Images (12)
Document
| id |
id
183391916
|
|---|---|
| contentType |
contentType
document
|
| source |
source
import
|
Source image fields (6)
Extracted text
OCR Page 1 of 12STANDARD FORM NO. 64
co
1056
Office Memorandum
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
the
TO
: R.G. Barnes
DATE: 6/5/50
the
**NATIONAL
ARCHIVES AND
RECORDE
FROM : R. Love
BERVICE*
a
SUBJECT: Summary of the main points concerning the relationship between US
and USSR brought out by Secretary Acheson in his public announcements
since Feb. 8, 1950.
I
In his speech on Feb. to and again on Feb. 16 Sec. Acheson clarified
the policy the U.S. would take in its relations with the Soviet Union.
The basis of what Mr. Acheson said was that agreements reached with the
Soviet government are useless unless they register facts or the existence
of a situation. The Berlin crisis was used as an illustration of this
point: there the Russians violated previous agreements with regard to our
rights in Berlin until the Western powers took a strong stand through the
airlift and it was then no longer advantageous to the Russians to be uncoop-
erative.
This policy is further explained in centences from his two speeches:
It has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend
the area of possible agreement, that is, to create strength instead
of the weakness which exists in many quarters.
Where these areas of weakness exist they form an irresistible temp-
tation to the Soviet government to expand into these areas and no
workable agreements can be framed with regard to these areas.
The arms program and ERP are illustrations of the way in which we are
trying to extend the area of possible agreement with the Soviet
Union by creating situations so strong that they can be recognized
and out of them can grow agreement.
When we have eliminated all of these areas of weakness ve will be
able to evolve working agreements with the Russians.
II - Discussions with USSR
Sec. Acheson made clear our position on possible conferences with
USSR in his talk of Feb. 16, in which he stated that no good would come
from our taking the initiative in calling for conversations at this point,
that public hopes would only be raised in vain, that results could only be
achieved by dangerous concessions on our part, in which the Russians alone
would benefit. However, he added that we were always ready to discuss with
them any outstanding issue.
In his r ecent talk at Harvard Sec. Acheson stressed the same point,
"Until the Soviet leaders do genuinely accept a 'live and let live' philoso-
phy, then no approach from the free world, however imaginative, and no
Relations
belongs_to
belongs_to