Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Ambassador of Great Britain Sir Oliver Franks, H. Freeman Matthews, and George McGhee

millic S/S DEPARTMENT OF STATE / 80 79 Memorandum of Conversation DATE: July 7, 1951 SUBJECT: Iranian Oil Crisis DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 PARTICIPANTS: Ra Sale NLT Depi. 14-16 Guidelines Merch 6, 1982 The Secretary of State By DEB Mr. Freeman Matthews - G NT D-D 12-10-87 Mr. George C. McGhee - NEA Sir Oliver Franks - Britäsh Ambassador COPIES TO: s/s G DECLASSIFIED EUR E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 GTI State project Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 NLT Amembassy, London (only) By DEB 84-16 NLT, Date 12-10-87 1-1493 The British Ambassador called, at his request, and presented the attached memorandum from Mr. Morrison dated July 7, 1951, which was in response to con- versations between myself and the British Ambassador on the 4th of July relative to the President's proposal to send out a personal representative to Iran to discuss the oil question. After reading the memorandum I advised that I felt the U.S. Government could and should support the recommendation of the International Court of Justice as requested by Mr. Morrison. I did, however, feel that it might still be desirable for the President to send out a personal representative whose going might be linked to the findings of the Court and who might facilitate a working out of a modus vivendi either in the way prescribed by the Court or in some variation of the Court recommendation which might be acceptable to both governments. I then sketched out some of my thoughts in this matter (which were subsequently incorporated in the President's reply to Dr. Mosadeg) for the benefit of the Ambassador. The British Ambassador stated that he was sure that London would appreciate United States support of the ICJ recommendation and might not oppose the Presi- dent's sending out a representative if linked to the Court's decision in the way that I had suggested. He stated, however, that he would like to go back to London on this point and hoped to advise me by noon the day following as to London's reaction. (The British Ambassador did, on the day following, advise the Secretary that London acquiesced in the proposed reply by the President to Prime Minister Mosadeg's message, even though it was indicated that Mr. Morrison still had the same reservations with respect to the President sending out a personal representative.) TOR