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183391522
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Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Livingston Merchant, and L. K. Little, Inspector General of Customs for the Republic of China
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183391522
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document
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Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Livingston Merchant, and L. K. Little, Inspector General of Customs for the Republic of China
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Dean Acheson Papers
Secretary of State Files
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17
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1950-02-17
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2
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1950
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cf909967baf4c89c
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1949
5/5
niss
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
antionson
62
Memorandum of Conversation
DATE:
2/17/50
ARCHIVES 'NATIONAL SERVICE* RECORDS AND
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
The Secretary
Mr. L. K. Little, Inspector General of Customs
for the Republic of China
Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Acting Assistant
Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
COPIES TO:
S/S
S/P
FE
CA
1-1493
I talked with Mr. Little for about a half an hour this after-
noon, at the outset of which I asked him, out of his experience
of more than thirty years in China, how he accounted for the
collapse of the National Government. Mr. Little replied without
hesitation that it was a combination of incompetence and corruption,
accentuated by the strain of long years of war. We then turned to
a discussion of Formosa and I solicited Mr. Little's views on this
problem.
Mr. Little expressed the strong conviction that we should
either disassociate ourselves completely from the National Govern-
ment on Formosa or, preferably, we should encourage and if neces-
sary promote a separatist novement which would bring into being
an independent Formosa which we could then recognize and overtly
support. Mr. Little expressed his opinion that we were making
the worst of both possible courses by continuing to support Chiang
Kai-shek, diplomatically and economically. We discussed all phases
of the problem at some length and I pointed out certain of the
difficulties encountered in our search for a solution which took
into account the interests of the Formosan people as well as our
own.
FE : LTMerchant mw
2/27/50