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DECLASSIFIED
3.
THINK
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or 75 (E)
"NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND
Dept. of State letter, 13.33.1973
RECORDS
2
.
SERVICE"
SECRET
Ba NLT. HL NARS Date 4-28-66-4-
international obligations. He asked how we could bring our own atti- -
tude to the attention of the Chinese people. I thought that this might
be done both through the Voice of America and by printed material
which could be circulated. He doubted whether such material could
be effectively circulated. His general attitude seemed to be that
since recognition was doubtless inevitable, there was little purpose
in postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers.
Kashmir
I asked the Prime Minister to talk to me fully and frankly on
this subject so that I might have a real understanding of his point
of view. He gave a long history of the dispute, the upshot of which
was that Kashmir had been invaded by tribesmen through Pakistan
and he thought with their consent and assistance, and later by
Pakistan troops operating through the thin disguise of being on
leave and subsequently, he believed, in regular formation. Paki-
stan for a long time had denied any such action and only recently
had admitted it. He spoke bitterly of Pakistan deception and in-
trigue. Indian troops had entered Pakistan only upon the invita-
tion and request of the Government after the invasion had taken
place and only just in time to prevent the complete occupation of
the country. Subsequent military occupation had driven back the in-
vaders although they still occupied part of the country, and several
hundred thousand refugees had either abandoned their homes or had
been driven out.
He then spoke of the fact that there was in this whole matter a
very profound ideological issue. Pakistan wished to create a re-
ligious state and wished Kashmir to be a part of their nation be-
cause the inhabitants were largely Moslems. This he thought struck
at the very basis of stability in the Indian sub-continent. The Indian
idea was one of a secular state, in which religion had nothing to do
with the participation of the citizen in government. India had in
high office many Moslems. There were some thirty-five million
Moslems in India. To establish now a religious basis for adherence
of provinces would have a profoundly unsettling effect upon all the
Moslems in India, and upon the Hindus in Pakistan. A plebiscite
campaign based on these principles would be inflammatory and
disastrous throughout the sub-continent.
One of his basic ideas seemed to be that preliminary to any
SECRET
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"ocrText": "DECLASSIFIED\n3.\nTHINK\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or 75 (E)\n\"NATIONAL\nARCHIVES AND\nDept. of State letter, 13.33.1973\nRECORDS\n2\n.\nSERVICE\"\nSECRET\nBa NLT. HL NARS Date 4-28-66-4-\ninternational obligations. He asked how we could bring our own atti- -\ntude to the attention of the Chinese people. I thought that this might\nbe done both through the Voice of America and by printed material\nwhich could be circulated. He doubted whether such material could\nbe effectively circulated. His general attitude seemed to be that\nsince recognition was doubtless inevitable, there was little purpose\nin postponing it by diplomatic maneuvers.\nKashmir\nI asked the Prime Minister to talk to me fully and frankly on\nthis subject so that I might have a real understanding of his point\nof view. He gave a long history of the dispute, the upshot of which\nwas that Kashmir had been invaded by tribesmen through Pakistan\nand he thought with their consent and assistance, and later by\nPakistan troops operating through the thin disguise of being on\nleave and subsequently, he believed, in regular formation. Paki-\nstan for a long time had denied any such action and only recently\nhad admitted it. He spoke bitterly of Pakistan deception and in-\ntrigue. Indian troops had entered Pakistan only upon the invita-\ntion and request of the Government after the invasion had taken\nplace and only just in time to prevent the complete occupation of\nthe country. Subsequent military occupation had driven back the in-\nvaders although they still occupied part of the country, and several\nhundred thousand refugees had either abandoned their homes or had\nbeen driven out.\nHe then spoke of the fact that there was in this whole matter a\nvery profound ideological issue. Pakistan wished to create a re-\nligious state and wished Kashmir to be a part of their nation be-\ncause the inhabitants were largely Moslems. This he thought struck\nat the very basis of stability in the Indian sub-continent. The Indian\nidea was one of a secular state, in which religion had nothing to do\nwith the participation of the citizen in government. India had in\nhigh office many Moslems. There were some thirty-five million\nMoslems in India. To establish now a religious basis for adherence\nof provinces would have a profoundly unsettling effect upon all the\nMoslems in India, and upon the Hindus in Pakistan. A plebiscite\ncampaign based on these principles would be inflammatory and\ndisastrous throughout the sub-continent.\nOne of his basic ideas seemed to be that preliminary to any\nSECRET"
}