Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Admiral Sidney Souers

DECLASSIFIED top OLCHE1 1. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E) Dept. of State letter, E.R.D.A. CTR. 1-29-76 23 Bx HC NARS Date 6.1-76 NLT. 570 MEMBRANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION PARTICIPANTS: Admiral Souers = ARCHIVES SERVICE** "NATIONAL RECORDA AND JUNE Secretary Acheson DATE: January 19, 1950 Admiral Souers called me today to say that the President mentioned the publicity on the hydrogen bomb and said that he had a report from Sec. Johnson which to him made a lot of sense and he was inclined to think that was what we should do. The President had given Admiral Souers two copies of the memorandum and asked that one be given to me and one to Mr. Lilienthal. The report actually was from General Bradley to Secre- tary Johnson. Admiral Souers said he thought someone was playing on the unilateral side, but he would get it back into the NSC machinery and he did not think it was too far afield. He thought the State Department people had seen it, but I said I was sure I had not had it. I said I had been talking with Paul Nitze this after- noon and asked him to talk with Admiral Souers about a paper we have been working on here. I pointed out to the Admiral that before I committed myself to any position on the matter I had wanted to see all the people Lilienthal wanted me to see. I had done that and thought the next thing was to have a meeting with Admiral Souers, Secretary Johnson, Mr. Lilienthal and any people they wanted to bring. I said I had about reached the position that we should advise the President to go ahead and find out about the feasibility of the matter. But that we should be quite honest and say that in advising this action, we are going quite a long way to committing ourselves to continue down that road. However, after considering drawbacks and advantages, adding and subtracting, that seemed to me the position we should take. I expressed the hope that at the proposed discussion with him, Johnson, Lilienthal, etc., the discussion should be on the broad question and not an editing of a paper. Everyone should be given a chance to say all he wanted to say. Then the paper should be thrown into the working group under NSC for editing, etc. We could then have one more meeting and report to the President. Admiral Souers seemed to agree with this suggested procedure, except that he thought Jimmy Lay should be tied in with it. FOP SECONT