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TOP SECRET
-2-
dropped a few bombs on one field and damaged six of our planes.
THE PRESIDENT asked whether we had any defense against such air
attacks.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said not without bombing their airfields or with-
out pulling back some of our planes to Japan to get them out of danger.
GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the meeting this morning of their Policy
Committee which was attended by Dean Rusk and Averell Harrimano He had
asked each of the three secretaries and the JCS to state their individual
views. He had then asked the three secretaries and the JCS separately
to formulate their views. He read a memorandum prepared by the three
secretaries. This memorandum proceeds on the following assumptions. We
are engaged with other members of the UN in suppressing a Korean aggression.
We are now faced by a new Chinese aggression. We should act through the UN
and not individually. It is possible to hold a line. While the Chinese
Communist action is dictated in large measure by the Politburo we should not
publicly hold the USSR responsible nowo Our purposes are to fulfill our
UN obligations but not to become individually or as a member of the UN
involved in general war in China with the Chinese Communists. To do this
would be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trape We should use all
available political, economic and psychological action to limit the ware
Strong military support is needed for the localized action. We should
not go into Chinese Communist territory and we should not use Chinese
Nationalist forces. To do either of these things would increase the danger
of war with the Chinese Communists. We need a more rapid build-up in the
West. We should increase the number of UN troops, other than US and have
them available in Korea regardless of whether we have to pay for them.
We should press for the second supplemental 1951 appropriation at once
and give Congress notice we will need more. The 1952 budget should be
revisedo We should accelerate instead of decelerate, accelerating production
and production facilities as a matter of special emphasis.
GENERAL MARSHALL made comments on this paper as follows: There should
be no cuts in the estimates of personnel and materiel needede In the next
two weeks we should work in the UN and maintain our position in Korea.
We should not now try to change our budgetary figures. We should find
a way to go along with the UN approach without involving injury to our
troops. A very difficult question is the danger of Chinese aerial
bombardment to which eur troops are not accustomedo This would pose a
most difficult question. The question on how to line up our allies in the
UN is for the State Department. He stressed once more the view of the
three secretaries that we should not get into "war with the Chinese
Communists. He suggested that the general attitude in the UN would
probably not complicate our decision in that respect.
DECLASSIFIED
GENERAL
E. O. 11612, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, 3-10-37
By NLT- He NARS Date 3-27-77
Top SECRET
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-2-\ndropped a few bombs on one field and damaged six of our planes.\nTHE PRESIDENT asked whether we had any defense against such air\nattacks.\nGENERAL VANDENBERG said not without bombing their airfields or with-\nout pulling back some of our planes to Japan to get them out of danger.\nGENERAL MARSHALL referred to the meeting this morning of their Policy\nCommittee which was attended by Dean Rusk and Averell Harrimano He had\nasked each of the three secretaries and the JCS to state their individual\nviews. He had then asked the three secretaries and the JCS separately\nto formulate their views. He read a memorandum prepared by the three\nsecretaries. This memorandum proceeds on the following assumptions. We\nare engaged with other members of the UN in suppressing a Korean aggression.\nWe are now faced by a new Chinese aggression. We should act through the UN\nand not individually. It is possible to hold a line. While the Chinese\nCommunist action is dictated in large measure by the Politburo we should not\npublicly hold the USSR responsible nowo Our purposes are to fulfill our\nUN obligations but not to become individually or as a member of the UN\ninvolved in general war in China with the Chinese Communists. To do this\nwould be to fall into a carefully laid Russian trape We should use all\navailable political, economic and psychological action to limit the ware\nStrong military support is needed for the localized action. We should\nnot go into Chinese Communist territory and we should not use Chinese\nNationalist forces. To do either of these things would increase the danger\nof war with the Chinese Communists. We need a more rapid build-up in the\nWest. We should increase the number of UN troops, other than US and have\nthem available in Korea regardless of whether we have to pay for them.\nWe should press for the second supplemental 1951 appropriation at once\nand give Congress notice we will need more. The 1952 budget should be\nrevisedo We should accelerate instead of decelerate, accelerating production\nand production facilities as a matter of special emphasis.\nGENERAL MARSHALL made comments on this paper as follows: There should\nbe no cuts in the estimates of personnel and materiel needede In the next\ntwo weeks we should work in the UN and maintain our position in Korea.\nWe should not now try to change our budgetary figures. We should find\na way to go along with the UN approach without involving injury to our\ntroops. A very difficult question is the danger of Chinese aerial\nbombardment to which eur troops are not accustomedo This would pose a\nmost difficult question. The question on how to line up our allies in the\nUN is for the State Department. He stressed once more the view of the\nthree secretaries that we should not get into \"war with the Chinese\nCommunists. He suggested that the general attitude in the UN would\nprobably not complicate our decision in that respect.\nDECLASSIFIED\nGENERAL\nE. O. 11612, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nDept. of State letter, 3-10-37\nBy NLT- He NARS Date 3-27-77\nTop SECRET"
}