PRIME MINISTER
-4-
the required manpower.
Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is
thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something
that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.
Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear
programme of our neighbouring country. India, having
already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes
no secret of its intention to carry out a series of
nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation
of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the
additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other
hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium
to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been
discontinued by the United States or that India will be
compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded
Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry
out its nuclear explosion in 1974.
I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other
countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop
unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we
believe that, for world peace and stability in our region,
the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent
it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear
weapons. What is happening at this time is that while
India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',
it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination
and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance
with the United States, being subjected to pressures while
they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year
RALD
military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.
PRIME MINISTER
-5-
I am sure that if the full significance of the
kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect
to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your
Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear
that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for
non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,
one cannot imagine that the United States would wish
Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its
nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the
expectations of its people about their development but
also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of
support from the United States in their legitimate
interests.
I have, of course, given serious thought to your
view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing
facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of
regional facilities promoted. Even before I received
your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit
to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this
matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in
converting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a
regional project. We both will explore the possibility
of inviting one or two other countries in this region to
participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we
are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.
hi
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, DC.
"
RALD
4d
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
March 19, 1976
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual
understanding which has traditionally characterized
exchanges between our two Gover ments. During your
visit to Washington last year, we held very productive
discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on
matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the
openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly
on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear
facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my
Government.
I know from my discussions with you that you share our
fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the un-
restrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My
Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that
Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts
into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear
activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.
You should be aware, however, that there is considerable
apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread
on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with
the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically,
uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical
reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN
General Assembly last September the view of this Government
that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities
under national control would seriously aggravate the problem
of nuclear proliferation.
For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego
acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same
reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious
consideration to the broader implications of this matter for
stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state Review 9/17/03
BY tabs
$ NARA, DATE 3/9/04
- 2 -
I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a
highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively
to forestall further nuclear proliferation.
My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your
Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear
facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to
perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances
which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful
uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such
perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and under-
mine the nutual confidence and sense of security which must
be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful
nuclear cooperation.
These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the
lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining
sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience
of the United States, as well as of all countries with major
nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor
fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program
than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.
I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed
similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline
to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect
of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support
in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad
range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear
that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's
actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship
with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this
country among the public and in the Congress over the years.
However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities
would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode
this support.
With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give
serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire
reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future
nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need
and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are
thoroughly explored.
A
DERALD
- 8 -
- 3 -
1 believe that I under stard the difficulties that my
I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. 1 would not naise NA
this tratter withryou, however, if I did not consider it to be:
oftheratmost importance.com would be grateful if you would
let me have your views on the points I have raised.
Sincerely,
Sincerely,
Health R. Sal
His Excellency
His Excellency notto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tox
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad
LIBRARY FORD & OF
DOC
PRICE
LOG NUMBER
-
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ONDENCE PROFILE
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16
3
7601625
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HYLAND AND
BOX
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DAVIS
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YS
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State sosition OTHER caper we Outher
Vemarkles on Pakisteni Ruchar
Issues
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hes to Son dts Bhutto to
3/29
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Pree
8
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3-19
C
Pres sgd lts to Bhatto
|
Vto blate
head-carried by DR. Elliott 3-20-76 NOTIFY
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PA
4f
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.
30 March 1976
Dear Mr. President,
I have given the most careful consideration to
your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire
a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was
handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on
March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from
being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the
serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which
permeates your communication.
In this spirit and mindful of the traditional
bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour
and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual
position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching
importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I
recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression
of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,
I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not
fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.
As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily
given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of
our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted
iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.
Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I
must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need
to be borne in mind in this context.
First, neither our nuclear programe nor the
plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision
DECLASSIPIED
BO. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
state feview 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
or a reaction to what others may have done. The pro mme
is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research
reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace
Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in
1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research
centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a
Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was
completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.
About that time, we also started discussions with France
for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in
principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work
was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the
signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on
the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.
This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral
safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by
its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of
great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements
were approved by consensus and without opposition not only
in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in
Brussels.
Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA
rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent
conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines
recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.
This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment
FORD
to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.
I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's
proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to
inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in
sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of
Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the
small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for
meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used
for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all
our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed
to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe
to saticfy the additional conditions laid down by the
nuclear suppliers.
Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced
examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear
programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral
part. Pakisten is especially poor in terms of indigenous
fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent
energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast
tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable
by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process
persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and
operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal
with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the
accelerating energy needs of our increasing population
and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do
not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer
to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation
FORD
in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,
&
it 1S essential for us to embark now on a large-scale
nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the
necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train
PRIME MINISTER
-4-
the required manpower.
Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is
thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something
that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.
Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear
programme of our neighbouring country. India, having
already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes
no secret of its intention to carry out a series of
nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation
of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the
additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other
hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium
to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been
discontinued by the United States or that India will be
compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded
Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry
out its nuclear explosion in 1974.
I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other
countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop
unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we
believe that, for world peace and stability in our region,
the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent
it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear
weapons. What is happening at this time is that while
India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',
it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination
and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance
Fond
with the United States, being subjected to pressures while
&
GERALD
they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year
military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.
PRIME MINISTER
-5-
I am sure that if the full significance of the
kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect
to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your
Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear
that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for
non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,
one cannot imagine that the United States would wish
Pakistan to reverse its considered decision shelve its
nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the
expectations of its people about their development but
also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of
support from the United States in their legitimate
interests.
I have, of course, given serious thought to your
view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing
facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of
regional facilities promoted. Even before I received
your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit
to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this
matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in
converting the reprocessing plant in Pakisten into a
regional project. We both will explore the possibility
of inviting one or two other countries in this region to
participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we
are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.
Shoulds
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
FORD
WASHINGTON, DC.
&
GERALD
Dac
RECD
LOG.NUMBER
4g
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
4
14
4
1510
7602211
Oahle INITIAL ACTION o
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
t
S/S 7607747 UNCLAS LOG IN/ OUT J
SCOWCROFT
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
+
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
SUBJECT Ceel lte to koo OTHER for fm Bkutto of TS Rakistas SENSITIVE
re he Inl lte to him of Rae 19 1976
he Los- Pakistani Rulear Issues
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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MID EAST/ NO. AFRICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? AT this time
*
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 1976
599-022
7607747
2211
4h
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
willia
April 14, 1976
SECRET/EXDIS
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter
to the President
The attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister
Bhutto is in response to the President's letter to him
of March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by
Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the
Secretary's office on April 12.
The Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of
your staff and representatives of ACDA, is consider-
ing options as to possible further steps which might
be taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the
President's letter of March 19.
C. arthmBood
1
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
Letter to the President
be
SECRET/EXDIS
GERALD
GDS
h 3/9/04
PRIME MINISTER
Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.
30 March 1976
Dear Mr. President,
I have given the most careful consideration to
your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire
a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was
handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on
March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from
being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the
serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which
permeates your communication.
In this spirit and mindful of the traditional
bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour
and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual
position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching
importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I
recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression
of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region,
I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not
fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.
As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily
given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of
our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted
iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities.
Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I
must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need
to be borne in mind in this context.
First, neither our nuclear programme nor the
plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision
DECLASSIFIED
FORD
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines Stateleview 9/17/03
, NARA, Date 3/9/04
PRIME MINISTER
-2-
or a reaction to what others may have done. The programme
is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research
reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace
Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in
1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research
centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a
Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was
completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi.
About that time, we also started discussions with France
for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in
principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work
was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the
signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on
the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility.
This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral
safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by
its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of
great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements
were approved by consensus and without opposition not only
in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in
Brussels.
Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA
rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent
conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines
recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries.
This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment
to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes.
I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's
proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after
FORD
&
BERALD
PRIME MINISTER
-3-
exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to
inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in
sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of
Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the
small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for
meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used
for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all
our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed
to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe
to satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the
nuclear suppliers.
Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced
examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear
programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral
part. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous
fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent
energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast
tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable
by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process
persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and
operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal
with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the
accelerating energy needs of our increasing population
and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do
not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer
to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation
in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary,
it is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale
nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the
FORD
&
necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train
GERALD
PRIME MINISTER
-4-
the required manpower.
Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is
thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something
that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable.
Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear
programme of our neighbouring country. India, having
already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes
no secret of its intention to carry out a series of
nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation
of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the
additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other
hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium
to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been
discontinued by the United States or that India will be
compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded
Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry
out its nuclear explosion in 1974.
I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other
countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop
unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we
believe that, for world peace and stability in our region,
the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent
it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear
weapons. What is happening at this time is that while
India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli',
it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination
and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance
FORD
with the United States, being subjected to pressures while
&
they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year
military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.
PRIME MINISTER
-5-
I am sure that if the full significance of the
kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect
to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your
Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear
that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for
non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled,
one cannot imagine that the United States would wish
Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its
nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the
expectations of its people about their development but
also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of
support from the United States in their legitimate
interests.
I have, of course, given serious thought to your
view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing
facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of
regional facilities promoted. Even before I received
your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit
to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this
matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in
converting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a
regional project. We both will explore the possibility
of inviting one or two other countries in this region to
participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we
are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.
Shoulds
Jusilin Ali Bhutto
hi
His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
is
WASHINGTON, DC.
BRALD
DOC
RECD
LOG NUMBER
4:3
MO
DA
MO
DA
HR
NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE
4
14
4
1510
7602211
TO: PRES
FROM: SECSTATE
S/S 7607747
Oakley
+
SCOWCROFT
SECDEF
LOU
NO FORN
NODIS
HYLAND
DCI
X REF
C
EYES ONLY
EXDIS
DAVIS
STATE EXSEC
S
CODEWORD
SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
SUBJECT: Ceel lte to Rx OTHER for Sm Bkutto of TS Fakister SENSITIVE
the 205- Pakistani Rulear Issues
re he Inl lte to him of Mar L9 1976
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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JOINT MEMO
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FOR:
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X
ANY ACTION NECESSARY? AT this time
#
NSC PLANNING
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DUE DATE:
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X
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SUB-SAH/ AFRICA / UN
Logged per Oakley's instructions
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1-11-77
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NSC 76-21
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE - 599-022 - 1976
599-022